the book argues that american presidents need to master the tools of diplomacy and war in order to be effective. during this hourlong event hosted by the intercollegiate studies institute, professor codevia accepts the award and talks about his book. >> "advice to war presidents" how does somebody get off writing something like that, and why would anyone presume, how could anyone presume who is not himself a president or an adviser, a close advise or to presidents, presume to give advice and, further more, to tell these folks who have been, who are occupying the highest positions with regard to our foreign policy that they're in need of remedial course. why?

well, quite simply because they have done something terribly remarkable. the u.s. armed forces over the past century really have won some pretty tremendous battles. they've won every single battle, major battle into which they have been sent. and yet our state have managed to lose every single piece ha has ensued -- that has ensued from those battles. now, when you lose piece, you've lost the war. losing the piece after losing battles is unremarkable, there's nothing to explain. but losing the war after you've won the battle, that's not easy. it takes peculiar kind of talent to do that. and it raises, it raises some very important questions.

how come? well, the gross answer is that our statesmen's mistakes have not been mistakes of detail, they've been mistakes of multis. vince lombardi used to say that the difference between winners and losers is in the blocking and tackling. so he would presume to teach these pros how to block it -- blocking and tackling ever since they were that high. >> and this is when championships -- little neglect of these felts will lead to defeat. i submit to you that what has happened we're there in our foreign policy. in fact, they have missed the fundamentals. the foreign policy equivalent of blocking and tackling.

now, they are most concern this book is, in a sense, quite useless pause in high affairs as in low affairs, those who are in greatest need of remedial courses are least likely to pay attention to. go and tell condoleezza rice and warren christopher and people like that that they're in need of remedial courses, they'll say, well, i am -- who are you? but, in fact, reality says all the coherence veils little in the face of the results that they bring forth.

consider these results. world war i. this was followed not by what woodrow wilson promised which was a kind of universal peace, but rather by greater strife than had preceded it. the versailles settlement has not yet ceased to. what is going to happen there is still open to very, very deadly contention. palestine, the spire middle east -- entire middle east was reengineered after world war i, and it was reengineered very badly. henry cabot lodge warned against that and said the notion that we should fix the affairs of,

arbitrate between the groups, this was a trap the united states ought not to get into. but, no, people who have shown themselves to be wiser thought that we should, that we should somehow become the arbiters of the world. and, indeed, the fact that we were not, that we did not become the arbiters of the world became an item of environment of which the ruling class accused the american people of respondent for -- responsibility for world war ii. some of your may remember a movie title of which was wilson

about woodrow wilson. movie was made in 1944 and the heavy was none other than henry cab pot both -- henry cabot lodge. the move was so outrageous that when franklin roosevelt showed it to winston churchill, churchill walked out in a rage. anyway, the point of it was what every school child has said, the american people have learned. they were unfaithful to wellson, and ha really started world war ii not quite as much as adolf hiterer. world war ii. it was certainly necessary for franklin roos relate to support stalin in 1931. but it was most certainly

foolish for him to maintain that support after the battle of strollen -- stalin guard. stalin grad. this led us not to the peace that america's arms had won, but rather to a half a century of very, very dangerous cold war. thereafter, you're all familiar with the surplus of power that the united states brought against the soviet union, against, against communist forces in vietnam and how that surplus of power was translated to loss after loss. how come?

well, because a whole variety of ideas this which, many which all of the -- in which all of the schools of our foreign policy occurred. our foreign policy establishment purports to be wided into -- divided into three major schools, internationalists, realists and neoconservatives. in fact, these schools have far more in common than they have that divides them. quite simply, they all assume that the rest of of the world is ready, willing and, indeed, eager to become just like they are. the liberal internationalists belief that the -- believe that the rest of the world is ready to embrace development and to modernize. so all ha we have to do is give them help for modernization, and they will become just like us.

