madam president, why such a request would have been denied. in 12 hearings, there were two witnesses who spoke in opposition to this treaty. members of the minority party requested others, but it nowhere came anywhere near the normal precedent given to the minority to have at least one witness on each panel. i was concerned that no former national lab directors were invited to testify. it is essential that an appropriate amount of time be spent on the senate floor considering this treaty. members who have serious concerns must be permitted the opportunity to offer amendments that would address the full range of problems. i would simply point out this is

the last quote of this speech today, madam president. in endorsing the start treaty, "the washington post" on november 19 said that positive steps had been made and the treaty ought to be approved. but it went on to say the editorial board of "the washington post" went on to say but no calamity will befall the united states if the senate does not act this year. i couldn't agree more with the "washington post." it will not be a calamity if we're given adequate time to fully discuss, to fully examine, to fully debate all of the ramifications about an issue so profound as our nuclear weapons capability. the worst thing this body could do is shirk our constitutional responsibility by rushing this

through in the final days of this lame-duck session simply to check the box before the new team, the new newly elected team comes to washington and takes office in january. thank you, madam president. a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from maryland. mr. cardin: thank you, madam president. madam president, i ask unanimous consent that floor privileges be granted to commander andre coleman, the department of defense fellow who has been extremely helpful in my office from the department of navy during the senate's consideration in executive session of treaty document 111-5, the new start treaty. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. cardin: thank you, madam president. madam president, we take up the consideration of the new start. we not only have the opportunity -- mr. wicker: would the senator yield for a unanimous consent request. mr. cardin: glad to yield. mr. wicker: madam president, i ask unanimous consent that the opinion pieces that i referred to in my remarks be admitted to the record. the presiding officer: without

objection. mr. wicker: thank you. mr. cardin: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from maryland. mr. cardin: as we take up consideration of the new start, we not only have the opportunity, but also an obligation to provide consent on the ratification of this treaty. it's long overdue. we need to regain our ability to provide boots on the ground verification of the russian nuclear complex. over the past eight months we've all had ample opportunity to resraout documents report related to the new start. we have considered, conducted 20 hearings, taken over 900 questions. there were questions asked by members of the senate mainly to the administration in which those answers have been provided. 900 questions over 900 for the record. in short, we have given significant consideration to the ratification of new start. i know that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle were committed to guaranteeing the security of our country, also recognize the obligation to ratifying this arms control agreement immediately. madam president, i want to take you back a little bit because i

hear my colleagues talk about not having enough time. i want to take you back to a hot day this summer in the foreign relations committee where, madam president, you were at that meeting in which the, those that are now saying we don't have enough time asked for just a little bit more time during the impending recess so that we could orderly consider the ratification process. that was a hot summer day. it's now a snowy day in december, and they're still saying the same thing. just give us more time. we've had plenty of time. i want to compliment senator kerry and senator lugar for the manner in which they have considered this treaty. this is a very important treaty for america, and they have made sure that the senate has had -- and each senator has had ample opportunity to get all the information we need, all the information we need from administration individuals or from experts or from anyone. they have been very open in this

process. they have also given every member of the senate ample time to get every question answered, to get all the material they need. and it's now time for us to take on our responsibility. that is, to take up this treaty for ratification and vote it up or down. and i certainly hope my colleagues will vote to ratify this treaty. i think it's critically important to our national security. in addition to its contributions to american security, one of the most compelling reasons we should ratify this treaty and do so before we recess is to regain our insight into russia's strategic offensive arms. since start i expired over a year ago, we've had no comprehensive verification regime in place in order to help us understand russia's strategic nuclear force. we need the transparency to know what russia is doing to provide confidence and stability, and we need that confidence and stability to contribute to a

safer world. we will only regain that transparency by ratifying this treaty, and we are in dangerous territory without it. let me just repeat: we need this treaty for verification. we need this treaty to know what russia is doing so we can verify what russia tells us to make sure in fact that it's true. not only will this treaty enhance the national security in the united states, it will serve as a significant step forward in our relationship with russia, a key partner in the overall u.s. strategy to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide. let's be perfectly clear about this. there are still two nations that have the majority of nuclear weapon capacity in this world. it's russia and the united states. working together, we can make this world safer. working together, we can move forward with reductions in strategic arms around the world. working together, we provide the

leadership so that we can move forward against proliferation against nuclear weapons. in fact we have done that, but the failure to ratify this he treaty could have a major negative impact on the leadership of the united states in this area. the u.s. relationship with the russian federation is key in our efforts to curtail iran's nuclear ambition. in june russia voted for the latest u.n. stkaourt council -- security council sanctions on iran and later canceled the sale of advanced arms defense missile system. the ratification of new start is essential in reinitiating investigations and for the united states and russia to lead the way in reduction of the nuclear arms stockpile. this is for leadership. we all talk about making sure iran does not become a nuclear weapons state. ratifying the new start treaty will help us in making sure iran does not become a nuclear weapons state.

it keeps the united states and russia focused on strategic arms reduction and focused on non proliferation. the failure is a setback in keeping iran from becoming a weapons state. new start, the first treaty with russia in almost a decade, calls for both sides to reduce deployed warheads modestly from 2,200 to 1,550. it would restore skhapbgz of information -- exchanges of information about arsenals. it would pave the way to greater cooperation between the two powers in dealing with such hot spots as iran and afghanistan. let me just point out one other part if i might. that is previous arms treaties have been ratified with overwhelming bipartisan support. start i was passed 93-6 in 1994.

and the moscow treaty passed 95-0 in 2003. legislators recognized then that arms control agreements between russia and the united states is not just good for security of our two nations but can lead the way for the world to reduce proliferation of nuclear weapons. during last month's nato summit in lisbon, the nato security secretary general stated -- and i quote -- "the new start treaty would pave the way for arms control and disarmament initiatives in other areas vital to euro atlantic security." so, madam president, i think this is a key moment in the history of the united states senate. i know that there are many important votes that we take in the senate. there are many votes that we take that have very significant consequences. i think the ratification of this treaty is just one of those moments. i think it keeps us on path and enhances our credibility to make

the world safer and do it in a twhaeu enhances the security -- in a way that enhances the security of the people of the united states of america. this is a treaty that needs to be ratified and needs to be ratified now. i urge my colleagues to vote in the interest of national security to move swiftly and pass this treaty. madam president, with that, i will yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from illinois. mr. durbin: madam president, i understand senator thune is the next to speak on the republican side, and i'd like unanimous consent to follow him after he's spoken. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: and senator chambliss would then follow me. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: without objection. thank you. mr. thune: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from south dakota. mr. thune: i thank the senator from illinois for blocking in the time and want to start by saying that here we are jammed against the christmas break with

the majority using christmas as a back stop to rush through an arms control treaty with the russians and a $1 trillion spending bill on a dual-track basis. what that means, madam president, is that we're considering at the same time two documents encompassing thousands of pages with very little ability to offer meaningful amendments or devote meaningful time to consider the full impact of these documents that will have a far-reaching and long-term impact on our nation. as i wrote recently in an op-ed that appeared in national review online, new start misses one opportunity after another to maintain a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries, to remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the senate. trying to force it through without ample time for debate and amendments would amount to a christmas gift to the russians. madam president, i'd ask unanimous consent that the op-ed i wrote for "national review" online entitled don't force new start dated december 9, 2010,

appear at the end of my remarks. the presiding officer: without t objection. mr. thune: madam president, the current funding resolution for the government ends tomorrow. we should not be debating a significant armors control treaty -- significant arms control treaty at this late date and trying to dual track, as i said earlier, thousands of pages of documents that need appropriate time on the floor of the united states senate. madam president, i want to speak, if i might, briefly today to the substance of the start agreement and my concerns about that agreement in its current form. first of all, i want to speak to the issue of missile defense. the new start treaty not only contains -- but reestablishes an unwise linkage between offense and defense broken when the l.b.m. treaty came to an end. russia's statement that the treaty can only be viable only

if the united states of america is troubling. viewed together, you new start treaty's preamble and russia's unilateral statement amount to a russian attempt to find a leverage point and exert political pressure upon the united states to forestall deploying a robust missile defense capability by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense capabilities. the recommend for this -- the remedy for this concern is for the senate to strike the offensive preamble language. that is why i wholeheartedly support an effort to strike the preamble as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of article 5 of the treaty. with regard to delivery vehicle modernization, and i want to speak specifically in that regard to bombers, madam president, nearly two years ago i began to have serious concerns about the administration's commitment to developing a follow-on bomber aircraft and its overall

commitment to the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. these concerns were aggravated by the administration's decision to terminate the development program for a new bomber and reexamine the need, the requirement and the technology. i was also troubled by secretary gates statement on april 6 of 2009 that we will examine all of our strategic requirements in light of start arms control negotiations which led me to be concerned that this administration would allow the russians to have a say in whether we would develop a new bomber. i was gratified to see the nuclear posture review determined that the united states should sustain the nuclear triad for decades. however, as the center for strategic and budgetary assessments recently stated in a report entitled sustaining america's advantage in long-range strike, the triad is in danger of becoming a diad by default because nearly half of the united states bomber inventory -- 47% -- predates the

cuban missile crisis. and the only aircraft the united states possesses today with survivability to have a chance of successfully executing missions more than 1,000 nautical miles of enemy territory from the last air-to-air refueling are 16 combat-ready b-2 bombers. madam president, the b-2 was designed in the 1980's and achieved initial operation over a decade ago and they will lose the ability to penetrate advanced air systems. the need, requirement, and the technology for the next generation bomber are well understood. the need for a new long-range strike capability is urnlt because the conflicts of the future will likely feature heavily defended airspace due in large part to the proliferation of expensive but extremely sophisticated and deadly air defense systems. we've heard testimony before the armed services committee from intelligence officials that russia is the developer of most of these advanced air defense systems and exporting those

systems both to china and to other countries in the world. various past an present combatant commanders of the peafng command and strategic commands and joint forces command have testified in the support of the capability the that the next generation bomber will provide. senator mccain replied the 1251 plan and even the updated plan lacks critical details about decisions related to the follow-on icbm, the next generation bomber or a follow-on air-launched cruise missile. general chilton has spoken about how -- how conversations about these matters need to start now. development of replacement delivery vehicles for all three legs of the triad needs to begin during the new start. development needs to begin in the next 12 years or replacement

systems will not be available when current systems reach the end of their current system lives. there is no assurance that the next long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. therefore, i plan to offer an amendment which will require the administration to certify that the president has made a commitment to develop a replacement heavy bomber that is both nuclear and conventionally capable. with regard to delivery vehicle numbers, madam president, on july 9, 2009 in a an armed services committee hearing, i asked the vice chairman of the joint chiefs about the administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems and to specify at what point in this range would he become concern that the delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear triad into a diad. general cartwright responded, i

would be concerned if we got below the mid-point, meaning if it fell below 080 delivery vehicles. madam president, this treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700, substantially below the number that general cartwright stated a year and a half ago. the administration makes the odd distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and points out the cap is 080. there is a letter frl general cartwright stating that he's comfortable with the distinction between the deployed and nondeployed vehicles. the real number we're working with is 700. i think it's worth noting that former defense secretary schlesinger testified to the senate foreign relations committee on april 29, 20 10, and i quote -- "as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the number specified are adequate though barely so."

