start before it expired and acknowledged this task before the obama administration. and this administration took that work seriously and diligently and produced a treaty and now it is our not only opportunity but i believe obligation to ratify the treaty. spf msome of my colleagues have already described the provisions of the new start treaty. let me suggest some of the important details. under the new start treaty, the united states and russia must reduce the number of their strategic arms within seven years from the date the treaty enters force. this treaty sets a limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads or warheads on deployed icbms and deployed slbms count toward these limit and each deployed nuclear armament counts as one warhead toward this limit. this limit is 70% lower than the limit of the 1991 start treaty.

and, again, let me stop, and i think if you asked every mes american, would we be safer with fewer nuclear warheads in the stock -- in the strategic forces of russia and the united states? the answer would be yes. i think we will all recognize the potential danger of the existence of more than enough nuclear weapons to wreak havoc, if they were somehow launched. the new start treaty also sets a limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed icbm launchers, slbm launches and heavy bombers. it is not only warheads but also launching systems. it puts separate limits on deployed icbms and deployed slbms and deployed heavy bombers. and the limit is less than half the limit established by the

1991 start treaty for deployed nuclear delivery vehicles. the sooner we ratify this treaty, the sooner these limitations can be in place and can be enforced. we're at a poirnghts i think, where we can continue the progress that -- we're at a point, i think, where we can continue the progress that began with president reagan, president heherbert walker bush, with the spirit started by the moscow treaty by george herbert walker bush. once ratified, the new start treaty will be enforced for ten years, unless supersede by a subsequent agreement, and of course the u.s. and russia have the opportunity to extend the treaty for a period of no more than five years, and there are withdrawal clauses if we feel our national security requires such withdrawal. furthermore, the 2002 moscow treaty will terminate with the adoption of this start treaty. like the first start treaty, the

new start treaty establishes a complex verification and transparency regime that will guard against cheating and will enable the u.s. to monitor russia's compliance with the treaty's terms. the treaty's verification measures build on the lessons learned during the 15 years of implementing the 1991 start treaty and adds new elements tailored to the limitations of this treaty and to the application of this treaty. indeed, assistant secretary of state rose got mueller -- rose got miller stated "much was learned during the 15 years that it was implemented and the united states and russia are sure to take advantage of that knowledge ensuring the in fact of the new start treaty. to include new measures where necessary, improve those measures that were an unnecessary drag on our strategic forces and eliminate

those that were not essential to verifying the obleses of the new start treaty." and these verification measures include on-site inspections, which we do not have at the moment, data exchanges, which we do not have at the moment, and notifications, as well as provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring, to increase confidence and transparency, the treaty also provides for the transfer of telemetry information. under the terms of the treaty, the parties are required to exchange data on the numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of deployed and nondeployment strategic arms that are subject to the treaty. the parties also agree to assign and exchange unique identification numbers for each dough ployed and nondeployed icbm, slbm, and nuclear-capable heavy bomber. we literally now will have the sear yuial -- the cereal numbers which we can -- the serial numbers which we can monitor.

the treaty tracks the movement and changes of status of strategic arms. through these note dpaitionz and the unique identification numbers, the u.s. will be better able to monitor the status of russian arms throughout their life cycle. it will also allow each party up to 18 on-site inexpects each year. these inspections will include deployed and nondeployed systems at operating bases as well as nonornting systems at conversion/elimination facilities. these on site inspections will help verify and confirm the information provided in the data exchanges and notifications, enssuring that russia is staying within the limits of the treaty. some have asked why have a treaty if russia is allowed to cheat? it is important to remind us of several points. first, because of the commitment under the comprehensive test ban treaty, russia has also already been ormting on a tighter

constraint than the united states. they are signatories. in 1996, president clinton and president yeltsin signed the test ban treaty, the russian duma approved the treaty, but we have yet to ratify the treaty. the russians are operating under more constraints with respect to comprehensive testing than we are. second, over a year has passed since the expiration of the original start treaty and, again, since that time, there have been no verifications, no inspection, no process in place to work with russia. it seems ironic to me that people are worrying about signing a treaty and having the russians cheating are not preoccupied with the issue of what are the russians doing today since we can't verify it? it doesn't make sense to say the way you eliminate a treaty to eliminate the law so they can't cheat. so again i think the logic as wellals the history as well as

the -- as well as the history as well as the details of this treaty are compelling and persuasive that we have to ratify this treaty. secretary of -- under secretary of state ellen talk about r. tauscher states "the urgency of the treaty because we currently lack verification measures with russia. the more that goes on, the more opportunity there is for misunderstanding and mistrust." in a letter to senator kerry addressing cheating by secretary gates -- let me commend the senator from massachusetts for his extraordinary leadership on this issue -- no one knows more about the details of this treaty, the ramifications, the nuances than senator kerry. no one has been more articulate, no one has talked with more wisdom, more experience, and more compelling logic than the senator from massachusetts when it comes to the ratification of this treaty. i thank him for his leadership. thank you, senator.

but secretary gates wrote to senator kerry to remind us that the survivability and flexibility of u.s. strategic posture planned for new start will help deter any future russian leaders from cheating or breakout from the treaty, should they ever have such an inclination. finding, ratifying the -- signing, ratifying the new start treaty will provide the structure to prevent cheating than to encourage it. let me conclude. let me again remiewndz my colleagues that this treaty will provide a significantly increased degree of certainty in a very uncertain world. it is continue our relationship with russia, one that we forged over decades an one that we must use, not just our mutual benefit but tooct against even more pressing threats like north korea, like iran, and like thousands of other emerging

threats over the next several years. this treaty will allow us to advance our counterproliferation initiatives a cross the globe. and as surchtion i urge my colleagues to support ratification of the new start treaty. i would yeeflt. -- i would yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, i want to thank the senator from riflt. i first of all thank him for his generous comments, on a personal lex but let me thank him for his work. i think everybody in the senate will agree that he is, as a member of the armed services committee, one of the most respected voices in the senate, one of the most diligent, hardworking members of that committee, and he knows and understands our weapons systems, our military needs, our security concerns, as well as anybody in the united states senate. so i value enormously the history that he provided in his discussion today.

i think it is an important predicate to the -- to this debate, and i really thank him for his work very, very much, and for the comefntses that he made on th -- and for the commes that he made on the floor. mr. president, i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

quorum call:

mr. nelson: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from florida. mr. nelson: mr. president, i ask consent to vitiate the quorum call. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. nelson: mr. president, i'd like to be recognized to speak on the start treaty. the presiding officer: the senator is recognized. mr. nelson: mr. president, i support this treaty, and the support is overwhelming and it's

bipartisan. the fact that the entire defense establishment in the pentagon supporsupports this treaty shoue very significant. the questions that have been raised about the modernization of our basically arsenal of nuclear weapons is a legitimate question but it's one that is constantly tended to, not only by the appropriate committees here in the congress but by the defense and national security establishment. the cold war has been over now for two decades. the u.s. and russia still possess 90% of the nuclear weapons, and the fact is that we

need stability in these huge arsenals of nuclear weapons to have that stability and to be able then to confront the rest of the world and its instabili instability. with regard to the potential nuclear threat. so, mr. president, while our nuclear triad remains a critical component to our overall national security, it is no longer necessary for us to maintain such a huge stockpile.

because we're facing new threats and we need new answers. now, here's what we know about the bottom line. this treaty enhances cooperation with russia. it allows for the on-site inspections. it allows for the verification of russia's nuclear arsenal, and it also demonstrates to a worldwide audience our commitment to oversight and monitoring of nuclear weapons. this start treaty reduces the number of nuclear warheads in russia by 30%. so preventing a nuclear terrorist attack is paramount. the more we create the stability with russia, it allows us then to increase pressure elsewhere

on other countries who have nuclear weapons and of whom we are always concerned about those nuclear weapons getting out of their control and getting into the hands of people who would do us harm. and of course it certainly is our concern of those countries with nuclear ambitions -- one, north korea, that apparently already possesses nuclear weapons -- and the country of iran, which is certainly trying to possess nuclear weapons. so it's just common sense that what do you is take an arsenal of some over 2,000 -- 2,200 nuclear weapons and that you would reduce them. and it's just commonsense that you would, under a treaty

between the two nuclear weapons that have 90 -- between the two nuclear powers that have 90% of the nuclear weapons, that you would start to reduce your delivery systems, and it just makes commonsense that we would be able to have an inspection and verification regime so that we can have that stability between russia and the u.s. now, you can always bring up all kinds of things. this does not affect in any way our ability to have a national missile defense system. if we do not ratify this and it is not only my thought but it is my expectation, mr. president, that we are going to be able to get the 67 votes to ratify this treaty, but if we did not, we would put ourselves in a much

less safe position, because the previous start treaty expired a year ago. now there is no recourse or system to inspect warheads. we've been analyzing this treaty now for the last seven months. the bipartisan support of this treaty, senator kerry and lugar, along with the colleagues on the senate armed services committee and the senate intelligence committee, we've been combing through these details. now, we constantly have to develop new ways to safeguard our national security, and developing new state-of-the-art systems allow for a more rigorous inspection regime.

and we built up some of that experience since the cold war ended. when it comes around to investment, the obama administration has agreed to invest $85 billion into the nuclear weapons complex. the administration agreed to senator kyl wanting another $4 billion increase. that's a modernization that needs to take place at several of our facilities so let's move on and ratify this treaty. this treaty does not limit our missile defense options. we've clearly heard consistently secretary gates, secretary

clinton, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and many others in the defense department state that that's the case. so the treaty's ratification is long yeefer due in order to secure our nation's security -- is long overdue. in order to secure our nation's security, i believe we must ratify this treaty now. mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. casey: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania. mr. casey: mr. president, i would first ask unanimous consent to speak as if in legislative session and as if in morning business for up to 15 minutes. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. casey: thank you, mr. president. i rise this afternoon to speak about legislation that has broad bipartisan support and will have a positive impact, if we pass it, on job creation in the united states of america. this is h.r. 6517, which is th

the -- known as the m.t.b., the miscellaneous tariff bill. i'm just going to provide some highlights and then ask my colleague, senator brown of ohio, to -- to comment as well, and then we have a -- a consent request. first of all, this bill supports manufacturing jobs. the national association of manufacturers supports the bill. when the last bill was signed into law earlier this year, the last so-called m.t.b. bill, at that time it passed the house by a vote of 378-43. this was in july. the national manufacturers praised it as -- quote -- "a victory for job creation." this bill, combined with the last bill of the same kind, is expected to increase u.s. production by at least

$4.6 billion over the next three years and to support 90,000 -- just imagine that, 90,000 manufacturing jobs, according to a study. as i said before and should repeat again, it has strong bipartisan support. the bill has 40 republican-sponsored provisions and 40 democratic-sponsored provisions. it has not just bipartisan support but the support of manufacturers across the country. domestic producers in the united states are relying on the new provisions in the bill to remain competitive, and these same producers are more likely to grow and support good-paying manufacturing jobs. just at a time when we need jobs in general, but in particular there is a crying need for manufacturing jobs in the united states as well as a state like

the commonwealth of pennsylvania. just a couple of words about one aspect of the bill, and then i will turn to senator brown. the -- one of the provisions, of course, is trade adjustment assistance. the 2009 trade adjustment assistance known by the acronym t.a.a., those reforms made significant improvements in this program for workers. since these changes were implemented, more than 155,000 additional trade impacted workers who would not have been certified under the former program became eligible for trade adjustment assistance for worker benefits and training opportunities. in total, more than 367,000 workers were certified as eligible for those -- for that support in that same time frame. just a word about pennsylvania.

we've lost -- and i think the corresponding number is similar in other states, but just imagine this. just since 2001, less than a decade, our state has lost 200,000 manufacturing jobs. this program, the trade adjustment assistance program, has played a vital role in helping those workers who lost their jobs in that time period. much more i could say about pennsylvania, and i'll hold that for later, but i did want to turn to my colleague from ohio who has worked tirelessly on this issue here in the senate and in years past when he was a member of the house of representatives. mr. brown: i thank the -- the senator from pennsylvania. i -- i agree with him that this bill has -- has as broad of public support as you get on a trade bill, a bill that's -- that deals directly with tariffs and trade relationships and manufacturing and help for

workers who are laid off and help with health -- both with training dollars and with health care dollars and health care tax incentives. i mean, it's supported and that's why it passed i believe by voice vote in the house of representatives last night, meaning nobody spoke out against it or it was passed overwhelming by a voice vote. there might have been a few scattered noes. i'm not even sure there were that. the ranking member of the ways and means committee who will be chairman, mr. camp, from michigan was supporting it. the ways and means outgoing chairman, also from michigan, congressman levin, supported this. the afl-cio supports it, the national retail federation, the chamber of commerce. they all recognize this is a good thing for the country, and that's why i am so hopeful that my colleagues will -- will not block this one person standing up in this chamber and blocking legislation because it's late in the year and i don't know if they are trying to cut some deal or what reason they would use for blocking it. but forget the politics of the support around the country, but

look what it does that's so important. trade adjustment assistance -- since 2009, trade adjustment assistance is certified -- more than 357,000 workers were certified eligible for -- for t.a.a. since 2009, trade adjustment assistance. these workers use t.a.a. to acquire new skills. when a worker is laid off in erie or right across the state line in ashtabula, ohio, you want to encourage them to go back to school and become a nurse if they were working in a plant and they're 45 years old, or you want to go back to school and be a computer operator or some kind of job you would hope would pay something comparable to the job they lost, and this is essential to do that. the health care tax credit which helps these trade affected workers and retirees purchase private insurance to replace the employer-sponsored coverage they lost. we want people to be able to get back on their feet. an objection to this motion by

senator casey, a no vote on this, really does say stop. we're not really interested in helping you do this. if we allow the program to go back, if this is defeated, the jobs that are shipped to china or india or other countries we don't have a trade agreement with will no longer be eligible. so we know -- i can name by name factories in places like cleveland and mansfield and toledo and dayton, and senator casey can in pittsburgh and philadelphia and altoona and all over his state, companies that have shut down or moved much of their production to china or india, and we want them to be eligible even though we don't have a trade agreement with those countries bilateral like we do nafta or cafta or some of the other bilateral trade agreements that we have. that's why this is so important. i -- i particularly ask my colleagues not to object to the passage of this bill. it's passed the house. we have the exact same language here.

it's vetted. the republican and democratic leaders in both houses say we ought to do it. senator baucus has worked very hard on this, harder than anyone to renew t.a.a. before the end of the year, but i particularly am concerned about the health care tax credit. we have tried to come to the floor and move that already. we haven't been successful in doing it because of the peculiar nature of senate rules and a very, very, very small handful, sometimes as few as one, can stop legislation. but the htct will mean directly, come january 1, there will be thousands of people in my state that lose their health insurance. there will be hundreds of them if not several of the thousand have spouses that will lose their health insurance because -- because of what this will do in terms of the tax credit for health insurance, so i guess my question to senator casey, and then he can make the motion which i fully support, is why, what -- what do you see in this that anybody would object to? i just -- i'm at a loss to

understand why anybody would object to this. mr. casey: i can't understand it, especially when you consider the fact that we have got 15 million americans out of work. i know the numbers are high in all of our states. in pennsylvania, we're fortunate we're below 9%. we're about 8.8% right now -- 8.6%, actually, the most recent number. that number has been going down, thank goodness, but it's just below 550,000 people. it was up above 590,000. so we're making some progress, but we're badly in need of manufacturing jobs, and i know the same is true in ohio. i would -- as if in legislative session, i would ask unanimous consent the senate proceed to the immediate consideration of h.r. 6517, the omnibus trade act, which was received from the house and is at the desk, that the bill be read three times and

passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate. the presiding officer: is there objection? mr. sessions: mr. president, reserving the right to object, and i will object. i'd like to share a few thoughts with my colleagues. i think if they knew the basis for the objection i have, they would be supportive of it, and i do object. the presiding officer: okay is is -- objection is heard. mr. sessions: let me just say with regard to this legislation, i have supported free trade, probably more than my colleagues. i believe in the indian trade agreement that's part of this. i support the trade assistance that's in the bill and would be glad to remove my oks to them if they -- my objections to them if they would like to move forward with that, but i have worked for two years to try to obtain a

simple justice to close a loophole in the tariff laws that have -- has impacted and will close a sleeping bag textile manufacturer in my state. it's in haleyville, winston county, alabama, northwest alabama. it's a poor county. they have great history. it's called the free state of winston. they claim they seceded from the state of alabama during the civil war, and most of the public officials from then until today remain republicans, but they are an independent, hard-working people, and this bill, as written, will close that plant, and it should not happen, and i would want to share with you the chamber of commerce and n.a.m. and the afl-cio have been made aware of

this as we have discussed it over the past years, and they believe that this company should receive some relief. but the people who put the bill together didn't do it. they just didn't do it. and i am very much of the belief that -- i know my colleagues are -- that when you have a -- good people in your state that are being put out of business by a company from bangladesh -- actually, a company that was moved to bangladesh to try to capture this loophole, it is not a little matter. these are human beings. you know, as i said, mr. president, i -- i do believe in trade. i think it's best for the world, but i would say to my colleagues we have got to have fair trade. we have got to have just trade.

and nations around the world i think have taken advantage of the united states' overconfidence in our economy, that they can cheat on agreements and manipulate agreements and close down businesses in the united states and somehow we're just going to pass on by and eventually we'll get to the point where we just have banking, i suppose, and hospitals in this country. but manufacturing is an important part of our economy, and this company has been able to withstand competition from china and have been successful, but they cleverly figured how to move it to bangladesh using 85% chinese products and ship it to the united states and get around the small tariff that makes a difference between success and failure. so i plead with my colleagues to

consider the justice of this matter, move your bill. i don't think there is any real substantive objection to it, and the trade -- u.s. trade representative expressed a lot of sympathy for this situation, and i thought somewhere the bureaucrats and the politicians were going to put together a bill that would grant relief so that this company would have a chance to continue to be very competitive. they have modern, high-tech equipment, good employees, they pay benefits, far more than they play anywhere else in the world, and they can still win except for this loophole. i -- i'm at a point where i'm not going to go for it anymore. i'm not going to stand by and allow nations to cheat on their trade agreements and manipulate

trade agreements that in effect destroy our industries. i'm acold air that the smoot-hawley trade agreement was part of the depression. i know all of that argument, and i'm not against free trade. i'm telling you, we need to stand up and defend our industries. i know both of my colleagues hear that. i want to say i feel strongly about it. i believe this is just, and i think this bureaucracy, this senate, this congress ought to listen to what we're saying and give us some relief. otherwise, i would be willing to move the parts of the legislation that -- that are not directly relevant to this and thank -- thank the chair. mr. casey: let me just say by way of response to our colleague from alabama, i have great respect for and appreciate the sentiments he is expressing for workers and employers in his state and fighting hard for them and the concern about jobs going overseas. i would say that -- say a couple

of things. number one, we did have an opportunity this fall to vote on legislation which would provide both incentives and disincentives to the shipment of jobs overseas by changing the tax code. we had a debate about one side voted for it, this side, the other side didn't. i just wanted to make that point. but the other point is that, look, we have a disagreement about this. what i would hope we could do is to try to find a -- a way to help firms like the one that our colleague is trying to protect, and that's certainly understandable, but at the same time if we don't pass this bill in totality, we're going to shortchange the ability to impact, not just the creation of 90,000 manufacturing jobs across the country, including all of our states, but also the ability just on trade adjustment assistance. the hundreds of thousands of

people -- tens of thousands in a state like pennsylvania, potentially even more than that, and certainly in all of our states, we have got to get this done even as we're trying to work on problems that arise that are -- that are specific to one employer or one portion of a -- of a particular community. mr. sessions: i'll be glad to discuss with my colleagues, but i will just note that the exemption that i'm concerned about here goes to third world countries. they're given a -- under the general standardized preference or g.s.p., the right to import pretty much duty-free. but it comes with a crucial condition, and that condition is you do not get to import in the united states under this zero tariff if you're competing with american companies and american jobs.

