>> a i think both sides have agreed he approaches in an intelligent, respectful way. and that he is really put in the time to really look at these the way he should. this particular treaty the way it should be. the s.t.a.r.t. treaty is a very important treaty. very important set of issues. but we simply don't have enough time to deal with it in this context, and the remaining days of the conference. i have to ask why can't we wait until the next congress? isn't that the morally upright thing to do simply that a lot of people have been elected who really ought to be going to represent the people having won the elections? it seems to me that we are to put off until we can have enough time to do it. usually these types of treaties take at least two weeks on the floor of the senate, and sometimes much longer than that. but sorely about to be given

that amount of time. 18 members of republican colleagues have requested in a letter to senate minority leader mcconnell argued this month that we should put us over until next year. i can say the american people just elected a whole bunch of new members to the senate. they have not been given an opportunity to examine this treaty and its implication. i think they should be given the time to study the treaty. and all other supporting documents which have been withheld, some of them. why? this is the u.s. senate. this is the most important legislative body in the world. it's our job under the constitution to a privilege as a proof of treaties. and it requires a super majority vote to do so. to handle it right, it's very logical and probably i given that this treaty will be vast. with so little time left we should focus on the funding of the government. by defeating the 2008,

$111 trillion omnibus bill, the american people opposed that. and instead we should pass content in resolution that will get us over to the next year. and to this the right way. if they do the right way to let more people voting for it, people like myself want to support our armed control people, to the very best we can. and would like to support a s.t.a.r.t. treaty. but i don't think this is an untraceable thing. and ram this through at this crucial time of year when we have a lot of other things left to worry about as well, i think it's just not right. >> i will jump in here on the intelligence bandwagon and agree with senator bond, who spoke as the ranking member when i was chairman of intelligence committee. we knew something like this was going to happen in the years

ahead. i would encourage everybody here to read the reservations that we all have about the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, as written. and i would simply agreed with my colleagues that we certainly need more time to do this in the proper way as opposed to jamming this up against the christmas holidays. each one of these questions are very serious. i am especially concerned that there's a classified section that has not been provided to congress. and i even toyed with the idea as did senator bond, toys it's probably not the right word going into closed session, and having a briefing by the state department, by others in the intelligence community on a classified section so that every member would be fully aware on everything that happens with regards to a s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i can think of several secret sites in russia when i served in a capacity. i would like to see the russians open up additional sites.

to trust and verify, i have problems with a modern station. i have problems with the lack of testing, site agreements. all of these things have not been answered to my satisfaction that i hope we can reach accord. i would hope it would be next year. at a time and atmosphere that we could get to a proper conclusion on s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i don't know how many of you have seen former president putin singing blueberry hill on the news, and i don't know if you've looked in his eyes and found trust and confidence or not. but i'm not ready to go there. as a matter of fact, i think i would probably sing back a country western song sang, the bridge of trust and verification is washed out. i can't swim, and the treaty is on the other side. and so consequently i hope we

can take more time and do it right, and all these numbers i don't support the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. and again, i would urge you to read the 14 concerns that we have, and these need to be addressed in the proper fashion. thank you. >> this schedule is very disappointing. this is a last minute christmas time stunt that puts a major arms control treaty in jeopardy. i've one united states senator who plans to support the treaty, its ratification. if we continue to debate it thoroughly, and it outcome and especially if we do with nuclear modernization in the correct way. this is not the way to do it. is not the way to get 67 votes. it's a reckless way to consider the treaty. if it's important, as i believe it is, to the future of our country by bringing it up at the last minute. this is a senate where majority

since the schedule and we are in the minority. but let's remember this is the senate that has not voted 15 in the entire year of 2010. there's been plenty of time to do these issues. we have a lame-duck session where the majority seems to be insisting on an encore where there were boos for the concert. they are bringing in every single issue they can think of it. it's called, snow is about to come. we will be meeting late at night and all of a sudden i ride the 2000 page bill. it sounds a lot like last year. as one senator already said what angered people in the elections issue is not just just a health care law and house passed last passed last year to jim down the throats of the american people. we have a 2000 page spending bill that we need to read carefully, consider before we act on it. we also in need to read and debate and carefully consider the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, out

of respect for the american people, out of respect of our country and the senate. that's not the way to do it. its reckless disregard for the future of this important treaty. that has a major effect on the future of our financial securi security. >> as a member of both the armed services committee and the intelligence committee, i understand the significance and importance of this treaty, and i'm a senator who wants to support the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. but the fact of the matter is that those of us on this stage have done our homework. we have studied this thing for months and months. i've traveled to other parts of the world with jon kyl to examine what our friends around the world are doing with respect to this issue. all of us take this work very, very seriously. the government is fixing to shut down saturday night if we don't do something about it. where does harry reid give his priority? he is trying to jam through a s.t.a.r.t. treaty that he knows needs to have at least 10 days

to two weeks from a legislative standpoint to fully debate and had the opportunity for amendments on the floor. instead of doing that a month ago or two months ago or a crane to set it in january or february, he or he is putting it ahead of a continuing resolution of an omnibus bill that he knows now would be jammed up against midnight saturday night deadline. that is amateurish at best, and it is poor leadership on his part to do that. >> first of all let me say that what we are doing here is constitutional to get for the most important constitutional things that united states senate does. a treaty like this requires two things that it requires the president's signature, but it also requires that the treaty be approved by two-thirds of united states senators. both of those have equal rank.

neither one out ranks the other. one of the things that has troubled a lot of us, member of the intelligence community i can tell you that the administration who negotiators had a lot of conversations, transcripts were kept, understands what addresses meetings, and they won't give it to us. i don't understand that. if both of us are equal and you have to both approving, how can one say that all the information, the other side be denied information? i certainly would agree to be done in a close setting in intelligence committee meeting, but we should have it all. as far as the overall issues involved here, i cannot is a just a little different standpoint. if this is really important, this is a matter of national security of the highest level for the american people, to do this the way we are doing it in a continuing to fashion is not right. what has happened is there been a number of issues raised and progress has been made on some issues. senator kyl has done an outstanding job of moving the

administration from one place to another place, as far as modernization of our nuclear weapon stockpile is concerned and that needs to be done. there's another one that troubles me, and it's to me is the most important one, and that is, i think the administration also needs to move from where they are to another place where we've had lots of discussions on it and it started out just like modernization where the answer was no, what's the question? and we have seen some part in that regard but there needs to our discussion. there needs to be more movement. and if indeed this is done right, the american people will be better off him and not only will modernization move and a much more positive direction, so will missile defense which is absolutely critical to the american people. thank you.

>> it's why only 13% of the american people support congress that in congress is doing a good job. the idea that we're going to take a solid responsible of approving a treaty with russia on nuclear weapons, and at the same time approved an omnibus spending bill that's a $1.1 trillion bill, 2000 pages long, can do all of that at the same time over the next seven to 10 days is impossible. if you want to do any justice. as my colleagues that it's our constitutional responsibility of spammers of the united states senate to approve or not approve the treaty. and to get his fair treatment and to come to place we can support the treaty i think every member of our conference wants to be in a position where they can support the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i'm so thankful for the work that's been done by senator kyl to make this treaty better. but i have a lot of concern,

being on the armed services committee having a guide would this treaty, i have concerns about verification, i have concerns about the missile defense portion of this. and i have a huge concerned about tactical nuclear weapons not being a part of this treaty. especially in light of the fact that the russians have a 10 to one advantage honest on tactical nuclear weapons. so we're going to have an honest and earnest debate about this, and give it a treatment it deserves, it's going to take a couple of weeks. we are going to need to offer a minutes to get members of the senate comfortable and approving this treaty. if we can do that, fine, but there's no way we can get the attention it deserves and at the same time to a 2000 page omnibus spending bill this latent import and is exactly what the american people don't want. it's exactly what they spoke on on november 2 when they rejected that type of politics here in washington. it's irresponsible to try to do both at the same time.

