do have to ask the question isn't like to spend so much money and asking people to do something that by law they will be asked to do anyway. >> thank you, mr. speaker. time and time again we seem to be exporting extreme islamist terrorism and suicide bombers afghanistan, israel, and now sweden. what steps is my honorable friend taking to drink extremism from our country because i think he raises a could point anywhere from both sides of the house we have not done enough to deal with the promotion of extremist islamism in our own country. where it is making sure that in arms coming over to study can speak english properly, whether it's making sure we deradicalize our universities, i think we do have to take a range of further steps. i'm going to be working hard to make sure that we do this. we got to the policing and place. yes, we got to make sure we

invest in our intelligence services. yes, we got to cooperate with other countries but we've also got to ask why is that so many young men in our own country get radicalized and is completely unacceptable way. >> order. 10 minute rule motion. >> thank you, mr. speaker. >> here on c-span2 will be the british house of commons now as they move onto other legislative business. you've been watching prime ministers question time and life wednesdays at 7 a.m. eastern by parliament is in session. you can see this weeks question time and again sunday night at nine eastern and pacific on c-span. for more information go to c-span.org and click on c-span series for prime minister's questions plus to international news media and legislation around the world.

>> a look at iran's nuclear program and the world's response. this conference hosted by the foundation for the defense of democracies, u.s. and israeli military officials discussed the possibility of a military strike against iran. we will also hear from the white house coordinator for weapons of mass destruction. this is two hours. >> if everyone will take their seats, we'll get started here. all right.

thank you very much. i do want to get started. we've been discussing now for more than 24 hours the iranian threat. and i would are you and i think others here would the principle of national security threat in foreign policy challenge we face today. we been talking about various responses and the range of policy options that we have. we come to a particularly interesting one at this point, what is called maybe some of you, the kinetic option. i'm going to stay out of the way of our panel because as a buddhist in which an great panel let me start right here with ken pollack, most of you know, everyone on this panel is to give the middle east policy expert they're currently the director of the center for middle east potter policy at the brookings institute center. he served on the national council. and written several books, many

articles on all sorts are all range of matters on international relations. reuel marc gerecht is a senior fellow with the foundation for defense of democracies. he is a former officer and analysts from the cia, director of operations. the author of a number of books including known by enemy. [inaudible] >> that's forthcoming. [laughter] [inaudible] >> major amidror is a program director for the institute of contemporary affairs at the jerusalem center for public affairs that you should as a command of the idf, israeli defense forces, national defense

college, and the idf staff and command college. and jeffrey goldberg is national correspondent of the atlantic. in september 2001 he published a highly discussed and debated piece entitled the point of no return on the possibility of a military strike on iran's nuclear sites. this was a cover story in the atlantic. it was thoroughly and scrupulously researched. jeffrey kueter great job appears into the minds of israeli leaders come and what i would like to how i would like to start, just become ask you to recapitulate your thing, your thesis from that an update is on and start with that as sort of a basis for discussion. >> thanks. thank you. thank you, cliff. i'll be very brief on this. i was curious, i guess about, well, i've been curious for a while because we keep hearing that israel is six to nine months away from bombing of a. we for that for about a dozen

years. so i was curious when we actually were. i'm fascinated by, i guess the point of departure for me as i'm fascinated by the prime minister and his understanding of jewish history and the role that the israeli prime minister after the holocaust. and particularly interested in this because i'm a huge reader of his father's works, particularly on the spanish inquisition. i thought, you could see the influence of his father who has come a now accepted that used to be radical interpretation of the spanish inquisition, that it was biologically based anti-semitism as opposed to mere religion. and the most important point i think that was transmitted to his son is that anti-semitic rhetoric turns to an anti-semitic visible violence.

and so i want to find a given that new government when we were, so i spent a month or so in israel just talking to people in and out of government come in and out of military, former generals, generals. and i came to the conclusion, and this is the conclusion i came to i guess eight months ago because the writing crossed you know, there was a better than 50% chance that israel would come if all things were remain the same, israel would strike at iran's nuclear facilities by the middle of next year, middle of 2011. since then and based on, now my own assumptions, but going back to many of the same people i have spoken to, i would doubt a long day that timeline a little bit. mainly because of the stuxnet virus and other, how shall we call them, active programs to deny iran the knowledge of its scientists.

spirit that was a lovelyc:s:s:ó: euphemism.k>k>k.k.[>k>k>k> they just can't -- that's some euphemism. [laughter] >> and various other programs. a virus first and foremost. and also i think we'll get into this, i think that there was a shift in the way the prime minister himself, president obama, which are doing the reporting, there was confusion and anxiety on the part of the prime minister about president obama and his ultimate intention. i think for many reasons we can go into. i think he's slightly more comfortable with what he would see as president obama's of seriousness on the issue. he probably believes at this point to quote from ken pollack, or from ken pollack, that the obama program is actually working, that the sanctions regime that obama has put in place, multi-lateral sanctions is working, but only it won't

work and i think that is where the israelis are right now and if i were to give a prediction i would say, i would move that timeline not too far into the future, into 2011, all things being equal, but these things are, and you, your work, connecticut another way. and we discussed we have to look at events and shape our analysis with the reality around us. >> by the way, 11:45 another panel where we'll talk about the stuxnet virus and cyberwarfare, so just so, you know. and as an interesting construction of the sanctions working, here in a comment that ultimate will not work and women want to come back to the. i would like to go to general amidror and just as for your comments on jeffrey's thesis on the thinking of the israeli leadership at this point, and not the least the ability of the use of military force to substantially delay if not

