on issues of spending, and each of you are going to be struggling with some very tough budgets. washington is going to be in very tough budget circumstance is, and many of you were a lot did on the basis that we have got to get control of spending because you care about the next generation. ..

now, i will confess that they are going to be times where we do believe that having basic national standard are going to be important. there are certain things that we as a country, we as a people if they are to do we need to maintain some consistency across the state. but for the most part, is there going to be -- if there is going to be experimentation, his states are going to continue to be laboratories for democracy, that is something we welcome and embrace. and so, if you have ideas about any of the issues that my cabinet members who are here are responsible for, i guarantee you will get a serious response from them in terms of how we can work together. so to sum up my initial remarks,

i overheard joe say that he will always take your call. i promise you, he will be calling you. and a certain point, you may say its fine again. but i think the same is going to be true for valley charity who heads up the governmental affairs. and if he will be true for various cabinet officials. they want to hear from you. and the one thing i would urge is don't wait until you really meant about something before you call us. we prefer not to read about it in the press. we'd rather you call us ahead of time and say you know what, we think this isn't working. we think this is a better way of doing things and will work with you. and if we don't agree with you, we will spell out in great detail what we don't agree with you. and it's not going to based on ideology, not going to be based on partisanship.

will be based on our best judgment about how we move forward with the policy objectives that we all share. if we end up disagreeing on something, i promise you we will not be disagreeable about it. and we will keep on working until hopefully we can figure out a way to solve problems. in the end, i think that's what this most recent election is all about. you know, people are frustrated, understandably with an economy that has stalled and is not doing as well as it should for american families. and that was true not just during this crisis, but it was true for the decade before this crisis. and i think what the american people are expecting from all of us is that, not that we suddenly put aside politics, not that we put aside principles because everybody here has driven off at times is very strongly held principles about what america should be and how we can move forward, but that at a certain point we also consider ourselves

with governing and delivering for them. and no group of people who are more consistently furies in that direction than governors because ultimately the buck stops with you in your state, just as the buck stops with the international level. and so, i look forward to working with you and i look forward to seeing you again fairly soon. we usually host a governors -- early in the year and that will have a way to meet your spouses in years to get dressed up and look really good. all right? okay. what that will clear the president of the rooms while these folks can tell me what they really think about me. [laughter]

>> so that democratic members can attend a caucus meeting on their approach to legislation. a lot of talk on the senate floor on extending bush era tax cuts in the house approved measure that extends tax cut for families earning less than $250,000. while we wait for the senate to return, republican senators mike crapo and tom coburn announced they will vote in favor of the report released wednesday by the national commission on fiscal responsibility and reform. the plan cuts the deficit by only 4 trillion over the coming decade. fourteen of the 18 commission members need to vote in favor of the report for it to be officially endorsed by the

group. >> everybody ready? already. tom and i have put out a statement, which i think you all should have now and we are both going to make brief remarks. the purpose for being here is to announce that we are going to support the commission report and encourage its adoption by congress. as we state and our announcement, our debt crisis is a threat not just our way of life, but to our national survival. and the threat that we face is so real and so close that we do not have further time for gridlock or inaction. it is necessary that we take

strong aggressive action now. in the near future if we take no action, we can see a collapse in the dollar, hyperinflation are there consequences that would force congress in this country to incur consequences and to take actions that are former serious and far more painful than anything in this proposal. as painful as some of the provisions of this proposal are. how want to talk for just a moment about what her current circumstances. we agree at the beginning of the jubilation of our commission to use cbo numbers. if you do that, you know that the data for nation has risen from 32% of our gdp, just about eight or nine years ago, to 62% today. and the alarming thing is that if we continue on our current policies, but that that will begin to skyrocket. it is projected if we do not change our course to hit approximately 90% in 2020 and

grow as high as 180% by 2035. it probably will never hit that because if we don't take decisive action, then the economy will and we will see the kinds of force consequences that will change those dynamics in very, very painful, difficult and damaging ways to every american. the reason that we're supporting this plan is because although it is not everything we wanted and although it contains things that frankly are painful to us and raise heart earn, it does take us dramatically down the path and in the right directions toward addressing these issues. first and foremost, and dresses standing issue. under the proposal, there will be definite hard caps on spending put into place. and to quickly summarize, it will result in us returning to

2008 spending levels by 2013 and reaching a balance in our budget by 2035. but if you look at those that numbers, it will stop after the wreck that i just talked about and actually by 2035 return our ratios down to 41% of gdp, still not adequate or necessary, but far different and far better than what we would see if we take no action. and i think equally as important and one of the most beneficial parts of this plan in my opinion is that it doesn't only focus on tax policy, but it also focuses on revenue policy and does so in a way that does not continue our debate in congress and in this country over whether we should raise tax rates are reduced tax rates, but instead engages us in tax reform. if we are going to strengthen our nation and preserve the american dream for people, we need to have a strong, robust

economy. yet if you look at our current tax code, i'm not sure you could construct one that is more complex, more unfair, mark crossley to comply with. and frankly is anticompetitive to her own business at tax code. and we expect that the reforms are proposed in this plan, which are some of the most dramatic and extensive reforms that i've seen in my lifetime to changing our tax code, will help us to move to a more fair, less complex, a less costly and a more competitive tax code that will generate a stronger, more robust and more dynamic economy. and one of the other beneficial parts of this is that in using the cbo numbers, we have not project did the dynamic impact of that kind of tax reform, revenue. in other words, if there is a dynamic impact, and were both confident they will be, that

additional revenue as a result of a stronger economy is locked in by this plan to be utilized for either further rate reduction for further debt reduction and is barred from being utilized to justify additional spending relief. it's these kinds of majors, among many others, that caused me to be ready to support this plan. i guess that at the outset, there is much in this plan with which i have problem. but there is a necessity that we move forward. and this plan will get us on the way. as we bring this plan before congress, i'm sure there will be need to adjust and to add to it. there are significant things missing from the plan that needs to be included. but as we debate about whether to add or adjust to this proposal, we must get carded. zero and as i started by saying that the time for divisiveness for gridlock and delay has

ended. we must take decisive action now. thank you. >> the best quote i've heard so far about this plan is the only thing worse than being for it is being against it from kent conrad. and i think it's really accurate. it says a whole lot. i'm not typically a warrior, but i can tell you right now, i'm significantly worried about our short-term future, not on long-term future. i think we are in a precarious balance. i think were a day of reckoning. and it doesn't matter what your political party is or which are philosophical event is. this is a starting point and not holidays. it's a starting point. more will have to be done. there will not be one american that is not called off to sacrifice if we are to get out of the hole that wherein.

at the time for action is now. the threat is real. it's urgent. we cannot wait for another election. we cannot wait until we get more of what we want. there's more in this plan that he disliked than i like, but the urgency requires me to put aside anything other than my constitutional obligation to try and get the federal government reined in to the brown to size and intense that it was originated upon. this bill does not touch spending near enough. we've documented to the press multiple times over $350 billion a year in wasteful spending, lucrative spending, fraud. we didn't get their. we need to get more. the tax rates are flat enough. they need to be flatter. if we really want a robust economy and use both growth and common sense to get out of the problems that were in.

the challenge is a matter of national survival. that does not understate the case. if you look at history, no republic has survived as long as we have. and they have all failed. in a ball field for for the same reason. they lost control of their fiscal policies long before they ever were conquered. we see it today in our weakness and in our foreign policy. we see today in our weakness to finance our way and get out of the tremendous recession that we've been in. all those are having detrimental impact on not only our kids and grandkids, but us as well. the good news is there is not a problem in front of us that we cannot both. the problem is, will we take off our particular have a work in the best interest of america to cure the real problems at als.

we'll take your questions. >> senators, what is a need to support his apparel contract also going to be spending my fix in congress? i thought the whole idea with a package? >> you pass this package, then you do more. this package does not solve our problem. it only cuts 4 trillion. we need to cut 10. and we need to grow the economy. and flattening the rates further, lessening the duplicative programs. you know, the real essence in terms of looking at america individual initiative and self-reliance has been replaced in all too many instances by dependent the reliance upon government. and the thing that built the country was that self-reliance and individual initiative and individual responsibility.

and we have to get back to that to succeed. >> when you decide to what tom said to make an exclamation point on it. this plan is a package and it does, the package. but it is not the end. it is the beginning of the significant steps that we must take. and i believe every member of the commission recognizes that additional steps will be needed. and tom and i are already committed on a number of those we believe are necessary to continue advocating for them. >> senator coburn, what do you say to the anti-tax zealots in your party to a party, with an predict both statements and seem to be driving a lot of the pen over cross? >> the first thing i would say is our obligation is to the country as a whole, not to any special interest group. number two is i don't think we break that pledge at all with this bill at all.

it may, in a cursory look at the letter we do, but if you look at where about 92% tax reduction versus tax increase. if you score that dynamically, we'll get more tax reduction many of tax increase. the leno believe were in there. and if we're in there, so was ronald reagan because this tax plan is reagan on steroids that was passed in 1986. >> just two quick additions to that. do you always, in every aspect of this plan, you have to look at what is coming if you do not take action. if we do not take action, the tax increases of this congress will face and probably have to pass are far greater than any kind of arguable tax increase on this bill. and secondly, we have put provisions in here, as i mentioned earlier, that if there is a dynamic impact on the economy, which were confident

there will be, and a strong one, but the revenue generated from that is to be used for further reproduction and for further debt reduction, which will address those issues. and i fully agree with tom that this is not breaking a pledge in any way. >> just to make sure everybody understands, this is the starting point. if we pass this bill tomorrow, it doesn't get us out of the woods. everybody needs to understand that. he does not get us out of the woods. there many more difficult choices that this country is going have to make. we're going to have to do something with medicare. impossible. the health care -- one of the objections to this plan as it doesn't address the health care costs. and because there's a political reason why can't because we just had a bill passed that nobody was going to go for on the other side. but the fact is we are going to have to come back. they were going to have to have something like pawprints roadmap for something else innovative if

we are to achieve any semblance of stability financially in this country. so this is the beginning. this is the start. it's not the end. >> you talk about the provisions in the plan that you think might be the most politically difficult for members to accept? >> now, i probably can't. you know, it's not a day for politics. we don't have that luxury anymore. america needs to understand. there's not a luxury for politics anymore. it is time for us to get our act together. we are really at war. we are on three fronts tonight now. iraq, afghanistan and the financial tsunami that is facing us. and we need to bind together, without a hat, philosophy, and they what do we do to fix our country? and i said in my opening statement, it's going to come a lot quicker than anybody in this room themes. all you have to do is watch would've happened in europe and were not far away.

>> you mentioned, mr. ryan, this morning he's indicated he's going to vote against specifically for those concerned. any reaction to the? >> you know, he's an independent member of the commission and he votes the way he wants. i believe will have to address that anyway. and i believe this is the first step. i will tell you, we have to start somewhere. and it can't be on my way. i would've written a totally different plan. i would've eliminated the income tax completely and leaped onto a national sales tax. it would be medicare tax or a social security tax. we wouldn't have done this at all. i can't have my way. but our country deserves us to sacrifice, like the car we're going to make to everybody else to sacrifice, to accomplish what we have to accomplish. and that is to get out of this hole. >> senator, have you talked to senator mcconnell about this or postal or any other republican senators?

