the issue that there isn't yet clarity on who is the effective leadership who could be. >> first of all, and i thank you very much at the outset. i was not a head of the state -- >> that's true. [laughter] >> the queen. >> the queen. [laughter] >> when i go back it will won't tower of london. [laughter] >> i'm dreadfully american in that sense. and i kind of knew as i was saying -- my apologies to the queen. >> i'll sort it out with her. [laughter] >> i think -- i think the -- i mean, the work we can only do in circumstances where a country has a relatively stability we from the outside should be prepared to be very clear about how we're going to try and

enforce certain rules because, you know, what's happening is obviously tragic. i hope they can sort it out in the next period of time. but, you know, one of the things we face when sierra leone was in the conflict and we intervened and there was a lot of pressure -- at the time people were saying don't you have to come to sort of compromises and put them all together and all the rest of that? and i came to the conclusion very strongly in the end that, no, what you really need to do is to make sure that the democratic system is upheld. and i think if that doesn't happen, it then becomes very hard afterwards to get the country really moving. so i'm not -- you know, the situation at the moment is very uncertain and unsure.

but i think the basic -- basically from the outside world, you know, we shouldn't just kind of leave that to one side. i think it's important we focus on it and try and sort it out because otherwise, you know, with a country literally being held up for years not taking the decisions properly. >> right. i don't have a name and affiliation -- what will you do if the leaders you are supporting -- that's the same question. well, what will you do if the leaders you are supporting now become corrupt or dictatorial? how you will you know when to pull out? i think it's a general question not only for your program the african governance initiative but for the aid community in general. >> it's a real challenge because i think -- i mean, frankly for the work we do, we couldn't stay in those circumstances. it would be very difficult.

>> it doesn't make any sense at all. >> i don't think so. now, you can have debates, you know, one of the countries we are working -- rwanda there's been a lot of controversy about that. now my view is that we are right to support those -- we're not ignoring those issues but we're right to support the president there and the work that he's doing. but there are countries, frankly, that we couldn't go into. and the countries we are in, we don't say it's a blank check and we're going to stay regardless. i think the other thing is that often the aid community has to be there for the sake of the people, right? but the work we do, i think, is very specific to the concept of proper governance. and so, you know, we are very conscious of that dilemma and very keen to make sure that we move -- you know, we're helping a country move in the right

direction. the other thing i think is true 'cause again if you take rwanda which has recovered from the genocide and is in a very, very difficult situation, therefore, is i also do look and track at how the country is moving. and a country like that has actually made dramatic improvements and that dilemma is there and we certainly watch that that very carefully. and the other thing that's really interesting about this is there comes a certain point at which the democratic and the effective due fit together because past a certain point -- you know, i'm not -- i'm not a supporter of the nine dictator thesis. some who remember my leadership at the labour party may wonder about that. [laughter]

>> but basically, you know -- you know, basically i think the democratic process is a vital part of it. the thing is i do think, though, when countries are emerging from a period of conflict or in the case of rwanda genocide, you have to -- you know, you have to be -- >> forbearance or something like that. >> i don't know if i would choose that word but you have to be aware that it is happening in a context where the stability of the country is still quite fragile. >> and rwanda is an interesting case what you said in the end if you can show effective government that you begin to create a sense amongst the people of how they can hold their own government accountable. >> yeah, i think one of the interesting things that's happening in sierra leone where we're working at the moment, these are basic things getting done, you know, like -- the lights going on in freetown.

that may seem -- does it really matter. yes, of course it really matters once people notice that. we have been helping to deliver a maternal mortality and child mortality programs. the number of young kids getting treated in hospitals has more than doubled so it's gone from 100,000 to just over a quarter of a million. the impact is enormous. now, some of the children would have maybe been all right already but the fact is and there's still an enormous distance to go in the quality of care given and so on. this is a very interesting example of what i'm saying. the money was there. the system to deliver it wasn't. and some of these things -- if you look at, for example, agriculture and how you deliver agriculture policy today, you know, there's an expertise there, things to do with logistics and, you know, things that are regularly done in many

organizations. but if a government is just beginning its process of change, it often doesn't have any effective leaders to deliver these things. so you can even have the aid money there but it's not necessarily going effectively to be used. >> okay. i think two related questions. how will you monitor -- this is from john hinkland from the imf. how will you work and evaluate the work of the iga seven? -- igi. he's a former visiting fellow. and a related question that i was talking about actually with kate, your hgi person. how will agi top this? i think you already addressed that question but i think you can talk maybe a little bit topping the skills of the diaspora? >> look, i think the -- how we evaluate our work is very

simple. i mean, one general one particular. the general is, is the country moving forward and improving and so on because we were very specific around and the president building that capacity but the second thing is, we work in specific areas so we will work alongside delivering significant priorities so we can see if we delivered or helped deliver the child mortality program or the agriculture program or the energy program of the country. so we actually set very specific deliverables and then we have them also independently evaluated. >> that's why you like cash on delivery. for those who know me, they know i couldn't resist putting that in. >> you do -- it's a really important part of this, of the pressure on the government and also the pressure on us to make sure what we're doing is effective. but the other way -- i'm not

sure we can measure this in quite the same way but the really exciting thing -- and this is particularly true 'cause we began the last year of working in liberia and certainly in the work we've done in rwanda and sierra leone, there's now a group of nationals, as it were, the local people there, who are doing it and here's the good new and there are really smart and good people there. and it may sound a really trivial thing to say. one of the things -- we did an analysis for one of our people and we showed -- sometimes people don't even have the very basic things around the president. scheduling, i mean, i know it sounds almost trivial but we did an analysis that showed the particular individual -- 90% of their time was spent on things other than their priorities. now, actually this is common to western leaders, too.

in certain regards. and actually i -- you know, it's one of the big problems of modern politics, in fact. however, 90% is a little too much time to be spending on things other than your priorities. now, by building just even -- now, those are hard to measure but by building effective instruments, this is what you -- you know, this is how we're going to map out your time, for example, what we do is we introduce concepts. we work with the presidents to achieve their priorities and there may be four -- 'cause i basically believe in many of these countries you really want to strip it down to the absolute essentials and then we say, right. we're going to put in place a system that allows evidence analysis and your time sitting with the ministers because my experience again is that unless the president or the prime minister has actually sat there helping do it, it doesn't get done.

and in the diaspora, i think there's lots of great work being done by many people not least ed and george soros and others to attract the diaspora back but here's what people are attracted back from the diaspora all the same to me. they say, if i'm going to work in a proper system, i'm prepared to commit but if you're going to chuck me in a piece of chaos, frankly i'm not really interested in that because i have a life to live and i've got a family. and i think -- you know, these things are linked. there is enormous talent in the diaspora but they need a little faith in governing systems before they put the whole of their lives on the line for it. in the three areas where we're working, though, we had really good people come back from the dias are a and make a difference. >> i am remembering -- i don't know if i have it right the scott family fellows in liberia,

at least a large number of them came from the diaspora. and at least one has became or has become a deputy minister and presumably is staying. so that point is absolutely right. let me do a question from reed scott. what role does fellowship in the country. >> you mean in the country itself? i mean, the faith community can be very active in this. for example, things like health care -- you know, there are large amounts of that delivered by the faith community. and i also think those that this interaction between the governments and civic society which very often means the faith community can be incredibly important in building support for proper systems of government and for keeping government itself -- keeping government itself honest.

and, you know, i've noticed really important work being done by the faith communities. and i think faith for some of the leaders as well and their immediate associates, that interaction with the faith communities is very important. >> here's a good one about nigeria. it refers to a former visiting fellow or currently still visiting fellow at the center. yesterday, anticorruption crusader announced his candidacy for president of nigeria. his hope is to challenge the ruling elite through an obama-like grassroots campaign. question, how can organizations like yours and others help create the space and opportunity for candidates like him to emerge in africa and truly compete for the people's vote? >> right.

>> focus and priorities. >> by the way, i think -- i mean, actually in the sierra leone context, for example, we specifically did work with them on setting up an effective anticorruption unit and that is busy at work. and it needs to be. but i think -- you know, i think what we really focus on, frankly, is creating the sense that if people are competing for government, then they're going to have a system there that is -- can deliver to the people. now, i think anticorruption as i say is part of that. and i think that the problem with corruption apart from the obvious problem with corruption

is that -- i think that's -- [inaudible] [laughter] >> it stopped. it's okay. >> well, i have to tell it's a bit alarming that lawrence is rifling through your handouts. [laughter] >> and we'll have some embarrassing revelations here. [laughter] >> it's my daughter. [laughter] >> okay. [laughter] >> where was i? >> i apologize. >> no, i think the problem with corruption other than the obvious one is that it results in some really bad decisions. i mean, i know that seems a slightly odd thing to say. i think in the resource area -- one thing, i think, on corruption by the way is you need to know where to start.

and i think for a lot of african countries is that the resource sector is a real important sector where you put a light on the corruption issue. because especially now, frankly, where there's a big competition to development resources and where after all -- i mean, this is the irony and indeed the tragedy many african countries is they are rich countries with poor people. if these countries are taken badly or wrongly on the resources and who get to develop them, it just -- it's devastating for the country. and actually worse than that, you can even find the resources that you have, for example, oil or gas or something turns out, in fact, to be a negative, believe it or not, for the nation because of what comes with it. so that's where i think it's really, really important. that's where i think also the international community has got

to be very tough, you know, the fact is if a country has a natural resource that it could it develop well with the right partners and the proper transparency and the proper contract, then it could yield enormous benefits to the country. so if that goes bad, that is, you know, a devastating blow to the effectiveness of the country. >> we actually have a proposal at the center that we've been working on in which would encourage donors and government leaders in resource-rich countries in africa and elsewhere to use more of the income in the way that alaska and the alberta province in canada has used it and was proposed recently in nigeria for one part of nigeria namely to have per capita distribution of at least some if not all of the net income, then there would have to be a tax system presumably that created some sense of accountability on the part of taxpayers to tax back

some of it for major investments. do you have a thought about that? maybe we could get you to help us? -- to think through that more. >> you know, i think that is one issue and, for example, norway also has a way of using its revenue. but i think the other thing is this is where, you know, ed and i discussed this on a number of occasions, too. i do -- i mean, maybe it's different in other countries but in the countries that i've worked, this absolute great negotiating team with experience in negotiating these types of contracts is a big problem for them. and yet, the expertise is there. and what we're doing now is we're putting our feelers out to people in all legal and financial networks to see if they're prepared to help in this because the other thing that

really matters is if you've got a great team negotiating it who has real expertise, it's hard to make corruption harder because they're tracking it and two, because the country gets a good deal and i've come across resources in these countries which is frankly appalling. you don't know if the corruption has gone into it or not. but there's certainly negligence gone into it. and i think that is something really worth us looking at. you see what i'm trying to suggest in the way is that those of us in government and in the development community upon ourselves as kind of enablers. what we do sometimes and this is not a traditional role for development departments but what we can do -- we can enable or bring together people from the outside whose expertise we can use and we do that and we go out and we organize that.

i mean, this is what i'm suggesting 'cause i think you could get -- just to give you another example from one of our countries. we've been discussing with one of them 'cause they've got a whole lot of investment opportunities coming to them. and the head of the -- we helped reorganize their investment, inward investment and operation. but it came to us when i was over there the other day and said, look, give me three or four analysts from financial institution who know how to make these deals happen. all these things coming in but i need some execution capacity here. and i need to better get things done. so trying to get me that. now, i think we can play a bigger part in trying to, you know -- to organize and access that capacity. >> let me -- we don't have too much time. i don't know how we're doing.

i have a couple of comments and i have one myself and it's more of a comment and see -- and you pick and choose. one is from patrick flannigan who is a student here at johns hopkins, in terms of your work in the development field is there anything you regret not doing or trying harder at while prime minister? and another interesting one on -- without at bugs would you advise president obama to make usaid independent of the state department and elevated to a cabinet level post? i don't know how much you're still a politician. you're awfully funny. [laughter] >> i'm sure you'll find a way to deal with these. and let me mention my comment and maybe you'll want to say something about that, which is -- it's actually a suggestion, a request in all humility. when in the development community we use the word

"capacity building," we imply, i think, too often that the capacity isn't there. and you've made the point very strongly that the -- that people who are talented are there but they often are operating in dysfunctional systems, which make it hard for them to be effective. but you've also made the point that sometimes an expert at the right time of the right kind, possibly from outside, can matter. i think it would be great if we could all find another way to talk about this that doesn't use the terminology "capacity building" in the traditional aid community as you know where they're not as forward-looking as you and haven't thought it through in the way you have because of your experience. it boils down to this sort of chestnut of training, sitting fees, consultants.