destroy iran's nuclear ambitions of this regime. >> first, thank you very much for having me here. all those who make the efforts for having me here. and first, i think the most important thing to understand, i am really glad that you begin with the historical frame that we're living in, that israel cannot benefit situation in which a state in which will have a nuclear connectivity. this is something that is the basis for all the arguments, pros and cons, and what should be done at the end. i'm not going to speak about this friday afternoon at act as the the israeli air force and i'm not going to make any announcement about dates. [laughter] >> but it should be very clear that it is a combination of some

element. first, we are examining in very details what are the result of sanctions and the pressure that it puts on the decision-makers, and it's not the same in iran. and from what we learn from the outside and from the inside, we understand that there are result, more than many expected in the past. but all these results didn't make any change in the plant itself. and it's very important to understand because yesterday i heard very optimistic word from the americans who are responsible for implementing the sanctions. it is very important to continue and to put pressure on the iranians, at least up till now it did make anyone in tehran to

think, to give a second thought to the decision, to go ahead with the plan to nuclear arm. and it is very important to understand because went to separate between the success of the sanctions and economical side and the last success of the sanctions in the, what is the target in the end, the plan to make iran military ability. so second, we are looking to the leaders what's going on within the plant itself, no question the effect, two very important cannot help anymore to improve their plans, is something that we are learning and we look at the plan and we see where we are standing. or if there is a line that will be crossed, it would be too

late, and if there are other possibilities to delay, will be used by others and by others, and to what is important to understand that we tried to understand, try to learn from all information that we have. where we are standing relating to this nuclear efforts of the iranians. and no question that at the end of the day this combination between both, how pressure from outside and what's going on within iran collecting to this plan would be part of the elements which we have taken into consideration by the decision, and by the decision-makers. and the third one is the one which is very, you know, practical, technical, the ability, the intelligence, and the how, what delay can be achieved and these are concerns of what delay can be achieving. how can a combination for the

three elements together, based on the assumptions that israel cannot agree to nuclear iran will lead at the end to the decision, i mean, technically israel will be ready if the decision will be taken to go ahead. it's a lot of money, and other preparation, and a lot of training, and a lot of thoughts, and many people sitting there doing their best to have the best plan. we will be ready when and if the decision will be taken. and if and when it will be taken is result of this combination of the three elements that i just mentioned. i can tell you one thing for sure, and it is please, off the record. >> we're all friends here. [laughter]

>> if iran, yes, if the iranians the sunnis will be affected militarily, it will be with american airplanes. the question is will it be american pilot for israeli one. [laughter] >> but don't make any mistakes. no one in israel is eager to go to this war. for us it is a last resort. everyone in israel, everyone in israel will be more than happy to learn that iran is stopping its nuclear plan without using military force. it's a last resort because it's a war that will emerge from this affect would be a long one, and one that no one wants to be in. i believe, attacking iran is very bad situation. but there is something worse

that iran will have a nuclear capability. but we are not running. we want to postpone as much as possible because we want to give the war, the americans, everyone who is ready to help to stop iran -- stop iran. it is not just an option. we prepare military, investing a lot of it, but we are not running to use it, and we hope that someone will find another solution. if you ask me as an expert, that's what it would with a good, what is my assessment? my assessment is it is almost impossible to stop iran without military force to that we should not run to use it before we be sure, 100% and more, that there is no other alternative. >> after jefferies cover cover story came out on the atlantic, reuel marc gerecht wrote a cover

story in the weekly standard that, i don't know if it was intended as a response or a continuation of the discussion, looking particularly at how iran, both ordinary iranians and the regime would respond to military force, reuel, if you go about and discuss that. and also in particular tackle the conventional wisdom which is, if the israelis and americanthe americans or anywhere else would use military force everyone would rally around the flag of ahmadinejad, and this would just fuse together all the people who are now distance from the regime. that's the conventional wisdom. i measured it is as wise as it is conventional. >> the first thing i would like to say is it's a pleasure to be here with jeffrey. i think jeffrey is the only journalist who could possibly profile president of ahmadinejad. a certain would be only journalist who could understand all of his jokes. and i would also like to say

that ken and i, we've been debating iran since we're in third grade. and i suspect and fear we will be debating iran into we are 60. >> sixty s. not so old. [laughter] >> be clear about that. sorry. >> the new 40. [laughter] >> the issue of what might happen, the israelis or the americans can which i think is highly unlikely, were to actually attack iran's nuclear sites, i think there's often been a very easy exaggeration of the possible blowback. i'm skeptical that many of the worst-case scenarios are likely. i do think for the israelis they obviously would be the target of

the most severe reprisals in the sense of that all those missiles and other weaponry that had been delivered to the hezbollah, i think the lebanese, hezbollah would let loose of them. i don't see, if he has to lose entire existence, it is all built around a war with israel, and i think they would respond with everything they had. and obviously the israelis would have to endure that. hamas, not so sure about it i'm not sure exactly how moscow do besides shoot more of their missiles, there are far less lethal than what hezbollah has. again, i seriously am doubtful that you will see much of a reaction throughout the rest of the middle east. if one goes back historically, people in the west have been fearing the reprisals of various

western aggressive actions in the middle east since before world war i. the germans come if you recall, worked very diligently to manufacture a jihad against the empire. it failed abysmally. i do not think that the notion of islamists, islamic terror of way either of israel or the united states is very likely. i think it would peter out, whatever there is would peter out quite likely. the primary iranian response to an attack on their nuclear facilities, at least so far as being a state is concerned, would be terrorism and. i think it's a foregone conclusion that the iranians would try to strike back using terrorism, and we have to be prepared to absorb that. i would add though that i'm