end quote. with regard, madam president, to this limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, i find it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. the administration has informed the senate how it might feel the force of 720 delivery vehicles, which secretary gates and admiral mullen acknowledge in the hearing before the senate armed services committee on june 7, -- june 17, 2010, would still require further reductions to meet the treaty's central limits. they went on to argue that because the united states will have seven years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to identify a final force structure at this point. meaning the senate will commit the united states to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without knowing how that force will be composed. this problem is compounded by the fact that the treaty was so

poorly negotiated that for every icbm or slbm deployed with a vengsal warhead 1 one less nuclear delivery vehicle will be available to the united states. russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits it would drastically reduce its arsenal with or without this treaty. as the congressional research service writes and i quote -- "russia has 620 launchers and this may decline to 400 deployed and 440 total launchers. this would likely be true whether the treaty enters into force because russia is eliminating older missles as they age and deploying newer missles at a slower pace than that to retain 700 launchers. end quote. in light of all these facts i will seek to offer an amendment

or two regarding the delivery vehicle numbers in this treaty. madam president, i'm also working on several other amendments that i may seem to offer regarding prompt global strike and other issues. ultimately this is a very significant treaty that deserves full and fair consideration. and we should not be jamming the consideration of this treaty up against the christmas break. as i've indicated, madam president, there are substantial issues here that need to be fully vetted and we obviously do not have the time to consider these issues this year. we should wait until next year to fully consider this treaty and have a full, free, and wide open debate on this matter with no -- no restrictions on amendments. madam president, i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from illinois. mr. durbin: madam president, before the senate at this moment is the new start treaty, which is an agreement between the united states and russia. this is an effort to try to make this a safer world, to make

certain that the nuclear weapons that are in this world are carefully monitored, that they're watched and inspected, and that we reduce any urge to expand nuclear weaponry. it's an effort to make this a safer world. the president worked long and hard on this. he brought it for consideration months ago. almost seven months ago. and we've had hundreds -- at least 200 hearings -- let me restate that. we've had many senate hearings. i don't have the exact number before me, but i'll get it, many senate hearings on this matter. we have had many efforts at every level to bring the experts across america and across the united states and around the world to support our effort in bringing this matter before us. what troubles me, madam president, is the same thing we discussed earlier in a press

conference. we brought this matter to the floor of the united states senate over 24 hours ago. and speaker after speaker on the republican side have used this time on the floor of the senate to come and complain that they don't have any time to speak on the floor of the senate. they can't have it both ways. they can't come here and give a speech about the treaty and say the reason we shouldn't take it up is that we don't have a chance to speak on the treaty. they've had an opportunity to speak on the treaty. they had over 24 hours. i asked senator kerry as he left the floor, i know the republicans want to offer amendments to the treaty, how many amendments have been filed? he said, i'll check, but i think only one amendment has been filed. i'll ask his staff. is that currently the situation? one amendment by senator mccain. is that correct? one amendment has been filed and no amendments have been called. speaker after speaker comes to the republican side of the aisle and says the problem with this treaty is we don't have time to

speak, as they speak, we don't have time to offer amendments, as they fail to offer amendments. so you've got to step back and say, well, maybe the problem is not a problem of time. maybe the problem is they just don't want to see this treaty passed. thank goodness senator lugar of indiana has spoken up in favor of this treaty. i said earlier at the press conference and would say here with him on the floor that there weren't a handful of people in america who are as expert as he is on this issue of nuclear arms and the safety of those that currently exist. there was a time when people across america thought his name was senator nunn-lugar because they kept hearing nunn-lugar, nunn-lugar. there was a time when senator sam nunn, a democrat from georgia, and senator lugar, a republican from indiana, really led this nation and this world at taking an honest look at nuclear weapons and make sure

they're safe and don't threaten our future. senator lugar knows, he said as much publicly, that this treaty moves us in the direction of a safer world. during the height of the cold war there were enough nuclear weapons to destroy this planet many times over. thank goodness the soviet union's gone and we're in a new era, a new peaceful era. still 20 years later both russia and the united states have thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, far more than either side needs for maintaining security. in an era of terrorist threats we are faced with new challenges including nuclear armed pakistan, with al qaeda operating within its borders and countries such as iran and north korea pursuing their own nuclear programs. this week we have a chance to make a difference. to reduce the number of russiaian nuclear weapons to make us safer and strengthen america's authority in persuading other nations around

the world to halt their destabilizing practices. senator lugar, i'll quote him said, "start would strengthen our nonproliferation diplomacy worldwide, limit potential arms competition and help us focus our defense resources effectively." what a succinct description of a critically important measure before us. and, yet, day after day, two days now, hour after hour senate republicans come to the floor and say we just don't have time to do this. ef pots to refuse the -- efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons have always been bipartisan in the past, they should be bipartisan today. as they say partisanship should end at the water's edge whether the president's a democrat or a republican. if it's good for america if it makes us safer, if it moves us forward in a goal of a more peaceful world, we should stand together, both parties working on it. but, unfortunately, the opposition we've heard over and

over on the floor has been on the other side. i want to thank senator john kerry. i tell you, this man is a dogged and determined legislator. and he has been working this issue harder than i've ever seen him work anything in my life for the last several weeks to get to this moment where we bring it up on the floor. he understands that last december when the start i treaty expired it left the united states without key inspectors in russia and reduced important security transparency. i'd say to senator kerry, the modern patron saint of the republican party is ronald reagan. and ronald reagan in a few words summarized his view when it came to negotiating, trust but ver fiesm for 3 -- for -- verify. for 376 we've been unable to verify what's been going on in russia with their nuclear weapons. we don't know if they're held

safety. we just don't know. how can we be safety as -- be safe as a nation. this new treaty that president obama will put inspectors on the ground in russia and in the united states to ensure that both sides live up to the treaty obligations. that's essential. and it's something that russian president medvedev called a truly historic event. president obama said at the signing, this is an important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation and for u.s.-russian relations. i couldn't agree with him more. here's the number i was searching for earlier. the senate conducted 21 hearings and briefings on the new start treaty. a significant number of opportunities to debate and assess the opportunity. in september the senate foreign relations committee overp whemmingly approved the treaty on a bipartisan basis. the people supporting this treaty across the board,

democrats and republicans, represent the best minds in america in recent history on the subject. they include current administration officials, secretary of state hillary clinton, secretary of defense robert gates, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff admiral mike mullen as well as mad lynn automobile, henry kissinger, sam nunn, george schultz, and john warner. seven generals and admirals feel the same way. this does not restrict the u.s. when it comes to missile defense. it is very clear that it doesn't. it's been one of the things said, but the people who say it ignore the obvious. it was just several weeks ago when we had a nato meeting on missile defense moving forward to make our nation safer and the russians were engaged in that dialogue. it was a breakthrough, an historic breakthrough. they ignore that when they raise this issue. secretary of defense bob gates

said the new treaty will impose no limits on us when it comes to missile defense. there's a concern as well expressed -- expressed the treaty does nothing to address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons where the russians reportedly outnumber us. i agree it's a serious issue that needs to be addressed especially from a nonproliferation viewpoint. however, this treaty, like the moscow treaty and the original start agreement, deliberately and rightly focuses on strategic nuclear weapons. bipartisanship on issues of national security has been the hallmark of our nation, even in the toughest of times and in the most desperate political circumstances we've come together. for example, in 1992, just after the cold war came to an end, the senate ratified first strategic arms reduction treaty by an overwhelming vote of 93-6. my republican senators who are still here today that were in

attendance for the vote -- senators bond, cochran, grassley, hatch, lugar, mccain, mcconnell and shelby -- all voted in support. 1996 the senate voted 87-4 in support of start ii, including the votes of republican senators bennett, bond, cochran, grassley, gregg, hatch, hutchison, lugar, mccain, mcconnell and snowe. and in 2002, the senate voted 95-0 -- that's right, 95-0 in support of the moscow treaty. 26 of the 27 republicans there at the time are still here today, and they voted in support of that treaty. at the peak of the cold war the stockpile of nuclear weapons held by all nuclear weapons states was 70,000 warheads. 1.6 million times the power of the bomb at hiroshima. we reduced the number of these weapons by more than two-thirds. yet today the combined global

nuclear weapons capability still equal 150,000 of the nuclear bombs used in world war ii. today we have an opportunity to further reduce this threat in a responsible bipartisan way. i don't know when this session will end tonight, but i will say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, you have ample opportunity to debate. you have ample opportunity to offer amendments. time is not a good excuse. we have been in session now this day and yesterday. we started about 3:30. only one amendment has been filed on the republican side. if they truly want to engage us in an important debate about this treaty issue, do you it now. don't put it o. we've got to reach the point where we can verify what is being done in russia to make this a safer nation and to move us to a more peaceful world. madam president, i yield the floor.

mr. chambliss: madam president -- mr. durbin: i ask unanimous consent the senate proceed en bloc to executive calendar 885, 886, 917, 9 35rbgs the knocks be confirms -- the nominations be confirmed en bloc, any statements related to the nominations appear at the appropriate place in the record as if read and the president be immediately notified of the senate's action. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection, so ordered. mr. chambliss: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from georgia. mr. chambliss: i want to speak for a few minutes about the start treaty. before i do, there is another issue that's been debated on this floor and that we'll continue debate on the over the next several days. that is the issue of funding of the federal government. there is an omnibus bill that has been laid out there now that is something that the process that happens here from time to time that is simply not the way

that business ought to be done in this body. and as we move into the debate on the omnibus bill, there are a lot of us who want to see obviously the government remain open and running at full speed. all of us within this body want to make sure that as we do that, that we do it the right way. and, frankly to, run in an omnibus bill at the last minute out here that has thousands of earmarks, some of which folks like me requested months and months and months ago, until two or three days ago had no idea that those requests would be honored are now included in there, and it amounts to billions and billions of dollars. and with the issues that we've got tphourbgs including the election that took place on november 2 where the american people spoke loud and clear about the way washington spends money, this is not the way to do

business. i intend to vote against that omnibus bill, and i'll speak more about that at a later date. but i want to speak for a minute on the start treaty. and i want to start off by commending both senator kerry and senator lieu tkpwarbgs who as the -- senator lugar, as the chairman and ranking member on the foreign relations committee have worked long and hard on this particular measure. this treaty was signed by the president after negotiations were completed back in the spring. by the time we got the text and then the additions to the text, i would say it was probably in, i don't know, april or may or whenever it was. since that time i know both senator kerry and senator lugar have worked very hard, and they have been open for discussion. i've had several discussions with senator lugar about it and have explained my problems with it early on to him, and he's been very receptive. i got another letter from him

today, further explaining some of the issues that are out there. but that is an indication of how complex this issue is. and as a member of the armed services committee and the intelligence committee, i've had the taoubt to have -- opportunity to have any number of briefings. i've been in hearing after hearing. i've been in meeting after meeting with members of the administration as well as outside experts with those who believe it is right as well as those who believe it is wrong. i've been in phone calls. i've traveled abroad to visit with our friends in both france and great britain about what they are doing with respect to their nuclear inventory. and it's not like folks like me have not been working on it and understand the complexities of this treaty and members of the senate that don't serve on foreign relations services or intelligence don't have the