>> i think the democrat leadership is somehow thinks that by being your christmas week that that's an act of courage, that they're being courageous by having congress here and we're doing all these important things. i think a democrat leadership is incompetent. and i think the american people are sitting there at home going, what's wrong with these guys? why can't they get the work done in a reasonable time and take seriously the big issues that are so important to the future of this country? everything that we are talking about doing right now are legislative matters. they could take a week or more on the floor of the united states senate, and should take a week or more on the floor of the united states senate. it is in is going to do its traditional deliberative function. and instead we are dual tracking a 2000 page omnibus bill, a treaty, a major arms control treaty. and all kinds of other things that they're trying to throw in the mix here, and it's not the

way the senate should function. and i think it's a big mistake to try to rush something this important. many of my colleagues have touched on their concerns on the treaty. i have my own. i'll be offering amendments when we get on a treaty with the number of delivery vehicles, modernization of delivery vehicles. i'm concerned about the missile defense issues in this particular treaty, but, frankly, it is ridiculous in my judgment to try to chant important matters like this through. the american people i think spoke very plain and very clearly. they want the tax issue dealt with. they want the funding issue dealt with. it would like to see a lot less funding rather than more which is why many of us are advocating to get us into next year. but all these other matters that should take some reasonable amount of time on the united states senate can certainly wait until next year. and staying here using the christmas holiday as a backstop i think makes the democratic leadership of united states senate look and competent.

>> well, let me start out and say thank you to jon kyl. he has done great work with this treaty. not only in terms of the negotiations but in giving us information in terms of what's in the treaty, what we should be paying attention to, just really outstanding work here this treaty is on the cusp of being a very serious trouble in terms of ratification. and it's not so much what's in a treaty or what's not in the treaty. as i do think negotiations can occur, discussions can occur. we've seen how senator kyl has worked to improve the situation here, made me feel a little more comfortable at least about one issue. the reason why this treaty is he getting into trouble is because there centers like me who quite honestly started this discussion

in this effort absolutely open to either possibility, yes or a no vote. iosa than any other relevant committees. this is something that i hadn't dealt with. this is new to me. i will tell you my wish for this treaty would simply have the time to dig into it deep, to listen to robust debate, to go to all of the briefings about the treaty. and then make a thoughtful, reasoned choice because this is so important. it is so important in terms of the security of our nation. and i will take today i stand here feel like i'm being jammed, like there's some arbitrary deadline out there again. and then happy to stay as long as whatever, you know. i'm here for the duration. but really, the strategy seems to be not to get to the best treaty we can get, to get to the

best situation we can get, but to try to get to vote by an arbitrary deadline. well, we've been there before and it didn't work out well. the american people reacted to that and told us in no uncertain terms, they don't want us to do business that way. so it's my hope that even with debate starting we can go so far, we can come back after the first of the year, we can dig into this, we can get the very, very best situation, the very best treaty, the very best approach to this that we can possibly get. my hope is that all my answers or are my questions are answered, and my hope would be that i can support a treaty. but i could not do that today. i could that be a yes vote. there's just too much out there that is yet to be answered, yet to be determined. >> mark kirk of illinois, the new senator, and first i believe

the first of 95 republicans coming to work and the congress on january 5, i think we'll do a very good job for the nation's business. with regard to the 60 new senators, they not only have the competence to do this work but have a fresh mandate eric we should honor that mandate. the lame-duck mandate has been overwritten. secondly, i had to amendments that i would like the senate to consider. the first is my concern on the russian support, integration of a plutonium stream for the country, weighted by every president since president carter as a state sponsor of terror and the potential proliferation risk. second amendment would explore what i see as a growing potential divide between the departments of state and defense on whether we move forward with the development and deployment of the him three block to bravo

missile that would have the capability to shoot down icbms, particularly thing about iranian icbm. or whether we would follow the state department assurances to the russian federation that we not deploy that kind of system. and having to cabinet department seemed to be in disagreement, something which is a very legitimate issue for the senate to explore as we look at this new treaty. finally, i think the number issued in the country is the omnibus and as a freshman i would regard the omnibus as a 1924 page memo to the american people at the congress doesn't get it. >> a treaty of this kind that the administration considered to be a critical part of the foreign policy is a new part of american strategic posture. and i'm worried about that. frankly. for example, north korea has

attacked one of our best allies. russia has attacked a sovereign nation. iran is proceeding with the nuclear weapons system, and russia has intermittently only been helpful in that regard and not very at that point in time. i am worried about where we are heading come in general, with our foreign policy. mr. putin has opposed the missile defense idea, so have a number of his people. they made statements to go contrary to what our administration is telling us. but december 1 on larry king, mr. putin said quote, if the radars and counter missiles we will deploy in the year 2012, along our borders, or 2015, they will work against our nuclear potential bidder, and we are obliged to take actions in response.

closed quote. so it seems to be on a fundamental issue like missile defense we are not in accord. and a big issue like this, on a treaty like this, series nations to be in accord on the fundamentals. and i would say that i'm also concerned about where it leads. we need to ask this question. the administration's policy is to have zero nuclear weapons in the world. and this is not a rational idea, i contend, and it certainly won't set an example for iran or north korea to eliminate their weapons. and i'm also concerned about how aggressive the russians have been in these negotiations. the fact that according to doug pfizer negotiate with them before, we rejected many other things that they attain in this treaty that previous administrations rejected a negotiations with the russians.

and they are proceeding aggressively to reduce the amount of inspections. y.? you would think rush is out to be a better nation and world and set an example. it seems to me that they are if anything drifting into a more dark atmosphere than we have seen before. so these are matters that i think all out to be a part of this discussion and should not be rushed in the long run. our country will be stronger if we do. >> we've overextended here and we're all a. however, you all want a chance to question or or two. >> we understand you don't want to equity planning, what procedures are you going to have so you make sure this doesn't happen? >> let me share you with you on what tactics right here. [inaudible]

>> what do you know that they don't know? >> well, i think that every senator has a right and opportunity and an obligation to consider the issues on their own. senator mccain and i ordinarily agree, and usually senator lugar and i usually agree. senator lugar and i don't agree on this. obviously, with respect to tactics nobody can talk about tactics. our main tactic is to have enough time to thoroughly consider all of the issues, and we don't believe that the way it's been laid that he will afford us an opportunity to do that. and with respect to the post, let's just say this, that people have told you here that they would like to vote for the treaty. but under the current circumstances they can do that. and i would just suggest this administration needs to take that into account when

considering whether they were really have the votes that they need. >> in terms of the issue of it being jammed through, senator lugar was pointing out it's been inevitable since may. -- it's been available since may. in that context, how is it being different? >> first, the most important issue facing our country right now is to ensure that people's taxes don't increase, that the government can be funded at a reasonable cost for the next year. those two items of business ought to be concluded a four do anything else. the leader of a decent that we would be leaving here on the 17th so that we could get home and be with our constituents and our family. the last week before christmas. that's now out the window because of the inability to get these other things are done. and it's still not clear what

the way forward is on funding the government. to suggest that we can do will attract an issue as important as the funding of the government with this almost 2000 page, trillion plus bill, at the same time that we are seriously debating the s.t.a.r.t. treaty is a fantasy. both of those deserve full focus and attention of the american people, and not to be bouncing back and forth one to the other without adequate time to do either one justice that i look at the amendments at iso four seen. they are all serious, important amendments. there's no way that they can adequately be considered in the time that we have, even if you assume we are not going to finish the omnibus or cr, which we have to. or take up some of the other items. now, different people have different opinions about how serious these issues are and whether they need to be dealt with.

but i don't think anybody can deny that things that we are talking about debating and resolving third amendment are not very deserving of the full a minute of the senate and of the american people. let me -- one of my colleagues made respond. [inaudible] >> you know, let me respond to that. i think senator kyl will probably be too generous in responding to that. those people that are saying that are absolutely wrong. indeed, they are inaccurate to the point going in the other direction. senator kyl has done things with this treaty as far as some of the issues come at no point to just want to start with, and that's modernization, which has done tremendous service for the american people. without going into intelligence

matters, i can say that it's pretty well established everywhere that our stockpile needs modernization badly. badly. that's particularly to in light of what the russians are doing, not only the russians, but the french and english and others who have weapons. they have all gone through modernization programs. we have not. the administration was dragging its feet on this, had no plan. senator kyl has taken to the point where they will start to do what really needs to be done. so those people who said that, i think that is posturing. i think it is typical of people who don't have substance or the facts on their side, and they start attacking the messengers, the people who are working on it. so senator kyl would've been much more generous in responding to that, but believe me, for those of us who have been shoulder to shoulder with him on this, he's been a patriot on this matter.