skeptical about iranian abilities. i think they are less proficient than people make them out to be. i think you have to understand that all western services would be watching them quite closely. they are diplomats and their spies base in the embassies, and again, i think iranian blackouts, those folks who work outside of indices, again, i think the kid goes have been exaggerated, would have an extremely hard time maneuvering and operating. that's not to say the iranians would not be able to hit us. i'm quite sure they would. again, i think the discussion of this gives a bit hyperventilated. so quickly but, the repercussions from an attack, whether the attack would be successful or not, which is perhaps more interesting question, i'm sure ken will get to that, the repercussions from that attack i think our flight,

which you might, sustainable. that we could, we could absorb it, and if you think about what the repercussions would be of iranians actually having a nuclear weapon, which is the thing had to focus on most clearly, then the blowback from that i think is -- isn't all that severe. and in particular i would like to mention the notion that iran's are suddenly going to dismantle iraq. actually, i would like to see them try. i think the capabilities of the iranians all by themselves and iraq, nefarious as they may be, in iraq they will have to be waging war against the iraqi shia. it has to be waging war against notch a. they will have to be killing their own brothers. i find -- spiritual brothers. i find it very hard to believe. could they come out after americans and do some damage? sure, but primarily they won't have to again with the iraqi she

and i don't think that will fly terribly well. even somewhat of a timid soul like mohamed rode up in anger at least briefly in 2007 about the iranian assassination teams inside of iraq. i really don't think the iranian government has much to play there. and in afghanistan, i would just note that the iranians are becoming much more lethal in their aid to the taliban, and are repeating their performance in some ways that they did in iraq. the iranians really on foreign trained in afghanistan. their entire focus has always been on the west. they are not comfortable in afghanistan. the have to operate through proxy. they have very few proxy to operate passionate operate from. they are not close buddies and pals. it's a limited game i think that they can play. and i just would recall when i was in afghanistan before 9/11,

i was with -- i happen to be with them when two members of the iranian revolution regard core arrived and i got the opportunity to meet them later. and they weren't, they were sort of funding source. they are witty. but what struck me most was when asked them whether they like being in afghanistan, the response translated was, i really hate this place. you know, those were tehran the boys and he wanted to get back. again, i think we have to be very, very careful in how we detect the iranian -- the iranian capacity, we have to fear from them is or terrorist potential. but again i think for us to shy away from striking down, taking away their nuclear facilities

because we fear terrorism should, in fact, tell you that under no circumstances should they be allowed to have nuclear weapons. >> ken, i'm happy to have you address any other comments you just heard. one question that arises in my mind that you might address is, am i wrong to think that the repercussions of use of military force would depend on great measure on the perception, not necessarily the same as reality, of whether force had been used brilliantly and effectively, whether it had been bunkley and ineffective at the end of the day and had and commerce its goals? i can imagine them saying you haven't hurt us to go beat difficult determined for a while whether that was true or not. >> absolutely. that's one of the issues we are going to after on a similar track. is going to be the circumstances any kind of use of force against iran. i think most people in this room

know i am a skeptic when it comes to the use of force against iran. this comes not because i'm a pacifist that i because most people know i am anything but. just as an old military analyst i keep trying to do the math and it still doesn't work out the way i would like it too before we or anybody else went ahead with it. and i think a big element of that is whether or not there is a provocation. we should remember, and i'm surprised that reuel has not mentioned already that the iranians are often their own worst enemies. they should themselves in the foot all time. it's not certain how they will handle the next several years. i want to come to something later on that we ought to be thinking about in terms of how we help them down that path. but if it is the case that the iranians do something foolish, if they do something incredibly provocative, that catches may change and it may be the case that in the future the circumstances for military use are much more propitious than they are currently. but the problem is right now

things don't quite add up that way. as reuel was suggesting, i too, when i came to look at the use of force i do mostly focused on this question of the day after. the question of what happens afterwards. for me it is about the day after than the date of the. i'm pretty confident that the u.s. air force and u.s. navy, said the israelis aside for a moment, but i'm confident the american military can destroy every single facility in iran that we know about. i said that specifically because there are things we don't know about. we don't know what we don't know in many cases, to quote donald rumsfeld. that is one of the issues out there. and as someone who live to our expenses in iraq in 1991, when i can remember my friends who worked at the technical side, who worked the nuclear program, you know, assuring us, the u.s. will take on everyone else, we knew exactly what the program look like, three major the sulleys, 10 or 11 smaller facilities, flatten them during

desert storm, they went and asked was thinking that they were just going to catalog the rubble and lo and behold there were three other massive facilities that we didn't even know that they had anything to do with the nuclear program. at least two of those three facilities probably could have produced a nuclear weapon. it gets to this larger question which i will come to any second, what do we deal to the iranian to do with the issue that reuel table which i think is an important one in terms of the retaliation. i will start by saying i largely agree with a depiction that reuel just put on the table. i think he is right. i think it would be quite a nasty response from hezbollah directed against israel, regardless of whether the stars on the planes have five or six points. i suspect that the response will be pretty much similar. i also agree with him that i think that there will be terrorist attacks from iran, we

shouldn't go completely insane over that. los..