you're unemploying americans. if you don't have that manufacture in the united states, they get this exemption. this is a loophole they achieved under the tariff rules by calling a sleeping bag not a textile. and it is a textile and it should be covered by this. that's all i'm saying. i would ask my colleagues, isn't it true that if the leadership of both parties agree to this amendment, there's plenty of time for it to be accepted, go back to the house and be passed before we recess? and that's what i would ask to be done. mr. brown: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from ohio. mr. brown: i see some real potential here, and i thank the senator from alabama. i know senator casey and i have fought for manufacturing. i know senator sessions has had

some disagreements sometimes with our trade policy in our country. i think trade policy is tkpopb more -- and the way we do globalization has done as much damage to our country as much as almost anything in terms of jobs, especially manufacturing jobs. there are several parts of this bill, as you recognize. the g.s.p., which you have some, obviously some strong feelings about, there are things that you have sounded like you are agreeing on with t.a.a. and with hctc, with the andean and the other part of the trade issue, the -- i'm just drawing a blank on the other part of the tariff issue. it seems to me that except for the general standardized preferences, the g.s.p., it sounds like we have a lot of agreement here. if i could speak for senator casey on this too, i will work with you on the part of trying to fix the part of the g.s.p. that doesn't work for alabama.

if we can either separate the other ones out and get a u.c. or work with them together and go back to the house, we're certainly willing to do that. i just -- i just don't want to see us adjourn, whatever day we adjourn, whether monday or tuesday or christmas day, i don't want to see us walk out of here without helping with trade adjustment, without helping with the health care tax credit and leaving out indian trade preferences on all of those. let's work together, see if we can do this in the next 24 hours and come back to the floor and work something through if senator casey agrees with that. mr. sessions: i do believe that's possible. i think maybe there's a growing belief that somewhere in this debate about trade that we can reach a common accord across the aisle that, yes, we want to have trade. we want to expand trade. that can benefit america. but at the same time, we've got

to not unnecessarily destroy american jobs. and this little part of it is damaging. i tried last year. we spent a year talking about this. it's not something that just got sprang on the floor here at this moment. i think there's a way out of it. and i thank you for being open-minded to that. mr. casey: i thank both our colleagues. mr. president, i would yield the floor. mr. demint: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from south carolina. mr. demint: mr. president, i know wur discussing a -- i know we're discussing different issues on the floor right now. one of the most important is the start treaty with russia. i'd like to take a few minutes to talk about it. we all take our responsibility of advice and consent very seriously. nominations, and particularly on a treaty of this magnitude.

i'm really disappointed that something of this importance that we are bringing up with a lame-duck congress at a time when americans are distracted on one of the most holy holidays for christians in this country. none of us mind working through the holidays or through the night on the nation's business, but it's important that americans participate in this process with us. and they know that many of the people who will be voting on this treaty are those who have been turned out of office by americans in the last election, and they'll also know that the reason to rush it through before new members are sworn in is that those who will be carrying the voice of americans into the next session may have a different view of some of the things that we're doing here. it's important as we look at this start treaty to understand

the implications and the background of this treaty. and a number have talked about various aspects of it, of verification, the number of missiles. i'll touch on a few of these things. but i respect the administration's intent to try to enlist the cooperation of russia on other major issues dealing with iran and north korea and that this is a symbol of our willingness to work with them. i understand that, and i understand that's one of the reasons that a number of secretaries of state, past secretaries of state have said we need to do this. i think the administration and many thraebg this treaty only -- recognize that this treaty only deals with intercontinental ballistic missiles, icbms, those missiles we've had for years on the shelf as a deterrent, as part of the strategy of mutually assured destruction. if russia had its number of

missiles, we had ours, and with the understanding that if they fired missiles at us, we would fire missiles at them and destroy each other. mutually assured destruction. these missiles don't defend americans except if you say maybe to deter russians from firing their missiles at us. but as we understand that this treaty only deals with the icbm, we recognize that it doesn't include many other weapons, such as tactical nuclear weapons. and we also understand it does not have any prohibitions on other countries developing nuclear weapons, nuclear missiles. we also understand that russia has basically or met the limitations in this agreement. they're not going to have to draw down their number of missiles or warheads. the u.s. will reduce the number of missiles, icbms that it

has. again, the other weapons that are perhaps more dangerous and of more concern to some of our allies are not included in this treaty. so i think part of the rationale of moving through with this is that it only deals with one type of missile that's perhaps of limited importance in today's world, although certainly the deterrence will continue to be part of our strategy. we're just dealing with these so-called strategic weapons and not tactical weapons that we can give this up. we can reduce the number that we have in order to gain russia's cooperation in other matters. i understand that rationale. but this is more than just a treaty between the u.s. and russia. it's a signal to our allies and to the whole world what posture america will take in the future on defending our allies, what posture we'll take particularly on missile defense.

and that's where i would like to focus most of my comments today. because it was no argument in the hearings that this treaty is an kpwhreus saeupbtd ex-police -- an implicit and explicit agreement by the united states not to develop a missile defense system knack defend against russian missiles. that should be clear here and there's no argument. i think we've played with words a little bit saying it does not limit our plans in missile defense. our plans tor develop a limited system that can shoot down a rogue missile. but in the hearings with secretary gates, secretary clinton, chairman kerry, it was made very clear that this treaty made it clear to the russians and to the whole world that the united states would not even attempt to develop a missile defense system capable of shooting down multiple missiles.

if russia was the only country in the world capable of developing multiple nuclear missiles, perhaps we could discuss that within that context. but as we know today, there that has been a proliferation of nuclear technology to many countries -- iran and north korea -- we know other countries such as pakistan have nuclear weapons, it's not unrealistic to suggest that within a few years there may be numerous countries who have the capabilities to fire multiple missiles at the united states or one of our allies. americans need to know that we are agreeing with this start treaty not to even attempt to develop a system to defend our citizens or our allies against multiple missiles. in the hearing, i made this very

clear with a question: is it our intent not to develop a missile defense system capable of defending against russian missiles? and senator kerry, secretary gates, secretary clinton agreed that that would destabilize our relationship with russia. so everyone should be clear about what is happening here, that in order to enlist russia's cooperation in other matters, we are agreeing to a strategy, a continued strategy of mutual assured destruction not just with russia, but with any country that chooses to develop the ability to fire multiple missiles at one time. i don't think this treaty is going to decrease proliferation. i think on its face it will increase the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. our enemies will know that we

don't have the ability to defend against missiles, and our allies will develop their own nuclear weapons because they know we no longer have the capability to defend against not just russia's missiles, not just strategic missiles, but against tactical nuclear weapons. russia has a 10-1 advantage right now with modern tactical nuclear weapons that are developed not as a deterrence, but to be used on the battlefield. this treaty does not limit their ability to continue to develop these weapons, and this treaty implicitly and i think explicitly says we are not going to develop any means to shoot down those shorter-range missiles. to be considering something of this gravity during the holidays when americans are rightly paying attention to other things than politics, to rush this

through with a few days of debate when the last treaty i looked at, we had nine days with many amendments, a lot of debate, and finally agreement that we will not only have limited debate and limited amendments but are going to try to push this through before we leave to go home for christmas. the process is wrong. i would appeal to my colleagues to let this go until next year. let's give a specific time agreement next year that we will debate this and we will have a vote on it and we will offer amendments and vote on those amendments and show the american people that this was a full debate with full transparency about what's in this treaty, and then let senators vote on it, the senators that americans have elected to speak for them here in the senate. i've heard folks say on the senate floor here that we need

to rush into this because we can no longer go days, weeks and months without verification. i think a close look at the verification of the last treaty shows we weren't very close to what was actually going on. and there are big loopholes in the verification aspects of this treaty, loopholes that are big enough to hide missiles and nuclear warheads. and i don't think there's a lot of debate about that. a few more weeks is not going to put our country in any more jeopardy. in fact, rushing this through, i think, could make the world much more dangerous. my hope is, is that my colleagues, particularly my republican colleagues, those who expressed an interest in voting for this will say enough's enough. pushing this legislation along with repealing don't ask, don't tell and the "dream" act and other bills that we're doing at the same time and all of these requests for unanimous consent to pass bills that people

haven't read, there's just too much business, too many distractions to take on something of this gravity at this time in a lame-duck congress. so, mr. president, i appreciate opportunity to speak and i respect those who feel like this treaty is something we should do. but it is my hope that those people will reflect on the importance of this treaty, the signal it sends to our allies all over the world and work with us to get an open and honest debate on this treaty at the beginning of next year. and, with that, mr. president, i yield the balance of my time. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from georgia. a senator: mr. president, i'd like to ask unanimous consent to speak as if in morning business. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. isakson: mr. president, on the eighth day of november of this year, i along with senator hagan of north carolina, the

senator from louisiana, sent a letter to chairman bernanke, chairman blair, mary shapiro at the f.c.c., mr. demarko at the federal housing agency and secretary donvan at h.u.d., asking them to look at the 941-b requirements at the todd -- of the dodd bill and asked them to complete their work through the amendment the three of us sponsored to create the exception for risk retention requirements by the definition of a qualified mortgage. and i rise today on one of the final days we're here together in congress to raise the importance of this issue, because the current fragile condition of the housing. pass the national reform bill. mr. president, rain a business for 22 years in residential housing in atlanta. during those 22 years the

average default rate or -- or delinquent rate was 3% on all mortgages, foreclosures rates were less than 1 1/2. things have changed dramatically in the last few years because of sloppy underwriting, because of no credit, because of no documentation. and we've seen some unbelievable new numbers. according to the fdic the total mortgage delinquencies was 10%. in my state of georgia it exceeded 12%. the 100% f.h.a. mart the delinquency is 13%. in my state of georgia in the third-quarter it rose above 20%. one in every five. we have mounting problems with greenhouse gas housing inventory, problems made worse with growing fees keeping many from being able to refinance affordable loans and therefore

becoming delinquent and foreclosed loans. i am, however, extremely proud of the bipartisan provision that senator hagan, senator landrieu and myself added to the financial reform bill. earlier this year i began working with senators landrieu and hagan to develop the concept of a qualified residential mortgage or as i call it a new gold standard for residential mortgages, which ultimately was included in the credit risk retention title of 941-b in the financial reform bill. while risk retention can serve as a strong deterrent through excessive risk taken by lenders, it also opposes the potential of a restriction of credit in the mortgage market. i want to make this point quite clear, the risk retention provision of the dodd bill would require the originator of a residential mortgage to retain 5% of that mortgage as risk retention. tier 1 capital requirements by the banking system is only 8% for the solid the footing of the

entire bank, we're going to add 5% to it. very few mortgages will be made and those that are made will be the most pristine mortgages. not necessarily those that meet the needs of middle america. likewise our standard makes some venture lending practices can never become a qualified residential mortgages. we specifically delineated in the amendment the things like no-doc loans, drive-by appraisals, interest-only loans, huge prepayment penalties would never be considered a qualified mortgage. against those loans you should require risk retention and additional security on part of the lender. but in terms of mainstream america, we need to go back to the good old days of the 1960's, 1970's, 1980's, if you get a residential mortgage, you had to get a letter from the boss about your job, your credit report had to demonstrate that you had good credit and would make payment on

the installment type of mortgage, the appraiser had to use legitimate information to appraise the house and the underwriters had to match your debt against your income to ensure that you're not too high a risk. that's why in those wonderful days we only had 1.5% foirs. -- fora closures. the easy underwriting that started in 2006 caused us lots of problems. i'm optimistic that our amendment will be the first step to correct the lending practices of the past and set us on a better path for the future. in the law we instructed the regulators to use specific criteria in conjunction with loan performances data to define the contours of the mortgage exemption. as we said in our november 8 letter to the regulators responsible for writing the rules and i -- quote -- "it was our clear legislative intent that underwriting and product features that data dictate a

lower risk default must be considered prior to sponsoring the amendment we were provided an analysis that demonstrated that loans that satisfy the elements set out in our element default less and cause far less problems than riskier loans do. we understand that each of your agencies have been providedded with the analysis, update to reflect loan performance in 2010. this demonstrates that historically tested standards including a documentation of borrowed incomes an assets, restrictions on riskier loan features such as balloon payments significantly reduce the default rate. in addition for loans with lower downpayments that have -- have a combined loan to value ratio higher than 80%, requiring mortgage guarantee insurance to ensure the lender of protection on the debt with contributes to less default and less problems. i'm aware of these agencies are actively engaged in meeting and

i received correspond from the regulators to assure that they will implement the qmr legislation, in a manner consistent with the language and purpose of that section. it is my hope that the regulators will follow the intent of the legislation by by ensuring a broad spectrum of qualified borrowers fall under the umbrella under the protection on the qualified safety and soundness provision. i look forward to continue to work with my colleagues on the other side in the new congress to improve our system of housing finance. it is with great anticipation that we await the administration plans to do with a freddie and fannie. i have my own ideas in this regard which i have expressed on this floor. i look forward to working with tim johnson and richard shelby in the months ahead. the crisis we experienced in large foreclosures and defaults, declines in housing values will only be cured in time when we return to a strong and vibrant

lending market where qualified loans and qualified borrowers come together to fuel the housing market once again. for until this happens, i fear the recession and the recovery that we're in will be protracted and will be slow and the american dream will still be out of the reach of too many americans. mr. president, i yield back the balance of my time. a senator: mr. president? the senator from missouri. mr. bond: mr. president, i come to the floor today to talk about the biggest problem no one's ever heard about. america is 100% dependent on foreign countries for our rare earth needs. and i am joining with senator bayh introducing legislation to begin the process to seek a solution. now, if you're like me, you're probably scratching your head and saying, what exactly are

rare earth metals? go back a little time, maybe more time than a littler some, when you were studying the periodic table in high school chemistry, rare earth elements are the elements you were told you would never have to worry about. unfortunately that was the problem. until recently no one was worrying about rare earth elements. in fact, these elements are critical to the u.s. economy, our high-tech economy and national security. back to the high school chemistry class again. rare earth elements are metallic minerals that significantly enhance the performance of other materials. these elements are used in small amounts in about every advanced industrial technology product today. we're talking about such a wide variety of products that americans depend on every day from m.r.i. machines to cell phones, to computers. in addition to being an

essential component in every day high-tech products, rare earth elements are necessary to our defense industrial base. precision-guided missles, secure communications, advanced jet engines, unmanned aerial systems, smart munitions, stealth technologies and advanced armor are all rare earth dependent systems andle technologies. rare earth elements hold ewe neck chemical, mag -- unique chemical shield and characteristics for environmental and green technology applications like lie hibred engines. the u.s. is 100% import dependent for rare earth needs. let me spell that out for you. while the united states today is the world's sole economic and military super power, there's not a single u.s. or north american company actively producing rare earth elements,

metals, al highways or rare -- alloies. the national academies, national materials advisory board have all determined that rare earth are strategic and critical to u.s. industry and national defense. yet, the united states is 100% import dependent upon tease materials. -- upon these materials. how can we let this happen? how can we let a critical element of our economy become beholden to foreign enemies? concerns about the dependence on rare earth minerals is not just an attempt to read the tea leaves of futuristic problems. the problems for some of our allies have already started. over the past several months japan has sounded the alarm over the inability to acquire needed supplies of rare earth for their companies and the high-tech manufacturing they perform.

what if our own nation's ability to import rare earth element was restricted or stopped all together? according to a report earlier this year by the general accountability office, g.a.o., it could take as long as 15 years to rebuild our rare earth industry. common sense tells us that considering our dependence on rare-earth metals, we don't have another day to waste. that's why the bill i've cosponsored with my good friend and fellow retirg colleague, senator bayh, is all about it. our legislation will promote the domestic supply and refinement of rare earth metals. it's time to take necessary action to redevelop a domestic resource of rare earth elements. a domestic resource that will ensure that we protect our national defense, our technology-based industries and the industrial competitiveness of the united states. currently there are no active rare earth production facilities

in the western hemisphere. however, looking at my home state, outside of sullivan, missouri, is one of two permitting but shut mines in the united states. it is where the greatest concentrations of both light and heavy rare earth elements exist. particularly those needed for the defense industry. rare earth ore or oxides needs to be reduced into a pure and elemental state before it can be used by industry. redeveloping our rare earth capabilities will be no easy tax. the hurdles for financing such a refinery are significant. the cost to construct a rare earth refinery capable of supplying u.s. consumption of 20,000-tons per year is estimated at more than $1 billion, perhap perhaps $1.5 billion. i do not believe it is practical or desirable for the united states to depend upon any single

rare earth mining company to supply our nation's rare earth productions or supply chain requirements. that's why our legislation will require a feasibility study on building a u.s. cooperative refinery to process rare earth ores from other mines in the united states or other allied countries. and there are a number of states which have rare earth, california has a significant deposit of the light rare earth. montana and oklahoma, my colleagues from those states, have told me they have it too. but we've got to bring everybody together in a cooperative venture to make sure we can process this rare earth and supply the demand for the united states. the cooperative refinery would be similar to our successful ag co-ops across missouri. we set the stage for the u.s. government to establish reserves and protect national security.

as i said, i'm bragging on my home state for a minute. although we're not the only one. missouri would be ideally suited for the development and location of a cooperative refinery given the significant amounts, 600-tons at the pearidge deposit. missouri's mining and work processing workforce, it's cost to utilities needed to operate a refinery in central location and transportation infrastructure all make missouri well positioned to help preserve our nation's strategic and economy security. in dealing with the tremendous costs of establishing a production and refining facility, the legislation would also provide the department of defense $20 million to support the defense supply chain and also $30 million for the development of rare-earth magnets. mr. president, the time has come for our country to act and for

this congress and certainly the next congress to take the necessary steps to secure our economic and strategic future. by ensuring that our nation has its own domestic supply of rare earths and the ability to process them, we should be able to compete in the 21st century. the bill that senator bayh and i have introduced will do just that. while introducing legislation during the last days of the lame-duck may seem like a hail mary, this issue is too important to continue to ignore. and we felt it was necessary to launch a hail mary in hopes that there will be others of our colleagues who have catch it and run with the ball in the next session of congress, to mix the metaphors up badly. ignoring our growing rare-earth needs and the overseas dominance and the monopoly is how we got p into this mess. senator bayh and i have laid the

groundwork with this bill. i hope our colleagues in january will call it back up and see it passed. the bottom line is is this: just as we cannot afford to be dependent on foreign oil cartels for our nation's energy, counting on any one or a few countries to supply all of america's rare-earth needs crucial to our technological innovation and national security needs is too risky a bet. i thank my colleagues for listening. i hope they will take up the ball in the next congress and make sure we begin to deal with this very important problem very seriously. and i thank the chair.

mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: thank you, mr. president. let me just say, i want to say to the senator from missouri that i greatly appreciate the comments that he made. this question of our dependence on a whole series of things which matter to our national security on these rare-earth minerals is an enormously important one, and i think he's done a good service to the senate to bring it to our attention today, and i thank him for that. mr. president, let me also say that we are open for business here. we'd love to get going on some amendments on the start treaty. and i look forward to the

opportunity to debate those amendments and hopefully have some votes on them in the course of the afternoon. until such time as that may become a reality here, i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

mr. kerry: i ask that further proceedings of the quorum call be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: i ask unanimous consent to proceed as if in legislative session for the purpose of processing some cleared legislative items. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the senate proceed to the immediate

consideration of calendar number 505, h.r. 5901. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: calendar number 505, h.r. 5901, an act to amend the internal revenue code of 1986, to exempt certain stock of real estate investment trusts from the tax on foreign investment in united states real property interests and for other purposes. the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the amendment at the desk be considered and agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read a third time, packed, and the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, that the title amendment which is at the desk be considered and agreed to, that any statements relating to the measure appear at the appropriate place in the record as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the senate proceed to the immediate consideration of calendar number 693, h.r. 4973.

the presiding officer: the clerk will or the. the clerk: calendar number 693, h.r. 4973, an act to amend the fish and wildlife act of 1956 to reauthorize volunteer programs and community partnerships for national wildlife refuges and for other purposes. the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate, and any statements related to the bill be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the senate proceed to the immediate consideration of calendar number 689, senate 1481. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: calendar number 689, s. 1481, a bill to amend section 811 of the cranston-gonzalez national affordable housing

program, to approve under such section for supportive housing for persons with disabilities. the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the committee-reported amendments be considered, that a johanns amendment which is at the desk be agreed to, that the committee-reported amendments as amend be agreed to, the bill as amended be read a third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate, and any statements related to the bill be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, it's my understanding we now are in executive session on the start treaty? the presiding officer: the senator is correct. mr. kerry: mr. president, we are still open for business and await amendments. i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

mr. inouye: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from hawaii. mr. inouye: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that i be permitted to address the senate as though in morning hour. the presiding officer: the senate is in a quorum call. mr. inouye: i ask that the quorum call be rescinded. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. inouye: and i ask unanimous consent that i be permitted to

speak. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. inouye: mr. president, last evening the senate made a regrettable decision to defer action on completing its work on the fy 2011 appropriations bil bills. i shouldn't have to remind anyone that we are in mid-december, one week before christmas, nearly three months into the fiscal year. yet because our republican colleagues have decided that they cannot support a bill that they helped to craft, we now face placing the federal government on autopilot for another two months under a continuing resolution. a c.r. my colleagues should all understand the consequences of this decision.

first, the c.r. does virtually nothing to accommodate the priorities of the congress and it abdicates responsibility for providing much-needed oversight of the resources of the executive branch. each year, the senate appropriations subcommittees conduct hundreds of hearings to review the budgets of our government agencies. our committee members and staffs conduct thousands of meetings with officials of the executive branch, our states, our municipalities, leaders and workers from american corporations, and the general public. the committee relies heavily on the work of the government accountability office, the g.a.o., the congressional budget office, and outside experts to

determine spending needs. tens of thousands of questions are forwarded each year to officials in the executive branch asking them to justify funding requested for each respective agency. mr. president, it is painstaki painstaking, detailed work. it requires great knowledge of each of our federal agencies. the desire to dig into the knity-gritty details of agency budgets and question their programs and functions they manage. this annual review is conducted, mr. president, in a bipartisan fashion with democratic and republican members and staff working in close cooperation to determine how our taxpayers' funds should be best allocated. in these meetings, reviews and

questions and deliberations together lead to the formulation of 12 individual appropriations bill. each bill is drafted by the subcommittee chairman and ranking member in concert, marked up by subcommittee, and then reviewed, debated, and amended by the full committee. mr. president, a year's worth of work came down to a choice: would the senate acquiesce in providing a bare-bones approach to funding or would it insist on allocating by agency and program with thousands of adjustments that are the results of the good work of the house and senate appropriations committees? mr. president, to me, the answer was obvious. nothing good comes from a c.r. the congress owes it to the american people to demand that programs funded by thei rer-eard

money will be the best we can recommend based on countless hours of hard work by the committees and their staff. some will point out that a continuing resolution will result in fewer dollars being spent. mr. president, that is technically correct. a c.r. will include less spending than was included in the omnibus, but as the old saying goes, you get what you pay for. the savings in the c.r. come primarily by shortcoming and shortchanging national defense and security. under the c.r., the total allocated to the defense subcommittee for discretionary spending is $508 billion. under the omnibus bill, the total is $520.6 billion, so more

than half of the so-called savings is really additional cuts to the defense department. for homeland security, the c.r. would cut nearly $800 million from the omnibus bill. in fact, if we look at the funding for all security programs, more than $15 billion in cuts come from this sector. surely we could have all agreed that we shouldn't be determining our national defense and security funding on the fact that congress was unable to finish its work. who among us really believes we should base our recommendations for defense, homeland security and veterans on whatever level was needed last year? mr. president, this is no way to rurun a government, and the unid states of america is not a

second-rate nation and we should not govern ourselves like she is second rate. a continuing resolution by design mandates that programs are to be held at the amounts provided last year, regardless of merit or need. moreover, in the vacuum that this creates, it is left to the bureaucrats to determine how taxpayer funds are allocated, not elected representatives. and may i at this juncture suggest that we who represent our states i believe know more about our states than these bureaucrats. and, mr. president, i don't believe the people of hawaii elected me to serve in the senate as a rubber stamp. the alternative that i offered

was a product of bipartisan cooperation in the senate. it represented a good-faith effort to fund many of the priorities of the administration while ensuring it is the congress that determines how the people's money would be spent. mr. president, while the omnibus bill that we drafted providing more funding than the c.r., it is by no means the amount sought by the administration. earlier this year, more than half of this body voted to limit discretionary spending through the so-called sessions-mccaskill level, which in total is $29 billion below the cost of budget requested by the obama administration. the appropriations committee responded to the will of the majority of the senate and adopted the ceiling on spending. moreover, mr. president, we

didn't use any gimmicks or tricks to hit this target. instead, each of our subcommittees was directed to take another look at the funds that we -- that they are recommending and provide additional cuts. each was tasked to identify unneeded prior year funds and use those to achieve this reduced level, and it was not easy. many worthwhile programs were cut, but we reduced the bills reported from the committee by by $15 billion, enough to reach the sessions-mccaskill level while still fully funding and paying for pell grants and covering all c.b.o. scoring changes. the administration's top priorities have received funding , but not always at the

level sought. congressional priorities were cut back, essential needs were met, but there were no frills. for many members, this debate focused on what we call earmarks. here, too, the congress tightens its belt. as defined by senate rules, we have reduced our spending that was provided in f.y. 2010 by nearly 35%. less than $8 billion was recommended in the omnibus bill for congressionally directed spending programs as compared to more than $12 billion last year. my colleagues should be advised that since 2006, the congress has reduced spending on earmarks by just about 75%.

in total, the omnibus bill recommended less than .75% of discretionary funding on these so-called earmarks. a tiny fraction of funds are provided so all of you can support the needs of your constituents which are not funded by the administration. we have all heard those who said this election was about earmarks. mr. president, nothing could go further from the truth. this election was not about earmarks. my colleagues who went home and reminded the voters what they had done for them just with earmarks are returning to the senate. if this election was about public distaste for earmarks, why did i receive a higher percentage of votes than any other member of this body who

had an opponent? why is it that virtually all of my colleagues who took credit for earmarks would be coming back next year? mr. president, this election was about gridlock and partisan gamesmanship, and what we saw in the past 24 hours is more of the same -- endless delaying tactics followed by decisionmaking by partisan point scoring rather than what is good for our nation. mr. president, some of our colleagues have suggested that since this bill is 2,000 pages long, it is obviously too big. but, mr. president, as we all know, this is not one bill. it is 12 bills, funding all government agencies. of course it is 2,000 pages

long. it is simply not rational to object to a bill because of its length, and that, mr. president, is nonsense. mr. president, too often our debates in the senate focus on mind-numbing budget totals that are hard to grapple with. but when the c.r. is $50 billion to $20 billion below the omnibus, it is not just a number. it is specific programs that will be cut or eliminated. when we point out that congressional priorities were curtailed, these are real programs that impact the life of millions of americans. when we are talking about a bill as large as the omnibus, we are talking about thousands of such programs. mr. president, for example, in the defense subcommittee, we prioritize the purchase of more

helicopters to move about the rough terrain in afghanistan. keep in mind there are thousands of men and women, american men and women in uniform putting themselves in harm's way, sometimes being injured or killed. these funds were not requested in the pentagon's budget but were identified as a need by feudal commanders. and so the committee justifiably appropriated more than than $900 million to buy new helicopters, and this will be lost from the bill when we vote for a c.r. instead of the omnibus. we added $228 million for tests

to procure the new vv-hull improvements to striker armored vehicles which will dramatically improve soldiers' protection. these weren't included in the president's request. to support our wounded warriors, we added $100 million for life-saving medical research and psychological health and traumatic brain injury. under the c.r., funding for the threat reduction program which secures nuclear weapons and materials in russia would be reduced by $100 million. there are hundreds of additional examples which could be described in defense alone, from breast cancer research to additional f-18 jets for the navy which they have declared to be essential, but it is not just

defense that will be impacted. similar issues will be found in every agency. it is evident, for example, that the threat to the security of the united states evolves every day, as evidenced by a growth of home-grown terrorism such as the times square bomber, the new york subway plot, the fort hood shooting and the recent efforts to blow up aircraft over the united states, whether the christmas day bombing attempt or the recent attempt to blow up all cargo planes. it is critical that careful decisions be made on the allocation of resources through the department of homeland security, but, mr. president, a continuing resolution would not provide the transportation security administration with the

resources necessary to enhance our defense against terrorist attacks such as northwest flight 253 and the recent attempts against cargo aircraft. this omnibus bill provided provided $375 million above the continuing resolution for t.s.a. to acquire 800 explosive trace detection units, 275 additional canine teams, hire 31 additional intelligence officers and strengthen our international aviation security. this omnibus bill provides provides $52 billion above the continuing resolution to deploy radiation portal monitors where vulnerabilities exist, such as airports and seaports and for radiation detection pages and

backpacks used to detect and identify nuclear materials. because we have chosen not to enact an omnibus, we will miss an opportunity to address cybersecurity at the department of transportation. the department recently assessed the security of its computer system and found it sorely lacking. security gaps at the department are putting at risk computer systems that manage our air traffic and monitor our national infrastructure. the department requested requested $30 million for f.y. 2011 to fix this problem as soon as possible. an omnibus appropriations bill would have provided this funding, but the c.r. will do nothing to address this urgent

problem. not passing this omnibus would halt new national security enhancements intended to improve the f.b.i.'s security, cybersecurity, weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism capabilities and assist in litigation of intelligence and terrorism cases. the f.e.i. will not be able to hire 126 new agents and 32 intelligence analysts to strengthen national security. mr. president, the omnibus was better for our brave men and women who work as members of law enforcement to make our streets and everyday lives of our constituents safer. without an omnibus, the department of justice will not be able to hire 143 new f.b.i. agents, 157 new prosecutors for

u.s. attorneys, target mortgage and financial fraud scammers and schemers who prey on america's hard-working middle-class families and devastated our communities and economy. mr. president, when it comes to the health and well-being of our constituents, it is clear that passing an omnibus has just been a fallacy. again, we are talking about redirecting our resources to address today's needs, not last year's needs. specifically, the omnibus bill included $142 million in vital program increases for the indian health service that are not in the c.r., which includes includes $44 million for indian health care improvement fund, provides additional assistance to neediest tribes, additional

additional $46 billion to a contract health service and and $40 million for support, as well as support for new initiatives and drug prevention, chronic disease prevention and assistance to urban indian clinics. this omnibus bill would continue the strides that have been made over in the recent past to significantly increase funding for the indian health service and thereby provide more and better medical care for our native americans and alaska natives. this c.r. will bring that to a close. mr. president, there are hundreds more examples of what we will not be done because the congress will not pass this bill. however, because the c.r. turns over the decisionmaking to the executive branch, we can't even

tell this body all the things that the bureaucrats won't do that are important to members of the congress. and to our constituents. the bill that i would have brought to the senate represented a clear and far superior alternative. it better protected our national security. it ensured that the congress determines how our citizens' funds will be allocated as stipulated in our constitution. it was written in coordination with senate republican members. it was not a perfect document, but it represented a lot of compromises. it made $29 billion in reduction from the president's program. but, mr. president, it was a good bill which ensured that the programs important to american

people will be funded. it assumed responsibility for spending decisions that i believe are rightfully the duty of the congress. mr. president, we find ourselves where we are today because we are unable to get this message across. in many respects, it was a failure of communication. we were never able to adequately explain to everyone what the good things in this bill would have accomplished. and so, instead, we are now faced with placing the government on auto pilot. our republican colleagues will a lout administration to determine how to spend funds for another two months rather than letting the congress decide. and in the two months, we will very likely find ourselves having to pass another

2,000-page bill that will cost more than $1 trillion or once again abdicating our authority to the administration to determine how our taxpayer funds will be spent. mr. president, i wish there were a better way, but the decision by our colleagues on the other side who helped craft this bill have left us with no choice. mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, i think the senator from north dakota wanted to engage in a very brief colloquy regarding some of the funding on the modernization program. and i know senator feinstein, the chairperson of the intelligence committee, wanted to talk about verification a little bit. but -- and i do this with the indulgence of the senator from california, if an amendment is

ready, we're ready to go to an amendment. we're not trying to delay by any speaker any movement to an amendment. i want to restate that 58 senators on this side of the aisle are ready to vote on this treaty this afternoon. we're ready to vote now. if there are amendments, we're also ready to take those up. we'd love to see if we could get the process going. i don't know if the senator from north dakota is here. he may not be here. i see that the senator from tennessee is on his feet. he may want to ask a question. mr. corker: thank you, mr. president. the presiding officer: the senator from tennessee. mr. corker: i do think there are getting ready to be some amendments coming forward. i had the opportunity, working with senator lieu tkpwarbgs to help -- lugar, to help write the resolution of ratification with the chairman. i don't personally have amendments, but i do think amendments are coming forth this afternoon.

i and others are encouraging that process to begin. so i think that's getting ready to take place. my sense is there are going to be a number of very substantive amendments to come forth. i just want to make a comment. i have, i think, helped this process along, and i have enjoyed it thoroughly. i watched something happen last night on the floor with our majority leader, who i respect, coming down and filing cloture on more campaign promise types of issues. and i just -- i'm one of those that absolutely believes that when it comes to foreign policy, when it comes to military issues taking place overseas, partisanship absolutely should stop at our nation's shore. that's why i've enjoyed this process so much. i want to say to our presiding officer that what's happened

over the course of the last 12 hours is by filing cloture last night on don't ask, don't tell and on the "dream" act during a lame-duck session in the middle of a start treaty, what it says is that republicans -- and i don't even like to use partisan labels here. but republicans, y'all need to rise up above partisanship and deal with foreign policy in a bipartisan way. but in the midst of that, we're going to throw some partisan issues in here that our campaign promises we made over the course of this last year as we ran for election. i have to tell what you this has done, and i've watched it. i've been in three meetings this morning. what's happening is it poisons the well on this debate on something that's very, very important. tkwropbt see that happen -- i

don't want to see that happen. i'm not one who comes down here and says fiery things and terrorize to divide. but i'm hoping that saner minds will prevail and these issues that have been brought forth that are absolutely partisan political issues, brought forth to basically accommodate activist groups around this country, i'm hoping that those will be taken down or i don't think the future of the start treaty over the next several days is going to be successful based on what i'm watching. and i can understand human beings reacting the way they do to what happened last night at 7:00, but i'm hoping that that is going to change. i'm going to continue to work through this, and i'm encouraging people to bring amendments forward. i know senator lugar is doing the same. but to ask republicans to rise up above, and i think we all should rise up above. i think foreign policy and

nuclear armaments, there are actual real differences in this case, but i think that we should try to work together to resolve those. but to say to do that in the midst of throwing in political things that are strictly there for political gain doesn't really add up. and i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i thank the chair. i didn't think i was actually yielding the floor. i thought i was yielding for a question. but i'm happy to have my colleague make his comment and i appreciate it. let me begin by saying i personally appreciate all of the efforts and good-faith engagement of the senator from tennessee, the senator from georgia on the committee, senator lugar and others. this has been bipartisan as a result, and that's the way it ought to be. we had a very significant vote of 14-4 coming out of our committee that brought this treaty to the floor. i'm proud of that on behalf of the committee, and i think that's the way we ought to deal with it here.

now, i don't want to get these other issues clouded up in this debate that's not what i'm trying to do and i'm not going to spend much time on them at all except to say this: we don't control what the house of representatives decides to do. the majority leader does not. they decideed to do something. they passed a bill and they sent it over here. that also has bipartisan support. and the senator knows my own feelings sort of how things should have been sequenced and where we are. we are where we are. if we're going to live up to the senator from tennessee's words about keeping this treaty where it ought to be, which is in the square focus of our national security and our interests abroad, et cetera, my hope is that everybody will simply rise above whatever, however they want to view these votes.

