mr. president, we have time to it to this treaty if we approach it seriously, if we don't have delay amendments, delay amendments, i believe we have an opportunity to embrace the fact that this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty is a common-sense agreement in the next step to reduce down 1550 warheads and enhance stability between two countries that together between them possess some 90% of the world's nuclear-weapons. it will limit russia over the next ten years to those 1550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery vehicles and 800 launchers. it will give us flexibility in deploying our own arsenals. we have huge flexibility in deciding what we put on land or

in the air or at sea. at the same time it will allow us to eliminate surplus weapons that have no place in today's strategic environment. new s.t.a.r.t. verification provisions will deepen our understanding of russia's nuclear forces. for the past four years the united states often at the instigation of republican presidents has used arms control with russia to increase the transparency and predictability of both our nuclear arsenals. this has built trust between our two countries. it has reduced the chances of an accident. it stabilized our relationship during times of crisis. and provided greater communication and greater understanding. as everybody knows peepers middle in making military decisions and strategic decisions, understanding legitimacy of a particular threat and the immediacy of that threat and knowing what the

intentions and actions of a potential adversary might be is critical to being able to make wise judgments about what reaction might best be entertained. frankly that trust is exactly why president george h. w. bush signed the s.t.a.r.t. 1 and s.t.a.r.t. ii treaties. that is why they pass the united states senate with overwhelming bipartisan support. knew s.t.a.r.t. simply stands on the shoulders of those two s.t.a.r.t. agreements. there are a few new components of it, a few twists and turns of verification, but not fundamentally new. they also stand on the trust and the fact of the legitimate enforcement of that treaty over

all of the year that s.t.a.r.t. has been in effect. we are not beginning from scratch. we have 1992 until today record of cooperation and knowledge and increased security that has come to us because of the prior agreements. that is frankly why i was so pleased that president george herbert walker bush last week issued a statement urging the united states senate to ratify this treaty. in addition to stabilizing the u.s. russian nuclear relationship, knew s.t.a.r.t. his profound on our ability to work to try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons in states like iran. in seven months since president obama signed this agreement russia has alreadyiran. in seven months since president obama signed this agreement

russia has already exhibited a greater cooperative attitude number of things including harsh sanctions against iran and suspended the sale of the as/400 air defense system to pteron. that is critical. we were struggling a couple years ago to strengthen sanctions against iran. there was a member of this body that did not articulate at one point or another of the need to move to the iran sanctions act. we finally did that but didn't have a partnership. neither china nor russia or permanent members of the security council were joining in that effort so we couldn't get the united nations to move. now we have and there's no one watching the restart with russia doesn't understand that cooperation has been enhanced by our signing of this treaty. to not ratify it now would be a very serious blow to that cooperative effort and in fact

according to many experts that would move us back into the kinds of arms race that we struggled so long to get out from under. the fact is we need to understand that relationship. i might add that steve forbes in forbes magazine wrote an article the other day urging the united states senate to ratify s.t.a.r.t. because he said it doesn't just have an implication in terms of the security component, the nuclear side, it has a very strong economic component and he is arguing for greater economic engagement between russia and the united states and russia and the west and he said cote restart relationship isthe restart

relationship is critical to that increased commerce -- i hope my colleagues will look carefully at a strong conservative voice like his that urges the ratification of this treaty. in addition to the russian component of the relationship, new s.t.a.r.t. will keep nuclear-weapons out of the hands of terrorists. one of the greatest fears of our security community is that terrorists may not necessarily get what we strictly call a nuclear bomb but they may be able to get nuclear material through back channels and through the black market because it hasn't been adequately guarded. we have reduced the numbers of missiles and material so they could get ahold of some of that material and make one is called a dirty bomb. that is a bomb that doesn't go

off in a nuclear reaction butwhd a dirty bomb. that is a bomb that doesn't go off in a nuclear reaction but because of the nuclear material has a broad toxic impact on large community. that is a legitimate real concern and one of the reasons we drive so hard to reduce the nuclear actors in the world. the original s.t.a.r.t. agreement was what is called the lugar reduction program. simply put, that is the most successful non proliferation effort of the last 20 years. as james baker, former secretary of the treasury, secretary of state, said, i really don't think lugar would have been as successful as it was under -- unless the russians liked the legally binding assurance of parallel u.s. reductions through the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. so the new s.t.a.r.t. will

secure nuclear materials and without new s.t.a.r.t. seven they, that ability to contain those materials will be weakened. insured, new s.t.a.r.t. will address the lingering dangers of the old nuclear age while giving this important tools of the nuclear age. that is weather such an outpouring of support for this tree. every single living new former secretary of state, republican and democrat, supports this treaty. so do five former secretaries of defense and the chair and vice chair of the 9/11 commission. so do seven former commanders of our nuclear forces and the entirety of our uniformed military including admiral line and the service chiefs and our

current nuclear commander all support this treaty as well. it is difficult to imagine an agreement with that from so many individuals who contributed so much to our nation's security. almost all of whom know a lot more about each of these arguments than any senator, myself and everybody here that they have been in the middle of this and over the last weeks every single one of them have spoken out in favor of this treaty. the messages we shouldn't rush to this. but only in the united states senate could year-and-a-half be a rush. we started working and is a year-and-a-half ago. senators had unbelievable opportunity to do this. the question is not why would we try to do it now but why not try to do it now? for what reason? in the four corners of the actual treaty not talking about

modernization, that is not in the four corners of the treaty. notwithstanding that the administration has allowed delay after delay after delay in order to help work with senator kyl and provide increase in modernization so much so that the modernization is way above what it was under president bush or any prior administration. that is not in the four corners of the treaty. that is something you do because you want to maintain america's nuclear force and we all want to do that which is why we work hard to provide that funding. but i believe that the importance here is to recognize it has been more than a year since the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty and its verification provisions expired. more than one year since we have inspectors on the ground in russia with access to their nuclear facilities. every day for the past year our knowledge of their arsenal

whatever they are doing begins to diminish. one small amount at a time. cumulatively over time which is why our entire national intelligence community has come out and said this treaty in fact will advance american security and assist us to know what russia is doing. two weeks ago, james clapper, director of national intelligence, urged us to ratify the new s.t.a.r.t. and he said i think the earlier, the sooner, the better. that is our national intelligence director. others have tried to suggest that this is a squeeze in the last days but let me just say respectfully i have already given you the time frame. one to five days. moscow, two days. if we work diligently there's nothing to stop us from finishing this in the time we have. we just have to make it clear we are going to stay here.

the president wants us to and harry reid has said we will until we get this done. the fact is starting in june of 2009, over a year ago, year and a half ago, before and relations committee was briefed five times during the talks with the russians. we match downstairs in a secure facility. with the negotiators. while they were negotiating. we met with them before we negotiated. we gave the parameters we thought they needed to embrace to facilitate passage through the senate. we met with them while they were negotiating. at least five times. senators from the armed services committee, senators from the intelligence committee. senators from the said national security working group which i co-chair with senator kyl. when senator kyl wanted to meet that group we call the meeting and that and called scott muller

and others and sat and talked. the said the senate committee on intelligence went to work and if you counted up more than 60 united states senators were able to follow the negotiations in detail over a 1-year period. senators also had additional opportunities to meet with the negotiating team and the delegation of senators even traveled to geneva with the administration helped make happened in order to meet with the negotiators while the negotiations were going on. even though the new s.t.a.r.t. was formally submitted to the senate in may the fact is congress about this treaty before it was even signed. the president made certain we were being briefed and the input of the united states senate was taken into account in the context of those negotiations. no other senate, not next year's senate could come back here and

replicate what the senate has gone through in preparing for this treaty. we can't replicate those negotiations. there over. they can go back and give advice at the beginning. that is done. we did that. it is our responsibility to complete the task on this is because we put a year-and-a-half's work into it. we have done the preparation. we have the knowledge and it is our responsibility. the fact is over the last seven months this senate has become more interest in the treaty. we have had briefings, documents have been submitted. nearly 1,000 formal questions were submitted to the administration and they have been answered. all of these were asked by senator is completely within their rights, totally inappropriate in the ratification process. we welcome it and i think it has produced a better record and

stronger product. the foreign relations committee conducted 12 classified hearings. we heard from 20 witnesses. the armed services committee and the intelligence committee held more than eight hearings in classified briefings of their own. we heard from robert gates, secretary of defense from admiral mike mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general kevin shock, strategic command, lieutenant general patrick o'reilly, defense agency, who incidentally repeated what every single person involved in this from secretary gates through the strategic command has said, this treaty does nothing to negatively impact america's ability or even impacted in a way that prevents us from doing exactly what we want with respect to missile defense. we also heard from the directors of the nation's nuclear laboratories. the intelligence officials charged with monitoring threats to the united states and we

heard as i mentioned previously several times from the negotiators of the agreement. we heard from officials who serve in the nixon administration. ford, carter, reagan, bullish, clinton, bullish 43, we heard from officials in every one of those administrations and overwhelmingly they told us we should ratify the new s.t.a.r.t.. as i said, some of the strongest support for this tree comes from the military. i chaired a hearing on the nuclear posture. modernization of nuclear weapons complex and missile defense plans, general shelton, commander of u.s. strategic command responsible for overseeing nuclear deterrent overseeing why the military supports new s.t.a.r.t.. he says, quote, if we don't get the treaty, the russians are not constrained in their development

of structure and we have no insight into what they are doing. it is the worst of both possible worlds. that is the head of our strategic command telling us if you don't ratify this treaty is the worst of both possible worlds. this treaty may have been negotiated by a democratic president with the strongest supporter the street from republicans. two weeks ago, five republican secretaries of state, five, henry kissinger, george shultz, james baker, lawrence eagleburger and colin powell wrote an article saying they support ratification of new s.t.a.r.t. because it embraces republican principles like strong verification. last week condoleezza rice published an op-ed that says the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty deserves bipartisan support when the senate decides to vote on it.

secretary rice wrote approving this treaty is part of our effort to, quote, stop the world's most dangerous weapons from going to the world's most dangerous regimes. if some think we have somehow considered this treaty carefully i just encourage them to revisit the voluminous record that has been produced over the last year and a half and i look forward to reviewing it here as we debate new s.t.a.r.t. in the coming days. in the end i am confident we will approve this treaty just as the senate approved the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty in 1992. at that time there were also senators who insisted on delay. there were senators who suggested serious questions remain unanswered. that is their privilege. there were senators who drafted dozens and dozens of amendments. but in the end within five days, the senate came together to approve the treaty 93-6.

what is important that we pay attention to as we look at the big picture to the national imperative, security imperative behind this treaty and what our military leaders and civilian leaders are urging us to think about past and present? if you pay attention to facts you can come to only one conclusion. that is we have to ratify a history. some of our colleagues said they could support it if we had certain issues in the ratification. have addressed them. many people are not aware of how much we have put in the resolution of ratification and how much we have done over the

last seven month to respond to the concerns that were raised during consideration of the treaty. the draft is 28 pages long. it contains 13 conditions. three understandings. ten declarations. and the conditions will require action by the executive branch, the understandings are formally communicated to the russians and the declarations express clear language of what we in the senate expect to happen in the next year. that is a distinction between each of those categories. this resolution currently addresses every topic we have addressed over the course of the last seven months. for example on the issue of missile defense, our military has repeatedly and unequivocally as short a us that the new s.t.a.r.t. does nothing to constrain our missile defense plans. the secretary of defense plan

says it does nothing to do that. the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff says it does nothing to constrain our missile defense plan. the commander of their nuclear forces says it does nothing to constrain our defense plan. indeed, the man who probably knows more about these plans in the greatest detail much more than any senator, lieutenant-general o'reilly, head of the missile defense agency, testified that in many ways the treaty reduces constraints on our missile defense. elson testified the russians signed a treaty full knowing that we are committed to the adapt approach in europe. he says, quote, i briefed the russians personally in moscow on

every aspect of our missile defense development. i believe they understand what it is and those plans for developments are not limited by this treaty. if the senator is still worried about the new s.t.a.r.t. missile defense treaty notwithstanding his comments they ought to read condition v, understanding 1. decorations 1 and 2. all of which speak directly to that issue. we also addressed the issue of what resources are needed in order to sustain our nuclear deterrent and modernize their nuclear weapons infrastructure. this is not an issue that falls within the four corners of the treaty as i mentioned but as a matter of good faith in an effort to work salary the ability of people who support this treaty every step of the way the administration in good

faith has worked to provide senator kyl and other senators with full knowledge of how the program will go forward. obviously the administration doesn't control what the republican house will do but senator andaway has given assurances and senator feinstein has given her assurances and we have guaranteed knowledge of funding going forward, the 1251 program which lays out spending going forward and made available way ahead of schedule. in a good-faith effort to try to make certain that every base is covered. the obama administration proposed spending $80 billion in the next ten years. a 50% increase over the baseline budget. even accounting for inflation. it would have been much more that amount that was spent during the bush administration.

