thinking is enshrined in the preapplicable. such a policy also preserves the future ability of iran to deliver an attack against the united states. we are assured that a missle which does not now exist and has not been deployed will defend us. the standard missle-3 block-2 bravo is rumored to be considered for development and deployment, but we cannot be defended by a missle that does not yet exist and has not yet been deployed. what has happened is that the mention has canceled plans to -- the administration has canceled plans to deploy the g.b.i. system to poland which would have defended us and would have been deployed. we withdraw a real defense

system for a planned one. a real deployment for a hoped-for one. it should be the policy of the united states to defend us against attack. it should be our policy to defend allies against atafnlgt therefore, we should sign no treaty which acknowledges a need to preserve russia's ability to attack the united states that also has the effect of opening a way for iranian missiles to find their mark against american or israeli families. i am struck by this debate. if the treaty does not affect the ability of the united states to defend us or israel against missile attack, then the amendment should go forward without effect on the treaty. if the treaty does limit the ability of the u.s. or israel to defend themselves, then the amendment is absolutely necessary to fulfill the

assertions of proponents that the treaty has no relation to defense. passage of this amendment improves this treaty, for this very new senator. it focuses the treaty on its key objective and makes this treaty much more likely to pass. defeat of this amendment weakens this treaty. it focuses the debate on ancillary subjects and makes it much less likely to pass. the 21st century should be a world in which fewer and fewer ways are available for nations to attack the united states or our allies, and greater and greater means for the democracies, especially the united states, to defeat an attack should war come. therefore, i urge adoption of the amendment and yield the floor. the presiding officer: the

senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: madam president, i would like to ask unanimous consent -- senator demint will be next. after senator demint, senator thune, according to the list. i would ask unanimous consent, since there were three opponents in a row, if we could insert -- i've been asked by senator mccain to put senator are issue in and i'd like to to put senator shaheen before that. so after senator thune, i'd ask that senator shaheen be recognize the for 10 minutes, subsequent to that senator are issue for 10 minutes, and senator sessions would follow that for 30 minutes. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection, so ordered. mr. kerry: finally, i would just -- quickly, before the senator from south carolina begins, just say to my friend from illinois that i would point out to him that actually the russians have helped israel by cooperating with us, as a result

of this cooperative arrangement that we've reached. they refuse to sell the s-300 interceptor -- air interceptor missile to the iranians, and that actually is very significant with respect to israel. so the impact of this treaty is very positive for israel in the long run, and i think that's an important thing to note. i yield the floor. mr. kirk: if the gentleman would yield very briefly? the presiding officer: the gentleman from illinois. mr. kirk: i understand that the s-300 has not been delivered, even though the russians signed a contract to deliver this to the is ramic -- the islamic republic of iran. but most of the threat is against russian-built and designed missiles. the russians have delivered hundreds of scud missiles to syria, which represents a vast bulk of the threat to the people of israel. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: and that's exactly

why the obama administration went out to have a reset button and that's precisely what has created this new cooperation. and since there's been in new cooperation that we've been able to move down a different road. i don't disagree -- there are tens of thousands of rockets in lebanon and elsewhere that have come from outside, but that's the whole purpose of moving in a different direction. obviously, we've said previously, you know, the substance of this -- of getting rid of this wouldn't bother me. the problem is, it's technical and it's in a place where it results in a process that kills the treaty. that's the problem here. and i think we've taken care of -- i ask my colleague to go look at the resolution, look at the demint amendment that we adopted, which is very clear about our ability to change this entire mutual destruction relationship and move to an adequate defense, and i think we could even strengthen it further.

i am real estate very happy to work with colleagues hon a condition or declaration in the next hours that might even improve this further and state if people don't fillets a been adequately stated, we're happy to try state it more clearly w that, i'd wreeld to the senator from south carolina. -- i'd yield to the senator from south carolina. mr. demint: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from south carolina. mr. demint: i want to thank my colleague from south carolina and associate with his remarks. i appreciate the chairman's support of the idea of committing ourselves to developing a missile defense system that could protect against russian missiles. but, unfortunately, during the debate in committee, when we offered this as a binding amendment on the treaty, it would not be accepted unless we moved it to a mere declaration, which has no force of law. but it's good that bev brought it up and -- that we have

brought it up and recognized that it is a major point of contention in the adoption of this treaty. so i'd like to begin by speaking in support of my colleagues, senator john mccain and senator john barrasso's amendment to strike the language in the treaty preamble that links offensive and defensive systems and limits our ability as americans to protect our citizens. we know that the russians would like to limit our missile defense capabilities. before obama signed the treaty, they express add desire to make the united states more vulnerable to future attacks. while discussions about the treaty were under way, prime minister putin commented on american missile defenses. last december he said, "by building such an umbrella over themselves, the united states could fill themselves fully secure and will do whatever they want." and putin got what i wanted. the russians successfully linked missile defense to an offensive