benefit of the stiff briefings that those who -- of the extensive briefings that those who serve on the committee have had are trying to understand the operatives of this treaty also. my concerns have been laid out to senator lugar earlier on in a letter, but i've been very clear in conversations, in hearings and whatnot, including an extensive conversation that i had with my longtime good friend and -- senator sam nunn who along with senator lugar in my mind are the two godfathers of the russia-united states nuclear issue. and the issues that are out there are in the process of being dealt with and resolved but we're not there, in my mind. i can't speak for the other 59 folks here, but i can tell you this, that there are five major issues that i have been concerned with from day one. first of all, this missile

defense and what impact this treaty is going to have on missile defense. and i'll be honest, i expressed concern about that, including in a hearing in the armed services committee when secretary gates, who is an individual that i have such great admiration and respect for, we can have differences of opinion on policy from time to time, but i know where secretary gates stands when it comes to the national security interest of the united states. and in response to a question that i asked him in an armed services hearing, he satisfied me with respect to the missile defense issue. and then, like happens with so many other issues when you have a complex treaty like this, we have comments that are made in portugal in recent weeks about the phase 4 of our missile defense plan that all of a sudden raise another issue, or at least a potential issue that's got to be addressed and has got to be resolved in my mind before i can vote for a

treaty that i want to support. i continue to work through that particular issue, the second issue is the issue of modernization of the weapons in the united states. and we can look ourselves in the eye, members of this body and members of the house, and take part of the blame on this. we have not funded a modernization program for the updating of nuclear weapons of the united states. and now we have called on the administration to make a commitment, and that commitment is going to have to be a financial commitment as well as a policy commitment. and to the credit of the administration, they have worked in a very diligent way, i know with the prodding of senator kerry and senator lugar, to address this issue both from a budgetary standpoint as well as a policy standpoint. and again, it's not just this administration that has to be involved. it's future administrations as

well as future congresses that are going to have to address that issue. and as we decide whether or not to vote for or against this treaty, we've got to satisfy ourselves that future congresses, future administrations are going to do that. and how do you resolve that? i don't yet know. but it's another issue that we have to go through in our minds and satisfy ourselves on the issue of modernization before we can vote for it. thirdly is an issue of verification. this is probably the major issue, at least in my mind, because the senator from illinois just spoke about the fact that we've gone for a tkwraoer or so now without having the opportunity under the treaty that expired in 2009 to have the opportunity to look at what the russians are doing and, likewise, give the russians the opportunity to look at what we're doing. it is important when you have a complex issue like this and an

issue where you have to trust the other side to do certain things that you have the opportunity to verify after you enter into a trusting relationship with them. verification process as set forth in this new start treaty is, frankly, significantly different from the verification process that was in the treaty that just expired. there are reasons why it needed to be different, and i understand that. but there still is an issue relative to do we have the right kind of verification measures in place in this treaty to be able to satisfy our community, both the defense community and the intelligence community, if this treaty gives us everything that we need to have to be sure that the russians are doing what they're supposed to do. and in that vein, one way that we are going about the issue of

making sure that the verification requirements that are set forth in here are adequate is to look at the national intelligence estimate that was put out two months ago, six weeks ago, whenever it was. when it did come out, i sat down and read through it, and it is a rather detailed document that sets forth each of the issues that in the minds of the intelligence community are issues, and those issues are dealt with in an appropriate way. there are still some questions in my mind with the classified portion of this treaty that i've got to be satisfied with. i've started going through the n.i.e. again, and i hope over the weekend looks like we're going to have plenty of hours to sit down with not much going on,

and i'm going to do that. and hopefully i'm going to satisfy myself on the classified portions of this. lastly, what's not in this treaty is just as much of concern to me as what's in the treaty. and that is a total lack of addressing the issue of tactical weapons. i understand because i've asked the question to the state department, to the intelligence community, the defense department about this issue of technical weapons, and their rationale is that look we can't deal with tactical weapons until we get this treaty agreed to and signed and deal with the strategic side. then we deal with the tactical side. well, i don't buy that. i think there was an opportunity that was missed. we, we are dealing with a country here that has fewer strategic weapons than we have. they're going to be huge beneficiaries under this bill from the standpoint of the sheer

numbers. on the other hand, they have hundreds and hundreds and hundreds, perhaps even thousands, because we really don't know, more tactical weapons than what we have. and it's the tactical weapons that bother me just as much as the strategic weapons, because a tactical weapon can be put in a suitcase and delivered to a location that could destroy either something domestically here or u.s. assets somewhere else around the world or people. and so i think the lack of addressing the tactical issue -- tactical weapons issue is -- it is a problem. is it enough to say we shouldn't do this? maybe not. but there are those of us who are really wrestling with the issue and trying to do it in right way because i will have to say that in concluding my eighth year here, i've never had to vote in favor of a treaty that was this complex, this

important, and had this much influence on what's going to happen with respect to the safety and security of our country for my children and my grandchildren. again, i just want to conclude by commending senator kerry and senator lugar and -- and -- and their staffs for a tremendous amount of work here and their openness. we've never asked a question that they have not attempted to respond to. and i'm very hopeful over the next couple of days, a week, whatever we're going to be here if -- if we concluded or if we conclude it next year, that we'll be able to -- to ultimately come together as a body and address this issue in a right and positive with. and, with that, mr. president, i would yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from new hampshire. mrs. shaheen: mr. president, i'm sheer to join my colleagues who believe now is the time to

ratify the new start treaty. the new start treaty is a continuation of a long history of bipartisan arms control cooperation and it is the culmination of president ronald reagan's consistent appeal, as you mentioned in your remarks earlier this afternoon, his appeal to trust but verify. -- verify when we are dealing with russia. at a time when much of america is fed up with this body's inability to work in a bipartisan fashion, i hope that we can still work across the aisle to strengthen america's national security and deal with threat that's posed by nuclear weapons. and i certainly applaud the leadership of senator kerry and senator lugar and the work that they've done on this issue heading to the senate -- heading the senate foreign relations committee. much like previous arm control

treaties, including the old start treaty signed by george h.w. bush and the sort treaty signed by george w. bush -- the new start treaty will reduce the limit of strategic nuclear arms aimed at the united states. the united states and russia will be bound to a lower number of nuclear weapons which will be 30% fewer than the current numbers under the sort treaty. the treaty's new rules allow us to count russia's nuclear weapons more accurately. i think that is a critical piece about whether we can really verify what's going on. these new counting rules give us the ability to more accurately figure out what's happening with russia's nuclear arsenal. new start leaves us the flexibility to determine our own force structure and maintain a robust deterrent capable of

protecting us and our allies. and despite all of the concerns that have been raised, this treaty does nothing -- let me repeat that. this treaty does nothing to constrain our missle defense plans and further it allows for the modernization of our nuclear weapons complex and we've already heard from the three directors of our nuclear labs that they're happy with the commitment that this administration has provided to modernization of our nuclear arsenal. the treaty restores a critical verification regime that was lost when the old start treaty expired. we have gone over a year without important intelligence from these on the ground inspections and this gap hinders our insight into russia's program. much like previous agreements, this treaty deserves broad bipartisan backing in the united states senate. past treaties have benefited

from overwhelming support in this body. the original start treaty was ratified by a vote of 93-6. you can see that right there start ii was ratified 87-4. the sort treaty, negotiated by george w. bush was ratified by a vote of 95-0. as you pointed out. incredible. no opposition to that treaty. new start has earned the backing of an overwhelming number of foreign policy experts and national security officials across a broad political spectrum, both republican and democrat. new start has the unanimous backing of our nation's military and its leadership including secretary gates, the chairman of the joint chiefs, the commander of america's strategic command and the director of the missle defense agency. america's military establishment is joined by the support of

every living secretary of state from secretary jim baker to secretary rice as well as fiefl former secretaries of -- five former secretaries of defense, nine former national security advisers and former presidents clinton and george h.w. bush. i know people can't read this because the writing is so small, but this is the column of former presidents and cabinet rank officials who support new start. look how long that list is. this is the list of those cabinet-ranking officials who oppose it. america's intelligence community also strongly supports the new start treaty. it has now been 376 days since we last had inspection teams on the ground in russia monitoring its nuclear program. every day we go without this critical intelligence is another day that erodes our

understanding of russia's intentions, plans and capabilities. new start gives us on the ground intelligence we currently don't have and for the first time includes a unique identifier system which allows us to better track russia's missles and delivery systems. i heard the senator from georgia expressing his question about whether this gives us the ably we need to verify what russia's doing. well, new start gives us more inspections per facility per year than the old start treaty did. without this critical information, our intelligence community is hindered from an accurate assessment and our military is forced to engage in costly worst-case scenario planning. our nato allies also support new start. as chair of the subcommittee responsible for nato, i am mindful of the defense and security of our nato alliance

members living in eastern europe. and i was pleas at the -- pleased at the recent nato summit all 28 nato allies gave their strong, unanimous support for ratification of the new start treaty. in fact, some of treaty's strongest backers are those countries who are our allies along russia's borders. nato secretary general said and i quote -- "a delay in the ratification of the start treaty would be damaging to security in europe." end quote. finally, ratification of this treaty should be important to those who are concerned with the nuclear threats pos posed by irr north korea or who are worried about the threat posed by terrorists around the world who are seeking a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials. now, i know that some critics look at the new start treaty in

isolation and say that this arms agreement has nothing to do with these proliferation threats. i couldn't disagree more. what does it say to our allies and partners around the globe if we turn our back on a long history of bipartisan support for working with russia to reduce the nuclear threat? delaying ratification of a treaty with so much support from the military, a treaty that is so obviously in our national interest tells the world that we're not serious about the nuclear threat. it says we're not serious about our responsibilities under the nonproliferation treaty. now, i know my colleagues on both sides of the aisle agree that we should do everything in our power to make sure that iran and north korea and a al qaeda o not have nuclear weapons. if we abdicate our position as a leader on nuclear arms control,

then we risk losing the authority to build international consensus in stopping rogue nations and ending nuclear proliferation around the globe. earlier this year brent scowcroft former national security adviser under george h.w. bush, testified to the foreign relations committee that the principal result of nonratification would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into a state of chaos. and that's a direct quote. it is much too dangerous to gamble with nuclear weapons or our national security at a time when we're working with our international partners to press iran and north korea on their nuclear weapons programs. in testimony before the senate foreign relations committee, former defense secretary james schlesinger said, that a failure to ratify this treaty would --

quote -- "have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to particularly the nonproliferation issue." that sentiment was echoed by five former republican secretaries of state in an op-ed written for "the washington post" a couple of weeks ago. you know, i -- one of the arguments we've heard on the floor this afternoon is that we're rushing consideration of this treaty. this is just not true. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i would ask unanimous consent that there not show an interruption with respect to the senator from new hampshire. the presiding officer: does the senator from new hampshire yield the floor? mrs. shaheen: i will. mr. kerry: i ask that the unanimous consent to return to legislative session to 7:00 p.m. with the recognition of the majority leader still in effect. the presiding officer: is there

objection? without objection, so ordered. mrs. shaheen: thank you, senator kerry. i was talking about the concerns that have been raised about rushing this treaty. well, this is just not true. this is an outline that shows how much time has been spent in the past as treaties have come to the floor. the fact is that the united states senate has thoroughly considered the new start agreement. we've had plenty of time to review the treaty. since it was signed in april, the treaty text has been available for everyone to read. it's not changed. we've had over 250 days to ex inthe treaty and ask -- examine the treaty and ask questions. the senate foreign relations committee held 12 hearings on the treaty. and, as you pointed out, there were another nine held by other committees. in contrast, there were only four committee hearings held by the sort treaty and only eight held on start ii.