what's political in one person's eye may be a passionate, deeply felt issue of conscience in somebody else' eye. and i don't want to get this issue confused in that debate. i just don't want that. and i think it's important for us to keep our eye on the ball. this is about our national security, the entire national security community, generals, admirals, our national strategic commanders, our military leaders from the joint chiefs of staff through the command have all said passing the start treaty, we want it now. the issue is really not why now. it's why would we delay. why would we not do it now? i hope we get that done. the senator -- the chairman of the intelligence committee, i think, has some powerful reasons for why now. and she has come to the floor by a prearranged agreement to speak at 2:00, so i'd like to yield

the floor to her for that purpose if we may. mrs. feinstein: thank you very much. the presiding officer: the senator from california. mrs. feinstein: thank you very much, mr. president. excuse me. i see both the ranking member and the chairman of the committee on the floor, and i want to just say a word about both of them and the good name that they give to bipartisanship, and the fact that both of them see how much of america's destiny is really wrapped in this treatyy and how nuclear weapons really become a bane of existence because of the size, because of the number, and because this inexorable concern that they fall into the wrong hands somehow, some way, someday. i'm one of the few members of the senate that was old enough to see the bombs go off in nagasaki and hiroshima. i know what it's like, and i know the devastation that a 15-

and 21 dill low -- 21 kiloton bomb can do. these bombs today are five times the size plus and they can eradicate huge areas. if you put multiwarheads on, the destruction is inestimatable. what's interesting to me about this debate is the fact that the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty was approved by a vote of 93-5. the 1991 start agreement was approved by a vote of 93-6. and the 2002 moscow treaty was approved by a vote of 95-0. as the chairman of the committee, the distinguished senator from massachusetts, has pointed out time and time again on this floor with far less deliberation that is being given to this treaty. i would make one other personal remark. the relationship with russia today is much better than was

the relationship with any of these former treaties were ratified. and secondly, the treaties were much stronger than this treaty is today. now for my remarks. i come here as chairman of the intelligence committee to address comments that have been made on the other side of the aisle about this treaty, particularly as those comments relate to monitoring provisions. let me just put out the bona fides. the intelligence committee has studied the june 2010 national intelligence estimate on the intelligence community's ability to monitor this treaty. we had a hearing, we submitted more than 70 questions for the record. we received detailed responses from the intelligence community. committee members and very highly technical, proficient

committee staff participated in more than a dozen meetings and briefings on a range of issues concerning the treaty, focusing on the intelligence monitoring and collection aspects. the conclusion is on my part that the intelligence community can in fact effectively monitor russian activities under this treaty. i'd also note for all senators that i have just reviewed a new intelligence assessment from the c.i.a. dated yesterday. it analyzes the effect of having new start's monitoring provisions in place and the loss on intelligence if the treaty is not ratified. i can't discuss the contents of the assessment on the floor, but the report is available to all senators. it is available through the intelligence committee and members are welcome to review this report and other documents

and the national intelligence estimate in our offices in room 211 in the hart building. let me now describe the ways in which this treaty enhances our nation's intelligence capabilities. this has been the lens through which the senate select committee on intelligence has viewed the treaty. and i believe the arguments are strongly positive and persuasive. there are three main points to make, and i will take them in turn. first, the intelligence community can carry out its responsibility to monitor russian activities under the treaty effectively. second, this treaty, when it enters into force, will benefit intelligence collection and analysis. and, third, intelligence analysis indicates that failing to ratify the new start treaty

will create negative consequences for the united states. so please read these reports. the u.s. intelligence community will use these treaty provisions and other independent tools which we have outside of the treaty, such as, the use of national technical means, for example, our satellites, to collect information on russian forces and whether russia is complying with the treaty's terms. the treaty provisions include on the ground inspections of russian nuclear facilities and bases, 18 a year. there's going to be an amendment, i gather, to increase that. i will get to that later in my remarks. second, regular exchanges on data on the warhead and missle production and locations. third, unique identifiers.

a distinct alpha new merrick code for -- ne new -- neumeric code. a ban on blocking national technical means from collecting information on strategic forces and other measures that i'm going to go into. without the strong monitoring and verification measures provided for in this treaty, we will know less, not more, less about the number, size, location and deployment status of russian nuclear warheads. that is a fact. i think most of you know that general chilton, the commander of united states strategic command, who knows a great deal about all of this, has said that without new start, we lose

rapidly -- we lose insight into russian nuclear strategic force developments and activities and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex and more costly. without such a regime, we would unfortunately be left to use worst case analyses regarding our own force requirements. end quote. think about that, members. let me be clear, that's what a "no" vote means on this treaty. russian prime minister putin made the same point earlier this month. he said that if the united states doesn't ratify the treaty, russia will have to respond, including augmentation of its stockpile. that's what voting no on this treaty does.

these monitoring provisions are key as are the trust and transparency they bring. and the only way to get to these provisions is through ratification. in fact, we have not had any inspections or other mop other g tools for over 100 years since the original start treaty expired. so today we have less insight into any new russian weapons and delivery systems that might be entering their force. that, too, is a fact. 13 months ago american officials wrapped up a two-day inspection of russian strategic missle base at takovo, 130 miles northeast of moscow where mobile ss-25, intercontinental ballistic missles were deployed. 12 days later the russian counterparts wrapped up a

two-day inspection at whitman air force base in missouri, home to a strategic bomb wing. since then, nothing. since those two inspections, one in russia and one in the united states, we have essentially gone black on any monitoring, inspection, data exchange, telemtri. let me describe the monitoring provisions in this treaty now. many of them are similar to the original start treaty's provisions. number one, the treaty commits the united states and russia and i quote -- "not to interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party." end quote. that means not to interfere with our satellites. and -- quote -- "not to use

concealment measures that impede verification." this means that russia agrees not to block our satellite observations of their launchers or their testing. without this treaty, russia could, and probably would, take steps to deny or block our ability to collect information on their forces. and there are ways this can be done. so let me make clear absent this treaty russia could try and perhaps block our satellites. to be clear, national technical means are an important way of identifying some of russia's activities in developing and deploying its nuclear forces. however, i can't be specific here, there are some very important questions that simply

cannot be answered through national technical means alone. i have also reviewed those this morning, and those are available if a member wants to know exactly what i mean by this, and they will go to room 211, members of the intelligence staff can inform them of exactly what this means. that is where other provisions of this treaty also, including inspections, data exchanges, unique ey identifiers come into play. without them, we are limited in our understanding. so, believe me, this is a big problem for our intelligence agencies. the second provision in new start on monitoring is a requirement that russia provide the united states with regular data not notifications.

this includes information on the production of any and all new strategic missles, the loading of warheads on to those missles and the location to which strategic forces are deployed. under start, similar notifications were vital to our understanding. in fact, the notification provisions under new start are actually stronger than those in the old start agreement. including a requirement that russia inform the united states when a missle or warhead moves in or out of deployed status. third, new start restores our ably to conduct on-the-ground inspections. there are none of them going on today and none have been going on for over a year. new start allows for 10 so-called type 1 inspections on

site of russian icbm, slbm and bomber bases a year. the protocol for these type 1 inspections were written by united states negotiators with years of inspection experience under the original start treaty. the day before yesterday i went over the credentials of our negotiating team in g geneva, ad many of them have done on-site inspections, so they know what they need to look for and they provided those -- those guarantees in this treaty. here's how some of it works. first, united states inspectors choose what base they wish to inspect. it's our choice. it's not the russian choice. russia is restricted from moving missles, launchers, and bombers away from that base. so if you think about it, using

national technical means, you can pick the base you want to go to. they are prohibited from moving, and you can go into that base. then when the inspectors arrive, they are given a full briefing from the russians. that includes the number of deployed and nondeployed missle launchers, or bombers at the base, the number of warheads loaded on each bomber, and this is important, and the number of reentry vehicles on each icbm or slbm. so you can pick your base, go to it, get the briefing -- these missles are all coded so you can do your inspection and you know what you're looking at. third, inspectors choose what they want to inspect. at an icbm base, inspectors

choose a deployed icbm for inspection, one that they want to inspect. at a submarine base, they choose a slbm. if they choose one that is not carrying launchers, the inspectors can pick one of those for inspection as well. at air bases the inspectors can choose up to three bombers for inspection. fourth when the actual inspection occurs with united states personnel verifying the number of warheads on the missles or on the bombers chosen -- as i mentioned earlier each bomber -- excuse me -- each missle and bomber is coded with a specific code numerically and alphabetically and the codes can't be changed. under this framework our inspectors are provided comprehensive information from the russian briefers. they're able to choose

themselves how how they want -- choose themselves how they want to verify this information is correct. and there are ways to do that verifying. there is also additional aid inspection -- eight inspections a year of nonemployed warheads where russia has nuclear arms. some have commented the number of inspections under new start, that is a total of 18 that i just described, is smaller than the 28 under the previous start treaty. and this is true, but it's also true that there are half as many russian facilities to inspect than there were in 1991 when start was signed. i just looked at a map this morning of these russian bases of the silo locations, of the bombers, of the sub pens, the

numbers are dramatically smaller than at the end of the cold war when the first start treaty was signed. so these inspections should suffice because the numbers are so down. in addition, inspections under new start are designed to cover more topics than inspections under the prior start agreement. in testimony from the director of the defense threat reduction agency, called in washington-ease, dtra, kenneth meyers, the agency doing these inspections said and i quote -- "type 1 inspections will be more demanding on both the dtra and site personnel as it combines the main parts of what were formerly two separate inspections under start into a

single lengthier inspection." so whereas you go from 28 down to 18 and 10 type-1 inspections, you can take a much longer time. they are much more comprehensive, and you have many more means to be able to get the answers to your questions. some of my colleagues who question this treaty have raised a couple of problems with the monitoring provisions. let me address a couple of them now. first, under start united states officials had a permanent presence at the russian missle production facility. now, that's a facility called v votkinsk. inspectors could watch, they were afganistaned there, and they could -- they were stationed there.

new start does not include this provision. but the bush administration had taken the provision off the table in its negotiation with the russians prior to leaving office. new start does, however, require russia to mark all missles, as i've been saying that's the numeric alphabet code with unique eye den identifiers so ie tracked over the lifetime of the treavment so it is not necessary to -- treaty. so it is not necessary to have a permanent monitoring facility at vut kink. it is required that russia notify us before a missle leaves a plant. so we will still have information about missle deployment and production. our inspectors and other nuclear experts have testified that

these provisions are, in fact, sufficient. now, look, i appreciate every one of us and we do our due diligence, but let me tell you, there's nothing like the view of a former inspector. there's nothing like the view of people that have actually done this work. these were the people that were involved in the negotiation, and there's nothing like the recommendation of the entire top command of our strategic forces, all of whom are for this treaty. now, we listened to our milita military, it seems to me, on views that affect the security of this nation. we should with respect to this treaty. i have not seen a single warrior come forward who is in the top command that said we should not endorse this treaty.

i think that's significant. instead, dozens have come forward to point out how important this treaty is. start required the united states and russia to exchange technical data from missile tests. that's known as telemetry. it required that -- release it to each other, but not to other countries. that telemetry allows each side to calculate things, such as how many warheads a missile could carry. this was important, as the start treaty attributed warheads to missiles. if a russian missile could carry ten reentry vehicles, the treaty counted it as having ten warheads. in fact obtained through telemetry was, therefore, important to determine the capabilities of each delivery system. new start, however, does away

with these attribution rules and counts the actual number of warheads deployed on missiles. no more guessing whether a russian missile is carrying one or eight warheads. with this change, we don't need precise calculations on the capability of russian missiles in order to tell whether russia is complying with the treaty's terms. so telemetry is not as necessary to monitor compliance with new start. nonetheless, because this came up in the negotiations as a gesture to transparency, the treaty allows for the exchange of telemetry between our two countries only, up to five times a year, if both sides agree to do so. in fact, it should be pointed out that if the treaty included a broader requirement to

exchange telemetry, the united states might have to share information on interceptors for missile defense, which the department of defense will not do. third, there has been a concern raised about russian breakout capability, a fear that russia may one day decide to secretly deploy more warheads than the treaty would allow. or to secretly build a vast stockpile that could be quickly put into its deployed force. i don't see this as a credible concern. here's why: according to public figures, russian strategic forces are already under or close to the limits prescribed by new start. in other words, they have been decreasing over the past decade, not just now but for a long time. there are many reasons for this,

but i think it's incontrovertible that that's fact. so the concern about a breakout is a concern that russia would suddenly decide that it wants to reverse what has been a ten-year trend and deploy more weapons than it currently believes are necessary for its security. they would also have to decide to do this secrecy, with a significant risk of being caught. because of the monitoring provisions, the inspection inspr national technical means, and other ways we have to track russian nuclear activities, i think moscow would have a serious disincentive to do that. moreover, instead of developing a breakout capability, russia could decide instead to simply withdraw from the treaty, just as the united states did when president bush withdrew from the

anti-ballistic missile treaty. finally, even in the event that russia did violate the treaty and pursue a breakout capability, our nuclear capabilities are more than sufficient to continue to deter russia and to provide assurances to our allies. the bottom line is that the intelligence community can effectively monitor this treaty, and if you vote "no," you're voting "no" for no monitoring of the treaty. i'd like just t for a moment -- and sigh the chairman on his feet -- to conclude, if that's agreeable. a second question relative to new start is whether ratifying the treaty actually enhances our intelligence collection and analysis. this is above and beyond the question of whether the intelligence community will be able to fulfill its responsibility to monitor

russian compliance with the treaty's terms. again, i'm unable to go into the specifics, but the clear answer to this question is "yes." the ability to conduct inspections, receive notifications, enter into continuing discussions with the russians over the lifetime of the treaty will provide us with information and understanding of russian's strategic forces that we will not have without the treaty. and if you vote "no," we will not have it. the intelligence community will need to collect information about russian nuclear weapons and intentions, with or without new start, just as it has since the beginning of the cold war. but absent the inspectors' boots on the ground. that's what's pat risk here. the intelligence community will need to rely on other methods.

put even more simply, the nation's top intelligence director -- official, director of national intelligence james clapper, has said that he thinks the earlier the sooner and the better this treaty is ratified, we are much better off with it. you know, i don't think i need to tell this body what's at stake in terms of our relationship with russia. russia is -- the russian federation is no longer the soviet union, and this is really the first reform vehicle of a new, young russian president that wants to enter into a much more transparent time with our country and has been of help to our country, specifically with

iran, of letting our equipment go through russian land into afghanistan, when pakistan refused to do so; in terms of refusing to sell a missile defense system to iran when it had decided to do so, and i think what this projects to the world as a whole is very important in this world of asymmetric warfare. what it projects is that the united states and the russian federation is willing to stand together. and i think the gesture of that standing together that's envisioned in the enhanced cooperation of this treaty should never be underestimated. members, i think we need all of the major powers to come together in this new world of asymmetric warfare in which we

are engaged and most likely will be engaged for a long period of time. so, i very much hope that the votes are there for ratificati ratification. let me end with this: iring's during the 15-year life span of the first start agreement, the united states conducted 659 inspections of russian nuclear facilities. and russia conducted 481 inspections of our facilities. again, it has been more than a year since american inspectors were at a russian nuclear facility. we have been in the dark for one year. it's time to bring the light of new start to bear. i thank the chair. i yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, i really want to thank the senator from california.

i think senators would agree that she has a reputation here for calling things the way she sees them, and as the chair of the intelligence committee, i think all of us are grateful for the diligence with which she approaches these issues of national security. she's ahead of the curve. she doesn't hesitate to hold the president or any of us accountable, if she sees anything differently. i appreciate her insights on the verification measures in this treaty. i would like to ask unanimous consent that the senator from idaho be recognized for ten minutes. mr. risch: 10 minutes is fine. mr. kerry: after which, the senator from arizona be recognized to propose an amendment. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. risch: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from idaho. mr. risch: mr. president, fellow senators, i come to the floor today to make some general comments about the matter under consideration and that being the

possible ratification of the new start treaty. first let me say that i come at this with -- i think -- a unique perspective in that i sit on both the foreign relations committee and the intelligence committee. in addition to that, i'm rather new here, and so it is a fresh set of eyes, if you will, on these kinds of issues. the ability to be able to talk about these, to debate them, and then cast a vote is somewhat frustrating in that i share my friend and the distinguished senator from california, senator feinstein, the chairman of the intelligence committee, just like her, my views of this matter are colored to some degree and are affected to some degree by matters that we can't talk about here and that we can't disdisclose. nonetheless, that obviously

cannot stop us from having what hopefully is a productive discussion about this subject matter. and it is -- it has been a productive discussion. there are good things that have come out of this so far. i'm going to talk about those in just a minute. but let me -- let me say one thing that i've been impressed with, and that is throughout this, i've sat through -- i can't tell you how many hours of meetings, of briefings, of actual field trips out to facilities, and all those kind of things, with the good faith of everyone that is working on this matter. this is a unique situation that we, as senators, have a constitutional responsibility to focus on. our responsibility in this is equal to the president of the united states. a foreign treaty such as this, the founding fathers said, can only come into play if, on the one hand, the president of the

united states signs off on it and if, on the other hand, two-thirds of the senators sign off on it. so our responsibilities are equal in that regard. and, as a result of that, all of us need to -- and have, in my judgment -- approach this on a good-faith basis and on a what is best for america basis. all of us have seen the people on tv who are very sarcastic about who's going to win and who's going to lose. the only ones we need to be concerned about who is going to win or lose on this is the american people. i've come to some conclusions throughout this that are new to me. one is, of course, the fact that -- and these are some observations i want to make about the whole process -- number wurntion how everyone is approaching this, i think, in good faith. the second conclusion that i've reached -- and i think is really

widely held -- and that is that we are much better off if we have a treaty than if we don't have a treaty. i would, however, modify that by saying, but not just any treaty. so, those observations along with one other that i have -- and that is, there are some really, really good things in this particular treaty, not the least of which are the things that people have faulke talked t here, that is, first of all, having relations with the russians, and secondly, having actual inspections, and thirdly having a table over which people can get around and discuss violations or accusations against one another. that brings me to the historical basis we find ourselves in. you know, the people who did this 40 years ago and actually started the dialogue and took us

to the first treaty with the russians are real, real heroes. they are people who are patriots and people to whom we owe a great, great deal of gratitude. they have -- they have set this stage, if you would, for where we are today. and probably the most important thing that they have given us is they have given us a 40-year history of dealing with this. when they sat down at the table, they did the things that they did to come to the agreements that they did but the overriding philosophy on the defense of the united states against russia and the defense of russia against the united states was that if either one launched against the other, the other would launch, which would ensure the mutual destruction of both parties. that has been the philosophy under which we've operated for the 40 years. and over the 40 years, sometimes

things take a long time to sink in, but i think the russians have come to the conclusion, as americans have come to the conclusion, that's not a good thing. and -- and the likelihood of either party pulling the trigger on the other, in my judgment -- and i think probably in most people's judgment, is not very likely. is it possible? of course, it's possible. anything's possible. an accidental launch is possible. i don't believe from our side. i've had the ability to, without going into details of this, but through the -- my intelligence work, i've looked at the fail-safe things we have in place and i don't believe we're going to have an accidental launch. i don't have the same level of confidence with the other side. nonetheless, i really don't believe -- i believe that the -- the likelihood of either party doing this is -- is highly unlikely. now, where does that take us to today? the world has really, really

changed in 40 years. 40 years ago, when we sat down with the russians, we were the two superpowers in the world, we were essentially the two that had these kinds of arms and we were worried about each other, for good reason. today, that is a very, very different situation. i am much more concerned -- and i think people are much more concerned -- about north korea, about iran, and, for that matter, other countries -- some other countries that have nuclear weapons as far as being a threat to us in the united states. and one of the overriding concerns that i've had and criticisms, if you would be, is that we're really focusing in this -- in this exercise again on this 40-year history and relationship we have with russia without bringing into the mix the other real issues, and there are real issues.