>> i certainly have. i checked to senator crapo in several other senators. >> what is the topic quite >> i'm not good at predicting how things will pass. i'm good at predicting things they want. [laughter] >> i was in response to back him or talk to most of the members of our conference. and of the other conferences welcomed the democratic conference, many of them. i would be at this point, other than members of the commission, were starting to no express their position on the report, most of the other members of both caucuses are reserving judgment. and my initial observations are that just like every other member of the commission, they are seen pain and they are seeing gagne and the proposal. let me ask you a question. most of you know me. what would cause mean to move from multiple principled positions over the last six years to accomplish what we need

to accomplish? to think i'm fearful of what's getting ready to happen to us? i am scared to death at the potential that could unwind this country, far greater than anything we've ever seen before and far sooner than anybody imagined. and we have to send a signal to the international financial community. look at great britain. they came in, put in an austerity budget. what has happened to the growth? they're starting to do this already. austerity works. and so were going to drive more austerity. i can promise you over the next six years i'm going to drag austerity like crazy because our kids and grandkids or work there. >> can you tell me about the process when president obama put out this position -- i think a lot of people were surprised with the support. he spent a lot of time for candid details about. can you tell us they do to this point? >> yet, let me take a stab at

that first. at the outset, it was very dubious light many, many people the country were. and i have to give credit to the six-month congressional nominee members of the commission who came in mma nonpartisan way, dressed this issue in half the members of the commission who are from the senate or the house achieves that bipartisan approach. now the members of the commission and from the congress were also hopeful that we could do this. but having not 6% of members who were not voting members of congress, in my opinion, actually helped significantly to move us in the direction of discussion that could get us here. one of the early things i think that happened was, as you'll recall at the outset there was a concern that this commission might be a vehicle to create another taxing and gin on top of the income tax in this country. and one of the early things that i think we were hoped to achieve their, was an understanding that that would not be helpful to solving this problem and that in

fact a major reform an overhaul of our tax policy, to help us become more competitive globally would be the better step for the commission to take. and it's those kinds of developments in deliberations that i believe help is then to move to this point. >> and miles would say, i think the members of the commission understands the severity of what we face a. and failing to recognize the -- at the congress doesn't recognize that in this next year, no matter whether it's this plan or some other plan, if we don't act, we have shorten the timeline under which we will have an opportunity at number one and the consequences will grow daily, that we will all suffer as americans if we don't. >> in terms of looking ahead,

[inaudible] said the white house said yesterday they look and possibly to evaluate proposals for their budget submission. wright mentioned he saw something there worth caulking umpiring for next year. what do you guys see as the core, mincer principles that if this plan doesn't get sent to congress next year, it should be carried into the framework for next year? >> first of all, i'm hopeful that we do get to 14. and i don't think it's out of the question yet. we don't get to 14, nothing stops us as a country whether it be through presidential initiative or congressional initiative from considering all the provisions and proposals in this plan or pieces of the plan. i'm actually confident that will happen in one way or another. i am hopeful that we can create a very strong dynamic but as tom says, will cause congress to act. because for the very reason that he said, i agree, we do not have time to delay. in addition now, i believe that the core elements that we must

focus on rsa said at the outset, the spending controls. i'm a strong advocate of caps with very strong enforcement mechanisms, to make sure that congress has put on a path that it cannot get off of without extremely strong margins. secondly, i believe that putting the spending restraint and control and in place and then putting the enforcement process in place to keep congress on the winning path, we also need to address the second key big element, which is to make our tax code more competitive than reform and in a way that will give us a much stronger and more dynamic opportunity for economic growth. those two pieces, i think, are the core pieces we've got to keep focusing on. >> do you think this will get an up or down vote regardless of whether to the 14?

>> practically speaking, if it does give 14, is there time to draft and score the legislation based on proposals? could there even practically speaking -- [inaudible] >> the closures have gotten an assurance from leadership in the house and the senate that they will allow the process to go forward in the near future. >> so sometime early next year quite >> due and sure from john boehner? >> i don't know. i know they get from harry reid. >> i'm confident if we have the votes that the congressional leadership on both sides, and both congresses, this congress and the next congress, would give us the opportunity. >> senator coburn, you know president obama pretty well. could you tell us of the tattoo about the deficit issue and if you think is pretty committed to

these things who have said? >> i have not talked to them in about five weeks or six weeks, and we've not discussed this. but you know, this is his commission. i voted against this process. i think we have a commission. but if the commission of the congress has failed to act, as we've seen just this week, we are to be acting on it. and so, he set it up. it's his commission. if this report. it's what his commissioners gave him. and now we're going to be about the majority, so i think it sends a position that's their potato now. cannot we talk about the tax cut extension, how does that fit in with -- >> that's now. but the point is that -- and what are the tax cut extensions about? it's about not hurting this very fragile recovery. and by the time this thing -- if you took where we are in this and treated that, i think you'd see a more buoyant recovery if we put this reform to the tax rates, especially the corporate

tax rate end of this in a way that will ultimately build greater revenues for the government, not to increase tax rates, but to increase the size of the gdp. >> then they just make an observation on that. a number of the economist reported to the commission during our deliberations told us one of the most things we could do, one of the biggest impacts we could have on her economic growth in this country, would be to adopt a planned and give the world economy the confidence that america was going to reverse and correct his fiscal policies. whatever the concepts in a plan where. and so, with regard to the tax question that you asked, i believe one of the important elements in one of the very positive elements of this plan is that if adopted, it would move us out of this debate about whether to raise taxes or lower taxes and i'm a which category should people's taxes be raised or lowered and instead would

move us into a new dynamic of pass reform and how should our tax code look as we try to create the kind of code that would be, as i said earlier, more efficient, less complex, less costly to comply with a more competitive. but when this plan, literally changes dynamic in the entire kind of discussion we're having in congress today over just rate levels. >> thank you all very much. >> thank you. [inaudible conversations]

>> next, the bp oil spill and onshore drilling commission continues its investigation of the oil and gas industry. the group is holding its final two-day public session this week before submitting its recommendations to president barack obama in january. former senator bob graham and former epa administrator, william reilly are the cochairman. >> chris, and thank you to you and your colleagues for the excellent support that you have given to this commission. we are very appreciative. the oil and gas off our shores is an american asset. the american government is not just a regulator of offshore oil. it is also the steward for the american people of this asset.

in a real sense, we have a landlord and an obligation to respond with the public trust has been abused. president john adams said, fax or a hard thing. there are some facts that i believe we have uncovered. one, our investigation has determined that their fundamental weaknesses in the u.s. governments regulatory approach. most americans would be surprised and disappointed, as i was, to learn that america lags behind other countries in how we regulate and oversee oil and gas exploration and production. this fact points towards the need for alternative strategies, such as a commitment to safety procedures as a condition of drilling on seabed, which belong to the people of america. to accommodate oil and and gas industry with our chosen obligation to respond.

it is not enough, in my view, to lay the blame solely on a few rogue companies. the companies involved in this disaster are major players in the polls and the contractors are used throughout the world. at lastmonth hearing, i was very impressed with the ceo of exxon mobil and shell and a dedicated image and to industrywide safety. they must continue a strong advocate for new and more effective industrywide regimes, which complements effective federal government regulation and execution of these conditions. three, america's current energy nonpolicy is unsustainable. with mineable awareness and virtually no considered debate, we have positioned ourselves as the user of 22% of the world's petroleum, while we control only 3% of known reserves under

america's lands and waters. this commission has an opportunity to speak to this radical imbalance, which threatens our national security. last month, the head of our investigative team, mr. fred hartley, put it well when he said, 100 years from now, we want the world to say, they changed the safety regime and offshore drilling. this is a worthy aspiration with one significant exception. the world should say this in 2011, not in 2110. as a nation, we have the opportunity to make this change. we have a chance to make the lessons from this disaster in a way that our oil and gas industry is stronger, our workers safer, our environment healthier international security more secure. finally, i would like to note

that i am very impressed with what we've been able to accomplish without subpoena power. i remain mystified as to why a few senators decided to deny this commission, this power, when subpoena power has been granted it's almost an absolute for congressional commissions, which have analogous responsibilities to iris. when subpoena power is the lack of subpoena power has made our commission to work more difficult. our success is a test in there, both to the determination and skill of our team and to the plain fact that the problems and deficiencies with the current safety regime are so egregious. over the next two years, we will discuss our findings and how we propose to translate them into reforms that are worthy of our great nation.

>> good morning. today marks the conclusion aerie phase, the last time that this commission will deliberate in public on our responsibilities. and we will consider in the course of the day the recommendations that the staff work is presented to us and will advocate to us. i want to say that this is as good a staff as i have ever worked with. i think it is a tremendous tribute to the executive director, richard lazarus and to the other members of this extraordinary team, that they have displayed the energy, creativity, resourcefulness and the investigative congeniality, which marks their best work. the fact that we are as prepared as we are after just a force of months of work or the commission is a great tribute, more than to anyone else i ain't the stuff

itself. today will have staff presentations and then deliberate on the safety culture, on regulatory oversight, on environmental review, on drilling in the arctic and the oil spill response. i am struck myself by the evolution in my own thinking in the course of the time that i've spent serving on this commission. i came into it persuaded, as i think most people in the oil and gas industry still may be persuaded that this was a case of the company with at least a five-year history of severe safety challenges and misbehavior and that we were dealing with essentially a rogue company. i think it has been conclusively and indisputably established

that we have a bigger problem than not. three major companies, as senator graham just absurd, were heavily involved in the decisions that are most questionable, that were made on the makamba rig. this conception and the oil and gas industry that maconda was the response to one companies issue simply doesn't stand. our investigative team concluded the three major companies were fully implicated in the catastrophe and our staff further reported that other companies had no effective containment preparations and laughable response plans that promise to look out for ending polar bears or walruses that have been onto the scene. the poor state of containment and response plans and capability in the gulf of mexico is indisputable evidence of a widespread lack of serious

preparation, of planning, of management. that culture must change. ms change for so many reasons, for the good of all of this. ms change among other reasons for the good of the oil and gas industry, reflect for a moment on this. a recent commission paper noted there was a point in the management of this crisis, when industry experts fear the entire 120 million-barrel reservoir might sweep through the ocean floor and wreak total havoc. i would ask you to take a moment to reflect on this. what would we be talking about today is the well couldn't be capped, if there was still pumping 60,000 barrels a day into the goal of, if the shores of golf results in mississippi, alabama and florida have been

smothered with oil and if the videos were still being shown 24/7 on every cable network and news website around the world? i can assure you, we wouldn't be here debating how long it will take to jumpstart the permitting process and the goal for the arctic. we be having an existential conversation about whether offshore drilling should never be permitted in u.s. coastal waters again. even the companies that find safety and environmental management systems -- and we have heard from them, and we have studied and come to admire those systems. these companies that were not implicated in the maconda explosion themselves, nevertheless found themselves shut down in the polls because of other companies this management, because of decisions over which they had no control.

the failure of three companies on one rig ended up shutting down three. and i was a risk that even the best risk management systems did not anticipate and did not control. so let let me say as emphatically as i can come in the oil and gas industry needs to embrace a new safety culture. the series of decisions that macondo evidence the failure of management and good management could've avoided the catastrophe. a new safety culture is important. it is not enough. drilling for oil in deep water is risky, but so is flying or operating submarines and nuclear areas. the systems in the industry safety -- the systems

represented in an industry safety institute, particularly of the sort that the nuclear institute has developed, institute for nuclear power operations particularly offered useful lessons on how to ensure management that is judged an incentive to implement best part says and called out when it doesn't. recent staff have identified a whole range of issues to which we must respond. i think that the self interest of the oil and gas industry that considers it does have superior systems of safety management lies in the reassurance that they could obtain, with the safety institute, the reassurance that the laggards from accident prone companies can be brought up to a higher

standard by their peers. that is the history of other industries, which have confronted serious catastrophes. well, the essential foundation of good risk management is high quality, no-nonsense regulation. staff presentations and staff investigations have made clear, as have other investigations by federal regulators and inspectors have failed utterly to keep abreast of the profoundly sophisticated technologies involved in deep water exploration and development. to protect the public interest, the interior department will require more funds, more inspectors, more engineers, more professionals who know the oil and gas industry and are the equal of the industry personality regulate. it is widely acknowledged that the generation of revenue is driven the old mms and it took

them a lot of money, billions annually. the money from oil and gas leases should be more than sufficient to finance the agency reformation that is needed. secretary salazar has recognized the need to separate the same and revenue generation from environmental and safety regulation. we will consider today whether to recommend that he go further and construct an impenetrable wall with environmental and safety regulators insulated from those who auction and lease and manage the money of those activities generate. that is what other countries have done. u.k. and norway most recently after their own disasters. a word about their proposals we are considering. we meet at a time of national preoccupation with reducing

federal expenditures. we are sensitive to the realities of the country's fiscal precariousness. neither a safety case nor safety institute meet intel's federal appropriations or even congressional action. and the improvements in the interior department's regular capability are, we believe, relatively modest and failure to upgrade the quality of federal regulation would be a national scandal. as both of the ceos of exxon mobil and the shell have observed, industry requires a competent regulator. i call in the industry to support him in congress, the increase in resources, all mara so badly needs to become

confident. oil is a strategic resource and is important to the security and the economy of the united states. my own experience with the industry leaves no doubt about the industry's technological savvy and its ability to manage risk and to feel the economy. we are not dealing here with basic or failing or unsuccessful industry, but with a complacent one. the industry created great while containment corporation is an important industry commitment that addresses shortfalls in containment. we need more such initiatives. and so, we will now hear presentations about the shape that some of these initiatives make take on the recommendations that the commission will

consider. >> good morning, cochairs, commissioners and colleagues. over the next two days, you'll receive many staff recommendations for improvements the government can make in its oversight of safety and environmental protection of the resources affected by oil and gas activities. within its first panel, we're going to focus on the frontlines on industry itself. the companies who invest in explore and produce energy resources to meet the demand of american consumers. these activities take place on public lands and in public waters and frankly, as we've been talking about, industry needs to do a better job protecting lives and the lights when they undertake these activities. to look ahead to the end of this session, we're going to end with recommendations that be the commissioners challenge the oil and gas industry to up its game, to help each other and to hold each other accountable for accident prevention and preparedness to respond to

action because that macondo demonstrated and as we show in the course of the presentation, it wasn't just macondo. they are not up for the task. they are not prepared for the task and this could happen again if they don't change their culture and change their preparedness for another accident. but before we get to the recommendations, my colleague rich sears will start us off. which is seen as the senior science adviser to the commission, and it's going to start a sub for the first part, where he recognized that macondo was an avoidable accident. >> thank you, nancy. i want to take us to the first part of this agenda and look specifically at the accident. and in doing that, i'm going to go back to where we pretty much where we left off in november. and it was with this site, where we summarize seven, will become in a jury conclusions, conclusions that we come to from investigation, looking at how the work was done a macondo. much of oversight in the

november hearing, in terms of the act investigation was about what, what they did, what they didn't do, what they could've done. a number closer to how. and how it's very important because that's how these organizations functioned at macondo, how they carried out their work, how they undertake operations that ultimately mattered. and it's where, when i finish with this short worry of kind of getting under the skin of that unlucky night and developing a little bit, nancy is going to talk about how the industry made to this difference he and might do better in the future. now you see in this conclusions. were not going to go through them again. but they can be summed up very quickly. commissioner riley come you basically sending your introduction that our investigative team found that mistakes and oversights led directly to the blowout. and they were the results of management failures by three companies: bp, halliburton and transocean at macondo.