the foreign relations committee also accomodated some member concerns earlier this year by delaying a vote on the treaty during the august recess and the obama administration has answered over 900 questions for the record on new start. nearly every major foreign policy or national security expert has weighed in on the treaty either in testimony, briefings, or in the press. now, the history of treaties like new start shows that the concern that there isn't enough time on the floor to consider this treaty just does not -- just is not accurate. in general arm control agreements take an average of two to five days of floor time. the original start treaty which was much more complicated and complex and the first of its kind took only five days of floor debate. start ii took two days of floor consideration.

the most recent sort treaty took two days of floor debate. so we've already had almost two days of floor debate. other arms control agreements like the conventional forces in europe treaty and the chemical weapons convention took two days of floor time. we have more than enough time to consider this treaty on the floor. and, finally, some have expressed concerns that the senate should not be forced to work so close to their holiday vacations. well, i think it's important to repeat what retired brigadier john adams said in response to that concern. he said and i quote -- "we have 150,000 u.s. warriors doing their job over christmas and the new year. the u.s. senate should do its job and ratify this treaty." i couldn't agree more with

brigadier general adams. the senate should get its work done. we should at pie the new start treaty -- ratify the new start treaty. we should do it before the holidays, before we go home in this session of congress, it is time to vote on this critical national security concern. thank you very much, mr. president. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. it's a delight to see you in the chair. mr. president, let me just make a brief comment on the last comment from my colleague about the work schedule of the senate, because i've been one of those folks who have decried the fact that we are dual tracking the start treaty and the omnibus appropriations bill here with just a week left before christmas. i do think it's an imposition on our families and our staff that we need to be working during this period of time. i don't think there's anybody in this body that works any harder

than i tkofplt i don't claim to be the -- than i do. i'm no stranger to hard work and i'm happy to be here right up to christmas eve if that's what it takes. but my complaint is that this is a problem that has been brought on by the democratic leadership. all year long we had the opportunity to do a budget. did we ever do a budget? no. all year long we had the opportunity to pass appropriations bills. this is the first time in my memory that the senate never passed a single appropriations bill. not one. so now here we are with a week to go before christmas trying to cram everything into the same short period of time. we have to pass a bill to fund the operations of government which cease on saturday at midnight. we could have done that in the last 300 days of this year, but, no, we wait until the very last minute. we wait until the last minute to do the tax legislation that just passed out of the senate. the house is considering this afternoon. and in addition to that, we're trying to consider the start

treaty. that's the concern that a lot of us have. let me return to where i was earlier today when i was talking about some of the my concerns about the treaty, laying the predicate for some of the amendments which we will have as soon as we are done with our comments, our opening statements about the treaty itself. i had last talked about the modernization program, and senator kerry and i had a brief conversation about that, agreeing that this was a very important part of the ability for the united states to have a credible nuclear deterrent. we were talking about the nuclear weapons part of that. there's a second part of our nuclear deterrent, and that's the delivery vehicles, the missiles, submarines, long-range bombers, cruise missiles, those components of our so-called nuclear triad that enable to us effectively deliver the warheads in the event that that should ever be required. the problem with this part of the modernization prapblg is that we -- package is that we don't have a degree of certainty

that i think we need to have the assurance that moving forward with an even lower number of warheads is a safe thing to do. specifically, we have asked the administration for but not received assurances with respect to the long-range bomber, the icbm, the minuteman 3. let me just mention those two things. with regard to the long-range bomber, we have repeatedly asked will we have a nuclear-capable long-range bomber. that's what the triad is. it could be a penetrating bomber, a bomber that carries cruise missiles that gets to the target. tpwu needs to be nuclear -- but it needs to be nuclear capable. we have no assurance. while everybody in the administration continues to say we believe in our nuclear triad, we must have a nuclear triad, we're not getting any satisfaction on the question

what about the bomber leg of the triad? our current long-ranger bomber cruise missiles are due to be retired in 2025. will there be a followon? again, no reassurance. no funding has been provided in the 1251 plan i spoke of earlier for the replacement of an icbm minuteman 3. here there is very troubling language in the 1251 update on a follow-on assessment study. i'm going to quote what this assessment study will be predicated on. this is for the icbm. it is a study that will -- and i'm quoting -- consider a range of deployment options with the objective of finding a cost effective approach for an icbm follow-on that supports continued reductions in u.s. nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrence, that supports continued reductions in u.s. nuclear weapons. the key dryer i can't here is not to -- the key criteria is

not to carry whatever is necessary. what i'm wondering is whether or not that suggests that the administration might not maintain an icbm capability so that it can pursue further reductions or that the icbm follow-on system will be used -- will be based on plans for reductions. let me just complete this thought. the administration's arms control agenda, my belief, should not be the key factor in determining the level of our icbm capability. i'll make a note here and allow my colleague to interrupt. mr. kerry: i thank the senator very, very much. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, i thank the senator. i thought it would be helpful if we talk about a few of these things as we go along. what i wanted to ask the senator is what he thinks is

inadequate in the resolution ratification, deck hraeurgs 13 -- declaration 13 makes it clear the united states is committed to the replacement of vehicles. the service lines run well past the ten-year life of this treaty. so my question would be, since the d.o.d. is already scheduled study and decision deadlines, time lines for the replacement of all of these systems, so since that's outside of the four corners of the treaty, so to speak, why would the declaration 13 not state that we are commited to proceeding to the full modernization and replacement of the vehicles? mr. kyl: i would be happy to respond to that. let me respond first by quoting two key officials of the obama

administration. secretary gates and undersecretary of defense jim miller. first secretary gates: there are place holders for each of the modernization programs because no decision has been made. they are basically to be decided. along the lines that admiral mullen is just describing those are decisions we're going to have to make over the next few years in terms of we're going to have to modernize these systems and we're going to have to figure out what we can afford. end of quote. deputy undersecretary of defense jim miller -- quote -- "we think the current icbms are extremely stable and stabilizing particularly as we demirv to one warhead each, we're doing that while the russians are mirving which creates more instability. to go on with the quotation. we will look at concepts that would make them even more survivable over time which would allow them to be part of a

reserve force. my point in reading these two quotations is to suggest to my colleague that it is troubling that the administration is not willing to commit to making a decision, is not willing to commit to having a nuclear-capable bomber force, is not willing to say that the icbm force will support the delivery of the warheads required for that leg of the triad but rather will be based on what we can atpaorpbd be based on our -- based on our desire to continue to reduce u.s. nuclear weapons. and that perhaps we are developing them in order to be part of a reserve force. all of this suggests that one quotation that was read by my colleague is a nice statement but doesn't reflect the reality of what the administration is actually planning on. mr. kerry: would the senator yield further? the presiding officer: the

senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: as the senator knows, a legitimate certain amount of analysis has to be made by d.o.d. in order to be able to submit to the congress a plan that's realistic both in cost and judgment about what the size will be. every single testimony from the joint chiefs of staff through secretary gates have all committed to the maintenance of a viable triad. that could not be more clear in this record. mr. kyl: if i may interrupt my colleague who interrupted me. a viable triad at a minimum per se has to include nuclear capability or it's not part of our nuclear triad. right? what i'm saying here is the administration is not assuring us that the long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. so maybe we have a diad now, not a triad. mr. kerry: mr. president, again -- the presiding officer: the

senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: this is really important to understanding where we are here and what the differences are. all of these systems, all three, dodd has scheduled them -- d.o.d. has scheduled them and put out a time line. they have to go through that process. the fact is that they have -- they've stated in the 1251 report that they're going to replace the ohio class submarine when it commences scheduled retirement in 2027. i don't think president obama is going to be there in 2027, unless there's some extraordinary transition in america. that goes way beyond this administration in terms of a decision and in terms of a congress. the navy is going to sustain the existing trident 2 through at least 2042. that's on the books right now, with the robust life extension program, the current minuteman 3 life extension program will keep the fleet in service through 2030, and d.o.d. has already begun the preparatory stories --

studies on replacement options which will begin in 2012. the soon to be completed long-range bomber issue that he just raised is not -- you know, is only on what type of new bomber is needed. not whether or not there will be a new bomber. so we don't -- the future congresses and future administrations are really going to make this decision. and to suggest that somehow the obama administration can right now be held -- have this treaty held accountable, the decisions where every one of those delivery platforms are going to be in existence well beyond the life of any of us in public service any of us here, i think is completely inappropriate standard. i would ask my colleague why a 2027 date and a 2042 date and a 2030 date? and a commitment to a bomber, even though they don't know what kind of bomber, why that is not

satisfactory? mr. kyl: let me answer a question with a question. given the fact that i think we're taking 30-minute segments each and we're having a debate here, can we agree we'll debate until 7:00? you can have half the time and i'll have half the time. either that or i'm going to have to quit yielding. mr. kerry: i appreciate that. i just think it's important to get oufplt i don't need that time, mr. president. i think it's important. i want senator kyl to have his time. i will not interrupt him but i wanted to try to see if we couldn't engage him in what the senate does, which is debate. mr. kyl: this is the kind of engagement we need on this treaty and other issues in this body. too many times there is a senator coming down giving a speech. half of us aren't listening or more. this kind of colloquy can develop more useful material for our colleagues, for the record, i think than anything else. i'm very happy to engage in it. i just want to make sure that i don't run out of my time with my

colleague's questions. here's how it relates and here's the importance. we're being told that even though the delivery systems -- and remember, this treaty deals with warheads and delivery systems. let's least warheads off to the side for a moment. the delivery systems which are the submarine with their missiles, the long-range bombers with cruise missiles in some cases, and our icbm force and the russian counterparts. those delivery systems are constrained in this treaty. the numbers are brought down to 700 deployable systems. so the question we have asked naturally enough is: is that enough? will that work to cover all of the targets that we need to cover? i talked this morning about the fact -- the answer to that question depends in part on what our future plans are. because take the b-52. most of the pilots that are

flying b-52's -- i think the word, two generations beyond the time these b-52's were built. these are aging aircraft. even the b-1's and to some extent the b-2's everybody realized need to be replaced. the decisions to do that need to be soon. whether or not 700 is a good number will depend on whether or not we have an adequate triad to deliver these weapons when the time comes. naturally we asked the question: what is our triad going to look like? it's true that some of these systems, the new systems that replace what we currently have won't be available until outside the treaty. the ten-year limit of the treaty. but it's also true that every one of these take an inordinate amount of time. how they take so much time, i don't know. it seems like in world war ii, you had all kinds of weapon systems come together and be built and fight the war, and it's over in five or six years. but nowadays it takes five or six years just to get something

ready to go. then it takes another five or six years to deploy it. these are weapons systems with long time frames for development and deployment. and it is true that the navy has already made the basic decision for the submarine. i haven't mentioned the navy. that's not my concern. but my concern is the i.b.m. force and the bomber force. i'll leave the point with this. what's troubling to me is on the bomber force, our administration is unwilling to commit that we will have a bomber leg of the triad nuclear capable. well, that's an important decision because if we're talking about 700 delivery vehicles that will not include nuclear-capable bombers, i've got a problem with this. and the reason is because when you get briefed on how we are going to deliver these weapons if, god forbid, they ever to be delivered or how are we going to deal with a potential russian breakout, for example, or how we're going to deal with a problem if, let's say we have an issue with one of our submarine