the first one i will talk about is modernization. that's one of the good things that's come out of this. we -- there's been tremendous movement since the beginning of this on people's realization that our need to modernize our nuclear stockpile is very real. i commend the administration, i commend the chairman and the cochairman of the committee for pursuing that issue and great strides have been made in that regard. the other issue that we're going to talk about a lot -- in fact, my distinguished colleagues from wyoming and arizona are going to lay down an amendment here in a moment about an issue that is of top priority to me and that is the missile defense issue. and i'm going to talk more about the details of that when we actually get into debating these amendments, but suffice it to say that the concerns i've had and the criticism i've had of this process is we are still talking about this in terms that existed 40 years ago instead of

the terms of the real world that we live in today, where we have an overhead threat from nations that we, in my judgment, have not adequately addressed. and i think one of the -- one of the criticisms i have here is we -- we have missed an opportunity on missile defense. we did not miss that opportunity on modernization but we have missed it on missile defense. and i'm going to close with this. brings notice my -- my last two points. and that is that time is important as you go through these things, and i really don't like us being up against the deadlines that we're up against here when we have a matter of this magnitude that we should be debating. and so that -- that colors my judgment here as the -- what i think is the lack of consideration -- the time for consideration for the most deliberative body in the world to actually deliberate on this

issue. and the last one that i have real difficulty with is a matter of what we call the transcripts. you heard me talk earlier about the fact that we have the same responsibilities, the president of the united states making a decision on this, yet he has access to the transcripts of the negotiators and we have been denied access to the transcript of the negotiators which really gives me pause. most reasonable people would not accept something, sign on to a contract as what is -- which is what we're doing with ratifying this, without knowing all the facts. and i can tell you, we don't know all the facts. and that particularly becomes important when i'm troubled by the missile defense issues that we have. i would really like to know what assurances were given to the

russians regarding missile defense, particularly when i read their independent statements, their third-party statements about this. i really would like to know what's in think those transcrip. so that is a very difficult bridge that i'm going to have to cross. nonetheless, my vote on this depends upon the amendments -- and there are real amendments addressing real issues in this discussion, my final vote is going to depend upon what actually happens in the amendment process. with that, thank you very much, mr. president, for the time, and i yield the floor to my distinguished colleague from arizona, senator mccain. mr. kerry: would my -- mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: would the senator from arizona just give me one minute, perhaps? i just want to say something to the senator from idaho. first of all, i really appreciate the constructive way in which he's outlined his approach to this -- to these questions and i think he has made a number of important

statements about the good side of what's in this treaty and i appreciate that he'd like to see how we can work through this amendment process. let me just say to him and to other colleagues who are in the same place, actually listening to him, i think i gained a greater appreciation for what -- for the point that he's trying to make with respect to sort of how missile defense has been framed in this discussion. and i think he is appropriately trying to sort of step away from only seeing it in the context of the former soviet union-u.s., warsaw pact, nato, russia, united states now, and how that offense-defense posture is addressed because he's thinking -- i believe, if i understand him correctly -- about the multiple points of concern from which obviously you have to sort of think differently about the deployment.

now, i would say to him, that is precisely i think how the administration is thinking about deploying it. but it suggested to me that maybe there is a way for us to find common language here that in a declaration or an understanding might embrace that more to the senator's liking without doing injury to the treaty as a whole so that we kill the treaty because we have to go back to the russians and renegotiate it, which becomes the critical thing. so i'd like to work with him and with colleagues on that and see if we can come to some agreement on it. but i think that was an important component. i would also mention, the senator was given access to a classified summary of the negotiating record with respect to missile defense and that was something we worked very hard to get the administration to do, and i hope that, indeed, that was helpful. i thank the senator from arizona. mr. risch: mr. president, may i respond briefly? the presiding officer: the senator from idaho. mr. risch: thank you, mr. chairman. and you have correctly

identified the serious concerns that i and a number of others have, and i am delighted to hear your invitation to attempt to clarify these matters where we can protect the american people, which is the highest objective that both you and i share. regarding the transcripts, i'm not satisfied with the summary. i'd like to see the transcripts. that is a point that we can discuss at another time. thank you very much for your consideration. thank you, mr. president. mr. kerry: mr. president, i'll work with the senator. obviously, i believe that if you look at the resolution of ratification, i think we've bent over to address it, but if it doesn't do it for the senator adequately, i want to try to see if we can find a way to do that and we'll work at it in the next hours. i thank the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: mr. president, i have a parliamentary inquiry. what is the parliamentary situation as it exists on the floor at this time? the presiding officer: the treaty is pending.

mr. mccain: and is there not other business before the senate at this time? the presiding officer: no, there's not, senator. mr. mccain: what about the filing of petitions for cloture on both what is known as don't ask, don't tell, and what is known as the dream act? the presiding officer: that's in legislative session and we're in executive session, sir. mr. mccain: so that is part of a legislative session and we are in executive session? the presiding officer: correct. mr. mccain: but the -- time is still pending on the matters in legislative session; is that correct? the presiding officer: the time for cloture -- the time for cloture motion is ripening but we are in executive session, sir. mr. mccain: i understand. so here we are, the date is

february -- excuse me, friday, december 17, and we are on the start treaty, a treaty that -- any treaty is serious matter before the senate. this is of the utmost seriousness. meanwhile, there is a cloture motion -- and may i please, parliamentarian, correct me. these are both that are -- the time is running on are both privileged messages, which means that there is no vote on the motion to proceed; is that correct? the presiding officer: there is no need for a motion to proceed with the house message, sir. mr. mccain: so really what we are about six weeks after the last election in a -- now discussing the start treaty, and i'll have an amendment that i'll be proposing in a moment that i

think is important. meanwhile, two other issues, both of which are very controversial, cloture has been filed on and the clock is running. there's also threats that we may have again other votes on things like the relief for the new york 9/11 people, the firefighters issue, and a couple other -- on-line gambling has been mentioned in the media as one of -- as one of the majority leader's proposals. so, again, here we are, the people spoke clearly on november the 2nd, and it was, in the words of the president of the united states, a shal shallacki. so what are we doing on december 17? we are in one session of the united states senate, the executive session; meanwhile,

the legislative session will go on, and who knows -- who knows? -- what issue the majority leader will bring another issue before the senate, maybe get a couple more privileged messages from the other side, file it, run the clock, 30 hours, and then force the members of this body, of which there will be six -- five additional members beginning january the 5th. and at the same time, my friend from massachusetts and the president of the united states and the proponents of the treaty are saying, put partisanship aside, put your concerns aside, trust us because this is very important for the nation. what possible good does it do when the majority leader continues to bring up issues and

force us to have votes on them which are clearly in keeping with the majority and the other side's political agenda? it -- it -- it's really kind of a remarkable situation. i've been around this body for quite some years and i have not seen a degree, an intensity of partisanship that i see today in the united states senate. all of us want to do what's right for the country. so that's why this start treaty deserves serious consideration, and it deserves serious consideration by itself. but this body operates in an environment of cooperation and comity. that very much is not in existence today. so we will then tomorrow, i take it, on saturday, we will go off

the executive counsel on to the legislative counsel, force votes on these two very controversial issues, and then maybe -- maybe, if it moves him so, the majority leader will bring up another issue, as he has in the past, to force votes, most of which those votes he knows very clearly will not succeed but will give him and the other side some kind of political advantage. that -- that wasn't the message of the -- the last election. so i -- i think that a number of us are growing weary of this on this side of the aisle. we're just growing weary. and we believe that the people of this country spoke, in the

words of the president of the united states, a shellacking, and we ought to, we ought to perhaps keep the government in operation, go home, and in less than two weeks -- or a little over two weeks, let the new elected members of congress on both sides of the capitol address many of these issues. now, i don't know if we will get through all of the amendments and all of the debate that a solemn treaty deserves before the united states senate. i really hope that we can. i would also remind my friend from massachusetts that my colleague from arizona, certainly the most respected person on this issue on this side of the aisle, has offered a date certain of january 25, with a final vote on february 3, to

the other side. that obviously has not been acceptable to them, and by the way, that would be with the input of the newly elected senators, not of those who are leaving. so i look forward to continuing this debate and discussion, and who knows? who knows what other issue they -- the majority leader may bring before the senate. it may be a privileged message again, which would only then require one cloture vote, and we will then force to be taking another politically motivated -- politically impacted -- impactful vote. so, mr. president, i tell my colleagues that we are getting tired of it. we grow weary. and it's not that we want to --

quote -- be home for christmas. i spent six christmases in a row away from home. but what it is about is responding to the american people. now, the american people yesterday in a resounding victory for those who voted on november 2 rejected the omnibus appropriations bill. i believe that some of the issues before the senate deserve the participation of the newly elected members of the united states senate and house. so, mr. president, at this time on behalf of myself and the senator from wyoming, senator barrasso, i'd like to call up amendment 4814. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from arizona, mr. mccain, proposes amendment number 4814, in the preamble to the new start treaty, strike "recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and

strategic defensive arms and this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced and that current strategic defense arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties." mr. mccain: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: i would like to thank my friend and colleague from wyoming, senator barrasso, dr. barrasso. it's been a great privilege for me since he has been a member of the united states senate to be with him side by side in a number of battles. i am particularly proud of the work that senator barrasso continues to do on the issue of obamacare. if anyone wants to really be brought up to date, i would commend his website, second opinion, that dr. barrasso has, and he continues to be credibly knowledgeable and effective, not

only here in this body but with the american people. as a member of the foreign relations committee, dr. barrasso has taken on this issue as well, and i'm pleased to be joined with him, and i'd say to my colleague from massachusetts, the distinguished chairman of the foreign relations committee, i know there are a number of senators who want to speak. i will try to get those lined up and time agreements so that we don't take an inordinate amount of time on this issue, and i think we can do that, say, within the next hour or so. but this is an important amendment. this is really one of two major issues that concern many members of this body and many americans. one is the modernization of our nuclear inventory, which i think continues to be a subject of

discussion, agreements, some agreements that is important, and my colleague from arizona, senator kyl, of course has been following that issue since the 1980's. i know of no one who has been more heavily involved in that side of the issue. the other, of course, is this whole issue of defensive weapons , and how the provisions of the treaty affect the entire ability of the united states, unconstrained by this treaty, to move forward where it deems necessary to put defensive missile systems to protect the security of this country. now, i'd like to remind you how vital this is. we are living in a world where the north koreans have nuclear weapons and missiles. the iranians have missiles and the ability to deliver nuclear

weapons. the pakistanis have nuclear weapons. other countries throughout the world are developing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. so our concern is not so much what the russians will do in the form of offensive nuclear weaponry -- and i would be glad to discuss about russian -- media reports about russians building a new missile and moving icbms to the borders of europe and all that, but the main problem here is can the united states under this treaty have the ability to put into place defensive missiles which will protect the security of the united states of america? we all know that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is one of the major challenges of the 21st century. so i think it is vital, it is

vital that we make it perfectly clear that there is nothing in this treaty that constrains our ability to pursue that aspect of america's defense. and so it is deeply disturbing to so many of us when the preamble of the new start treaty says recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current -- and i'm going to emphasize that word -- current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the party. operative word there, my friends, is current. i have been around long enough to have lived through the history of missile defense.

it's not that old of an idea. in the middle of the last century, the idea that we could develop and deploy strategic defensive weapons sounded like science fiction and wishful thinking, and for the most part it was. a few decades later, it was with this view of missile defense's fantasy that opponents of the idea mocked president ronald reagan who was more committed than any american president before him to the prospect of developing viable missile defense systems, what president reagan called his strategic offense initiative which -- strategic defense initiative which became known to all of us as s.d.i. you know, this idea scared the soviet leaders to death because they realized how serious he was about it and because the idea represented a threat to the very balance of terror that threatened all of mankind during the cold war. arms control theorists saw this

terror stabilizing, mutually assured destruction as stabilizing and believed that missile defenses could therefore be destabilizing. as a result, a key pillar of cold war arms control was the established interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons. this linkage was codified in the antiballistic missile treaty, among other treaties and agreements. it established an effective missile defense if developed could threaten the strategic offensive capabilities of the united states and the soviet union. for that reason, it limited the development and deployment of such defensive weapons. ronald reagan believed that viable missile defense systems in particular s.d.i. held out the opportunity -- yes. the presiding officer: the

senator from tennessee. mr. alexander: i thank the senator from arizona for his extreme courtesy to interrupt just for one minute so that the senator from new mexico can be recognized to -- on a matter. the presiding officer: the senator from new mexico. mr. bingaman: mr. president, as if in legislative session and morning business, i would ask unanimous consent that the commerce committee be discharged from further consideration of h.r. 5116, and the senate proceed to its immediate consideration. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 5116, an act to invest in innovation through research and development to improve the competitiveness of the united states, and for other purposes. the presiding officer: without objection, the committee is discharged and the senate proceeds to the measure.

mr. bingaman: mr. president, i would ask unanimous consent that the rockefeller-hutchison substitute amendment which is at the desk be agreed to, the bill as amended be read a third time, that a budget paygo statement be read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. bingaman: i would also -- would the clerk -- the presiding officer: the statement will be read. the clerk: this is a statement of budgetary effects of paygo legislation for h.r. 5116, as amended. total budgetary effects of h.r. 5116 for the five-year statutory paygo scorecard zero dollars. total budgetary effects of h.r. 5116 -- mr. bingaman: i would ask that the reading of it be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. bingaman: i would ask that the bill be passed, the motions to rebe laid upon the -- consider be laid upon the table, any statements to the bill be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection.

mr. bingaman: i join my -- my colleague from tennessee in thanking the senator from arizona for his courtesy and ask that this activity not interrupt his comments in the -- in the official record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. bingaman: i yield the floor. mr. mccain: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: mr. president, i guess i -- i guess i'll just start all over. mr. kerry: mr. president, we ask unanimous consent please spare us. mr. mccain: president reagan believed that viable missile defense systems in particular his strategic defensive initiative, held out the opportunity to eliminate the threat of nuclear holocaust and thereby render nuclear weapons irrelevant. president reagan was one of the leading proponents of a world without nuclear weapons, and he believed that it was missile

defense, not just arms control agreements, that would make that world possible. and my friends, if i may take you on a trip down memory lane, the debate on that subject was spirited, it was passionate and it was a fundamental debate that took place in this country during the 1980's. and that's why, that's why at the reykjavik summit of 1986 when soviet premier mikhail gorbachev cited the a.b.m. treaty as legal grounds for imposing what president reagan believed was a critical limitation on the strategic defense initiative, the president broke off the negotiation and walked out. one of the most remarkable acts in recent history. and you can imagine the initial response of the media and others to president reagan walking out of arms control talks.

with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the evil empire, the united states and russia were no longer more tall enemies with the means to threaten one another's very existence. for the proponents of missile defense, this was an opportunity to break once and for all the long-accepted linkage, the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. in a recent op-ed in the "wall street journal" -- and, mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "new start ratified with caveats" by condoleezza rice be included in the record at this time. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. mccain: former secretary of state condoleezza rice explains why breaking this linkage between offensive weapons and missile defense was so important during the post cold war. i quote from condoleezza rice's

article. "when u.s. president bush and russian president putin saoupbd the moscow -- signed the moscow treaty in 2002, they reduced -- addressed the nuclear by reducing weapons as their predecessors had. the moscow treaty was different. it came in the wake of the 2001 withdrawal from the antiballistic missile treaty of 1972. for the first time the united states and russia reduced their offensive nuclear weapons with no agreement in place that constrained missile defenses. breaking the link between offensive force reductions and limits on defense marked a key moment in the establishment of a new nuclear agenda no longer focused on the cold war face-off between the warsaw pact and nato. the real threat was that the world's most dangerous weapons could end up in the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes, or of terrorists who would

launch attacks more devastating than 9/11. since those very rogue states also pursued ballistic missiles, defenses would, alongside offensive weapons, be integral to the security of the united states and our allies. this brief background helps explain a key concern i have with the new start treaty as it relates to missile defense. that because of one clause agreed to by the parties in the treaty preamble, the russian government could use the treaty in its present form as a tool of political pressure to limit u.s. decisions about our missile defense systems. i followed this issue of missile defense pretty closely while the treaty was being negotiated. and as i have said before, i am concerned by the series of events that led to the treaty's handling of missile defense. first the senate was told that this treaty would in no way

reference the development and deployment of u.s. missile defense systems. here is what under secretary of state ellen tauscher said on march 29, 2010, and i quote, "the treaty does nothing to constrain missile defense. this treaty is about strategic weapons. there is no limit on what the united states can do with its missile defense systems." but then for some reason, after being told that this treaty was not about missile defense, the senate was then told that there would be a reference to missile defense after all. but that it would only be in the preamble of the treaty which, of course, is not legally binding. this was -- that was worrisome enough, but then we saw the treaty and not only was there a reference to missile defense in the preamble, but there was also a limit taoeugs our --

limitation to our missile defense deployments in the body of the treaty itself in article 5. this may not be a meaningful limitation, but it is a limitation nonetheless and a legally binding one at that. this sets a very, very troubling precedent. but what i want to focus on this morning is the reference to missile defense that appears in the preamble this afternoon. what i want to focus on this afternoon is the reference to missile defense that appears in the preamble, because that language carries a lot of historical significance and strategic weight. and it has been the root of mine and other senators' concerns about how the russian federation could use this treaty as a de facto veto against u.s. missile defense systems. this is what the eighth clause of the preamble says -- and i quote from the preamble --

"recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic arms, nuclear arms are reduced and that current -- current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the party." there are many problems with this statement and more that stem from. first, it reestablishes -- it reestablishes, after what i told you about happening during the reagan administration, it reestablishes, because we worked very hard over the past -- over the bush administration, i say reestablishes because we worked very hard overt past decade to decouple these two concepts. our offensive nuclear weapons and our missile defenses. during the cold war the soviet

union was always terrified of the prospects of u.s. missile defense. ever since president reagan proposed the strategic defense initiative, the russians have sought to limit development and deployment of our strategic defensive arms because they knew they could never compete. they sought to find our actions on missile defense through legal obligations and treaties. and when that didn't work, through political commitments or agreements that could citeed to confer future obligations and thus transformed into a political threat. in short, the russians have always understood that u.s. missile defenses would be superior to any defensive system the russian federation and the soviet union before it could ever deploy. so they have been relentless in trying to block it. it's for this reason, and because the bush administration worked so hard to break the lynchage between -- linkage,

that former secretary of state condoleezza rice conclude tphad recent op-ed which i cited earlier with the following counsel to this body -- and i quote -- "the senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this treaty the united states is not reestablishing the cold war link between offensive forces and missile defenses. new starts preamble is worrying in this regard as it recognizes the 'interrelationship' of the two." the reestablishment of the interrelationship is one problem with this clause in the preamble, but there are others. a second problem comes in the next line which states -- quote -- "that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic arms are reduced." this is only enhancing and strengthening the linkage between our offensive nuclear weapons and our missile defenses, because this treaty

will modestly reduce our strategic nuclear arms. and if the president is serious about his vision of a nuclear-free world -- and i believe he's serious -- then the importance of this agreed-upon interrelationship will only deepen in the years ahead. this takes an already problematic idea and makes it even more potentially damaging. the third problem and the one with potentially the most direct consequences comes in the next line which states -- quote -- "current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic defensive arms of the parties." this clause lays the groundwork for the political threat the russian federation wants to hold over the united states with regard to its missile defense deployments. by saying that current missile defenses do not undermine the treaty's viability and effectiveness, this agreed-upon

language in the preamble establishes that future missile defense deployments could undermine the treaty. thereby establishing a political argument that the russian federation will surely use at a future date and try to keep us from building up our missile defenses. in short, we have handed the russian government the political pressure they have sought for so long to bind our future decisions and actions on strategic defensive arms. imagine a world a few years from now when, god forbid, an iran or a north korea or some other rogue state has deployed longer-range ballistic missiles and a tkhroeubl nuclear capability -- deployable nuclear capability much earlier than we assessed that they could. imagine we're faced with a situation where unforeseen events compel us for the sake of our national security and that of our allies to qualitatively and quantitatively build up our missile defenses to improve our current systems or develop and deploy new systems to counter a

new and far greater threat than we expected. and then imagine that the russian government tells us that if we consider taking these actions, that we deem to be in our national security interest and such an action to improve our missile defenses would undermine the treaty's effectiveness and viability. this is an unacceptable constraint on u.s. decision making. as if to drive home the large potential problems that stem from this clause in the preamble, the russian government issued a unilateral statement at the time the treaty was signed. i realize this statement is not legally binding either, but it certainly adds to the political commitment that the russian federation believes the united states has made on limiting our missile defenses. this is a remarkable statement and it deserves to be read in full. and i quote -- "the treaty

between the russian federation and the united states of america on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms signed at prague on april 8, 2010, may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america. consequently, the extraordinary events referred to in article 14 of the treaty also include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america, such that it would give rise to a threat, the strategic nuclear force potential of the russian federation." that is a very clear statement made by the russian government about the linkage between defensive missile systems and offensive arms. this is the russian interpretation of what our two

governments have agreed to in the preamble. they explicitly draw the connection between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. they explicitly state that the united states is limited in its development and deployment of missile defense systems. they explicitly refer to the language of the preamble about the -- quote -- "effectiveness and viability of the treaty in order to claim that any build-up of improvement on u.s. missile defense systems that would undermine the treaty. then they go one step further. they draw a logical connection between what was agreed to in this clause of the preamble to article 14 of the treaty, which establishes the rights of the parties to withdraw from the treaty and the conditions under which they may do so. in short, the russian government has effectively turned a nonbinding political agreement into the pretext of what it believes is a legal obligation

under the treaty itself. you don't have to take my word for it. just list ton what russian leaders themselves -- just listen to what russian leaders themselves have said. here is certificate guy laugh -- here is sergei lavrov. "the treaty and all it contains are valid only within the context of the levels now contained in the sphere of strategic defensive weapons." here is foreign minister lavrov again on april 6, 2010 -- quote -- "russia will have the right to exit the accord if the u.s.'s build-up of stratepol i numbers and quality begins to considerably effect the efficiency of russian strategic nuclear forces. linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the accord and is legally binding." i would remind my colleagues, that's a statement of the

russian foreign minister. and here is everybody's favorite president, dmitry medvedev, speaking to the russian parliament on november 30. november 30. quote -- "either we reach an agreement on missile defense and create a full fledged cooperation mechanism. or if we can't come to constructive agreement we will see another escalation of the arms race. we will have to make a decision to deploy new strike systems." final hreurbgs here is my favorite, prime minister putin speaking on larry king live on december 1, 2010. "i want you and all the american people to know this, at least those spectators who will follow our program here. it's not us who are moving forward on missiles to your territory. it is you who are planning to mount missiles at the vicinity of our borders, of our territory. we've been told that you'll do

it in order to secure against the, let's say, iranian threat. such a threat as of now does not exist. if the countermissiles and rudders will be deployed in the year 2012 along our borders, or 20 15rbgs they will work against our nuclear arsenal, and certainly that worries us, and we are obliged to take some actions in response. unfortunately at the time the treaty was signed, after agreeing to this problematic cause in the preamble, the u.s. negotiators did not use the opportunity to make a unilateral statement of their own, to decisively discredit the russian government's claims. instead this is the statement that the united states government issued in response to the statement that i read, the signed statement. quote -- the united states of

takes quote. the united states missle defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with russia. the united states missle defense systems would be employed to defend the united states against limited missle launches. the united states intends to continue improving and deploying its missle defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and is part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions. my friend, i understand diplomacy and i understand statements that are equivocal. that certainly stands out as one of those. we could have stated that the development and deployment of u.s. missle defenses are in no way limited by the treaty, its preamble or anything the russian government says about them. we could have stated that the united states does not recognize

decisions about its missle defense systems as a legitimate and valid reason for the russian federation to withdraw from the treaty as is its right under article 14. we could have stated affirmatively that the united states will continue to make both qualitative and quantitative improvements to our missle defense systems regardless of whether the russian federation threatens to or chooses to with frau the new start -- withdraw from the new start treaty. we could have said that, instead we took note of what the russians had to say and spoke passively of our intentions without addressing the heart of the matter. what does all this mean? what it means is that the senate needs to fix the problem presented by this clause in the treaty's preamble. one way to do that, the easiest way is to strike the eighth clause from the preamble text and that's what this proposed amendment would do, would remove

any recognition of an inner relationship between offensive nuclear weapons an missle defense and it would undercut the logical and political foundation of russian unilateral statement as well as the clearly and repeatedly stated russian position that this treaty imposes a legally binding limitation on u.s. missle defenses. i see that i'm joined on the floor by my good friend and cosponsor of this amendment, the senator from wyoming. and, again, i want to take this opportunity to thank him, taking the lead -- taking the lead in offering this amendment within the committee on foreign relations during the markup of the resolution of ratification. i've had the opportunity to travel overseas with the senator from wyoming to iraq and afganistan and pakistan and many other places. i appreciate his consistent leadership on matters of national security. i would ask unanimous consent, since the amendment mine and

senator barrasso, that senator barrasso be recognized next. the presiding officer: without objection, the senator from wyoming is recognized. mr. barrasso: thank you, mr. president. it is indeed a privilege to join my friend and colleague, the ranking member of the armed services committee. he talked -- made mention of six christmass that he spent away from home. members of this body and members of this nation know that those christmases were spent in captivity in north vietnam. i would recommend to all of america, the faith of my fathers, i read it on a trip with senator mccain heading to iraq to visit and thank our troops serving several years ago on thanksgiving when we were there with the troops. and we were in baghdad and in kirkuk and in the anbar province. and out in the province, i had a chance to meet for the first time a young marine, and that

young marine is senator mccain's son. and as we traveled across this globe, vitting our soldiers, -- visiting our soldiers, thanking them in afganistan as well, we've been to georgia where he was awarded and received the highest national award from the president and the people of georgia. senator mccain is recognized and he is respected worldwide for his knowledge, for his patriotism, and for his bravery. and i think it's critical that we listen to him as we talk about this very important treaty. the amendment that he brings today is one to strike the -- the language in the preamble that limits our missle defense. it limits our ability as a nation to defend ourselves. i have major concerns about

russians trying to limit current and future u.s. missle defense capabilities through the new start. i am committed to our national security and the ability of the united states to defend ourselves. mr. president, in my opinion this treaty signed by the president and by the russian president on april 8, 2010, places explicit limits on united states missle defense. there should be no place in the treaty with russia for the united states to limit our ability to defend and to protect our nation. specifically i believe the language in the preamble, the language in the unilateral statement by russia, the day the treaty was signed, and the language in the statements by senior russian officials regarding missle defense all show -- all of them show that russia intends to weaken the

ability of the united states to defend ourselves. the language in the preamble provides an explicit linkage between strategic nuclear offensive weapons and strategic nuclear defensive weapons. the preamble implies the right of russia to withdraw from the treaty based on u.s. missle defense, that is -- defense that is beyond -- quote -- "current strategic capabilities." the treaty preamble gives russia an opportunity to turn their backs on the treaty at the slightest shine of a shift in american defensive strategy. this language is unacceptable and it needs to be removed. senator mccain read from "the wall street journal," editorial op-ed by former secretary of state rice, and she pointed out several very legitimate concerns about the new start treaty that

must be resolved during the rat indicatioratification process. i would like to repeat and reit rate two sentences -- two sentences that get to the very heart of this amendment that senator mccain and i are bringing to you today. she stated -- quote -- "the senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this treaty, the u.s. is not reestablishing the cold war link between offensive forces and missle defenses. she said, new start's preamble is worrying in this regard and it recognizes the -- quote -- "interrelationship" of the two. well, mr. president, russia is trying to force the united states to choose, to choose between missle defense and the treaty. and in that case i choose missle defense. the administration continues to claim there's no limit on missle

defense. and the administration also claims the preamble is not legally binding. well, russia clearly disagrees an believes the opposite to be -- and believes the opposite to be true. they have made it quite clear they consider the preamble to be legally binding. the russian foreign minister was quoted by senator mccain on the floor, he stated and i want to eat it rate one of the -- reiterate one of the sentences, the russian foreign minister stated that the treaty had legally binding linkage between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons. close quote. there is a fundamental disagreement between the united states and russia on this issue. i believe that placing constraints on future u.s. defense capabilities should not be up for debate. let alone placed in a treaty on strategic offensive nuclear

weapons. it is outrageous that this administration would make any concession to russia on our national security. i think that the administration's decision to include this language was a serious mistake. we should not be tying our hands behind our backs and risking the national security of both our nation as well as of our allies. the united states must always remain in charge of our missle defense, not russia, or any other country. as our country continues to face threats from around the world, we should not take any action -- any action that will hinder our missle defense options. with concerns over countries like iran and like north korea, the united states cannot take any chance -- any chance on language that could weaken our

missle defense capabilities. the administration claims the language in the preamble has no legally binding significance, then there should be no problem in eliminating that language on missle defense in the preamble of the treaty. and that is why i am privileged to join my colleague, senator mccain, in offering amendment 4814, and would ask my colleagues to give great consideration and thought to what the importance of this amendment is and then to go on and adopt it. thank you, mr. president, and i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma is recognized. mr. inhofe: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, i've been here

and have listened to the two previous speakers, and let me just echo and agree with the remarks that were made by the senator from wyoming about the senator from arizona. i served as a second ranking member of the senate armed services committee, and i've watched -- served under his leadership for quite some time now, and also i have to say that the senator from wyoming and i are both on foreign relations, and i've watched his leadership in this. so i come from a little different perspective than some because i'm actually on both committees. and one of the things that i've been concerned about for a long time has been that people don't really have a real firm understanding as to the threat that we're under in this country. now, we've heard a lot of different explanations about the intent of article 5 of the treaty. on the one hand the obama administration assures us there's no limitations on our missle defenses. on the other hand, as has been stated by the two previous speakers, the russian foreign

minister states that there are obligations regarding missle defense in the treaty that constitute a legally binding package. now, i think this is pretty well covered by the senior senator from arizona, but i want to mention three things that pretty well lock in, at least in my mind, this connection that is there. the preamble of the treaty recognized the inner relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms that is inner relationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, that means it's going to be increased, and that current strategic defense arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic defenses of the arms of the party. now, i have -- yesterday i quoted extensively -- i'll just paraphrase now. the foreign minister of russiaa when he said -- quote -- "we have not yet agreed on this missle defense issue and we're

trying to clarify how the agreement's reached by the two presidents co-rewith the actions taken unilaterally by washington and added that the obama administration had not coordinated its missle defense plans with russia. in a stronger statement that was made at the very beginning that has already been quoted and that is the treaty can operate and be viable only if the united states of america refrains from developing its missle defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. and i'd like to also mention that the -- as far as this link is concerned, i had occasion not too long ago to be in turkey and talked then to the turkey ambassador, are eric edelman, and many of us remember that he was the undersecretary of defense for policy and he just a couple of months ago made a very strong statement and i'll read that. he said -- quote -- "the new start, unfortunately, introduces limits and obstacles to further

development and precisely these means of defending the country. as part of the rat indication process -- ratification process, i would hope at a minimum the senate will express its sense that no further limitations on missle defense or prompt global strike should be considered as part of the future nuclear arms reduction agreements." he was referring to any other agreements, not just this one. allowing any other restraints could well prove a major error in long-term strategy because they would trade away areas of u.s. comparative advantage for reductions in russian strategic forces that would be likely to happen even in the absence of a treaty." now, put the first -- this chart up here. let me try to put this down. i think an awful lot of people have heard these same words raimented over and over again that, yes, certainly there's no one in here that can say there's no relationship between any restrictions that they are desiring in terms of their

obligate to -- of their ability to have a missile defense system. we know what happened in poland. i happened to be in afghanistan when the president announced his budget. that was his very first budget. at that time we had all -- several of us had been involved with both the czech republic where we were anticipating the building of a radar system as well as the -- as poland for a ground-based interceptor. now, one of the things that was very offensive about that was that several of us -- and i can remember personally the president of the czech republic saying to me in the czech republic that, are you sure if we take this risk and we are willing to do this because we believe it's the right thing to do that you won't change administrations and coupled and pull the rug out from under us? and i said, i can certainly give you that assurance. well, unfortunately, that's exactly what happened. and i think people realize that that happened, when he gave his

military budget, he just did away with and terminated that system. now, this is -- this is a chart that i think most people do agree with. it came from the congressional budget office. as you know, we have over here in alaska and down in california -- we have ground-interceptors. arnlgly there was going to be -- originally there was going to be quite a few more. recently under this administration, down to 30 ground-based interceptors. so we feel and i feel -- and i think most people agree -- that something that is coming in from north korea and coming across here can be detected, can be shot down, and if missed the first time you'd have another run at it. so, i have -- i have stated several times we're in pretty good shape for this. but if you look at the footprint of the coverage, it goes over and barely covers the eastern part of the united states, of course nothing over here in western europe. now, if this should happen, i don't think there's anyone --

and i've talked to a lot of expertexperts -- hoive that if e not accurate and right, the first time there would be another chance to do t all you have to do is look at this chart and i think you can see that that threat is out there that that cornlg sought there, that there's certain lay question as to whether or not we'd be able to do it with a ground-based interceptor from -- coming up from this direction. now, this is iran over here. the reason we'v we have this one chart is it is pretty-well accepted that iran will have the capability of a missile over by -- the year they use is 2015. now, if we had had the ground-based interceptor in what they called the third site, which would be right here in poland, then we would have been in a position to have that deployable. initially in 2012. then that was slipped to 2015. well, 2015 happens to cured --

happens to be the same date that the iranians will have that capability. and that's the thing that is -- that reall really is the scary thifnlgt now, put the other chawrpt and let me go ahead and sort of walk through here on the timing. according to the phase adaptive approach which replaced the idea that we were going to have a ground-based interceptor in poland, it says that, on phase i, 2011 time frame, we'd be able to deploy the current and proven missile defense systems available in the next two years, including the sea-based aegis system, the sm-3 interceptor,that's the block 1-a which would be right down here. this is something that we've right now. this chart shows something that is coming from tehran over to the united states, let's say to washington, d.c. now, if they have this capability over here, we can see that we would have to have a

capability of the ground-based interceptor in poland. but her we are right now, the capability that they have in iran would be portrayed right here. this is their capability. this is our capability to kill something coming over. well, that's -- that's where they are today. this is where they're going to be in 2015. now, this irbm capability would be sometime around the year 2012 or 2013. so when we look at what our capability on this side is, we see that phase i, according to the administration, would be the 2011 time frame, theals the sea-based aegis with the sm-3 block 1. that's when we're getting into the -- after the appropriate testing, deploy a more capable

version of the sm-3 interceptor block 1-b. this is the block 1-b right here. this would give us a little greater capability in both the sea and the land-based. but that would be for a short or a medium-range missile threat. to then phase 3. this is phase 3 right here. this is what they state that we would be able to have by 2018. that would be an sm-3 block 2-a. now, in order to replicate. i'm quite sure i'm accurate on this -- what the capability that we would have with a ground-based interceptor in poland it would have to be the sm-3, 2-b. phase 4, their estimating it might be as early as 2020. but that's it might be. there's no time range, there's no agreement it would be. now, that's in the best scenario. so what we've done by eliminating this capability here that would have been deployable by 2015, going something that

might be deployable by 2020, when they have the capability, we believe, by 12015. -- by 20156789 that's the scary thing. i've often said and it is an oversimplification when you look at the truth we've talked about, its it's with the wrong people. i see north korea. and by the way, north korea is going to have this same capability, we believe, that would be by -- for -- well, right now actually for 12,000 kilometers. and 10 thaw would reach the united states from tehran. we know, no one denies, that tehran and north korea are trading capabilities and technology. so, i only wanted to come to say that there is a real threat out there. i mean, this is something that is real. it's something that was -- we looked at, we were able to accept at one time before they took down the -- poland's -- the

site in poland. so now we've a treaty that i think by anyone's interpretation after you've heard the senior senator from arizona, the junior senator from arizona, the senator from wyoming and others speak on this, that we would have that -- that this treaty does certainly at the very least have the threat of reducing our capability of defending ourselves. so, with that, i only want to point that ute and get into the record how serious the threat is, what the time frame is and why we should be not even considering a treaty unless we have the language incorporated in raiments that will be offered, i believe, by a number of members on this side, including myself, addressing the missile defense. i yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts is

recognized. mr. kerry: mr. president, i don't -- if the senator from arizona was about to speak on this, i'd be happy to let him speak and then senator lou garring gar and i and -- and then senator lugar and i and others may respond. is that correct? yes, mr. president, i ask unanimous consent on behalf of senator manchin that sylvia platos, a new start treaty specialist serving on his staff, be granted floor privileges on the floor during the balance of today's session. the presiding officer: without objection, so ordered. mr. kerry: and i would ask the senator from from arizona how le thinks he might take. mr. kyl: i would say to my colleague, maybeton minutes is all. i just would like to respond to four particular points that have been made here. the presiding officer: the senator arizona is recognized. mr. kyl: possibly senator graham had a question, and i thought also i could respond to his question, if he wanted to pursue that. i very strongly support the amendment that's been offered by

senator mccain and senator barrasso. the primarily point here is the preamble has created a great deal of confusion and it will create dischord between the russian federation and the united states government. there's a built-in conflict, a big problem. it is a tumor here, and it is going to grow and eventually create a conflict between our two countries that frankly isn't necessary. and that's the purpose for removing this language from the preamble; that is, that creates this problem in the first place, that reestablishes the linkage between strategic offensive weapons which are the subject of the treaty and missile defenses which are explicitly not the subject of the treaty. my colleague, senator mccain, pointed out that secretary rice had written an -- rice had written op-ed that says reestablishment of the linkage which the bush administration had worked very hard to eliminate and in the moscow treaty of 2002 had eliminated

making it clear, even though the russians wanted a preamble language or treaty language connecting the two, making it very clear that they were not going to be connected by the united states. we intended to keep our missile defense plans separate and apart from any strategic offensive treaty. now, mr. president, the proponents here of this -- of the treaty and the language have made some arguments which i think i should respond to briefly. they'll probably dwell on some of these again, but i've heard these arguments so famplet one that you hear over and over again is that the treaty language is not binding. and the simple response to that is, fine, if it's not binding, then what's the big deal about amending it or simply eliminating this particular provision? because it's pernicious, it's going to create a host of problems in the future in terms of disagreements between the two countries, disagreements which are not necessary but which

could escalate into a real problem in the relationship between the two ons can. so if it's not binding, then clearly there shouldn't be any big deal about amending the preamble. second, i did hear my colleague from massachusetts the other day said, well, these preambles are not that big a deal. they're mostly for domestic consumption. it's a two-way street here. we've got some domestic consumption in the united states, too. the american people want the united states to be unconstrained in thevestment our missile defenses, and we'd like to have a little comfort in this treaty that we're not going to be so constrained. i'm well aware of the language in the resolution of ratification which is simply a statement that says the treaty doesn't limit u.s. missile defenses. that's true insofar as it goes. but of course it begs the question of how the russians interpret the preamble, and they interpret it, as i said two days ago, as a -- or yesterday, i guess, as a legally binding

authority for the russian federation to leave the treaty based on its interpretation of extraordinary circumstances allowing it under article 14, the withdrawal clause, to withdraw from the treaty if the united states were to deploy missile defenses that either qualitatively or quantitatively improve our condition, vis-a-vis russia, which clearly is going to happen if the united states pursues the plans that secretary gates has announced. of course, the real question is, in view of the russian objections, will we in fact do that? that's the pernicious aspect of this preamble. i am a frayed because the russians have made such a big deal out of this, the obama administration is backing away from what were announced as our plans for missile development. third, just point out the fact that this is a problem created by the administration. the senate gave its advice in the defense bill last year when we explicitly said, don't include any limitations on missile defense. we also added prompt conventional global strike.