strategic nuclear weapons treaty. after obama signed the treaty, the russian government issued a statement that said the treaty can operate and be viable only if the united states refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively and qualitatively. how much more clear could they be? the understanding of the russians is that this treaty ties our hands and prohibits us from defending our citizens against russian missile attacks. by giving the russians this lever, the treaty dampens the u.s. ability to defend against missile attacks. this has been the effect -- or has the effect of making america and her allies vulnerable not only to russia but to rogue nations. russia should not be permitted to dictate whether we can develop our missile defense capabilities. no negotiations should be

required -- require us to sacrifice our sovereignty. the united states has a constitutional duty to protect its citizens in a moral obligation to protect its allies. former director of the c.i.a. james woolsey said it well in an op-ed he wrote in november. "why has the administration agreed to a treaty that limits our nonnuclear long-range weapons and runs the risk of constraining our missile defenses? ""the administration's unilateral statement on limited missile defense does not resolve this ambiguity. this treaty has a flawed premise, which i would like to talk about for just a few minutes. the treaty is crafted out of the idea that the united states and russia play the same role in the world. that's simply not true. the united states security

imleal covers over 30 countries. america is a protecter of many. russia is a threat to many, but a protecter to none. america's commitments are much greater. imparity is unacceptable, especially given russia's large tactical arsenal, which is not covered at all in this treaty. moreover, the new start fret is intended to be a step towards the president's goal of a world without nuclear weapons. president reagan, who has been quoted at length during this debate, believed that the only way to get to a world without nuclear weapons was by making them impotent and obsolete to. a strong missile defense system. he walked out of negotiations with the russians rather than sacrifice our missile defense options. now i'd like to go through the ways the new start will reduce

the u.s. forces while russia is not forced to make any reductions. all of the reductions will be on our side. the obama administration champions the fact that the treaty would limit both countries to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each. however, given the loophole in accounting rules, the number that can be deployed is several hundred higher. that means no real reductions are required on behalf of the russians. the treaty's delivery vehicle limit is also troubling. the administration cannot even show the senate how they intend to change the force structure to reach the new deployed delivery vehicle limits. russia, however, is already well below the new limits. to be clear, russia does not have to destroy any nuclear warheads as part of this treaty. the treaty does not deal with nuclear stockpiles or tactical

nuclear weapons. russia can maintain its huge stockpile of roughly 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons, thousands more than the united states has, because the treaty doesn't restrict those types of weapons, which can also be a fixed to rockets -- affixed to rockets, submarines, and atack aircraft. the administration lost a key opportunity to address the 10-1 opportunity between russia and the u.s. tactical nuclear weapons. proponents 0 argue that we will address tactical nuclear weapons during the next treaty, but that was said during the debate on the last arms control treaty with russia. the administration has also subjected advanced u.s. conventional capabilities to limitations in this new start treaty. why are these included? i also have questions about the verification measures in russia's compliance.

why is it that the new start treaty has a substantially weaker verification regime than start i? and given russia's history of cheating on arms control treaties, the weaker verification and inspection provisions in this treaty will only exacerbate the problem. i is also concerns about the negotiating records for this treaty. we have asked repeatedly for these records, and the administration has refused to give senators access to it. we have asked numerous times, and there is a precedent from past ratification of arms control treaties to make it available. we need to see the negotiating records, to find out exactly what confessions were made during the negotiating process, particularly given the disagreement between what russians are saying about missile defense and what we're saying. we need to see what was agreed to during the negotiations. by not providing negotiating

records, the administration has only increased concerns. supporters of this treaty would like everyone to believe this is a matter of urgent national security. but this is not true. i would like to quote former secretary of state lawrence eagleburger, who said, "they want to do this treaty before the lame-duckers are out of there. that's not the way to move on this issue." well, i agree with the former secretary. this is not the proper way to move on this issue. as the "washington post" moat noted in its editorial, "no calamity will befall the united states if the senate does not act this year. the cold war threat of a nuclear exchange between washington and moscow is, for now, nonexistent." and if it was so urgent, why did the administration allow the originals start treaty, which included verification provisions, to lapse on december 5, 2009? surely they were aware it it would be months before this