or icbm components to the triad, if we don't have a bomb-carrying or -- or cruise missile-carrying nuclear capability with our bombers? then it is quite obvious that the viability of our triad is implicated. so we have to know these things. it's not something esoteric question. we're talking about delivery systems being brought down to 700, and is that too low? well, it's not too low if we've got a very viable triad but it becomes too low if our triad is not viable. let me just, because in the time remaining i'll probably only be able to talk about only one subject, let me talk about missile defense. this is something that a lot of my colleagues have talked about. it's kind of the core at the concerns that a lot of us have of the treaty, and, frankly, my ultimate support or not will depend, to some extent, on how we resolve this issue, whether it's by amendment to the preamble to the treaty or in resolution of ratification or a combination of things. but clearly, this treaty

implicates u.s. missile defense and that is wrong. one of the chief achievements of the bush administration was to finally decouple missile defense and strategic offensive weapons and the treaties that deal with strategic offensive weapons. it was somewhat limited in the start treaty, but in the moscow treaty of 2002, or so-called sort treaty, we said we're going to reduce our weapons. if the russians want to do the same, that's fine with us, we don't need a treaty to deal with that. the russians essentially said we want a treaty and we want to you limit your missile defenses. we said no and eventually they were relented and said okay. and i've spoken with secretary reich, i've spoken -- secretary rice, i've spoken with undersecretary fife and others in the administration who count as one of their achievements the fact that we finally decoupled those two issues. well, now in this treaty, they're right back together again and in a way that's enimcal to the development of missile forces to the united

states. that's what i want to focus here. we don't think that there should be any limitations on u.s. missile defense. and yet the new start treaty not only contains specific limitations, though we were told there wouldn't be any, but also it reestablishes this unwise linkage that i talked about in the -- in the preamble. let me just quote three things that under secretary tauscher said as late as march 29 of this year -- quote -- "the treaty something nothing to constrain missile defense. this treaty is about strategic weapons." okay. "there is no limit on what the united states can do with its missile defense systems." third quotation, "there are no constraints to missile defense." end of quote. now, those three statements are not true because it turns out there are limitations and constraints specifically in the treaty. article 5, paragraph 3, specifically constrains a particular kind of missile defense, the united states using

a strategic offensive silo, for example, to use for defense. we've done that before. our current plans are not to do it again because it's expensive. we might not do it in the future. this administration says it doesn't want to. but it's certainly constraining. how can you say that those three statements by under secretary tauscher are true? they're false. the administration simply says, well, yes, there are limits but we don't intend to do that anyway so it's kind of a theoretical limit. well, in the first place, why is there a limitation on any missile defense capability in this treaty? we thought this was about, as secretary tauscher, about strategic weapons. well, it turns out that the russians, of course, want to make it also about missile defense. one way they make it about missile defense is by article 5, section 3 -- or paragraph 3, specifically constraining a particular way that we would develop missile defense. that is what we object to here,

that relinkage. why is that important? because the russians have always wanted to limit u.s. missile defenses and this now gets the foot in the door for them to argue that under the tre treaty, they would have a right to withdraw if we improve our missile defensesmen defenses --e defenses. that gets to the real issue here and that's the preamble to the treaty. i want to quote from richard pearl and ed middle east, both m served in the reagan administration. and he was with president reagan at reykjavik, a seminole moment in arms control history and for the reagan administration, a time when president reagan decided that missile defenses for the united states were so important that he would walk away from a major strategic offensive weapon proposal that had been made to him by president gorbachev. here's what they write. "with this unfortunate paragraph, new start returns to the old cold war balance of terror and assumes that attempts

to defend the u.s. and its allies with missile defenses against strategic attack are threatening to russia and thus destabilizing. limiting missile defenses to preserve u.s. as a rule noacialt russian strategic nuclear strikes, as defined by the russians, will result in less effective defenses against any and all countries, including iran and north korea." end of quote. that's the problem. now, how does that proob rise? -- problem arise? because of the language in the preamble. this is the language followed by two signing statements from russia and the united states that define the intentions of the two countries with respect to this issue of missile defense. and here's what the preamble states. quote -- "the current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the parties." that's what it says, in part. current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic arms of the parties. current. now, that's new language.

that was not in the start i treaty. so what they're doing is defining the current systems. and why is that important? because later, they talk about any addition as that would qualitatively or quantitatively improve our system would allow the russians to withdraw. here's what -- what -- well, let me just make one point before i quote that. the administration says that the preamble is not important because you can always walk away from a treaty. and even though the russians say this preamble language gives them the right to walk away from the treaty, the they can do it anyway so what's the big deal? well, you can't just do it on a whim. we agree that if there is a -- is a matter that is so important to either country that it constitutes an exceptional circumstance, referred to in article 14, which is the withdrawal clause, then a party can withdraw. so, yes, it's true that either party can define anything as an exceptional circumstance and, therefore, withdraw.

but that's bad faith and it clearly is something that would be very difficult for a country to do. unless a country had built into the treaty the very excuse that they are talking about as grounds for leaving the treaty. and what would that extraordinary event be? well, it would be the improvement of u.s. missile defense systems. here's what foreign minister lavarof said on march 28 -- quote -- "the treaty and all its obligations contained are involved only within the context of levels which are now present in the sphere of strategic defensive systems." that's their position. that's their legal position. that's what they mean by "current." in the preamble. and the reason that legal opinion is important is because the united states does intend, if you believe secretary gates -- and i certainly do -- does intend to develop missile defense capabilities that could qualitatively advance our

protection against a missile coming from russia. it's not necessarily designed for that purpose. it may be designed to thwart an icbm from iran or from north korea but it has that capability. and the russians can easily define it as such. here's the russian legal opini opinion. quote -- "the treaty between the russian federation and the united states of america on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, signed in prague on april 8, 2010, can operate and be viable only if the united states of america refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitativel qualitatively." end of quote. well, we will develop our missile defense capabilities quantitatively and certainly qualitatively. that's what the phased adaptive approach that secretary gates has announced is all about, a qualitative improvement of our

missile defense capabilities. and so how would the russians treat that? their statement, their signing statement, signed at the time that the treaty was signed, says that the exceptional circumstances referred to in article 14, the withdrawal clause of a treaty, include increasing the capabilities of the united states of america's missile defense system. in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the russian federation. that's why this preamble is so important. they treat it as the legal basis for their withdrawal if we improve our missile defenses qualitatively, which we most certainly will, and potentially quantitatively. they've, therefore, built this into the record. and from my point of view, and a lot of my colleagues, this can only be read as an attempt to exert political pressure on the united states to forestall continued development and employment -- deployment of our missile defenses. and there's evidence that it's already worked. first of all, we have pulled back from the deployment of the

ground-based interceptor system that the bush administration had developed and was prepared to deploy in poland with the radars associated in czechoslovakia. and we have also said now that with respect to our nato deployment of the so-called phased adaptive approach, the first three phases will be deployed but the fourth phase, the one that is most effective against an icbm coming from long range, which could include a country like russia, is available, not deployed but available. by 2020. instead of having a firm rebuttal in response to what the russians said in the preamble and in their signing statement accompanying the preamble -- the signing of the treaty, what was our response? it was not a firm rebuttal. we didn't say, "no, that is not correct. that's not our understanding." that's not what we did, even though we had done that, by the way, with the start i treaty.

we pushed back very firmly on the russian signing statement. but instead, the state department response to the russian unilateral statement reads as follows -- and i quote -- "the united states of america takes note of 9 statemenof thestatement on missy the russian federation. the united states missile defense systems are not intended to defect the strategic defense balance with russia. the united states missile defense systems would be employed to defend the united states against limited missile launches and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners against regional threats. the united states intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions." end of quote. in other words, don't worry, russia, we're not going to develop missile defenses that could thwart your strategic offensive capabilities. we're only developing forces --

missile defenses that would be effective against regional threats, against limited missile launches, against limited atta attack. so it appears to me that while the russians have built into this treaty and into the preamble the perfect argument for withdrawal, and they've already said it constitutes exceptional circumstances under their interpretation of article 14, the united states has not responded with a negative but, rather, with a statement that says, don't worry. mr. president, might i inquire, is the original 30 minutes which this side was allotted consumed? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona, there is no time limitation right now because we have no one following, so you're more than -- mr. kyl: met m kyl: let me do ti do see senator casey on the floor and i -- senator kerry may have something more to say. let me try to sum up what i'm saying about missile defense, though there is much more to talk about here and this will very definitely be 9 subject

of -- be the subject of maybe even the first amendment that is offered on our side. this cannot -- this cannot -- well, i think we need to -- because there's been such a cavalier attitude about this on the other side, we don't need any amendments, we don't need to worry about missile defenses, this is serious business. you would never enter into a contract by a car -- to buy a car or to buy a house, for example, with the degree of uncertainty or disagreement between the parties as to what the terms mean, as you would -- i mean, think about this treaty. this is a very serious proposition that starts with a fundamental disagreement between the parties and clearly could create enormous complications in our relationships in the future. mr. kerry: mr. president? mr. kyl: if i could just finish this point. instead of creating a more stable relationship, a relationship built on the reset, a relationship which is built on very clear, transparent views of things on how we're moving forward together built into this

treaty is an inherent conflict that can cause nothing but trouble in the future. unless the unite united states s fine, we won't develop any missile defenses that could conceivably be effective against russia, which then means that they couldn't be effective against an icbm from iran or an icbm from korea. this is the dilemma that's presented by this treaty and its preamble terms. this is what causes us such great concern. and i'd be happy at this point to yield to my colleague and if he'd like to engage in a colloquy on this, that would be fine. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i thank the senator from arizona. i want to take a moment, though, to address this point that he's made. because i think it really is central and then we can talk about it and i certainly want to give senator casey an opportunity here. but let me just say to my colleague from arizona,

mr. president, a lot of us are sort of scratching our heads and trying to figure out what we have to do to get the senator from arizona to accept yes for an answer. yes on modernization. yes on our willingness to go forward and build a missle defense. it has been said again and again and again by the highest officials of our government and the president, i think, will make some further statement about this hopefully in the next hours or day that can indicate the absolute total commitment to proceed forward and the irrelevance of what the senator is referring to in the context of -- of a statement that is not within the four corners of the agreement that has no legal binding authority at all. none. now, don't accept my word for

it. secretary of defense, robert gates, who i know the senator respects enormously said the following on may 25 -- quote -- "so you know the russians can say what they want, but as secretary clinton said, these unilateral statements are totally outside the treaty and they have no standing. they're not binding. they never have been." that's one statement. lieutenant general patrick o'reilly is the director of our missle defense agency. he testified on june 16th -- quote -- "this is yes i have briefed the russian officials in moscow, a rather large group of them in october of 2009. i went through all four phases of the phased adaptive approach, especially phase iv." i'm quoting. "while the missles we have

selected as the provide a defense for a regional type threat, they are not the size to reach strategic missle fields. it is a very verifiable property of these missles given their size. he says,s it was not a controversial topic the fact that a missle, given the size of the payload, could not reach their strategic fields. i have briefed the russians personally in moscow on every aspect of our missle defense development. i believe they understand what it is. and those plans for vecht are not limited by -- for development are not limited by this treaty. so in the treaty rat indicationn resolution, here i'm going to make the senator from arizona happy, but i'm also not going to please him. the happy part, if you want to be purely technical, if you want to be literal as to a technical writing of some particular

thing, can you say that article 5 has a limitation on strategic defense? yes, in the most limited technical way you can say there is a limitation. the limitation is that we can't take intercontinental missle silos other than the ones grandfathered, we're not going to take the new ones and convert them into an intercepter missle silo. in that sense we've limited something, but have we limited missle defense as we think about it in its larger strategic concept? and the answer is, no, not one iota we haven't limited it. why? because those particular silos cost more money and in a deficit curbus age where we're -- conscious age where we're trying to cut spending, it is a heck of

a lot smarter to dig a new hole, build a new silo that's more effective, that's more efficient, that's less costly and does the same thing and that's our plan. so there's no limitation on the ability to actually deploy missle defense. so if we want to play a technical game here on the floor and run around and say, oh, there's a limitation here, it's just terrible, you can do that. but it doesn't make sense. it doesn't actual limit the plans of this administration to go forward with real missle defense and with a system that allows us to intercept missles fired from a silo in the missle field in the united states. what's more, if you do convert those other silos, we don't have a mechanism for determining what kind of missle is coming out of there is it an icbm or is it an interceptor? and what happens if we're firing one of those mitches to intercept -- missles to intercept a rogue missle from

korea and the russians misinterpret it and they don't know what it is. there's no plan -- there's nothing that says that we can do that. so, in fact, we're safer given the way the administration has decided to deploy this. here's what the resolution of ratification says -- it says -- this is understanding number one, missle defense, this is what we will vote on: it is the understanding of the united states that the new start treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missle defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 of article 5 i that just referred to about the silos that we don't want to do anyway, that cost the american people portion that make us less -- more, that make us less safe. we don't want that do that. that's in there. that's all that's in there. it goes on to say this provision shall not apply to icbm

launchers converted prior to the signature of the treaty. it goes on, any additional new start treaty limitation on missle defense, beyond the one i just talked about, including any limitations that come out of the bilateral consullive commission, those would require an amendment to the new start treaty which could only enter into force with the advice and consent of the united states senate. that's it. we have control over whatever might happen beyond that one simple silo issue. so i would respectfully suggest we ought to listen to the folks who are telling us what they've accomplished here. secretary of defense, so from the very beginning of this process more than 40 years ago the russians have hated missle defense. it's because we can afford it and they can't and we're going to be able to build a good one

and are building a good one and they probably aren't. and they don't want to devote the resources to it and so they try to stop us through political means. this treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. that's what secretary gates said. those are his words. this treaty doesn't accomplish it. so, you know, i believe, senator -- i believe the secretary of defense. i believe general patrick o'reilly who, you know, serves our country one purpose. he's not a member of a party. he's not here for politics. he believes he's defending the nation. he believes he told the russians in full, we're doing things in full. and secretary clinton said that the obama administration has consistently informed russia that while we have a framework, the united states cannot agree to constrain or limit ucbm

ability operationally, geographically or in other ways. i don't know how much more yes, you can have in -- in statements. now, with respect to -- one last thing. with respect to the senator's comment about how they can withdraw. mr. president, they can withdraw for any reason they want at any point in time just by noticing us that they're going to do that. and guess what? so can we. so can we. both parties have the right to withdraw. so this isn't some new component that they could withdraw from. it -- you know, the point i would make to my colleague is and he's very intelligent and knows these issues very, very well. the senator from arizona knows that you can't unilaterally get another country to change its perception of how they may feel threatened. that's what drove the arms race

for 50 years. if the united states of america has an ability to knock down their missles that they think defend themselves and all of a sudden they no longer believe those missles defend them because we can knock them down, what do you think they're going to do? they're going to sit there and scratch their heads and say, wow, we ought to deliver them -- we ought to develop some method to guarantee that they can't knock them down or we've got enough of them so we can overwhelm whatever system they have that knocks them down. we went through this with president reagan. we spent billions trying to pursue this. we understand this. and the fact is they're just stating a truism. those aren't my words. those are dr. henry kissinger's words who simply said all the preamble does is acknowledge they believe there's a connection. we've stated simultaneously we don't care if you believe there's a connection. we've stated that. secretary clinton stated it,

secretary gates has stated it and the president has said, we're going forward with our phase iv. now, it's not connected. there's no legal binding qeks whatsoever -- binding connection whatsoever in this treaty, this does not restrain america's ability to have a robust superior system. if we do, we're going to make a decision when we deploy it to accept whatever consequences come with whatever shape, form we do deploy. but there's no restraint on our ability to do . it and, in fact, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle ought to be leaping at this opportunity because it, in effect, codifies america's intent and codifies our independence and capacity to go off and do what we're going to do. so i wish i could get the senator from arizona to accept yes for an answer. mr. kyl: first of all, there are a lot of colleagues on my side of the aisle.

so there's not just a matter of satisfying jon kyl. i'd be happy to take yes for an answer if that were the answer. first ofle all, the preamble has been agreed to by both parties. this is not just a russian statement of intent. the preamble is part of the treaty that we have agreed to and for the first time it connects missle defense by saying that the current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the strategic defense of the parties. my colleague says secondly it's only a technical argument that the treaty con strains missle defenses. it's more than a technical argument because it specifically does and there was no place in this treaty for any limitation on missle defenses, however -- however important or unimportant they are. why -- let me finish my point. why would the russians insist on putting that in there except to establish the -- the point that,

yes, a strategic arms control treaty will deal also with missle defense. it does. and the preamble does as well by linking the two. and why is this important? there is not a technical statement in the treaty that says the united states will limit its missle defenses. that's true. but because the russians interpret the extraordinary events, that's the technical term under article 4 that would permit a country to withdraw as specifically including the u.s. development of missle defenses that are qualitatively better than we have now. better than current policy. because that's interpretation, that's their interpretation, whether we agree with that interpretation or not, we have created a dichotomy between the two parties to a very important contract here. they interpret it one way, we interpret it another. and so what will the inevitable result be? disagreement between our two countries about a very fundamental point, one which according to the russians will require them to engage in a new

round of the arms race will begin according to president medvedev. so they're saying if you don't agree with us, then we're going to engage in another round of strategic offense weapon building and what we on our side are concerned about is that president obama, who has already backed off the deployment of a g.b.i. system, which was the most robust american missle defense system and has qualified, it appears, the deployment of the fourth phase of the phased adaptive approach, and whose -- who other people in the administration speak in -- in terms that suggest that our -- specifically talking about the state department suggest that we will only develop a missle defense against limited or regional threats. those are all reasons to believe this position of the russians is already working to cause the united states to back away from what would have otherwise been a much more robust development of missle defense to protect the

people of the united states. so that's the argument we're making. we can say that technically anybody can withdraw from the treaty and the preamble doesn't mean anything and so on it appears to have a significant meaning within this administration is the point we're trying to make. mr. kerry: mr. president, i want the senator from pennsylvania to have his chance and we're running out of time. i disagree with the senator with respect to the judgment he has made with what it does or doesn't do and we'll have an opportunity to be able to further discuss that component of it. let me just remind the senator what -- what secretary gates said this may. he said you under the last administration as well as this one, it's been the united states policy not to build a missile defense that would wren tker use -- render useless russia's ph-fld capabilities. he went on to talk about the expense and capacity we have today. we're going to continue to develop whatever the best system

is that we're able to develop that could protect the united states of america. we support that. the administration could not be more clear in its determination to continue to do that, including phase 4. i will submit when we get time and come back here further statements and further clarification to the senator that hopefully can give him a comfort level that there is no dichotomy that, we are proceeding forward. the russians understand what we're doing. we should not misinterpret. preambles have historically incorporated statements that one side or the other need for domestic consumption for politics. there is no misinterpretation here about where we're headed, what we're committed to do. and i would think that the recent announcement by the administration in lisbon and the embrace of this effort through the european countries, our allies, would be strong testimony to the direction that we're moving on with respect to

this missile defense. we will continue this. i look forward to do that with my colleague. i thank him for his courtesy. i look forward to further discussion. i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania. mr. casey: thank you, mr. president. i'm grateful for the work that our chairman, chairman kerry put into this treaty over many, many months now, in fact many years when you consider his work as a member and now chair of the foreign relations committee. we're grateful for the debate that we've just heard because these are critically important issues that we're talking about here. and that's one of the reasons why it's critically important that we make sure that the american people know what the stakes are. without ratification of this treaty, we are in fact less safe than we should be. i think the american people understand that. i also believe that the american people want to make sure that even upon ratification of this

start treaty, the new start treaty, that in no way will our security be undermined as it relates to our nuclear arsenal. we can say without qualification, without hesitation that ratification of the new start treaty doesn't in any way undermine the safety, security and effectiveness and even reliability of our nuclear arsenal. so these are critically important issues. we know that there's been, have a side debate about time and timing. we know that in addition to all of the living secretaries of state who have supported ratification -- former president george herbert walker bush, secretary of state gates, admiral mullen, our leading national security team, but also i think the american people want to tell us in a very direct way that we're going to continue to work up to and through the

holidays if that's necessary. because i think a lot of americans agree with what brigadier general john adams recently said -- and i quote -- "we have 150,000 united states warriors doing their job over christmas and the new year. the u.s. senate should do its job and ratify this treaty." that's not a comment by a public official. that's from brigadier general john adams. we know that this debate and we know that this similar treaties in the past have been overwhelmingly bipartisan. i think when we finally get to the vote, this will be as well, and there's evidence of that both in the foreign relations committee and the committee i'm proud to be a member of, working with chairman kerry on this treaty ratification and the work that was done in the committee. but also we're seeing a lot of bipartisanship as well here in the senate when we're discussing

the eventual ratification. i wanted to talk about two issues, maybe three. but, first of all, ratification as it relates to verification. i think in our own lives, no matter who we are, when we're making an important decision and we're reaching conclusions, we want proof. we want information that's conclusive so that we can make important decisions in our own lives. and the same is true, and certainly even more urgent when we're talking about nuclear weapons. when we talk about a treaty that we're working to ratify, we're talking about a couple of basic issues. one of them is ratification -- one of them is verification. what does that mean? it means that, for example, the american people hope that we have in place -- and they know that we will upon ratification -- verification and tracking system that will give us that assurance, that will allow us to be secure in the knowledge that we're going to be able to do everything humanly

possible to verify. the treaty contemplates a couple of ways to do that, four or five that i'll mention. first of all, invasive on-site inspections, just like it would in any situation in your own life. you want to make sure you can be on site. the problem right now is that we've gone all these months and all this time without verification in place. so we want to have boots on the ground, experts trained to verify what is the situation when they're reviewing the russian nuclear weapons. second, it allows to us use our technology, the wonders of american technology to help on this, the so-called national technical means. third, what is referred to as a unique identifier placed on each weapon so that you can track each weapon because of that

identifier. and that's a critically important part about this. the data exchanges between our two countries and certainly the prompt notification of movement of weapons. this treaty permits up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections each year to determine the accuracy of russia's data and to verify compliance. we'll talk more about that later. but of course when the american people talk to us and expect us to get this right, they want to make sure that there's a very strong verification structure in place as we go forward. without ratification, we won't have that verification in place. and i think a lot of people in the country expect us to ratify for that reason alone in addition to the other reason. we had a good debate here today about missile defense, the

second issue i'll address because i know we're short on time. our committee, the senate foreign relations committee, made it absolutely clear in the resolution of ratification of the treaty that the treaty itself would not, would not constrain missile defense. two understandings within that, both understandings number one and number two, as well as declarations number one and number two specifically address and reiterate the united states commitment to developing and deploying missile defenses. nothing in this treaty will prevent us from having a safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal and nothing will constrain our ability to have missile defense. tph-fbg, as chairman -- in fact, as chairman kerry noted, and it is important to repeat this, the committee's resolution, the resolution that got the treaty to this floor, goes to great lengths to reaffirm and further clarify the treaty's preamble

and russia's unilateral statement imposes no limits on our ability to develop and deploy these missile defenses. i would note also in connection with missile defense that our military and civilian leaders, ones who have studied the treaty, who have vast experience with national security and in fact experience with nuclear weapons treaties from the past, all of those leaders have stated that neither the language in the preamble referencing any interrelationship between strategic, offensive and defensive forces, nor this unilateral statement by the russians place legally binding obligations on the united states. in fact, that summary really of their position appeared in the