>> one more question. >> senator kyl, senator kyl. >> you have been very deliberative about not pronouncing what you plan to do on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty in terms of what he would vote yes or no. you mentioned you have amendments. what would it take for you at this point to support the s.t.a.r.t. treaty lacks it sort of sounds like you don't support it. >> first, let me say that at one of my colleagues will confront the fact that i haven't tried up to now to convince anybody to vote for or against the treaty. so all the time that the administration has been lobbying very hard, i have not. rather i have been trying to work constructively to improve it, as senator risch said, in the best ways i know have. currently the best way that i know how to do that is to get the very best and amendments out and see whether we can build support for them. if ins for or against the treaty at this point, i'm not sure that

anybody will listen to me. but i think you can detect in my community a great frustration of disappointment with the fact that notwithstanding our trying to work constructively we will get stiffed now. and i don't like that. and i don't think it's good for the country him and i go back to what judd gregg said in his speech yesterday. we are to listen to those departing speeches. that reflect wisdom of senators who have spent careers here thinking about what's most important. and what judd gregg said is the pillar of our government is the senate, and the reason this is so important is precisely because we ordinarily have plenty of time to talk things over and to resolve issues through the give and take of the amendment process that is the way that the current process will allow for that. we will have a lot of opportunity to talk about other issues, specific issues come other matters as the days come forward here but we are really late. we will see later.

>> thank you very much, all of you, for coming. i'm delighted to be joined by senator carl levin, chairman of the armed services committee, and senator dianne feinstein, the chairwoman of the intelligence committee. and we are delighted to be here to share some thoughts about where we are. at the beginning of the debate on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty on the floor of the united states senate where the marks a historic moment. the senate has the opportunity, and, frankly, it has a solemn responsibility to act to reduce the number of nuclear weapons pointed at our country. that's what makes this moment historic. it's a continuum of an effort that has been engaged in by republican and democratic

presidents alike. and congress, united states senate, is overwhelmingly embraced arms reductions as in our national security interests. some have suggested that somehow we don't have time to take up the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty because christmas is only 10 days away. well, let me read you what retired brigadier general john adams said in response to that claimed a couple of days ago. he said, we have 150,000 u.s. warriors doing their job over christmas and new year. the united states senate should do its job, and ratify this treaty. and all of us agree with that statement. i think that general adams has said it precisely right. and he echoed the support for this treaty that has come from every single leader of our military. the secretary of defense, robert

gates, all the way through to the director of the missile defense agency, to the command of our strategic forces, all of them have asked us to ratify this treaty as soon as possible. and a question about to be asked others, why come if the entire military establishment of our country, and the national intelligence establishment of our country time and the strategic command of our country are asking us to ratify this treaty, why do some senators, suggested that we shouldn't? we believe we should stay here as long as it takes to get this treaty ratified, and we are prepared to do so. there's no legitimate reason not to finish the work that has been done to date. to anyone who suggests that this treaty is being rushed, i offer a little reality check. the original start agreement in 1992 was a far more dramatic treaty. again in the immediate wake of the fall of the soviet union.

at left, it had a great deal of uncertainties that case at that time. it was a more dramatic treaty in this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. the cuts in nuclear weapons were deeper, the uncertainty was greater because of the soviet union had just collapsed. yet the full united states senate needed only five days of floor time before it approved the treaty by a vote of 93-sex. the start to treaty which was ratified by the senate but never fully approved by the russians, because of the abm treaty practice at that time, but it was ratified by the senate. it took only two days of floor debate before it was approved 87-four. and the moscow treaty, or the debate took exactly two days, and it was approved 95-0, and

had no verification in it at all. so the question has to be asked what happens if you delay networks what happens if you don't do this? it's really a recipe for endless delay on a matter of enormous national security importance. with newly elected senators that when it next year you have to go back to square one. you have to go back to new hearings, you'd have to go back to a new round of questions. we have to book year, over 900 questions -- put those up your -- 900 questions were filed and passed and answered by the administration in response to all of the questions posed by senators over the course of the last months. we've gone a year in 10 days without any inspectors of russian nuclear sites.

and while the debate goes on in the delay goes on, our understanding of russia's nuclear arsenal will continue to deteriorate day by day, and our efforts to contain the nuclear ambitions of iran and north korea with the weekend day by day. i know that i think senator levin and i, i know senator feinstein will speak to that in a minute. so i don't except and i don't think the majority of the united states senate accepts the idea that we should wait, delay on this. let me share with you what james r. clapper, director of national intelligence, had to say about how responsibly to ratified history. he said this months ago. he said i think the earlier, the sooner, the better. that's our national intelligence community speaking to us. so again, we should be willing to stay here, folks, if we get the job done.

we have 100,000 troops in harm's way in afghanistan, and 50,000 troops in harm's way in iraq. better get a break for christmas. they don't take new years off. they are away from their families because they are protecting our country. surely we and the nazis sent can ask any less of ourselves as anyone chamber and talk about this treaty. we owe it to our servicemen and women in afghanistan, iraq and elsewhere in the world to do everything in our power to make the world safer him and reduce the threat of conflict to them as a threat to our own citizens. this treaty is the least that we can do. now, i know the answer to the claims of some of those who incidentally have posed in most cases both treaties. but that aside, the s.t.a.r.t. process goes back 20 years ago. this is not new. this treaty is built on the foundation that was laid by earlier agreements.

we are safer today because of that legacy. the original s.t.a.r.t. agreement cut our arsenal some some 10,000 nuclear weapons on each side down to 6000 nuclear warheads. start to treaty would have cut in to about 3500 the moscow treaty did ultimately reduce those numbers to 1700, to 17. that's what we are committed to his to 1550. i don't understand why an agreement that reduces our nuclear warheads can be done in the next few days in the interest of the security of our country. starting in june of 2009, nearly a year before this agreement was signed by the president, foreign relations committee was briefed five times on these talks with the russians. senators on the armed services committee, from the intelligence committee, from the national

security working group which jon kyl has on the other side, we work together in a bipartisan way, we took part in all of these briefings, roughly 60 senators were able to follow the negotiations in detail over the course of an entire year. so we were present in real-time as the negotiators worked through the intricacies with the russians. we met with negotiators, the negotiators briefed us during this period of time. that's what makes this senate and this congress uniquely qualified to ratify this treaty. fact is that individual senators had individual opportunities to meet with negotiating team, and negotiation of the senators including senator can't even travel to geneva in the fall 2009 to meet with negotiators. my friends, that kind of deep and detailed involvement in the production of this treaty is not rushing anything. in fact, the republicans came to

me last summer and said, gee, please don't have the vote in the committee. we would like a little more time over august recess. and against the will of many of our members, i exercise the prerogative of the chairmen and i gave him that extra six weeks in order to make certain we gave people as much time as possible to get these questions answered. they were answered. when we came back they've been made, they made the request, the people here who say we are rushing something, make the request to delay again saying please don't do this before the election because if you do you will politicize it. so we didn't do it before the elections. out of complete comedy and deference to their requests to give them a dime. now we came back after the election and all of a sudden it's gee, we are cannot rush it up until now. this is the time, this is the time and this is the moment when

the united states senate needs to stand and be counted on issue of national security for our country. the fact is that six months after this treaty was signed and presented, the committees of jurisdiction that held more than 20 public and closed hearings and briefings, michael to be held at 12 hearings. we heard from past, current, military leaders and statesmen, and as i've said every living former secretary of state, republican and democrat, supports this treaty. and lastly former president george herbert walker bush who signed both start one and start to issued a statement that he, too, supports this treaty. so there has been no rush of consideration in this treaty. still some sort of suggest what you have to do it now? well, the real question, my friends, is not why now put. the question is why delay?