treaty would be completed. after the start i treaty expired, the two countries issued a joint statement pledging to continue to work together in the spirit of the start treaty following its expiration. but that never happened. senator lugar even had legislation that would have allowed the inspections to continue after december 5, but his legislation was ignored. if these verification measures are so urgent, it seems like there would have been more of an urgent to pass his bill. the administration's promise to bring the agreement with russia to preserve verification has failed. special assistant to the president, gary smore, stated last month that he was not particularly worried near-term about the lack of inspections. as i said earlier today, i take my responsibility of advice and consent very seriously. we would be harming this institution if we do not

seriously evaluate the many serious flaws in this treaty. i worry about many of the long-term nextgen effects that this treaty will have on our security. but i would also like to talk some about an -- and explain why i oppose the treaty in the short term. first, we should not be ratifying this treaty during the lame-duck session. it is unpress dejtsed to do so. the heritage foundation cross-checked the dates of each lame-duck session of congress with the senate date of treaty ramification with treaties going all the way back to 1947 and found no major treaty has ever been ratified by a senate during a lame-duck session of congress. doing so would violate the principle of convent maintained by the government since the 20th amendment was passed in 1933. the first two sections of the 20th amendment were created to shorten the lame-duck period after an election and before the new officials take offers.

-- take office. treaties ratified during a lame-duck session are undemocratic because many of those who support ratification are no longer accountable to the voters. at a minimum, we should wait until the new senators are sworn in before we consider voting on this treaty. let me note that this is only the second day of full debate of this treaty during a very hectic session. and it's being dual-tracked or triple-tracked with other matters before the congress and backed up to the christmas break. we're still working on a way to make sure the government is funded. this chamber is also considering holding votes on the dream act and don't ask, don't tell and no telling what else. when the senate considered the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty known as the i.n.f., in 1998, the senate gave it nine days of floor time and it was not dual or triple

tracked with other issues. we focus odd it and had a debate. the first start treaty was available for the senate's review for over 400 days. i share the concerns expressed earlier today by my colleague from tennessee, senator bob corker. he objected to the dual tracking of matters of national security with partisan issues. as we are debating this treaty, meetings are being held to strategize ways to get votes on other bills to reward special interests and fulfill campaign promises. the new start treaty will have many implications for our country's security, and surely something as important as this disefbz the senate's full -- deserves the senate's full attention. as i okay, i'd like to thank again senators mccain and senator barrasso for their amendment and for their thorough explanations of why it's so important. they were right to point out that the bush administration worked very hard to break up the linkage between offensive and defensive missile systems. that's why former secretary of state condoleezza rice wrote in

a recent opinion editorial that the senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this treaty, the united states is not reestablishing the cold war link between offensive forces and missile defenses. new start's preamble is worrying in this regard, she continues, as it recognizes the interrelationship of the two. by passing the mccain-barrasso amendment, we can fix this and we can make sure that this treaty does not limit our ability to defend our citizens. with that, madam president, i yield the floor and reserve the balance of my time. a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from south dakota. mr. thune: madam president, i, too, want to rise in strong support of the mccain-barrasso amendment to strike language from the preamble to this treaty

that links strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. this language in the preamble is highly troubling because it reestablishes an unwise linkage between offensive arms and defensive arms that was broken when the a.b.m. treaty came to an end. more troubling is the fact that the new start treaty contains specific limitations on missile defense in article 5. moreover, russia's unilateral statement that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the united states of america refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively is also extremely troubling. when viewed together, the new start treaty's preamble, the limitations on missile defense in article 5, and russia's unilateral statement amount to a russian attempt to find a leverage point and exert political pressure upon the united states to forestall deploying a robust missile defense capability by threatening to withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense

capabilities. the remedy for this concern is very simple. it's for the senate to strike the offensive preamble language. that is why i wholeheartedly support the effort to strike this language from the preamble as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of article 5 of the treaty. i would simply say, madam president, that the -- there have been conflicting statements made about the preamble and its significance. we've heard supporters of the treaty say that the preamble is a throwaway and it means nothi nothing, and then on the other hand you've got people saying that, well, if you change this, if you strike this language, it is a treaty killer. so we're hearing what are essentially contradictory statements that this means everything and it means nothing. and, mr. president -- madam president, that just can't be. and so i would say that it's critically important that we as a nation ton qualitatively and quantitatively continue to build

up our missile defense svmentz we know that rogue nations like iran and north korea are rapidly building up their ballistic missile capabilities to eventually be able to strike our country. we cannot let another nation have a vote on whether we build up our missile defenses. i'm very confident that if russia threatens to withdraw from this treaty when we seek to qualitatively and quantitatively improve our missile defenses, the administration will cave in to the russians. we've already seen something like this happen with the administration abruptly ending the bush administration's efforts to build a third missile defense site in poland in the czech republic. why should we have any confidence that they won't do the same thing when something like this happens again? and that's why it's critically important that we remove this language from the preamble, to eliminate any pretext by the russians to threaten to withdraw prosecute the treaty because we are -- from the treaty because we are improving our missile defense capabilities. it's particularly galling, madam president, that the administration inserted this missile defense language into the treaty when one considers that congress made it abundantly clear at the outset of