the neoconservatives believe that people's thirst to become just like we are or at least a lot more like we are than before while the realists believe that the ruling passion in the world is one for moderation and that realization of concrete interests, realization that all interests are ultimately compatible will lead everyone, really, to cooperate with us. well, all of this is really not true because it megaelects the individually of foreign nations, the fact that foreigners really are foreign, that they really rule themselveses. they have their own ideas about their own interests and that, it is impossible for outsiders to

shape those ideas. those ideas are theirs, and they will develop them as they wish. nothing we can do will change that. the best that we could do would be to take care of our own interests. but net another thing that our realists, neoconservatives and liberal internationalists are united about is that, in fact, the world has common interests. we have -- that, in fact, all of our interests are commensurable, all of our cultures are commensurable. parenthesis, by the way, this is not only nonsense in and of itself, but it is contradicted by the way our foreign policy, what i call a ruling class actually behaveses. they will say they recognize all other cultures as inherently

evil, but, of course, when they come in contact with the culture of most, they have nothing but content for the -- contempt for the culture of the average american. that is not a culture that they consider commensurable with their own. well, they do believe that they have a duty to reform the rest of the world. and, indeed, they have a duty to reform the rest of america. i just had a conversation with with, with one of the last president's advisers, one of president bush's close adviser. and i asked how he felt about the outcome of the war in iraq.

which, by the way -- for which, by the way, the bush administration never had a coherent objective. he said, well, it's true, we really meant to improve the quality of society, but we underestimated how primitive those people really were. it occurred to me, and i told him that not only iraq, but the rest of the world is filled with primitives. primitives defined as people unlike the add saysers to our president and, in fact, i was going to say but i didn't have time that america itself is filled with people whom our ruling class regards as

primitives. tea party people who they would like to reform, but of whom they believe are beyond redemption. never the necessary, they want to reform. how do they want to reform? well, these people would never think of themselves as imperialists. to -- no, no. they wouldn't as the british did, clamp down and tell locals some of their -- but our people would never presume to tell muslims that, for example, female circumcision's a bad idea or things like that. or they would not forcibly

reform foreign societies. well, what then do they want to do? well, they want to build nations, and they want to do it with a minimum of force although they're certainly willing to use some force. a minimal of force. not war in the election their needing of force. theodore roosevelt, who was not like these folks, called this kind of thing peace with insult. the worst of all policies. it doesn't result in anything other than making enemies. but foreign policy doesn't understand that. they don't understand that because they have wrapped what they do in a, in a cloak of language that appears to make

impossible things possible. for example, they peek of an -- speak of an international community as if such a thing existed. but, of course, the bedrock, the foundation of international life is something called sovereignty. sovereignty which means that every government is inherently unquestionable about its own internal practices. this goes back to the treaty of westphalia of 1648. ..

meeting trillion on a massive scale the enemy's capacity. they don't believe that's the thing that really accomplishes

anything. accomplish changes and antagonists as well, what is it? nationbuilding. what is not? well again, that involves perhaps a little bit of force and an awful lot of bribery. and when that doesn't work, then what do you do? then you try some more of it or you find an exit strategy. what does that mean? well, it means figuring out how to get out of there without looking too bad. but in reality, it ends you up with more enemies and it means you buy them have developed content for you, which of course

is highly dangerous. now this language warps the language of the foreign policy warps their understanding of the tools of international affairs. for example, take the term soft power. now, we don't know, those of us who read and they'd realize that there is such a thing as prestige and prestige counts for a lot. your reputation precedes you very often. and very often your prestige is at a certain protein c.

you don't even have to do anything to get your way. genghis khan, for example, genghis khan's forces would ride into european towns and offer their necks to be decapitated because they knew if they didn't do that they would certainly be tortured to death. that was genghis khan's reputation. people for the book, she's going to kill us. please kill us this way. what do people do nowadays when confronted by american diplomats why they most certainly don't say will give you whatever you want. this is what can you give to us? what can you give to us in

exchange for not bothering you too badly? if american troops come in, what they know they don't have to fear the kind of campaign that genghis khan would've been against this in relative safety. so reputation really does matter, but the concept of self power doesn't reach that. the concept of self power, which you may read about detailed and joseph nye's book by that name boylston on to this, that being -- being nice, being perceived as being nice actually moves people to do what you want. now, we all know that this isn't true. they get this is how -- this is