why would you not do this now when you have a chance to reduce the numbers of weapons pointed at united states and a chance to get american inspectors back on the ground and russia to understand what is happening there. so i hope that in the next days we will give time. we are not rushing this vote. they can decide how much time they think it takes, but we believe that a fair amount of time will be allotted by the majority leader in order to allow for amendments. i will go in in my statement on the floor to the huge number of changes we have made in the resolution of ratification on behalf of the republicans. we worked very closely with many of them. we have taken their comments and advice. we have incorporated them into the resolution. there are at least 13 amendments. we have already accepted and made our missile defense. we have provided additional funds on modernization to meet the needs of senator kyl. i think we have reached over every way possible to be fair,

and to allow people an opportunity to comment on this treaty. but now is the moment, and this is the time to proceed forward. and i will go into it now but if there are questions on the delay, i can certainly, what the history has been that leads us to this moment, that we need to proceed now on a dual track. let me turn to senator karl levin. >> thank you, senator kerry, for your excellent leadership. u.n. senator lugar together have made the team, a bipartisan team which is going to lead us to success. we will not be thwarted by the obstruction she. we cannot be because the national security of this country is at stake here. this is a significant treaty. it's significant because of the reductions that provides in terms of nuclear missiles that are aimed at our country. it is significant in terms of our relationship with russia. we should not underestimate the importance of strengthening that

relationship. iran is the greatest threat this world faces. it is a state which is aimed as far as we are concerned, i think most of us would agree, at acquiring nuclear weapons. it is essential russia continues to be a part of that group that either is near iran or is distant from iran, that understands that iran with a nuclear weapon would be a major threat to the well being of this world. and we need to be linked arm in arm with russia with this kind of a treaty. and not to ratify this treaty would be a significant breach in terms of that relationship. we cannot, cannot tolerate that kind of a reduction in the relationship that is so growing and so important. two quick points. one, the argument has been raised that somehow or another this treaty would in some way limit our missile defense

programs. it does not. it's not just me saying that. as chairman of the armed services committee, the authorization to which we pass in the committee says specifically that, quote, there are no constraints contained in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty on development or deployment of effective missile defenses, including all phases of a phased adaptive approach to missile defense in europe, and further enhancements of the ground-based midcourse defense system as well as future missile defenses. that has been concerned i general children are stratcom commander who says that as a combatant command also responsible for synchronizing global missile defense plan operations and advocacy, i can say with confidence that this treaty does not constrain any current or missile or future missile defense plans. secondly, in terms of verification. and they believed that senator feinstein will go into that

issue because of her position as chair of the intelligence committee, but it is vitally important that we have people on the ground in russia looking at their systems. we have none now. to s.t.a.r.t. treaty previous one has run out. just s.t.a.r.t. treaty will again get our people on the ground looking at their systems. we believe the wise by surprise oregano to the second half of that wise advice in play, in effect we must ratify this treaty. so it is a treaty which is clearly a national interest interest of our country. previous secretaries of defense of both parties, previous secretaries of both parties, previous presidents of both parties have together urged the senate to ratify. and we cannot allow the obstructionists who have obstructed so me thinks congress to stop this national security

interest from being taken care of. >> thank you, senator, kerry and senator levin. we often come to these press conferences and our colleagues speak and we agree with some things, perhaps not all things. in this case i want to categorically say i very much agree with the statements made both by senator kerry and senator levin. i think from the perspective of foreign relations and the perspective of armed services, this treaty must be ratified. i want to add to that that the intelligence community has carefully reviewed the june 2010 national intelligence estimate, or as we would say the in ie on the intelligence community's ability to monitor this new treaty. we held a hearing on the nie and related issues, and then sent 70 questions for the record and receive detailed responses from

the intelligence community. the committee undertook its own independent review of the nie. committee staff participated in more than a dozen meetings and briefings on a range of issues concerning the treaty. focusing on intelligence monitoring and collection aspects. so i'd like to focus my remarks today on the intelligence related aspects of this treaty, beginning with its monitoring provisions based on our committee's review. new s.t.a.r.t. and includes several provisions that allow the united states to monitor how rush is reducing and deploying it strategic arsenal, and vice versa. the united states intelligence community will use these treaty provisions and other independent tools such as the use of national technical means. that's obviously our satellites, to collect on russian forces and

whether russia is complying with the treaty's terms. these provisions include on the ground inspections of russian nuclear facilities and bases, 18 per year. regular exchanges of data on warhead and missile production, and the location. a requirement that there be unique identifiers, a distinct out the numeric code for each missile, and heavy bomber for tracking purposes. and a ban on blocking national technical means of collecting information on strategic forces. these provisions enable the intelligence community to monitor russian activities under this treaty. more broadly, they provide indispensable information on russian strategic forces. there have been no inspections and no data exchange, and no

telemetry since the exploration -- the expiration of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty about the one year, so we have less insight into any new russian weapon and delivery systems that might be entering their force. we had essentially gone black on any monitoring, inspection, data exchange is and the notification which is allowed by this new treaty. so i believe that it is in the nation's interest to act quickly to ratify this treaty. the senate intelligence committee has a detailed review of the monitoring decision of the treaty and whether the intelligence community can effectively monitor russia's activities. my conclusion is yes, we can. the intelligence community will be able to perform its monitoring mission under new s.t.a.r.t. him and will have far

more information about russian strategic forces with this treaty than without this treaty. the intelligence committee also looked at the consequences of failure of new s.t.a.r.t. senate rejection of new s.t.a.r.t. would not only undermine our understanding of russian strategic forces, it could also this trail or disrupt a host of others united states policy objectives. and let me just give you a few examples of those. russia has been allowing the united states and other members of the international security assistance force in afghanistan to transport materials into afghanistan over russian territory. this is a system or efforts, especially in light of recent attacks against convoys crossing through pakistan. also russia has withheld and delivery of the 300 advanced air defense system to iran, and

supported united nations security council sanctions against tehran. russia and nato partners have agreed at the recent summit in lisbon to a new missile defense system for europe. here's the conclusion. beyond the intelligence region i discussed, there are many reasons to support new s.t.a.r.t. it's important to nuclear nonproliferation your it will lay the groundwork for future arms control agreements. it will strengthen our relationship with the key world power. and i really cannot say too much about that. this is a world where nonstate actors are the fighting forces, and there are no rules of the battlefield. our relationship with the big nations is extraordinarily important, much more important than ever before. and this treaty helps cement

what can be a much more and better relationship between our two countries. without new start, our national study will suffer. every day without this treaty is another day without american inspectors on the ground in russia. another day in the dark, and the black. the bottom line, we should ratify this treaty without delay. >> thank you, senator feinstein. why don't we hang for a couple of questions? let me just say quickly, i have been here for 25 years. karl has been here longer than me, but i wanted are know to senators who lead their committees more competently and/or more diligent, and i think substantive. and i'm pleased to stand here with him today and have their

expertise led to this effort to try to get this important treaty ratified. yes? [inaudible] [inaudible] >> first of all, let me just say, look, i understand the emotions better certainly than it did a number of years ago. let's see how people feel tomorrow and how they feel the day after tomorrow, after people have had a chance to really step back and i just what is appropriate and what isn't.

i want this to stay up at a higher level. i sorely don't want to become political. and it shouldn't be. it's about american national security. our country is stronger when republicans and democrats together, come together. but i would ask of them in good conscious to ask themselves why we are here at this late hour. as i said, senator lugar was asked 13 times -- they had counted them -- by their own colleagues to delay the process of s.t.a.r.t. so that centric i would have time to do modernization. we did do modernization. i think there's such a thing as reciprocity here in the workings of the state senate, and we are looking for it. the fact is that since january of 2009 we've had to file 125 cloture motions in order to go

forward and do this business. that's why we're here late. that's as many cloture -- we need you to tell this story to americans. as many cloture motions that have been filed, in the last year as were filed between 1919, world war i, in 1974. and so they can't even say that we, we were guilty of the same thing because the fact is they've doubled the number of closures over the course of the last few just since 2007. so all i can say is that we've had to file 200 safety for cloture motions on or an average of 66 per year since 2007. that's why the business has been slowed down and that's what americans are mad at. and they need to take a look at their hearts, frankly, and the realities of these choices where we are heading here. so yes, i believe we will have

the votes eric i also believe that if we have given people adequate time, we have moved down the road with respect to motions and amendments, and we are willing to do amendments. we are willing to have votes. we will give people time to debate. but as i said the first s.t.a.r.t. treaty took five days. the second s.t.a.r.t. treaty today's come and moscow treaty, today's. after a legitimate amount of time i think harry reid is prepared to file a cloture motion and we hopefully will get cloture. but as i said we are not rushing that. we want people to have time. we would have people to have debates. >> how much time do you think is adequate? and what we feel like -- [inaudible] and at what point we feel. [inaudible] >> we going to put the vote off to next year. we intend to have this vote sometime this year. it's up to them as to how much