wind be making the opposite argument. i was making the obvious argument when we were debating it in 2006. at that moment in time given where iraq was iran have capacity to do damage to the united states was enormous. today is minimal. that is really about the change in her act and it is why a continued american engagement with iraq and continuing progress in iraq is so important. now back to iran. our previously scheduled program. i also agree that we need to be careful in thinking about just how broad the retaliation by iran might be. to a certain extent there will be terrorist attacks. they might try to stir up trouble in saudi arabia and bahrain but their ability to do so is somewhat limited.

but wary might take exception with what reuel mare gerecht was talking about is an israeli war is quite troublesome. i'm much more confident in israel's ability to handle and then i was in 2006, this is one of those moments of opening pandora's box that i would prefer not to go for and i think the people mr. would prefer not to go through if possible. although i agree with him that the scale of iranian retaliation often gets greatly exaggerated the don't want to suggest for a moment that what the iranians could do could not be troublesome or lead to a much bigger set of problems in the region. but the other issue and would like to point on the table and talk about a little bit is the question of iran's nuclear program itself because that is the other big question when it comes to the use of force. will use of force result in a end or delay, meaningful delay in iran's nuclear program.

the question -- the answer to that is no. there is no reason to run any of the risks involved in retaliation for the inevitable costs that will be involved and there i remain very skeptical. i do suspect there will be something of a rally around the flag based on what i have seen from iranians. they do seem to be quite nationalistic. they do seem to really dislike it when anyone attacks them even if they don't particularly like their government. and on the history of strategic bombing. for decades, almost centuries people have suggested that if you bomb a people long enough they will turn on their own government and say you got us into that so we blame you. it doesn't work that way. people tend consistently to blame the people bombing them. whether or not they do like their governments. so i am skeptical that you would see the iranian people turn in a meaningful way as a result of

the bombing. it is much more likely. whether or not they do i am quite convinced that this regime will use the bombing as an excuse to further crack down and do what it wants to do. i very much fear that the hardest of the hard-liners in the regime, those wanting to deploy weapons capability will use bombing as an excuse to basically say to anyone to the left of them who are not exactly leftists, just not quite as far to the right as the hard-liners and basically say the reason we got bombed is because we don't have a nuclear weapon. what is the difference between iraq and north korea? north korea has a nuclear weapon, iraq didn't and this is proof. suspect they will use a bombing to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty and go about shifting their focus from the japan capability they constantly talk about to a full-fledged nuclear arsenal. having done a lot of work on

dealing with those two situations there's a big difference in terms of the stability of the middle east between iraq with japan capability and iran was deployed capability. the latter is much more dangerous than the former. i have heard a number of people talk about iraq 1981 as being good reason for bombing attack on iran. when israel struck, they might said the iraqi program backed by one or two years and what happen? iraq never got a nuclear weapon. a true statement but very misleading. and very dangerously misleading because the effect of the matter is that strike did not turn off the iraqi nuclear program. it caused saddam hussein to redouble his efforts. he went from a small, backwards program that most chemists the estimates we could take 15 years

to produce a nuclear weapon to a much more aggressive, more extensive, much better concealed program. going from single track to six tracks across the country. at least three of which could have produced a bomb. what prevented the iraqis from acquiring that capability was desert storm. let's remember when we went in after desert storm, the iraqis might have been as little as 12 months away from having a nuclear weapon. so that did not stop the iraqi program, eventually caused it to be more dangerous. it caused the regime to make a greater investment in the program, make a more aggressive effort to acquire it and a more aggressive effort to conceal it. that is what i am concerned about with iran. can i prove that that is the case? no. but that is what the evidence suggests is more likely. when it comes to bombing and

military operations, my feeling is opening pandora's's box is something you don't want to do unless you're certain there is no other way to deal with this problem. >> two more questions. as those questions are answered, if you want to let me know if you want to ask a question i will go to those. i will ask a couple questions first. these conversations usually proceeds from the assumption that use of military force would be against the nuclear facilities but there are other options, one was suggested according to wiki leaks document dumps, by a saudi which cut off the head of the state which i assume him to mean target the jihad leadership directly, never mind the facilities. the other option have heard discussed occasionally, not so much, is the possibility before

-- wiping out all conventional iranian military forces, what about the navy and air force, leave the regime humiliated and intensely vulnerable. can i ask you to comment on those possibilities? >> i assume this those possibilities? >> i assume this is coming to an israeli decision. we understand our limitations. israel is not in a position to take iran -- we spread our capabilities around. to be very focused and to be very sure that after the end of operation that the delay will be as achievable as possible. i don't see any other targets connected to the nuclear plant.

i want to say something about the iraqi example. you are right. at the end, without keeping vote nuclear reactor by israel, does it storm would not come to the world because the iraqis would have a nuclear bomb before that. you cannot put it aside and say he didn't do achieve a nuclear reactor at home. we did it in this -- next stage was done by you. you are positioned to talk about capabilities before desert storm. i was very much involved in the research over the united nations

in iraq. it was a bit of an exaggeration, the day before having nuclear capability, but without the nuclear bomb some years before that, as you know, the nuclear state takes that as an example. this is why exactly because of that we should be sure we are not coming to the stage in which iraq is north korea. we caibot do anything, world cannot do anything because iraq had nuclear capability and think about world, not just how to use the umbrella to recommend its neighborhood. but think about the center of all the middle east states and

the spending in israel could not stop iraq. the reaction of all this, strong and weak states, when you put it -- it is not just a delay but also the question what is the reaction. iran, nothing would be done. the atmosld iran, notion of who is leading, look at the weakeshou mmuing frm one side to the another. try to understand this picture.