"wall street journal" on april 20 of 2010. so that's not just a -- not just a statement by people on this floor. it's cited in the "wall street journal." i think when you step back from this on a number of questions, especially on missile defense, in order to reach the conclusion that some have reached, the determination that they made against the treaty, i guess, on missile defense grounds alone, you'd have to conclude that i think it's a logical conclusion that secretary gates doesn't seem to be too concerned about missile defense. but apparently erbgs and he's spoken to this. you would have to conclude that admiral mullen who has said that we should ratify this, you'd have to conclude that admiral mullen hasn't made a determination about missile defense. i think he has. i think that's why we can rely

upon that support. certainly missile defense agency director lieutenant general patrick o'riley as well, someone whose job it is to be concerned about and someone who has experience with an involvement in what missile defense really means, what it means to our security. so i think there's ample evidence and ample testimony on the record before our committee and otherwise that indicates that in no way does this treaty constrain our ability to develop and deploy missile defense. so, mr. president, i know we're short on time and i'll wrap up. i'll have more to say as we go forward. when you consider the implication for our security that this treaty involves but also, i think, in a larger sense maybe in terms of how people view this debate in washington, there are a lot of people that are concerned about our economy. they're concerned about their own job. they're concerned about their own family's economic or

financial security. that's a chief source of anxiety. i think they also worry about our national defense. they're worried about terrorism. they're worried about attacks. they're worried about national security and their own security. we need to give them assurances that at least as it relates to nuclear weapons pointed at the american people, that we're taking a significant step here, really an historic step that will ensure that we have both a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal to go at any nation that would cause us harm but at the same time we're taking steps to reduce nuclear weapons across the world to make us in fact safer. we all believe this. both sides of the aisle believe this, that we want a strong national defense and that we want to be safe. what we have to do in the next couple of days, after thousands

of, almost 1,000 questions asked and answered to the administration, after 15 or so hearings just in the foreign relations committee, months and months of debate, months and months of testimony, after all of that what we have to do is complete our work, ratify this treaty, give the american people some peace of mind in this holiday season that our defense is strong, that our nuclear arsenal is strong and that we can come together and ratify a treaty that's been endorsed across the board by experts in national defense, people who care deeply about our security. with that, mr. president, i would yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i think we've had a good opportunity over today and yesterday to open up some of the issues and give colleagues a

sense of sort of what is in the treaty, resolution of ratification and how it addresses many of their concerns. my hope is that perhaps as we go out of executive session into legislative session for a period of time, that will give some of us an opportunity to sit down, work together, see if we can find some of the clarifications that might resolve some of those issues for people. senator lugar and i are both prepared to sit with our colleagues and try to do that, and obviously we look forward to being able to get back to begin the process of legislating on whatever understandings, declarations, clarifications senators may have. i would ask my colleagues to carefully read the resolution and look at the many places in which rail mobile, missile defense, all of these other issues have been addressed by that resolution.

i see the hour of 7:00 has arrived, and i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

quorum call:

quorum call:

mr. reid: mr. president? mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: i ask the call of the quorum be terminated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: mr. president, we were under the -- members on both sides anticipated tonight my filing cloture on the spending bill that would take us through next year.

everyone knows we're operating under a continuing resolution now that expires saturday night. midnight. senator inouye has worked so very, very hard for the entire year, working on a bipartisan agreement and a bipartisan -- in a bipartisan manner to put together a bill that will responsibly fund our government for the next fiscal year. he hasn't done this as king. he's done it working with democrats and republicans. senator cochran has been in all the efforts that senator inouye has made. the product was filed a few days ago. the overall spending level on that bill was suspected by 40 republicans earlier this year. in addition, the bill contains priorities for members, democrats and republicans. and though some of my republican colleagues in recent days have publicly distanced themselves from the idea that members have a role to play in the appropriations process, nearly

all of them did nothing privately to withdraw their priorities from this bill. now, mr. president, i'm not going to take a long time tonight but i am going to say a few things about this. it's no surprise, because i've said it before, i, like everyone here, support the constitution of the united states. i don't carry this with me every day but nearly every day. i don't read it every day but i have a pretty good idea of what's in it. and one of the things that i understand and support is the founding fathers decided that we should have a unique form of government, with three separate and equal branches of governme government. and i believe, as one of the legislators here in the framework of government set up by the founding fathers, that i have a number of responsibilities. but one of those responsibilities set forth in that constitution is to make sure that the executive branch of government does not take

power away from us. three separate and equal branches of government. not three branches of government with one stronger than the other. and i think my republican friends are giving up so much to the executive branch of government in doing away with congressionally directed spending. now, mr. president, i would say this. it wouldn't matter if george bush i, george bush ii, jimmy carter, ronald reagan, president clinton or barack obama were president. i don't like this grab of power and that's what it is. and i don't know why people in this branch of government are willing to give that power up. this bill, put together by senator inouye and senator cochran, is a good bill, important piece of legislation for our country. it has priorities that are so

vitally important to children. 300,000 children in america as a result of the action that is going to be taken here and our not moving forward on this are going to be treated much differently. the head start program has been proven, mr. president, to be something that's vital to our country. 300,000 children will not be eligible for head start because of this. programs in our schools will be much less than they should be. senior citizens are going to be significantly harmed. we have in this legislation programs that will create jobs, jobs through developing infrastructure that is so desperately needed in our country. this action taken by my friends on the other side of the aisle is going to cause people to lose their jobs.

military construction -- i have important bases that are vital to the security of this nation in nevada. they're all going to be damaged as a result of what's happened here. now, one reason i feel so -- put upon is probably a word that people don't much care whether i'm put upon or not, but i've really tried to make this something that was good for the congress. and i was elated that one of my republican friends said here's who's going to support you, here's who's going to support you, up to nine. nine. and i've talked to -- i talked to a number of those senators -- i'm not going to identify. i know -- i have it right here. i know every one of them and i won't tonight or any time ever publicly say anything about who they are but they know who they are. and in the last 24 hours, they've walked away from the -- the ability for us to complete this legislation.

i was told within the last 24 hours that we had bipartisan support to pass this bill. many told -- i shouldn't say that, many is a word that's too long, but a number of republican senators told me that they'd like to see it pass and they couldn't vote for it. so those nine senators -- i've called some of them tonight and visited with them. they're not going to support this legislation. we now have a simple choice. are we going to help people in america? i've listed some of the people that desperately need this help. and that appear -- the answer appears that it's going to be a "no." or we will wind up passing a short-term c.r. to keep government running. and in reality, we only have one

choice and that's a short-term c.r. i ask my friend, senator mcconnell, if i should file cloture on the c.r. that we got from the house, and he said no. then one thing about senator mcconnell i found that he levels with me on issues and there's no need to go through that procedure. it's not worth it to anybody if we're not going to have the votes on that. so in the next 24 hours or so, senator mcconnell and i will work to try to come up with a c.r. to fund the government for a certain period of time. that's where we are right now. i'm sorry and disappointed that we don't have -- mr. mcconnell: mr. president, i have to say to my friend, may i make a few observations about where we are? mr. reid: yes, and i would also say this to everyone. i'm going to file cloture tonight on the dream act. we'll have a cloture vote on that saturday morning fairly early. we're going to have a cloture vote tonight on don't ask, don't tell -- not a cloture vote. i'm going to file cloture on it

tonight. so those will be sequenced for saturday or whenever we get to them. but we've got to move this alo along. following that, the -- i was told by a number of republican senators that they needed six or seven days to debate and offer amendments on the start treaty. that will certainly be availab available. we'll finish, i think if the math works out the way that i believe it will, early monday morning -- that early monday morning. first of all, tomorrow we can debate start to everyone's heart's content, offer as many amendments as you want. and then monday we can go to that again. remember, this would -- this would have been three days already completed on that. and work whatever -- three or four days, whatever people feel's appropriate next week to complete the start treaty. and we would wind this up by -- taking care of the nominations that senator mcconnell and i have been working on. so that's the range of things that we have to do. i've told the people -- the two

senators from new york that we'll have -- i'll move to reconsider their vote at some time but that's -- that can happen fairly quickly. mr. mcconnell: mr. president? the presiding officer: the republican leader. mr. mcconnell: let me respond briefly to the majority leader. i, too, want to commend the members of the appropriation committees for all the work they've done, particularly the republican members of the appropriations committee who did spend an enormous amount of time crafting and developing the 12 different appropriation bills that we should have been acting on all year long. this is the first time in modern history -- the first time in modern history -- that not a single appropriation bill went across the floor of the senate. not a one. and so the appropriations committee members on a bipartisan basis did, indeed, do their job. the problem was the full senate didn't do its job. and so what we ended up with,

mr. president, was this, this almost 2,000-page omnibus appropriation bill which we only got, it was yesterday? yesterday. and so the point here is the work that the appropriations committee did in many respects was squandered because the full senate didn't do its job. and this is precisely the kind of thing the american people have gotten tired of. and so i think the message we ought to take out of this is that next year we're going to listen to the american penal, we're going to do our work, do it in a timely fashion. there's no more basic work than the funding of the government. that's the basic thing. here we are trying to do it

right at the end, as an old congress goes out of office and a new congress comes in. so the message is, let's don't do this anymore. let's make a bipartisan decision at the beginning of the next session that the basic work of government is going to be done in a timely fashion, where an opportunity out here on the floor of the senate for members of both parties to offer amendments, make suggestions and improve the bill. and so i, too, respect the work that the appropriations committee has done. i don't agree with the priorities we've had here in the senate about what things are important. and as a result of not doing the basic work of government, here we are at the end struggling with this issue. now, there's only one reason why cloture is not being filed and the majority leader, to his credit's, already said it -- he doesn't have the votes. and the reason he doesn't have the votes is because members on this side of the aisle increasingly felt concerned

about the way we do business. and for many of our members, it was not so much the substance of the bill but the process. and so let's learn from this. we will get together, as the majority leader said, and determine what appropriate time for a continuing resolution makes sense to operate the government on an interim basis and let's come back here after the holidays with a renewed desire to do our business in a timely fashion and avoid this kind of thing in the future. mr. president, i yield the flo floor. the presiding officer: the majority leader the mr. reid: yes, thank you very much. mr. president, -- the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: yes, thank you very much. mr. president, it really doesn't take a person with a ph.d. to understand that my dear friend, the senior senator from kentucky, has said things that really don't indicate what his is in the senate. we have been facing 87