notwithstanding, still last month, some senators expressed further concerns so guess what? the administration responded even further and put up an additional $5 billion over the next ten years and response the directors of our three nuclear-weapons laboratories sent me a letter saying, quote, they were very pleased with the new plan and they said, quote, we believe that the proposed budget provide adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effective of america's nuclear deterrent within the limits of 1550 deployed strategic warheads the established by the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable risk. last week the person responsible for running our nuclear weapons complex, a man who was originally employed in that position by george w. bush told the wall street journal, quote,

i can say with 70 that our nuclear infrastructure has never received the level of support we have today. that is a ringing endorsement, mr president, one that is completely persuasive, any reasonable mind. if you are still concerned are suggest they go see condition 9 of the resolution of ratification. it says that if any of this funding does not materialize in coming years the president is required to report to congress as to how he or she will respond to that short fall. every other issue that has been raised is addressed as well. if you modernize strategic development vehicles, declaration of 13 gets concerned. global strike abilities, go look

at conditions 6 and 7 understanding 3 in declaration 3. tactical nuclear weapons likewise covered in the resolution verifying russian compliance also covered. and rail mobile missiles have been addressed in the resolution of ratification. obviously there is room for someone else to say you need to do this or that. we completely remain open to any reasonable and legitimate efforts to improve on or guarantee some safeguard that is not included without obviously scuttling the treaty itself. i reached out to colleagues and had a terrific conversation. i want to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who sat with us and in quired and helped us to navigate this process but a coma state.

we are not going to amend the treaty itself. we will accept resolutions that don't kill the tree but we won't get into some process after all that has been said and done after all the bipartisan voices that inspected this treaty and found one we should ratify. mr president, i have been through all the folks who signed and endorsed so i would say i hope in the next hour we will have a healthy debate on this. our hope we can also work out given that everybody knows the holiday is on us. i hope we can reach out -- work at reasonable time periods. we will not put on a debate. most senators have a sense where they deal on these issues. we look forward to working with our colleagues in a constructive way to expedite the process. we have other business before

the senate as well. we are cognizant of that but this is truly a moment where we can increase america's hand in several of the greatest challenges we face on the planet. first and foremost if we are truly committed to a non-nuclear iran, the united states to turn away from reducing weapons with russia in a way that sends a message to them about our bonafide clean hands in this effort it would be a tragedy if we didn't take this opportunity to strengthen the president and west's and other's hands in trying to deal with this increasingly threatening issue. i hope our colleagues will warmly rise to that challenge in the senate. i thank the chair and yield before.

>> remarks from senator of the foreign relations committee john kerry who is chair of the senate foreign relations committee. he made those remarks yesterday. there will be more debate on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty today as senators gavel in to begin debate on the u.s./russia nuclear arms treaty. president obama and the russian president earlier await ratification in the senate. we are live to the u.s. senate floor on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the chaplain dr. barry black will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. sovereign god, you see all that happens in our world, as you lead us

by your mercies and grace. continue to shower our land with your blessings, protecting us from the forces that hinder freedom. give our lawmakers the wisdom to obey you, striving always to do what is right. may their words be true and sincere and their actions be characterized by honor and respect. help them to keep their promises to you and to one another, no matter how great the challenges may be. enable them to walk securely

in the path of your will. we pray in your great name. amen. the presiding officer: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. the presiding officer: the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., december 16, 2010. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable kirsten e. gillibrand, a senator from the state of new york, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: daniel k. inouye, president pro tempore. mr. reid: madam president? the presiding officer: the

majority leader. mr. reid: following leader remarks, if any, the senate will proceed to executive session to consider a new start treaty. roll call votes are expected to occur throughout the day in relation to amendments to the treaty. the two managers of this bill, senator kerry and senator lugar, are some of the most experienced members, and they will do an outstanding job of managing this legislation. the current continuing resolution expires saturday at midnight, so we need to take action to consider a funding resolution sometime in the next few days. just an update on the schedule. the tax package which we passed yesterday is now in the house. they're going to consider that very likely today. we have the omnibus or the continuing resolution that we have to deal with in the near future, because as i have indicated the funding expires before -- at midnight on saturday. the "dream" act is something we need to work on. it's an extremely important piece of legislation.

allowing young men and women to join the military if they serve two years in the military. they would be eligible to get their green cards and also continue their education, an extremely important piece of legislation. we had the 9/11 health matter which we need to reconsider that. we hope we can move forward on that. there is thousands of people who are desperately ill that need to be helped as a result of that terrorist attack that took place on 9/11. yesterday, the house passed don't ask, don't tell, and we're going to have to deal with that in some way. we have nominations, including that of jim kohl, the deputy attorney general. we have been trying for several months now to get cleared the second ranking person in the entire justice department. it seems a little untoward to me that we're having trouble getting even a vote on this individual, so that's going to have to be resolved before we

leave here. it's extremely important that we do that. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate will proceed to executive session to consider the following treaty which the clerk will report. the clerk: treaty, calendar number 7, treaty with russia on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. mr. reid: madam president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: the republican leader is going to do his statement now, and so i understand that, but i do ask on behalf of senator shaheen that roger tomin, a fellow in her office, be permitted floor privileges during the consideration of the start treaty and any votes relate to go that matter. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. mcconnell: madam president? provided the republican leader.

mr. mcconnell: madam president, i want the american people to see something. this is the -- this is the bill that the majority would have us pass, this omnibus appropriations bill. 2,000 pages long. and i think the american people should think back to this time a year ago, last december, when the democrats did the very same thing. at that point, it was a 2,700-page health care bill, because, frankly, they didn't want us to see what was in it. only afterward did we find out -- only afterward did we find out about the cornhusker kickback, the louisiana purchase and all the rest. and this is early familiar to anyone who remembers the health care debate. we have even got snow in the forecast, which is reminiscent

of last year. last year, we voted on health care in a blizzard, the 2,700-page health care bill in the middle of a blizzard. this bill is so enormous, it took the government printing office two days to print it. it spends more than half a billion dollars a page. let's take a look at it again. here's the bill. it spends -- right at 2,000 pages in this bill. it spends a half a billion dollars a page. it's got more than a half a billion dollars in it for the democratic health care bill that we passed last year, the 2,700-page bill that looked pretty much like this. it's got a half a billion dollars in it, but that health care bill that we passed last year, an ever-growing number of americans looking at that health care bill would like for us to repeal it, not fund it. this is exactly the kind of

thing the american people voted against last november, just this kind of thing. you know, we had a referendum november 2 on how the american people felt about what we had been doing the last two years, and right at the top of the list was the 2,700-page health care bill. frankly, it's just kind of unbelievable. just a few weeks after the voters told us they don't want us rushing major pieces of complicated, costly, far-reaching legislation through congress, we get this 2,000-page bill. they want to ram this gigantic trillion dollar bill through congress, and they're getting -- they're using once again the christmas break as an inducement to vote for it. we all know that this is not the way to legislate. americans expect more from congress, and they demanded more on election day. that's why today i'm introducing this clean, clean, one page, one

page, clean continuing resolution that would operate the government through february 18. so we have got a choice here. we can pass this 2,000-page bill, spending a half a billion dollars a page, or we can do this one page, clean, continuing resolution through february 18 of next year. that's the choice we have. once the new congress is sworn in, we'll have a chance to pass a less expensive bill free of this kind of wasteful spending. until then, we need to take a step back and respect the will of the voters. i think the message was pretty clear last november. one pundit referred to it as a restraining order. in other words, quit doing what you have been doing. and here we are a month after the election attempting to pass this 2,000-page bill when we could pass a one-page, one pager

that would simply continue the government through february 18. so look. we're going to have an opportunity to do this. i would hope that it would make sense on a bipartisan basis, this one-page continuing resolution on february 18 as an alternative to this 2,000-page monstrosity that spends a half a billion dollars a page. i don't think there's any question it's the right thing to do, and i would hope that my colleagues would decide in the end that that's the direction we ought to take. so, madam president, i would ask that this appear -- yeah, i am going to introduce this and just wanted to highlight it for my colleagues. on another matter, madam president, i know there are others on the floor seeking to speak, but i want to bid farewell to one of our -- one of

our colleagues. madam president, few people can say they have had the same range of experiences and successes in life as senator jim bunning. in fact, there isn't even another major leaguer who can say he struck out ted williams three times in one game, and jim accomplished that notable feat in just his second year in the majors. 39 years after that, he had become the only member of the baseball hall of fame to serve in the u.s. congress. for the past 12 years, i have been honored to work alongside this remarkable american here in the senate. we follow different paths in life but we share a deep love for kentucky and its people. it's been n my honor over the years to work closely with jim to advance our common goals. so today i would like to say a few words about my good friend as we honor his remarkable life and his remarkable service. jim was born and raised in southgate, kentucky, and it wouldn't surprise anybody to

learn that he excelled in school and in sports growing up. he played baseball as a teenager at st. xavier high school in cincinnati, but it was for his skills as a basketball player that would earn him an athletic scholarship to xavier university. baseball interrupted his college education, but at his father's insistence jim would return to xavier and earn a degree in economics that served him well in congress over the years. he entered the majors in 1955, and over the course of a storied 17-year career, he would play for the detroit tigers, the philadelphia phillies, the pittsburgh pirates and the los angeles dodgers. jim is a pretty imposing force at committee hearings. just ask chairman bernanke. but he was a dominating presence on the mound long before that. at 6'4", he was a hard-throwing sidearmer who would tumble off the mound with every pitch he

threw. by the end of his career, jim could boast that he was the first major league pitcher to win 100 games, rack up 1,000 strikeouts and throw no-hitters in both leagues. he finished with an impressive 224 wins, 184 losses, 2,855 strikeouts, and a 3.27 e.r.a. the career stats that would earn him a spot in the baseball hall of fame. jim's two greatest pitching achievements were his no-hitter in 1958 and the perfect game he threw on father's day, 1964, a feat that has only been accomplished 20 times in baseball history. another little-known feat was jim's so-called immaculate inning in 1959 when he struck out three red sox on nine pitches, a feat that's only been achieved 43 other times in baseball history. around here, we joke that jim likes to throw high hard ones,

but he developed the skill early. over a four-year period with the phillies, jim hit more opposing batters with pitches than any other pitcher in the league. in fact, over a 17-year career, he plunked 160 batters or nearly ten batters a year, making him the 13th most dangerous pitcher of all time, ahead of such other well-known head-hunters as roger clemens, nolan ryan and don drysdale. jim has never been afraid of a little chin music, and he brought that same competitive mentality to his life in public service. after baseball, public service seemed like a logical choice. it was jim's turn to give back. give back is exactly what he did, and when jim walks out of this chamber for the last time at the end of this session, he will be able to say with justifiable pride that he has given 3 years of his life to public service and to kentucky. over those three decades, jim has served in all levels of government, from the fort thomas

city council to the kentucky state senate to both chambers in this building, 12 years in the house and 12 in the senate. he has dedicated his life to serving the people of kentucky, and kentuckians are grateful for his service. in the house, he made a name for himself, among other things, by working tirelessly to strengthen and protect social security as chairman of the house ways and means committee subcommittee on social security. and in 1988 he decided to make a run at the u.s. senate seat which at the time was held by wendell ford. it turned out to be a pretty close election, but once jim came to the senate he turned out to be one of the most hardest working and influential members of this chamber. he's been a budget hawk who for years has sounded the alarm on the kinds of concerns about spending and debt that drove so many americans to the polls last month. jim spoke for many americans when he said that being a

grandfather to many, he worries that future generations will be saddled by the poor decisions that are being made today. for the first time in my life, he said, i question if my grandchildren will have the same opportunities that i had. one particular issue that's been close to jim's heart is the jewish of adoption. in -- is the issue of adoption. in 2001 jim introduced legislation to make adopting more affordable for american families. in 2007 he introduced legislation to make those tax incentives permanent. of course if there ever was a controversial issue regarding a national past time on capitol hill, jim was at the forefront including the 2005 hearings related to steroid use in baseball. in one memorable exchange from that hearing, jim offered the following testimony from his own experience as a player. he said "mr. chairman, maybe i'm old-fashioned, but i remember players didn't get better as they got older. we all got worse. when i played with hank aaron and willie mays and ted

williams, they didn't put on 40 pounds to bulk up their careers and didn't hit more homers in their late 30's than they did in their late 20's." it was this straightforward, common sense approach to issues that won jim a legion of admirers not only on the baseball diamond but off it as well. in particular, jim's passion and personal perspective helped shed light on the dangers of steroid at the professional level and the growing use of young athletes at all levels. jim has been a staunch supporter of clean coal technologies as an efficient way to use coal, improve our environment and bring jobs to kentucky. another issue that was extremely important to all kentuckians was the failed cleanup of radioactive contamination that was found in the drinking water wells near residences at the

department of energy's aourpl enrichment -- uranium enrichment plant in paducah, kentucky. jim criticized the d.o.e.'s cleanup efforts. in every issue he's taken on, whether national, statewide or local, jim has been a man of principle from start to finish. he stayed true to himself. and in a truly remarkable life, he's got a lot to be proud of. but if you were to ask jim to list his greatest achievement, i don't think he'd say it was his election to the u.s. senate or his induction to the hall of fame. they both come at a distant second and third to the day he married his high school sweetheart mary. jim and mary still live in northern kentucky where they grew up. they have been married for nearly 60 years. together they raised nine

children and they enjoy nothing more than spending time with the next generation of bunnings, which the last time i checked included 35 grandchildren and 5 great-grandchildren. jim is happy to give all the credit of his success to mary. as he put it in his hall of fame induction speech, she's his rock. today we honor and pay tribute to our friend and colleague of more than three decades of public service. jim will be remembered for his two hall of fame worthy careers, for his example of principled leadership, for his devotion to god, country and family. on behalf of myself and the entire senate family, we thank senator bunning for his service, and we wish him best in the next chapter of his life. i yield the floor. mr. kyl: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from kwra*z. mr. kyl: i'd -- the senator from from arizona. mr. kyl: jim and i came into

the house of representatives at the same time as part of the 100th class. i've enjoyed being with him as well in the u.s. senate. jim and mary are counted as among the best friends that my wife carol and i have. i agree with senator mcconnell, that while people may disagree with jim bunning, no one has ever doubted his courage, his sincerity, his love for this country, his desire to do what's right, and his commitment to all of those things. and so i will greatly miss jim when he's no longer part of the u.s. senate. but i think it's probably time for jim and mary to have a little bit of time to spend with all of those children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and obviously we all wish them both well. madam president, i'd like to speak for a few moments about the matter that senator mcconnell brought to our attention, namely, this almost