so this language is negotiated, notwithstanding a warning by the senate that limitations it on missile defense could create a problem in our consent to the treaty. fourth, the language, as is said, is inconsistent with the -- that is, the language in the preamble is inconsistent with announced plans for u.s. missile defense. my colleague, senator kerry, quoted administration officials saying, we briefed the russians thoroughly on this. no doubt that's true. it also appears to be true that the united states has begun to modify our announced intentions with regard to deployment of missile defense. my colleague, senator inhofe, pointed out that in place of the ground-based interceptors that the bush administration had planninged to deploy in poland along with associated radars in the czech republic, to complement the ground-based interceptors already in california and alaska primarily dealing with the threat coming

from east asia, in place of that, the administration announced that it would substitute a phased array -- rather, a phased adaptive approach which included at least in its fourth phase the potential for intercepting icbms that could come from iran to the united states, but also of course anywhere else, including russia. that would clearly be a qualitative improvement of missile defenses, vis-a-vis russia, which under their interpretation of the preamble would allow them to withdraw from the treaty. we say, no, it wouldn't. oh, no, wait. that was the start i treaty where we said no, it wouldn't. in the start i treaty, the united states's union statement reject what had the then soviets said. the language is almost the same. the soviets said, we don't want you to build missile defenses. if you do, that's a grounds for withdrawal from the treaty. tarnghts the united states said,

no, it is not. did we say that this time? no, not a word. as my colleague, senator mccain said, the united states was silent. instead, in effect, saying in our unilateral signing statement, you know, you don't have anything to worry about because we're only going to develop missile defenses good against limited or regional threats. in other words, neither the ground-based interceorhat we were going to deploy but president obama pulled back from europe, and the phased adaptive approach, which in its final phase could be effective against a russian icbm, apparently neither of those are going to be deployed. the administration didn't make an announcement to that effect but they did appear to confirm it when they briefed in lisbon a couple weeks ago the nato allies and russia that the first three phases of the phased adaptive approach would be deployed but the magic language wasn't used on the fourth. they just said it would be available. so which is it? are we, in fact, pulling our punches already, before the

treaty's even ratified, because the russians have objected to it? isn't this exactly what secretary rice warned us about, saying that she was worried that we had to in this treaty do something about the fact that the russians had reconnected defense with offense? well, that's exactly what the mccain and barrasso amendment would do. it takes out this language which raises the question, the confusing interrelationship language between missile defense and missile offense, and it strikes the language that says that current u.s. missile defense is not a problem, of course laying ole the whole question open the whole question of whether it will be a problem. i would be happy to yield to my colleague. mr. mccain: the amendment, as you know, strikes the language in the preamble. there are some that allege that a -- quote -- "letter from the president," a strong letter from the president would suffice to address this issue.

i wonder what the senator from arizona's view is as to how binding and how impactful that would be as opposed to the existing language which exists in the preamble? mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. i thank my colleague for the question because it sets up the perfect reason why this amendment is necessary. the russians interpret the preamble as the basis for their legal argument that they can withdraw from the treaty if we do what secretary gates has said we're going to do. so what would a letter from the president potentially say? either it's going to say, we intend to go forward and develop and deploy the missile defenses which would be seen by the russians as contrary to their national interests, their supreme national interests, thus, further laying a foundation for them to withdraw from the treaty.

or the president would contradict the briefing at lisbon and contradict the u.s. signing statement and -- or, excuse me, would confirm the lisbon briefing and the signing statement and say we don't intend to deploy those, we only intend to deal with limited original threats -- limited or regional threats so the russians have nothing to worry about. the senate would be on positio position -- would be on record in an understanding accompanying the treaty that confirmed all of this, the senate would at least be on record. but that doesn't commit the president. so i think the only answer to avoid the confusion and to avoid any future president having pressure from the russians that they're going to withdraw is to just remove the language. i mean, that's the butte of th the -- of the author of the amendment. it takes out the -- it pulls the thorn so that the sting no longer can exist.

mr. graham: as we play this out, i think there's a lot of bipartisan agreement that the united states needs to develop some form of missile defense. i know senator kerry does. i'm sure the president does. we all live in a very dangerous world and the idea of a missile coming from iran or north korea, some other rogue nations, is a reality. it's a different topic to talk about neutering a first strike from the russian federation, but the idea that an intercontinental ballistic missile coming to the united states from some rogue nation, like iran or north korea, do you believe that's a possibility in the future, senator? mr. kyl: well, mr. president, i certainly do and our -- obviously our defense planners all are worried about that as well. mr. graham: and i believe the president of the united states believes that too. mr. kyl: yes. mr. graham: now, here's the problem, as i understand it -- and correct me if i'm wrong -- if we enter into this treaty and the preamble is not clarified or

stricken, there could come a point down the road as we develop these systems to defend against what we all agree is a real national security threat to the united states, what damage would it do to our relationship and what kind of conflict would it create or anxiety in the world at large if the russians say we're going to back out of the treaty? because that's the one thing you don't want to happen. you don't want to sign a treaty where we're going to do, a, and if we do a, they back out. because you put the world in a state of confusion and really danger. the idea that the -- all the papers in the work would read one day, "russians back out of strategic arms limitation treaty because of u.s. deployment of missile defense," to me, that is something that we need to deal with, with certainty. because if that day ever came, it would really be an unnerving event. and, to me, it is clear that the

russians have taken the preamble language to mean that we have limited ourselves. it's clear to me that the president is trying to say we haven't limited ourselves. senator kerry says it. i say it. you say it. but if the russians don't agree with that, it would be better not to do the treaty, in my view, than would be to create an illusion that the world is safer and hav have that illusion destroyed. so just think this thing through. no matter how much you want a treaty, the worst thing that could happen, in my view, is two major powers with nuclear weapons sometime in the future have a falling-out, and that's where we're headed if we don't get this right. so to my colleagues, this is a big event. this is a big moment in terms of our relationship with russia. but you should not sign a treaty when there's a high likelihood if we do what we think we need to do, it will put them in a

spot of having to withdraw. that, to me, has to be settled and to me, taking the preamble out and if he took it out and they still signed the treaty, to me, that would make sense. if you leave it confusing, then you're asking yourself for heartache down the road. do you agree with that? mr. kyl: yes. mr. president, i certainly do, and i'll terminate my conversation here by also adding one other point to my response to my colleague from arizona about a letter from the president. the problem right now is that that -- that such a letter, if it confirmed that we were going to move forward with our missile defense system adequate to protect the united states from an icbm from more than regional threats would directly contract our unilateral signing statement. so what the president would have to do would be to say i hereby reject or repudiate the signing statement that the state department attached to the treaty when we signed it and state the u.s. position instead as and then lay out his commitment to deploy a missile

defense system adequate to protect the united states even from an icbm. mr. mccain mccain: one additionl question, while the senator still has the floor, for my colleague. as we all know, there's nothing more important probably that comes before this body than the ratification of treaties. our founding fathers reserved it for the senate alone. and this treaty is, obviously, of significant importance, not just in the treaty itself but the impact that it has around the world, the allegation there's certainly -- there's certainly something to the allegations that are made or comments that are made that this could affect u.s.-russian relations. and i think that the senator from south carolina and you and i and every member of this body is very aware of the absolute importance of this treaty and for us to make the decision strictly based on the merits or demerits of this treaty. the reason why i ask my

colleague this question is because there continues to swirl allegations that there is going to be a vote for or because of another piece of -- for or against because of another piece of legislation or for other reasons, for other political reasons. i reject that allegation. and i wonder if my colleague from arizona does as well? i know that every member of this body is making the judgment on this treaty on its merits, and their view of its merits or demerits, and its importance to the future security of this nation. and i wonder -- and i hope my colleague from arizona, that i clear that up and i hope that my colleague from arizona will too. mr. kyl: mr. president, i couldn't agree more with my colleague from arizona. there have been rumors swirling around here for two or three weeks, for example, when the tax legislation was being negotiated that somehow or other there was some deal in the works to trade some -- to trade, it was the --

the extension of the existing tax rates for support of the start treaty. well, there's -- there was never any kind of a deal like that going on. so, no, there's -- there's no -- this treaty stands or falls on its own merits. the other thing i would say, however, is that i have made the point for a long time that one of the impediments to ratifying this treaty or to debating it and considering it in a meaningful way was the intercession of all of the other business that was being put before the senate, much of it very partisan. and that it was very difficul difficult -- i mean, my colleague from arizona was right in the middle of the sentence awhile ago but he was interrupted by another colleague to say, well, we have some intervening business we have to do here. and that's the problem. if we're going to debate and considerate treaty and be able to do it in the -- in the thoughtful and focused way that it really deserves, then we shouldn't have all of these other items come popping in and out of the senate, we're on the treaty for two days and then

we'll back on it for two -- off it for two days and then back on it for another few days are meanwhile we're voting on this, that and the other things, that's what i was portending would keep us from really doing the treaty right and i think my predictions were very, very correct. mr. sessions sessions: mr. pres, would the senator yield for a question, senator kyl? you've been a practicing lawyer and i know a successful one. you negotiated a lot of agreements here in the senate. to follow up on what senator graham said, it seems to me at the very heart of this treaty is a very apparent misunderstanding about the meaning and ability of the united states to deploy a missile defense system. so when two serious parties enter into negotiations on matter as serious as nuclear weapons, should there -- isn't

it a basic part of a good agreement that there are no misunderstandings on important issues? and it seems to me quite clear from repeated russian statements that they're taking a position very fundamentally contrary to the one that the united states should be taking. mr. kyl: mr. president, i'm glad to respond to that and just summarize this again. yes, any lawyer -- and we are both lawyers here -- knows that if you have an ambiguity in a contract, you're asking for trouble, you're asking for litigation or dispute down the road. well, it may not be all that important between two parties or two companies, but when you've got two major countries like russia and the united states with a lot of tenuous relationships there, a lot of things we agree and some that we don't agree on, and very important matters that can arise, if you have a major dispute between the two countries, you can affect international relationships not just between the two of us but affecting a whole lot of other things in the world as well. you don't want to build in potential conflicts. and there is a double conflict

here. the first conflict is between the united states and russia. the russians say, if you improve your missile defenses, we get to withdraw from the treaty. now, the state di state departmt signing statement says don't worry, we're only going to improve our -- we're only going to protect against regional or intermediate-range threats. but the white house at the same time talks about having a letter from the president or a statement from maybe the secretary of defense or somebody that says, but we are, in fact, going to go forward and develop these kind of missile defenses, which would, in fact, qualitatively improve our position vis-a-vis russia. and so not only do we have a disagreement with russia, we have a disagreement within our own government about our own intentions. and i don't think the senate can ratify a treaty with all of this uncertainty out there. we don't know what this country intends to do, and there are enough confusing signals that there's not only potential for dispute between russia and the united states, but between the

united states congress and the obama administration. mr. mccain: i ask unanimous consent to engage in a short colloquy with -- the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts is recognized. mr. kerry: mr. president, if we can, i think we have had about six or seven missiles launched our way. now i'm going to show you what one good defense can do to all of the balance of power, and that's what this is all about. reality. we just heard the senator from arizona -- first of all, i am so happy that we are engaged in this debate. i thank my colleagues for the seriousness of that debate, and this is -- this is where we really get to the heart of this, and i look forward to it. the senator from arizona just engaged in a couple of

questions, the senior senior -- the junior senator, i have to get this straight. the other guy is senior in every way, what can i say? in that colloquy, they suggested that there is some kind of confusion and that we're proceeding down a road where somehow we're going to come into some kind of a confrontation over this issue. now, let me begin by saying it doesn't take missile defense or any misunderstanding over it or any -- there isn't one, i'll come to that next, but it doesn't take that or any other treaty for the russians to decide to get out of the treaty or for the united states to decide to get out of the treaty. i mean, to suggest -- i mean, senator risch from idaho stood here a few minutes ago talking about all the benefits of modernization that are in this

treaty, talked about all the really, really good items, about knowing what they are doing. the choice here is between having that modernization locked in the way we have it in the context of the treaty and locked in with a treaty where we have verification or not having it. now, that's -- that's really what we're talking about. and the fact is that there is no confusion, mr. president. let me read, first of all, the united states congress has passed a law. it is the law of the land. defense act of 1999 -- quote -- "it is the policy of the united states to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the united states against limited ballistic missile attack paren thesis whether accidental,

unauthorized or deliberate, end, with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for national missile defense." unequivocal. no if, ands or buts. the law of the land, which we voted for, is to have a missile defense system, and that's the policy of the united states. now, what the senators have just been arguing about is a paragraph that has no legal binding, none whatsoever, no legal binding standing whatsoever. it's not part of the four corners of the treaty, not part of the treaty. it's a statement. now, there is no confusion about what that statement means. let me read the united states unilateral statement, our statement. april 7, 2010." the united states missile

defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with russia. the united states missile defense systems would be deployed to defend the united states against limited missile launchers. that is incidentally language completely in keeping with the national missile defense act of 1999. same language, to defend the united states against limited missile launchers and to defend its deployed forces, allies, allies and partners against regional threats. some colleagues have come to the floor and questioned whether we're going to be there for our allies. here's the statement that makes it clear we will be there for our allies. the united states -- i read further -- "the united states intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems." hear that, please hear that. that's our signing statement. "we intend to continue improving and deploying our missile defense system in order to

defend ourselves against limited attack as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions." now, did the russians understand what we said? let me read what the russians said. if i can find it. "as early as april 6, 2010, russian foreign minister lavrov said -- quote -- " the present treaty does not deal with missile defense systems, but with a reduction of strategic arms." on august 2, 2010, foreign minister lavrov made this especially clear in an article in a russian publication. he said, "dedicated from the outset to the reduction in limitation in strategic defensive arms, the new agreement does not impose restriction on the development of missile defense systems." a month earlier, deputy foreign minister rabikov said at a press

conference, "russia did not seek to limit the development of u.s. missile defenses while drawing up the strategic arms reduction treaty. we have never set a task to limit the development of the u.s. a.b.m. system, including a global one by means of the treaty. there are no such limitations in this treaty. -- this treaty." so the russians understand what this treaty means, and so do we. now, that said, mr. president, what is -- i ask that those statements be placed in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: now, mr. president, what is the language that the senator seeks to strike and why is it problematic? and why will i oppose it? i oppose it because since it is not within the four corners of the treaty but nevertheless the preamble to the treaty, it requires us to go back to the russians and renegotiate.