it's a very clear and important statement and there's no mincing words about it. we need to understand look at more closely to think about how we move forward. and i'll start here. offshore deep water offshore exploration particularly is a very complex business. and it's a very complex business that carries with the risk, inherent risk and operating in deep water, far offshore remote locations. and these risks have to be managed. they have to be managed very carefully. when you're out on one of these facilities, you really have two things that your disposal to manage these risks. you have the people here are the people what their experience, training, knowledge, instincts. and your processes. processes that support those people, that allow them to do their job, to function in complex environments and think beyond the tax in hand. and as the people and the processes together that make the

system worked and make the system work safely. and what we found a terms of the risk awareness and risk management at macondo, with ipp in particular had their management systems that were on display, as we looked at the macondo incident, did not ensure that the team was able to identify and properly evaluate the risks that they were even creating with their own decisions. they were not able to look at the risks holistically and evaluate them and the context of a complex system. and very specifically, and the result of this, there were a lot of changes made to the well-planned, to the well program in operations that we described in november. changes in the last month of operations prior to the blowout. and these changes themselves created risks that were not and could not be adequately addressed by the macondo team. it's very, very critical conclusion that we came to.

even if you have the risks clearly identified, you have to make good decisions about these risks. you have to have them before you in a framework that allows you to consider them properly. i said earlier, holistically and in the complex system. and it appears, from our investigation, that there were many key decisions made to the macondo team. when i see the macondo team, and speak in a very extended team that included people on the rig for many companies, many offices and many companies. the key decisions were made by the macondo team without formal risk analysis and sometimes without internal expert review. and that macondo, there were several key decisions that in one case or another addressed one risk, try to minimize the risks associated with one aspect of the decision, without realizing that in other ways

they may have, in some cases did, increase the overall risk they were taking. in other cases they failed to take full expertise. they were not necessarily processes in place that encourage them to call home for help and rely on very experienced people out side of the rush of the business to help them make complex decisions. in many cases, they show an over reliance on individual preferences and experiences, that we found in the documentary evidence, comments like well, i've seen this before and, to explain a very complex set of data around the negative pressure test. or i have always done it this way, so, to explain again how a complex test time. and when you fall into that trap, it gets to the last bullet here, that you really are

putting aside the cadence that's available from established best practices. industry best practices is a very large industry with a lot of activities, and love competent players and even the young company's best practice. bp, halliburton and transocean. in some cases we found this best practices and regarded these tests didn't even exist at wardwell spelled out for the people to act on. so this lays the foundation of not just poor risk awareness, but poor decision-making around the data they had. and at the heart of poor decision-making comes communication. and here, you know, communications is really important. i'm going to say in this world of deep offshore operations, there's very little that goes on on these platforms, on these rigs that is a spectator sport.

this is not about sending e-mails and sitting back and waiting for a response. this is about to engage communication, to a sharing of information. and this is one, for me at least, having been in this industry for several decades is actually one of the troubling things about our conclusions is what we found is there are ways of communicating around these operations, between operator and contractor in between contractors themselves, where information is partitioned and shared selectively. sometimes all for good reason, at least thought to be for good reason on the day, it's highly competitive information or it is not deemed to be necessary, or it is not their responsibility to make a decision. what information this complex environment is partitioned like that, you run the risk that the people that could be involved, but should be involved, that could add to the deliberations and decision making, are not involved in the decision-making

is consequently not as good as it should be in. and what we found indeed, in many cases at bp, transocean, halliburton, they were not always sharing information, climate experts, engaging and certainly there are many instances where they did not share information from operator to contractors surfing between contractors, information is not being shared. as a result, individuals are making very important decisions about the operations, about the safety of what was happening on the rig. they were making these decisions without fully appreciating the context in which they were being made or even the importance of the particular decision. now i want to quickly go down a level and look at an example. instrument is actually good place to look in the business of this deep water while.

and particularly, cementing the production casing. the reason we chose cementing is because it and a number of operations that extended over a period of time. and in fact, there are operations that involve many of the companies that leased out on the rig and certainly involved three players, bp, halliburton and transocean. and when we look at the cement testing, this was testing of the cement slurry and opponents themselves prior to that cement being pumped into the well. what we found is that management processes in place that halliburton and bp did not ensure the cement was adequately tested before was pumped into the well. halliburton didn't have the controls in place to initiate testing soon enough and did not have the controls in place to make sure that the test results were properly connected to the operator, bp, who is ultimately responsible for what was happening. in some cases -- in one case in particular, it appears to us

that the test was undertaken so late that the test results were not even available to halliburton prior to the pumping of the cement. this is important. and it's even more important that bp personnel, have been engaged in an e-mail dialogue prior to this about the importance of the cement job, cementing of the production casing, but they authorize the pumping of the cement without actually knowing whether this testator had been received, without reviewing a couple with a rigorously vetting it. and they could not find that there was an engaged conversation discussion between the players about it. and so again, it's failures of management, certainly about this particular area. and then after the cement was pumped, it continued in really poor communication. bp, halliburton employees have had many discussions about the complexities of the cement job. all the things we talked about

in november, the difficult pressure environment at the bottom of the well. .. they were making decisions, and again, communication, poor communication is at the center of it, and we do believe that

had this been done differently, had the conversation only on the rig about for example the negative pressure test then instead of being well, i've seen this before and, if instead the conversation would have started with well, look, we've got high-pressure hydrocarbons at 18,000 feet, something like 13,000 psi, a very difficult scene meant a job, we have lost circulation, we've had difficulty on the floats, a long things we discussed on november, had that conversation occurred, we believe the macondo well could have been prevented. a very different conversation on the rig at the time could have presented the disincentives. so you come back to the decision making the bottom line is you can't leave it to chance. you can't hope the right conversation happens of the right time with the right people. you have to have a process in place that allows these people

to come together that encourage and in fact insist these people come together to consider the complexity of what they are undertaking. and given the risks in the deep water drilling, companies have to create peace process season policies. they have to enforce them. this has to be the way the business is done. and if they don't do this, the risk is that the time pressures that are inherent in these big, expensive operations are going to buy decisions in favor of the efficiencies and cost saving and it's a fair and natural outcome of not looking at it clearly and systematically. and we found that bp did not have the policies or systems in place, or if they did, they were not applied in the macondo well, they were not enforced, and there is not evidence across the board that there was good systematic thinking about what they were doing.

now, we talked in this context we talked briefly in november about a number of decisions that had been made, which ultimately did result in time savings on the rig, and reference was made to a chart that was made very much of the last minute. it was still a work in process of the end of the november hearing. this is that chart. this is a preliminary version of the chart. we are working on it now to improve it. we found there are errors on it in the sense that it certainly could be made clearer and more complete and an updated version of the charts is going to be available very shortly, which we will share with the commission. but when you look at this charge on the left-hand column under decision, these are, again, things we talked about in the november hearing go about centralizes, about the cement jobs and various tests that were done or were not done. and many decisions made about these -- and in particular, decisions that were taken turned

out to be riskier than alternative decisions, and in most cases save time during the operation. >> gft did chart does not, i would assume, take away from the conclusions drawn in the columns? >> nope. the updated chart is being updated for completeness and clarity. there's a little bit of redundancy in this chart and things we think could deeply now afford it better. but the conclusion is the same. the conclusion is important. many decisions taken on the rig one at the time turned out to add risk to the whole operation were the results of the decision there was sometimes involved whether there was a primary driver or not is not the point. but in the and if you look to the right-hand column, all of these companies were involved either as the primary decision maker or involved in the decisionmaking process.

so when we some all of this up, we have -- which frankly for me is a very disturbing conclusion. better management systems at macondo well by these three companies, certainly would have prevented this blowout by improving the ability of the people on the rig to identify the risk they fees to manage them, communicate them and understand properly. it's a very difficult thing for me to say. i've worked in this industry more than three decades. i was one of the managers. to think these three companies screwed up like this bothers me. but it is the conclusion of our work that we found. and it's from here the plame going to handed back to nancy who was going to talk about what this means in the context of trying to create a proper safety system and try to build an environment where this work can be done better. >> thank you.

>> terrie brief questions or comments before we go on to the next part? >> rich, in the summary table charge, the negative pressure test isn't specifically listed. >> it's not. and as i said, this is a preliminary charts, and that's info revised version we added the negative pressure test. thanks for adding that. because again, it's all complex because the negative pressure test wasn't necessarily carried out swiftly. it was debated over a six hour period. but at the end of the day they chose to move on. and there could have been more debate, extensive the bait and thinking about what is exactly happening here. and other ways -- mabey for the simple the negative pressure test didn't actually come from that of the cement is good. how can we -- what could we do to further evaluate the quality of the cement shop?

that is a decision that could have been taken and is certainly would have added time to the whole process. it was a decision that was not taken. >> dr. bosch misses nothing. [laughter] >> okay, so we just talked about sort of the what we have gotten out of our own investigations of what happened at macondo command the same time we've been trying to look to the context of that what do we know about investigations of previous accidents or investigations that look at the first of all the three companies involved at macondo. and this is a slide that shows bp, which is one of the world's largest integrated oil companies and it's the largest companies in the gulf of mexico deep water, it has a history of crosscutting and resulting problems associated with all the business segments over many years. and this suggests to us systemic

corporate issues, some going back to 2000, there were at the complex incidents i had to show about a minute that turned out to be very similar to texas city refinery but in between that the kid problems a production platform in the gulf of mexico called the 40's alpha, and after texas city refinery to problems with their founder horse platform which was related to poor material that was an engineering problem, and then just after texas city, which is the most famous problem that bp had in the united states, they discovered really serious problems with the pipeline and prudhoe bay in alaska. we've been talking about the deepwater horizon, which overshadows the fact that they had chemical weeks, serious exposure at the fence line of the texas city refinery, again, this summer. and they've just been reporting from their own self investigation about really serious problems with their pipelines across alaska. so all this adds up to give us

the impression that the safety lapses do appear to be with bp and it's about system safety engineering and safety culture and the company still needing improvement, even though they are making a bold effort to improve it and invest a lot to improve it. just to blow up a couple of these, and taken from the previous accident investigations like our own. the u.k. health and safety executive looks at the -- there were a series of three incidents at the complex that was refineries and chemicals and the stress here want to point out is they found it was weakness in the safety management systems that will free period of time contributed to the succession of events that resulted in the failure and that is about one particular event but then they reached the same conclusions about the other to a fence and these all happened over the course of about a month. and then invest getting the texas city refinery explosion