what is being taught. this is in fact a reflection of the highest levels in washington. the nice moves people to do what you want. but joseph nye calls europe quote a superpower of soft power. if you go yourself sufficiently harmless, people will do what it is you want. and by the way, if someone on the other side shows himself to be terribly frightening and harmful, people will simply turn away. that is what the ideology says. i submit to you that reality says quite something else. it is the rights of people being moved by honor, fear and

interest. that is not what joseph nye talks about. interest, by the way, is the least of these powers. honor is the second most powerful because it does lead people to sacrifice their lives to right wrongs, to abandon themselves, do the right thing. but fear is often the most powerful of those sacked tears. it takes an awful lot to overcome fear as hobbes has pointed out to us and all of this now. few things can overcome fear. one of them of course is fear of

a. now, i hate to keep harping on joseph nye, but joseph nye is very much a representative of our foreign policy class. he can reach us at nye's book on soft power and not read one word about what pope john paul ii did in his role in the fall of the soviet empire. john paul -- because of john paul you had a million people in warsaw square chanting we want god, we want god. you can imagine the feeling of the communist elite holed up in our offices above the square, watching a billion people yelling we want god in fearing that the pope might just say

something that would lead them to go get their atheist tormentors. but he doesn't recognize that. night doesn't recognize that. he does not take seriously that a certain politicized belief in god has led any number of muslims to want to kill americans and does not recognize the fact that a certain block of belief in god prevents the american government from taking those types of murders seriously. moving on with regard to diplomacy, the peculiar language

of our foreign policy establishment would have us believe that this thing called diplomacy exists and exerts power regardless of what it says, the mere contact infotech live. well, in fact it is not. words, we all know from our experience, our meaningful not for the harshness or softness, but for the realities to which they point. you can say whatever you like, but if in fact you are pointing to commands, you have no reason to hope that everyone will

believe you. shakespeare's line, i can call up spirits from the nasty deed. in answer to it, so can i.can i., but will they answer you click will they come? you can promise foreign government anything you want. but a person at the other and bless themselves, what are the chances of that happening? all of this came in the 1960s when the u.s. government invented the concept of a declaratory policy, particularly of nuclear weapons, but was applied in nuclear grounds as well. what is a declaratory policy as

opposed to a real policy? and what is the point of a diplomat going to another one saying well, this is our declaratory policy. the other diplomats say well, nice to hear about that, but now tell me about the real one. what is the evidence that what you're telling me is for real, that you are in fact going to do the things that you say you are going to do in this or that circumstance. where is the evidence. words have to be plausible. and in the book i appoint as an example of good diplomacy,

spartan general who very simply made offers that the other side could not refuse. such an offer is defined by asking far less than one is able to compile. the person who was last would be happy to comply with a request which he knows is less than the oscar could compel by the force that he has. force an excess of demand is called solvency. force that is inferior to the demand or demands that are greater is called encrypts the. in bankruptcy is quite as deadly in discrediting in international

affairs as it is in finance. then of course there is the concept of war itself. what is this thing called war? is the fact -- is it a reasonable thing to do? well, it is reasonable insofar as you plan to make it so. it is reasonable only insofar as the operations that you design. or they could be successful, actually bring about the piece that she went to live a. designing operations because of their visibility.

when designing operations because they might be pleasing from a domestic constituency to reform domestic sea for any purpose other than bringing about one's own preferred to use is quite utterly senseless. to put it most plainly, you should know whom you are shooting and what good that would do you. if shooting personsa, b. and c. will not bring you the peace that you want, by all means don't shoot them. find somebody else to shoot or stay in bed. war really must be conceived to bring about peace. otherwise, there's no point to

it. otherwise there is no end to it. the purpose of all movement is rest. what is the state of rest which are aiming to vote this motion bring it to that rest? these are questions that are not asked by our foreign policy establishment. nor does our foreign policy establishment ask against to shoot to cure the homefront. security is so terribly important. homeland security. we know all about that. every time i go to the airport we know about homeland security. that against him are we being secured? well, we're been secured against everybody and things are being secured against nobody. deciding against him to secure