2,000-page oil omnibus appropriations bill. i know that the majority leader has turned to the start treaty. i think it's fairly obvious why. the american people are focused like a laser beam on this spending bill. i can't turn on the tv without hearing comments by both the commentators as well as people in public life about what this spending bill will do for this country's future. and i think that it's time that we devote some attention to this spending bill rather than put it under the table and to talk about the start treaty instead, which, after all, we could accomplish at any time. but as the majority leader said, spending for the u.s. government runs out at midnight on saturday night. and i can just hear the cries at that time. we have an emergency on our hands. you don't want to shut the federal government down, do you? we've got to do something. well the something is apparently this 2,000-page, over $1

trillion bill which will not have had adequate time for debate or exposure to the american people. apparently under the schedule laid out by the majority leader, would not even entitle us to try to amend it. think about that for a moment. that which is most important to the american people and the subject of the message that was conveyed in this last election: stop the wasteful washington spending; we're not going to be able to amend the trillion-plus bill that has been laid before us here. now i know -- i think most people in this body know how important i think international relations and treaties are, including the start treaty. but i also agree with the colorful comment by james carville, former advisor to president clinton, who has a way with words and said that the american people don't give a pig's patooty about the

president's start treaty. obviously we do. at this moment the most important thing on the minds of the american people is how we're going to fund government without wasting billions of dollars of their money. that's what we ought to be focusing on in the last few hours we have. let me address a little bit about what we have found so far is in this bill and why so many of us are so concerned about it. the first point that i'd make is i don't think ever in the history of the modern congress that congress has failed, or the senate has failed, i should say, to pass a single appropriations bill. the american people should understand that ordinarily congress passes a budget, and we each, both bodies pass about 12, sometimes 13 bills to fund the different agencies and departments and functions of the

united states government. we didn't do that this year. we didn't pass a single one, and we didn't pass a budget. and so now the emergency that occurs because we run out of funding on saturday, obviously is laid at the feet of the majority which didn't do its work earlier in the year and forces us into this position of having to act in this emergency way. and as the republican leader said ironically at the same time that we were considering the health care legislation last year in the week before christmas, in a situation in which members have very little time and very little ability to change the legislation that's before us, the bill that will cost more than $1 trillion, and very few members will have had time to analyze, let alone read. funding of the government, of course one of the most important responsibilities that we as senators have, but as i said

this bill is going to get short shrift upon the floor because it appears that we will not even have an opportunity to amend it if the majority leader's schedule holds. so let's talk about some of the specifics in it. as i said, it costs more than $1 trillion. there's nearly $18 billion more spending in this legislation than in the temporary continuing resolution that was enacted last september. in other words, at that time we understood we needed to begin the pro selves funding the government even though not one appropriations bill had been passed. we passed legislation that over a 12-month period was $18 billion less than the bill that comes before us know. i don't think this is responsible and i think most americans who have had to trim their budgets would agree it's not responsible. the bill contains more than 6,700 earmarks. think about that for a moment. i mean, there are only 535 members of congress, and most of

us don't have earmarks in this bill. so at 6,700 earmarks, you're talking about some legislators in the house and senate having numerous earmarks. and the total is $8 billion worth of earmarks. now, there's a debate about whether earmarks are good or bad, and some who believe that they're okay say it's not that much money. $8 billion is a lot of money no matter who is doing the counting, even in the federal government. it includes things -- and i don't like to make fun of these things because they all have some purpose, but we've got $247,000 for virus-free wine grapes in washington. i'm sure it's important to have virus-free wine grapes, but last time i checked, the people who grow grapes are doing fairly well financially and can probably afford, if they pool all their resources, all of the wine growers, to come up with $200,000 to make sure their

grapes were free of virus. there is a $100,000 appropriation for edgar allan poe visitor center in new york. edgar allan poe is certainly an iconic american literary figure. but for the federal government -- i mean the taxpayers in arizona i think probably don't appreciate the need to pony up money for an edgar allan poe visitors center in new york. the omnibus bill contains upwards of $1 billion increase in spending for the vastly unpopular health care bill that americans said they didn't want and continue to strongly oppose. and here are a couple of the details on that. there is an allocation of $750 million for the prevention and public health fund slush fund for a variety of programs, not named. $175.9 million adjustment in the centers for medicare and medicaid program management account to implement the massive medicaid spanks as well as

cuts ex-ex -- expansion and on and on. there are millions included for implementation of the controversial dodd-frank financial reform bill including a securities and exchange commission funding increase of $189 million. that's 17% more than last year. a commodity futures trading commission funding increase of $117.2 million or 69% increase over last year's funding. treasury gets an increase of 10%, and on and on. the omnibus also contains $790 million for an increase in education stimulus programs and a thorough examination of a lot of those programs reveals that at least in some cases they advance the cause of the teachers unions, at least in my view, more than the cause of educating american children. some claim that well at least

you can say this bill's top line, its gross a. spending is consistent with the budget proposal advocated by senators sessions and mccaskill and many of the rest of us, including myself, but that's not actually true as it turns out. the omnibus excludes numerous parts of the sessions-mccaskill proposal such as multiyear spending caps, enforcement mechanisms and limitations on emergency spending designations, something i'll talk about in just a second. in addition, the majority is using a budgetary sleight of hand to ostensibly meet the proposed discretionary spending caps for 2011. this is what i was going to mention. they do this by a trick of retroactively declaring spending in last year's supplemental appropriations bill for agent orange claims as an emergency. so that money is spent, last year's funding. now we're going to say we're going to call that money emergency funding. what's the effect of it?

it doesn't count, reduces the baseline. like magic, by treating it like an emergency to the tune of almost $3.5 billion, they have been able to secure a lower c.b.o. score on the bill and, therefore, not exceed the spending caps. with the bill they would have exceeded the spending caps proposed in the sessions-mccaskill legislation. let me mention process. this bill is being considered under a deeply flawed process as the republican leader said. voters made a very clear statement, i think, last month. they don't like wasteful washington spending, they want it to stop. they didn't like the health care bill. they don't want us here a week before christmas to rush very complex, very large bills through the congress without time for their representatives to read them, to study them and have an opportunity to even potentially amend them but under the schedule as i laid out an

open amendment process for this bill would be impossible. at the very least, one would think that republicans should be entitled to one or two amendments to each of the 12 appropriation bills that are included within this giant omnibus appropriation package. under regular order, each of these bills would take at least several days of floor time and we would consider numerous amendments. not going to happen with this bill. instead, we'll do the ee qif length of -- equivalent of a month's work of floor time in several days, and some wonder why congress' approval rating has fallen to 13%. someone said who is the 13%? the answer was well, it's our staff and our families. maybe. let me just conclude here with a little bit about jobs and the energy prices. this bill will raise energy prices in the united states and destroy energy jobs through including some of the following provisions. there's a ban on shallow water

drilling. now, i thought the whole idea, especially after the gulf where we had deep water drilling problems, was to encourage drilling in shallow waters to make up for that other loss of production. the bill changes the law to triple the time for the department of the interior to improve exploration plans for offshore operators from 30 to 90 days. the provision could lead to huge financial penalties to the government, breach contracts and add further impediments to creating jobs and energy here at home. the bill reduces the state's share of federal -- down to the 50-50 split required under current law. and it raises fees for on shore and offshore gas production on federal land. these fees amount to a tax that will make domestic energy production more expensive to produce, especially for the small businesses that do so. and there is much more, much more that the american people should know, but we're supposed to be talking about an arms control treaty with russia instead. well, madam president, i wanted to remind everyone that we're in

a lame-duck congress, and my view is that trying to enact such a huge and complex bill within the narrow post-election time frame really shows disrespect for the democratic process, and for that reason and the others that i have discussed, i urge my colleagues to oppose cloture on this bill and to pass a sensible continuing resolution of the kind that the republican leader has introduced. and i just want to leave no doubt about this final point. those who are watching this process carefully and who understand how the process works understand that the important vote here is on cloture. it's the first vote. it's in effect the vote to consider this omnibus bill. our constituents will not be fooled by senators who vote yes on cloture to go to this bill, ensuring that it will be considered under this rushed process without amendment, but then who vote no on final passage after it's too late to

stop the flawed process, and say, well, i voted no on the bill. of course they voted no on the bill, but then it was too late. the key vote is on the cloture vote, whenever that might occur. i'm told it might occur at actually 12:01 on sunday morning. in other words, one minute after midnight. well, that would be very reminiscent of last year's consideration of the health care bill where through all of the procedural gimmickry, this body, i think, did not distinguish itself in adopting legislation under a process that the american people saw through, objected to, and continue to criticize the legislation adopted as a result of the process as well as its substance. we want to do the same thing with this legislation here, then it will demonstrate in the very first act relating to spending after the election that this senate did not get the message sent by the american people. the presiding officer: the gentleman from illinois.

mr. durbin: madam president, are we in morning business at this point? the presiding officer: we're on the treaty. mr. durbin: i ask consent to speak as if in morning business for no more than ten minutes. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: madam president, i'd like to respond to what has been said by my friend, senator kyl of arizona, as well as senator mcconnell of kentucky about the appropriation bill which we are going to consider in a very short period of time. i'm a member of this appropriations committee, and i remember what happened, and i want to put it on the record right now so that some of the things that have been said can be compared to what i think is the reality. this is the reality. in the appropriations subcommittee, each and every subcommittee of that full committee met with democrats and republicans and prepared a bill. i have a subcommittee on financial services and general government. senator susan collins of maine and i worked long and hard in preparation of that bill. other subcommittee chairs did the same thing.

there was full bipartisan cooperation in the preparation of each of these subcommittee bills, every single one of them. and the appropriation bill that we will vote on is the combination of all of that effort. let me also talk about the amount of money that we are going to appropriate to continue to fund the operations of our federal government. it's true, it's over a trillion dollars. in fact, it's $1.1 trillion in this bill. but what hasn't been said by senator mcconnell and senator kyl, that's exactly the amount that they asked for. senator mcconnell came to the senate appropriations committee and said republicans will not support this bill unless you bring the spending down to to $1.108 trillion. that is exactly what we bring down to the floor to be considered. so to stand back in horror and look at $1.1 trillion and say

where did this figure come from, it came from senator mitch mcconnell in a motion he made before the senate appropriations committee. it reflects the amount that he said was the maximum we should spend in this current calendar year on our appropriation bills. he prevailed. it's the same number as the so-called sessions-mccaskill figure that's been debated back and forth on this floor, voted repeatedly by the republicans to be the appropriate total number. so we have a bipartisan agreement on the total number, and now the republican leader comes to the floor, stands in horror at the idea of of $1.1 trillion, the very same number he asked for in this bill. you can't have it both ways. secondly, they say this is a 2,000-page bill. well, allow me to explain why. when you take the work of 12

subcommittees instead of separate bills and put them in one bill, the total number of pages is going to increase. maybe the best thing we can give is a christmas gift to the senate republican caucus is a speed reading course so that they can sit down and read these bills. it turns out that their fingers get smudgy and their lips get tired if you have more than 100 pages in a bill. over and over again, we're told don't worry about the substance of the bill, just count the pages. if it gets up to a thousand pages, it's clearly a bad bill. wrong. this 2,000-page bill reflects the work of 12 subcommittees and 12 republican senators who helped to assemble and to device the contents of that bill. it's no surprise that it would reach that number when we put all of the spending bills, the appropriation subcommittee bills into one document. another point that's raised,

what a surprise. we have this thing thrown at us, we haven't seen this before, we haven't had time to look at this. this bill was posted two days ago and will be available not only for every senator and every staff member but for every member of this country to look at in detail. the reason members have been coming to the floor talking about its contents is they have access to it and have had for almost 48 hours, and they will for an even longer period of time before it's finally considered. i also want to say that the schedule that we are facing here now, the schedule which is putting us up against some deadlines, deadlines for the funding of government, a lot of personal family deadlines which trouble all of us but we accepted this job and its responsibility. many of these deadlines have come to be because of an exercise of the senate rules. time and time and time again, the republican minority has forced us to go into a cloture

vote, into a filibuster. record-breaking numbers of filibusters over the last several years. if members of the united states senate were to go back home and ask the cable tv viewers who watch c-span what their impression of the senate is, their impression is an empty chamber. an empty chamber because day after weary day we have had to put up with cloture votes and filibusters from the republican side, delaying us time and time and time again. while we burned off the hours on the clock instead of rolling up our sleeves and actually getting down to business. now they come and tell us, well, we're going to threaten to start reading bills. well, they have a right to do that under the rules. it's really not needed since all these bills have been posted and any senator who wanted to read them has now had 48 hours to read this appropriations bill if they want to, but they may burn off hours on the clock again and then complain that we're ruining christmas for members of the senate and their family. well, unfortunately, their hands

are not clean. and when it comes to the things that are included in this bill, incidentally, i've heard many republican senators come down here and talk about specific elements in this appropriations bill that they disagree with, and that's their right. but many of the same senators who are criticizing congressionally directed spending or earmarks have earmarks in the bill. that is the height of hypocrisy. to stand up and request an earmark, have it included in the bill and then fold your arms and piously announce i'm against earmarks. you ought to be consistent enough to know that if you're asking for an earmark one day and criticizing it the next, your credibility is going to be challenged. that is a fact. as far as some of the things that have been talked about, one of them brought up by senator kyl relates to drilling and how quickly drilling permits will be issued by the federal government. our department of interior has asked for 90 days to review applications for drilling permits included in the bill.