and what can be done and what cannot be done, both are important. >> i can see there's a lot of questions out there. >> back to the panel, the aevaument opponents with the u.. military, overstretched, if you talk to people, and very few people do actually support -- if anything is under utilized, and

-- [laughter] >> they are on this question buo what we say to you, we can do this and sitting in we the and and south daminta, we can go again. the air force is nothing. what we will hear in the next couple years particularly like those taking a lead on this is if america were toders- lindsey graham is ready to attack iran. unlike an israeli attack, would attack all of the iranian air force and naval assets and economic assets as well which we can do with relatively little difficulty. it is harder to find nuclear facilities than air force bases.

lto uming in this panel is wher president obama is in this question. they're not the most important plaay brs, nor the iranians in kind of way. they are negatively moving toward the nuclear threshold. the question is where is president obama and by would love to hear the panelists on that question because that is the kes, n the israelis will only make their decision that president obama under no circumstances will seek a military option to deny iran its nuclear weapons. >> do you want -- >> what are largely agree with,

it is fair to say the people of the left are in prison right nonuclear b people you have to with in the revolutionary guard corps, as the 9/11 commission report let us knf, iranians before and after 9/11, what we are hearinwill a suwanee poste boy for the iranian regime since the 1980s that you would allf to have a nuclear weapon to a country -- an organization that buiilds fondly, aided al qaeda. hi would agree that the main issue here and to mr.ates,effer question will be about iranian misfiring. they have astonishing ability to do the wrong thing at the wrong time. was much more likely in this scenario is not that the

israelis will preempt or prevent but the iraheyans will do something stupid. they get closer to obtaiheyng a nuclear weapon. and israeli -- iranian who press will get the better of them. in 1986 on the greatest scale, we have a great question g forward to president obama, as we retaliate. if we are going to retaliate for this act of terrorism will you at this time say we do not want this regime to have nuclear weapons. there will be a two or three year delay, i do not rd will we strive because the known fact of this re gome having nuclear weapons is too much to

bear. >> we will do our best to go through it. >> i was in israel with the congressional deleand stion in august of 2009. the same question to iran and nuclear weapons, and israeli military leaders. it wasn't practical, iraq wasde- winds the facility abmue-ground. according to press reports, syria was above ground and the best course of action was for the u.s. to go forward with aggressive sanctions and iran was a big boy and a require a relief from those sainwtions to

stay in poweaed they might have just been trying to get us to go back and mmue on aggressive sanctions. i wonder if you could comment oo that. [laughter] >> are we finished with that one? >> it is this issue of provocation. the nature of a strike changes dramaticalls, n there is another element to that. just in the interest of time when i was responding to initial questions is going back to the day after if the iraheyans -- most likely the iranians would try to rebuild after woriran . what happens the day after? one big problem with a strike is under the wrong circumstainwes

strike can destroy everything the united states and israel and all of our allies working to build up over the last seven ay bars which the obama administration i give them a lot of credit on this. remarkable job muer the last year and a half. we have a gto ud international coalition lot better than we had 18 months ago. it is a lot stronger and harommr than the iranians expected anybody else expected. there is real pressure as the iranians pointed out. moving forward we want to be in a position where we can maintain pressure on the iranians. we can keep them isolated. if they do try to reconstitute their not free to do so. in the face of proe. will be much better able to hold off that inteadmational suo por

worse engine and for the other elements of pressure on iran. absent proe. that all goes away. they will lto uk at us and say told you not to bomb and now that you bombed the iranians withdranuclear b what do you ex? we can argue until we are blue in the face that that is the right response but my fear is that is the response. the isssuo of that proe. important and the point you are making that right nf is the recent alteadmatr the, iraheyane having a lot of trouble with their prograor in part because of someone's covert action against them. we can only wiomm that country well and hope others will join in the effort. in part because of a variety of factors having to do with their fn ineor iinwompeteinwe. that gives us some time and the piece thatates,eff quoted me on about a month or two ago talking about how to ratchet up the pressure on iran using more

aggressive sanctions, pursuing human-rights, cmuert action and other means. >> i don't think -- if you really bel paved m- more than belief but decisionmakers will wish and hope -- if we lead to the situation where we are not needed, andd m - ä o pwione little finger if i would like to continue. everything -- we need to be careful about not letting the process become the en lo it is a very dangerous thing and

a recurring thing that is most nap[ral with the process of trying to stod.the nuclear program that is more important than stoo ping the nuclear program. >> let's go to michael gold steen. >> your comparison of the attack causing iraq to doubled its eor speed as they can get. will it make some ng toh a any d isn't that correct? the analogy fails. ä o pwii disagree with that on tng scores. there are certain things the iranians could be doing that they are not doing yet. things like hiding their facilit pas. we have seen them try i.