time. as i said, look, five days on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, two days on a second s.t.a.r.t. treaty, two days on the moscow treaty with no verification at all. so they have to decide how much time frankly they think it takes. at some point will make a decision whether the motions and amendments are duplicated and repetitive and simply there to delay, but we are not prejudging that. we want people to have a legitimate opportunity here. and let's let them have a chance to do that and maybe they will help to make that decision for us. i'm not going to prejudge anything in terms of days. >> are you willing to put to a vote even if you think the votes might go down? >> that's a decision the president of the united states and the vice president will make. i was a with the vice president said to me yesterday, and i think he said this to some republicans. he said look, if we have a chance of losing this now, next year it looks like there's even a greater chance that would happen. we would rather lose it now with

this crowd that is done the work on it and go back and start from scratch. we all understand what's at stake you. we understand applications, and i think they do, too. so our disposition is look, we've got time. there's nothing written in the rules of the united states senate that says we can't do the business of america remained here before we go home. i think we have an obligation to do it. our caucus is ready to working day and night. we may to be here late. we are ready to be here all weekend. we are ready to work and vote. it's up to them how quickly we do that. >> i just want to say one thing. i was in geneva when senator kyl, and in my floor remarks i will go into it a little bit more, but we met both with the russian negotiating team as well as with the american negotiating team. and a lot of questions were asked about inspections, about telemetry, about missile defense, about specific weaponry. and the questions were answered.

and that was a year ago, and he we are of the -- he we are a year later is of this treaty has been out there. as i look at it basically every informed republican that i respect, president bush 41, president bush 43, all major secretaries of state who are republican, george shultz, henry kissinger, james baker, and on and on and support of this treaty. plus, virtually all of the data military. there are a few outliers that may have their own reason. so why delay it? why do we pass the s.t.a.r.t. treaty at a time when the soviet union was collapsing and when there was major anxiety over where the world would go? and now when we know russia wants to move closer to the

united states, russia wants to develop a relationship with the united states, this could be positive for both countries. he is a treaty which approves the cooperation between both nations. why would we not support this? >> one quick word about reciprocity. we have a national security working group that senator kyl is a member of, and every time he wanted a briefing, we got the security folks up here to provide everything. when he wanted to go to geneva, that was worked out. so there's been real effort on the part of the administration and on the part of senator kerry and all of us to accommodate senator kyl throughout your. .-- throughout your. ..

>> it does not complicate matters. 51 votes in legislative session will do that. we will come back to this when appropriate. >> you brought up earlier in the lame-duck -- >> the simple reason we were trying to accommodate senator nasrallah and his request for more time and more work and more discussion and we kept the door open. until we finally are added point

where obviously -- >> you mentioned today -- >> can i ask something else? the 42 person letter obviously complicated the choices with the tax issue. people felt was important to get the tax issue done as a sign of good faith. that we would really do that and not try to jam that at the beck end. the tree was really held in good faith in order to show that we were prepared to be serious and get that done, keep our word. you all saw the flak the president took in the effort to do that. this begs the question of reciprocity. this can't be a 1-way street. doesn't work that way. we are asking our republican friends to send the country a

message at christmastime that we have the ability to work together particularly on something that can reduce the number of nuclear weapons pointed at our nation and leverage against iran and north korea. what could be more important at this time of year. >> on verification that such an issue as the s.t.a.r.t. treaty with some critics and response often is we are much better off with a treaty then without one which is a pretty lobar -- are we better off with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in terms of verification? >> that is an important point for all of you as we go forward. on verification, with respect to the component that some of our friends complain about, the bush administration prior to

president obama coming into office was noticed by the russians, that they were not going to continue the same process of reporting on missile production because it was a 1-way street. they found that to be unfair in terms of treaty so they noticed george bush. that would not exist going forward. it wasn't something that happened under president obama. it was prior to that then they said they would just that in context of whatever the next round is. our administration has negotiated what our people feel it's a terrific and in some ways better -- because for the first time we will have accounting of all warheads. we didn't have that before. we have a tracking system of individual warheads. as you will see from dianne feinstein and carl levin and others as they debate on this they will be required to provide us with 18 short notice on the

ground inspections this year in their most sensitive nuclear installations. there are all technical needs which we are not privileged to talk about publicly that our intelligence community has completely sign off on the notion that this is fully verifiable. they are completely comfortable with it and to them there is no issue of capacity to verify. thank you very much. >> after news conferences on the s.t.a.r.t. nuclear reduction treaty the ranking member of the foreign relations committee, john kerry and richard lugar spoke on the senate floor. this is an hour and a half. >> senator from indiana. >> i rise today to speak in support of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. we undertake this debate at a

time when almost 100,000 american military personnel are fighting a difficult war in afghanistan. more than 1,300 of our troops have been killed in afghanistan was almost 10,000 wounded. meanwhile we are in our seventh year in iraq. the deployment that has caused 4,400 american lives and wounded roughly 32,000 persons. we still have more than 30,000 troops deployed in that country. tensions on the korean peninsula are extremely high. and no resolution to the problems in north korea's nuclear program. we continue to pursue international support for steps that could prevent iran's nuclear program from producing a nuclear weapon. we remain concerned about stability and pakistan and the security of the nuclear arsenal. a counter terrorist threat emanating from afghanistan,

pakistan, east africa, yemen and many other locations. we are concerned about terrorist cells in allied counties and even in the united states. we remain highly vulnerable to disruptions in oil supplies due to national disasters, terrorist attacks, political instability or manipulation of the markets by unfriendly oil producing nations. even as we attempt to respond to these and other national security imperatives we are facing severe resource constraints. since september 11th, 2001, we have spent almost $1.1 trillion in iraq and afghanistan. we are spending roughly twice as many dollars on defense today as we were before 9/11. these heavy defense burdens have occurred in the context of a financial and budgetary crisis

that has raised united states total government debt to almost $14 trillion. the first year 2010 and -- budget registered $1.3 trillion or 9% of gdp. all senators here are familiar with the challenges that i have just enumerated. as we begin this debate we should keep this larger national security context firmly in mind. as we contend with the enormous security challenge of the twenty-first century the last thing we need is to reject a process that has mitigated the threat posed by russia's nuclear arsenal. for 15 years the s.t.a.r.t. treaty has helped us to keep a lid on the u. s russian nuclear rivalry. and establish a working relationship on nuclear arms with a country that was our

mortal enemy for four and a half decades. s.t.a.r.t. transparency features assure both countries about the nuclear capability of the other. for us that meant having american experts on the ground in russia conducting inspections of nuclear weaponry. because s.t.a.r.t. expired on december 5th, 2009, we have had no american inspectors in russia for more than a year. knew s.t.a.r.t. will enable american teams to return to russia and collect data on the russian arsenal and verify russian complaints. these inspections greatly reduce the possibility that we will be surprised by russian nuclear

deployment or advancement. before we even get to the text of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and the resolution of ratification, members should recognize what a senate rejection of a new s.t.a.r.t. would mean for our broader national security. failure of the united states senate to approve the treaty would result in an expansion of arms competition with russia. it would guarantee a reduction in transparency and confidence building procedures and diminish cooperation between the united states and russia defense establishment. it would complicate our military planning. rejection of new s.t.a.r.t. would be greeted with delight in iran, north korea, syria, burma. these nations want to see nuclear weapons from outside scrutiny and they want to be able to acquire sensitive weapons technology. they want to flaunt international efforts to make

them comply with their legal obligations. rogue nations fear any nuclear cooperation between the united states and russia because they know that it limits their options. there want to call into question our own non-proliferation credentials and they want russia to resist top economic measures against them. if we reject the treaty it will be harder to get russia's cooperation in stopping nuclear proliferation. we can create obstacles on some issues in the united nations security council where russia has a deal. we might reduce incentives for russia to cooperate in providing supply routes for our troops in afghanistan. it will give more weight to the arguments of russian nationalists who seek to undermine cooperation with the united states and its allies. it would require additional

satellite coverage of russia at the expense of their use against terrorists. with all that we need to achieve, why would we had to our problems by separating ourselves from russia over a treaty that we ratified. our military commanders are anxious to avoid the added burden and uncertainty of an intensified arms complication with russia. there no such competition would detract from other national-security priorities. that is one reason that they are telling us unequivocally to ratify this agreement. they also have asserted that the modest reduction in warheads and delivery systems in the tree in no way threatened our nuclear deterrence. defense secretary robert gates

and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff admiral mike mullen have testified that they have no doubt the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty should be ratified. general kevin shows and who is in charge of our strategic nuclear forces has said the treaty, quote, will enhance the security of the united states and. general patrick o'reilly who is in charge of our middle defensees endorsed the treaty saying, quote, does not constrain our plan to execute the united states missile defense program. moreover, seven former commanders of strategic command, military command in charge of our strategic nuclear weapons have backed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. members of the senate pumping into democrats have taken pride

in supporting the military and respecting military views about steps necessary to protect our nation. rejecting an unequivocal military opinion on a treaty, involving nuclear deterrence, would be an extraordinary position for the senate to take. the military is supported in its review by the top national security officials from past administrations. today, every secretary of state and secretary of defense has expressed a public opinion about the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty as in favor of ratification. this has included ten republicans and five republicans -- democrats. all five living americans who served ronald reagan as defense secretary, secretary of state or white house chief of staff have endorsed the new s.t.a.r.t.