negotiations on this treaty, specifically in section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill, that there should be no limitations on united states ballistic missile defense systems. specifically, we said -- and i quote -- "it is the sense of congress that the president should maintain the stated position of the united states that the follow-on treaty to the start treaty not include any limitations on the ballistic missile defense systems of the united states." we also received repeated assurances by senior state department officials that the treaty would do nothing to constrain missile defense. so i was surprised to see that the treaty ended up containing specific limits on some missile defense options in article 5, paragraph 3, as i mentioned earlier, as well as this language in the preamble that we're currently considering in the mccain-barrasso amendment. when those of us who criticize this treaty point out that russia may rely on language in

the treaty's preamble as a pretext for withdrawal if the united states builds up its missile defense, the administration response is usually to say the preamble is not legally binding. obviously, if this language is not legally binding, then it shouldn't be a big deal to delete it from the preamble. but it can be no accident that russia used the words "effective" and "viable" in its unilateral statement that it would view american advances in missile defense as grounds for withdrawal from the treaty, thereby creating a textual hook from the treaty for its position. unilateral statement is certainly a sign of how russia interprets the preamble. ly i believei believe, madam pr, therefore, that there is ample reason to be concerned that this administration will not dedicate itself to deploying a robust missile defense that in anyway irks russia. in the preamble, russia has

established a pressure point to dissuade this administration from improving our own missile defense system in a quantitative or qualitative way. therefore, it is extremely important that the senate simple remove that preamble language. madam president, i wholeheartedly support the mccain-barrasso amendment. i urge its passage and would ask unanimous consent that i be added as a cosponsor. and i would also simply say again, madam president, that i don't think you can have it both ways. you can't say that this means nothing at the same time that it means everything. if it is a throwaway, some language that doesn't mean anything, that's one thing. but if it's a deal killer for us to suggest that we ought to remove this language which we think means something, that that's a deal killer, then somehow it means a lot more and it matters a lot more than i think the supporters and proponents of this treaty are letting on. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. thune: and so, madam president, i would ask that as we continue the debate

on this, that this issue be fully aired. i think we've had a lot of people that have come down and talked about it. i think this is at least one amendment that i'm aware of on the issue of missile defense. but i do know that in terms of the overall treaty and the concerns that some of us have about it, this issue really stands out. the issue of missile defense, when you live in a dangerous world, is a critical, critical issue when it comes to our national security and it's one that we need to take very seriously, and particularly, as has already been mentioned, the threats that we face from rogue nations like iran and north korea, we can't do anything that would lessen or weaken our ability to defend our country and our allies from threats from those types of countries. and so i would say that when it comes to this issue, madam president, it would make it a lot easier for those who are advocating support for this treaty if the mccain-barrasso amendment were adopted and we just simply deleted and struck this language which, if it

doesn't mean anything, shouldn't matter all that much. and if it does mean something and it matters, i think that tells us everything we need to know about what the russians' intentions are with regard to having that language in the preamble. and couple that with the statements that they've made in the unilateral signing statement along with the article 5 language in the treaty itself, madam president, this is an issue of great importance and we should not take it lightly, we should not minimize, it we need to have a full debate on it. and i hope that we can stay on this issue. i know that the leader's plan to move -- leaders plan to move tomorrow to some other legislative business, but if -- if this particular agreement is that important to the administration and to this country and to the united states senate, then we ought to be able to stay on this and the legislative items, many of which are political items that are sort of what i would call check-the-box items that the democratic leadership wants to get voted on, ought to be put off. we can deal with those issues

another time, another year. if we're really serious about getting this treaty done, then we ought to stay on it, keep our focus on it and allow the senate to have a full, fair debate open to amendment and hopefully ultimately get this thing disposed of one way or the other. madam president, i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from new hampshire. mrs. shaheen: thank you, madam president. i wanted to come down and join senator kerry and again recognize his leadership along with senator lugar's on moving the treaty ratification through the senate. and i would like to address some of the objections and concerns that are being raised by the critics of the treaty this evening. first, i want to point out that if the senate were to approve the amendment that senator

