so it's surprising, given, it surprises me even more that we haven't written about it or talk about it in terms of the kind of racial terrorism and that was happening in the united states. and i think that we need a truth and reconciliation committee to really cleanse ourselves of this past and be honest about it so that we can move on to a brighter future. south africa can do it, we can do it. >> i thought it was interesting hearing you talk about the militant figure. so i was wondering if being part of a nonviolent civil rights movement, was there any tension with her in the leadership of it being nonviolent and/or having his different ideas? >> that's a really good question. i think this meant that everyone in the civil rights movement was nonviolent and they adhere to kantian principles. but the reality i think is if utah to black southerners and if

you read a lot of history books, you find that most people had guns. southerners in general. americans like their guns and black people are not aliens. they are americans, right? so i think that there's a long history of people having guns and using them to defend themselves, particularly african-americans who live in rural areas. not going to the use guns to hunt but to protect themselves when they needed to. so i think that you could not portray herself as a gun toting madman to the public media in the 1950s. you would be sent to mccarthy's committee and blacklisted, and may be deported somewhere. jailed. but i think that what happened is that african-americans who participated in things like the bus boycott in selma, they decide to adhere to nonviolence

when they were active, when they were marching. they put the guns were for those moments. maybe a lot of them in the car. maybe they were just in the back pocket, but it would've. oftentimes the people we associate with nonviolence, white, they often have armed bodyguards around their home. glenn smiley from the fellowship of reconciliation went to visit martimartin luther king your daf montgomery bus boycott before king had decided on being gaijin. you go back and said this place is an arsenal. he had so many guns around the house and to convince them not to do it, not use guns anymore. so it's a mess. [inaudible] >> thank you for coming. [applause]

>> danielle mcguire is an assistant history professor at wayne state university. >> next, angelo codevilla was awarded the 2010 paolucci/bagehot book award for his book "advice to war presidents." the book looks at foreign policy decisions of leaders going back to ancient greece, and argues that american presidents need to master the tools of diplomacy and war in order to be effective. during this hour-long event, hosted by the intercollegiate studies institute, professor codevilla accepts the award and talks on his book. >> "advice to war presidents," how does somebody get off writing something like that.

i presume, how could anyone presume who himself was not a president or an advisor, close adviser to president, presume to give advice? and furthermore to tell these folks who are occupying the highest positions with regard to our foreign policy that they are in need of remedial course. why? well, simply because they had done something terribly remarkable. the u.s. armed forces over the past century really have won some pretty tremendous battles. they have won every single battle, major battle, and yet our statesmen have managed to lose every single piece that has ensued from those battles.

when you lose the peace you've lost the war. now, losing the war after losing battles is a remarkable, natural, there's nothing to explain. but losing the war after you have won the battle, that's not easy. it takes peculiar kind of power to do that. and it raises some very important questions. how come? well, the gross answer is that our statesmen mistakes have not been mistakes of detail. they have been mistakes of fundamentals. vince lombardi used to say that the difference between winners and losers is in the blocking and tackling, and so he wouldn't presume to teach these pros out to block, and who have been

blocking and tackling absence there were that high, how to block and tackle. this would win championships. little neglect of these fundamentals will lead to defeat. i submit to you that what has happened within our foreign policy elite is, in fact, they have the fundamentals, the equivalent foreign policy equivalent of blocking and tackling. now, they are most, the book is in a sense quite useless because in high affairs as in low affairs, those who are of greatest need of remedial courses are least likely to pay attention to them. this is what happens in most schools, and this is certainly what happens at the highest

levels. go until condoleezza rice -- go and tell condoleezza rice, warren christopher, people like that but they are in need of real courses, and they say i am great, who are you? but, in fact, reality says that all of the coherence of ales little in the face of the results that they bring forth. consider these results, world war i. this was followed not by what woodrow wilson promise, a kind of universal peace, but rather by greatest strength, the versailles settlement has not yet ceased to kill. iraq of course is one of the creatures of world war i, and

what is going to happen there is still open to very, very data contention. palestine, the entire middle east was reengineered after world war i, and he was reengineered very badly. they warned against that, and said that the notion that we should fix the affairs of, albert trade between the hashemites and the wallabies, this was deadly, this was something the united states was told not to get into. but, no, people sold themselves wiser, thought that we should, that we should somehow become the arbiters of the world. and, indeed, the fact that we

were not come we did not become the arbiters of the world became an item by which our foreign policy ruling class accused the american people of responsibility for world war ii. some of you may be old enough to remember a movie, the title of which was wilson. about woodrow wilson. the movie was made in944, and the heavy was none other than henry cabot lodge. the movie was so outrageous that when franklin roosevelt showed it to winston churchill, winston churchill walked out in a rage. but the point of it was, whatever school child in america

has learned, namely that the american people were unfaithful to the great leader, woodrow wilson, in -- and that really started world war ii. of course, this was nonsense. world war ii, it was certainly necessary for franklin roosevelt to support stalin in 1941. but it was most certainly foolish for him to maintain that support after the battles of stalingrad in 1943. after those battles have changed the equation of our in the world. this led of course not to the peace that america's arms had one, but rather to have a century of very, very dangerous cold war.

thereafter, we are also loaded with a surplus of power that the united states brought against the soviet union, against communist forces in vietnam, and have a surplus of power was translated to loss after loss. how come? well, because of a whole variety of ideas in which all of the schools of foreign policy establishment occurred. our foreign policy establishment purports to be divided into three major schools, liberal internationalists, realists, and neoconservatives. in fact, these schools are far more in common than they have that divide them.

quite simply they all assume that the rest of the world is ready, willing and, indeed, eager to become just like they are, the liberal internationalists believe that the rest of the world is ready to embrace development and to modernize, so that all that we have to do is give them hell for modernization and they will become just like us. the neoconservatives believed that the first, the people's thirst for democracy will lead them to become just like we are, or at least a lot more like we are than before. while the realists believe that the ruling passion in the world is one for modernization, and that realization of concrete interest, realization that all

interests are ultimately compatible will lead everyone really to cooperate with us. well, all of this is really not true because it neglects the individuality of the foreign nations. the fact that foreigners really are for an. that they really rule themselves, and they have their own ideas about their own interests. and that it is impossible for outsiders to shape those ideas, those ideas are affairs and they will develop them as they wish. nothing we can do will change that. the best that we could do is to take care of our own interest, but yet another thing that our realists, new conservatives and liberal internationalists are united about is that, in fact, the world has common interests. that, in fact, all of our interests are commensurable, all

of our cultures are commensurable. by the way, this is not only nonsense in itself, but it is contradicted by the way that our foreign policy elite indeed, the ruling class, actually behaves. they will say that they recognize all other cultures as inherently equal, but, of course, when they come in contact with american culture, the culture of most americans they don't regard that as equal. indeed, they have nothing but contempt for the culture of the average american. that is not a culture that they consider commensurable with their own. well, they do believe that they have a duty to reform the rest

of the world. and, indeed, they have a duty to reform the rest of america. i just had a conversation with one of the last president advisors, former president bush's close advisers, and i asked how he felt about the outcome of the war in iraq. which, by the way, for which by the way, the bush administration never had a coherent objective. he said, well, it's true we really meant to improve the quality of that society, he said. but we underestimated how primitive those people really were.

it occurred to me, and i told them, that not only iraq, but the rest of the world is still primitivists. primitive defined as people unlike the advisors to our presidents. people unlike our foreign policy establishment. and, in fact, i was going to say, but i didn't have time, that america itself is filled with people who are ruling class regards as primitives. who they would like to reform, but whom they believe are beyond redemption. nevertheless, they want to reform. how do they want to reform? well, these people would never think of themselves as imperialists. no, no. as the british did, clampdown

and tell locals that some of their customs are unacceptable. by the way, the british and whiteboarding in india. you know, but our people would never presume, tell muslims that, for example, female circumcision as a bad idea or things like that. they would not forcibly reform foreign societies. well, why then do they want to do? well, they want to build nations and they want to do with a minimum of force, although they're certainly willing to use some force. a minimum of force, not war, the dictionary meaning of the term. a minimum force and a maximum rhetoric. now, theodore roosevelt who was

not like these folks, called it this kind of thing peace with himself. the worst of all policies. does a result in anything other than making enemies. but foreign policy doesn't understand that. they don't understand that because they have wrapped what they do in a cloak of language, that appears to make impossible things possible. for example, they speak of an international community as if such a thing existed. but, of course, the bedrock of, foundation of international life is something called sovereignty. sovereignty, which means that every government is inherently

unquestionable about its own internal practices. this goes back to the treaty of versailles of 1648. and that is the soldier of what is owed and those come and that, and, therefore, every government reflects its own at those and the atlas of its own people, and the purposes of its people. and that these purposes often clash. what happens when these purposes clashed? well, you read any of the classics on these matters and you quickly come to the realization that yes, war is the arbiter of major human differences.

but that is not what our foreign policy establishment believes, that war, meaning killing on a massive scale so as to destroy the enemy's capacity to resist, they don't believe that such a thing really accomplishes anything. the only thing that it does accomplish, changes, antagonists is, well, what is it? nation-building. what is that? again, that involves perhaps a little bit of force and an awful lot of bribery. and when that doesn't work, then what do you do?

well then, you try some more of it. or you find an exit strategy. what does that mean? well, it means figuring out how to get out of it without looking too bad. but in reality that simply gives you up with more enemies -- that simply ended up with more enemies than you started with. enemies who have been filed content for you, which, of course, is highly dangerous. now, this language warps, this line which our foreign policy establishment, warps their understanding of the tools of international affairs. for example, take the term soft power. well, we all know, those of us

who will read and those of us who lead to realize, that there's such a thing out as prestige. and prestige counts for a lot. your reputation d.c. do very often, and very often you don't come if you're prestige is at a certain potency, you don't even have to do anything to teacher away if prestige goes before you. genghis khan, for example, genghis khan forces would ride into the european towns and people would offer the next to be decapitated because they knew that if they didn't do that they would certainly be tortured to death. that was genghis khan's reputation. so people said look, if you're going to kill us, please tell us

this way -- please kill us this way. what do people do now, nowadays when confronted by american diplomats? why, they most certainly don't say we will give you whatever you want. rather, they say what can you give to us? what can you give to us in exchange for us not bothering you too badly? and if american troops come in, well, they know they don't have to fear the kind of campaign that genghis khan would run against his enemy. and they know they can take pot shots at them in relative safely pashtun safety. the reputation really does matter, but the concept of soft power doesn't reach them. the concept of soft power which you may read about in full some

detail in joseph nye's book by that name, oils down to this, that being, being nice, being perceived as being nice actually moves people to do what you want. now, we all know that this isn't true. but yet this is how, this is what is being taught in our schools, and this is, in fact, a reflection of thought at the highest levels in washington. being nice moves people to do what you want, thus joseph nye calls to europe, quote, superpower of soft power. if you show yourself sufficiently harmless, people will do what it is you want. and by the way, if someone on

the other side shows himself to be terribly frightening and harmful, people will simply turn away from it. that is what the ideology says eric i submit you that reality says something else. the rights of people being moved by honor, fear and interest. that is not what joseph nye talks about. interest, by the way the least of these powers, honor is the second most powerful because it does lead people to have sacrifice their lives to right wrongs, to avenge themselves, to do the right thing.

but fear is the most powerful moving factors. it takes an awful lot to overcome fear as hobbes as pointed out to us, and all of us know. and few things can overcome fear. one of them of course is the fear of god. now, i hate to keep on harping on joseph nye, but joseph and i really is, teaches at harvard, is very much a representative of our foreign policy class. you can read joseph nye's book on soft power, and not read one word about what pope john paul ii did in poland in his role in the fall of the soviet empire.

john paul, because of john paul you had 1 million people in the central square in warsaw chanting we want god, we want god. you can't imagine the feelings -- you can imagine the feelings of polish communist elite holed up in the offices above the square watching a million people yelling we want god, and fearing that the pope might to say something that would lead him to go get their atheist tormentors. but he doesn't recognize that. nye does not recognize that. nye does not take seriously that a certain politicized belief in god has laid any number of

muslims to want to kill americans. and does not recognize the fact that a certain lack of belief in god prevents the american government from taking those threats seriously. moving on with regards to diplomacy, the peculiar language about foreign policy establishment would have us believe that this thing called diplomacy exists, regardless of what it says, that new contact is seductive -- that's me or contact seductive. well, in fact it is not. words, we all know from our experience, our meaningful not

for the harshness or softness of the sound, but the realities to which they point. you could say whatever on your mind, but, in fact, you are pointing, you have no reason to hope that anyone will believe you. shakespeare's line, i can call up spirits from the vast and deep, and the attitude, so can i, but will the answer you? will become? you can promise a foreign government anything you want. you can threaten anything you like, but they will ask

themselves what are the chances of that happening. the bridge of all of this came in the 1960s when the u.s. government invented the concept of a declaratory policy. is concerned nuclear weapons, but was applied in other grounds as well. what is a declaratory policy? as opposed to a real policy? and what is the point of a diplomat going to another one and say, well, this is our declaratory policy. go? that's nice to hear about that, but now tell me about the real one. and what is the evidence that what you are telling me is for

real, that you are, in fact, going to do the things that you say you are going to do in this or that circumstance. where is the evidence? the words have to be plausible. in a book i point as an example of good diplomacy, the spartan, his conquest, who very simply made offers that the other side could not refuse. such an offer is defined by asking far less than one is able to compel. the person who is asked will be happy to comply with the request which he knows is less than the

asker could compel by the force that he has. force in excess of demand is called solvency. force that is inferior to demand, or demand that are greater is called bankruptcy. and bankruptcy is quite as deadly and discrediting in international affairs as it is in finance. then, of course, there is the concept of war itself. what is this thing called war? is it in fact, is it a reasonable thing to do?

will come it is reasonable and so far as you plan to make it so. it is reasonable only insofar as the operations that you design, we do the successful, actually bring about the peace that you want to live with. designing operations because of their own feasibility, or designing operations because they might be pleasing to a domestic constituency or foreign constituency, designed for any purpose other than bringing one's own preferred these is quite really senseless. what most plainly plainly, you should know whom you are shooting, and what could it what

do you. if shooting persons a dnc will not renew the peace that you want, then by all means don't shoot him. find someone else to shoot, or stay in bed. you see, war really must be conceived to bring about peace, otherwise there is no point to it. otherwise there is no end to it. the purpose of all movement ultimately is rest. what is the state of rest at which you are aiming? and with his motion bring you to that rest? these are questions that are not passed by our foreign policy establishment. nor does our foreign policy establishment ask against who we

should consider -- secure the home front. security is a terribly important. every time i go to the airport. we know about homeland security. but against whom are we being secured? will come we are being against everybody. that means we are being secured against nobody. deciding against him to secure yourself is as important in deciding who you are any of war is. indeed, it is exactly the same thing. precisely the same thing. does this involve profiling? absolutely. you have to decide who is you are worried about. there's a good reason why the israelis are not worried about orthodox back blowing up airplanes. and, indeed, there's good reason for us not to worry about

orthodox jews layout our -- blowing up our airplanes. and generally it would be just as prudent for us not to worry about grandma and grandpa blowing up our airplanes, but it would be terribly, terribly useful to worry about people from certain countries blowing up our airplanes, or people of a certain religion of peace blowing up our airplanes. over for that matter, blowing up other places. but that is commonsense. and commonsense is certainly not part of our foreign policy establishment. as a substitute for common sense they would have us use intelligence. now, daniel patrick moynihan with whom i worked in the u.s. senate, a man of many flaws but

of some intellectual capacity. one of his favorite sayings was, intelligence is not to be confused with intelligence. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and >> it cost us some 60, $70 billion a year. what do we get from that? what do we get, what kind of intelligence is injected into our foreign affairs by this harming of people working in tremendous secrecy? what are they trying to figure out? couldn't figure out out that perhaps saudi arabia is full of wahhabi's? you did need 60 or $70 billion to tell you that.

did you need to know, did that tell you that 15 out of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were saudis? no, no. you did need for that either. did you perhaps needed to tell you that every arab government supports the causes for which 9/11 was perpetrated? no, you don't need for that either. so what do you need them for? well, you need them to tell you about the whereabouts of minor players in afghanistan, or in iraq. but gee, why do you need that? suppose you killed all of those minor players. would not bring you peace?

with that bring you the peace that you want? no. so, why are you spending all of that money, all that effort for that? let me put in a little parentheses here. they don't do a very good job of that either. because you, i'm sure remember, that last december 30, a man walked into a meeting of an advanced base, ci based in pakistan, and i'm sorry, afghanistan, and blew himself up, together with a number of cia folks. that was not the store. that is not is what you be remembered. what is to be remembered, and our media has forgotten, is that batman had been supplying cia

with information about all of those little bit players in afghanistan. and it was on the basis of that information that these drones that carry missiles were being targeted. we have been shooting people, killing people in afghanistan and pakistan on the basis of information supplied to us by someone who, in fact, was working for the other side. had always been working for the other side. how many other such people are there who have managed to hold on to their feelings, have not blown themselves up, i continue to supply erroneous information? i don't know, but i did work for the central intelligence committee for eight years, and i can tell you that we do not have

any counterintelligence. and i can assure you that intelligence without counterintelligence is considerably worse than useless. considerably worse. and that is what substitute for common sense in our foreign policy establishment. all this leads me back to the beginning of my point. namely, that the book that offers a remedial course of statecraft to a competent statesman is kind of useless. because, in one sense, because they are not going to read it. they are not going to study. they are not going to be brought back to commonsense by such a book. of what use is it didn't? well, this brings us back to ssi which aims to put books that teach commonsense into the hands of the next generation.

and perhaps the next generation will actually look at results and say, you know, what our leaders have done with the vast resources at their command, that has not been good. perhaps we can do better. perhaps we can look into old ways of doing these things better. and here's a book that, in fact, teaches the old ways. probably, the book begins by saying there's nothing new in your. there's absolutely nothing new in your. but here i'm trying to say in modern english, and i hope that you will find it interesting. so thank you.

[applause] >> we have some time for questions, and i will ask to repeat your question when he asserted from you. >> to questions. first, how are your grades doing? >> this was an excellent year. slow ripening fall, could have been better. >> your lecture kind of reminds me of a book i study from far too many years ago, said so at a bookshelf, i can remember the author and the name of it, it seems like it was politics among

nations. [inaudible] >> there you go. he was a realist and perhaps you would say machiavellian in his approach to statecraft. but to your theme their i get hints of perhaps maybe a degree of isolation in debt when you say some problems are soluble, you can't change of getting people to comply, also the business empathizing a willingness to use it if necessary. is that correct as part of your -- >> no, sir. the question is, did you detect and my presentation a bit of isolationism because of my statement that some problems are insoluble, and that one ought to

not imagine that one can simply change the world. and my answer is, no, it is most sort not isolationism. nor is a realism in the sense of -- first, the question regarding isolationism. my point is that if one focuses on one's own needs, one's own problems, successfully, one would have done one heck of a lot. that does not necessarily mean not involving oneself in the rest of the world. it means doing so when necessary for one's own purposes. it's not a question of isolate

oneself. it's a question of focusing on one's own need. for example, let me contrast theodore roosevelt with woodrow wilson. theodore roosevelt took the panama canal and was very much in favor of the annexation of hawaii and puerto rico, for that matter. but he was doing it, he was in favor of those things because he wanted america's out of works -- america's out of works to be as potent as possible. woodrow wilson invaded mexico, invaded several nations in the caribbean, including nicaragua, for the purpose of improving them. vastly different purposes.

neither was an isolationist. in fact, isolationism, it's not a descriptive term but an epitaph that some thought others. but it was a matter of a different perspective. handicap would lodge was certainly not isolationist is although he was portrayed as that. he was very much for a variety of involvement, but he wanted to be involved from the standpoint and for the purpose of the united states of america. not for on behalf of any attempt to initiate the world. as regards, like a lot of other realists, he believes and wrote that all men are moved by the same notice. he told his universal motive,

power. everyone wants to maximize power. well, that ain't necessarily so. some people are moved by desires other than for power. he does not understand, he does not allow, morgantown, at least in his original addition, did not allow for diversity of human motives. and yet we know that people do act are very different reasons which happened to be their own. next. >> i remember reading or hearing somewhere not too long ago that back in the 1920s the head of the american communist party

said that the american people will never, never vote for socialism, but you call it liberalism, they will buy it every time. and here we are now after 40 or 50 years of liberalism doubt in washington given to us by people with resumes that we hear about, and i believe that our current occupant in the white house would be well advised, along with his secretary of state, to invite you down there and had to give a discussion to those folks. you certainly make a lot of common sense. and my question is with regard to the upcoming elections, we see a large tidal wave, tsunami of the tea party inspired

republicans. do you think that after november, and, of course, after january, and hopefully we can, the republicans can regain control of the senate, do you see any possibility of any commonsense being restored to the american government? >> the question is, do i see any possibility that commonsense would be restored to the american government with the electoral changes that will be forthcoming? [inaudible] >> of course, of course. given that you have a tidal wave of republican opinion, which is at least as important, probably more important than any particular electoral resort, what are the chances that this

will draw some common sense into our ruling class, be that with regard to foreign policy or domestic policy. generally the answer is no. i don't think it will draw many sense into them. it will diminish their power somewhat, and it will most certainly increase their fears. and that maybe, that a substitute for common sense to some extent. but to learn, that takes humility. and i don't think that our ruling class has learned the meaning of the word humility. certainly they have lost, they have subjected the united states of america to greet its losses, domestically as well as internationally. but i don't see any humility in the pages of the "new york

times." i don't see any humility in the journal of american affairs. i don't see any openness to other points of view, or at least very, very little. the ruling class' reaction i think was typified by the republican trent lott, when the newly elected folks come here, we're going to just co-opt them. and they will try and they will succeed to some extent. but they will not succeed otherwise, ultimately to answer your question, this election cycle is by no means the end of the tsunami. because i believe that some things radical has happened to american public opinion in the last two, three, four years. the bush administration i think has done much responsible for it as the obama administration.

the american people's realization that we are not led by the sharpest knives in the drawer. despite their protestations. >> you gave illustrations that kind appointed to negative performance of the state department and can you give us any positives? you mentioned theodore roosevelt, can you give any positive ones? and is it any other nation in the world today that come as you serve them, they appear to be at the many apposite -- the positive traits? >> yes. look, i am an unabashed did admirer fan of john quincy adams. i cannot think of an american who embodied prudence, wisdom,

and understanding of the peculiar need that the united states of america, as much as john quincy adams. he was followed by william seward who worship him, and he was followed by other statesmen who did their best to follow him, up to theodore roosevelt. we have had a run wilsonian, including george w. bush. i cannot think of a more succinct negation of founders view of foreign policy are more succinct negotiation than george bush's statement has 2000 not go that america will not be free until the rest of the world is free your meaning we are never

going to be free. as 40 effective foreign policy in our time, i think you have to look at china. consider their vast internal problems. i would want to beat the chinese leadership right now. they are sitting on top of a simmering volcano. how that's going to develop, no one can say. but sitting as they are, they have played their hand, east asia, as competently as any deal politician, one of my teachers, as any politician would want.

namely, strengthening military control over the periphery, while conducting a masterly diplomacy with regard to both the united states and japan. and meanwhile, intimidating the lesser powers. and a very subtle game in korea. if you want to look at machiavellian, effective machiavellian diplomacy in our time, look at china. >> yes, ma'am. >> you seem to indicate that american involvement and the problems in palestine many years ago, i thought it'd been chiefly

the british who were handling that come are settling at with the balfour declaration and the palestinian mandate. would you tell me, please, what was the american involvement? >> i apologize if i gave you the wrong impression. what i said was that henry cabot lodge warned against our involvement in that situation. you are quite correct that it was the british who crafted jordan and, the president of saudi arabia, and really failed to help their clients, the people, the hashemites who would help to defeat the turks during the war and let the wahhabi's, the south family, defeat, which

made necessary the establishment of jordan, and of iraq. but no, this was a british, certainly british thing. and, of course, the balfour declaration and the failure to support that, again, we are not the only power that has practiced that diplomacy. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> find out more about the paolucci/bagehot book award or the intercollegiate studies institute, visit isi.org. >> watch the entire process including the house impeachment, the senate trial and the final

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