the u.s. chemical safety board found that a texas city the tragedy was an accident with organizational causes in bit in the refinery's culture. certainly the chemical safety board looked at all the technical causes of the accident. i am pulling out the comments that speak to the management culture and organizational causes. they went out and went on to find that these organizational causes linked to the number saved if the lawyers that extended beyond the unit that had trouble, and i'm imagining your hearing an echo of what rich just told you, these combinations of problems that link up with in this failure as a failure of a safety system. as you will probably recall, bp itself commissioned a panel to look at what went wrong and how they could change it after texas city and they noted similarities between grange mouth which is in the u.k., and the texas city

blast. including the lack of management leadership and accountability and just to highlight the poor understanding of and lack of focus on process safety. and the panel concluded that in its response to grangemouth, bp missed an opportunity to make and sustained company wide changes that would have resulted in safer workplaces. and i want to highlight here that i think a failure -- sorry, i had of myself. i think it's important for us and to forbid paying attention to this accident to make sure the lessons of deepwater horizon are learned across the whole industry. >> nancy, could i ask a question before we leave bp. you said you thought that bp had instituted some practices now that would improve the situation. i noticed the last sentence in the baker panel item is and

timely completion of corrective action from audits, pure review and instance investigation. what is our evaluation that leads to the conclusion that they've made sycophant improvements? >> date sent us a summary of how they are handling safety improvements, and we -- for the simple, after texas city, one of the recommendations is they have an independent evaluation of their safety management systems. and they did hire this independent. i think it's called an independent investigator were independent dee-tal-ya reader who is preparing and you will or by the annual reports, and in reviewing one of those reports we found they are making progress in a number of areas and they are not seeking progress in other areas, so i think would be unfair to the company to say this. they are not paying attention and they are not trying but i also think it is fair to take a look at macondo and conclude that they just haven't gotten

there. they haven't been able to completely reform and come up with a new safety culture that would have avoided inpo were not able to avoid deepwater horizon. they have an operation management system which i think they would like to be like exxonmobil's operations think, operational integrity management system that we were told about the last hearing. i'm not in the position to say if it's good enough for how comparable it is, they've invested in a number of efforts in light of the texas city blast and the recommendations that came from it. >> so then, just some things we've learned how to which is the world's largest cement and go cement business and it's a significant part of halliburton's total business. and the comment i have here is for all of its experience the prepared cement for bp which is

one of its largest clients the repeatedly field laboratory tests and then the halliburton managers on shore with its own team and transocean and bp continue with a cement job without timely and positive stability results in the bigs the question for me is if you have all this experience and you're in the largest in the field, how does that happen? how do you continue to let something go forward when you're not absolutely sure that you're providing the best? >> and there was a large explosion on the rig off the coast, off the northern coast of australia in august, 2009, and the accident inquiry just officially came out last week, and it confirmed that cementing problems led to the low and there were different in the root macondo but in both cases, management process east by the operator whose ultimate responsibility and halliburton, they feel to insure the crew achieved a good cementing job.

and then we have rig which is the world's largest deep water driller, and they have their own safety culture problems. seen in february of this year the u.k. health and safety executive accused the company's offshore managers of bleeding, aggression, harassment, humiliation and intimidation towards their staff, half to death, according to one of the industry trade journals that had seen a copy of the report. and also, in response to a series of serious accidents and near the become year hits in the transocean global organization the company contacted the register the safety culture and of the fourth north american rigs that he visited the deepwater horizon had the highest scores. they were in the middle of a 5. scale. two and three. and then on the next page i'm going to show you that of the comments that they collect on

hazard identification which on the risks and how the crew managed them look strikingly similar to what our investigators found at macondo. some fees' are quotes coming from the register report. the fund a fundamental lack of awareness underpinning many issues in the north american division. the transocean supervisors and rig leaders themselves believe come and fees' more quotes they found, the work force is not always aware of the hazards they were exposed to. risk management plans didn't always identify relevant hazards related to the tasks. that rigs posed by hazards were not fully understood. the emerging hazards during task execution and hazards with a changing for school were not always detected or fully appreciated. and that the crew didn't always know what they don't know. as a front line crew seem to be working with a mind set or potentially working with the mindset they believe they are fully aware of all the hazards when it is highly likely that

they were not. and i think that's really similar to what rich was just describing as what is going on at macondo. >> soon nancy, can i ask were these supervisors and rig leaders mostly on sure? because rig leaders and plight were also on the rig. >> they were all over. they looked -- i would have to come back and answer. they were on the rig and on shore and i remember from reading the report the answers were quick to read on the rig forces on shore. >> and there were a lot, to be clear, there were a lot of positive responses. there wasn't uniformly negative audit. there were a lot of good cohesion, a lot of trust in the managers on the rig. they felt like they had a really good safety culture. they felt like high majority of them, people on the rig felt they had the ability to stop something was dangerous.

that contrast with these kind of comments which is they were not necessarily sure they would know when something was too hazardous to continue. >> before we go on to the international scene. i wonder of the halliburton issue, do you know if -- is there a corporate portal called that requires that they have satisfactory tests conducted and approved before the new job and cement the job and completed test to the company? >> we've asked halliburton to complete the materials. >> and you don't have them yet? >> we don't have them. we don't know if they are on their way or if they are there and just haven't yet been provided. >> could i -- we were about to turn to a page that has gulf of

mexico action incidents. how confident are we at indicators of safety are being fully reported? for instance, you raised the question of is the crow culturally willing to pull the plug on the operation if they see a dangerous situation? do we have the debt as to how frequently that has occurred on the rigs in the gulf of mexico? >> i haven't seen any data on that. i think you would take surveys and there might be surveys done by companies like the lloyds register report is a private prayer report produced for one company trying to improve, understand and improve its own safety culture. the reporting is very uneven. it's not done the same across countries with respect to a fisher reporting accompanies to a regulator or safety of 40 so i

would say we don't have very strong confidence we is a comprehensive global understanding of accidents probably better. but neither is his. i don't think we have a good baseline of that at all, and very important in my for example the u.s. doesn't require the reporting of releases of khator to -- hydrocarbon because they would be a spill and the would have to report that the release of gas is you have lost control, and that should be reported and investigated as a near miss if for a with a reasoned and has learning, not reporting kits in the week of having learning within the industry, and i think shirley might touch on this that is something that should be changed in the coming months and other regulatory regimes to require that. >> could i go back a moment to the lloyds issue? i would assume that there is a

relationship between the cost of insurance and the insurers' level of confidence in the safety of the operation. is that kind of information maintained in some systematic way? >> i want to make one clarifying point. lloyds register is not speed insurance and they are not the same company. the median the same group. i don't understand that. but we did look at the question to what extent do the underwriters -- to what extent are they able to discern safe from an unsafe behavior by and the answer from the research is the certainly to try to look at that, but i think that they know that they are going to try harder in the future if they were not aware as some of the system safety risks they were taking before macondo. there is not a will accepted set of what you might call process

safety or system safety leading indicators that everybody would look at an degree of this company is really managing its engineering system risks better than that company. that's a very difficult to do today. but understanding from interviews with the industry that they will be interesting more and trying to discern those kind of behavior is moving forward. >> is what you're saying as of today insurance rates are not a particularly reliable indicator of the underlying safety of the operation? >> no, not completely. not completely. >> are you finished? >> yeah. >> i would add that map and a list of incidents suggests to me to a very important needs. one is for standardized reporting throughout the world. it is a global industry after all, and there aren't that many

players and it. that is one, and i assume can be outdone by the international regulators meeting together to agree on such standards for reporting. but secondly, it suggests the need for international agreement on safety itself. you look at the very large part of the goals that isn't under the united states sovereignty and one company is responsible for the oil and gas development occurred in water. we have the similar issues in the arctic with the canada on the one side and russia on the other. anyone of those three countries in that immediate area could affect significantly the resources, the environment, wildlife and the rest of the others and there is every reason it seems to meet for an international agreement safety. has anyone pursued that? is that an issue at the state department or something we should recommend? >> i don't know if it is an

issue at this the department. i do know there is a group called the international regulators for him, and it is -- i don't know if informal might be too long but it's the members of that themselves of gotten together frequently in the past year post macondo and these come up with some consensus recommendations really quite consistent with what you're suggesting and i have those listed in a couple slides from now and we will get to them and i don't know if they're headed toward a treaty and we can investigate the formal treaty there's an awful lot that adds to the treaty of those recommendations companies can do themselves and that national regulators can do themselves that don't need to wait for a lot of formal negotiations. they've done some of them, they worked through a lot of what they consider to be best practices and how to proceed in

order to stay on top of best practices as we move forward and one more point before we leave this slide is to say a list of incident is sitting over were there will be new deepwater activity very soon which is off the coast of cuba only about 50 miles from the florida coast. and of course our u.s. operators won't be involved in that directly because of our trading embargo but it is going to be one of the next sites -- >> we understand that the gas is likely to be the company that is preferred they're so would be useful to have a relationship if not with cuba than the gas from international operations because they have a lot riding on it. >> and the chinese are involved and the spanish will have the lease if that's what it looks like so this is just a pure it's not exhaustive, it just illustrates macondo was in the

black swan, it was a lot of loss of will control in a blowout, lots of slice the lead the life out there and this isn't even a complete list, there's a much longer list of incidents out there on the shelf that have been serious enough to trigger the panel's investigation. >> you look at the list of incidents and looked down the list of names and the companies that we are familiar with many other names aren't as well known at least to the general public the independent contractors are coming to the issue is a risk profile and whether the companies have the resources to manage the risk. could you just go 50 perhaps reflect on what this list indicates has the range of size companies that are participating out there and there's some sense

only the large majors are operating at these high risk situations. but this indicates it is a much broader range of tv coverage of companies because i'm not familiar with them. if you could just elucidate that. >> it's a very diverse list for sure. very large companies on their. bp, for example. a lot of medium-sized wealth and chevron is a large company. a lot of the medium-sized companies and anadarko. i would consider in terms of the offshore companies like devin and mariner and apache to be in that firmly in that medium size and then there are some rather small operators, independent operators. they are not insubstantial companies significant market capitalization and fairly active, and a lot of oil and gas but they are nowhere near the

scale. a couple orders of magnitude separate the top of the scale from the bottom if you look at market capital revenues or production. so it is a diverse list. one of the things i was looking and thinking there are many of these companies that don't exist anymore because they've been and absorbed by others even on that list and that's another aspect of this business and a very vibrant ecosystem of those companies and assets out there and that's part of what makes it complex. >> i was going to ask how many of those that you know ourself injured? >> on that list i don't know but who would guess that two of them at least, bp and chevron, the big ones for sure. i don't know what self insured

means in this context. i don't know that you can actually buy tens of billions of dollars worth of insurance. i don't think you can. >> can anyone walk away from the liability in these companies? >> i don't know, i can't say honestly. the ones i think i can say the ones on that list that don't exist, i don't think it's because of these incidents. it's because they were observed by something else, so i don't think that is an issue. but i don't know what the insurance standing is of most of the companies on the list to be honest. >> i have another question about this list. i noticed that from the first, which is aimed 1979 through 1999, there were a total of 12 incidents reported beginning in 2000 there have been 21. now is that function not the data set, or has there in fact been that degree of exploration of accidents?