the other piece is the inspectors. the i a e a is gone. an american strike, 94% of the intelligence will come from them. this is what we learned in iraq. once we buise the inspectors w are blind. that is what all of a sudden we have these ridiculous assumptions. they seemed perfectly reasonable about what the iraqi program is becoming. and how completely blind we became to what was grytng on in iraq with regards to their weapons of mass destruction program. those inspectors are without qsuostion, what the iraheyan prgreram is and what it is doin and everything else. oinwe thill 're gone the irahey can do a lot in large part because the in thaectors are there and are conceadmed, they were doing it in such a way the

in thaectors wouldn't to rand it. ä o > stand up so these guys -- >> i am going to ask my question with my hat as the founparttionf democracy in iran. the problto nuclear-weapons. israel does not fear nu laeaargeweapons in great britaiam g to the radical expansionist imperialists aggressr the gene. regime in iran. israel does not have these htapabilit pas. why is the government not foddsing on helping the people of iran as we mentioned yesterday instead of a

connectiddt sotoltion. why is the obama administration following on the professionaeaa or pan. professionals who canceled the monill about freedom mmuto 2006. [applause] >> i am not grytng to defend th boama feamiheystration. >> we are advocating a containment pan. re gome change policy but that s what it is. i will just srd this is not really a defense of the obama

administration, regime change is extremely difto raddlt. i am all in favor of it the intelligeinwe ageneaa where we used to work, hates it passionately and we fight it dgregedlica and enormous amounts of attention and muscle to make this thing move. i am in fae. i have no illusions about it getting off the groun lo htmuert action takes a time. you need to build ud.a cfeare that knows something. they always fight programs where thill actually have to knomue something. it will be an extremely

dior >> you can take a $200 million -- [talking muer each other] ä o > i will be very pe in fnap bec i can't resist. the ns wheber of times in my lifetime that i agreed with tim zimmerman are few so i have to say i agree with him. we might disagree on some of the details an. where the od thma aexpainistrat needs to step up. we need to do more in terms of d whether it is the green mmuto or other groups. we need a greater focus on human rights abuses in iran. it is the rit dt thing to do an the strategically smart thing to do. ä o > with that in mindd m-

>> i don't know where to start. is missing from the discussion what am i missing?

>> we are trying to -- >> it is a big ten. pro-democracy. robert dreyfuss makes some interesting points. not entirely true that everyone in the military is in the administration. i certainly don't see this coming eminently but president obama is seriously motivated by fear. that iran crossing the nuclear threshold will be to proliferation in the most volatile region. i see president obama working on nuclear facilities to save israel or the united arab emirates.

but i could imagine him taking some definitive action in order to prevent history remembering him as the president who most sought a nuclear zero world and oversaw the great expansion in the number of nuclear powers in world. it would be an act of extremely muscular counterproliferation but i don't think -- that is one of the things i learned in doing this report. whether or not it actually translates i don't know. >> to the front row. i will throw this on the table. it may be that it is useful to talk about what the world would be like if there were an oil-rich nuclear arms regime tehran. [talking over each other] >> on balance it would

negative. [talking over each other] >> i am just a moderator. >> my 50th birth day i bought a bmw motorcycle. i would describe such an operation as technical as opposed to strategic. in the strategic sense if israel were to get it, the u.s. would not be finishing the job as a lost opportunity, one that could be disaster at the polls. could the regime survive such a bombing as i suspect these people really want to get rid of that, this would be an opportunity for more greater resolve wind of people but also as mr. tim herron suggests to

help the people solve many problems and win the long war. >> will the u.s. lose the opportunity? we lose lots of opportunities. the number of opportunities we take advantage of i can count on my hands. more importantly i understand the sentiments behind the question and can sympathize with the desire. i am a student of military history. i spent my whole life on it. the idea you just put forward is one that people believed for decades. we have tremendous amounts of evidence. it has never happened. people do not rise up in response to any bombing attacks. we can wish it would be the case but the evidence argues compellingly the opposite.

that is not to say there are things that bombing of accomplishs. bombing can accomplish certain things but has never accomplished that. is that is what we're looking for. you have to look to other stuff i am talking about in terms of helping the iranian people and putting pressure on the iranian machine. bombing doesn't produce popular revolution. >> bombing is not good for rallying around the flag. going to the experience to the middle east, in 2006, we had an operation against hezbollah. we have seen the lebanese population today or before the

operation. someone crushed the nuclear reactor and it is not stronger within the population. uncle sam was not stronger in the 80s. i agree that this must lead to a stronger opposition and revolution even if it is very successful. but on the other side there is a myth that between bringing the opposition, iran would bring the government to support the government if it would disappear from the outside. [talking over each other] >> i don't think a bombing run on the nuclear facilities are going to make people in iran --

we have just witnessed the regime's successfully dismantled civilian protests, they have deployed rape and torture quite effectively. they have borrowed pages from saddam hussein. i am deeply skeptical that any type of american military short of invasion would change the dynamic of political control inside the country at least on the short term. in the long term i don't know but i believe that if you lose a battle and the united states were to actually destroy those nuclear facilities, if the israelis do it is even more embarrassing if the israelis are capable of doing it, to lose the

battle, the iranian government has said repeatedly that the americans and israelis do not have the will and means to destroy their nuclear program. if it were destroyed, in the long term the regime would have some answering to do. >> there is a huge debate in the intelligence community and a lot of israelis believe that bombing attack would emasculate the regime and allow people to rise up. a more compelling argument is that it would use any attack as a cover to killed or imprisoned and rape and torture what remains of the green movement. it is a perfect cover for a dastardly regime.

i tend to see an attack setting back the democracy movement, not giving it legs. >> we will go quickly through these questions. not a lot of people will be angry at me but we will get to it. let's go quickly. >> your assessment of benjamin netanyahu. as interesting as your article was, the article -- the interview you did hours before he took the oval office, talk about an apocalyptic regime in iran, assessing him, assessing obama, that is the question. you can't get him to do what you want him to do. benjamin netanyahu believes in his role in history come what may. >> i think so but i don't know.