why would we want to be careful when it comes to drilling permits? america knows why. we saw what happened in the gulf of mexico. we saw the damage done, and we know that for many businesses and many families and many people and for a very fragile environment, things will never be the same. let's avoid that from happening in the future, waiting 90 days instead of 30 days is hardly an onerous burden to make sure that what is done is done properly and done in a way that won't come back to haunt us. finally, to argue that this is disrespectful of the democratic process is to ignore the obvious: time and time and time again, when we have tried to move the democratic process, we have run into a roadblock with filibusters from the other side of the aisle, obstructionism. i'm glad we passed the tax bill yesterday. it was an amazing day. i think the final vote was 81- 81-18, which was an incredible, strong bipartisan showing. let's end this session on a

bipartisan note. let's get away from these lobbing bombs back and forth across the aisle. let's roll up our sleeves and do what we need to do. senator kyl should come to the floor and offer his amendment on the start treaty. he has talked about needing times to offer amendments. let's do it. let's do it this morning. let's start the amendment process, let's have votes. let's not filibuster anything. let's vote on the substance and bring this to an end. then let's bring up the omnibus appropriation bill and the c.r., let the senate work its will and let's vote on it. we have two or three other items we can complete, and if people don't exercise delay tactics, we can get this done in a few days. i urge my colleagues in the spirit of what we did with the president's tax package, let's return to a more bipartisan approach to completing our business and going home to our families, and i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from indiana. mr. lugar: what is the business before the senate? the presiding officer: the start treaty. mr. lugar: i thank the chair.

i would like to work with my colleague, the chairman of our committee, to make time available to senators. i see the distinguished senator on the floor. are you prepared, sir, to make a statement? mr. barrasso: madam president, yes, i am. the presiding officer: the senator from wyoming. mr. lugar: yield to the senator from wyoming. mr. barrasso: thank you, madam president. madam president, i rise today to express my views on the new strategic arms reduction treaty, also known as new start. this treaty is an extremely important and serious matter. new start significantly impacts america's national security and nuclear deterrent. as a result, i believe that this treaty deserves adequate time in the senate, time to examine the issues, time to debate the many flawed provisions and time to vote on all of the amendments offered for consideration.

the majority leader should not be piecemealing together segments of time for debate on an issue as important as nuclear arms control. the treaty should not be shortchanged and rushed through the senate. the treaty should not be jammed together with consideration of a 1,924-page omnibus federal spending bill. the treaty should not be considered during a lame-duck session. consideration of the treaty will require a substantial amount of time in order to sufficiently address its many flaws. like many of my colleagues, i plan on offering amendments, amendments designed to protect our national security. this debate concerns the national security of the united states. it is critical that the united states maintains a strong nuclear deterrent in order to defend our nation and provide

assurances to our allies. i have may stkwror concerns about the -- i have major concerns about the impact the new start will have on wyoming and on national security. while i have many issues with the new start, i want to address only a few of my major concerns this morning. first, start straitjackets the united states missile defense capabilities. second, start offers no method to make sure an historically noncompliant russia state will keep its promises. third, the approach embodied by start is representative of an outdated and simplistic view of the united states position on the world stage. to begin, i would like to specifically discuss the limitations placed on the united states missile defense by the new start. the treaty signed by president obama and russian president

medvedev on april 8, 2010, places explicit limitations on u.s. missile defense. the preamble of the treaty -- the preamble declares an interrelationship between strategic nuclear offensive weapons and strategic nuclear defensive weapons. it implies the right of russia to withdraw from the treaty based on u.s. missile defenses that is beyond -- quote -- "current strategic" capabilities. the treaty preamble, the very preamble of the treaty gives russia an opportunity to turn their backs on the treaty at the slightest sign of a shift in american defensive strategy. this language is unacceptable and needs to be removed. i offered an amendment in the

senate committee on foreign relations to strike this language. the white house resists any attempt tow amend the preamble. the administration argues it is a nonbinding concession to russia. well, russia clearly doesn't see it that same way. they have made it quite clear they consider the preamble legally binding. a russian foreign minister stated the treaty contained -- quote -- "legally binding linkage between strife offensive and strategic defensive weapons." in quote, legally binding. the russians have wanted this language for a long time in order to have grounds to claim that the united states missile defense program violates an international agreement. this type of constraining language is not unique to the preamble. the treaty also places a legally binding limitation on missile

defense in article 5 of the treaty. article 5 prohibits the transforming of offensive strategic missile launchers into defensive strategic missile launchers. as this nation continues to face threats from around the world, we should not take any action that will hinder our missile defense options. we need to be able to defend ourselves. just like the preamble, the administration makes excuses as to why they have made concessions to the russians on our missile defense. the current administration claims that they have no plans to use the missile defense options prohibited under the new start treaty. i believe that placing any constraints on future u.s. defense capabilities should not even be up for debate. let alone placed in a treaty on

strategic offensive nuclear weapons. the purpose of new start was to reduce strategic nuclear weapons between the united states and russia, not limit the ability of the united states to defend ourselves. it is outrageous that the administration would make any concessions to russia on our national security. the united states must always remain in charge of our own missile defense, not russia, not any other country. we should not be tying our hands behind our backs and risking the security of our nation and our allies. russia is trying to force the united states to choose between missile defense and the treaty. the clear choice should always be to protect the ability of the united states to defend ourselves. i believe the administration's decision was a serious mistake.

i also have major concerns about the central limits of new start. this treaty is a one-sided agreement aimed at only reducing u.s. strategic nuclear weapons. russia is currently below the limit for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the new start treaty. as a result, russia will not have to make reductions. the united states will be the only party required to slash its forces. now, due to loopholes in the treaty counting rules, russia could deploy more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warhead, go above that ceiling and still be in compliance with the treaty. russia may even be able to deploy more than 2,100 warheads under the treaty. each deployed heavy bomber, regardless of the actual number of warheads on it, only count as

one deployed strategic warhead. now, if anything, the limits just tell russia how many weapons they are allowed to add to their strategic nuclear force. why would the administration enter into a bilateral treaty that only requires the united states to make sacrifices? this is not acceptable. new start offers us nothing in return, not even a robust verification mechanism that enables us to make sure russia is keeping its promises. president ronald reagan regularly repeated the phrase "trust but verify." he did it repeatedly regarding nuclear weapons. the verification measures play an important role in analyzing the new start. the new start has a weak verification regime. former secretary of state james baker made the exact point by indicating that the new start

verification provisions, he said, were weaker than the original start. under new start, the united states would be limited to 18 inspections per year as opposed to at least 28 in the past. under the original start treaty, the united states conducted approximately 600 inspections. under new start, the united states is limited to a maximum of 180 inspections. this further plays into russia's favor due to there being 35 russian facilities compared to only 17 u.s. facilities to inspect. the administration also dropped two key provisions from new start. the united states will no longer have continuous monitoring at the russian nuclear missile assembly plant. we had it in start 1. why are we giving thup important verification component in new

start? the united states will also not have full access to russian ballistic missile launch at the hrepl try under new start. -- telemetry. why are we giving that stphup the treaty does not provide us with the verification mechanisms that enables us to make sure russia is keeping its promises. instead there is a lot of trust and precious little verification a weaker verification system is even more dangerous due to russia's long history of noncompliance on arms control treaties. russia has a record of noncompliance and violations under the original start treaty. up until the end of the original start treaty in december of 2009, russia was continuing to engage in compliance violations. the department of state compliance reports from 2010 spells out the numerous violations made by the russians.

finally, the treaty relies on the false premise that russia is america's only nuclear rival. now, this view of the world is outdated and simplistic. even if we could trust russia, there are numerous other threats such as north korea and iran which have repeatedly shown hostility to the united states and to our allies. we should never abandon our defenses and sacrifice our deterrent in the face of increasing international belligerence. it is the equivalent of asking america to stare down the barrel of a gun without knowing whether the gun is loaded and then to trust the person holding it not to pull the trigger. in arguing for this treat kwraoerbgs the administration has -- treaty, the administration has tried to have it both ways.

the treaty demands the united states reduce our nuclear strike force by specific numbers. yet the administration has only offered a vague range of estimates regarding where these cuts would take place. the president's force structure plan provides up to 420 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 14 submarines carrying up to 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers. even if the administration did cut the absolute maximum number of weapons it has proposed to cut, it would still fail to live up to the reductions demanded by new start. instead of giving the senate a specific force structure, the president is repeating his health care play book and telling us to wait until after the u.s. ratifies the treaty to find out the details. it is wrong that the senate is

being considered to approve this treaty without knowing the details, and these details matter. the force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to maintaining effective deterrent. the nuclear triad of the united states spans sea, air and land. by working together, our nuclear triad complicates and deters any attempt at a successful first strike by anyone on our country. i believe the president's force structure proposal will weaken our nuclear triad. the american people, madam president, deserve a full debate on the senate floor on a treaty of this magnitude. it is my hope that the senate will take its constitutional responsibility very seriously and provide the new start with the scrutiny it deserves.

thank you, madam president. i yield the floor. mr. lugar: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from indiana. mr. lugar: madam president, i understand the distinguished senator is on the floor and prepared to speak. is this true, sir? i'm going to yield to senator udall. mr. udall: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from colorado. mr. udall: let me start by thanking my good friend from indiana for not only yielding the floor to me on his strong leadership on this crucial issue before us here in the united states senate. i rise in support of the new start treaty. i want to start by reminding my colleagues that arms control treaties are an integral part of this country's modern history premised on the shared belief that a world with fewer nuclear weapons is a safer world. even as the cold war raged, it was ronald reagan who committed america to the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons from the face of the earth. those are his very words.

this goal has animated numerous arms control agreements since then and underpins the new start treat kwraoerbgs an agreement -- treaty, an agreement i believe we cannot fail to ratify. the dangers of nuclear proliferation have grown. and as the senator from indiana knows well, the threat of global nuclear war has receded, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased, enabled by the spread of nuclear technology and the danger of materials falling into the wrong hands. madam president, i believe as a -- we cannot be seen as a credible leader or a nation strongly committed to meeting our nonproliferation obligations unless we pursue further nuclear arms reductions ourselves. the united states and russia have over 90% of the world's nuclear arms between us. and, thus, we have an obligation to verifiably decrease our nuclear stockpiles and reduce this primary threat to global and national security.