so that's my comment and request. but do go back to obama, usaid independent and what you wish you would have done more of when you had to be a politician also in the u.k. and you couldn't always have your priorities around? >> first of all, on the usaid, i know i've been out of office over three years now. while i'm not completely out of practice, okay? [laughter] >> i do not a question not to answer when i see one. [laughter] >> very good. i knew you would be funny. i said it would be really interesting. [laughter] >> but i will say that -- he's doing a great job. it's a really good appointment and that's all i'm going to say. [laughter]

>> now, on the rest of it, on what i would have done in government differently -- >> on development issues. >> yeah, i think -- [laughter] >> no, that was the question. [laughter] >> 'cause otherwise it's too long a list. [laughter] >> >> it's a bit the same in many aspects of government. i think by the time we got to the glenn eagle summit in 2005, i actually was very proud of what we did there. and proud also of the partnership part 'cause the other thing we did was establish the africa commission, which bob geldof was the driving light on. and what that did was very much put a peer review on everything and so this was a partnership. >> uh-huh. >> i think when we were first in off we were a bit slow. it was all about aid and not enough about partnership.

and i also think -- i mean, just one personal regret, we've been able to do more on the zimbabwe front i would have been very pleased but that would have been difficult to do. but i guess, yeah, of course, there are lessons -- here's, i think, the bigger point really that i would make about this. because i think what's all about government, this is a far more general point, is, you know, as i say in my book and thank you for the plug, by the way -- you know, when i came to office, the prime minister was the only job i ever held, right? i'd never been a government minister before. and then your prime minister. and then running the country. and what i've actually learned over the 10 years is that the business of running government is -- believe it or not, it's

like anything else. why i was surprised in itself absurd and it's like anything else. you get better at it the longer you do it, in fact, or you certainly learn more about how to do it. and you don't -- there are lessons out there that had they come to me in the sort of identifiable form would have been quite useful to know. [laughter] >> you know, so when you start to deal with, for example, how you're forming in this case inmy case it was the education systems and health care and law and order systems, you know, i knew so much more by the end of the -- when i got into my second term, i was so much more attuned and able to start looking at the systemic change that was necessary in those things. and part of the purpose of what we're trying to do that i think, you know, this has got a more general application is to try and accelerate that learning process. >> uh-huh.

which is absolutely critical in some countries where the results have to be -- >> yeah. critical in every country but in those countries where, you know, you're dealing with the very basics, they're incredibly important. and so what we find when we're sitting alongside -- 'cause the team of people usually work in u.s. government or the british government or the mckinneys or the private sector but the thing is someone taught them, right? and what we find in working alongside, say the president's team -- the president's team may be perfectly smart and capable people. but they never -- they'd never been -- they've never been sensitized to the fact that actually today in most governments there are different ways of doing it. you take communication, for example, which matters in every situation today. it's going to be organized. it doesn't happen. so i think -- >> it's the business of government --

>> and the business of government today really, really matters because it's probably not the ideology of government. i'm not saying that there's not a lot of that around, but it's amazing how often that can get in the way of just focusing on what is the most effective way of doing things. >> bravo. let me say to our participants that there were a lot of questions -- i see a big fat stack. and what we'll do is we'll share them all with the african governance initiative people and we'll put them with your permission on center for global development website, okay? with some sort of discretion about what's okay to -- from them and from us. let me congratulate you for really bringing a new idea about

what it means to be practical and how to be helpful in that area and the focus on leadership. i don't think there's anybody else that could have brought it as i said with the same eloquence and elegance. and i wish you and your colleagues at the african governance initiative much luck and success in pushing forward this. i think it should infuse the entire development community over the years and you can -- you have begun that process. you can certainly accomplish it. could i ask everyone to join with me in thanking mr. tony blair. [applause] [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> this sunday on c-span, in her first televised interview, the newest supreme court justice elena kagan on the confirmation process. her adjustment to the court and her relationship with chief justice john roberts. an unprecedented on the record conversation sunday at 6:30 and 9:30 pm on c-span. >> on this friday, the u.s. senate is about to gavel in. lawmakers will continue the debate on the u.s./russian treaty known as s.t.a.r.t. president obama and medvedev signed that. senators may consider a short-term funding bill for the federal government now that a more comprehensive measure has been withdrawn and now to live coverage of the u.s. senate here on c-span2.

the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the chaplain dr. barry black will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. how glorious you are o god! how majestic are your works. you make your judgments known from heaven and no earthly power can withstand your might. when we remember your great deeds in our history, we look to the future with confident hope, for your anger

is only for a moment, but your favor is for a lifetime. teach our lawmakers your ways. teach them to number their days that they may have hearts of wisdom. teach them to believe your good will toward them that they may obey you with joy. and teach them to serve others that they may honor you. lord, during this holiday season, we mind us to strive for peace on earth, and let that peace begin in our hearts.

we pray in your loving name. amen. the presiding officer: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. the presiding officer: the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., december 17, 2010. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable jeff merkley, a senator from the state of oregon, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: daniel k. inouye,

president pro tempore. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: following leader remarks, if any, the senate will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the new start treaty. the treaty is open to amendments. senators are encouraged to come to the floor to offer and debate their amendments, or to make statements regarding this most important piece of legislation. i'd like to begin today on having votes on the amendments amendments -- amendment that has been filed. as a reminder, last night, i filed cloture with respect to the house messages on the "dream" act and the don't ask, don't tell repeal. the first cloture vote will occur tomorrow morning fairly early. if cloture is not invoked on the "dream" act, the senate would proceed immediately to a cloture vote on the don't ask, don't tell repeal. senators will be notified when any votes are scheduled. mr. president, i have a matter that i believe is at the desk,

s.j. res. 42. i think it's due for a second reading. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: s.j. res. 42, joint resolution to extend the continuing resolution until february 18, 2011. mr. reid: mr. president, i would object to any further proceedings with respect to this joint resolution. the presiding officer: objection is heard. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the bill will be placed on the calendar. mr. reid: thank you a lot. mr. president, the path is clear that we can finish our work here relatively soon. as i indicated earlier, we're going to have two votes in the morning. there is no reason if we -- even if cloture is invoked on one or both of those matters, there is no reason we couldn't complete that work tomorrow. there is no reason that we would have to extend that into sunday. we will be happy to do that because we're going to work every day, every day until we

finish this legislative session. if we get those two things out of the way, we have minimal things left to do. we have to do the health care as it relates to 9/11. we have to, of course, complete the funding for the government. we all -- we know what happened last night, and so we're looking forward to doing the c.r. a tremendous disappointment as to what it doesn't do for our country, but that's where we are. the republicans made that choice, and the american people need to understand that. i was told that there were needed six or seven days to debate the start treaty. that's easy to do. we can complete that very quickly. it all depends on -- on our friends on the other side of the aisle, if they want to continue as they have this whole congress

in throwing roadblocks in the front of everything we do or move forward to a culmination of this debate. mr. president, we have done some very, very important things during this congress, but there is nothing, nothing more important than the start treaty, because it has ram if -- ramifications far greater than our whole country. so i would hope everyone would be patient, we know this is the holiday season, but this is something that we are going to complete before we leave here. and i have received conversations with a number of my republican friends. they understand the seriousness of this. as i indicated yesterday, the ranking member of the foreign relations committee, richard lugar, has been an advocate for this for a long, long time. we know that our chairman, senator kerry, believes fervently in this legislation.

so i'm going to do everything that i can to expedite the other matters, and that's the reason that cloture was filed on these two issues last night. i repeat, there is no reason we can't complete everything by tomorrow in the evening, tomorrow, leaving the days we have spent on this already, which are three in number. we can do sunday, monday, tuesday, that's six, seven days. i mean, we're set to complete this very quickly. it's all up to people who believe in this to come down and make their statements and to support amendments that are strengthening of this, oppose those that don't. so i would hope that everyone would understand the importance of the work that we have, the issues dealing with the "dream" act. i have given many speeches on this floor dealing with the importance of that. legislation supported by our

secretary of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs. they know how important it is to have quality people in the military. they know that we're taking into the military today people who have been convicted of crimes, people who have not graduated from high school. this would certainly be a way of bringing into the military people who really wanted to serve and serve their country. i hope we can get that done. don't ask, don't tell is another issue that is certainly ripe for completion. i appreciate the work of the house in completing that, and there is no reason that anyone, no matter how they dislike that legislation, should stand in the way of the start treaty. the don't ask, don't tell will will -- we have, as we have all seen, read in the press, have enough votes to pass that. it passed in the house for the second time by -- picked up 45 votes from the first time that they voted on it, so it's

gaining strength. mr. president, one reason i think it's so important that we do that -- that is, complete the repeal of don't ask, don't tell -- one of the problems we have had with the issue of abortion around the country is it was -- it has been determined by the courts, not the legislature, and there have been numerous articles written that that's one problem that has caused so much consternation with the abortion issue is because it should have been handled by the legislature. i feel the same way about don't ask, don't tell. we can see the courts moving in on this. we should have the courage to do what is right for the american people and do it legislatively, not leave it to the courts. the only thing i didn't mention, mr. president, is we have a lot of nominations i'm working with the republican leader on to complete, and one person we're really concerned about is jim cole, the deputy attorney general. that is the number two person at the justice department. it's a shame that that has taken so long to complete.

the presiding officer: under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the following treaty, which the clerk will report. the clerk: calendar number 7, treaty with russia on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, i note that the minority leader is here, and he may want to use his leader time now, and i understand that. mr. mcconnell: i would say to my friend from massachusetts, i was going to make my opening remarks. i believe senator lemieux is making his farewell address. if you could give us the chance to -- mr. reid: i note the absence of a quorum, mr. president.

the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call: mr. kerry: i ask that the proceedings of the quorum call be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, as soon as the leader wants to take the floor, i will cede it. i'm not trying to hold the floor for anything. i just do want to say to colleagues that we are now beginning day three of consideration of the start treaty. we have not yet voted on or moved on any amendment, so i hope colleagues will take advantage of the extra time that we now have, given the events with respect to the omnibus last c.r., and we have an opportunity today to quickly get there. needless to say, at some point here, particularly in the absence of amendments, there

will be a higher motivation to move to a cloture vote to move to bring this to a close if that's what it's going to take. we are ready to vote on our side of the aisle. we're ready to vote today on the start treaty. so i want to emphasize to colleagues that if there are amendments, now is the time to bring them to the floor, and i hope we can do that, and we look forward to a good, robust debate in an effort to try to bring this matter to a close. i would yield the floor to the minority leader at this time, and then we'll come back. mr. mcconnell: mr. president? the presiding officer: the republican leader. mr. mcconnell: mr. president, i'm pleased to report two pieces of good news out of congress today. after two years of policies that lacked public support, the tide is beginning to turn. today the president will sign a bill that ensures no american,

not a single one, gets a tax hike on january 1. republicans have fought hard for this legislation. up until last week, most democrats resisted, but in the end, the american people were heard. that's a welcome change, mr. president, from the last two years. the american people have finally been heard on another matter as well. yesterday, republicans united against a 2,000-page, 2,000-page, $1.2 trillion spending bill that democrats were trying to ram through congress in the final hours of this session. the goal of this bill was perfectly clear. its purpose was to lock in for another year the same big-government policies voters overwhelmingly rejected on november 2. by approving this bill, we would have helped cement for another year massive increased in spending that help pave the way for a health care bill most

americans are asking us to repeal. once those details became clear, it was imperative that we reject it. the voters don't want us to wait to cut spending and debt and fight the health care bill next october. they want us to do these things immediately. so i'm proud of my conference for sticking together on these principles. here in the final days of the 111th conference, we've held the line on taxes, we've held the line on spending. next we'll turn to cutting spending and cutting debt. the american people are seeing change here in washington. they can expect more in the new year. mr. president, on another matter ,

i rise to pay tribute to a man who's made the most of a short ten haour in the -- tenure in the senate. after george lemieux was sworn in, he said his goal was to get six years worth of work done in 16 months, and i don't think there's any doubt the junior senator from florida made good on that promise. in his short tenure, george served the people of florida with honor, integrity and purpose. and while he may be leaving us soon, i'm certain this will not be the last time we hear from this incredibly gifted man. george grew up in carls spring, florida, or god's country, as he refers to it. he went on to emory where he graduated phag cum laude and -- magna cum laude. he inconcerned for congressman clay shaw and senator connie mack. then it was on to georgetown for law school and then private practice back home in florida.