filibusters this congress. 87. and so for anyone to suggest that the reason that the work of senator inouye and cochran was not completed is because we -- excuse me -- we didn't do the appropriation bills is far-fetched. mr. president, senator inouye and cochran in good faith worked toward what they were told that the democrats and republicans wanted to do; that is, have a bill that took in the priorities of democrats and republicans. mr. mcconnell: would my good friend yield for a question? mr. reid: the bill before -- the bill that we were talking isn't a bill that's a democratic bill. its a democrat and i can a republican bill. mr. mcconnell: would my good friend yield for a question? mr. durbin: i would like to ask the majority leader, does he recall the time when i returned from the appropriations committee and said that senator mcconnell had come to the committee and said that he was going to establish the maximum amount that he would vote for in

all the appropriation bills, the 302-b allocation of $1.10 $1.108 trillion? and i said to the majority leader, i think ultimately that's what we're going to be voting for is senator mcconnell's number? and is the senator from nevada aware of the fact that the bill that we were going to consider was at that number that was asked for by senator mcconnell in the appropriations committee? mr. reid: yes. and it satisfied, i say to my friend from illinois, it satisfied what we had debated here on a number of occasions and voted on, it was the so-called sessions-mccaskill number. so we did that. this is not -- this is not a big balloon that we just threw up to see how it would work out. we -- senator mcconnell, who has had a long-standing association with the appropriations committee, that was a number that he told us we should work with. mr. durbin: would the senator yield for one further question? mr. reid: i would be happy to. mr. durbin: as a former member of the appropriations committee -- mr. durbin: through the chair,

i'd ask the majority leader, as a former member of the appropriations committee, are you aware of the process in that committee, a bipartisan process, where the ranking republican member and the democratic chairman of each subcommittee sit down to literally have a hearing, mark up a bill, accept earmarks from both sides of the aisle? that is the common practice and has been followed with the bills that are currently sitting in front of the minority leader? mr. reid: yeah. to senator cochran's credit, there were things that he thought shouldn't be in the bill that senator inouye was putting together. senator inouye, to his credit, said, okay, doesn't go in. everything that people wanted in this bill, in addition to the work that went on on the subcommittee level, the full committee level, anything that was added at a later time had to be approved by both senator. mr. durbin: on a bipartisan basis. mr. reid: that's right. mr. durbin durbin: in every subcommittee. mr. reid: yes. and things what senator cochran did not want in, senator inouye, being the gentleman that he is,

said okay, that's what i'll tell my caucus. mrs. more ray: will the senator yield for a question? mr. reid: yes. mrs. murray: the senator will yield for a question. the presiding officer: the senator from washington. mrs. murray: i would ask if he is aware if the bill before us that we do not have enough votes for, has gone through a long committee process, the transportation and housing bill that i worked with, i worked with my republican colleague, i didn't agree with all of his requests, but i gave him a lot in this bill. we worked our way through it and passed it out of subcommittee. passed it out of full committee. a commit that the minority leader is a member of. all of the bills that are involved in this omnibus bill, every one of them went through a long, long process of committee hearings, subcommittee markups and passage and full committee markups and passage. the changes to this bill that have come to the floor have come

as a result, not of change in policy, but because we all were told in order to get an omnibus passed, we had to reduce the amount of that bill that's inned out of committee each of those bills a significant amount to meet the -- the mccaskill-sessions level, so we went back and cut a significant amount out of each one of our bills. the result of is the omnibus in front of us. so the 2,000 pages we're referring to have worked their way through a process. i would ask the leader if he knows this. and the difference is we had to cut money to meet the level of sessions-mccaskill and that's what we have before us and that's what we're being told after a year's worth of work that somehow we don't have the capability of knowing what's in this bill. is the leader aware of that? mr. reid: i'm aware that my friend, the republican leader, wants to ask a question or make some statement, but i would say this to my friend from washington, remember, this bill

which is 1,090 pages -- 1,900 pages is work from 12 subcommittees. it is the work that has been done over the last year or more in some instances to come up with a product. if you break it down in subcommittee, it is a reasonable number of pages on each subcommittee. there are 12 subcommittees. i would be happy to yield without yielding the floor to -- mr. mcconnell: i would ask my friend -- it's hard to ask a question without making something of a statement in connection with it if that's okay. mr. reid: that's fine. mr. mcconnell: i was not talking about the process by which the bill was developed in committee as i started off, i would say, mr. president, to my friend from nevada. i was commending the committee for its work. i was commenting of the lack of taking the bill up on the floor of the united states senate. over $1 trillion, the basic work of the government, and so,

mr. president, i would ask my friend why if these bills enjoy bipartisan support, and i think they did, why were they not brought before the full senate and passed? i think i would say to my friend i expect it's because you had other priorities and this is the basic work of government. why did we not bring any of these bills before the senate floor? mr. reid: i hope the court reporter will take down the smile i have on my face. because the answer to the question is kind of easy. we have had to file cloture 87 times in this congress because every we've tried to do we have been obstructed. and so that's the reason. everyone knows that we've had some very big issues. when the president was elected, president obama was elected, we found ourselves in a deep, deep hole. it was so deep. so deep. during the prior administration we lost eight million jobs. the month that president obama and president bush shared the

presidency in january, that month we lost 800,000 jobs. so we had a lot to do. i know people criticize our doing health care because of for various reasons. there's criticism that we did the bank reform bill, wall street reform. we did housing reform. we did -- we had a very, very busy congress to try to dig out of a hole. so i say to my friend, who like me, has been on the appropriations committee, i'm not on it now, but he is, the appropriations committee is a wonderful committee, everyone here knows why we didn't have individual appropriation bills and i say to my friend, i hope next year we can get them down. i think there's more of chance next year because we have gotten a lot done to help get ourselves out of the hole we found ourselves in because of the years that created a big hole that we've got to dig out of. mr. president, i ask the chair to lay before the senate a message from the house --

a senator: will the senator withhold? the presiding officer: will the senator withhold? mr. reid: yes. the presiding officer: under the previous order the senate returns to legislative session. the majority leader. mr. reid: i ask the chair to lay before the senate a message from the house with respect to h.r. 5281. the presiding officer: the chair lays before the senate a message from the house. the clerk: resolve that the house agrees to the amendments one and two to the bill h.r. 5281 to amend title 28 united states code to include certain provisions to the removal of litigation against federal offices or agencies to federal courts and for other purposes. and be it further resolved that the house agree to amendment number three of senate with the following house amendment to senate amendment. mr. reid: mr. president, i move to concur on the house amendment to the senate amendment three. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: cloture motion: we, the undersigned senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate, do hereby move to

bring to a close debate on the motion to concur on the house amendment to the senate amendments to h.r. 528 1, the removal clarification act dream act, signed by 16 senators as follows, lieberman, rockefeller, dorgan, whitehouse, reid, menendez, cardin, nelson of florida, bennett of colorado, murray, mikulski, dodd, durbin and kerry. mr. reid: i move to -- with an amendment which is at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid moves to concur on the house amendment to the senate amendment number three with an amendment number 4822. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there is. there is a sufficient second. mr. reid: i have a second-degree amendment at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, proposes amendment number 4823 to

amendment 4822. mr. reid: i move to refer the house message to the senate judiciary committee with instructions to report back forthwith with the following amendment. i ask the clerk to state that motion. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada mr. reid refers to move to the senate judiciary committee with instructions to report back forthwith the following amendment number 4824. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays on that. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there is a sufficient second. mr. reid: mr. president, i have an amendment to my instructions which is at the desk i ask to be reported. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, proposes amendment number 4825 to the instructions of the motion to refer to h.r. 5281. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays on that. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. mr. reid: i have a second-degree amendment to my instructions. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, proposes

amendment 4826 to amendment number 4825. mr. reid: mr. president, that was the dream act. i'm now going to ask the chair to lay before the senate a message from the house with tonight h.r. 2965 which is the don't ask, don't tell legislation. the presiding officer: the chair lays before the senate a message from the house. the clerk: resolve that the house agree to the amendment of the senate to the bill h.r. 2965 entitled an act to amend the small business act with respect to the small business innovation research program and the small business technology transfer program and for other purposes. with a house amendment to the senate amendment. mr. reid: i move to move on the house amendment to the senate amendment to h.r. 2965 and i send a cloture motion to the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: cloture motion: we, the undersigned senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate, do hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to concur on the house amendment to the senate amendment to h.r. 2965, the

s.b.i.r. reauthorization act signed by 16 senators as follows, lieberman, boxer, wyden, bennet of colorado, casey, lautenberg, stabenow, merkley, card inn, klobuchar, dodd, carper and frank inn. mr. reid: i move to concur on the house amendment to the senate amendment to h.r. 2965 with an amendment which sat the desk. the presiding officer: . the clerk will report. the clerk: the clerk: the senator from nevada mr. reid moves to concur on the house amendment to the senate amendment with amendment 2965. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a second. mr. reid: i have a second-degree amendment at the desk. the presiding officer: the clerk: . the clerk will report. the senator from nevada mr. reid proposes amendment 4828 to amendment 4827. mr. reid: i have a motion to refer the house message with instructions to report back forthwith with the following amendment and i ask the clerk to state that moaghts.

the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada mr. reid moves to -- the armed services committee with instructions to report back forthwith the following amendment number 4829. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. mr. reid: i have an amendment to my instructions which is at the desk i ask the clerk to report that. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada mr. reid proposes amendment number 4830 to the instructions on the motion to refer to h.r. 2965. mr. reid: i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. mr. reid: mr. president, i have a second-degree amendment to my instructions. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from nevada, mr. reid, proposes amendment 4831 to amendment 4830. mr. reid: i ask consent, mr. president, that the mandatory quorums required under rule 22 be waived with respect to the cloture motions filed. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: mr. president, i would

now ask unanimous consent that we proceed to a period of morning business with senators permitted to speak for up to ten minutes each. and i would say, mr. president, that we've made contact with the republican -- republicans and they tonight do not wish to have more debate on 9 -- on the start treaty. so that's why we're moving to morning business, people can talk about whatever they want for the rest of the evening. tomorrow i'm going to move back to executive session to do the start treaty. i hope that we can make progress on that tomorrow. the presiding officer: without objection, morning business will be granted. mr. reid: note the absence of a quorum, mr. president. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll.

mr. mccain: mr. president, i ask that further proceedings under the quorum call be suspended. the presiding officer: the

senator from arizona. mr. mccain: mr. president, i'd like to note that we just saw -- the presiding officer: without objection. the senate will be in order. mr. mccain: mr. president, i'd like to note that we just saw a rather extraordinary event here on the floor of the senate. i first came to the united states senate in 1987 and i saw the practice of earmarking and pork-barrel spending grow and grow and grow to the point where last november 2, the american people overwhelmingly rejected this practice about a controlled spending and debt that we have -- uncontrolled spending and debt that we have laid on our children and grandchildren. and i also, along with the republican leader, would like to thank the members of our -- our members of the appropriations committee who clearly heard that message and heard the outcry when the american people began to become