that's why the new start treaty matters. it establishes limits for u.s. and russia nuclear weapons to levels lower than the 1991 start treaty and the 2002 moscow treaty. these numbers have been validated by defense planners and ensure we have the capability to meet security needs. the treaty includes a strong verification regime which secretary gates called the -- quote -- "key contribution" of the agreement. as we debate this agreement today, we should not only consider the consequences of ratification, but also the consequences of failure. because start 1 expired over a year ago, we currently have no treaty and therefore no constraints on russia's stockpile or verification of their weapons. madam president, the choice facing u.s. presidents throughout the decades has been whether we are better off signing arms agreements with the

russians or pursuing an arms race. historically, our presidents from both parties and bipartisan majorities in the united states senate have agreed that we are better served by agreements, and today is no different. as u.s. strategic command's general chilten testified, without a treaty, russia is not constrained in its development of force structure and we have no insight into its nuclear program, making this the worst of both possible worlds. failure to ratify the treaty would make the broad resetting of u.s.-russian relations harder. the distrust it would engender would also reduce or even eliminate the possibility of further bilateral strategic weapons reductions. as former national security advisor brent scowcroft, one of the wisest americans about foreign policy, testified earlier this year, the principal

result of nonratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos. but, madam president, we also need to remember that this treaty isn't just about washington and moscow. it's also about the world community and our global relationships. failure to ratify this treaty would signal to the world that america is not willing to constrain its own weapons arsenal, even as we ask other countries to restrict theirs or avoid joining the nuclear club altogether. it would discourage multilateral cooperation on nonproliferation goals and hinder our ability to lead by example. it would make global cooperation on dealing with rogue states like iran and north korea more challenging, tying our hands at the very time when the threat from those two countries is increasing. treaty opponents have tried to make the case that the dangers of ratifying the agreement outweigh the advantages of

ratification. madam president, they are simply wrong. they argue that the treaty limits our ability to develop missile defense capabilities. the head of our missile defense agency argued the opposite, that the treaty actually reduces constraints on missile defense. and countless military and civilian leaders, including the former secretaries of the last -- i should say the former secretaries of state. for the last five republican presidents have publicly stated that new start preserves our ability to deploy effective missile defenses. treaty opponents also argue that it inhibits our ability to remain an effective and reliable nuclear arrests signal. it's -- arsenal. it's true that this administration inherited an underfunded and undervalued nuclear weapons complex. but the president understands that the nuclear experts and infrastructure that maintain our

arsenal also help secure loose nuclear materials, verify weapons reductions and develop technologies that underpin our nuclear deterrent, and that's why the president's budget request provides $7 billion for these programs this year. a 10% increase over last year. new start would in no way limit these investments, and as treaty opponents know well, the president has offered an even more robust investment in modernization and refurbishment of our nuclear infrastructure over the next ten years, totaling $84 billion. madam president, the importance of ratifying this treaty goes beyond politics. we know that a lack of demonstrated bipartisan support could poison relations with russia and our allies, and we cannot risk the loss of american leadership in the world that would ensue if we are perceived as too entangled in our own

internal politics to ratify a strategic arms treaty that is clearly beneficial to our own security. now, i know that some of my colleagues hope to amend this treaty and in so doing kill it since any changes will require that the administration restart from scratch and reopen negotiations with the russians. i urge them to reconsider and to think about what is at stake, and i urge them and all my colleagues to listen to our military leadership when they tell us that this treaty is essential to our national security. as senator lugar pointed out yesterday in his eloquent statement -- "rejecting an unequivocal military opinion on a treaty involving nuclear deterrence would be an extraordinary position for the senate to take." unquote. let's not allow this to be the first time in history that the senate denies ratification to a treaty with overwhelming

bipartisan support and the endorsement of the full breadth of our military and civilian leaders. i urge my colleagues to support this treaty and to support, therefore, a safer world. madam president, thank you and i yield the floor. mr. kerry: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: madam president, i want to thank -- thank the senator very, very much for his comments and his support. it's my understanding senator ensign was going to speak at this point in time. he's on his way. we're happy to accommodate that. let me just say to colleagues that we are open for business, we're ready to entertain amendments that people may have. we encourage colleagues to come down here.

obviously, some people have raised the question of the press of time, but it doesn't seem from both yesterday and today that anybody is actually in a rush to bring an amendment. so we're prepared to vote on our side of the aisle. i want to make that very clear. there is -- there are 58 democratic united states senators, and senator lugar who obviously is working to advance this treaty. we do not have any amendments. we are prepared to vote. so if colleagues want to bring an amendment, now is the time to do it, and we encourage them to do so. let me just say that i know senator barrasso just spoke with respect to missile defense, and i understand the legitimate concerns that have been expressed by a number of colleagues about the question of missile defense. i want to make it as clear as possible from all of the record

to date, the treaty's preamble, first of all, requires nothing legally whatsoever. there is no legal binding effect of the preamble, none whatsoever. secondly, the -- the secretary clinton said this, secretary henry kissinger said this. all it is is a statement of fact about the existence of a relationship. it has no restraint whatsoever on our ability to proceed forward with missile defense. moreover, the resolution of ratification could not be more clear about that. there are pages within the resolution and several different individual references to the fact that the missile defense is not affected. let me just read from it.

this is from understandings. this is the missile defense understanding number one. it is the understanding of the united states, this is what we will pass when we pass this. the new start treaty does not impose -- i'm quoting from it." the new start treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile defenses other than the requirement of paragraph 3 of article 5 of the new start treaty, which states states -- quote -- each party shall not convert icbm launchers. each party further shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of icbm's and slbm's therein. it goes on to say any start treaty beyond those specifically

contained -- and he will speak what they are in a moment -- would require an amendment to the new start treaty, and that would require an entire new process of ratification in order to live up to the requirements of the treaty process itself. now, the specific tiny little limitation that they are talking about in there is one that the secretary of defense said we don't want. that's the conversion of a current icbm silo. there are four of them that are grandfathered into existence here, but the military has determined that it's more expensive to do that than to simply build a new silo for a ground-based missile, which is what we plan to do in the event when we deploy. so there is in effect zero limitation. every single member of the strategic command and the current command has said there is no limitation, secretary gates has said there is no

limitation, and i believe we will be able to have even some further clarification of the absence of any limitation here. the fact is that if you change that preamble now, you're effectively killing the treaty because it requires the president to go back to the russians, renegotiate the treaty, and then you have to come back and go through months and months of hearings and resubmission and so forth. now, the important thing to focus on is the fact that -- let me quote henry kissinger. about the language that senator barrasso has referred to, he said it's a truism, it's not an obligation. and secretary gates also emphasized the fact that it has no impact whatsoever on the united states. secretary gates reminded us in

may that the -- the russians have always reacted adversely to our plans for missile defense, so they have tried a number of times to try to interrupt that, and secretary gates said in his testimony this treaty does not accomplish any restraint for them at all. he also said we have a comprehensive missile defense program, and we are going forward with all of it. in addition to that, general chilten reported how he informed the russians in full about exactly what program we were going forward with, including the recently agreed on deployment at lisbon for the deployment of missile defense in europe. they understand exactly what they're doing -- we're doing, what our plans are, and notwithstanding that, they signed the treaty. so i think the comfort level of all of our military, of all

those involved with the laboratories, all of those involved with the strategic command ought to speak for itself. i see that senator ensign is here so i will yield the floor. mr. ensign: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from nevada. mr. ensign: madam president, i rise today to talk about this new start treaty and i have some very serious concerns about it. i appreciate the work that has been done by my colleagues. this is an incredibly serious issue. i think the motives, don't question anybody's motives, but i do think there are some serious flaws that lie not only within the four corners of the treaty text but also speak to the manner in which this administration has dealt with russia. this policy of russian reset has meant that the united states is making major concessions while our russian counterparts give up virtually nothing.

further, i have serious reservations about the manner in which the senate is considering this treaty. this body, the united states senate, is supposed to be the most deliberative body in the world. it is supposed to be a chamber that respects the rights of the minority. senators are supposed to be able and afforded the right of unlimited debate and the right to have their amendments considered. rushing a treaty of this magnitude through a lame-duck session is not what the founders had in mind when they gave this body the power of advice and consent in these serious matters. the american people sent a clear message in december -- or in november: to concentrate on jobs, taxes, and the economy. while i do not think that this lame duck is the time to debate this very important treaty, i do plan on offering multiple amendments to address this treaty's flaws, as well as the

resolution of ratification. my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will also offer amendments with topics ranging from how this treaty restrains our missile defense capabilities to ceding the senate's advice and consent rule to the flawed bilateral consul at a timive commission. for example, there needs to be an amendment which addresses the verification regime in this treaty, or lack thereof. further, it is astounding to me the tactical nuclear weapons were left out of this treaty, considering that russia has approximately a 10-1 advantage on this. additionally, we need to consider how the rail mobile icbms are counted or aren't counted in a broader sense. as the senate moves forward in examining the consequences of this treaty, we need to pay very careful attention to those consequences that are unintended

because that is where the danger truly lies. in order to properly examine these, the administration needs to provide the senate with the full negotiating record which it has yet to do. only upon examination of this record can we accurately determine how russia views this accord to ensure that the -- their understanding is the same as ours. on the topic of missile defense, this is clearly a case of the administration wanting to have its cake and eat it too. there should be zero -- let me emphasize that -- zero mention of missile defense within 100 miles of this treaty. and yet there it is, right in the preamble to the new start which clearly recognizes an interrelationship between offensive nuclear weapons and missile defense. i believe this is simply unacceptable. further, if you examine article 5, paragraph 3, of the new start

missile defense is referenced plain as day in the prohibition prohibiting the united states from converting icbms or sea-based launchers. where is the wisdom in removing such an option from our tool kit? for the whole life of the treaty. russia must understand that we will not limit our options for national defense based on current plans, ideas, or technology. should a breakthrough occur in missile defense technology or launcher development, we cannot have already ruled out pursuing new courses of action. in their attempts to persuade republicans to support this, proponents of this treaty have attempted to invoke the name of ronald reagan. let us remember that over two decades ago president reagan returned from iceland and made the following statement: "while both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and

warheads threatening the world, the soviet union insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny me and future presidents for ten years the right to develop, test and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the free world. this, we could not and would not do," he said. i think this clearly states in his own words where ronald reagan would be on this new start treaty. another especially troublesome facet of the new start is that it would establish a bilateral consultati sr*e commission with authority to agree on measures to increase the effectiveness of the treaty. this seems like a broad and vague purview for the commission and i'm unclear why the senate would delegate its responsibilities to a commission. this leads me to ask the question since missile defense has fallen under the purview of this treaty, wouldn't it be

logical that this commission would make decisions taos what we can and -- as to what we can and cannot do with our missile defense assets? we must make it very clear that this commission, the b.c.c., cannot have the authority to further handicap our national defense. as it could otherwise do under this treaty without further scrutiny of the senate. i hope that we agree as a body to insist that the workings of the b.c.c. are completely visible and accessible to the senate and that we explicitly make these changes to the treaty itself, not just the resolution of ratification. as we move forward in examining this treaty, i'd like to point out that a colleague of mine will be sorely missed. the senior senator from missouri, kit bond, as vice chairman of the senate select committee on intelligence, is the foremost expert in the senate and likely in all of congress on matters of intelligence. at least that's my opinion. i want to quote from my good

friend. the select committee on intelligence has been looking at this issue closely over the past several months. as the vice chairman of this committee, i reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and heard from intelligence professionals. there is no doubt in my mind that the united states cannot reliably verify the treaty's 1, 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. it is fatally flawed. if a fatally flawed arms control agreement is the price of admission to the reset game, our nation is better off if we sit this one out." end of quote. i could not agree more with my friend. it is naively optimistic to assume that a world with fewer nuclear weapons is the same thing as a safer world. our security has long depended on a strong and flexible deterrent. new threats are constantly

emerging from every corner of this globe, and this was recently demonstrated by iran's resistance to denuclearization and north korea's increasingly violent saber rattling. the united states must be able to rapidly adapt and respond to new threats to our security. now is the time for more flexible deterrent capability, not less. new start is riddled with u.s. concessions from which i can see little gain. u.s. leadership in this arena will be measured by how well we protect our ability to defend ourselves and our friends, not by how quickly we agree to an imperfect treaty. madam president, i yield the floor. a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i would ask my colleague from nevada, he mentioned he had some amendments. we're ready to do amendments. is he prepared to go forward with his amendment?

madam president, let me just quickly speak for a moment to a couple of points that the senator from nevada raised. he talked about the article 5 ban. i discussed this a few minutes ago with respect to the silos, the conversion of icbm silos launchers. and there is a, one-paragraph restraint in the treaty with respect to the conversion of those missile defense interceptors. the foreign relations committee, in the course of our hearings, pressed the administration on this question very, very extensively. there were a lot of questions asked by colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and i want to say that the record unequivocally counters the

argument that was just made by the senator from nevada. the ban does not prevent us from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, and i would be very specific about that. we will soon have some 30 missile defense interceptors in silos in california and in alaska. we're going to have an additional eight extra launchers in alaska if we need them. now, if we need more interceptors, the missile defense agency director, lieutenant general patrick o'riley, who was originally appointed to that post in the last administration, appointed by president george bush, he told the committee -- quote -- "for many different reasons, they would never recommend converting either icbm silos or

shreub launchers into -- or slbm launchers into missile defense launchers." what you're hearing is a red herring argument throwing it out there somehow saying this is a restraint and this is a defense. why is it not a restraint? one reason is cost. it's intriguing to me to hear a lot of colleagues who sort of raise the issue of this particular missile defense issue in the treaty. they also raise the issue of the deficit and how much we're spending and how we shouldn't be spending on things that people don't want and the military doesn't want. here's something that the military doesn't want. and they don't want it because the conversion cost of the last icbm launcher in vandenberg into a missile defense intercept launcher cost about $55 million. the average cost for a new hardened missile defense interceptor silo in a new

missile field is $36 million. so -- and the reason for that is because the missile defense agency has developed a smaller, more effective special purpose silo to meet its needs. the annual operating cost for a separate converted silo, for a converted silo, which is what our colleagues are complaining about is actually $2 million higher per silo, and it's $2 million higher than a silo which they -- the military thinks is more effective and less expensive to maintain. the strategic command general chilton noted, we also don't want to force russia to make a split-second-guess as to whether a missile that's flying out of the u.s. silo field is either a missile defense interceptor or which may be aimed at a rogue

missile or is it a nuclear-tipped missile aimed at moscow. that confusion is impossible to distinguish between unless you have a completely separate silo field. so converting an old -- you know, an old icbm silo in a particular field where you can't distinguish between an interceptor or an icbm actually increases the potential of confusion and threat and possibly a dangerous mistake and decision. with regard to putting a missile defense interceptor into a submarine-launched tube, secretary gates and admiral mullen both said this is not a cost-effective step and it presents very unique operational challenges. so we need to take these red herrings off the table here. secretary gates and admiral mullen both noted that it would

make much more sense to put missile defense interceptors on aegis-capable surface ships, which is what they're doing. and that is not constrained by any treaty. so there's no constraint here whatsoever in our ability to go out and do what best meets the needs as defined by the military themselves. the bottom line is article 5, paragraph 3, does not constrain us one iota. i yield the floor. mr. kyl: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: thank you, madam president. i plan to speak for about an hour here, for the benefit of colleagues' scheduling. although i will only scratch the