mccain and senator barrasso are proposing, that that effectively kills the treaty. and i think that those people who support that amendment understand that. so that's number one. secondly, one of the issues that's been raised in a number of the estimates that evening has to do with the -- statements this evening has had to do with the concern of dual track, can the senate really deal with this issue while we have so much other business to deal with. well, i happen to think that in the senate we can deal with more than one issue at a time. i believe we can walk and chew gum at the same time. and, in fact, during consideration of the original start treaty back in 1992, a treaty that was much more complicated than the one that's pending before us, at the first time that the senate was considering the start nuclear disarmament agreement, the

senate on the same day we debated the treaty back in 1992 passed an interior appropriations bill, a d.c. appropriations bill, and we debated and held two roll call votes on the foreign operations bill. so the concern that we can't deal with this while we're dealing with other issues i think is just not borne out by the historic precedent. now, one of the other issues that has been raised this evening by the critics is that we don't need to do this right away. there's no overwhelming national security concern to get this passed now. well, i would just point out that we have a number of military leaders in this country who just disagree with that. yesterday, general james cartwright, the vice chair of

the joint chiefs of staff, said -- and i quote -- "all the joint chiefs are very much behind the treaty. we need start and we need it badly." and today general frank klatz, one of the military's most respected nuclear arms experts, klatz is the commander of global air force strike demand which oversees the nuclear enterprise, says that the new start treaty with russia should be ratified immediately. and, again, i quote the general, "i think the start treaty ought to be ratified and it ought to be ratified right now this week." now with respect to the issues that have been raised about how this treaty impacts our missle

defense, i think it's important to point out what some of the experts, some of the most recognized foreign policy, military, national security experts in the country have had to say about this missle defense issue. first let me quote general mike mullen -- or admiral mike mullen, who's the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff who said, "there's nothing in the treaty that prohibits us from developing any kind of missle defense." and then lieutenant general patrick o'reilly who's the read of the united states missle defense agency said, "relatively to the recently expired start treaty, the new start treaty actually reduces constraints on the development of the missle

defense program." he says, "i have briefed the russians personally in moscow on every aspect of our defense development. i believe they understand what that is and that those plans for development are not limited by this treaty." and then defense secretary robert gates who said, "the treaty will not constrain the u.s. from developing and deploying defenses against ballistic missles as we have made clear to the russian government the u.s. will continue to deploy and improve the interceptors that defend our homeland. we are also moving forward with plans to field missle defense systems to protect our troops and partners in europe, the middle east and northeast asia against the dangerous threats posed by rogue nation like north korea an iran.

-- and iran. separately from the treaty we're discussing missle defense operation with russia which we believe is in the interest of both nations, but such talks have nothing to do, again -- he said such talks have nothing to do with imposing any limitation on our programs or deployment plans. and i would just point out one of the earlier speakers talked about concerns that those within our security umbrella, so our allies in nato, might be affected by the start treaty. well, the fact is every one of our nato allies has come out in support of passage of the start -- new start treaty. they have all said it is in the interest of the nato countries. now, to go back to what some of the experts have said about

missle defense, general kevin chilton, commander of the u.s. stratigic command, straticom, said as a combatant command also responsible for synchronizing missle defense plans, operations and advocacy, i can say with confidence that this treaty does not constrain any current or future missle defense plans." and former secretary of defense james schlesinger said, "i don't think that it inhibits missle defense in a serious way. i do not think that we will be inhibited by this treaty or even by the russian pressure with respect to defending ourselves against north korea and ultimately against iran." former secretary of defense william perry said, "the treaty imposes no meaningful restraints on our ability to develop and deploy ballistic missle defense

systems." former secretary of state henry kissinger said, "the treaty does not unduly restrict our ability to deploy an effective missle defense system." and, finally, former secretaries of states, kissinger eagleberger and collin powell wrote in "the washington post" that new start preserves our ability to deploy effective missle defenses. the testimonies of our military commanders and civilian leaders make clear that the treaty does not limit u.s. missle defense plans. so i know we have a lot of experts in the senate on this issue, but i certainly believe that the experts who have spoken there about the lack of an impact on our ability as a country to develop a missle

defense system are people who should be believed because they know what they're talking about. now, the other thing that i think it's important to point out, and i know senator kerry did this earlier, but with respect to the resolution of ratification and some of the concerns that senator demint raised on the floor this evening, i just want to read what is in this resolution of ratification. this is language that senator demint had amended into the resolution to address the concerns that he had. defending the united states and allies against stratigic attack, it is the sense of the senate that a paramount obligation of the united states government is

to provide for the defense of the american people. deploying members of the united states armed forces and united states allies against nuclear attacks to the best of its ability. policies based on mutual assured destruction or intellectual intentional vulnerability can be contrary to the safety and security in both countries and the united states and the russian federation share a common interest in moving cooperatively as soon as possible away from a stratigic relationship based on mutual assured destruction. in a world where biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them are are proliferating, stratigic ability can be answered by stratigic defensive -- enhanced by stratigic defensive measures. accordingly the united states is and will remain free to reduce the vulnerability to attack by constructing a layered defense