george got his start in local politics as chairman of the broward county young republicans. he then went on to make his own bid for the florida statehouse in 1998, knocking on more than 10,000 doors in the heavily democratic district he was hoping to represent. despite george's own campaign loss he impressed a lot of republicans and was elected chairman of the broward county republican party. in 2003 he was asked to serve as deputy attorney general. george answered the call leaving the law firm he was working with at the time. as deputy attorney general, george was responsible for a team of 400 lawyers. he also argued and won a death penalty case that earned a unanimous ruling from the u.s. supreme court. george would go on to serve as the chief of staff to florida governor charlie crist overseeing the governor's legislative agenda, policy initiatives and messaging.

after a year and a half, george wanted to return home to his young family. he said i've got three little men at home and a wife who's a saint. despite the demands of work, george has always made sure not to lose sight of his first priorities, and we've all seen and been touched by the special pride he has for his wife mei k*e and their -- meike and their three boys and their newborn daughter. after a couple of years of private practice, george got the call to serve when mel martinez announced he was retiring from the senate. from the moment he got here, he was determined to do the best job he could. he wasn't going to be a place holder or a seat warmer, as he put it. floridians expected vigorous representation and that's exactly what they got. at the time of his appointment, george may have been the youngest sitting member of the senate, but that didn't stop him from rolling up his sleeves and getting to work. he made an immediate impact by inserting himself into the

health care debate as an eloquent and passionate opponent of greater government intervention and an enemy of waste, fraud and abuse. in the first bill he introduced, was the prevent health care fraud act of 2009 which proposed a more aggressive approach to recovering the billions of dollars that are lost each year to health care waste, fraud and abuse. george has been deeply involved in efforts to raise awareness about the national debt and promoting free trade. he's been involved in latin american and cuban policy and he was a leader on the gulf oil spill. he's worked tireless throeu hold b.p. and the administration accountable to the cleanup and protection of florida's beaches. he's been an outspoken critic of the bureaucratic red tape that kept most skimmers from cleaning up the florida coast. through his efforts in exposing this lax response he was able to get dozens of skimmers sent to the florida coast for cleanup. as george put it at the time, we must ensure b.p. does not

abandon the hardworking families, businesses and local communities devastated by the spill once the media leaves. after just a few short months on the job, as u.s. senator, george found his voice in the midst of the largest environmental disaster in u.s. history. upon arrest fleissig this chamber, -rblg -- upon arriving in this chamber, george has made an antitax, antiwaste voting record which made him the recipient of several awards. in august of this year he was recognized as a taxpayer hero by the council for citizens against government waste for his tworbg expose and end wasteful government spending. the following month george was honored the guardian of small business by the national federation of independent business as well as the tax fighter award by the national tax limitation committee. while george's impressive tenure in this chamber has been brief, we've enjoyed getting to know

him and working with him to advance the best interest of floridians and all americans. he's been one of our sharpest and most passionate spokesmen on some of the most important issues we face. he's smart, capable and willing to work hard. he should be proud of his service. i know we've been proud to call him a colleague and a friend. we thank him for his impressive service to this chamber, the people of florida and the nation, and we wish him and his young family all the best in what i hope will be many years of success and happiness ahead. mr. president, i yield the floor.

the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, again, i repeat, we're beginning the third day of debate on the start treaty. senator lugar and i are anxious to begin debate on an actual amendment, and we're prepared to do so as soon as colleagues decide to come to the floor and bring us those amendments. i do want to repeat that given the press of business and the holidays, we're sort of in a place here where we want to afford people that opportunity. but if people don't want to take advantage of that, we're certainly prepared to move to a vote. i want to emphasize that there are no amendments from colleagues on the democratic side. we are prepared to vote on this

treaty. so, i think perhaps we're getting the signal that other colleagues may want to likewise move to conclude this treaty fairly rapidly. certainly senator lugar and i are prepared to do so. senator lugar has pressed me to try to see if we could proceed with respect to the procedure votes that would bring us to that point. i suggested that we ought to perhaps give that a little more time, and we're prepared to do so. but at some point here i think it will be appropriate for us to do that. so, i know senator lugar wants to speak a little bit i think with respect to some of the points that were made yesterday. but i think first, senator lugar, would be agreeable to having senator franken speak, and then we'll come back? mr. lugar: mr. chairman, i would be delighted to delay my

remarks and listen to other senators who have come to the floor. we are eager to try to expedite all of the statements of our members. mr. kerry: senator lieu tkpwarbgs would you agree with -- senator lugar, would you agree with me we've been open for business for two days now. this is the third day, and i think we need to get to a substantive amendment or perhaps move to close off the debate and have our last 30 hours? mr. lugar: i would agree with the chair, and i would hope that having raised that issue that members will come to the floor promptly, amendments will be offered, votes taken. it appears to me that a number of our colleagues are prepared really to conclude business, including, as we just heard, our majority leader and the republican leader. i think that's the sentiment of the body. as a result, given nine and a half hours of open time yesterday and a number of good

statements, we did not progress toward any resolution of either amendments or the treaty. i think today we must do so. i would support action to accelerate that. mr. kerry: i might emphasize that if colleagues want to be here, the majority leader has told me he will keep the senate open saturday, sunday through the weekend in order to do so. so it's our choice, but i think that in lieu of complaints about the rapidity with which the holiday is arriving, we might spend more time on an actual amendment or proceed to a vote. i yield the floor. mr. bond: senator kerry? -- -- mr. franken:senator kerry, can i ask you one question because i was presiding yesterday when a member rose in

opposition to the treaty and was complaining about it coming up now. he pointed to when we got the treaty from the white house. it was in may; is that right? mr. kerry: mr. president, that is correct, i would say to the senator from minnesota. it was april that i think it was signed and may that we actually received the submission of the documents themselves. mr. franken: i'd ask the chairman, is it true that -- and this senator, i was presiding on the floor, he was saying we got this in may. now it's this close to the end of the year and it's outrageous we're doing it now. we got it in may. but i'd ask the chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, senator kerry, didn't we accommodate, or didn't you accommodate those on the other side of this issue several times

who asked for delay themselves? mr. kerry: mr. president, the senator is absolutely correct. there were a series of requests from senators on the other side, which are totally appropriate incidentally. i'm not suggesting that that was inappropriate. but i think the record needs to reflect that on those multiple occasions when people requested time in order to be able to prepare, we gave them time. senator lugar in fact was importuned some 13 times specifically to slow down the treaty process in order to allow for more time to be able to address the modernization process which is outside of the treaty but not unlinked to it in terms of how you make judgments about this. senator kyl appropriately brought up some very relevant

omissions in that modernization process, and that extra time allowed us to address that. and i think to his -- i hope to his satisfaction. certainly to the improvement of an understanding of where we're proceeding and to an increase of funds. then we delayed even further. the committee was prepared to vote. there was a request for delay. we delayed that vote. and then we delayed even after that in order to avoid the appearance of politicizing the treaty for the election. so we literally took it out and said okay we'll do it after the election, which is why i think people feel so adamantly that now is the time, that there's been an appropriate series of delays. you can't come in and ask for delay and ask for delay and then say, oh, my gosh, we're sort of pushed up against the calendar. it's difficult to do it now. particularly since we're in day three and we have plenty of time to even exceed the amount of

time we did start i in. i thank the senator for clarifying that. what i hope to do now is not get locked into a discussion of process or what happened when. let's just do the substance of the treaty and show the country that we have the ability to, in a bipartisan way, meet the national security needs of our nation. i thank the senator for his question. mr. franken: i thank the chairman for the clarification. mr. president, i rise today to discuss missile defense and the new start treaty. missile is one of the persistent areas of concern of the treaty raised by some of my colleagues. however, the reasonable questions that have been raised on the subject can be answered in a very straightforward manner. the treatment of missile defense in the treaty is no cause to oppose it. quite the opposite, it should garner support for the treaty. most of those who have raised concern understand that

long-standing russian anxiety about our missile defense is misplaced. the purpose of our missile defense is not to undermine russia's deterrent. it is to protect us from attack from the likes of iran or north korea. in fact, the senator who raised the objection about it coming up now after their requests for delay pointed out as if i didn't understand that, for some reason. this is long-standing u.s. policy and law across administrations, and congresses controlled by both parties, going back to at least the administration of george h.w. bush. nothing in the treaty bars the development and deployment of missile defense for countering those very real threats from the likes of iran and north korea,

nor does the treaty give the russians any say over missile defense or any kind of veto over it. the fact that we and the russians remain at odds over missile defense is, to some degree, nothing new. it has not prevented overwhelming support for arms control agreements in the past, including this treaty's predecessor, the original start treaty. a more radical strand of criticism argues that our missile defense should target russian forces and should, in fact, seek to render russian strategic forces useless. i won't have much to say about this criticism. in reality, it's criticism of the entire foreign policy consensus of the united states that has prevailed across party lines, at least since the end of the cold war. secretary gates has spoken about the danger and the needless

budget-busting expense of this perspective. so setting this view aside, i want to focus on the more reasonable skeptics of the new start treaty. they have expressed concerns about each of the two mentions of missile defense in the treaty. article 5, section 3 of the treaty states, and i quiet -- "each party shall not convert, shall not use icbm launchers and slbm launchers at submarine launch ballistic missiles for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. each party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors, replacement of icbm and slbms therein. this provision shall not apply to icbm launchers that were converted prior to the signature of this treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors

therein. in other words, this provision prohibits the converse and use of icbm and slbm launchers for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. however, it grandfathers the five missile silos at vandenberg air force base that have already been converted to launchers for missile defense interceptors. some have seized on this provision as a constraint on our missile defense. in reality, this provision effectively keeps missile defense outside the scope of the treaty, an objective that proponents of missile defense surely desire at no real cost to us. the ban on conversion of icbm silos or slbm launchers to missile defense is not a meaningful constraint, as lieutenant general patrick o'reilly, director of the missile defense agency, testified, his agency has no

plans, never had any plans to convert additional icbm silos at vandenberg. it is both less expensive and operationally more effective to build new ground-based interceptors. as general riley explained, replacing icbms with interceptors or adapting slbms to be interceptors would -- quote -- "be a major setback to the development of our missile defenses." substantial conversion of icbm silos to missile defense would also be unnecessarily risky. mixing interceptors with the icbms, especially in or near icbm fields, would create an ambiguity problem for the russians that risk tragic misunderstanding and devastating miscalculation. as general kevin chilton, commander of u.s. strategic command put it, seeing a missile launch, the other side may well

be uncertain whether the launch was of an offensive or a defensive missile. eliminating conversion of icbms silos to defense is eliminating an unnecessary and undesirable option. that's why this so-called limitation on missile defense in article 5 of the new start treaty is, to use senator mccain's phrase from the committee hearings, not a meaningful one. nevertheless, senator mccain and others have gone on to ask, even if the limitation is meaningful in itself, why did the administration agree to include it in the treaty? why did we make this concession on missile defense to the russians? the short answer is because we got a very good deal on missile defense, getting several benefits by agreeing not to do something we were never going to do. that's pretty good negotiating, i think. the five converted missile silos at vandenberg were a major source of contention in the

context of the existing original start treaty. the russians considered the conversion of those silos a compliance problem. they worried that we would be able to convert them back and forth and undermine the treaty's central numeral limits on nuclear weapons. apparently, in negotiations over the new treaty, the russians pushed us either to undo the conversions to missile defense at vandenberg or to count the silos under the new start central limitations on our arsenal. we met neither of those russian demands. instead, in return for agreeing not to perform future conversions that are unnecessary and undesirable, we got the five existing missile defense silos at evander denberg grandfathered. that means not only do they continue as defense silos, but russia can no longer raise compliance complaints because we converted those silos to

defense. more importantly, with the conversion ban in place, our missile defenses are not subject to the treaty and its inspection regime. it's true that we will exhibit the vandenberg silos to the russians on future occasions to assure them that the silos are unable to launch icbms, but by keeping vandenberg out of the regular inspection and verification regime established by the new treaty, we deprive the russians of a precedent for extending inspections to our defenses elsewhere. if conversion were allowed under the new start treaty, our missile defenses at fort greeley , for instance, would potentially be subject to intrusive inspections by the russians to determine whether any such conversions have taken place. instead, with the conversion ban in place for greeley and other