surface of what i will have to say about this treaty. so let me begin by talking about 14 or 15 specific things that i intend to cover at some point when we have time during this debate and note that there will be amendments proposed that deal with many of the items that i'm going to be mentioning here. but first i think it's important for us to lay out what some of the concerns are. this morning when i talked about the fact that the senate is going to have to deal with the funding of the u.s. government which expires on midnight on saturday, i noted the fact that the process that the majority leader has invoked here to dual track or consider the start treaty along with the omnibus appropriations bill is not a process that allows adequate consideration of either, and that the american people sent a signal in the last election that they didn't want us to continue this wasteful washington

spending spree that we've been on. and yet the omnibus appropriations bill, which i'm not sure i could lift right here, will do exactly that, and we ought to be focused on a process by which that can actually be considered with amendments under the way that the majority leader has lined out our schedule here, that doesn't appear to be possible. the first concern i have with respect to going to the start treaty at this time is we're putting the cart before the horse. our first job needs to be to ensure that the federal government doesn't run out of money at midnight on saturday. and yet, the majority leader has turned to the start treaty. well, why? i think the obvious, at least one answer is divert attention from this big pile of spending that i'm pointing to right here. 6,700 earmarks. if we're talking about the start treaty, we're not talking about the omnibus appropriations bill. but the american people are

talking about the government spending, and that's what we should be focusing our attention on. the problem is now that we're on the start treaty, those of us who really want to talk about this and want to amend it and believe that we're going to be denied the opportunity to amend it will be accused of not wanting to talk about the start treaty because that's what the majority leader has put on the floor, and he'll say in a few days, you had all this time to talk about it. why aren't you talking about it? that's part of what's wrong with the process. that's one of the reasons i have been saying you can't do all of these things and do them right. in addition, the majority leader said this morning, we have other things he wants to consider before christmas as well. there is no earthly way to do all of this within the time that we have. let me mention some of the concerns that i'll be discussing with respect to the start treaty. i think one thing you have to talk first of all about is whether or not we are going to have sufficient time in order to do what needs to be done, to

both amend the treaty as well as the resolution of ratification and debate some of the issues, including the issue that my colleague from massachusetts was just talking about. secondly, what were the benefits of the treaty for the united states vis-a-vis russia? what were the concessions we made to rush? what do they get out of it? what do we get out of it? mthey get everything oust it. i don't know what we get out of it, except for the president to say he made another arms control deal with russia. third, where will this treaty leave our nuclear forces, our delivery vehicles and our warheads in terms of the deterrent capability not only for the united states but the 31 allies who rely on the u.s. nuclear umbrella? we will have cut our forces to the bone and yet, interestingly, russia won't be forced to make any reductions at all in these

delivery vehicles for the nuclear warheads. fourth -- and there's been quite a bit of discussion in the media about my work on modernization -- where does the administration's modernization plan end up relative to start? the point here is that if you're going to bring your nuclear warheads down to a bare minimum or below that, you've got to make darning sure that every one of them is safe, secure, and reliable, and they'll do whatever they're supposed to do, and everybody needs to know that. but all of the experts agree that the facilities we have for taking care of our warheads and maintaining them are inadequate for that purpose, and they've got to be modernized. is the process and the amount of money that's been set aside for that adequate? i'll discuss my views on that and the questions that remain about critical funding for the modernization of both our nuclear weapons and the comple complexes necessary to sustain them. fifth, the commitment necessary

for the nuclear triad. while we've committed to a nuclear modernization program, they haven't yet committed to a program for the modernization of the three legs of the nuclear triad, the bomber force, accompanied by cruise missiles, and our submarine force. i'll be discussing the areas in which i think the commitments in that regard are insufficient and dangerous. probably most interesting to a lot of people in this country and certainly to a lot of our colleagues is the question of what has occurred with respect to the relinking of strategic offense and defense capabilities. this is the missile defense concern. there are significantly divergent views between the united states and russia on this question of what the treaty does or does not do with respect to missile defense. both explicitly and impliedly, there are limitations on u.s.

missile defense activities in the treaty. on the one hand, the department of defense has said that the united states has plans for developing and deploying missile defense systems that will have adequate capability against icbms, coming for example from iran. if they have capability against those missiles, they also have capability against russian missiles. on the other hand, the u.s. official policy statement that accompanied the treaty and subsequent briefings from the state department assured the russians that the united states will not deploy defenses that are capable of undermining the russian deterrent. and that's important because of the way the russians interpret the preamble and other features of the treaty. misunderstanding and conflict between the parties is, thus, built into the treaty. if the united states intends to deploy more capable missiles either to defend europe or the united states, which it is our stated policy to do.

so are we to believe that the administration will ever put this treaty at risk over future missile defense plans? that's a subject we'll be exploring in debt. -- in depth. certainly the senate gave advice to the administration not to limit missile defense or conventional prompt global strikers which is a capability that would permit us to deliver over long ranges, inte intercontinental ranges, something that is not a warhead, something that this administration and i think are very important for our future ability to deal with rogue states, for example. nevertheless, contrary to congress's instructions, the administration has subjected advance capabilities to limitations in this treaty. and we'll discuss that. eighth is something else. there are people that say there's nothing that stands between us and a world of -- a nuclear-free world. it's called zero nuclear.

the president's stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. some say that this treaty needs to be adopted, ratified, in order to permit us then to take the next step, which is to achieve that great goal. i submit that goal is neither feasible nor desirable and that to the extent that this treaty is deemed as a steppingstone towards that, it is a bad step to take. moreover, it is an unwelcome distraction from addressing the true nuclear dangers that the russian -- that the president, rather, that is made very clear are his top priorities, and that's the dangers of proliferation and terrorism. ninth is a question about verification, something that senator bond has talked a great deal about and i'm going to be speaking some about because of issues that arose during my trip with senator feinstein to geneva during the time that our negotiators were working on this treaty with our russian counterparts.

it's very clear that with lower force levels we need better verification. but this new start treaty has substantially weaker verification provisions than its predecessor start i, and of course russia has a history of cheating on any arms control treaty that we've ever entered into with them, which amplifies the concern. there's some comparisons -- and i would suggest they are false comparisons -- to the sort treaty, which is the -- it is called the moscow treaty. that's the treaty that deals with our strategic offensive weapons after the fall of the berlin wall, the fall of the soviet union, and the determination by the united states and russia both to simply bring down our nuclear forcees. we didn't need anymore the nuclear forces that existed during the cold war. and there are some false comparisons there that i think are very important for us to talk about as it relates to this treaty before us. i think we also need to talk about the new start and russian

reset. i'll talk about that a little bit when i begin here discussing the reasons for trying to act so quickly here, but i think it also requires some further discussion because, frankly, russia is threatening a new arms race if the united states senate doesn't ratify this treaty. is that the reset that the president is so fond of talking about, this new wonderful relationship with the russian federation? 12th -- i think we need to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. this treaty did not deal with tract cal nuclear weapons. and respected members of this body, including the president, made clear that the next item on the agenda had to do with tactical nuclear weapons. it should have been but it was not done here. 13th -- this deals with some of the amendments that are going to be necessary here -- there is a commission in here that is

somewhat like previous treaty commissions called the bilateral consultative commission. the treaty delegates to this commission the ability even in secret to modify terms of the treaty. a group of russians and a group of united states negotiators. there is some reference in the committee's resolution of ratification, but in any view it is inadequate for the senate to be able to act in time on note any indication by that commission for-to-do, for the united states to provide its advice and consent, if those are necessary. as i mentioned, it is also important for us to determine how this treaty is distracting attention from what the president has said -- and i agree -- is our top priority and that's dealing with proliferation and terrorism. this treaty doesn't do anything to advance our goals in that respect. and i think it would be much better if we could have spent part of the last two years better focusing on the illegal nuclear weapon programs of iran

and north korea and why that should be our top agenda item right now. well, madam president, those are some of the things that i'm going to be talking b i won't have time to deal with all of them during this first hour, but let me at least talk briefly about the question of adequate time. i don't think senators are quite aware of some of the procedures that exist here with respect to treaty ratification. because of precedent in the senate, when cloture is filed, it will close off debate, both on amendments to the treaty and the preamble as well as amendments to the resolution of ratification. and i think it's important to note that there are amendments that members -- at least on our side -- have that go-go both to the -- that go both to the treaty and preamble and go to the resolution of ratification. i think there are many more that deal with the latter subject. we're going to have to be able to deal with both of those

subject matters. so when members talk about filing cloture, i think it's important to realize that that would cut off debate on every additional change, even if we haven't been able to complete work on the amendments to the resolution of ratification. also i think it should be clear that there have been numerous letters sent to our leadership in the senate and to the committee leadership from republican members of the foreign relations committee, other republican senators, the ten republican senators-elect, representatives from the house armed services committee, and others indicating that this is not the appropriate time or way to deal with this treaty. incidentally, i just happened to be watching chris matthews the other side -- a television program -- and lawrence eagleburger, one of the people huwho supports the treaty, was asked what is the fuss about getting it done now? this is what he said.

he said, "they want to do it before these lame duckers are out there. that's not the way to move on this issue." and, madam president, i agree with that. there's a lot of serious things -- there are a lost serious things to consider here -- there are a lot of serious things to consider here and in the rush to do all of the business this lame-duck session has is not the best way to get that done. the chairman of the armed services -- or of the foreign relations committee yesterday expressed the view that we had plenty of time to do this, comparing the work that we have here to the start i treaty. the start i treaty is the predecessor to this new start treaty, though there was the intervening 2002 moscow treaty that i mentioned before. but just to make two quick points on this, when we dealt with start i, we didn't have all of the competing considerations, the dual tracking with an omnibus appropriations bill and the votes that we're going to have to take on that, as well as the other items that the

majority leader has mentioned here. and secondly, if we're to talk about an analogous treaty, the start treaty was not starre cond by the senate until september of 1992, and the analogy would be that this treaty before us now would be appropriate to bring to the treaty -- excuse me, to the senate next may, may of 2011. that's how much time elapsed between the two. now, i'm not suggesting that we need that much more time, but i'm simply pointing out the fact that it is not analogous. probably a better analogy would be the i.n.f. treaty. that took the senate nine days of floor time. there were 20 votes on amendments and plenty of time to work out consideration of other amendments. so, i mean, to the idea that, well, some treaties haven't taken that long, therefore, why can't we do this one, it is a specious argument and i think when we see the serious issues that need to be considered, our

colleagues will appreciate the need to take adequate time on this agreement. now, one of the curious arguments is that we have to do this quickly because the verification provisions of the predecessor start i treaty have lambed, and, as a result, we've a situation that's just untenable. as a matter of fact, robert gibbs, the press secretary, believing that the senate yesterday was reading the treaty -- which did not happen -- nevertheless put out a statement, obviously prematurely, and among the things he said was, "every membership that the start treaty is being read on the senate floor increases the time that we lack verification of russia's nuclear arsenal." well, apart from the fact that he was wrong about the reading of the treaty, he's also wrong about the urgency here because of the lack of verification of the russians. first of all, i am really confused by the two main arguments to support the treaty.

number one, we have this wonderful relationship with the russians that's been reset and we're cooperating and all these things, and by the way, you can't trust those guys because we've got to quickly put these verification measures in place. there's something that doesn't quite connect there, as far as i'm concerned. but i go back to why we don't have verification right now. and this story reminds me a little bit about the trial of the fellow who killed both of his parents and then pled for mercy on the court because he was an orphan. this problem of verification was created by the administration. it has nothing to do with action by the senate, and they have nothing but themselves to blame for whatever verification procedures are not in place. now, highwa how did that come a? the start treaty had perfectly good verification provisions in it that could have been continued for another five years if the united states had taken the position with russia that that's what we should do.

but but the administration said no, we're going to deliver the start treaty on time so there won't be any hiatus there so we don't need to continue the provisions of start i. here is what was said in a joint statement between president barack obama and dmitry medvedev, president of the russian fed ration, on april 1 of 2009. quote -- "the united states and the russian fed ration intend to conclude this agreement -- federation intend to conclude this agreement before the treaty expires in december." so originally we had nothing to worry about because the new treaty would be done by then. well, it soon became evident that that wasn't going to happen, that the negotiations were dragging and that the treaty would expire. did this administration decide to try to continue the existing treaty, which it could have done? it just takes the u.s. and russia agreeing to do it. nope, senate action is required. no, it didn't do that. and several of us began to express concerns about this. the republican ranking member of

the senate foreign relations committee even introduced legislation to provide the necessary legal framework for verification to continue even though the two treaties had lapsed. and i cosponsored that legislation. the administration said, well, what we're going to do is get a bridging agreement with russia that will bridge the time between the time that start i lapses and the time the new treaty is ratified. and mike mcfall, the n.s.c. advisor for russia, in a press briefing on november 15 of 2009, made that point. he said, it, meaning the treaty, "does expire on december 5. and in parallel, we have a bridging agreement that we're also working on with the russians so there's no interruption." interruption. "and the key thing sheer verification. we just -- here is verification. we just want to preserve the verification." so that was the intention. those of us who had at least expressed concerned were somewhat mollified. except when i went to geneva, what we found was there had been

no conversations whatsoever and it appeared to me -- and i came back to the senate floor and actually called it malpractice -- that our negotiators and the russian negotiators had not thought about, let alone begun negotiating what kind of agreement would need to be put in place in the event that the treaties expired and nothing else was in place providing for vair fib. verification. but at least they promised that we would have this bridging agreement. then the administration said when the treaty was signed -- when the treaty was signed and the two presidents spoke to the issue, that we would continue in the spirit of the previous treaty so that there would be no difference in action between the two countries in whatever time period it took for the ratification of the treaty to occur by the two countries' bodies. and this is a quotation from the statement of president medvedev and obama. quote -- "we express our commitment as a matter of principle to continue to work together in the spirit of the

start treaty following its expiration as well as a firm intention that a new start treaty enter into force at the earliest possible date." madam president, it's a complete mystery as to what happened, what happened to the bridging agreement, what happened to this spirit of cooperation that we're going to continue in the spirit of the previous treaty? we're now told that it's an slough absolute emergency for the united states senate to hurry up and ratify this treaty because the russians might cheat. nobody has explained what happened here, and nobody's explained why it was important before but it never got done and now we have the emergency. there were documents that trickled in over time but one of the things that we've asked for to try to explain what happened and what this spirit is that the presidents both talked about was the negotiating record.