treaty. the list of endorsements include president george h. w. bush, george shultz, jim baker, jim schlesinger, henry kissinger, colin powell, condoleezza rice, stephen hadley, howard baker, lawrence eagleburger and frank lucy. many of these officials serve at a time when states were related to russian nuclear arms were even higher than they are today. during the cold war, uncertainty over russia's intentions and weapons advances, this cost us 10s if not hundreds of billions of dollars. and industry developed devoted to parching soviet military capabilities. this is one of the biggest if

not the biggest expense of our intelligence budget each year. the fact that we could not judge soviet military capabilities lead us to elevate our spending on weaponry. called of a sense of caution. these times predominated by contradictory risk assessments and rumors about dangerous new soviet weapons systems. we were constantly worried about missile gaps destabilizing arms deployment or soviet technology--all of this came at tremendous cost to the american taxpayer. and the psyche of the nation which lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction. i firmly believe our opposition to an aggressive soviet state was absolutely necessary and led directly to the achievement of freedom for tens of millions of

people in eastern europe. it also set the stage for a dramatic breakthrough in international cooperation. that does not mean that the cold war was a benign experience or that we want to revive nuclear competition. carried out in an environment without verification or basic limits on weapons. i am not suggesting that we are on the brink of returning to the cold war. reality is far more complicated than that. but we should not be cavalier about allowing our relationship with moscow to drift or about letting our knowledge of russian weaponry accurately -- still americans to they give much thought to the new support -- nuclear arsenal of the former soviet union. americans have not had to be concerned in the same way as they work during the cold war

years. large elements of that arsenal still exist. and still threaten the united states. weather through accident, miscalculation, proliferation or any number of other scenarios, russian nuclear weapons materials and technology still have the capability to obliterate american cities. it commands the attention of our government. i relate these thoughts about where we have been in part because most senators entered national public-service after the cold war ended and even if you were worse serving in this body when we were called upon to make decisions on arms treaties. current members in the senate were here in 1988 to debate the

i n f 3. >> caller: current members serving in the senate during the geneva summit between president ronald reagan and mchale gorbachev in 1985. only 11 members were in march 1983 when president reagan delivered his so-called quote back evil empire speech. only seven were here when the soviets invaded afghanistan in 1979. in a few weeks these numbers will decline even further. the final question remains as to how we manage our relationship with a former enemy and current rival that still suggests enormous capacity for nuclear destruction. and president reagan managed an adversarial relationship that

previously was salt and accompanied by enormous cost to our own society. and restrained competition with russia is the best way to ensure security and relations with that country but that is not the view of the american people and there's no indication that that is what americans were voting for in november. it was certainly not ronald reagan's view. president reagan began the s.t.a.r.t. process. his team going to the term s.t.a.r.t. standing for strategic arms reduction talks. this shifted the bowl of nuclear arms control from limiting weapons to making substantial, verifiable cuts in existing arsenals. hunter mahan eighth, 1982, president reagan made the first

s.t.a.r.t. speech in illinois. calling for a 1-third reduction in nuclear warheads. for the rest of his presidency eat engaged in numerous arms control their reduced weaponry and established tough verification measures. he personally conducted five summits with russian leaders that focused on arms control. his efforts led to the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty which was signed in 1991. the cornerstone of president reagan's arms control agenda was verification. his interest in verification is some up by his line trust but verify. what the united states and

russia have done through the s.t.a.r.t. process is more than verification. s.t.a.r.t. has provided structure and transparency upon which unprecedented arms control and raise initiatives have been built. most notably the stability that came with a long-term agreement and the treaty approved by both the russians and american legislatures has been indispensable to the success of other non proliferation endeavors with russia. over in the course -- the lugar program americans and russians in a sustained effort to safeguard and ultimately destroy weapons and materials of mass destruction in the former soviet union and beyond. the destruction of thousands of weapons and a monumental achievement for our country, the process surrounding this joint

effort is as important as the number of weapons. the u.s./russia and relationship has been through numerous highs and lows in the post cold war era. throughout this period s.t.a.r.t. inspections and consultations and the corresponding reduction activities of the non nuclear program has been a constance, reduced calculation and build rejection. this has not prevented highly contentious disagreements with room moscow wind we have not had to wonder about the makeup and disposition of russia's nuclear forces. it has also reduced the not eliminated the proliferation threat posed by the nuclear arsenal of the former soviet union. this process must continue if we are to answer the existential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. every missile destroyed, every warhead deactivated, every inspection implemented makes us safer. russia and the united states have the choice whether or not to continue this effort and that choice is embodied in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. the senate formulation and on services committee held 18 hearings on the treaty with national security leaders who served in the nixon, ford, reagan, george bush and obama administration is. these hearings were supplemented by dozens of staff and member briefings as well as 1,000 questions for the record. we know that bilateral treaties are not need instruments because they involve merging of the will of two nations with the often conflicting interests. trees come with inherent

imperfections and questions. as secretary gates testified, even successful agreements are accompanied by a differences of opinions by the parties. that process is intended to reduce a resolution of ratification for consideration by the whole senate. the resolution should clarify the meaning and effect of free provisions for the united states and resolve areas of concern or ambiguity. on september 16th, 2010, the former relations committee approved a resolution of ratification to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty by a vote of 14-4. with important contributions from democratic and republican members. this resolution incorporates the concerns and criticisms expressed over the last several months by committee witnesses. members of the committee and other senators, it will be further strengthened to hour

debate in coming days. with this in mind i turned to specific concerns addressed in the resolution of ratification. first of all, missile defense. some critics of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty that it impedes the united states missile defense plan, but nothing in the treaty changes the bottom line that we control our own missile defense destiny, not russia. defense secretary gates, admiral mullin, general patrick o'reilly who is in charge of the missile defense program have all testified the tree does nothing to impede our missile defense plans. the resolution of ratification has to be reemphasized in multiple ways. some commentators expressed concern the treaty's preamble knows the interrelationship between strategic defense and strategic defense but preamble

language does not permit rights or impose obligations and it cannot be used to create an obligation under the treaty. the text in question is stating a truism of strategic planning that and in relationship exists between strategic offense and strategic defense. critics have also worried the prohibition on converting icbms launchers to the missile silos reduces our missile defense options. general o'reilly has stated flatly that it would not be in our own interests to pursue such conversion because converting a silo cost an estimated $19 million more than building a modern tailor-made missile interceptors on a. the bush administration converted five icbm test silos at vandenberg air force base for

missile defense interceptors and these have been grandfathered under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. beyond this, every program advocated during the bush and obama administration has involved construction of new silos dedicated to defense on land. exactly what the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty permits. general o'reilly said in the silo conversion it would be a major setback for our missile defense program. addressing whether there would be utility in converting any existing launch tubes to a launcher of defensive missiles, the commander of u.s. strategic command stated, quote, the missile tubes that we have are valuable in the sense that they provide strategic deterrent. i would not want to trade how powerful it is and its ability

to the turf for a single missile defense interceptor. essentially our military commanders are st. converting silos to missile defense purposes would never make sense for our efforts to build the best missile defense possible. a third argument involving mr. defense centers on russia's unilateral statement on signature of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty which expressed its right to withdraw from the treaty if there is an expansion of u.s. missile defense programs. unilateral statements are routine to arms control treaties and do not alter the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the treaty. moscow issued a similar statement concerning the s.t.a.r.t. i treaty implying its conditions were conditional involving the united states compliance with the abm treaty yet russia did not withdraw from