missile defenses are off-limits. i'm not entirely sure were the the -- why the russians agreed to this, but it's very good for us and our negotiators deserve praise for article 5, section 3. we kept something of value, namely the existing vandenberg converted silos. we cleared up a source of con tending with the russians, and we kept our missile defenses out of the new start regime, ensuring that they are not subject to intrusive inspection by the russians. in exchange, we agreed to ban something again that we were never going to do, further convert silos, because that would be unwise in the first place. in other words, article 5 is a good reason to support the treaty. but i think the deepest concern of those who have raised questions about missile defense go to the treaty's other reference to missile defense in the preamble, together with the

unilateral statement russia issued on its own on the subject and the so-called withdrawal clause in the treaty. the treaty's preamble recognizes -- quote -- "the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defense arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties." unquote. i don't think anyone would deny that there is such an interrelationship. it's simply a fact. nor does the preamble impose any obligation on us or on the russians. it is not a binding limit on us, requires nothing of us, and has no effect on the nuclear forces, limited or not limited by the

treaty. russia also issued a unilateral statement on missile defense at the time the treaty was signed. this is not a part of the treaty, and there is no binding force whatsoever on us or on the russians. we issued a statement in response as well. russia's unilateral statement asserts that the treaty can only be effective and viable where there is no qualitative or quantitative buildup in our missile defense system capabilities. that is not what the actual treaty's preamble says. beyond that, the unilateral statement goes on to state that a missile defense buildup -- quote -- "such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the russian fed ration would count as an extraordinary event under article 14 of the treaty. article 14 includes the withdrawal clause, which is a standard part of arms control

treaties. that clause makes clear that each country has a right to withdraw from the treaty if it judges that extraordinary events relating to the treaty's subject matter have jeopardized its supreme interest. that judgment cannot be second-guessed. russia or the u.s. can always make a decision that its supreme interests require it to withdraw from the treaty under article 14, and there is nothing the other party can do about it. some of my colleagues on the other side are troubled and worried that russia will seek to leverage the mention of missile defense in the preamble and their unilateral statement to pressure the u.s. to limit our missile defense. these worries are without foundation. the preamble and unilateral statement had no force whatsoever to article 14's power of withdrawal from the treaty.

as secretary gates testified, we know the russians have hated missile defense for decades, since the strategic arms talks started. there's no surprise there. so it is no surprise that the russians say a fundamental change in the strategic balance between our countries because of missile defense might lead them to withdraw from the treaty, but even that threat is far less than it has been made out to be by the treaty's critics. even the russians' own unilateral statement counts only a missile defense buildup that -- quote -- "would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the russian federation." unquote. as potential cause for withdrawal. right now, we have 30 ground-based interceptors, and the russians will be able to deploy up to 1,500 nuclear warheads. it's accepted that you need at least two interceptors for each threat missile. we can and will continue to improve and deploy our missile

defense without changing the fundamental situation with russia. we can improve and expand our missile defense without threatening strategic stability with russia. u.s. missile defense simply won't meet the russians' own description of cause for withdrawal. but suppose russians see things otherwise, what is it that the russians are actually threatening? are they threatening to withdraw from the treaty? no. here is what president medvedev said on april 9, the day after the treaty was signed with reference to missile defense -- quote -- "if events develop in such a way to ultimately change the fundamental situation, russia would be able to raise this issue with the u.s.a." this is the sense of the interpretation and the verbal statement made yesterday. unquote. so if the russians decide that

there has been a change in the fundamental situation on missile defense and offense, then they will, and i quote -- quote -- "raise this issue with the u.s.a. "not withdraw from the treaty, raise the issue with us. that is a threat i think we can handle. there's another reason not to be overall concerned. around the time the u.s. and the soviet union signed the original start treaty in 1991, the soviet union issued a unilateral statement on the antiballistic missile or a.b.m. treaty whose language is virtually identical to the unilateral statement the russians just issued in connection with the new start treaty. as you know, the u.s. did withdraw from the a.b.m. treaty, and russian, the successor to the ussr, did not in turn withdraw from the original start treaty, as they threatened to do in a unilateral statement.

why would the russians structure their unilateral statement exactly like their previous one if they wanted to take the threat more -- us to take the threat more seriously than the last one? the russian objection to missile defense is well known and well understood. their threat to withdraw from treaties such as it is is not strong. and the treaty's actual preamble imposes no obligation, restraint or pressure upon us. the bottom line is that whatever decisions the obama administration and congress make on missile defense policy can and will be made independent of russian threats. frankly, our missile defense will not threaten strategic stability with them. the new start treaty doesn't alter our calculations on missile defense one iota. if this is russia's effort to pressure us on missile defense,

it's very weak and easily resisted. i personally pledge to make judgments about our missile defense policy on the basis of technical and strategic considerations entirely independent of russian pressure, and i'm sure my colleagues will do the same. to sum up, the limitation on conversion of launchers in article 5 of the new start treaty is in fact a major success of our negotiators in return for agreeing not to convert more icbm solos which we were never going to do anyway, we kept our missile defense out of the treaty and away from regular russian inspection. and we put to test -- put to rest russian complaints about our existing converted silos. we got several things of value at very, very, very low cost.

similarly, the mention of missile defense in the preamble and the nonbinding statement made by the russians will not allow them to pressure us or exercise a veto on our missile defense. there is no meaningful pressure there. the threat is exceedingly weak and it's hard to see how my colleagues would take it seriously. there's simply not a missile defense problem with this treaty, but don't just take it from me. in addition to the extraordinary support this treaty has garnered from foreign policy experts across the political spectrum, there is remarkable support among our defense leadership responsible for missile defense. this ranges from the secretary of defense to the chairman of the joint chiefs, the service chiefs, the commander of u.s. strategic command responsible for our nuclear deterrent and the director of the missile

defense agency. what's more, seven former commanders of strategic air command and u.s. strategic command recently wrote to the foreign relations and armed services committees to express their support for ratification of the treaty, and specifically, specifically dismiss objections based on missile defense. i hope that we consider the resolution of ratification on the floor of the senate as soon as possible. the substantive case of the treaty could not be stronger. it's time to bring it into force. thank you, mr. president. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from tennessee. mr. corker: thank you, mr. president. i have a, i guess a parliamentary inquiry. maybe the senator from massachusetts through you might answer. i think we're at a point in time where it's time for amendments

to be offered, and i would encourage people on our side of the aisle in particular if they have amendments to offer them. at present i have no amendments personally. i was able to be involved in the resolution of ratification that senator lugar and i drafted early during the committee. but i know that a number of my colleagues have been wanting to offer amendments, and it seems like there's a lot of time for that to occur today and that ought to be forthcoming so that we can get on. i have some comments i'd like to make about the treaty and i guess concerns that i have that we would introduce in the middle of this debate some political issues regarding our military that are unnecessary at this moment in time. that can be said later, but it's my hope that we can move this along. i would like to ask the senator from massachusetts through the chair how the amendment process

is working. i know there's been some question from our side about whether amendments to the treaty and amendments to the resolution itself can be offered at the same time. and i think it would be helpful because everybody's impatient. they're wanting to see the amendments come forward and let's move on with this process. it would be good to know how that process actually is going to work. there's been a question about the cloture vote and how that impacts pending amendments. and i think that in order to help move this along, it would be good if that could be answered. mr. kerry: mr. president, let me say to the senator, it may be that we need the parliamentarian to add on something here. here is my understanding. there is a distinction obviously between an amendment to the treaty and an amendment to the resolution of ratification. under the parliamentary rules, there is a vagueness, frankly, according to parliamentarian

even as to sort of how you go back and forth. i think in the language in the particular amendment, you can really deal with that issue so that you can make certain either addressing the resolution ratification or the treaty itself. but technically speaking, the treaty has to be dealt with first and then the resolution to the ratification subsequently. we can go back and forth, and there's no problem in that. is that accurate, mr. president, i'd ask through you, the parliamentarian, that we can take an amendment at any time on either the resolution ratification or the treaty? the presiding officer: by unanimous consent, that could be achieved. mr. kerry: we could take them at any time by unanimous consent. we could be actually defining what we're specifically agreeing to deal with. under the rules tech nick khreurbgs you have to do --

technically, you have to do the treaty and then set that aside and move to the ratification. is that a fair statement? the presiding officer: the senator is correct. mr. corker: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from tennessee. mr. corker: thank you, mr. president. i'm not sure that it's my role, because of the way the managers manage this bill to ask for unanimous consent in that regard. i think that's probably something that either the two leaders should ask or the two managers of the bill. it would seem to me that that would clear up any questions that people have about the process itself. i would just ask the senator from massachusetts through the president, if that's the way it should work -- mr. kerry: mr. president, to really simplify matters, let me say this: we are prepared to take any amendment at any time and to proceed to it. and at the time that the amendment comes to us and we both get a chance to look at it, we will address the question with the parliamentarian whether

or not we need to ask unanimous consent or to change the initial language of that particular amendment so that it fits into that moment. what we will do is abide by the rules and make sure that the amendment is appropriate. but we will take any amendment at any time as we always have in dealing with a treaty, and we've always been able to resolve this question of where it applies. and in the end, once we've moved on to the final 30 hours of debate on this, it's irrelevant anyway. we simply conclude. mr. corker: mr. president, i thank the senator. i would say that i was here last night on the floor. eupblgt senator was too when discussions took place around the c.r. i think emotions around here are slightly frayed and i think everybody kind of wants this session to end. it's my hope it will end with us

doing what's necessary on the start treaty. i think that it would be good just to clear that up. i think the last thing that we need right now is confusion over that. and it seems instead of taking each amendment at a time -- i'm not up to any trickery here. i'm just trying to clear this up. i think it would be much better -- and again maybe this is beyond my pay rate at this moment. but if the two bill managers would just go ahead by unanimous consent and ask for that and move on with it, and that way there is no question about whether people have the ability to try to amend either one. and we can move on so that peek cannot come down here later and say well, they were blocked off from offering certain types of amendments. mr. kerry: we are working on the appropriate language so that we don't in fact wind up inadvertently amending the treaty, and so we'll make certain that we proceed in an

appropriate way. but i guarantee any senator if they have an amendment, we will be able to take it and we're ready to proceed forward. mr. kerry: i thank the senator from tennessee and i thank him very much for his cooperate effort. i yield the floor. mr. kyl: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. i think that having spoken to a couple of colleagues that it's quite likely that the first amendment that will be offered relatively soon will be on the treaty itself, so that issue won't have been -- we will have time to work the question out that senator kerry and senator corker have been talking about. mr. president, senator kerry and i were involved in a discussion about missile defense last evening, and i think that will be probably further debated in connection with the first amendment that's likely to be offered. so let me turn to another matter that is of great concern to some

of us and i think will require some resolution either in an amendment of the treaty or preamble or in the resolution of ratification. and that is the limitation placed on our potential -- potential global strike weapon. this is a matter on which the senate gave its advice. our role, of course, is advice and consent. in the last defense bill, section 1251 of the fiscal year 10 fdaa, we included a statement that the new start treaty should not include limitations on advanced conventional systems otherwise known as conventional prompt global strike. for the purpose of this let me refer to this as cpgs. despite the assurances from some in the administration that that wouldn't happen, it did happen. there is both limiting language and language in the preamble that sets the stage further limitations on cpgs. we were clear about this because i believe we're going to need

this, and general chilton has said the same thing. first let me make it clear, what we're talking about here is a conventional warhead on top of a missile which has icbm-like capabilities that can quickly reach a spot a long way away to deliver a nonnuclear warhead. with the w.m.d. and terrorists and other rogue state kinds of threats that exist today, our administration and many of the rest of us have concluded that this is a capability that we need. let me just quote general chilton here. to provide the president a better range of nonnuclear options against rapidly emerging threats, we require a deployed conventional strike capability to hold that risks targets in denied territory that can only be rapidly struck today with nuclear weapon platforms. that's the rationale for it. that's the administration's statement. and i agree with that. the senate provided its advice in section 1251 of last year's

defense bill and here's what under secretary tauscher assured senators -- quote -- "there is no effect for global strike in the treaty." it a march 2010 fact sheet assured tkwoe quo the -- -- quote -- "the treaty does not contain constraints on current on planned united states long-range strike capabilities." obviously that statement was meant to assure us that cpgs would not be constrained or limited, but the kicker in there were the words current or planned. that's because there is no current cpgs, and the administration is studying what particular system or systems to move forward with. so while technically correct that there's nothing current or planned, it is also true that the constraints in the treaty will limit whatever system we eventually come up with.