we've absolutely been denied access to that negotiating record. now, the russians know what we said and what they said. the state department knows what we said and they said. but u.s. senators who are asked to give their advice and consent can't be trusted i guess to know what was said between the russian and u.s. negotiators. numerous officials of the administration has said there's an urgency to ratify the treaty because we lack verification measures with russia. that was a statement that senator clinton made back in august and others have said the same thing. of course we do have some verification but i don't want to get into open session here about the national technical means that we have. we can discuss that in executive session. but apart from the mystery about this bridging agrecian and th the -- agreement and the commitment of the two presidents, this urgency is irrational if we're to believe that we've really reset this relationship with russia. and, in fact, administration officials have actually denied

that the emergency exists, a point that's been made by others. gary semore, who is special assistant to the president, said, "i'm not particularly worried near term but over time, as the russians are modernizing their systems and starting to deploy new systems, the lack of inspections will create much more uncertainty." absolutely true, i agree with him. but he's not worried in the near term; that is to say within the next few months. "the washington post" i thought put it well. they, in an editorial, said, "but no calamity will befall the united states if the senate does not act this year. the cold war threat of a nuclear exchange between washington and moscow is for now almost nonexistent." so i don't think that's a valid argument to rush this treaty through in the week of christmas that somehow there's an urgent need and that our national security is threatened if we don't do that. i also reject the argument that the only choice between us is

this treaty or no treaty. obviously there are other choices. and when it comes to verification -- when it comes to verification, both countries have the ability to have agreements with each other that provide for the kind of inspection regimes that would be appropriate. mr. kyl: madam president, i know there's a bit a disruption but let me just conclude this at this point here. ian kelly, who's a state department spokesman, made a comment here that i think kind of sums it up. he said, "both sides pledge not to take any measures that would undermine the strategic stability that start has provided during this period between the expiration of the start treaty and entry into force of the new treaty, which will take some months."

and he's right. but i think the argument that the senate has to act now, right now, or else our national security is going to be jeopardized by lack of verification is specious. and it certainly raises questions, if we are to examine what the real basis is and -- and result of this new recent relationship with russia is. now, that's the argument -- we have to do this now because otherwise we won't be able to verify what the russians are doing. and the other argument is that we've reset relationship with russia, and, therefore, if we don't do this, it will make the russians mad and they will not continue to cooperate with us on important matters that they have cooperated with us on. so i think it's important to both examine that allegation as well as the question of what the two countries got out of this treaty. and let me just talk for a

moment about what the russians got out of the treaty and what the united states purportedly gets out of the treaty, most of it characterized in this reset language. well, political -- russian political scientist sergei kergnam said -- and i'm quoting -- "russia could not have had -- or could not have an easier partner on the topic of nuclear arms than obama," referring to president obama. what exactly did the russians get out of this? some said, well, even though they are no longer a powerful nation, they need the superpower status and entering into the treaty like this, like the kinds of treaties that used to be entered into during the cold w war, gives them a feeling of superpower status along with the united states. so important for us to do that. i -- i -- first of all, i'm not sure you treat a serious reset partner that way, but apart from that, obviously the russians felt that if they could negotiate a good treaty with the united states, it would be to

their benefit and i don't question their intentions in doing that. but what we got out of this in terms of the primary feature of the streat to reduce -- treaty is to reduce the nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. the delivery vehicles are the most important thing, in my view. but only the united states reduces its strategic delivery vehicles under this new start treaty. the russians don't. they've currently got about 560 delivery vehicles. these are icbm's, bomber capability and submarine capability. the united states has 856. well, the treaty takes you down to 700 of deployed delivery vehicles. so even under the treaty, russia can build up to that level by adding 140 launchers that they don't currently have. while the united states must cut our forces by 156. now, you say, well, why shouldn't it be exactly equal?

the united states has obligations beyond those that russia has. russia has a need to defend its territory. the united states has 31 other countries relying on the u.s. nuclear umbrella and, therefore, the targets that we must hold at risk and the concerns that we have about adequate delivery vehicles are much different than russia's. nonetheless, we've agreed to a parity number here of 700. so they can build up to that number, we have to build down. not exactly a great victory, in my view. in fact, it's the first time since the very disastrous washington naval treaties with germany and japan before world war ii that the u.s. has agreed to one-sided reductions in military might. i mentioned the bridging agreement before. where that fell through the cracks, i don't know. the administration was apparently pushing for it. it didn't get it, and we still don't know what happened because

we haven't been given the record. on mobile missiles, this is a matter that exercised -- exorcised the russians when the committee dealt with it in a very modest way in its resolution of ratification. you see, the russians have had rail mobile missile plans and don't know exactly what they're going to do in the future with rail mobile, but when the committee daneed to speak to this, the russians reacted like a scald -- a scalded dog. well, we'll recommend the duma not approve the treaty if we're going to be talking about rail mobile missiles. well, what about the u.s. contention we shouldn't be talking about missile defense, u.s. missile defense? no, that's okay. but we don't want to talk about rail mobile missiles. so the russians successfully presented any restriction on that. and there is now a concern that maybe we made a mistake in not including that. and obviously the concession makes it much more harder to monitor their forces. in addition, we limited the monitor of missile production at

voitinsk. that was the site that produced many of the missiles that russia used. and this was required by the start treaty. the russians didn't want this anymore. i can understand why. if we're going to understand what they're producing in their their pharmaceutical company to her and seed what happens when they roll them out the factory, then we'll have a better idea of whether they're cheating or not. the russians said from the very beginning, we're not going to let do you that anymore. so they got something very, very important with regard to verification. again, the argument is, well, we've got to do verification. understand the verification of this treaty is much, much weaker than the verification that existed under start i and that could have been continued for another five years if the administration had taken that position. very troublesome is a reverse in course by the united states and russia both with regard to moving of icbms. we have been working against mirving for a long time and finally achieved in the last treaty a recognition of the fact

that mirv'd missiles -- that is to say missiles that have numerous warheads on top, are very destabilizing because it creates a situation where you basically have to -- have to use them or you lose them. if we attack a missile silo and we kill eight warheads all at once with one strike, that's a major loss. and so the idea is that strategic offensive weapons with those murves on i mirvs on it nt off before hit by an oncoming missiles. very destabilizing. so both countries agreed to move toward a single-warhead missile. well, this treaty moves that by the boards the u.s. is going to continue to provide for single warhead but not russia. in fact, it's believed that 80% of the russian icbm force in the future will consist of murved icbm's. -- of mirv'd icbms. i don't know why the administration walked back from that. again, we don't know because we don't have the records.

the slcm, this is the submerged launch cruise missile. the start i treaty had a side agreement that limited submerged launch cruise missiles. but this new start treaty ends that side agreement and says that even though the united states is retiring our submerged launch cruise missiles, as we had intended to do under start i, it appears that russia is developing a new version of such a missile with a range of up to approximately 5,000 kilometers, which is a longer range than some ballistic missiles covered by the treaty. again, why do we allow a relink only of a subject as important to us as missile defense with strategic arms limitations and yet not limit rail mobile,

slcm's and so on? very lopsided result in the negotiations, it seems to me. i mentioned missile defense. russia not only achieved a recognition of its position that missile defense is related to strategic offensive systems in the preamble to the treaty but it negotiated limitations on u.s. missile defense in article 5 and importantly added some very i'll call it bullying language in the unilateral statement accompanying the treaty. these achievements came after the europeans gave away ground-based -- on defensive missles. missle defense targets, this is another area in which the united states gave ground. there is ambiguous treaty language that will likely constrain the united states' ability to maximize the affordability of our missle defense targets.

tiltilemtry is something that te united states fought hard on, we don't know the quid quo pro. under start i, one of the most valuable intelligence messages was the unencrypted tilemtry and they got uncrypted tilemtry from our tests. in a sense that's stablizing. under new start, which is supposed to be improving the situation with regard to certainty, unencrypted data from almost every ballistic missle flight will be not subject to sharing with the other side. at best five flights a year will be shared, but russia can choose to never share flight test data from new missles they're currently developing an testing much they can say here's data

from five tests of old missles, but they don't have to share data with any of their new missles and none of our intelligence people will tell you that's an improvement or good situation. here's another disparity in the treaty. prompt global strike. remember i mentioned the russian potential plans for rail mobile or cruised missle submarine launch? the united states has, i think, a very good idea about moving forward with conventional prompt global strike. it's not even a nuclear program. it is a sensible way to deal with some of the threats around the world today where we may have a need in a quick time over a long distance to sent a -- send a conventional warhead to a country. you may not want to have to send a nuclear warhead, which heaven knows what that would start. it makes sense to have the conventional capability to do

this. the russians have fought that. certainly not russia. g a treaty nominally about specific limitation on conventional prompt global strike. it would limit the capability that we are seeking to address w.m.d. and terrorist threats by requiring that any such missles be counted against the already too low limit of 070 missles for -- 700 missles of delivery of nuclear warheads. let's say we were going to deploy 24 of these missles, then that means you've got to reduce the 700 by 24. that provides a huge disincentive to -- to deploying these conventional prompt global strike missles and a dangerous reduction from the negotiated 700 launcher limit in the treaty. i'm not going to get deeply into

inspections and verifications since that's mostly going to have to be dealt with in an executive session we're can discuss classified matters. suffice i had to say -- suffice it to say between what the russians have done and what we got, in a number of inspections, this new treaty cuts the number of inspections by more than half compared to start i. part of the problem here is that none of the inspections that are permitted would ever enable us to have a good sense of the total number of warheads. so that's different from the start i treaty. you're never going to be able to monitor under this treaty whether the russians are complying with the overall limit on warheads. we'll have to get more into that in executive session. i talked with tactical -- when he was then senator, vice president biden made remarks with the 2002 moscow treaty, he said after entry into force --

getting a handle on russian nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and nonproliferation of the united states government. here it is eight years later and not only is there no further progress toward that -- by the way, i totally agree with the vice president on this. this treaty at the insistence of the russians has not one word about tactical nuclear weapons. i'll be discussing that in more detail later on. i mentioned it to illustrate there's another area of great disparty which are. i didn't count it all up, there are 10 or 12 areas where the russians appear to have got very much what they bargained for. what did we get? well, we're told we benefit for the following reasons: first we can resume inspections in russia. we could have done that by extending the start i treaty. that's a problem of our own making by allowing that to not

only allowed to expire and not renewed, but not put into place a bridging agreement or a joint statement about the two presidents working together in the spirit of start i. the inspections, as i said, also are significantly weaker than under start i. and i'll quote senator bond on this point, the administration's new start treaty has been oversold and overhiepped. if we cannot verify that the russians are complying with the treaty's three central limits, we have no way of knowing if we're more secure or not. there's no doubt in my mind that the united states cannot reliably verify the 1,553 limit. senator bond is exactly right on that. we'll discuss some of that in open session. we'll discuss the rest in closed session. let me conclude this point by noting that the vice president and others have also suggested that this treaty is important for the united states because

it's a valuable part of the so-called reset relationship with the russians. i have to ask several questions about it. first of all, why have we assumed this has been such a great success? my colleague, senator durbin, for example stated a couple of weeks ago that we need russia's help in dealing with iran because that nation is about to bring online a new nuclear power plant. well, i would remind everyone that russia built and fueled that power plant for iran. so a great benefit to this recent relationship. we'll have more to say about this as well. let me conclude this part by quoting from dr. henry kissinger, who incidentally believes that the treaty should be ratified. he said the argument for this treaty is not to placate russia. that is not the reason to approve this treaty. under no conditions should a treaty be made as a favor to another country or to make another country feel better. it has to be perceived to be in the american national interest.