system cable -- capable of countering vehicle. the united states will welcome steps by the russian federation to develop a fundamentally stratigic posture that no longer views robust stratigic defensive capabilities as undermining the overall stratigic balance and stands ready to cooperate with the russian federation on stratigic defensive capabilities as long as it is aimed at fostering and no way con strains the defensive capabilitiesies of both sides. and, finally, the united states is committed to improving united states stratigic defensive capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively during the period that the new start treaty is in effect. such improvements are consistent with the treaty. this is language that senator demint proposed that is adopted in the resolution that clearly -- that makes very clear

that missle defense is not affected by the treaty. the presiding officer: the senator's time has expired. mrs. shaheen: thank you very much. mr. kyl: thank you, madam president. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: thank you, madam president. i had hoped to be able to respond to some of the things that the chairman of the foreign relations committee said earlier. a lot of words have been spoken in between what he said and what i'll say now. but i think i have -- have correct what his arguments are and if i don't, i'm sure he will set me straight on that. so let me respond to some of the things that senator kerry talked about. i think one of the most significant is this, it's the question of whether the preamble is important or not. is it binding or not? is it significant? while on the one hand the argument is made that it's an

insignificant instrument. it's not binding. it's a throwaway statement to quote senator kerry, that it's generally sometimes done for domestic consumption. it is also portrayed as a treaty killer. and in one sense you can say both of those things can't be true. it can't be both insignificant, a throwaway document, but also significant to be a treaty killer. i suppose it's possible for one side to treat it as insignificant and the other side to treat it as very significant. thus in so far as the russians are concerned, it's a treaty killer. and that's obviously because it means something to the russians. and that's the point. we have to appreciate the fact that they have set this up so that the preamble, combined with their unilateral statement, represents the case that they make legally for withdrawal under article 14 if we develop missle defenses that they believe qualitatively improve

our situation, vis-a-vis them. that's the importance of it. and it is important whether they're laying the pred cat to withdraw from this treaty. you have two parties to a contract. there's a dispute about what a critical term in the contract means. one party says it's not that big a deal. the other party says, yeah, it is. that enables me to vitiate the contract. that's a big deal because it sets up a future conflict and that's precisely what the problem here is in the preamble. so we can't say on the one hand it's insignificant and the other hand it's a deal killer, treaty killer. secondly, it's true that either party can withdraw, but only under certain circumstances. and when senator kerry makes the argument that the russian threat of withdrawal is not that important because obviously either party can withdraw, that is only true as far as it goes and misses the point. the russians are setting up in the instrument in the preamble,

and in their unilateral signing statement that accompanied the signing of the treaty, the grounds for withdrawal. what they have said is that they believe that if we develop our missle defenses, as we've said, than that constitutes the extraordinary circumstances that would give them a right under article 14 to withdraw. so while it's true that either party can withdraw, the question is, is it a withdrawal that's important, that's significant, that we can't ignore or is it just something they're going to do no matter what we do and there's nothing we can do about it? let me tell you why this is important and go back to the start i treaty. what -- what countries say about these treats is very -- treaty sincere very important. it sets the groundwork for approach to foreign relations vis-a-vis each other and frankly the position that they take. for years the -- the russians had, before them, the softs

tried -- soviets tried to get the united states to cut back or eliminate the missle defense plans, this is the moment when ronald reagan, as much as he would have liked to have rid both sides of their nuclear weapons or as many as possible, nevertheless when it came right down to it, didn't take the deal that was offered, which is you eliminate missle defense and we'll eliminate stratigic offensive weapons. i'll come back to that in a moment. the russians for a long time have been trying to get us to link missle defense and offensive capabilities. when that occurred in start i treaty, our negotiators pushed back very very hard. here's what the united states unilateral statement was in response to the russian statement. and the reason i quote this is because it is opposed to the approach that our negotiators took with respect to this new start treaty.