the question, therefore, is what happens when, as general chilton urges us, when we develop a cpgs in the future? general chilton is the head of our strategic command. he is the person responsible for understanding what the threats are and how we can deliver the right ordinance to the right place with perishable intelligence in a very constrained atmosphere. and that's why his views on this, i think, are very, very important. and yet we conceded to russian demands to place limits on cpgs. how is this done? the russians were very clever about this. they knew that they weren't going to be able to get the united states to back off of with our plan. they said you'll have to. count this against your nuclear missiles. that is not a good deal. most of us pwhraoeft 700 is -- believe the 700 is too low to

begin with. what we'll have to do is subtract that number from 700. if you have 25, you're down to 675 launchers for nuclear weapons. that is a limitation. that's a constraint. there is no way to describe that in any other terms. russian foreign minister lavrov said -- quote -- "for the first time, this treaty sets the ceiling not only for strategic delivery vehicles but also those ones which will be fitted with nonnuclear warheads. the u.s. is carrying out this work, which is why it would be extremely important to set a limit precisely on these types of weapons." end of quote. i think he was more straightforward about this than the spokesman for the administration. he says sure, we put limits on it. the united states is moving forward on it, and that's why we wanted to put limits on it. so despite the relationship between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons -- but we wouldn't dare deal with tactical weapons either in the preamble or the treaty -- yet in another

concession to the russians, the preamble of the treaty notes that the parties are, -- quote -- "--" mindful of the impact of conventional icbms and slbms on strategic stability." end of quote. first of all, i don't agree with that statement. what's the impact? the impact assumes you can't segregate the two, which can't be done. second, are we to believe that tactical nuclear weapons which the russians enjoy huge advantage, some say a 10-1 advantage over us, have no impact on strategic stability while conventionally armed ballistic missiles do. what do russia's neighbors think of that argument, i might wonder. clearly, these limits on cpgs and the dangerous language in the preamble were concessions to the russians. it's not in our interests because we do intend to go forward with this. i think taken toyotas extreme, the treaty could prevent the united states from acquiring the nonnuclear strategic capabilities necessary to counter today's principal threats, thrifts and regional adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction. now, we recognize that the

resolution of ratification has language on this. it does not rescind and could not rescind the specific limitation on counting conventionally armed ballistic missiles or mitigate the potential for severe disagreement with the russians over this issue in the very near future. i don't think we should ratify a treaty without knowing what kind of cpgs systems may be counted and how that will affect the nuclear triad at the much-reduced levels now of 700 delivery vehicles. according to the department of defense, an assessment on treaty implications for cpgs proposals will not be ready until 2011. so under the resolution approved by the committee, senators won't know until the treaty enters into force when, obviously, it would be too late. so the bottom line here is that with the 700 launch vehicle in it and cpgs counting against that limit, we will have fewer nuclear delivery vehicles than we negotiated for in the treaty, and that limit will be a disincentive to develop the cpgs as a result.

second, the language in the preamble regarding the impact of cpgs on strategic stability opens the door to further russian pressure against the united states not to develop and deploy these systems. why should we accept these constraints in a treaty that was about nuclear weapons? now, senator kerry had, i think, three main points, if i distilled it correctly on this. first was, well, the russians wanted to limit us from doing this at all, so in effect we should be thankful that the only limitation was on the number. i don't think that's a very good argument. as i said, we wanted to talk tactical, the russians said no, so we didn't talk tactical in the strategic treaty. there is no reason why in a strategic treaty you need to talk conventional arms either, so we didn't do that. senator kerry -- well, it goes along with some in russia who said well, it would be very hard for us to know whether or not a missile launched was a strategic nuclear weapon or one of these

conventional global strike weapons. that's sort of the justification for the russian position. most of the experts with whom i have talked say that is not a limitation that we need worry about at all. we could easily agree with the russians in various ways to assuage their concerns. for example, we could deploy conventionally armed ballistic missiles in areas that are distinct from our icbm field, allow them to periodically conduct on-site inspections under separate agreement. that could be done. and there are other methodisms as well. the key point here is we need these capabilities, and i don't think we should limit them in an arms control treaty dealing with strategic nuclear weapons. the other argument is, well, we're not going to develop these for maybe ten years, which is outside the life of the treaty. first of all, we shouldn't have constraints on developing them at any point. we shouldn't create the precedent that whatever we do with prompt global strike is going to count against our nuclear delivery limits, which

is what this treaty does. but finally, there are programs that are being studied right now in the united states that would allow us to put the prompt global strike capability into service quite quickly. we need it. we need it now. and, for example, there have been proposals for weapons, conventional trident missiles to cite one example that could be deployed in less than ten years. the national academy notified congress in may of 2007 that conventional missiles could be operated to deploy within two years of funding, and there are others. the point here is that we should not be saying well, because certain things aren't going to happen for ten years, the treaty lasts ten years and therefore we don't have to worry about it. it takes a long time to plan these systems, and if they are going to be constrained by what's in the treaty today, they are likely going to be constrained by provisions in future treaties as well. this is a bad precedent. it's one of the reasons why we think that before we would

proceed with this treaty, we would need to have some resolution either in the preamble or the treaty or the resolution of ratification that would give us assurance that we could develop prompt global strike without detracting from our ability to deliver nuclear warheads as well. mr. president, i would like to turn to another matter. i mentioned briefly when i began my conversation yesterday morning about the treaty, and that is that looked in the larger context, some people have said this treaty in and of itself may not put that many constraints on the united states, and therefore they are willing to support it, and i appreciate the rationale behind the argument, but there is an argument that this treaty has to be considered in its context. that's one of the reasons people are concerned about the missile defense issue. but another element of -- another element of context is the whole modernization issue which is directly related to but in a slightly different way relevant to the consideration of the treaty. but the other aspect of context

is that this is a treaty seen by the administration as moving a step forward toward the president's vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and there are a lot of people who disagree with that vision and who believe that if this treaty is ratified, then in effect the administration's very next step is going to be to begin negotiations to do that. and indeed, administration spokesmen have said precisely that. secretary clinton, when new start was signed, talked about the president's vision of a world without nuclear weapons and said we're making real progress toward that goal. and there have been numerous administration spokesmen who have made the same point. the very next thing -- i'll just mention three. under secretary tauscher who i referred to earlier, rose goettemuller have all indicated the next round of negotiations the administration intends to engage in beginning immediately after the ratification of the start treaty is the march toward

the president's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. now, i said i don't share that vision and i don't share it for two reasons. i think it's difficult if not impossible to achieve, and i question whether it's a good idea at all. i don't think anybody believes that that is something that's achievable in anybody's lifetime today, even if it's ever achievable, but right now focusing on this diverts attention, as i think this treaty does, from the efforts to deal with the true threats of today, countries like iran and north korea and nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. and as i said -- in fact, let me quote dr. rice who just recently wrote an op-ed in "the wall street journal," december 7 is the date. she said and i'm quoting -- quote -- "nuclear weapons will be with us for a long time. after this treaty, our focus must be on stopping dangerous proliferators, not on further

reductions in the u.s. and russian strategic arsenals which are really no threat to each other or to international stability." end of quote. i agree with that. and let me quote george kenna who wrote this a long time ago but i think it applies today. i quote again -- "the ee -- evil of these utopian enthusiasms were not only the misplaced emphasis and encouragement of false hopes. the evil lay in that it distracted our gaze from the real things that were happening. the cultivation of these utopian schemes took place at the expense of our feeling for reality." end of quote. i would apply that to today. while we make a big hullabaloo about signing a treaty between russia and the united states, countries who are no longer enemies, who are bringing down our strategic arsenals because it's in our own self-interests to do so, and ignore the threats -- i shouldn't say ignore because that's to suggest the administration and others have not spent time working on

the problem of iran and north korea. i ask, however, how much success we've had and whether or not woe need to devote more attention and effort to resolving those problems that are immediately in front of us rather than dealing with a nonproblem in the start treaty with russia. also, i would ask my colleagues to just reflect for a moment on what such a world would be like. you can divide at least in my lifetime, barely, pre-august, 1945, in the last century and post-august, 1945. world war ii claimed between 56 million and 81 million lives. it's astound to go me we can't even get a more accurate count of that. that's how destructive and disruptive and cataclysmic world war ii was. but it was ended with two atomic weapons. since that time, the major powers, russia, the united states, china, have not fired a shot in anger against each

other. major wars like world war ii, world war i, these wars have been avoided, at least in part, because the countries that possess these weapons know that they cannot be used against each other in a conflict. that's the deterrent value. now, would it be nice if they had never been invented? yes, except for what they accomplished in ending world war ii, but they can't be uninvented, and the reality is that today it does provide a deterrent for the united states to have these weapons. 31 other countries in the world rely on that deterrent. so i would just ask those who say it would be wonderful if these weapons didn't exist, what would the world look like today with all the conflicts that exist and the opportunity for conventional warfare unconstrained by the deterrent of a nuclear retaliation? nobel prize winner and arms control expert thomas shelling recently observed that -- "in a world without nuclear weapons,

countries would maintain an ability to rearm and that every crisis would be a nuclear crisis. the urge to preempt would dominate. it would be a nervous world." end of quote. well, to be sure, and that's an understatement. "new york times" columnist roger cohen wrote, and i quote -- "a world without nuclear weapons sounds nice, but of course that was the world that brought us world war i and world war ii. if you like the sound of that, the touchy feely global zero bandwagon is probably for you." end of quote. general brent scowcroft, who is actually a proponent of this treaty, wrote -- "given the clear risks and the elusive benefits inherent in additional deep cuts, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate such reductions to demonstrate exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance u.s. security. absent such a demonstration, we should not pursue additional cuts in the mistaken belief that fewer is ipso facto better." and this is a point that was also made by the bipartisan congressional commission on the strategic posture of the united

states, the so-called perry-schlesinger commission, in which they concluded, and i'm quoting -- "all of the commission members, all of the commission members believe that reaching the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a fundamental change in geopolitics." end of quote. and, again, quite an understatement. as i said, even the notion that we would be immediately pursuing to try to reach this goal after the start treaty is ratified is to bring into question, at least i would suggest in the minds of 31 countries that depend on our nuclear deterrent for their security, whether this is a wise idea. there are plenty of folks around the world who have commented on this, national leaders who have commented on this. let me just quote a couple to illustrate the breadth of concern about it. president of france, nicholas sarkozy. "it is neither a matter of prestige nor of rank. it is quite simply the nation's

life insurance policy." mr. president, i'll -- i'll ask unanimous consent to put in the record the -- at the conclusion of my remarks a list of comments and quotations by people who have spoken to this. let me just cite maybe one. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kyl: additional one. i thank the chair. bill krystal, who is, i think, a very astute observer of these matters wrote in "the washington post" in april of last year, quote -- "yet to justify a world without nuclear weapons, what obama would really have to envision is a world without war or without threats of war. the danger is that the alure of a world without nuclear weapons can be a distraction, even an excuse for not acting against real nuclear threats. so while obama talks of a future without nuclear weapons, the trajectory we are on today is toward a nuclear and

missile-capable north korea and iran and a far more dangerous world." end of quote. m mr. president, the point of all the people i don't quote here but will include in the record is that the gene knee isn't going to be put back in the bottle. countries will have nuclear weapons. as one of them pointed out, if you are ever by some magic be able to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the threat of one nation quickly acquiring them would be the most destablingizing thing one -- destabilizing thing one could imagine. the reality is that it's not going to happen. and the united states moving toward that goal isn't going to influence anyone, including north korea, syria, iran, or other countries that may not -- that may mean the united states harm. so for those who believe that this is a bad idea and who would like to see the president step back from that goal and instead

focus more convincingly and significantly on dealing with the threats that are near-term, the ratification of this treaty presents a real problem, especially when the administration talks about the very next thing they want to do after beginning those negotiations is to bring to the senate the comprehensive test ban treaty again, which this senate overwhelmingly defeated 11 years ago and over which there are even stronger reasons to reject it today. so the bottom line here is on this particular point, i think one can argue that the dramatic reductions in the arsenals of russia and the united states of these strategic weapons has been a good thing. it certainly has been an economically justifiable action for both countries because they are costly. but it's had no discernible effect on nuclear proliferation. we've had more proliferation since after the cold war we began to reduce these weapons. they are unlikely between the united states and russia to be a

cause of future conflict, and i just think it's time for global disarmament, starting with president obama to recognize this reality and channel their considerable efforts and good intention toward the true dangers of which i've spoken. mr. president, i'd like to address one other subject, if i could, before i -- mr. kerry: i wonder -- the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i don't want to interrupt the senator, but i wonder if before he goss another area he'd like to engage in a discussion on this particular one or not? mr. kyl: i would be happy to do -- mr. kerry: if he is pressed for time, i understand that. mr. kyl: no, no, i'm always happy to yield to my friend. as a predicate to amendments, some of us have opening statements we'd like to give. now, i'm ready to go to amendments here, but there are a couple of things that i'd like to say before we do. i appreciate that very much.

and i will enjoy the colloquy we have when we do get around to that. this is something i just twonts bring up very briefly. we don't have time to get into a lot of detail on it. but it is the question of verification. this is one of the other major matters that people have written about, including senator bond, who is the ranking republican on the intelligence committee. it is going to be important for the snoot have an executive session to go over intelligence, classified information that relates to the question of verification and past russian compliance or noncompliance with agreements that they've made with the united states. i just want to, in this short period of time, rebut something that continues to be repeated and is simply not true, or at least the implication is not true. we have to do this treaty because we need the verification provisions and the implication is that they are good and strong and will be effective. they won't, they're not. the verification provisions in this treaty are far less than we had in the start i treaty, and

in the view of many people, they are not going to be very effective. secretary of state james baker, who testified earlier on this treaty, said -- and i quote -- "the verification mechanism in the new start treaty does not appear as rigorous or sentence safes the one that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and provisions under start i. this complex part of the street even more crucial when fewer nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past." my colleague senator mccain said, "the new start treaty's per miss cybill approach to verification will result in less transparency and create additional challenges for our ability to monitor russia's current and future capabilities." and senator bond said, "new start suffers from fundamental verification flaws that no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix." and he also said this. "the select committee on intelligence has been looking at this issue closely over the past several months. there is no doubt in my mind that the united states cannot

reliably verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads." and in very simple terse, the reason he is saying that is that there is no overall verification of those warheads. you can look at an individual missile and see how many warheads are on the top of it but that doesn't tell you whether they're in compliance with 1,550. and so it's just one of the fundamental flaws. the amount of telemetry -- unencrypted telemetry, useful in fact from russian missile tests is reduced essentially to zero unless the russians decide to give us more than zero. there's no longer on-site monitoring of the mobile missile final assembly facility at votinsk. we didn't even fight for that. it is a critical in fact issue with respect to potentially a railcar or other mobile missiles

that the russians will be developing. i won't quote him here, but secretary gates spoke to that eloquently with respect to the verification provision in start i. there are fewer on-site inspections and, you know, if you declare a facility -- i can't imagine the russians would declare a facility, which is the only place we get to visit, and then be doing something new nefarious at that particular declared facility. it is the undeclared facilities and the places we don't know about or w or they don't tell us about that present a big problem. james woolsey said this, "new start's verification provisions will provide little or no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the russians fail to declare. h., are off-limits to u.s. inspecialghts, or are underground or otherwise hidden from our satellites." when he refers to satellites, those are sometimes referred to as our national assets. they do good and they tell us a lot, but they can't possibly

tell us all the things we need to know. that's why we had much more rigorous verification under the start i treaty. there are other things, as i said, that we will be discussing when we get into the classified session on this. let me conclude this point and my presentation this morning with this reality. we will find, and we can say this much at least in open session, that the russians have violated major provisions of most of the agreements that we've entered into with them for a long, long time. start i, the chemical weapons convention, the biological weapons querntion the conventional forces in europe treaty, the open skies and by the way others that i won't mention here. the concern would be for a breakup. today russia and the united states are not enemies. that's why a lot of this is of less concern than it eerld would be. the big concern is just that ultimate concern of a breakout. what if all of a sudden they

would decide to confront us over some issue relating to a country on their border or something else and we weren't aware that they had gaininged a significant advantage over us? again, the preparation of the united states to deal with that takes a long time. i won't get into it here, but it takes a long time. that's why verification and intelligence is so important. so, mr. president, i've just talked about two things here this morning -- the conventional global strike and the verification issues -- as well as the general concept of a world without nuclear weapons, which unfortunately i think this treaty, at least in the minds of a lot of people, is viewed as predicate for and which would be very dangerous. there are some other issues that eventually i would like to speak to, including the whole question of whether or not, as a rationale nor this treaty, the russian reset relations with russia have really provided very much help to the united states and whether this treaty should be used as a way of assuaging

russian sensitivities or convincing them to cooperate with us on other things. others have talked about tactical nuclear weapons, and there will be amendments that we will be offering that deal with thargs and we can discuss that later. there's also a very important matter of the bilateral consultative commission, recognizing that this group of russian and american negotiators could in secret change terms of the treaty. the resolution of ratification provided for a notice provision, but it's not adequate. i'm hoping my completion will agree with us on that -- i'm hoping my colleagues will agree with us. we'll provide something to reject terms that are deemed central to the treaty and which we really need to be providing our consent or nonconsent for. and then finally, something that i alluded to here, which is that the united states really ought to be spending more time dealing with the threats that i think are more real to us today, threats coming from places like iran and north korea, rather

than assuming that our top priority here -- we've just got to rush it up to christmas in order to get it done -- is this treaty with russia. we'll have more opportunity to talk about all of those malts later, and hopefully this afternoon we can begin debating amendments to the treaty first, and we do need to get squared away the issue that senator corker and kerry talked about, how to go about that that doesn't cut off people's rights to offer amendments which are to the resolution of ratification, because i think it is true, as senator kerry said, that under the precedents of the senate, we first have to attempt to amend the treaty and the preamble and to do otherwise or to mix the two up would require a unanimous consent, i gather. mr. kerry: mr. president, let me say to -- the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: let me say to my friend that we have no intention of trying to use any technicality to deny an ability to have an amendment. so we'll agree, and when each

amendment comes up, we'll find a way to make certain that it is appropriate. but we obviously have to send a signal that there's a point where you have to go off the treaty and on to the resolution of ratification. that appears automatically when we file cloture. once that's done, it really becomes irrelevant. mr. kyl: if i could just have senator kerry -- if cloture is filed and invoked, then both amendments to the treaty, the preamble, and the resolution of ratification are cut off at this point, correct? mr. kerry: no, the -- there still are germane amendments allowed to the resolution of ratification at that point, providing we at that point have completed the issues on the treaty. mr. kyl: well, mr. president, i think they would have to be pending. in other words -- mr. kerry: it would have to be pending -- mr. kyl: cloture cuts off both of the resolution of ratification amendments as well treaty and preamble amendments?

mr. kerry: right. mr. kyl: together. it is one cloture that cuts everything off? mr. kerry: once et cetera a been invoked. is that correct. mr. kyl: yes. mr. kerry: mr. president, i would just say to my friend a couple things, if i can. he's got to run, but i just want to say to him that in his earlier argument with respect to the global strike, we can get into this later, but he said something about how you could eliminate the issue of confusion with the russians because, of course, you could just agree with them and they could agree and then you have sort of an identification. the only point is they won't agree. they're not going to agree. i mean, we -- you can't sort of make this supposition all of a sudden that you're going to erase a problem simply because they'll agree to something they don't want to agree to which is why we're in the place we are with respect to that issue. that's number one. number two, we made the decision -- our generals made the

decision, our defense folks -- that we're better off with this because it in fact gives us a greater capacity to to be able to verify what they're doing as well as what we're doing, and understand the makeup of icbms us a go forward. let me say, i urge my friend to go reread the resolution of ratification because we have in that resolution condition 6 addressings these questions, condition 7 addresses these questions, understanding 5 addresses strategic range, nonnuclear weapons systems, and declaration 3 addresses them. so i'm not going to go through all of that language with the senator right now. but we have addressed this question. now, any future treaty with respect to this question of global zero that keeps coming back up, i'll talk about this later with the senator, but the senator must have a very different vision of where he'd like to see the world go and of

what would be in the long-term interest globally and of what the impact simplify multiple nuclear weapons in the world with a lot more fissionable material, a lot more ability for terrorists to be able to access that fissionable material. and the fact is that in testimony before our committee, secretary baker was very, very clear about the linkage of the nunn-lugar threat-reduction program and the start treaty. he said directly to our committee that were it not for the start treaty, we would not have been able to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and, therefore, the amount of fissionable material that in many cases was badly guarded or not guarded at all complete ava possibility of black market sale and falling into the hands of terrorists. so, there are many ways to proceed forward. i'd also say to my friend -- i am not going to go into a long discussion of it now -- but with

respect to this global zero, nuclear zero, it is stunning to me that completion are coming to the floor of the senate -- that colleagues are coming to the floor of the senate, fighting against an organized principle and concept for how you could move the entire world to a safer place ultimately, none of which will happen, clearly, without extraordinary changes globally in the way nations relate to each other and behave, how you control fissionable material, and what kind of dispute resolutions mechanisms might be available in the future. but, for heaven's sakes, it's incredible to me that you can't imagine and have a vision of the possibility of a world in which you ultimately work to get there. that's the purpose of human endeavor in this field in a sense. it's why we have a united nations. it's why president after president has talked about a world without nuclear weapons, a

world that is safer. does that mean that all of a sudden we're discarding the present-day notion of deterrence? no. does it mean that we're ignoring the reality of how countries have made judgments over the course of the cold war about peace and war and what the risk is of going to war? obviously not. i acknowledge -- you know, one of the things that the navy did for me was send me to nuclear, chemical, biological warfare school and i spent an interesting time learning about throwaway concentric circles of damage and the extent to which one nuclear weapon wreaks havoc in the world. the concept to me of 1,550 of them aimed at each other is still way above any sort of reasonable standards in my judgment about what it takes to deter. do you think we'd think about bombing china today or going to

war with them? china has in published, unclassified assessments, one-tenth maybe of the number of weapons we have. i think they're feeling particularly threatened by the united states in that context, nor we they. because you arrive at other ways of sort of working through these kinds of things. i just think that this concept of a nuclear zero is so irrelevant to this debate, particularly given the fact that we're debating a treaty which is the only way to agree to reduce the weapons that requires 67 votes in the united states senate. so if -- even if president obama wanted to try to do something in the future, this treaty doesn't open the door to it because it would require a next treaty in order to accomplish it. and that would require 67 votes. and it's pretty obvious you'd never get that in the united states senate in the current

world. so what are we talking about here? it's sort of a distraction. it's one of these hobgoblins of some folks who are so ideologically narrowly focused that they can't see the forest for the trees. the choice here is between having a treaty that gives you inspection that every member of our intelligence community says can be verified that helps to provide security or not having one and having no inspection and having no verification. none whatsoever. that's the choice here. this is not particularly complicated unless you really want to make it so for a whole lot of other reasons. so, you know, the concept that this is somehow doing this treaty is a distraction from dealing with terror is absolutely contradicted by the facts. witness what jim baker and

others have said about the nunn-lugar threat-reduction program and its linkage to start i, not to mention the myriad of other benefits that have come. and there you see what russia has done with the united states in recent months to move with respect to iran. if we hadn't had a reset button, if we hadn't improved the relationship with russia, if we hadn't been able to share information and have a cooperative atmosphere partly increased by virtue of this treaty agreement, if we hadn't done that, russia would not have joined with the united states because the relationship wouldn't have been such that they would have been willing to in order to bring greater sanctions against iran and try to deal with iran's nuclear program. so all of these things are linked. and to suggest somehow that you can walk in here and just separate them and treat them differently is to ignore the nature of government-to-government

relations, to ignore the nature of bilateral relationships, to ignore the nature of human nature in which people react to what other people do. and countries are the same way. they react to the sense of where we're headed, and by working together cooperatively on this, i think we've been able to say we're headed in the same direction. and that's an important message. mr. president, there's a lot more to be said on all of this, but i will yield the floor. mr. lugar: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from indiana. mr. lugar: mr. president, during the debate several senators have noted concerns about the u.s. triad of submarines, land-based missiles and those weapons which we will equip with our heavy bombers over the duration of the treaty. others have cited concern with the administration's plan in the

updated 1251 report. they noted it could somehow constrain our flexibility to meet some arms control aspirations rather than weapons modernization. our resolution to ratification incorporated a declaration concerning the so-called triad. this was done in committee with an amendment offered by senator risch. that declaration, number 13, states -- and i quote -- "it is the sense of the senate that the deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic delivery vehicles. to this end the united states is committed to flicker the modernization -- committed to accomplishing the modernization of deliver of nuclear vehicles and to ensuring the continued flexibility of the united states conventional and nuclear

delivery systems. that, as i say, was included in our committee work. secondly, i wrote to secretary gates last week -- our secretary of defense -- regarding the concerns that many senators have noted about the age and weaponry for our heavy bombers. notably, the b-52 and its air launch cruise missile and about modernization plans for our icbms. i wanted assurances that over the duration of the treaty, we will have a triad of systems that is credible, particularly the bomber leg of our triad. mr. president, i ask consent to insert in the record the response i received from secretary gates on december 10. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. lugar: mr. president, i asked for assurance that over the duration of the new start treaty, the defense department

will not permit a situation to arise where heavy bombers lack sufficient and credible nuclear and attack capability. secretary gates responded that the current air launch cruise missile will be maintained through 2030 with multiple lifetime extensions. and that -- and i quote -- "the administration is committed to providing a sufficient and credible nuclear standoff attack capability and ensure the bomber leg of the triad remains fully capable of supporting u.s.-deterrent requirements." i also sought assurance that the language in the 1251 update will in no way modify the basing of the icbm leg of the triad, nor constrain its future designs with respect to warhead loadings. that is, constraining it to meet some arms control goal of fewer

warheads for icbms. secretary gates responded that -- and i quote -- "the administration is also committed to sustaining the silo-based minuteman 3 force through 2030 as mandated by congress." end of quote. and that -- and i quote -- "neither the update of the 1251 report nor planning and guidance for a followon icbm will constrain the flexibility of a follow-on design with respect to warhead loadings." end of quote. "bombers will have sufficient nuclear weapons under new start. we are not going to constrain a future icbm for purposes of arms control." with these commitments and our declaration, i am assured by secretary of defense gates we will have a credible bomber leg, one that allows us sufficient

and flexible responses for you to change and a future i can -- icbm will not be less responsible than our present. levels where the combatant manner is responsible for planning for nuclear operations. general chilton has said this about the new start treaty and its force structure -- and i quote -- "under the new start treaty based on u.s. strategic command analysis, i assess the triad a diverse and complementary delivery system will provide sufficient capability to make our deterrent credible and effective. under the new start treaty, the united states will retain the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of treaty. u.s. strategic command analyzed

the required nuclear weapons and delivered vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance and provided options for consideration by the department of defense. this rigorous appraisal rooted in both deterrence and strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities valued the both agreed-upon reductions and the new start treaty and recommendations in the nuclear posture review. end of quote from general chilton. note what he said, mr. president. that this analysis takes into account potential adversary capabilities. general chilton is confident in our deterrent and that the force structure under the treaty, under our triad will meet our needs. i do not think that we should dispute either general chilton, our secretary gates, long-serving professionals who

have served with president bush and obama so very, very well. mr. president, i would add supplementing the excellent comments made by my colleague, the chairman, that from the beginning of our debates in the united states senate on arms control treaties or even before that, the so-called nunn-lugar cooperative threat-reduction program, there have been many senators very sincere in their viewpoint that they simply do not like arms control treaties. furthermore, they would counsel that you cannot trust the russians. and, therefore, agtd two together to have an aversion to arms control treaties and agreements and do not trust the russians and, furthermore, you really don't want to trust the russians or have any further dealings with them, quite apart from treaties on arms control,

this leads to certain skepticism, if not outright opposition to those of us who have been proposing arms control treaties for several years. and arms control treaties with the russians in particular. i would just simply point out, as i tried to yesterday informally, that there are always extraordinary problems with verification of any treaty. and much of the debate in this treaty in terms of our committee responsibilities and initial statements made by senators on the floor, zero in on such points as the fact that you can trust the russians and/or there are other things in the world we ought to be paying attention to much more important than the russians, for that matter. and further, that somehow this treaty in particular will

inhibit the defense of our country, specifically through missile defense. members of administrations past and present have affirmed it is important to have arms control treatyies with the russians. there's not ever been a question of trusting the russians. there's been a question of trying to provide verification, that the permission of the treaties we have negotiated are in fact fulfilled. it is a fact, as has been suggested by some senators, that on several occasions we have found violations or very dubious conduct on the pafrt russians. -- on the part of the russians. i have no idea how many times they have tested they have found something doubtful about our peformance. but in any event, in the real world of deterrence and the real world of verifiability, there have been abrasions and arguments and disputes.

i would simply say that one of the values of the treaties we've had with the russians, and specifically, the start treaty regime, is that they have allowed many of us -- the distinguished chairman has made a good number of trips to russia and to countries that surround russia -- russia. i've had that responsibility and opportunity for many years, likewise. and i testified yesterday during our debate that on one occasion, when i was invited to come to a submarine base, i saw things that no american had ever seen before, apparently. when we talk about our -- our intelligence facilities, there were no pictures taken by our intelligence folks or really very good dimensions of what a

typhoon submarine actually looked like or what it did. we had various suppositions, incredibly, after my visit to submesh, we were not allowed to take pictures, a picture sent to me of me standing in front of a typhoon submarine. from our intelligence standpoint, this is the first time anyone has ever seen a picture of a typhoon, quite apart from a diligent senator standing in front of it. and furthermore, we had many opportunities with the russians to discuss the typhoon. i don't specialize in submarines, but i was able to take notes and make note at least of my impressions of that particular situation. why in the world would someone invite a senator to see something of that variety? it came about because we literally had not only boots on the ground in terms of our military but some of us even as

senators, and the relationship was such that the russians perceiving they needed to get rid of the typhoon submarines, and it's going to be very expensive, technically may even be dangerous with regard to removal of all the 200 missiles. i decided that it was time to do business. the opportunities that come, in other words, from a relationship of that sort sometimes move in directions no one might have anticipated, but to the good, in my judgment. i admitted yesterday only three of the six typhoons have, in fact, been destroyed. it's a tedious, expensive, difficult process. but getting back to our debates on the floor of the senate, i can recall not only during the initial discussion of the nunn-lugar act, but almost annually as appropriations were sought to continue this work, skeptical colleagues, first of all, doubting the value of any type of arrangement with the

russians and doubting very much whether a dime of american taxpayer money should ever be spent on the russians in this regard. so some of us as reasonably and calmly as possible say we think it's probably important that if there are, in fact, nuclear warheads, thousands of them aimed at our cities as well as our military installations, and we have opportunities in cooperative threat reduction to work as contractors, as senators, as military officials, whoever, with the russians, we ought to take those warheads that are aimed at us off the missiles. we ought to physically take the missiles down, we ought to, in fact, destroy the silos in which they are located. we think this is probably valuable use of taxpayer money in terms of our own defense.

each year, by and large, that argument won, although rarely unanimously, and on one occasion, mr. president, incredibly as it may be, members of the senate added so many qualifications, so many additional reports that had to be filed by the defense department or the state department or intelligence, that the whole fiscal year passed without a single dollar being available for expenditure on any of this armament reduction. senators, in other words, were -- were so involved in attempting to demonstrate their mistrust of the russians, their demand that our bureaucracy fulfill all sorts of impossible goals, that nothing got done. eventually, over the course of the decade, we have evolved to a point of whereby and large those sorts of debates began to taper

off, and i'm grateful for that, and we began really to see the possibilities not only with regard to the russians but other countries who strangely had strange weapons that they reported to us and sought our cooperation, and this is well beyond even the ability to wind up the nuclear situation in ukraine or kazkstan or byelorussia or what have you. i cite one more, mr. president, and that is in the year 2004, the first year in which the senate voted that at least least $50 million, just just $50 million of about about $500 million that year of the nunn-lugar program could be used someplace outside of russia. so strong were feelings of some in opposition to the nunn-lugar program that they -- they saw

the fact that it might spread outside of russia almost as a contaminant, something that ought to be contained. they felt it was bad enough that we had ever had such a thing in russia, quite apart from that we ought to destroy weapons anywhere else. nonetheless, a majority of the senate did allow for for $50 million, and that very summer, authorities in albania notified the pentagon that they had found some strange drums up above the capitol city, tarana, in albania. they wanted to report that to us because they thought they needed assistance, probably for the safety sake of the albanians who had found the drums. our officials, having been invited by the albanians, went. in -- went, in fact, to the mountains, and they found the drums were filled with nerve gas. very quickly, they really simply

put up a modest fence and began to roll the drums in behind the fence. i was invited to come over at that stage, and i did and had good visits to our ambassadors with albania, with their foreign minister and defense minister and members of their parliament. albania at that time was a state that was coming out of a terrible dictatorship, a dictatorship that was so adverse that it was even difficult for the soviet union and the chinese to deal with. where in the world the nerve gas came from is a matter of conjecture. but in any event, once we had indicated our hopes that we could work with the albanians, they invited us to do so and to help them destroy it, and as a matter of fact as a bonus while we were up in the mountains, took us by several sheds where there were hundreds of manpad

missiles. not weapons of mass destruction, but missiles that we had furnished, as a matter of fact, to forces in afghanistan, an earlier war to drive out the former soviet union. so we were able to destroy those while we were at it. as an added bonus, the defense minister of albania said, you know, we believe we ought to set up a military academy along the same standards of your military academy at west point. as a further gesture, we're going to have as a requirement that each of our cadets must master the english language, so that we are going to be able to deal with you for some time to come. i felt that was an important gesture, and i mentioned this because in the course of arms control, a good number of things happen that are very important. i conclude by saying that albania two years later invited

all the countries of the world to come to their capital and to celebrate the fact that albania claimed to be the first nation state to fulfill the chemical weapons convention, that all chemical weapons in the country had been destroyed, and we celebrated with them. it was literally a derivative of a situation we are describing today. so i ask those who are normally skeptical to continue to ask good questions, but likewise to understand the history at least of the last two decades that has been very constructive for our country. i yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. speaker, i want to thank ranking member senator lugar for relating -- for sharing that account with the senate. i think, first of all, it's historical, historic, but secondly, i think it's really

relevant to the interconnectedness between what we're doing here and the long-term ways in which we make our country safer. one can only imagine if one group or another that we're all too familiar with the labels and names of these days had gotten a hold of those barrels, the havoc that could have been reached somewhere is just extraordinary. as the senator from indiana knows better than anybody here, some of these nuclear materials were behind creeky old rusty gates, with maybe one guard if any guard, a lock that was so easy to break. i mean, it was infantile, the notion that something was secured. and much of that has changed as a consequence of the program that he and senator nunn began, but also the consciousness that's been raised in a lot of countries around the world.

and this effort, we believe, continues that. so i thank him for his leadership again on that score. mr. president, i suggest the absence of a quorum. before i do -- before i put that in, we are awaiting amendments from colleagues and look forward to entertaining them when they get here. i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

quorum call:

mr. reed: mr. president, i would ask that the quorum call be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reed: thank you, mr. president. i rise today to express my support for the new strategic arms reduction treaty, also known as the new start treaty, which was signed by president obama and russian president medvedev on april 8, 2010, and would replace the start treaty that expired on december 5, 2009. as a member of the armed services committee, i had the opportunity to review the implications of this treaty over the course of five hearings and multiple briefings. i am convinced that ratification

of this treaty is essential to the security of the united states, not simply in the context of our relationship with russia but also in our efforts at counterproliferation throughout the world. as a startingpoint to consider this treaty, it is important to recognize that since december 5, 2009, when the start treaty expired, we have not had inspectors on the ground in russia to monitor their nuclear weapons complex. it wasn't until december 2008 that the bush administration and russia agreed to this athey wanted to replace start before it expired but acknowledged that the task would have to be left to the obama administration, leaving them one year before the treaty was set to expire so that they could begin these negotiations. the reality is that weave we haven't had a verification regime in place for inspectors on the ground in russia for over a year. and every day that goes by without this treaty in place is

another where the united states has the ability to verify effectively and in person and inspect russian's strategic nuclear forces. and if the senate rejects this treaty, it may be many years, if ever, before we once again have american inspectors on the ground in russia. president obama stated, and i quote, "in the absence of start, without the new start treaty being ratified by the senate, we do not have a verification mechanism to ensure that we know what the russians are doing, and when you have uncertainty in the area of nuclear weapons, that's a much more dangerous world to live in." the bottom line is this, frankly: if you don't trust the russians, then you should be voting for this treaty, because that's the only way we're going to get in a timeland effective way american inspectors back on the ground looking at that nuclear complex. there is another aspect here.