so what are the two big arguments for the treaty? well, we've got to get the verification regime in place because the russians might cheat. by the way, they're our new best friends and we have to keep it that way. dr. kissinger has written before about this matter of what should motivate you to ratify or to do an arms control treaty. he said every arms control treaty has to be justified within its own four corners. you can never say that a reason to do it is to make the other country feel better or to gain some kind of leverage with the other country or to gain its cooperation some way. it is illegitimate and doesn't work. he's made that point precisely with respect to that treaty. he's a proponent of the treaty saying, that's not a reason to endorse this treaty. so i conclude that the two big arguments are not arguments at all and that in point of fact the russians got a lot more out of this treaty than the united states ever would. i spoke a little bit about the

treaty limits. because this is the central idea of the treaty to reduce the number of warheads and delivery vehicles. and i wanted to discuss that in this context because there are a lot of people who believe, and i certainly understand the argument it seems like a good idea if both countries are reducing nuclear worses anwar heads. -- forces and warheads. under the moscow treaty in 2002, we don't need that many warheads. and the russians said we're going to reduce ours, why don't we have a treaty. the united states said, you can have a treaty if you want to, but we don't need one. we're going to do this out of our best interest and it costs a lot of money. but as a favor to russia, we said, if you want to do a treaty, that's fine. we're not going to make any concessions to do it. now we're at the point where we're cutting into bone. getting the level of delivery vehicles down to 700 could

jeopardize our ability to carry out our missions. now, that's my assertion. there are experts in the administration who have briefed us who can show exactly where the targets are and where our missles are and how many we would need and so on and they say that actually we still have enough to do the job and i'm willing to accept their -- first of all very patriotic motivation, their expertise and judgment on this issue. but i would also note that when you read all of the statements that all of them made, they appreciate that this is it. this is the limit beyond which we don't dare go and it rests upon several assumptions including the assumption that's the russians are never going to break out or cheat and it rests on the assumption that we don't have new targets we have to worry about. and i would suggest that especially with respect to the chinese development and modernization of its nuclear force and the role that it's beginning to play in the world

militarily that it is not necessarily a valid assumption that the targets that existed during the cold war are all that we will ever have to worry about. so let me just talk very briefly about this matter of how we've brought down the number of warheads and missles and why it's not necessarily the great thing that proponents are cracking it up to be. first point i'll reiterate, we did all the giving. they did all the taking. we have to reduce the number of our delivery vehicles, they can build up the number of theirs. at the signing of the treaty russia had a total of 640 strategic delivery vehicles, only 571 deployed. and that's according to the moscow defense briefing in 2010 about their missles and delivery vehicles. aleski, the former deputy chairman said and i'm quoting

the new treaty is an agreement on reducing the american and not the russian strategic nuclear forces. in fact the latter will be reduced in any case because of the mass removal from the order of battle of obsolete arms and one at a time introduction of new systems. and we believe that his statement is correct. now, i said i'm a little worried that we've gotten very close to the line. nothing has really changed since 2008 except that the chinese have been working very hard at their modernization and that's when the bush administration testified that the current levels, that is the levels that we have here today, not the levels we're going down to, were necessary for deterrents. i can quote from secretary bodman and secretary gates who spoke to that issue in september of 2008 to make that point. general cartwrite, vice chairman of the joint chiefs, testified in 2009 he would be concerned

about having fewer than 800 delivery vehicles. i'm quoting from about 1,500 to about 500, 500 being where the russians would like to be, 1,100 is where we would like to be. now the negotiations start. i would be very concerned if we got below those levels. secretary is hissinger said -- slessinger said what the number of nuclear weapons the number is adequate, but barely so. secretary kissinger, who testified in support of the treaty said and i quote -- "the numbers of american and russian strategic warheads and delivery systems have been radically reduced and approaching the levels of arsenals of other levels will bear on the strategic balance as will tactical nuclear weapons given the great asymmetry in their

numbers in russia's favor. end of quote. there are two things he's talking about here. first, as russia and the united states bring our forces down, there is a certain point, i'm not suggesting we're there yet, but there's a certain point that countries like china, for example, can say, wait a minute, there's now not that much difference between where russia and china are and russia and the united states are and where we are, and, therefore, if we build our up somewhat, we can be at parity with russia and the united states and whala, instead of having two powers with large nuclear warheads, you have three. there's an incentive for countries like to build up once we get down to a certain point. the other point he makes is with respect to tactical weapons. and tactical doesn't really relate to the amount of boom that the weapon makes. it's destructive capability, so much as the delivery vehicle

that it's on. and the russians have a significant snrang that, it is secretary kissinger pointed out. so there is an asymmetry that exists, both with respect to warheads and delivery vehicles. general chilton, when he talked about support for new start, predicated it on no russian cheating or changes in the geopolitical environment. i would like to read his quotation. he said, "it was decided we would just fix that presidential guidance for our analysis of the -- theation how we moved forward. the only assumptions we had to made with regard to the new n.p.r. which was in development in parallel at that time with the start treaty was that there would be no request for an increase in forces and there was also an assumption that i think valid that -- and that is that the russians in the post-negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty. he assumes there is going to be

another one. but those are the two asum thons that we to reduce on. i ask the senators whether they agree with these assessments in light that russia does continue to modernize its force, as does china that "no" more nuclear forces in those countries means more potential targets for the u.s. to hold at risk and that russia has violated practically every arms treaty it signed with the united states and taking into account what hangs in the balance, the commitment of the united states not only to our 31 allies and the nuclear umbrella that we have but also the protection of the united states with our nuclear deterrent. we've little to gain and much to lose if we can't be certain that the numbers in new start are adequate. let me conclude this point by talking about some counting rules. this is a little he i esoteric s down into the weeds but it is foreign understand in the

context of what i'm talking about here. under the treaty, strategic ability may be weakened because there's not a specified loadout of vehicles per missile. that's what we used to have. the counting rules in the treaty present opportunities for allowable cheating that the united states is not likely to pursue. in fact i would say we will not pursue but which could give russia an advantage. while the u.s. improves stability in our icbm force by eliminating the mirving that the talked about before, russia will become more reliant on mirv'd icbms. it encourages first-strike planning for fixed silo weapons. the use it or lose it problem. the chairman of our joint chiefs of staff, admiral mullen said, "the united states will demirv the icbm force to a single warhead to enhance the stability of the nuclear balance." so why would we then encourage

the russians to go exactly in the opposite direction in this treaty? and let me quote again. and this is from a russian forces blog november 30, 2010 the commander of the strategic forces announced today that all new mobile topol-m missiles will carry multiple warheads. this modification is officially known as rs-24. the first three were deployed in takovol earlier this year." that's what i was referring to before. and that promotes strategic instability, not stability. finally, due to the bomber counting rules, at least one russian military commentator has noted, "under the treaty, one nuclear warhead will be counted for each deployed heavy bomber

which can carry many. consequently, russia will retain 2,100 warheads." madam president, might i inquire how close i am to using rt 60 minutes that i had intended to speak? the presiding officer: the senator has about ten minutes remaining on the hour that you asked for but there is no time limit. mr. kyl: i appreciate there is no tiement time limit on my speaking but i have an engagement at noon. and secondly i didn't want to be here on the floor talking for too long. so let me just -- mr. kerry: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i just want to ask the senator, if i can -- i don't want to interrupt him -- but i wanted to inquire, get a sense here, i appreciate a lot of the comments he's made. first of all, let me say, madam president, i have appreciated

working very, very closely with senator kyl on this for months now, and we have had an enormous amount of dialogue. we've had a lot of meetings. we've gone back and forth. i think he would agree we've tried very hard to in good faith address many of the concerns that he's raised, notwithstanding the ones that he raised in his speech, many of which i'll speak to as we go along. but i would like to get a sense from him. you mentioned amendments. others have. but we're now almost at lunchtime. we don't have an amendment. i'd like to to get a sense of when we might anticipate sort of really being able to do business on the treaty? mr. kyl: i will be happy to spreendz to my colleague before i conclude these remarks. part of the business of the senate on the treaty is to expose its flaws and to have a robust debate about those flaws which can provide the foundation for amendments, which we intend

to offer. i was struck by the seriousness and importance, at least in my mind, of the two-page list of amendments that my staff acquired from colleagues. as my colleague knows, we actually shared a list of 10 or 12 allotamendments that i12amenb there are some very serious amendments, most of which go to the resolution of ratification, a few of which go to the treaty or the preamble itself. i note yesterday my colleague said that -- i think i'm quoting you directly -- "make no mistake, we will not allow a treatamendment to the treaty ore preamble." i do think it is important in this discussion before offering an amendment-to-appreciate why we believe such an amendment would be important.

so as my colleague well knows, there is a great deal that can be said about this. i'm trying to say it in as succinct a form as i can. but there is quite a bit of discussion i think that needs to occur as a predicate for the amendments that we intend to offer. mr. kerry: well, madam president, i completely respect what the senator from arizona has just said. and we obviously want to give him time to lay any predicate to what he may or may not perceive to be a flaw. for instance, as he raises the question about the mirveg, as he just did -- about the mirving, as he just did, and i'll later go through each of these points, but the fact is, the reason that the russians are mirving, which we all understand, and there are plenty of letters from the strategic command and elsewhere that will articulate the way in which they do not see that as a threat, the reason they mirv is because they can't afford to do some of the other things with respect to the numbers of

missiles, so they put more warheads on one missile. and we have preserved a very saying breakout capacity here. as general chilton and others will point out, it's not a flaw at all. it's actually an advantage which is maintained in this treaty for the american strategic pos chiewmplestree -- strategicpost. what the snot senator describes as a flaw from his point of view i think the record will well state is a preserved american advantage. that said, i respect -- obviously we want to get this joined. i think what the senator has just laid out is very helpful. but i do want to impress that the sooner we could get to some of these amendments, the more we could really discover whether something is in fact a floor or not a floor and has been adequately answered. mr. kyl: i appreciate my colleague's comment, madam president. i would just note that i think

the reason why the russians are going to mirving is -- at least the primary reason is exactly as senator kerry has stated. they have financial limitations on what they can do here but the result of it, i don't think one can deny, is strategic instability compared to moving toward a singular warhead missile such as the united states has -- has been doing and will continue to do. what i wanted to do in this segment of my remarks before i conclude and then will advise my colleagues that the next thing that i intend to be talking about is the administration's commitment to the nuclear triad. but i don't think i'm going to have time to get to that. i would like to conclude now with some comments about modernization. it's been well noafn that i have -- it's been well-known that i have been involved with negotiations with the administration. my colleague, senator kerry, has

been very helpful in occasionally restarting those negotiations. when they golt bogged down a little bit. and was helpful and i specifically have complimented him beforehand and will do it again in ensuring that the president's increase in the budget for our nuclear modernization program that was in his budget this year will actually be carried out in the funding that the congress does. we had to do a continuing resolution back in september and i think it was largely due to senator kerry's efforts that that funding was cluvmentd and i will just note that the house of representatives -- we've had a the love concern back and forth about whether there is a real commitment to get that done over the years. and it drve obviously both of us appreciate the fact that no one can guarantee anything. but there is a certain amount of good will and commitment involved here. and certainly the administration needs to be very actively involved in ensuring that the funding that is required for its modernization program actually comes to pass.

i'd note that the continuing resolution that was passed by the house of representatives unfortunately conditioned this funding that senator kerry and i were responsible for, conditioned it on the ratification of the start treaty, saying if you don't ratify the treaty, you're not going to get the money. now, thankfully, a couple of administration officials relatively kickly pushed back on that and said, no, that's not right. the treaty stands on its own, and the modernization program stands on its own. and this funding is necessary. that's the kind of pushback on what might otherwise be rather petty politics that's going to be required by all of us to understand that modernization is critical in the future. swoa that imreef predicate -- so with that brief predicate here, let me just say the what the problem has been and scwnly how we went about trying to correct or solve the problem. the united states, believe it or not -- and this is fault of the republican and democratic administrations and republican

and democrat members of congress -- it's a negligence, i would say a gross negligence on all of our parts. and i'll take some of the blame for not having yelled about this more than i have. but at the same time that every other nuclear power is modernizing its forces, both its facilities, its capability to maintain its weapons, and its weapons and in the case of the russian and the chinese, their delivery systems as well. while everyone else has the ability to produce a warhead to put back into production when one comes out of production, the united states does not. i meaner th mean be, the countrt licialtly invented these weapons with the manhattan project, that's 1942 in case you've forgotten the era, buildings to take care of these most sophisticated weapons. i mean, if tarp liken it to a

car, it would be like a ferrari race car or formula i race car, highly technical. i don't think you'd want to refurbish those in somebody's backyard garage. the bottom line is that these facilities have got to be brought up to modern standards to be able to modernize our weapons over time. why do the weapons have to be modernized? generally speaking, these are weapons that were designed in the 1970's, built in the 1980's, and built to last ten years. well, do the math. we're still relying on those weapons. and what we found, even though we've cut way back on the funding for what we call surveillance -- that is, to say, taking a look at several of these weapons every year, taking the skin off, looking down inside, seeing what's rusty and what's loose and so on, to use an analogy to a car maybe -- what we found is that there are

significant issues with these weapons that need to be addressed, if our commanders are -- and labs are to continue to be able to certify them as safe, secure, and reliable, as they must do. and so we both need the facilities in which to bring these sophisticated weapons in, take them apart, make sure that they are put back together properly with all the requisite parts, whatever is necessary to alloathem to work, and the timee is more than critical. suffice it to say in this open session of congress that we dare not waste any more time at all. i think that's one of the reasons why the president's advisors from the laboratories and the department of defense and energy presented this to the president and his nuclear posture review and the modernization plan that he thveloped.