here's the united states unilateral statement at that time, while the united states cannot si circumscribe the sovit right to withdraw from the treaty, if the soviet believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the united states of its legal righted up the a.b.m. treaty, that's the treaty that permitted us to have missle defenses. as we have discussed with the soviet union in the past would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. in other words, directly contradicting the russian claim that they could withdraw on that basis. continuing the quotation, the united states will be signing the start treaty and submitting it to the u.s. senate with advice with this view, in addition the provisions for withdrawal based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a party's supreme contract. soviet statements that a future hypothetical withdrawal from the

a.b.m. treaty could create such conditions without legal or military foundation. end of quote. in other words, the united states rejected the argument that the russians were making that the united states withdrawal from the a.b.m. treaty would constitute a legal right of withdrawal for the then-soviet union. now, you can argue about the merits of that, but the point is that we did not want to leave unresponded to a view of the russians that we thought was fallacious, that was antithetical to the interests of a good relationship between the two countries or that could potentially impact our decision on whether to stay within the a.b.m. treaty or not. it was important then to push back. so why didn't our negotiators in geneva push back in this treaty when the russians sought to do the same thing? now, my colleague from massachusetts said, well, actually, secretary rumsfeld and

even president bush at one point said, we're going to talk to the russians will our missile defense and strategic offensive weapons, and that is true. however, the united states was never prepared to take a position that those two items should be linked in the treaty. and as doug feith, former under secretary of defense, who helped to negotiator the treaty with the -- who helped to negotiate the treaty with the russians, said -- when his russian counterpart said we they'd to have it tied in with it treaty, doug feith said, no twoaf have a treaty to establish the structural relationship between our two countries? doug feith said, no, we have no treaty like this to establish a truch for our relationships. and doug said, look, we don't need a treaty with you to bring down our weapons. we're going to do it anyway. if you want a treaty to conform

your withdrawal and ours, that's fine. but we're not going to concede missile defense to you. and the russians finally backed off. the point was, in these situations we did not allow the russians to successfully make this linkage. but in this case, we not only didn't push back, but we issued our own unilateral statement that essentially confirmed that we were not going to push the issue with the russians because our missile defenses would only be good against regional or limited threats, was the language that was used. now, this is a problem because while it's true that the resolution of ratification has some language relative to the establishment of our missile defenses -- by the way, let me quote what was in the in the language but was offered by senator demint at the time. what senator demint said was that accordingly the united states is and will remain committed to reducing the vulnerability to attack by constructing a layered missile

defense system exaibl of countering missiles of all raifnlings well, the administration was not agreeable to that. they didn't want language to say that we were committed to this. they insisted on saying instead that we were free to do t that's part of the problem. we don't know what this administration's real commitment is to the development of such a system. what we do know is that we shouldn't allow the russians to believe that they have a legal right to withdraw from the treaty on this -- based upon our future development of missile defenses because they might well threaten to do that. and if they do it, it becomes a big deal whether the united states says, fine, leave the treaty, or -- because we're going to develop these missile defenses instead, or a president says, well, i am a afraid you are going to leave the treaty, so maybe i'll pull my punches and maybe we won't develop the missile defense. now, condoleezza rice in an op-ed in "the wall street journal" on december 7 made precisely this point. here'here's what she said after saying on balance she would

support the treaty. she said, still, there are legitimate concerns about new start that must and can be addressed in the ratification process. and here's the second point that she makes. the senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this treaty, the u.s. is not reestablishing the cold war link between offensive forces and missile defenses. new start's preamble is worrying in this regard, as it recognizes the interrelationship of the two. and she goes on to say, "congress should ensure that future defense" -- well, excould you me. administration officials have testified there is no link and the treaty won't limit our missile defenses. she says that congress should ensure that the future defense budgets reflect this. "moscow contends that only current u.s. missile plans will acceptable under the treaty. but the u.s. must remain fully free to prepare the best

defenses, that includes quantitative increases. i personally witnessed moscow's tendency to interpret every utterance as a binding commitment. the russians need to understand that the u.s. will use the full range of american technology and talent to approve our ability to intercept and destroy the ballistic missiles of hostile countries. she is saying that the preamble is especially worrying in this regard and that we need to do something about it. that's what the mccain-barrasso amendment does. it removes that thorn. it removes that issue, that potential conflict between russia and the united states if we intend -- or if we do go forward with the missile defenses that most of us would hope that we intend to do. now, two final points, i think. senator chirr made the point that -- senator kerry made the point that it is merely a statement of fact that there's a relationship between offense and defense. and in one sense, it is true.