without the new start treaty in place, there is an additional strain on our intelligence network to monitor russia's activities. in his testimony to the armed services committee, general kevin chilton, commander of stratcom stated, "without new start, we would rapidly lose some of our insights into russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities. we would be required increasingly to focus low-density, high-demand intelligent collection and analysis assets on russian nuclear forces." these intelligence assets include our satellites, which are already in high demand, particularly in our operations in afghanistan and iraq, as well as in emerging threat locations like yemen, somalia, the pacific. furthermore, these national technical means can never supplant the intelligence gathered by experts in verifying the quantity, type, and location

of russia's nuclear arsenal. dr. james miller, principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy remarks, on-site inspectors are a vital complement to the data that the united states will receive under new start. they provide the boots on the ground presence to confirm the validity of russian data declarations and to add to our confidence and knowledge regarding russian strategic forces loablghted at facilities around the country. the failure to ratify may present a significant operational cost to our efforts on the war on terrorism. to compensate for a lack of treaty, our satellite set as ses could be shifted to maintain some coverage on russia which in the short-run would deny the capability of look at other places like sudan and yemen where we know that al qaeda and its affiliates are establishing facilities. in the longerrer term we may consider putting up new

satellites, something that would not give us the same kind of information as having inspectors on the ground. let me just once again emphasize this: if this treaty goes unratified, if we do not have inspectors on the ground, then we must rely on what is known as our national technical means of verification, significantly satellites. those are, as general chilton said, high-demand assets, and if they're being flown over russia, i can't concede, if we let this treaty lapse over several years, that military commanders will just feel confident not putting more and more satellites over russia. that takes away from efforts right now to monitor troubled spots around the globe and is a real cause to the failure to ratify this treaty. it ratifying this treaty is also a vital part of our relationship with russia.

it is the essential element in the process of controlling nuclear weapons tbeen the united states and -- between the united states and russia. i want to quote my esteemed colleague and the manager on the russian side, senator lugar, who has long been not only a leader in this effort but someone whose vision and whose actions already, particularly through his work with senator sam nunn, has made this world a much, much safer place and one whose debt nationally we all are in, and i thank him for that. but senator lugar stated on the floor this week, "we should not be cavalier about allowing our relationship with moscow to drift or letting our knowledge of russian weaponry atrophy." he's right, as he has been on so many issues with respect to national and international policy. this process also has a long history of bipartisan support. for the first formal agreement with the soviet union under the

carter administration that limited nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, through both terms of president reagan's administration which produced the original start treaty, to the overwhelming support in the national to ratify these important agreements, all of these agreements had bipartisan, strong support. this treaty is an important part of renewing our relationship with russia and will provide the foundation for negotiations on other nuclear issues. ellen tauscher, under secretary of state for arms control, international security, has stated, "it is my calculation that we need to get this done now because every day that we don't is a day that will not only -- that not only don't we have boots on the ground but it's also a day we can't move on to other parts of the agenda." this was the new start treaty but it's also the start of the reset of the relationship and is a very big agenda." we have other issues -- tactical

nuclear devices which the russians may have and former countries in the soviet union may have; we have a whole set of issues; we have issues with respect to iran, north korea. if we can ratify this treaty, we now have momentum to move forward on these other issues. but we all know that the proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens more than the security of just russia and the united states. indeed, this treaty is val to the continued need for worldwide effort to control nuclear weapons. it is every president's worst nightmare that somewhere in the world a nuclear accident will occur, a rogue state will obtain nuclear capability, or a nuclear weapon or materials will fall into the hands of a terrorist group. this treaty is an important step towards reducing the number of nuclear weapons around the world and demonstrate demonstrates toe international community that the

united states and russia are committed to this goal. if we don't ratify this agreement and don't continue this 40-year process of working with russia on limiting nuclear weapons, how can we get them to assist us effectively in addressing the nuclear ambitions of north korea and iran? what credibility will we have among the international community to restrain iran's development of nuclear weapons if it's perceived that we have abandoned a long-lasting, long-term and so far mutually beneficial attempt with the russians to limit our nuclear weapons? we must do everything possible to counter proliferation, through containment, through interdiction, through a host of different programs. again, i want to quote senator lugar. in his words, "this process must continue if we are to answer the existential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction. every missile destroyed, every warhead deactivated and every inspection implemented makes us safer. russia and the united states have the choice whether or not to continue this effort and that choice is embodied in the new start treaty." we also understand, too, that as long as we have nuclear weapons, we have to have an effective nuclear arsenal. in its fy 2011 effort, the obama administration requested $7 billion for the national nuclear security administration, nnsa, which oversees the u.s. nuclear complex. this request is about 10% more than the previous year's budget. that is a significant increase for any department in this government. particularly as we face challenging economic times and an increased d indeed, the former nnsa administrator, lynn ton brooks, under george w. bush

said, "i'd have killed for that kind of budget, and that much high-level attention in the administration." so the issue of dealing with our nuclear arsenal is being addressed with more energy and more resources and more attention than it was in the preceding administration. and i don't think that that argument can be used as an attempt to delay the ratification of the -- this treaty. many have argued that before we consider the treaty, we must commit to substantial funding increases in the future budget to modernize our nuclear infrastructure. we are doing that. and while i support the need to provide a safer, reliable nuclear arsenal, i applaud the obama administration's to commit significant resources to do so, we have to recognize that this is a recent change. in fact, the obama administration is not only bringing this treaty to the senate, it's also bringing to

the congress a level of commitment that was lacking previously, i think and both of those are necessary and both of those mutually reinforce one another and together are strong, strong support for the ratification of this treaty. during an armed services committee hearing in july, i asked the directors of the national labs about the significant commitment of resources this administration has made to the nuclear enterprise. dr. george miller, the director of the lawrence livermore national laboratory responded, "it is clearly a major step in the right direction. the budget has been declining since about 2005 and this represents a very important and significant turnaround." the obama administration has also outlined an $85 billion ten-year plan for nnsa nuclear weapons activities which includes an additional $4.1 billion in spending for fiscal years 2012-2016. the $85 billion represents a 21%

rise above the fiscal 2011 spending level. as secretary of defense robert gates wrote in his preface to the april 2010 nuclear posture review, "these investments and the n.p.r.'s strategy for warhead life extension represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation's deterrence." ratifying this treaty presents us with the opportunity to recommit ourselves to preserving and reinvesting in our nuclear enterprise, including the highly-trained work force, which is so necessary. but again, ratifying this treaty is such an intentional part of our national security that it both complements and in some cases transcend transcends simpy reinvesting in our modernization efforts but we are doing that, and that should give, i think,

comfort to those who see that as an issue which may -- and i don't think so -- present some inhibition in ratifying this treaty. in all the discussion we've had on the content of this treaty, we've often failed to note the caliber and professionalism of the american negotiators who worked tirelessly on this trea treaty. this elite cadre of experts devoted their lives to serving our nation in promoting nuclear arms control and doing it from very wise, very experienced, and i think very critical notions on what is necessary to protect the united states, because that is their first and foremost responsibility. this impressive team consisted of state department negotiators, representatives from the department of defense's joint staff, from stratcom, our military command that is responsible for all these nuclear devices. most of them took part in the development of start i and the subsequent treaties.

they've had the experience of years and years of dealing with the russians, of understanding the strengths and the weaknesses of our approaches. they captured these lessons learned on what we need to know about the russian nuclear enterprise and the best means of achieving our national strategic objective. this was not the labor of amateurs. this was the work of people who've devoted their lifetime to try to develop a effective nuclear regime involving inspections, verification. they know more about what the russians do and vice versa than anyone else. they were at the heart of these negotiations. many of the principals behind this treaty are as a result complex and nuanced. most americans, frankly, and, indeed, many of our colleagues don't have the means to invest the time to become versed in

launches, ite telemetry and verification ra jeeps. these individuals have spent their lives doing it. and we're quite fortunate that they have committed themselves to this enterprise and they have produced this treaty as much as anyone. furthermore, former secretaries of state and defense for both republican and democratic administrations and military commanders, including seven previous commanders of stratco stratcom -- these are the military officers whose professional lives have been devoted to protecting america and commanding every unit that has a nuclear capability. they've all urged us to support this start treaty. that is a very i think strong endorsement as to the effectiveness of this treaty and the need for this treaty. all of them understand that this is in our best national security interest. again, all of the commanders,

all of the individuals who have spent every waking hour as commander and, indeed, probably sleepless nights thinking about their responsibilities for nuclear weapons, their use consider this treaty essential. that i think should be strong evidence for its ratification. as i mentioned before, the new start treaty builds upon decades of diplomacy and agreements between the united states and russia. the new start treaty is appropriately structured to address the present conditions of our nuclear enterprise and national security interests. while building on the lessons we've learned from decades of previous treaty negotiations. decades of implementing treaties, of finding out what works on the ground and setting nonproliferation goals for the future. and it's important i think to understand how we got to today. the united states and the soviet union signed their first formal agreements limiting nuclear offensive and defensive weapons

in may 1972, the strategic arms limitation talks known as salt. produced two agreements. the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. in 1979, these agreements were followed by the signing of the strategic arms limitation treaty known as salt ii, which sought to codify equal limits on u.s. and soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. however, president carter eventually withdrew this treaty from senate consideration due to the soviets invasion of afghanistan. throughout the 1980's, the reagan administration participated in negotiations on the development of the intermediate-range nuclear force treaty is, the i.n.f. treaty, and it was ultimately signed in 1998. at the negotiations, the reagan administration called for a double zero option, which would eliminate all short- as well as

long-range i.n.f. systems, intermediate systems, a position at the time viewed by most observers as unattractive to the soviets. president reagan also worked extensively to reduce the number of nuclear warheads which led to the signing by president george herbert walker bush to the initial start treaty in july of 1991. again, the work of president reagan, the work of president george herbert walker bush all led to the historic start i treaty. it limited long-range nuclear forces, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, icbms, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, slbms, and heavy bombers. start also contained a complex verification regime. both sides collected most of the information needed to verify compliance with their own satellites and remote sensing equipment known as the national technical means and verification. but the party also used data exchanges, notifications and on-site inspections to gather

information about forces and activities limited by the treaty. taken together, these measures were designed to provide each nation with the ability to deter and detect military significant violations. the verification regime and the cooperation needed to implement many of these measures instilled confidence and encouraged openness among the signatories. the original start treaty, which was ratified by the senate in october 1992 by a vote of 93-6. we are building literally on the path-breaking work of president ronald reagan and president george herbert walker bush. limiting these classes of systems cialg usin. usualing national means of technology, putting inspectors on the ground. and i find it ironic that we might be on the stage of turning our back on all that work, of

walking away from a bipartisan consensus, 93-6? i don't think that would be in the best interests of this country. now, in january 1993, the united states and russia signed start ii which would further limit warheads. after some delay, the treaty eventually received approval by the senate in january of 1996 but it never entered into force, mainly because of the united states withdrawal from the a.b.m. treaty in june of 2002. but once again, there was another effort along these same lines to further limit numbers of launchers and warheads and in that same spirit that today we have this new start treaty before us. during a summit meeting with president putin in november 2001, president bush, george w. bush, announced that the united states would reduce its

operational deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads during the next decade. he stated that the united states would reduce its forces unilaterally without signing a formal agreement. however, president putin indicated that russia wanted to use the formal arms control process, emphasizing that the two sides should focus on reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement in a legally binding document. yet the bush administration wanted to maintain the flexibility, the size and structure its nuclear forces in response to its own needs and preferred a less formal process. the united states and russia ultimately did sign the strategic offensive reduction treaty, also known as the moscow treaty, on may 24, 2002. the united states senate ratified the treaty on march 6, 2003, by a vote of 95-0. and the russian duma approved

the treaty also. once again, a high-level arms treaty negotiated by president george w. bush with the russians came to this floor and was unanimously approved. in mid-2006, the united states and russia began to discuss their options for arms control after start. however, the two countries were unable to agree on a path forward. neither side wanted to extend start in the original form. russia wanted to replace start with a new treaty that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same definitions and counting rules of start. the bush administration initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty but would have been willing to extend informally some of the start's monitoring provisions. president bush and president putin agreed at a summit in april 2008 that they would proceed with negotiating a new legally binding treaty. as i mentioned before, it really wasn't until