>> i can't answer for certain, but when we put this together, and when this was given to me i was told this is not exhaustive, and i think the staff putting this together are only trying to put things on the list that the understand enough about to put on the list. so i wouldn't draw a conclusion about the acceleration of accidents from the pattern here. and we can do more research on this, but this wasn't a primary point of our investigation, rather just to show it wasn't -- it wasn't like we've been in the gulf of mexico for 30 years and nothing's happened until macondo. >> i do want to make one point about the size, about the range of companies, the independence forces the major and super major out there. we've done a lot of work and i don't think there's any reason to think the independent or riskier operators than the super majors. they are smaller, everybody's so

other than a super major oil company. some of them are really big companies and some of them are quite small, but vital think we have any research that says they are riskier. they don't have the capitalization, so this is a big part of the discussion that has to further happen about how to make sure that there is a robust -- if we are going to have the industry in the gulf, there is a robust he goes system of economic actors out there because they do all serve important purposes in the economy of the exploration and exploitation of the resources out there and it doesn't, it doesn't correlate with risk as far as we can tell. >> i would say that all of these companies operate with similar skills sets. many of the very small companies are in fact start-ups of people that have left the large companies and have gone out on their own thinking this would be an interesting business to run. and so they operate with a very

similar skill sets and even experience. significantly they all use the same group of contracting companies, and this is where the relationships between operator and contractor become important, and because they all all i expect of different relationships on how they rely on the expertise on the contractors so much of the contractors have said that. we know we are talking to. a very large companies with a deep bench and a lot of experience in this environment we recognize that we're talking to a small independent that might need more of our expertise. how that plays out exactly in terms of sharing is not clear. but certainly the same group of contractors are involved. >> rich or nancy, do we know how many of these small or medium-sized companies are in all true deepwater?

is there any evidence? >> of the ones that exist, still in this list, several i will just say. yes, several. >> they were in the independent that operate in deep water have been in to talk to us but we didn't do the head count on them. there's more than one would think we'll talk about the majors. >> it's obviously important when we get to the financial responsibility. >> solutions for ideas how to transform the industry cyclical to and make sure that they are prepared in a very practical way to practice rescue responsible container. it starts the slightest quoting from i think the dean of regulators, the director general of more we petroleum safety authority, and he put it that it's a risky business.

no question a talked the risk. but the presence of risk doesn't mean accidents have to happen. if we don't learn lessons from this disaster will have been a double tragedy. so the next session is how we put those two ideas together. in response to bill's question, there is international regulators for them and they have every reason to come up with consensus findings and recommendations because this is the session on industry and i'm going to focus just on the things industry can do. industry needs to take the lead on the other point on the continuous improvement and they need to delete on the communications and learning although there is a government role for government regulators themselves and also for helping. industry needs to take the lead on that. industry has a big role in international standards and sheer audits justice and a few

minutes on this, operators and contractors have to manage their companies to achieve safety objectives and continually assess the effectiveness of the management programs there is the need for the indicators but to identify major hazards and safety culture and worker input is also essentials. this is something that's talked about less in the u.s. than the other oecd countries there has to be much more worker input in this safety system. rich talked an awful lot about how the rule was, what the role of the poor communication was from the macondo accident and this shows up in all accidents, all accidents in all industries. usually there's a communication problem and this is communication among the regulators but also the operators and the contractors, and some of that communication during operations, but also the collection and maintenance of comprehensive and verifiable

incident databases as senator gramm just brought up. we certainly don't have comprehensive incident databases that we can rely upon. and international standards we need an effort now to identify best standards and apply them internationally and these can't be the lowest common denominators which is a lot of people as to the standards we have today and these can't really be options peepers we need to know how to do things best for the industry knows how to do things. some ways are best, some ways are better and some ways just aren't okay. to be having options papers on these and pure auditing programs should be considered for with regulators and operators and this is part of our recommendations. as bill mentioned earlier this another inherently risky activities or industries in areas that have made the decisions leadership made the

decision they are going to become safer and the civil aviation comes to mind in the fifties there were not a lot of passengers from airplanes to read this can out of the airline, the airplane cannot of the war effort and people to fly and people said no, i don't think so. and so there's just too many accidents, and so boeing, the manufacturers and the airline industry and the regulator got together and did what it took to make the industry seeks to convince the consumer that they could use this service safely, and we will talk about nuclear power, and then there was the tremendous power to lecturer after the loss of the submarine that they would never lose the submarine again and in the beginning of all of this is the leadership in the industry came to the realization that they were only as safe as the weakest link and the agree to hold themselves and peers accountable for safety and then they set up mechanisms to make this real.

>> can i make an observation? there was some other things that happened and that was a dramatic consolidation. it used to be there were a dozen or so companies that made commercial airliners, lockheed martin, douglas. today basically there are too. there is going and there is the airbus. do you think we are looking in terms of achieving level of safety that we want here towards a similar consultation? and that may have something to say about this issue of liability insurance, which has tended to revolve around how do we protect the smaller companies? >> it looked as some of the recent literature, and the analysts predict more consolidation in the oil and gas industry. as rich said there's been a consolidation even before this

accident, and of the industry analysts predicted there will be more consolidation. it's doubtful that it will consolidate in a healthy way down to just of the majors. i haven't seen anybody who thinks we could have a healthy and efficient oil and gas exploration industry that's just a handful of companies out on the gulf and that comes to the how we have to be careful about the liability which isn't as much the issue as the certificate of financial responsibility, how those provisions are handled. and then on the industry side, particularly how they are going to demonstrate that they can prevent the accident and then -- >> glisson this record program floor where they can just get pulled back in.pl this is live coverage on objection, so ordered.

mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader is recognized. mr. reid: i ask the chair to lay before the senate a message from the house with respect to h.r. 4853. the presiding officer: the chair lays before the senate the following message. the clerk: resolved that the house agree to the amendment of the senate to the bill h.r. 4853, entitled an act to amend the internal revenue code of 1986 to extend the funding and expenditure authority of airport and airway trust fund to amend title 49 united states code, to extend authorization for the airport improvement program, and for other purposes, passed with a house amendment to the senate amendment. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: i move to concur in the house amendment to the senate amendment to h.r. 4853

with an amendment, and that amendment is at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, moves to concur in the house amendment to the senate amendment with an amendment numbered 4727. mr. reid: mr. president, on that i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. the yeas and nays are ordered. mr. reid: thank you. i have a cloture motion which is at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report the cloture motion. the clerk: cloture motion. we the undersigned senators in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the motion to concur in the house amendment to h.r. 4853, the airport, airway extension act of 2010, with an amendment, signed by 17 senators. mr. reid: mr. president, i apologize for interrupting the clerk. i would ask that the names be waived -- the reading of the

names. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i have a second-degree amendment at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, for mr. schumer and others proposes an amendment numbered 4728 to amend numbered 4727. mr. reid: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the senate not require the reading of the amendment. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i have a cloture motion at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report the cloture motion. the clerk: cloture motion. we the undersigned senators in accordance with the provisions of rule 22, the standing rules of the senate, hereby move to bring to a close debate on the second-degree amendment number 4728, signed by 16 senators. mr. reid: i ask that the reading of the names be waived, mr. president. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i also ask the mandatory quorums required under rule 22 be waived. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: mr. president, --

mr. president, i have a motion to refer, and with that are instructions at the deswik. nevada, mr. reid, moves to refer the house message to the senate committee on finance with instructions to report back forthwith, being amendment number 4729. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays on that, mr. president. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. the yeas and nays are ordered. mr. reid: i have an amendment to my instructions at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report the amendment. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, proposes an amendment numbered 4730 to amendment numbered 4729. mr. reid: on that i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. the yeas and nays are ordered.

mr. reid: i ask the reading be waived. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: mr. president, there is a second-degree amendment at the desk that i ask be reported. the presiding officer: the clerk will report the amendment. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, proposes an amendment numbered 4731 to amend number 4730. mr. reid: i ask the reading of that be waived, mr. president. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i note the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call: mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: i know that we worked hard today. the presiding officer: the senate is in a quorum call, i would note. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent that that be waived -- rescinded. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: mr. president, we have worked hard today trying to be

at a point where we could be further down the road than where we are. i know the republican leader has worked hard to try to get to a point where we could have the four amendments that people are talking about all around the city. we were unable to do that because of at least one republican who held that up. senator mcconnell has given this a valiant try and i have been in the position that he is in and i understand that. i certainly don't criticize him. i would hope that everyone understands we'regoing to have s saturday. we're going to wind up having right now two cloture votes. we may not have any is more. we may not be able to work out anything with the minority. but everyone should be aware, that could happen. we're -- we're satisfied, if the minority doesn't want those other two amendments, then we'll just go ahead as we're scheduled now under the rules of the senate. we're going to have to be here on saturday.

we have so many things to do, as everyone knows, and we've been trying to work through some of these things this week and haven't gotten through as much -- nearly as much as we wanted. i am, however, disappointed that we haven't been able to do more. now, i received a letter from the -- all the republicans yesterday saying we're not going to allow you to do anything legislative until we get the tax cuts resolved and funding the government. well, mr. president, we're not only not getting legislative things down, now they're not letting us do the tax cuts and funding the government. so we're going to try to work our way through this. we have a lot of things to do. we have to work together on this. and i intend to be as cooperative as i can. and my caucus, even though it has -- we have very strong feelings, recognize that we're trying to do things for the good of this country. but we can't do them alone. and i apologize for the -- not having more definition early on

but we did the best we could. so tomorrow we're going to be in session and there will be time for people to give some speeches and do the things that they need to do. and be prepared for saturday. as so what time saturday, we don't know. under the rule, it's one hour after we come in. if we can work out something different than that, we will do that. mr. durbin: mr. president? the presiding officer: the assistant majority leader is recognized. mr. durbin: an the senate proceed to a period of morning business with senators permitted to speak up to ten minutes each. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: i ask unanimous consent the judiciary committee be discharged from further consideration of h.r. 1107 and the senate proceed to its immediate consideration. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 1107, an act to enact certain laws relating to

public contracts as title 41, united states code, public contracts. the presiding officer: is there objection to proceeding to the measure? without objection, the committee is discharged and the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. durbin: i ask unanimous consent that a sessions amendment which is at the desk be agreed to, the bill as amended be read a third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate and any statements related to the bill be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: i ask unanimous consent the senate proceed en bloc to the following postal naming bills, calendar numbers 665-669, s. 3784, h.r. 5758, h.r. 6118, h.r. 6237, and h.r. 6387. the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed en bloc. mr. durbin: i ask unanimous i as consent the bills be read a third time and passed en bloc,

the motions to reconsider be laid on the table en bloc with no intervening action or debate and any statements relating to the bills be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: i ask unanimous consent the senate proceed to the immediate consideration of senate resolution 693, submitted earlier today. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: s. res. 693, condemning the attack by the democratic people's republic of korea against the republic of korea and affirming support for the united states-republic of korea alliance. the presiding officer: there objection to proceeding to the measure? without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. durbin: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent to have my name added as a cosponsor to this measure. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: i ask the preamble be agreed to and the motions to reconsider be laid on the table with no intervening action or debate and any statements relating to the resolution be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that when the senate completes its bid today, it adjourn until 9:30 a.m. on

friday, december 3. that following the prayer and pledge, the journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day and the senate proceed to a period of morning business with senators permitted to speak for up to ten minutes each. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: mr. president, if there's no further business to come before the senate, i ask that it adjourn under the previous order. the presiding officer: the senate stands in adjournment senate stands in adjournment

now at a hearing on international aviation screening standards. government witnesses include the assistant homeland security secretary as well as officials from the transportation security administration. north dakota democratic senator byron dorgan is chairing the senate transportation subcommittee hearing on aviation. >> we are going to call the hearing to order this afternoon. this is a hearing of the aviation subcommittee, the committee and commerce science and senator dorgan, chairman of the subcommittee on joined by the chairman of the full committee, senator rockefeller. senator rockefeller, thank you for being here. let me provide a brief opening

statement and then call my colleague, senator rockefeller, after which we will hear from four witnesses today. first, let me say i'm pleased that during this congress under the leadership of senator rockefeller, we considered a significant number of aviation issues in our subcommittee and full committee. i know that these efforts ultimately are going to make the skies safer for the traveling public, and there is much work yet to do. the largest piece of legislation we accomplished, however, the faa authorization bill is awaiting a vote after many months of negotiation. it is a great disappointment to me and i know the chairman of the full committee that we have not yet seen that completed by the senate, completed by this committee, but we have not yet had completion of a conference report and get it to the president for signature. and i hope that my colleagues in the senate -- i know i speak for senator rockefeller -- would

join us in working seriously to try, even at this late date, to get the faa reauthorization bill completed. it deals with air traffic control modernization and so many issues that are important, and i still remain hopeful that there might be some cross t's, some of narrow crevice for which we can get the legislation passed at long last. we have had 16 extensions of the faa reauthorization bill, and that, to me is a failure in the work that we have done is excellent work, and the country would be well served if we can get the bill to the president for signature. with that said, the hearing we have today touches on something we have been talking about a lot, particularly since the last christmas period when a man got on an airplane in a foreign land and attempted to bring down and

aircraft loaded with passengers with a bomb so in the underwear, the christmas bomber. well as to what fortunately the bomb did not detonate although the passenger attempted to detonate the bomb. we know from that plot and other bomb plots over the years the aviation security screenings are important, not just at our airports that a free airport in this world. we also know that every nation is expected to meet aviation security protocols that have been set out by the civil aviation organization, if he icao, but the best in the come methods by which countries meet these particles is at the discretion of each country. we also know that over the past year, the department of homeland security has worked extensively with international partners to try to update existing aviation

security protocols, and i applaud and appreciate the work the agencies have done but clear standards tall airports in this world should meet and must meet are still lacking. the christmas day incident that i just referenced is an incident which the suspect departed from nigeria where, he in fact was subject to walk through a metal detector, metal scanner, which meets existing security protocols in that country. nonetheless, a person with a bomb in their underwear board the airplane and could agree easily have brought that plea and down and killed all of the passengers. the floor to the bombing suspect was able to get through with explosives on his body because those standards in the scanner did not pick up those explosives. this occurrence has led some nations including our country to use advanced imaging technology. those machines have generated a great deal of discussion and

news stories in recent weeks. those machines are a commercial airports and in many cases in this country, not all cases, while other countries continue to use other methods, rather to screen passengers. i know that these new machines are designed to catch types of explosives that are difficult, and i know that these are controversy all screening techniques. we are very anxious to get to the had chanced technology which we have discussed in this committee of that long ago where imaging technology would have the human figure as a stick figure, detecting only that which would be difficult or represent a threat to the airplane. so, we are working very hard on advanced technology. companies and the agencies are working together to have a more secure system while still respecting all of the civil rights of passengers. a couple more points.