s.t.a.r.t. when the united states withdrew from the abm treaty in 2001. nor did it was dropped when we subsequently destroyed missile defense interceptors in california and alaska. nor did it withdraw when we announced plans for missile defense in poland and the czech republic. russia's unilateral statement does nothing to contribute to its right to withdraw from the tree. that right which we also possess is standard in all recent arms control treaties and most treaties considered throughout the united states's history. resolution of ratification approved by the formal relations committee reaffirms that the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will in no way inhibit our missile defenses. it contains an understanding that the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty imposes no limitations on the deployment of u.s. missile

defense other than the requirement to refrain from converting offensive missile launchers. it also states russia's april 2010 unilateral statement on missile defense does not impose any legal obligations on the united states and any further limitations require treaty amendments subject to the senate consent. consistent with the missile defense act of 1999 it also declares u.s. policy to deploy and effective national missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. then it is the paramount obligation of the united states to defend its people, of forces and allies against nuclear attack to the best of its ability. in a revealing moment during the senate foreign relations committee hearing on the treaty,

secretary gates testified, quote, the russians have aided missile defense ever since the strategic arms talks began in 1969. because we can afford it and they can't. and we are going to be able to build a good one and they probably aren't. and they don't want to devote resources to it. so they try to stop us from doing it. this treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. there are no limits on us. i would paraphrase the secretary's blunt comment by saying simply that our negotiation won on missile defense. if indeed a russian objective industry was to limit missile defense, they fail as the defense secretary asserts. does anyone really believe that russian negotiating ambitions were fulfilled by nonbinding

language in the preamble or by a unilateral statement with no legal force or by a prohibition on converting silos which caused more than building new ones. these are fruitless. they do nothing to constrain us. moreover has outlined our resolution and ratification states explicitly in multiple ways that we have no intention of being constrained. our governance is investing heavily in missile defense. strong bipartisan majorities in congress favor pursuing current missile defense plans. but the russians are left on missile defense is unrealized ambition. at the end of any treaty negotiation between any two countries there are always unrealized ambitions left on the table by both sides. this has been true throughout

diplomatic history. the russians might want all sorts of things from us but that does not mean they are going to get them. if we constrain ourselves from signing the treaty that is in our own interests on the basis of unrealized russian ambition we are showing no confidence in the ability of our own democracy to make critical decisions. we would be saying we have to live with the end of s.t.a.r.t. inspections and other negative consequences of rejecting this treaty to prevent the united states government in the future from bowling to russian pressure on missile defense. if one buys into this logic it becomes almost impossible to seek cooperation with russia on anything. let us be absolutely clear. the president of the united states, congress and the executive branch agencies on behalf of the american people control our own destiny on

missile defense. the russians can continue to argue all the ones on this issue but there's nothing in the treaty that says they need to pay attention to them. let me turn to the item of verification. the verification regime has been the subject of considerable debate. the important point is today we have zero on the ground verification capability given that s.t.a.r.t. 1 expired in 2009, one year ago. under s.t.a.r.t. this united states conducted inspection of weapons, facilities, delivery vehicles and warheads. in russia, ukraine and belarus. these inspections fulfilled a crucial national security issue by greatly reducing the possibility that we would be surprised by future advancements in russian weapons technology or deployment. only for ratification of new

s.t.a.r.t. will u.s. technicians returned to russia to resume verification. under the new s.t.a.r.t. the united states and russia each will deploy no more than 5,050 warheads for strategic deterrence. seven years from its entry into force the russian federation is likely to have only about 350 deployed missiles. this smaller number of nuclear systems will be deployed at fewer bases. it is likely russia will close down even more bases over the life of the treaty. both sides agreed at the outset that each would be free to structure its forces as it sees fit to. that is consistent with the views of the bush a

administration. rules and procedures for verification of new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. many being drawn from s.t.a.r.t. 1. the inspection regime in new s.t.a.r.t. is designed to provide each party confidence that the other is up holding the obligations while also being simpler and safer for inspectors to implement. it is disruptive for strategic forces and less costly than the s.t.a.r.t. regime. recently wrote to congress that, quote, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the commander u.s. strategic command and iss that russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant feeding or break down under new s.t.a.r.t.. and the verification regime and inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned u.s.

strategic force structure. we should not expect new s.t.a.r.t. will be eliminated but will provide for a means to deal with those differences constructively as under s.t.a.r.t. 1. ratification approved by the foreign relations committee requires further assurances by conditioning ratification on presidential certification. and the ability to monitor russian compliance and immediate consultation should a russian break out from the treaty be detected. for the first time in any strategic arms control treaty the condition required a plan for knew s.t.a.r.t. monitoring. some assert there are too few inspections in new s.t.a.r.t.. the treaty does provide for fewer inspections compared to s.t.a.r.t. 1 but this is because

fewer facilities will require inspection the new s.t.a.r.t.. s.t.a.r.t. 1 covered seven facilities in soviet sectors whereas knew s.t.a.r.t. only applies to russia and 35 remaining facilities. new t.a.r.p. also maintains the same number of, quote, reentry vehicle on-site inspections as s.t.a.r.t. 1. namely ten per year. baseline inspections were phased out and no longer needed. and treaty implementation, date on which it relies. the efficacy of the baseline data will eventually deteriorate. this is unique identifiers. it is be affixed to all nuclear capability heavy bombers.

they were applied only to russian mobile missiles. it will provide confidence and transparency. and the location of 700 deployed missiles. something that s.t.a.r.t. 1 did not do. the new s.t.a.r.t. recodified and continues important verification enhancements. and warhead loading on russian icbms. these enhancements originally agreed to start 1 implementation, work and confirming the number of warheads on each missile. the united states maintained continuous on side presents, and technicians from russia to conduct monitoring.

and strategic systems. monitoring has not continue under new s.t.a.r.t. and the arrangement was made by the bush administration. and s.t.a.r.t. 1's expiration with lower rates, it is not as crucial as a was during the cold war. for the united states to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will allow flexible modernization and operation of u.s. strategic forces while facilitating transparency regarding the development and deployment of russian strategic forces. let me comment on accounting rules. with regard to warhead counting, knew s.t.a.r.t. had the rules of the moscow treaty. each deployed missile or bomber was attributed a maximum number of weapons.

for which it was always accounted. each launcher of a missile or weapon also countered regardless of whether it performed nuclear missions or contained missiles. this resulted in inaccurate accounts of warhead, missiles and launchers. under the moscow treaty there was never agreement on what constituted an operationally deploy strategic nuclear warhead. consequently the parties use their own methodology for counting which warheads under the treaty's limits. under new s.t.a.r.t. one common set of accounting rules will be used by both parties regarding deployed and non deployed icbms and bombers and deployed warheads on missiles and bomber weapons. so that the data exchanged under this treaty will more accurately reflect the modern deployment of the party's strategic forces. under new s.t.a.r.t. bomber accounting rules are also different from s.t.a.r.t. 1.

under new s.t.a.r.t. each heavy bombers attributed one nuclear weapon. despite the aircraft stability to carry more. despite the modern fact that neither party maintains bombers loaded with nuclear weapons on a continuous basis. this rule is not an invention of new s.t.a.r.t. but was president reagan at negotiating position. he proposed that bombers not be counted at all because they are not first strike weapons and does not need stabilized. it was the concession to moscow to include heavy bombers and strategic offensive arms in s.t.a.r.t. 1 but president reagan never agreed to challenge their maximum capacity as the soviets thought. those who have inexplicably criticized new s.t.a.r.t. bomber accounting rules are advocating

the historic position of the soviet union, not our own. the department of defense plans to maintain 60 nuclear capable bombers under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty including a large number capable of carrying 20 a lc ems. detaining this standoff capability will enable the united states to feel a substantial number of penetrating weapons in the bomber way of our triad. flexible accounting for one weapon of each b-52 gives us immediate and powerful flexibility. something president reagan protected as they knew s.t.a.r.t. treaty. and turning to tactical nuclear weapons. some opponents contend the treaty should not be ratified because tactical nuclear weapons