you are dealing with a couple of contradictions within the same person. he does not like to make decisions. he is a person who the view from the chair is always different and the view from the opposition and he would be more cautious. but i tend to think at the end of the day he would feel as if he failed jewish history if iran crossed the nuclear threshold on his watch so ultimately, if all else failed he would make the decision to -- >> used to be of the opinion -- >> we tried and effectively to bring about sanctions that are

meaningful. it would seem the administration would bring about sanctions that are formidable that would bring about major change in a rapid time. sanctions haven't worked because they haven't been affected by this administration, economically that everything we are talking about would prevent from happening. sanctions against iran, affective in short order, to bring about a revolution and all the other things we were talking about. i have been to iran and i know the situation. i know they don't have a chance of succeeding. is an absolute police state. there is no way they will be able to rise up. they have no guidance or ammunition, except strong feelings. so the peaceful lancer is effective sanctions. what has happened?

nothing. a new bank just opened by egypt, everyone knows about it. they haven't done anything. we do all these things internationally by economic means. sanctions is the answer now but effective sanctions -- >> we have and enforce them yet. we want to tackle the question of whether that would work. >> i agree with you that we need you to put a greater emphasis on sanctions and there's more that can be done. let me make two refinements. we are getting more effective sanctions than i would expect. going into revolution 1929 i had low expectations. elson makes the case further.

my biggest concern is there are cases where a position of heavy sanctions brought about rapid changes in regime behavior. there are all the cases when that is not the case. iraq seared into resolutions or sanctions that should have been the most draconian in history and we thought they would force the iraqis to change their behavior in 145 days. you want -- you want my people to starve? fine. i have no problem with that. and we had to deal with a sanctions regime that stretched out for 12 years. in order to make that work with and three years it was falling apart. one of my great concerns about setting sanctions of now is we have to be prepared that they won't last in the short term. we have to make some work in the

wrong term. can actually have staying power. this is not iraq yourself africa. >> can you comment why it seems the israeli estimates of the iranian program have been one or two years away? does this reflect the failure of your analysts or success of senators? >> that is an easy to answer question. [laughter] >> we tried to convince you, iran is going nuclear and sh

both. in some cases people try to put as much -- to stop the ran from that. it is going under economics.

without any interference from the outside, in 95 was a a real calculation that could bring iraq to have capability in 200075. but then the world changed. nothing could be done in 2005. >> we're going to the last ten minutes. we will try to get a few more in. >> this is a comment i want to move to the other part of the world, north korea. i just came back from japan. a member of the current ruling party said the following. will the united states defend japan with nuclear weapons if north korea uses nuclear weapons against japan. the second question is when is inappropriate for japan to develop its own nuclear weapons.

that is what you're facing with respect to iran. >> if you look at the middle east, you will see saudi arabia and india and what they're going to do. it will take a long time to understand it cannot be a super power in the area without having looked at the capability. i don't know about the reaction of greece after nuclear capability. will be a disaster. think about al qaeda, has and others. syria gave hezbollah scud missiles. if you asked me, would -- you see -- not look at from 200

meters. the meaning of this is if it would not be strong enough and determined enough we will find nuclear capability for al qaeda, hezbollah and others. not mentioning saudi arabia and i don't know. you know europe better than me who would be next to defend itself. >> three quick question. hold your answers and responded those answers. thank you. >> there is this implicit assumption that any kinetic action is only an air strike about what about a naval blockade with very limited air activity to defend that? that requires less collateral damage. >> i will take several questions right here. one right here.

right here. >> i want to follow up with jeffrey's point which is obama's capacity or stomach for a military strike. my question is what happens after? the obama administration will help israel arm against a hezbollah attacks or when the un tries to sanction israel for the attack? >> right next to you. these lineup as you conclude. >> the message you need to send is being in nuclear-powered does not make you bulletproof. what about shifting focus? cup off the head of the snake in north korea which is going through a dicey transition right now. why don't the people in iran look at that? >> what do the panelists say about a briefing we had on the hill on november 27th, three years ago by a prominent air

force general now retired, but he said 2500 strikes in 48 hours with special ops on the ground. there would be little collateral damage and no after effects. there could be a regime change and it would not include nuclear strikes but only conventional weapons and recently i checked and he is still of that mind. is that really what we would do if america today, would israel not do it perhaps more effectively and efficiently as they have shown? >> there is much more question and we will take questions. >> i wonder if any of you noticed if you believe it is true that is room made a strategic decision to persuade the obama administration to move toward military strikes, saying you have to. we are not big enough. that is a decision they may have made to push the u.s. into a. >> i will let the panel respond to any and all of that.

after this is over there will be an address on iran by the white house coordinator for weapons of mass destruction and counter-terrorism. we will start right here in two minutes after extensive responses take place. stay in place for that because we will move along. >> we don't have capability of making effort in locating iraq or the capability in korea. [laughter] >> i want to be clear about both. don't expect israel to take the job. >> the jewish community. [laughter] [applause] >> the next question is very --

we are not pushing america to take military action. this is the reason israel prepared itself to do the job. we think america has to make the decision. if it is american interest, not is really interests to attack iran. or any other administration, in the interests of the united states of america, not pushing america to do the job. we are pushing you to beam worse still with sanctions. it is in your hands not in our hands. we cannot do what you can do in this area. israel is pushing to do the job because we in this and we should not push you to do it. if you do not think it is in

your interest. israel is not asking someone to do the job of defending israel. we ask for money for systems, kind of capabilities and not produce but in the end, basic philosophy is if it is not in the interest of the united states of america you should not attack. we will have to do the job. it is our interest. >> on the naval blockade is an interesting idea. if we get to the point where it is on the table and something worth considering, what is worth keeping in mind is there is no basis in international law for military action against iran right now. that is something the united states would have to generate support for. not just because the united states is a government of law but more importantly, naval blockade in particular has to be sustainable. it is something that will take a long time like sanctions to have an impact so it has to be -- you

have to get international support. i want to thank you for allowing a registered democrat from the left leaning brookings institution to come to your party today. it was an under to be on the panel with you. it is always a pleasure to be with you. i always learn something from our debates and i look forward to the next one. >> we are thrilled to have you and the sympathy we have. don't read the left wing blog. do not read them. brookings now has elena kagan. >> can you stop the love fest for a second? [laughter] >> they are very adorable. they are really adorable. the answer to the question on obama and israel, hy has the year ago, and wind won't name

but you will see his name. what is ideal vision of how this will play out and his dream is that israel will attack iran have nuclear facility, screw it up, the hornets has been aroused and they will begin to attack interest in the persian gulf forcing president obama to come in and white iran of the maps to borrow some language. at the end of the day he said what we will get meaning the arabs is the persian threat will be neutralized and the americans will be passed off that is relieving arabs as their only friends. nothing to achieve the goal. it is actually borne out by what we have read in the last couple weeks. all i can say is president obama is no different than any other

president. he does not want to be forced by a small country to go to war when he doesn't feel like going to war. that is a fair assessment to make. he is not unaware many americans, jewish and not jewish see iran as an enemy and understand it would not be an unpopular war if it went quickly and well. but that being said he is not in the mindset of going to war with iran right now. there's a possibility that he would look at the threat of non-proliferation and go to war. it is plausible but not probable. >> our time is up. do you want to do ten seconds? >> billy bob fulton could play santa claus, president obama could go to war with iran. it takes time. people tend to forget, europeans got into playing the eu trade negotiating with iran on the

nuclear program in 2003. they initially went into that not because they of fear the nuclear program but they fear george w. bush. it has taken the europeans eight years but they're beginning to fear nuclear iran. they became invested in the negotiation with the issue very astute move by nicholas burns. he does not get much credit. it is a good call but these things take time. the notion of a blockade. tightening sanctions. taking them where they need to go which is hitting oil and gas, regrettably takes a lot of time. i don't know if that time clock works against the nuclear clock. we will have to see. >> let me think can and reuel mare gerecht and even jeffrey goldberg for bringing so much

insight to a difficult subject. thank you so much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> the u.s. senate gavels in for half an hour at 9:3 eastern. we will have live coverage of debate will continue and tax cuts and unemployment. live coverage of the u.s. senate on c-span2 at 9:3 eastern. we will show you some floor debate yesterday on those same items with senators kyle and hutcheson. >> i want to speak for a few minutes about the tax package or tax legislation that the senate is debated and we will be voting on before long. there has been dismay on both

sides regarding the merits of the package and i emphasize the point made by others. no one thinks this is a perfect bill. most conservatives are upset about the unfunded extension of unemployment benefits or the fact that the tax rate extensions are not permanent. on the left there are those who dislike the death tax reform and would prefer the top marginal income tax rates be increased. there are other concerns as well. i agree with some of the criticisms my conservative friends have made. this is not the bill i would have written. there are some provisions in the package i disagree with or would have written differently but on the other hand this is not the bill president obama would have written. he made it clear he doesn't like everything in it either. the package represents a true bipartisan compromise. that is something we talk a lot about but seldom seemed able to do. but political circumstances will not allow either party to

dictate a perfect bill. so neither party got everything it wanted but there are provisions to appeal to both sides of the aisle and most of us agree it would be very bad for americans to allow taxes to be increased. most important things the bill does is freeze all existing income, capital gains and dividends tax and reform the death tax. without legislation taxes are set to go up for every taxpayer in just 17 days. by maintaining current tax rates and instituting death tax reform the bill will provide positive economic certainty both families and job creators. this is a very important development for american taxpayers and for the economy. according to new data from morgan stanley this bill could boost economic growth to 4% or more next year. that is better than the anemic 2% achieved in the third quarter this year. ironically, some commentators argue this economic growth will

benefit president obama's reelection prospects and therefore should be opposed. that is not clear thinking. some other conservatives say we should wait until next year to pass tax legislation, than the gop house could pass a better bill than this one. that is true from my perspective but no guarantee the senate or house or white house would go along with such a bill or we could get a better compromise in the end. in the meantime, every taxpayer would be hit with tax increase in the first paycheck of the new year and for many weeks thereafter. tax increases would certainly hurt the economy. look back at 1936 when president roosevelt raised taxes on high earners. the shaky economy plunged back to depression and unemployment skyrocketed. freezing tax rates has the potential to help the economy and job growth. some on the liberal left think tax provisions in this bill is

to implement their particular philosophy of class warfare but the tax code is not a vehicle for punishing certain taxpayers as some on the left seem to think. i would hope we all agree we want to help job creators as well as job seekers. audiology should not from those concerned on either the right or the left. a wiki thing is tax rates matter to growth. businesses should retain earnings to expand and invest and hire new workers. as i come to the floor to point out again and again many successful small businesses that create jobs paid taxes that individual rates and would be hurt by the increases in the top marginal income tax brackets. according to a irs stats by economist kevin asset and alan beya beyard. 40% of the sole proprietorships and escort corporations reported tax returns wind to