it's clear the most significant threats to the u.s. aviation system are consistently for yen-based. i say that not suggesting there aren't internal threats. indeed, there are, but if we take a look what we have confronted, the eshoo bomber, the underwear bomber, the cartridge toners, the liquids and bottles, all of those or foreign based plots that in many ways we are trying to put explosives on airplanes that would fly over our territory. that's why it is critically important we worked so closely with other countries and corporations to cooperate on improving the system. now it's in the best interest it seems to me of commercial air carriers of our manufacturers and homeland security representatives to come together on security solutions and push for consistency in their application, and that's the purpose of this hearing today. to determine not just what is

happening at a hour airports. we've certainly ready enough about that in recent weeks. not what is happening at our airports to keep someone off the commercial airplane who may have a bomb on their person. but what is happening in the three other airports in the world, in which persons who may well come to this country will be traveling elsewhere the boarding an airplane that may be unsafe because of screening technology and the screening capability wasn't meeting standards that we would expect. this is a very important, very controversial and very complicated subject. and the members of this committee appreciate a great deal all of the work that has been done by tsa, homeland security and other private companies working on technology as well. let me call on the chairman of the full committee, senator rockefeller, for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. before we begin, i want to say

that this is, after 25 years of public service in the congress, this is the last hearing that senator dorgan will chair, and to me, that is worthy of comment. because he's been absolutely superb. he's not going to retire. he doesn't know how to do that. i don't know what he's going to do. but if it's an enormous loss to the senate. byron dorgan can talk on any subject at any time at great length or shortly, whatever is required. he can be on three different television stations at the same time. i don't know how he does that, talking passionately about jobs going overseas and, you know, having tax incentives for that to happen. he cares so deeply about

manufacturing. he's the quintessential of what i would call -- if you have north dakota and west virginia isn't similar, one is flat and the other is not, but we are very similar in our people in our work at and byron dorgan exemplifies that. he makes me incredibly proud just to serve with the guy. you watch him, he never stops moving. i think he's already spoken on the floor twice this morning. i know i saw him once. i didn't watch the floor very much, is probably twice. he always has his thoughts in order, he's always right. i can't think of a single time we disagreed, and sure it's happened, but it doesn't come to mind. so i think this is going to be a weaker committee, this is going to be a weaker senate without byron dorgan, and i mourn that, because what we need in this place are people with passion,

and people who are not grouped by politics first of all or feel what she first of all, but are gripped by issues and particularly putting people to work,, not exporting jobs, but creating more jobs, somebody who's just totally working middle class oriented, and he is that. ..

nothing is frivolous, but he is a very good sense of humor. but you have to know him well. and he's a fighter. that's what this play should be about. somebody loves public policy. and not iran. >> your time is expired. >> no, it hasn't. [laughter] my thoughts about you have expired. >> thank you very much. you're very generous. >> well, and very generous, but i'm also very honest. you're good, byron, you need to know that. okay, so eager to talk about aviation security matters. as byron said there've been a lot of significant steps taken, the sole question of invasion of private security versus the security of the country, security of airports is huge.

and we're doing what everything is global now. everything is in an international environment and are others doing what we want them to do? and if not, what do we do about that? and so, i look forward to this hearing. i look forward to hearing their witnesses and i think the chair. >> thank you very much. senator johanns. >> mr. chairman and mr. chairman. let me, if i might just offer a word also. i want to say to chairman dorgon how much i appreciate the opportunity to be in the senate with you over the last two years. as a former secretary of agriculture who interfaced with you a lot when i was in the cabinet, i always know that when i had a meeting with you, i better turn will be prepared because i knew you were going to be prepared. and even though there were

probably many times where we ran opposite sides of issues, i want you to know that you're one of the members, when you pop up on the tv screen and i'm in my office going through paperwork or whatever, i tend to listen to what you're saying because you're so articulate and you have so much experience that you bring to bear. so i join with my chairman rockefeller has said. you have brought a lot to this body and you will be missed. i also wanted to offer just a word or two if i could about the subject of our hearing. first thing i want to say and i really feel i speak for everybody when i say this, and that is to just recognize how important airline security is. we all watched in horror on 9/11

as those planes were flown into the tower and into the ground and into the pentagon. and we certainly don't want to ever, ever see that again. and we want to do everything possible. i fly a lot, like every member, i have flown a lot internationally because various jugs that i have had i required me to do that. in my experience with the traveling public has been good. i think if we explained to them the need for the security and what we're doing and why we're doing it, the public has been more than willing to go along. and it's been an evolutionary process, as we all know. i think we can all remember the days when you could arrive at the airport play minutes ahead of the flight, make a mad dash for the ticket counter and make a mad dash for the gate and run

on the airplane. well, those days are over. and the public has been understanding. ms security has developed a nice we have explained the need for security, the public has evolved. so if i were to just offer one talk, whether its international flight or domestic flights, i think if we could communicate to the public, this is why this is needed. this is why we are taking this new staff. it will go a long way to calming the concerns of people. the last thing i wanted to mention on international flight, an important piece of the security puzzle for me as baggage. what are we doing about baggage clerks can we be assured that that that that is put into that airplane is safe, that it's been checked, that they cannot piece of the security puzzle his towel

is. we can ask our travelers to go through a lot, whether it's advanced screening, whether it is a pat down, whatever it is. but if we're not getting the job done on the cargo, then very simply we've got a problem. so i'll be anxious to hear about that. but again i'll just wrap up and say, i just believe this is so terribly important that we get this right, that we communicate with the public and we continue to let them know why these measures are important. thank you. >> senator johanns, thank you very much. as you're mentioning, i came here 30 years ago when a time you could rush to the airport, rushed to the ticket counter, and get on the airplane and have a cigarette, not that i smoked at the time. things have changed very dramatically.

the first thing was to make certain the people who boarded the airplane did not have a gun. the reason is people were using airplanes on guns to hijack the airplane mostly to fly to cuba, but sometimes applied to other places. if you could potentially separate a garden, then you are good. so things have changed so much with the shoe bomber and underwear bomber and also we find ourselves at a very different situation, that was just american or u.s. airports, but with airports all around the world. i'm very pleased today to honorable david heyman, director of policy at the department of homeland security. the case of fork out security transformation agency, office of global strategies, international operations at department of homeland security. and mr. stephen lord, the director of homeland security and justice issues at the gao, government accountability office. is it someone? mr. heyman, thank you for being

with us. when you provide a full statement of the witnesses that were made part of the record. mr. heyman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. for having us here today. let me thank you and join in thanking your service, support for the department over the years and for economic security for even longer. the topic today continues to be one of great importance. as you know, the attempts of the past year to attack the united states made the international accounting for the aviation system quite clear. in both cases, terrorists like to strike at america by using international aviation system. the structures and operations across multiple countries and international airports to attack us here at home. the key lesson in both of these incidences if you have access to one part of system, you have access to the entire system. this attempted attacks highlight the fact that the terrorist

threat is a global challenge and ensuring aviation security is a shared responsibility. consequently, efforts to protect americans at home must extend beyond their shores to include partnerships with industry and governments abroad. in fact, american security relies on in part a robust system comprised of many layers, operated by many partners across many continents. the system of collective security, in part relies upon the competent and capability of each individual partner at such maintaining effective standards and best practices is critical. and so, i commend you on the steering and shedding light on the support topic. we will talk today about our response to the october 28 cargo pilots. the work we've done over the last year. and as he said, we've submitted a full statement for the record. the october cargo pod represents an evolution to the threat beyond passenger planes to

cargo. our enemies continue to try to penetrate our security. senator dorgan, as he said, we separated the gun from the passengers and we've tried to separate the bumps in the passengers. now bombs are going elsewhere. the department and its partners need to adapt and innovate as well in terms of addressing these threats. it that ability to address to anticipate and craft strategies for their person to secure the flows of people and cargo around the world that will allow us to prevail. the department both as a matter of response to the failed attacks and is part of a larger strategy already underway has undertaken a number of members to increase aviation security. we augmented a distant protocols for cargo including temperately grounding all packages in yemen destined to the united states. but can't medication and in coordination with the private sector, with information, were able to support the larger government to disrupt apart on october 28 before he did any

harm. dhs is also issued additional directives to the ailing industry on nonacceptance for extra screening of high-risk packages on passenger and all cargo flights. those directors are in effect today. in terms of our broader effort is 1225 and the attempts of abdulmutallab and the device another lens to detroit, we accelerated efforts to enhance international and domestic aviation standards come with a focus on four key priorities: first, strengthen aviation security measures and standards. second, develop and deploy new security technologies and measures. they're coming in for an information gathering and sharing. i'm forth, coordinating international technical assistance. in terms of strengthen aviation security standard, immediately following the events of top 25, we initiate a broad international campaign to strengthen global aviation system against evolving threats posed by terrorism. the deputy secretary and i traveled to and consulted with

nearly a dozen countries, touching on every continent or region. the secretary then participated in five regional summits and meetings engaging nearly 90 countries and consultations and discussions. that effort culminated in a declaration by al qaeda, as he mentioned an aviation security bill is signed into by 190 nations and following that the assembly meeting of ik out, the council updated its standards to include updates on cargo security. this is a major accomplishment. in terms of developing and deploying new technologies, more than a dozen nations have joined the united states in strength and aviation systems at boosting budgets on security phineas ameritech ologies to include advanced imaging technology and the expansion of federal air marshals and screening of air cargo. in terms of enhancing information gathering, we have this week, a secure flight initiative, we now have taken over the responsibility for vetting 100% tax on flights in

or about to united states against the watch list. a number of other technology initiatives on information sharing initiatives in court nation on technical system; it will touch upon in her opening statement. let me conclude by recalling a strategic document that we put forth this year, first-ever quadrennial homeland security was developed by the department and released earlier in february this year. and that we set forth a vision of faith comiskey are resilient homeland where aspiration to live life can thrive. that is their vision. particularly clear mission, goals and objectives to a congress destination. we concluded rightly that america, this nation can protect itself, but we must all play a role. and the commitment of these, we will secure the homeland for all. the same conclusion is true for all those who comprise the international aviation system in the commitment of each we will secure the system for all. i look forward to the discussion today. thank you.

>> mr. heyman coming to an inaccurate testimony. next we hear from his vicki reeder, director of global strategies. ms. reeder you may proceed. >> chairman dorgan, chairman rockefeller, senator johanns and senator lautenberg coming thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the topic of effort to include aviation and security standards. the security administration as they can put an agency with dhs charges protection the nation's transportation systems. in addition to travel within and from the united states, tsa ensures the robust authorities apply to all u.s. airlines regardless of where they are flying into all flights operating directly to the u.s. but the daily network of thousands of flights went across the globe, the security and performance of our individual operations are only as strong as those of our international partners. within tsa, the office of global strategies are ogs works with international partners to ensure

that security is established and maintained. ogs connects these offers 33 primary missions. the first one is compliant, which i'll explain and that is the one of which i'm a director. we conduct outreach and engagement image or a capacity development. we used the risk based approach that looks at the threat, vulnerability and the consequence in place for each of the flights from airports to provide the service that to reevaluate. in compliance, my group identifies and evaluates the risk that is in place, the threat and vulnerability in place at each of the airport to leave in charge evaluate. elected all 300 plus airports from which they operate from which ford eric harris aubrey to the united states impose high risk to international troubles than those we've been informed to do so by the secretary of homeland security. ogs is five regional operations centers in approximately 65

inspectors who perform on this work. the 300 airports have visited on a one to to three year interval preventing depending on the risk that identified with those airports. the evaluations at the airports are based on international civil aviation organization or ipo standards and recommended practices. so these are the international requirements for the airport assessments. ogs also conducts sessions of every air carrier in the united states and every air carrier around the world, regardless of whether flying. our evaluations of those operations are based on tsa regulations. those regulations are codified in the standard of security programs, security direct is an emergency amendments. his other mechanisms through which tsa is able to regulate, able to direct activity to be taken at foreign countries and foreign airport. there were outreach and engagement efforts, we work with

international counterparts at the global, regional and bilateral levels. the global level, worked very closely with the international fable big organization and our focuses on enhancing baseline international security standards. but the bilateral levels, we deploy tsa representatives at locations throughout the world to work on developing transportation security measures, share best practices and coordinate implementation of appropriate responses for new and emerging threats arise. if especially with the foreign air carriers, other components of tsa work with the u.s. carriers with the foreign carriers and associations. we assure that the necessary procurement are implemented and airlines are alerted to threats as best we can. finally, capacity development is the third leg of our stool at

tsa. we help partners build sustainable security practices through this capacity development effort. we have a team of instructors who are able to go to various countries, various airports, evaluate security posture, identify areas where they need additional help and then we work with state department, organization of american states and other funding sources to get the mechanisms to be able to pay for extended support to various locations. to such locations were st. lucia and liberia, but we've been working extensively with yemen. in fact, we have a team it's an odd the works tomorrow. they been for two weeks working with the yemenis and we have a program that will be setting up in the very near future that will be an 18 month program at cnn. in the past 11 months, we've taken a number of initiatives that have enabled us to make

gains in compliance and outreach and engagement and capacity development. her example, we've deployed personnel to the winter games in vancouver, to the viva world cup and to haiti following the earthquake. in areas of outreach and engagement can we find agreement with cacao with liaison officers with foreign governments. there have capacity development we concluded the effort and st. lucia and are about to conclude efforts and might be we look forward to your questions and i defer to mr. lord for the additional gao comments. >> ms. reeder coming thank you for her testimony. next we'll hear from mr. stephen lord. he represents the government accountability office and director of homeland security justice issues in the office. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i is well am honored to appear at your life to a chaired. and we also wanted to thank you for your years of service.

today i would like to discuss u.s. efforts to harmonize aviation security standards with those of other nations as the other witness mentioned, the december 25th terrorist incident in detroit in the recent air cargo incident in yemen underscores the importance of undertaking efforts to harmonize these standards. today i like to do essentially two things. discuss dhs and process in international aviation standards and practices, as well as discuss some related challenges they encounter in doing so. one of the key messages i want to convey today is tsa and dhs have taken several important steps over these last few weeks and months at the same time i think it's important to find out that harmonization is not a new concept. these efforts have been ongoing for many years and progress has been instrumental in deliberate. for example, the first amendment to the icao on securitization and exquisite.did in 1976, the

latest amendment, amendment 12 was approved last month after three years of patient negotiation. in terms of progress and as noted by mr. heyman, the secretary of homeland security is participated in five regional summit in the beginning of the year. the security principles espoused during these regional summit on the basis for icao's december declaration aviation security. this is a very significant achievement. this declaration, i'll icao achievement took efforts to strengthen security procedures, utilize modern technologies to better detect explosives and dangerous items as well as provide technical assistance to those in need. it's also worth noting that tsa plays a very important role on the harmonization efforts. for example, tsa has been at the forefront of efforts to

encourage other countries to adopt advanced imaging technology, the so-called body scanners, but at least 13 other nations are now testing or deploying these scanners or have committed to deploying them in the near future. the agency has also worked closely with foreign governments in drafting the latest amendment to the icao annex on security. a major focus of the recent negotiations as air cargo. as gao recently reported, however, harmonizing air cargo standards is extremely difficult because of the global nature of the air cargo supply chain as well as other regulatory logistical challenges in a number of players involved. and as the tsa administrator noted on the recent hearing before this committee, tsa will need several more years before it can effectively ensure that all inbound are cargo, that air cargo climb into our country is fully screened in accordance

with 9/11 mac requirements. and it's important. i'd like to give ms. reeder and not. it's important at the tsa for an airport assessment helps achieve these broad harmonization goals for this foreign airport assessment she manages. choo-choo program, tsa would use the security practices of foreign airport to help identify where a country might need additional security training and technical assistance. we think that's a very useful expenditure of tsa resources. we'll have more to say about this program next year. we're currently doing a comprehensive audit and we expect to report on this probably the middle of next year. at the same time, i'd like to also highlight a number of challenges that dhs and tsa face in their efforts to harmonize. first come harmonization depends on the voluntary participation of foreign countries, which is sovereign nation cannot be

compelled to implement specific security standards. the second, many developing countries do not have the resources or human capital to enhance security programs in a manner consistent with their expectations. and third, legal and cultural fact there is sometimes inhibit harmonization efforts. i think a good example is somebody of recent concerns countries across the world have expressed about adopting body scanners. they've expressed concerns related to privacy and help. in closing, the recent air cargo pods demonstrate that enhancing aviation security is the shared responsibility among u.s. foreign and industry stakeholders. and harmonization efforts were discussing today should be considered part of a nation strategy for improving aviation security and deterring future threats. however, other elements include timely intelligence, effective technology, well trained and capable staff and regular

oversight such as conducted by this committee. mr. chairman, that concludes my statement. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you for the work the government accountability office routinely does. i'd like to ask a cooperation of the three witnesses that i made for a moment. we have a second panel of only one presenter and i would like to ask your cooperation if i'm isi presenter to come forward to the end of the table and make this presentation. if mr. gregg principato who is the president of the airports council international. and if we could have mr. principato's testimony on the record. and then when i call them members of the committee, we can ask questions of all of them. it's a thank you for your cooperation in allowing that to have been. we do have some time restraints and i want to handle it that way. mr. principato cover the presence of the airport international nursing that will be made part of the record.

if you're willing to summarize we'd appreciate that. you may proceed. >> thank you very much, senator dorgan. i may begin as well by adding my appreciation for the career well served and all you've done for the country, for the senate, deviation industry and of my colleagues here said, i'm honored to be part of the last hearing come as a thank you very much. mr. chairman, members of the subcommittee come on behalf of members their parts counter international north america, thank you for me to testify this afternoon. it's important that industry and government work together to find solutions to secure aviation system and passengers. close coronation yields positive results. after discovering a bomb threat using liquid explosives in 2006, tsa recorded closely with tsa and airlines to be on liquids, aerosols and gels. airports were instrumental reach out to committee to explain a checkpoint procedures, which help to mitigate confusion at airport security checkpoints.

at the aftermath on christmas day, 2009, tsa impose new security requirements with regard passengers boarding flights to the u.s. to additional screening and enhance carry-on luggage. the procedure is caused wait times to security checkpoints and in many cases, flights to the u.s. were delayed or canceled. they had no choice to work with their airlines to cancel 25% of all the u.s. bound flights due to delays caused the increase keeping requirements. these new mandates were particularly cumbersome for european airport, which unlike the u.s. are actually responsible for screening passengers and baggage. unfortunately, while the department of homeland security and tsa were closely with the airlines on december 25th company did not kittner with airports. we press for meeting the secretary napolitano when she graciously gave us, where we

offered to assist dhs and working with airports, both domestically and internationally to develop sustainable security measures. since then, dhs and tsa have begun to better coordinate with foreign governments and global industry stakeholders to strengthen aviation security standards. in addition, we routinely encourage tsa, canada and the european union to develop mutually recognized standards for security screening technology. having similar standards will allow passengers, baggage and cargo to be screened once, which will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the security process. as a result of the christmas day bombing incident, tsa announced its plans to install advanced technology. although supportive we stress to tsa the need to consider peru political screening with aig versus metal detectors and the space available in airport points. in response to these concerns, tsa has begun installing a i.t.

that can readily accommodate machines. the concern to pose significant challenges in airports where major facilities modifications may be necessary to accommodate the equipment. along with installing ait, tsa is implemented to enhance patdown procedures. advance of the implementation of these pat downs, we strongly urge tsa to conduct a public awareness campaign to educate travelers on the rationale and necessity for the new procedures unfortunately, tsa launched a public awareness campaign only after the public backlash. it's critically important for airports to receive timely and actionable intelligence information from dhs and tsa. as the christmas day bombing incident showed, this is not always the case, yet even this intelligence was airports to make risk informed decisions to help mitigate threats by effectively using the limited

resources to ensure the security of the facilities and passengery directives is a way to issue security regulations for airports has become increasingly challenging. we understand tsa must be old to issue security direct is in response to intelligence involving an imminent threat as with a liquid pot for years ago. however, tsa as you security directives shall cost of regulations that do not meet the threshold with little or no industry regulation or input. were please however with tsa's willingness to examine some outdated security initiatives through the end of security review task force initiative by aci north america, which is to let tsa and airport industry representatives to have an open discussion about sustainable security measures. and we commend tsa for this coronation at the airport industry. aci north america in november or ports and ready to partner with tsa to help maintain the secure aviation system. you might be interested to know

that yesterday representatives from key commercial aviation stakeholders got together in our offices to discuss all this in the best ways to move forward hammer prepared to work with you, colleagues in congress, dhs, and tsa and others on continuing improvements to the system. we remain optimistic that dhs and tha will more closely courtney with the airport industry and with the international community and future aviation security measures. at order taking your questions. >> mr. principato, thank you for your perspective on these issues. as a good number of questions, but i think i will defer questions until others have been able to ask you questions. so all: senator rockefeller. senator lavender, why don't you proceed quite >> all just take a couple of minutes, mr. chairman because we're called back to something else and i wanted to thank the witnesses. i feel that we've got a very good team at homeland security

and tsa and i thank them for their work. i particularly did not want to miss a moment to say that we're going to miss you, mr. chairman. we served together for a great number of years, about 16. i left for a couple of years and i'm hoping you'll have a chance to think about the. maybe we'll see you again. but it's been an honor and a privilege to work with byron dorgon. thoughtful, articulate, loved his job and gave it his best. and you'll be missed and we wish you and your family all good things in the future. don't be afraid to give this device. you have been until now, so why would you start at this point? >> thank you pretty much. and thank you cannot put my questions to the witnesses in

writing. select senator lautenberg coming thank you through much senator johanns after which all: senator rockefeller. thank you, mr. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. principato, i'll start with you. i offered the observation in my opening statement, as you know, that if passengers can kindest be forewarned about what is coming, if possible -- to show seems to work together. it is your bond that as a think about the next generation of security and what might be required, what is the best way to roll these things out if you will? >> senator johanns, and think the point you made is it just can't be overstated. it's critical. as i mentioned 2006, we have a liquid pot. many less and mr. moore on the

conference call late that night and no one knew anything. as i was going to be rolled out the next morning. but if the government, airlines and airports at a magnificent job of getting together with absolutely no lead time to educate public on what was going on. there was an awful lot of -- people went that night figuring they would show up at the airport an hour off before their flight and maybe find and see their family. and they got there and it different. but because of all the efforts of all three players of the airlines, there were folks at the a airport asking what was going on, explaining why. there's a lot of excellent work done with the press overnight to make sure the story was out. it's worth looking back on my case and seeing how the situation were you at no lead to manila, a it really worked very well. it is very frustrating that given that the pat downs and so

forth are rolled out without that kind of effort. and now john pistol, for whom i've agreed to have regard, by the way, is going to href in childcare. he's already indicated he could have won that. but i think passengers want information that you've got their best interests at heart. and i think if we can do that by working together, but that's really the model for the way forward. >> gray. appreciate those thought. i don't know which witness would be best equipped, but i would buy just a little education here in my foreign travels, my observation has been that, for example, if you fly from what state a third world country in

the fly from the interior of the country, the security is quite honestly kind of so-so. but it seems like an foreign observations they have kind of hub system where you fly into a more major airports to be, wherever does come a security really thinks up at that point and that looks like u.s. security and then you come over the ocean wherever you're coming from. is that a correct observation? is that what we are dealing with? and if that is a correct observation, what is the key element in terms of bringing security to that system if you will? >> maybe we'll split the question. i'll take the first part. so the observation is probably -- is possibly correct. there is a difference that you may be observing is that in 250 or so countries or places around

the world represent a last point of departure, we are coming directly from another country to the united states. those last points of departure we have programs with fewer security -- security programs in our security direct is, but to ensure that the level of standards aren't here to, that are critical for our own domestic interests. those are regulated through the 9/11 and are overseen by my colleague here in terms of oddity and then in curing to maintain those standards. and so, you will see -- you may see a type of difference. the part of the reason that we've just gone through this last year's efforts to increase standards globally is so that we can actually raise the bar across all points of departure.