yourself is as important to deciding who your enemy of worries them is exactly the same thing. precisely the same thing. does this involve profiling? absolutely. you have to decide who it is you're worried about. there's a good reason why israelis are not worried about orthodox going up their airplanes. it's a good reason for us not to worry about them blowing up our airplanes. and generally would be just as pertinent for us to worry about grandma and grandpa blowing up airplanes. but it would be terribly, terribly useful to worry about people in 13 countries blowing up our airplanes or people of a certain religion of peace blowing up our airplanes were

blowing up all sorts of other places. but that is common sense and common sense is certainly not part of our foreign process establishment. as a substitute for common sense, they would have a huge intelligence. now you certainly remember daniel patrick moynihan for who i worked in the senate. a man of many fellas but have some intellectual capacity. when you think intelligence is not going to be confused with intelligence. well, we have right now and intelligent community if you want to call it that, that cost us some 60, $70 billion.

what do we get for that? what kind of intelligence is inject it into foreign affairs by the squirmy of people working in tremendous secrecy? what are they trying to figure out? could they figure out that perhaps saudi arabia is full of wahhabi? you do need 60 or $70 billion to figure that. did you need to know -- does that tell you that 16 out of 19 hijackers on 9/11 were saudi? no, no, you didn't need it for that either. do you perhaps need it to tell you that every arab government supports the causes for which

9/11 was perpetrated? no, you don't need it for that either. so what do you need them for? well, you need them to tell you about the whereabouts of minor players in afghanistan or in iraq. the gee, why do you need that? supposed to killed all of them, would that bring you peace? with that bring you new pc word? no. so why are you spending all of that money, all of the effort for that? let me put in a little parentheses here. they don't do a very good job of that either. because i'm sure you remember that last december, a man walked

into a meeting at the vast space in cia pakistan -- i'm sorry afghanistan who blew himself up together with a number of cia folks. that was not the story. that is not what should be remembered. what is to be remembered in our media has forgotten is that man was supplying the cia with information about all of those little players in afghanistan. on the basis of that information by those drones carry missiles would be targeted. we've been shooting people, killing people in afghanistan and pakistan, on the basis of

information supplied to us by someone who in fact was working for the other side, had always been working for the other side. how other country and many other such people have managed to hold onto their feelings, have not blown themselves up, but continue to supply erroneous information? i don't know. but i did work for the senate intelligence for eight years and i would tell you we do not have any counterintelligence. and i can assure you that intelligence about counterintelligence was considerably worse than useless. and that is what substitutes for common sense in our foreign policy establishment. although this leads us back to the beginning of my point. namely that a book that offers a remedial course to accomplish a

statesman is kind of useless in one sense because they are not going to read it, they are not going to study it. they are not going to be brought back for common sense. of what use is that? well, this brings us back to our side, which aims to put books that teach common sense into the hands of the next generation. and perhaps the next generation will actually look at the results and say, you know, what our leaders have done with the vast resources at the command, that has not been good. perhaps we can do better. perhaps we should look into old

ways of doing these things better. and here is a book that in fact teaches those old ways, recounts the old ways. the book begins by saying there's nothing new in their. there's absolutely nothing new in the air. and if you read facilities, you probably said it even better than i did. the were trying to say in english and i hope you'll find it interesting. so thank you. [applause] card [applause] >> we have some time for questions. i'll ask you to repeat your

question. >> yes, sir. >> two questions. [inaudible] >> this was an excellent year. slow ripening fall, couldn't have been better. >> your lecture kind of reminds me of the book i studied from far too many years ago and is sitting on my bookshelf. i can't remember the author in the name of it. i think was politics among nations. he was a realist and perhaps he was a mock rebellion in his approach. but for your theme they are i get hints that perhaps maybe a degree of isolation in things that are soluble. you can't change character, difficulty getting people to comply. also, the business emphasized in

a very strong willingness to use it when necessary. is that correct that's part of your theme? >> no, sir. the question is, did you detect in my presentation a bit of isolationism because of my statement that some problems aren't soluble and not one ought to not imagine that one can simply change the world. and my answer is no, that is most certainly not isolationism. nor is it realism and the sons of the first regard against

isolationism. my point is that if one focuses on one's own needs, one's own problems successfully, one will have done one heck of a lot. that does not necessarily mean not involving oneself in the rest of the world. it means doing so, when necessary, for one's own purposes. it's not a question of isolating oneself. it's focusing on one's own needs. for example, for the contrast, theodore roosevelt was woodrow wilson. theodore roosevelt took the panama canal and was very much in favor of the annexation of hawaii and puerto rico for that matter. but he was -- he was doing it.

he was in favor of those things because he wanted america's outer works to the side and to be as potent as possible. woodrow wilson invaded mexico, invaded several nations in the caribbean, including nicaragua for the purpose of improving them, vastly different purposes. neither was an isolationist. in fact, isolationism is not a descriptive term, but in appetite of some others, but it was a matter of a different days. harriet cabot lodge certainly was not an isolationist, although he certainly portrayed that.

he was for a variety of involvement, but he wanted to be involved from the standpoint and for the purpose of the united states of america, not in any chance to reshape the world. in regards, housework and all, like lot of other realist, he believed and wrote that all men are moved by the same motives here. the colleges universal motives power. everyone wants to maximize power. well, that ain't necessarily so. some people are moved by desires, other of them are power. he does not understand tiered he does not allow morgenthau at

least in its original edition, did not allow for diversity of human motives. and yet we know that people do ask for it in very different reasons, which happened to be there around. ..

>> our current occupant of the white house would be well advised along with his secretary of statement to invite you down there and have you give a discussion to those folks. you certainly make a lot of common sense. my question is with regard to the upcoming elections we see a large tidal wave, a tsunami of the two-party inspired republicans. do you think that after november and, of course after january and hopefully we can call the republicans can regain control in the senate, the use see any possibility or common sense being restored to the american government?

>> the question is do i see any possibility that common sense would be restored to the american government by the electoral changes that will be forthcoming? of course. of course. given, though, that you have a tidal wave of public opinion which is at least as important, probably more important than any particular effect for result. what are the chances that this will draw on -- from some sense into our ruling class b that with regard to of foreign-policy or domestic policy. generally the answer is no. i don't think it will drown any sense into them. it will diminish their power somewhat, and it will most certainly increase their fears. that may be -- that may

substitute for common sense to some extent. but to learn it takes humility. i don't think that our ruling class has learned the meaning of the word humility. certainly they have lost their -- they have subjected the united states of america to grievous losses domestically as well as internationally, but i don't see any humility in the pages of the new york times. i don't see any utility in the journal of foreign affairs. i don't see any openness to other points of view or at least very little. the ruling class is a reaction, i think, was typified by the republican. when the newly elected folks come here we are going to just correct them. and they will try. they will succeed to some extent, but they will not

succeed otherwise. ultimately to answer your question this electoral cycle is by no means the end of a tsunami because i believe that something radical has happened to american public opinion in the last two years, three, four years. the bush administration having been as much responsible for it as the obama administration. the american people's realization that we are not led by the sharpest rise in the george. yes, sir. >> you gave illustrations that kind of pointed to a negative performance. >> yes, sir. >> of the state department and intelligence department. can you give us any positives. you mentioned the door

roosevelt. can you give any positive once? is there any other nation in the world today that as you observe them appear to be implementing the positive traits of good for a policy? >> yes. look. i am an unabashed admirer and fan of john quincy adams. i cannot think of an american who embodied prudence, wisdom, and an understanding of the peculiar need that the united states of america as much as john quincy adams. he was followed by william seward who worshiped him. he was followed by of the statement who did their best to follow him.

up three theodore roosevelt. we have had a run of loose zonians including george w. bush. i cannot think of a more distinct negation of the founders' view of foreign-policy or more succinctly negation been george bush's statement that america will not be free until the rest of the world is free. meaning we are never going to be free. as for effective foreign policy in our time at think you have to look to china. consider their vast eternal problems. i would not want to be the chinese. right now there are sitting on top of the simmering volcano. how that is going to develop no

one can say. but sitting as they are they are playing their hand in east asia as competently as any deal politician comes to mind. as any gile politician would want. namely strengthening our military control over the periphery while conducting a masterly diplomacy with regard to both the united states and japan and meanwhile intimidating the lesser powers.

a very subtle game. if you want to look at machiavellian -- effective machiavellian diplomacy in our times look to china. >> one more question. >> yes, ma'am. >> you seem to indicate that american involvement in the problems in palestine many years ago, chiefly the british who were handling that are handling it with the bell for declaration and the palestinian mandate, would you tell me, please, what was the american involvement? >> i apologize if i gave you the wrong impression. what i said was that henry taub that large warned against our involvement in that situation.

you are quite correct that it was the british who crafted jordan and present-day saudi arabia and really failed to help their clients, the people whom the hashimites had helped to defeat the turks during the war and let the wahhabis of the match family defeat was made necessary the establishment of jordan and iraq. this was a british thing. and, of course, the declaration and the failure to support that. again, we are not the only power that has practiced diplomacy.

[applauding] >> to find out more about the paolucci/bagehot book award or the intercollegiate studies institute visit the isi got org. >> a hugh pope, where did you get the title "dining with al-qaeda"? >> better than eating chinese with al-qaeda. recounts an episode in the book, one chapter. very soon after september 11th i was sitting down with the missionary from the al-qaeda camps where most of the saudis who were the canon fodder on the jets here in washington had been . the dinner started off with him saying i am going to kill you. i said to a soldier that's not

necessary. and after about half an hour i convinced them that i was the person that wanted to hear his story. in those days you could bill see and -- still be innocent in the middle east. i read a lot about the way he thought and what he told me about those kids that were on the plains. obviously very difficult for americans to believe that those people have normal lives back home, but they did. that is what my book is about, trying to humanize the middle east. not to justify terrorism, but to explain what the context is. >> how is it that he hooked up with him? >> as usual these things are quite random. i had a friend who gave me a contact. at a certain point your driving out to the out-of-town and suddenly someone is introduced. i was lucky. my colleague did something that was a little bit more like an ambush, but not much different.

poor danny had his head covered. i feel very lucky that i got a way to tell the story. >> what did you learn? >> i think i learned that the way -- the reason that he wanted to kill me at the start of the interview was that he believed that i wanted to kill him. that is the key thing. you must remember that in most complex when you are brought it always feels much more when you receive it and when you give it. i think that is the main lesson. when america is conducting military expeditions all over the middle east with probst and montrose, you should be aware that it is rarely felled by the people there. it is not just what is being felt in america. >> still in contact with anyone associated with al qaeda? >> no. the reason i gave up journalism. i was 25 years a journalist.

to after the iraq war, i was the only correspondent. trying to explain to americans why the war was pointless. but would blow up in their face literally and not be taken seriously at all. the finding that actually it makes a difference. i'm so happy i was a journalist for a long time, but ultimately i could not go on with the old system in the middle east. i have a british passport. we have done a lot of damage in the middle east. work for the "wall street journal" which vehemently supported this point. i am going up to ordinary people saying talk to me. tell me your story, and it will make a difference. that was the whole deal. i felt it did make a difference. i resigned. lucky enough two years later i

joined the international crisis group for conflict resolution ngo and i'm feeling a lot more happy and my work now. >> the author of "dining with al-qaeda," three decades exploring the many worlds of the middle east. thank you, sir. >> walter star -- walter stahr chronicles john jay. he talks about the founding fathers career as the first chief justice of the supreme court. secretary of foreign affairs, governor of new york, and president of the continental congress. john j. was born on december 12th 1745. this event from the national archives is about 40 minutes.nol >> i would like tod give a littr intro for our speaker. walter stahr was born in massachusetts and corrupt and california. study political science atliticl stanford and graduated there in,