that's a treaty killer. make no mistake, this becomes a treaty killer. now, can we deal with this issue without a treaty killer amendment? the answer is yes, senators, we can deal with it. oh, incidentally, we have dealt with it. we've already dealt with it. it's in the resolution of ratification. and i want to read very clearly to our colleagues the resolution of ratification, which incidentally i say to my colleagues, it's an understanding, which means it has to be communicated to the russians. this is not something that we just -- this is communicated to the russians. and here's what it says. "it is the understanding regarding missile defense, it is the understanding of the united states that, a, the new start treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile defenses other than the

requirement of paragraph 3 of article 5, which is the one that refers to the silos. now, we've talked about that yesterday. we talked about the silos yesterday, and i'll come back to it in a minute. the most relevant language is in b. that incidentally, the silos is all that our understanding refers to as contained within the treaty. in paragraph b, it says, "any additional new start treaty limitations on the deployment of missile defenses beyond those contained in paragraph 3" -- that's the silos, the conversion of silos -- "beyond that would require an amendment to the new start treaty which may enter into force for the united states only with the advice and consent of the senate." so, in other words, if there were to be any other restraint on missile defense, we are making it clear and this is

communicated to the russians that it would require the united states senate's advice and consent. it has to come back to us. we control what happens. so the only component of this that has any legal force of law are the silos. now, i'd say to my colleagues, are the people who came here last night saying we're spending too much money, advocating that we build and allow a silo conversion that costs costs $55 million, compared to the silos that the military wants to build that cost cost $36 million and are brand-new and more effective and more efficient and not confusable with the sold icbm silos. i think what makes more sense? that is not a limitation on missile defense, because we have the right to go out and build any number of fields of silos wherever we think they most

effectively work. we can go build those new silos for some $20 million less than the ones they want to reserve the right to conceivably convert and confuse the world about what's in them. now, it's pretty clear there is no limitation on defense because we can do what we want with our bombers, we can do what we want with our submarines and we can do what we want in terms of our interceptor missiles fired from fields somewhere where we decide to put them. that is not a limitation on defense under any definition whatsoever. and, i might add, for those who quoted a couple of comments by a couple of russians, they're giving greater credibility to those russians than they are to the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the president, the vice president, the joint chiefs of staff, all of whom and our strategic command and the head of our missile defense agency, all of whom have said we're going ahead

with our plans, we're going to do what we want. so, mr. president, when you look at the language we already have in the resolution of ratification, which will be communicated to the russians, there's no limitation on our defense for anything that we intend to do, want to do or make sense for the united states of america. now, that said, let's talk about the language and what it really does mean that the senator's amendment seeks to strike. it says the following -- "rebeccaing the -- recognizing the difference of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms -- i.e., referring to our plans of what we have and what we're

doing -- do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic defensive arms of the parties." that's all it says. what is that? i'll tell you what it is. it's a statement of fact. it's a statement of the truth. it's a statement of a truth that was recognized by president george bush, by condi rice, by jim baker and by all of their predecessors, all the way back to richard nixon, henry kissinger and others. now, what is the statement of fact? well, here's the statement of fact. is there a relationship between one person's level of offensive weapons and someone's defensive weapons? i was here with the senator from arizona, the senior senator from arizona, and we had a long debate in the 1980's over this subject, and he was right. it created a lot of turmoil back and forth over the so-called

s.d.i. program, strategic defense initiative that president reagan initially proposed, and i think he and i maybe -- and senator kyl may have been here then, were part of that debate with president reagan in that period of time. and what we learned during that period of time is that this reality of this relationship between offense and defense. now, i want to take a minute just to sort of go through it a little bit because i think it's important to understand how innocuous these words really are and what they sort of recognize in this process. our policy of our country is now to set out to create a limited defense. i read that. the strategic defense initiative was a much broader, much bigger kind of concept. in fact, in the beginning of that debate, it even contemplated putting weapons up in space and having the ability to shoot down from space and a whole bunch of other things, and

we went through a long and tortured debate about all of that which finally sort of exposed this -- this following reality. here's the reality. for years, we would each respond to each other as we both built up the numbers of nuclear weapons, and we both contemplated first strike capacity and survivability, second strike capacity and how the numbers of weapons that we had affected the judgment of each side about their security. if one side had a whole bunch of great big missiles with big warheads, as the russians did, the big ss-18's and so forth -- they had bigger ones than we did, actually, and that motivated us to sort of think about a whole bunch of other ways of defending against it because we wanted them to know that if they did use these big missiles against us and tried to

do a first strike, that they couldn't take us out and we had the ability to come back and annihilate them. that was the theory of mutually assured destruction that had everybody building weapons until we had thousands of military weapons each and ten thoufs more of -- thousands of more cruise missiles, various other platforms by which -- tactical nuclear weapons by which we could deliver a nuclear warhead. ronald reagan, to his credit, and mikhail gorbachev came to the conclusion in reykjavik that this was madness, neither side could be affording to be spending endless amounts of money building up huge offensive amounts of weapons so they could at least have a sufficient level of threat that the other side was scared to do anything. and i listened earlier to, i

think it was senator kyl and others talking about how we have prevented some wars. i'm convinced, tpwrafrpbgly, that -- frankly, that we probably didn't invade the north of vietnam largely because russia and china were the surrogates behind the war both with massive nuclear power. we never quite went that distance because we always knew there was that counterthreat in the background. that certainly was the threat that existed in those 13 days of october when president kennedy and kruszchev squared off over cuba and we came perilously close to a nuclear war. what happened is when president reagan put out on the table the idea we're going to go ahead and build a defense, all of a sudden the russians who, frankly, couldn't afford it then and can't afford it now, they look at that defense and they say whoops, what does this do to our

calculation about first-strike survivability, second strike and the nuclear deterrence that we have if all of a sudden the other side has the ability to shoot down all the weapons, or a sufficient number of weapons of the other side in its calculated first-strike, second-strike survivability capacity, you've an nighted the -- annihilated the theory of deterrence. if one side deploys it all by itself, go ahead and deploy it, put it out there. like these desks here. the front row desks are our offensive weapons and the back three rhodes are all of a sudden a massive defensive system and all they have is the front row of desks. are they going to think differently. they say we either develop that

system so we can take it out or we develop a big enough offensive system so we can overwhelm all of it. right back to the arms race that we have struggled to get away from. that's why the idea that we're going to try to take out of here a nonbinding, nonlegal completely throw-away statement that there is a truism as henry kissinger called it -- i know senator mccain respects henry kissinger. i know he talked to him for advice in the course of a presidential race. he's still one of our wise men of foreign policy and state craft. and he testified to our committee that that statement, you ought to just ignore it. forget about it. it has nothing to do with this treaty. and all it does is state a truism, a fact, a reality. there is a relationship between offense and defense. and if we can't be, i don't

know, sort of capable enough here and understand the nuance of this thing well enough to be able to admit the truth about something, given all of the other evidence that's on the table about where we're heading, we would make an enormous mistake to kill the treaty over a nonbinding, near irrelevant piece of text. now let me just say further, i've already pointed out that in the resolution of ratification, we've obviated the need to have this agreement. we've completely put in there language that i think clarifies. i'm happy to work with my colleague further to see if there's some other way to even state more clearly in a declaration or in a condition, we could state some way perhaps more clearly if that satisfies it. but i don't think, given the lack of legal standing here, that we're going to kill the

treaty over the notion of this. a couple more things i want to say about it. does this assert this link for the first time, or reassert a link that has been separated? let me state, i've stated the obvious link between offense and defense. let me say one other thing. president reagan, incidentally, had a fascinating idea which a lot of people laughed at initially when he put it out there. he said let's share it with the russians. why would you share it with the russians? that's president reagan talking. because if they know what we're doing, if they know that it's not a guise to get an advantage over them, to somehow be able to surprise them or overwhelm them, that they understand exactly what you're doing, which is precisely what we have done in the course of this european

deployment. they know it, they understand it, they see what it's directed at, it's focused on iran, focused on rogue missiles, focused on the threat we ought to be focused on. they understand that. and, therefore, they don't see it as a reason not to enter into this kind of an agreement. but if we just unilaterally quietly go off on our own and develop something that they think can alter the strategic balance, then their leaders are subject to the same political pressures that we are of people who say, hey, you're not protecting our nation. you're not thinking about us. the evil united states of america might be trying to, you know, blanket us, et cetera. we both have folks in our political bodies who hate treaties or don't want to deal with us or they don't want to deal with us, we don't want to deal with them. we understand that. every president, republican and democrat alike, has found that strategically it made sense for the united states of america to in fact reach these agreements.

and to negotiate these agreements. and the world has been made safer because of it. and nobody has a greater testimony to that than senator lugar who is passionately for this treaty. because as jim baker said, it was start i that really created the foundation for the nunn-lugar threat-reduction program to be able to work and reduce the threat to our country. now i repeat, when donald rumsfeld was preparing to negotiate the moscow treaty, here's what he said, "we agreed that it is perfectly appropriate to discuss offensive and defensive capabilities together." as those negotiations began president bush said -- quote -- "we will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems." and he said the two go hand in

hand. what's more, seven former heads of the strategic command wrote the senate foreign relations committee this summer saying "the relationship between offense and defense is a simple and long-accepted reality." so the obama administration isn't creating some link. it's acknowledging a reality and it's acknowledging it, i might add, in a paragraph that has no legal standing with respect to the treaty itself, but it is, for whatever benefits or negatives, a sufficient part of that document that it requires under the law to go back to the russians and do it. but as secretary clinton said, it has no legal obligation, obligation on the united states. it's a statement of fact. so henry kissinger said, you know, don't worry about the language, and i accept what he's saying. finally, the preamble also

states that the current systems that we're planning on don't undermine the viability and effectiveness of either party's strategic arms. it also does not say that the future system that we can develop and we are developing, and the president laid out a clarity about stage 3 and stage 4 deployment with respect to europe. we can come back to that later if people want to. but the russians were briefed on why the treaty has no restraint whatsoever on our phased adaptive approach in europe, specifically including stage 4. and lieutenant general patrick o'riley, director of the missile defense agency, told the committee that once again folks can choose to believe lieutenant general patrick o'riley or you can believe a newspaper article in russian or some russian official. what matters to us is what we decide to do because we can pull

out of this treaty any day we want to if we have a qualitative change in our system and we think it's going to defend the united states of america, you don't think any president in the future isn't going to be the first to say i'm deploying that because it protects the country? and you don't think that senators here aren't going to be the first to stand up and say, mr. president, you have to deploy it because it protects the country? what's more, we can't reduce below the 1,550 warhead level, folks, without the united states senate agreeing to do it. so we're not sort of on some cascading downward trend here. we're in a position where our defense and intelligence community says we need this treaty because we want to get back on the ground. we want to know what russia is doing and we'd like to catch up to what they're up to. lieutenant general patrick o'riley said -- i quote -- "i believe the russians understand what the plan is and that those plans for development are not

limited by this treaty." that's a quote. he also explained what he told them about it. i quote again: "throughout these conversations, it was very clear to me through their questions and responses that they fully understood my presentation i.e., fourth stage and our commitment to proceed forward." you know, there's nothing in this treaty that changes our course on missile defense. bob gates reminded us of that. and once again you believe bob gates or you want to believe the russian press? is it relevant anyway? if bob gates says we're going to do it, the president says we're going to do it, the congress says we're going to do it and we are doing it, it doesn't matter what they say because if they're

going to pull out, they're going to pull out. until then we have the advantage of the inspections and the cooperation which comes with this treaty. here's what bob gates said, he said the russians have always tried to resist our ability to do missile defense. but he said this treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. he said we have a comprehensive missile defense program, and we are going forward with all of it. all of it. so the administration has made clear to the russians that we're going ahead with missile defense. we don't need this amendment. it doesn't change russia's withdrawal rights. it doesn't change what we've already made clear, not withstanding, it does have that minor impact of killing the treaty. and so i will oppose it. you know, much as the duma's action on start ii killed that treaty, it never came into force because of our pulling out of

the a.b.m. treaty. i don't think this amendment will advantage the position of our country. i know senator lugar wants to speak, but others are on the floor already. mr. mccain: mr. president? mr. kerry: i yield the floor, mr. president. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona is recognized. mr. mccain: mr. president, in deference to senator lugar, i'll be very brief. also senator sessions is here. he would like to speak as well as senator barrasso. i'll be very brief. i believe the senator from illinois is also here. mr. kerry: mr. president, i wonder if i could ask my colleague, we're at 4:45 now. i want to get a sense because colleagues are asking me on our side at least where we stand here. would it be possible to get an agreement, a time agreement? mr. mccain: i regret we can't at this time. this is one of the really seminal aspects of whether the united states senate is going to ratify this treaty or not. to have a time agreement after all of the fooling around that we've been doing on "dream" act,

on new york city, on all of these other issues that's taken up our time, we will not have a time agreement from this side until all members on this side have had an opportunity to express their views on this issue. mr. kerry: mr. president, if i may, i would simply ask a question. before i yield the floor, let me just say i'm not trying to reduce the level of debate. i'm just trying to get a sense of how much time we might need. no senator should be cut off. it seems to me we ought to have a sense of how many senators want to speak, how long they need and the normal procedure in the senate is sort of to try to establish that so we can pin down where we're heading here. all i'm trying to figure out is -- let me ask the senator two questions. number one i'd ask the senator, does he think that sometime in the near term he could have a sense of how many senators are going to speak and we could try to pin him down?

i'd ask him that, mr. president, without losing my right to the floor. mr. mccain: was the the floor yielded before the senator spoke? just out of curiosity. the presiding officer: it's the understanding of the chair that the senator from massachusetts has the floor. ain't contain all right. thank -- mr. mccain: all right. thank you. under any circumstances, i'll clarify any question that my friend from massachusetts asks. i cannot tell him at that time. what the senator from massachusetts has done is sparked a strong response from this side. this is not a situation where we come down and everybody just gives a staples. i mean, i had not planned on talking again until i heard the senator from massachusetts' comments. and i'm sure the senator from arizona and the senator from wyoming feel the same way. so i'll be glad to try to get a list of speakers, but i -- i certainly can't tell the senator from massachusetts when we will be done because i have to, obviously, in the spirit of

debate, i have to challenge the senator from massachusetts' assertions because that's what i think ratification process should be all about. i'm sure my colleague understands that. i just want to emphasize to the senator from massachusetts, i'm not trying to drag this out. i just want to make sure because this is really one of the most important parts of this debate that i don't want it to be short circuited, but i promise the senator from massachusetts i'm not just trying to drag it out. mr. kerry: mr. president, i completely understand and accept the senator's desire to have this robust debate on this. we need to and i welcome it. and i completely agree some of these issues are contentious. there are different points of view on . it i'm all in favor of that. i'm not trying to cut it off. mr. mccain: i will try to get a limit on the number of speakers. mr. kerry: i totally appreciate that. mr. president, i'm trying to help other colleagues on both sides of the aisle to figure out

where we're headed. the second thing waintd to ask him is this, -- i wanted to ask him this, i understand the powerful feelings on the other side about this particular issue. i thought we had addressed it. we certainly tried to address ited we took an amendment -- where's senator risch's amendment here? senator demint was it? we accepted an amendment to the resolution of at indication from senator demint -- i have it right here. no, that's on conventional weapons. well, here it is, mr. president. on missle defense, this was very important because senator risch, as he came to the floor today and talked about this entire way in which we deal with it -- no,

that's not it. this is a declaration -- if i could just say to my colleague, senator risch -- demint proposed this amendment and we accepted it. let me share with him what it says. it is the sense of the senate a paramount obligation of the united states government is to provide for the defense of the american people, deployed members of the united states forces and policies based on mutual assured destruction or potential vulnerability can be contrary to the safety of both countries and the united states and the russian federation share a common interest of moving as soon as possible away from a stratigic relationship based on -- in a world where biological weapons -- can be enhanced by stratigic defensive

measures. accordingly the united states is and will remain free to reduce the vulnerability to attack by con strucking a layered missle defense system capable of countering missles of all ranges. the united states will welcome steps by the russian federation to adopt a defensive stratigic posture. that's powerful language in my judgment. i'm very prepared if senator mccain would work with me, we could find a way that doesn't kill the treaty but that nuts here the language that embraces the thoughts that we're trying to convey with respect to our rights. mr. mccain: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona's recognized. mr. mccain: mr. president, i'll be belief. i know that our beloved senator lugar is waiting as is two or three of my colleagues. i appreciate what the senator from massachusetts just said because it -- it's the best argument for this amendment that

i've seen. it says that the preamble is nothing. it's meaningless. doesn't have any effect. then let's get rid of it. fine, let's just throw it away. in fact, he called it a throwa way, i believe. isn't that true, i would ask my colleagues? i yield for comment from my colleague. mr. kerry: yes, mr. president, that is exact -- mr. barrasso: that is what i see here, the senior senator from massachusetts, that's why the transcript from a few minutes ago said that that's the idea we're going to try to take out of here a nonbinding, nonlegal completely throwaway statement. so i ask my clear, shouldn't we just -- mr. mccain: what's the problem? if it's all of that, then let's get rid of it. the second point i'd like to make, of course the senator from massachusetts gave various quotes from russian leaders about -- about the whole aspect of missle defense. and, yet, again, on decembe

december 1st, 16 days ago, putin, speaking on "larry king live" i'm not making this up, i want you and all the american people to know this, et cetera, et cetera, it is you planning to mount missles at the vicinity of our borders. we've been told you'll do it to secure against let's say iranian threat, but such a threat as of now doesn't exist. if the rutters, whatever the rudders mean, if the rudders an countermissles will be deployed in 2012 along our border or 2015, they will work against our nuclear potential there, our nuclear arsenal and certainly that worries us and we are obliged to take some actions in response. now, that is -- 16 -- 15-16 days

ago from the prime minister and we all know the most powerful man in russia. we are obliged to take some actions in response. and, of course, these ones earlier. one day earlier president medvedev, either we reach an agreement on pitched and have a -- missle defense defense or if we can't come to an agreement, we will see an escalation of the arls race. we will have to make a decision to deploy new strike systems. now that was 17 days ago. now, who are we to believe and what are we to believe? we can clarify it. take that out of the preamble and we can clearly clarify it and there are other statements by the foreign minister and on and on. also there is recent press reports, russia develops new

icbm. that's on december 16. there's another news report that says russia has moved russian missles fuel u.s. worries in the wall street journal. u.s. believes that russia moved short-range nuclear warheads to north atlantic treaty organization allies as recently as this spring adding to questions in congress about russian compliance with longstanding pledges ahead of a possible vote on new arms control treaty. one of the reasons this is very important, i would argue, my friends, that back in 1991 the russians agreed that they would not move any of their tactical nuclear weapons. i mean that was a commitment that they made. so, again, i'm befuddled by the

reluctance of the senator from massachusetts to simply remove this preamble. i'd like to mention kind of the difference between this administration and start i on this very same issue. in fact, if you look at the statement that the united states made, it's very interesting. he says the united states intends to continue to improving and deploying its missle defense system in order to defend itself against limited attack. the word limit attack is very interesting there. and it's part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in the key regions. now that -- contrast that with what the united states said at the time of ratification of start i. the united states said, while the united states cannot circumscribe the soviet right to withdraw from the treaty, if the soviet believes it is jeopardized, the full exercise of the united states by its legal rights under the a.b.m.

treaty as we have discussed with the soviet union in the past would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. the united states will sign the start treaty. in addition the provisions for withdrawal from start treaty based on supreme national interest clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that jeopardize the party's supreme interest. soviet statements of the u.s. withdrawal from the a.b.m. treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. i ask my colleagues to look at the differences between the two comments. finally i'd like to just emphasize again there is clear clearly -- clearly room for some disagreement as to what russian intentions are. but shouldn't it be clarified. shouldn't we ask the russians? couldn't we ask them tonight,

say, what are your intentions as to regard to missle defense systems. there's contradictions. on "larry king" your prime minister made a strong statement about it. so has the foreign minister. so have others. we have constant communications with the russians. we could clarify some of this, anyway, if we asked the russians for a statement of clarification. i would hope that the senator from massachusetts might do that. but that also wouldn't change the fact that given the contradictions in russian statements we should get rid of that meaningless throwaway provision that this amendment requires. i thank my colleagues. i yield to the senator from indiana. the presiding officer: the senator from indiana is recognized. mr. lugar: mr. president, two major arguments have been made against the new start treaty. they resolve around the missle

defense issue that we have been discussing and verification issues. there may be others, but those two had some -- have some importance and the amendment before us now is to strike a part of the preamble. let me just say, first of all, and i will conclude with this argument after i hope a reasonable discussion of it, if, in fact, we were to adopt the -- the amendment that is before us, we kill the treaty. i think members need to understand that fundamental proposition. we kill the treaty. now, there may be many of our colleagues who did not like the treaty to begin with who, as a matter of fact, have not liked any treaties, and certainly

treaties with russians. there may be colleagues who -- as a matter of fact, would not be opposed to a treaty with the russians on occasion, but not at this particular time. even have stressed that other foreign policy issues are more important. this is almost a diversion of our attention. i'm one who believes the treaty is important and i think fundamentally we have to understand this amendment kills the treaty. so as we vote aye and nay, we're deciding whether, in fact, we're going to continue to have a debate on this treaty. now, mr. president, many critics of a new start treaty have argued that it impedes the united states missle defense plans and most of us who have -- have replied to that have said nothing in the treaty changes the bottom line