>> to provide a little background, the program that i managed now actually began with the twa flight back in 1985, or the navy dagger was taken out and assassinated by the terrorists. that was the genesis of a foreign airport assessment program, which has gained momentum over the years. and the challenge we face is that icao annex 17 focuses on international airport. countries are encouraged to apply those same standards to their internal airports, but they're not obligated to do so. so if you're taking off from a small airport in poland and you go to warsaw, that's all within the e.u. unfortunately that is subject to produce strict standards. but the same situation and say kenya doesn't apply, so you take off from the small airport in kenya and you go to nairobi.

and you depart -- nairobi is not a good example because we don't have direct flights, but those airports that have direct service to the united states, as mr. heyman explained, they are monitored by my inspectors. because at least one of your to look at air carrier inspection activity and we do an airport assessment at least every one to three years to see they are complying with standards when they are not fully compliant, take actions with government or even at the airport to revise additional training. >> thank you, mr. chairman. senator rockefeller. >> first come a quick with senator johanns on the public adjusting to more security. there really isn't any choice. and it's been -- you know, the pat downs which only affect about 3% of the people who go on to airports and airplanes and they have to fill another test to get to.

you know, it is sensationalized makes everybody nervous. in fact, it is necessary and others have learned how to live with us and i think we can too. so i really agree with you and i think tsa is doing a terrific job at it. in fact, on most trips i'll find a tsa person, particularly in rural areas where they are developed a family who doesn't speak the english language all that well. but they handled very nicely. but i routinely do is to find out the supervisor and break the letters and what a good job i did. i think they're doing a great job in the adjustment as part of the responsibility of the media and most important the american people themselves to face reality. i was very interested in what you said about canada and 25% of their flights being canceled. i really reflect bolivia. you know, not knowing what the security procedures are, i would

assume that they'd be pretty rigorous. and then i would potentially falsely going to assume that once they took off from canada and landed in the united states and were then departing from that airport to some other destination, that they would be allowed to go for a security system without -- you know, without special attention because they've been through the canadian one because i assume the canadian one had been dead. what you say is really stunning they canceled 25% to this country because of long lines of waiting, which doesn't make sense to me because i only traveled from the busiest airports in the country and they don't take up much time. so several questions. one is do we have those kind of arrangements, all of you, with other countries, that if they do

a good security, that they can not get a pass, but whatever the proper word is within america as they change to another desk nation. that's number one. number two, the very fine line that you've talked about it has reiterated also. mr. heyman, the line on a third world country, where some say okay, the rural airport is not so good, but the main airport is good. that's very tricky. and it is hard to get a third world country to upgrade. it's expensive. they don't have that. they don't have experience. they don't have sort of the mentality and the resources that we do in the west. so how do you judge in your audit, ms. reeder, which you do of these countries, how much they need to do to be

satisfactory in order for us to trust them. how do you make those judgments? and then the canada question, too. but you go ahead. >> yes, sir, going to the canada question first, there are 1813 now airports around the world that are preclearance airports. they're a team canada, for an islands in the caribbean and the up and take and then there is one in ireland, soon to be too. at these preclearance facilities, their customs and border protection officers who do the customs, the immigration and the agricultural screen while the passengers. we've entered to win agreements in those countries where they conduct screening that is equivalent with what is done in the united states. so they use dtd is on the passengers the same way we do. they do pat downs the same way we do. they do everything. perhaps any tentacle, but certainly very comparable to

what is done in the united states at u.s. airports. this is a very complicated legal matter that took us several years to go through the development of the standard operating procedures to ensure that the alignment was there and that the passengers were all being screened physically upon departure of the same way that they would be screened at the united states. as a result upon arrival, those passengers do not have to go back through. they don't enter the federal inspections station. they don't have to go back through tsa screening because we party verified and were regularly inspect them to ensure they are complying with tsa sop is, not with the rump government as a piece. there's 24 airports in canada provides service to the united states. if those are preclearance. the other 16 are not preclearance and they comply with transport canada's requirements, not with tsa's

requirements. the persons that depart from those other 16 airports. >> explain that difference to me because this is actually very interesting. because canada is having these problems. >> yes, sir. it may have been that there were issues with some understanding the complexities that we have been working on. they are not always the very first one in the lineup as though peace ticket generator, so that maybe were generated in in a letter way more about that particular instance. but the agreement we have reached with the different countries with ireland, aruba, bahamas, bermuda and with canada, are such that cbp has their roles and responsibilities are fulfilled at those four locations but rather than being fulfilled at the u.s. locations. and then we ensure that passengers themselves and their accessible property rescreen exactly the same way they would be here. now the other departures, for example, they are 10 islands in

the bahamas for no service to the united states. those measures are not the same thing with stunning shreveport an asset with a 16 airports is not as rigorous as screening as will be required for most preclearance airports because we do require a certain percentage of passengers that get randomly selectively screened. the dtd usage, et cetera. that's where the difference lies from the passenger in the experience perspective. there are no other countries whose measures have been deemed to be identical because we have to comply with the aviation and transportation security act requires that very specific things be done by tsa with all flights that depart from the united states, whether it's an internal domestic flight for outbound flight. it's a very specific requirements and that's where we get into the challenges with baggage that arrived from canada and from the other preclearance

locations because the baggage is not being screened using the same kind of equipment that we require for screening here in the united states. so we continue to have those discussions. so after the third world -- >> bedtime is out and i will continue in the next round. there are too many of us appear. okay, you go ahead. >> after the third world countries. as i mentioned, i have a cadre of 65 inspectors i have turnover at any given time, who are very skilled and very -- they have a lot of knowledge and expertise. >> and they are doing the audits. >> are the ones going to the foreign airports and looking at them. and airport that is the size of this room, for example, and they will look at are the doors locked? yes, doors are locked. it amounts wackos, but there's only two keys. okay so it is arduous perhaps there's vfw, but there's a limited number of doors.

there's a limited number of keys and a good key controls. and they determined that access control for that facility is strong. they may not have a sense, have a lake full of crocodiles. there are different ways they ensure that there is access control. and so, it's not that you have to have a 10-foot wall with triple couple tina wire at the top. there are different ways of accomplishing this. and so, we ensure the inspectors are familiar with would expect practices, what are ways that can meet these requirements without having to have all the bells and whistles we may have a u.s. airport. >> if i could just -- i know i will pursue service later, but the canadian issue just a little bit of quick perspective. and if you'd like, senator rockefeller can't bring in the air air portraiture from toronto next time you're in town to give you further perspective on this. toronto, to use the example used in the testimony, has more departures to u.s. cities banal about 3435 u.s. airports had the

u.s. cities. so it's an awful lot of -- a couple hundred of departures each day. even the busiest european -- european gateways don't have that kind of traffic. so while the extra requirements were sort of multiplied into situations like that. but they have a guess a constitutional compassion with taking people whose passports have been stamped in those countries and so they had to treat everybody the same and they ended up just beginning carry-ons and all that because they couldn't scream everything at the gate because they had to screen all the carry-ons by opening them out. there's a lot of things add up very quickly when you have that many departures. and i guess we ended up working very, very closely. i want to give tsa some credit here. we worked very closely with tsa and folks in toronto and some other canadian airport to help alleviate some of the and find some solutions to it. but you know, from the get-go, i

think these requirements put an end, there was a sense at all for an traffic is the same and it really isn't. the airports in canada have so many more departures, especially toronto's or montréal and calgary's come a vancouver's and so forth. it just sort of multiplied out. >> thank you. >> libby asked a couple of questions. the question i think i was asked earlier about the hub and spoke system and other countries, or the congress for that matter. that hubbard's boat question is very much like ours, a experience where facing terrace with that for the weakest link to book for the system. because of the system will be screened and rescreened generally speaking. so what, for example in africa does the hub and spoke system look like? and am i right that which i

would for the terrorists would try to find the weakest link on the hub and spoke system in order to get the system and how are responding to that? soon i guess, serotonin is a very limited number of supports in africa that provide direct service to the united states. from every airport except preclearance airports i mentioned previously, at every airport, everyone has to be rescreen. the passengers are prescreened. their accessible property is rescreened and checked packages rescreened. it's not as though, the person gets on an aircraft in uganda and flies to dakar senegal, that the uganda thread is what we're concerned about as much as ensuring that dakar is the strongest possible amount which is why tsa focuses the majority of our efforts on the five points of departure or from most places were u.s. carriers apart. places like yemen and pakistan, there are other areas where we focus attention as well because

they want to ensure that because there are so many flights that are coming from those locations or because there is an incident that has occurred, we want to ensure that at the very beginning that security is being implemented. and so we will do that at the direction of the secretary. >> if we were holding this hearing at the exit airport for the christmas bomber, what kind of security would we find at that airport small it? >> actually, he departed from amsterdam direct the united states. at that time, there were whole body images that were not in the terminals with direct flights to the u.s. this has placed transfix al departure points for the u.s. but the security in place at amsterdam i can provide to you and ssi briefing on exactly the posture briefings. we did team there very recently, but that would not be an area of concern for me.

>> okay. and you mentioned a number of -- a universe of 300 airports and then you also mentioned the universe about 60 or or 65 inspectors, 55, 60 inspectors. >> yes, sir. >> go over again with those 300 airports are present. tonight they're about 270 advantage erects service to the united states. another 30 or so have all cargo service to the united states, but no passenger service to the united states. recognizing we do have limited resources, with hunter and rent in a evaluation of the threat, how much terrorist activity has been documented, how many terrorist screening database matches the root of both airports, et cetera. we look at historical vulnerabilities as a result of the assessments they conduct they conduct another look at the size and the number of the aircraft to depart from those locations. so if we're looking at an airport that is to fight for the

19 theater only to the united states and there's never been a ts db coming from that location, that's not real high on the list. a place that is to triple sevens with three ts db matches per passenger, that's very high on the list. and so those are the ways we look at where we should send people and ensure that we get two of those locations in a reasonable amount of time to ensure the security posture at those locations continues to meet the standards we've identified. >> the other issue, mr. principato, perhaps you could respond to this is you represent airports in the united states, correct? and you know, we understand that we have standards here that we expect to be implemented across the country and in a similar fashion. and it is also the case, with respect to aviation safety or environmental standards, any number of things, that you can add whatever standard you want a paper i'm writing.

the question is are they implemented and how are they enforced? can you give me your assessment based on the meetings you have held at international airports and partners abroad, what is the notion of the enforcement of standards as you see it? what should we believe exist out there with respect to the enforcement standards? >> yeah, i think -- i've been talking to airport leaders all over the world. of course, there isn't a single one who wants to run in a secure airport. they all want to -- they want to the security they could possibly have. in many cases this is already been described by ms. reeder and others. i like the resources and training to do that. so they're certainly looking to do that. but you know, there's plenty of places around the world a desire to be discussed in europe and elsewhere, where the standards are as good as what we have

here. and you know, i think the main thing -- i think the main point and want to make about this is that the department of homeland security's temples to work through icao and harmonize and work with other countries exactly the way to go. i think early on we responded in a decade to the liquids and gels pod. there were airport folks in africa and are swell, who were just frustrated. they say now i've got to do this, now we've got to do that. were not part of this and now they are. i think there's a genuine desire around the world to meet the highest standards they could possibly meet. you've got boeing building planes that can go point to point to at the different places we didn't have before. people want in on that. they can't get in on that unless they're part part of the solution. i'm very pleased that should the u.s. government is working so hard through icao with their

international partners to develop standards, get them on board that we can have a more uniform approach throughout the world. >> mr. lord, what progress has tsa made from their perspective in establishing a system to screen 100% of the inbound air cargo? on the passenger aircraft? >> sure, sure, we received a port in june of this year on that very subject. and what we gave tsa good marks for establishing a system to meet the 9/11 act requirements on domestic air cargo carried on passenger flights, we pointed out they did not meet 9/11 act requirements on into air cargo passenger flights. together with a multitude multitude of reasons why you're essentially working with the number of foreign government to help harmonize standards and help ensure that the systems in place. but it didn't credibly complex

opposition and the tsa indicators that i will probably take until 2013 to come up with a system. i don't think they're ever going to have identical screening systems. i think the operative word is commensurate with. the tsa is currently in the process of evaluating certain number of other country systems to ensure their commensurate with tsa requirements. and it's going to take some time to do that. it's a valued process. they have to collect information and it's difficult. >> senator thune. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for calling the hearing and i want to express my appreciation to the panel of witnesses other joined us today to talk about a very serious matter. it's a question that's on the minds of more and more americans as they result of recent events in the increase in air travel that always happens this time of the year, whether it was