are not covered. rejection of this treaty would make further limitations on taxable russian nuclear arms far less likely. some critics have overvalued utility of russia's nuclear-weapons and undervalued our deterrent to them. only if fraction of these could be delivered significantly beyond russia's borders pursuant to the imf treaty and the soviet union long ago destroyed intermediate range or shorter-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles arranged between 5200 kilometers. most of russia's tactical nuclear weapons have short ranges used for homeland nuclear defenses in the chinese border in storage. a russian nuclear attack on nato countries, deferred by nato conventional superiority. our own tactical nuclear forces,

with strategic forces. nuclear weapons and not threaten our strategic deterrence. and in eastern and northern europe understand this and strongly endorsed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. it is important to recognize the size differential between russian and american tactical nuclear arsenal did not come to pass because of america's in attention to this point. during the flush -- first bush administration our national command authority with full participation by the military, to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons we deployed. this was irrespective of russian action because the threat of massive ground invasions in europe largely evaporated due to the breakup of the former soviet union. our conventional capability had improved to the extent that

battlefield nuclear weapons were no longer needed to defend western europe. in this atmosphere maintaining large arsenals of nuclear artillery shells, land mines and short-range missile warheads was a bad bargain in terms of cost, save the, alliance cohesion and corp. risk. in my judgment russia should make a similar decision. the risk to russia of maintaining their tactical nuclear arsenal in its current form are greater than potential security benefits those weapons might provide. they have not done this in part because of their threat perceptions about the borders particularly the borders with china. and agreement with what russia that reduced, accounted for an approved nuclear arsenals is in the interest of both nations.

rejection of new s.t.a.r.t. makes it unlikely that a subsequent agreement concerning taxable nuclear-weapons will ever be reached. the resolution of ratification encourages the president to engage the russian federation on establishing measures for mutual confidence regarding accounting and security of russian on strategic nuclear weapons. let me touch upon modernization. i would like to turn to the nuclear modernization issue. the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will not directly affect modernization of nuclear weapons laboratory. the treaty explicitly states modernization and replacement of strategic arms may be carried out. senate consideration of new s.t.a.r.t. has intensified the debate on modernization and

stockpile stewardship program. at the end of the bush administration, a consensus developed that our nuclear weapons complex was at risk due to years of underfunding. in 2010 the senate approved the amendment to the defense authorization bill requiring a report to congress known as the 1251 report. the plan to modernize nuclear weapons stockpile, the 1251 report submitted by the administration committed to an investment of approximately $80 billion over a ten year period to sustain and modernize the united states nuclear weapons complex which according to secretary gates was a credible program for stockpile modernization. pursuant to this report the administration submitted fiscal year 2011 request for $7 billion. nearly 10% increase over fiscal

year 2010 levels. the 1251 plan was augmented by an additional $5 billion in funding. directors of our national laboratories on december 1st road that they were very pleased with the updated plan which provides adequate support to sustain the safety, reliability and effectiveness of america's nuclear deterrent under s.t.a.r.t.'s central limits. the resolution of ratification past 94 and relations committee declared a commitment to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear forces to a robust stockpile stewardship program. resolution include the requirement for the president to submit to congress a plan for overcoming the any future resource shortfalls associated with this 1251 modernization plan. the resolution also declares a commitment to modernizing and replacing nuclear weapons

delivery vehicles. in conclusion it is imperative we vote to provide consent to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. both strategic concerns that motivate republicans and democratic administrations to pursue nuclear arms control with russia during the last several decades still exist today. we are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and reduce the cost of maintaining weapons. we are pursuing transparency of our nuclear arsenal, backed by strong verification measures and formal consultation methods. we are attempting to maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenal and encouraged global cooperation or non-proliferation goals. we are hoping to solidify the united states cooperation on nuclear security matters while

sustaining our knowledge of russian nuclear capabilities and intentions, rejecting new s.t.a.r.t. would permanently inhibit our understanding of russia's nuclear forces, would weaken our non-proliferation diplomacy will arise with potentially reignite extensive arms competition that would further strain our national budget. bipartisan support for arms control treaties has been reflected in the overwhelming votes in favor of the imf treaty, s.t.a.r.t. 1, s.t.a.r.t. 2 and the moscow treaty. the merits of new s.t.a.r.t. will have demand similar bipartisan support. i thank the chair and i yield the floor. >> mr. president, this afternoon the united states senate takes up an issue that is critical to the nation's security and the

opportunity of doing so, to reduce the danger from nuclear-weapons in very real and measurable terms. we have an opportunity here to fulfill the constitutional obligation that feet lies the united states senate to provide a 2 thirds vote of the members present who must vote in favor of a treaty. the constitution by doing that insists on bipartisanship and insists on support that is critical to our foreign policy and to the security definitions of our country. that obviously requires we put politics aside and act in the best interests of our country and i am confident in the next day the senate will embrace this debate in a substantive way that it deserved to be embraced and we look forward to welcoming constructive amendments from our

colleagues on the other side of the aisle. obviously give them time to be able to make those suggestions and we look forward to having an important discussion about the security of our nation. we have been working together for a lot of months to get us to this point in time and it is indisputable that we have worked in good faith on our side of the aisle to provide enormous latitude to colleagues who have had questions about this treaty some of whom have opposed this or other trees from the beginning but who really wanted to engage in the process. i take the administration to their credit, those who have negotiated the treaty available throughout the process have been an enormous number of briefings and discussions, dialogue, phone calls, a very open effort.

as open as any that i can remember in 25 years in the senate. i have been through this treaty process with president reagan and president bush, president clinton and others. this has been as open and accessible and in depth and accommodating as any of those if not significantly more. i want to begin by thanking my colleague in this effort, my friend and a long time knowledgeable advocate of nuclear common-sense, senator lugar. we all know he is one of the world's foremost experts in the subject of threat reduction and proliferation reduction. there are very few senators. look out and see a program that has been as constructive in reducing the threat to our nation that bears their name, the lugar reduction program. it has been an honor to work

with senator lugar and to have his wise counsel in this process and equally importantly to have his courage in being willing to stand up for what he believes in so deeply and what he knows will advance the cause of our nation. my comment to my colleagues that what we're doing here in these next hours and days, providing advice and consent is a responsibility that is not given only to the senate. founding fathers intended that the senate be able to rise above the pettiness of partisan politics. as my friend chris dodd said, our friend chris dodd said in his valedictory speech the senate was designed to be different. not simply for the sake of priority but because of the framers believed the senate could and should be the venue in

which statesmen woodcliff america up to meet these unique statements -- challenges. that is the word we need to focus on, statement. too often in recent months the american people signaled that in the last election, said it has been unable to lift america up to meet its challenges. too often we became one of those challenges. rather than cooperating or compromising, we saw a blockade after blockade, an inability to address a number of issues. as senator dodd said, what determines whether this institution works in is whether the 100 of us can work together. with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty we have the opportunity to do just that. not only to demonstrate our

leadership to the world's, i would say to my colleagues just a few days ago the foreign relations committee had the privilege of welcoming the entire united nations security council which came here to washington with our ambassador, dr. susan wright. much on their minds was this question. could the united states senate rise? with the united states senate accomplished this important goal which has meaning not just to us but to them because they have joined with us in resolution 1929 in order to put pressure on iran and not to mention long-term efforts we made with respect to north korea. what we do here is going to be an expression of our opportunity, our ability to provide leadership to the american people. let me clarify one thing at the onset of this discussion. we have enough time to do this treaty. anybody who wants to claim we

don't have time and can't do it, is right before christmas and so forth, let me just remind people the original s.t.a.r.t. agreement which was passed back in 1992 was a far more dramatic treaties and the new s.t.a.r.t.. the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty was formulated in the aftermath of the demise of the soviet union. there was a huge uncertainty in russia at that point in time. the soviet union had just collapsed and yet despite all of the uncertainty, despite the complexity of going from some 10,000 nuclear warheads down to 6,000, the full senate needed only five days of floor time to approve the treaty by a vote of 93-6. the start ii treaty which

followed it four years later took only two days on the floor of the united states senate. it was approved 87-4. and the moscow treaty which actually resulted in the next further big reduction because the s.t.a.r.t. ii was not approved by russia because of what had happened with the unilateral pullout of the united states of the u b m in treaty, it was ratified but we managed to go to moscow treaty and resulted in further discussions from 1700 to 2,000 weapons. a dramatic reduction. that treaty which did not have any verification measures in it at all, no verification, that treaty took only two days on the floor of the senate and it was approved