it is a statement of fact that there is a relationship between the two. the point, however, is in a diplomatic agreement here between two countries, i it is t always appropriate to acknowledge a particular fact if the purpose of that by one of the parties is to build a foundation for later withdrawal from the pact. we have never conceded in an offensive weapon treaty a relationship that could infer a quid pro quo between missile defense and strategic offensive weapons. and president reagan explicitly rejected it at reykjavik. my colleague points out that at least in his view one side should never have an advantage over the other or there's an arms race that will occur. i don't agree with that. i think we should have an advantage. i think we should have missile offense. that's what ronald reagan believed. to the extent that the question is must the united states give up missile defense as a condition to reducing offensive weapons, president reagan was

willing to take a chance on a new arms race knowing that the soviets couldn't afford to do it. and they didn't. he took the chance, and i think it worked out rather well. so, i think to the point of what's the -- what's the harm in re-creating this relationship, that's the harm, and condoleezza rice has made it very clear that in our ratification process, we should eliminate that harm, specifically by pointing to the preamble, and that's what the mccain amendment would do. now, just a final point. i really don't think this requires much elucidation. the question is what do the russian official really say? i don't think that we really need spend a lot of time on the thargt they believe that this would give them a trite withdraw from the treaty. but there was one comment made by my colleague, who are you going to believe, the russians or the united states? the point is, on russian intentions and interpretations, i would take into account what the russians have said.

and without going into a long, detailed explanation, here are just a few headlines and maybe quoting from one article. headline -- this is near the time of the signing of the treatiate, right at about the time. this is april 6. "russia may pull out of nuke deal if u.s. expands missile defense." and there are a lot of other headlines and articles that point out the same thing. here's bloomberg business weefnlgt "russia may exit accord if u.s. pursues missile plan. "kings that according to sergei lavrov. let me quote a couple things he says and i don't think it's been seriously questioned that the russian have made it very clear their intention that the preamble sets up the condition along with their unilateral statement for the extraordinary circumstances that would allow their withdrawal under article 14. this is the article that is dated april 6, posted by joshua keating, f.p. pass --

know, that's not the -- i'll put this in the record. it's from "foreign policy.com post. and at the end of my comments i'll ask it be put in the record. "it appears that russian defense minister lavrov isn't quite ready to pop the champagne on the new nuclear arms reduction agreement that will be signed in prague this week. russia will have the right to exit the accord if the u.s. buildup of its strategic potential in numbers and quality considers to considerably a. effect the ability of russian nuclear forces," lavrov told reporterreporters today. "going on was th major stick pot in the treaty after the united states announced floons build new facilities in bulgaria and romania," that was after the withdrawal of the radar from the czech republic and the missiles from poland. continuing on with, "as f.p.'s josh rogan reported, a work

around to the solution was reached in which the issue of missile defense is not mentioned in the preamble itself. the obama administration has been adamant that the treaty does not limit the u.s. right to expand missile defense and will likely make that case to scwept cal senate republicans. laugh love apparently didn't get the memo. quote from laugh who have: "russia insists that the agreement includes a link between offensive and defensive systems, linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the accord and is legally binding," laugh who have said today. i would ask unanimous consent that the text of this article be included in the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. sessions: will the senator yield? mr. kyl: sure. mr. sessions: you as a lawyer have negotiated agreements. the presiding officer: the senator from alabama. mr. sessions: thank you. you've negotiated agreements. it seems ta what i hear you saye

united states enters a into a binding treaty equivalent to a party entering into a binding contract, but the other party has laid a groundwork that allows them to exit the treaty and the contract whenever they want to, in essence. is that correct? mr. kyl: madam president, that point i'm make. and in contrast to the start i negotiations, where when the russians said something very similar to this we pushed back and sairntion no, you're wrong. that would not be an appropriate reason to withdraw from the treaty. in time we didn't do that. we let it pass. therefore, i would suggest taitsly accepting the legal position of the russians. mr. sessions: and, further, it is not a question of whether the united states' diplomats and negotiators are telling the truth and the russians are not telling the truth. it is a question of is there a meeting of the minds, and its he

really a question of what's in the russian mind as to whether or not they could have a right to leave the treaty if we proceed with missile defense. mr. kyl: madam president, that's -- that is correct. session significance thank the chaimplet. mr. kyl: and, madam president, that really concludes the point that i'm making -- the point fa that i'm make something well-made by senator sessions right now. that problem can be cured by the amendment that would fix the preamble by eliminating the words that create this conflict. i think that is something we should do by adopting the mccain-barrasso amendment. mr. kerry: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator massachusetts. mr. kerry: let me just ask -- i want to ask my colleague from arizona just something if i can. i don't think -- i really don't think that it's necessary for us to actually have the divide that

is sort of being drawn here over this issue of this preamble, given what the preamble says and also plashed against the relateties of this -- the realities of this treaty and without the preamble. let's plea tend for a moment that there's -- let's pretend for a moment there's no preefnlt and we go ahead and would do -- there's no preamble and we go ahead and do very extensive events and the russians don't like it even without the preamble. is it not true that according to article 14, paragraph 3, they have a right to say, that's going to alter the balance of power if you do that, we don't like it we're pulling out of the treaty? quote -- "each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary