vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators in the chamber who desire to vote or change their vote? if not, the yeas are 95, the nays are 0 and the nomination is confirmed. under the previous order, the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid upon the table, the president will be immediately notified of the senate's action, and the senate will resume legislative session. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader is recognized. mr. reid: mr. president, i ask -- first of all, if we could have order. the presiding officer: the members of the senate please take their seats, clear the

aisles. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: all consent agreements that i've been involved in over the years have been imperfect but this is the best we could do and i think it's a pretty good one. so i would ask unanimous consent that at 3:00 p.m. today, all postcloture time be considered expired and the reid motion to concur with the amendments be withdrawn and that no further amendments or motions be in order and without further intervening action or debate, the senate proceed to vote on the reid motion to concur in the house amendment to the senate amendment to h.r. 2965. that upon disposition of the house message, the senate then resume executive session and the start treaty -- resume executive session on the start treaty and there be four minutes of debate prior to a vote in relation to the mccain amendment number 4814, with the time equally divided and controlled between senators kerry and mccain or their designees. that upon disposition of the mccain amendment, senator risch be recognized to offer an amendment with any debate time prior to disposition of the house message with respect to

h.r. 2965 equally divided and controlled between the leaders or their designees. the presiding officer: is there objection? mr. mccain: reserving the right to object and i will object. four minutes is not adequate for my amendment. there's a couple of speakers, including the cosponsor, senator barrasso. mr. reid: mr. president, i say through the chair to my friend, the senator from arizona, i agree with you, so tell me what time you think would be appropriate, it doesn't matter. mr. kyl: mr. president, might i join in this colloquy? i don't think there needs to be any reference to time for deba debate. if i could just make a brief state. i think the purpose for this unanimous consent agreement was to allow members by unanimous consent to speak as if in morning business on the don't ask, don't tell bill prior to a vote on that at 3:00. mr. reid: 3:00. mr. kyl: but that we would be on the treaty and if people did not want to talk about the don't

ask, don't tell, then we would be on the mccain-risch amendment and that that debate would conclude before 3:00 and then the mccain-risch amendment would follow the vot vote -- the vote on that would follow the vote on the don't ask, don't tell. mr. reid: i think that's totally appropriate. i would just add to my friend, while the chair is considering the consent agreement, one of the reasons we were able to get this agreement is we've worked pretty hard the last few days and the people thought we should have the afternoon off after we finish this information. as far as i'm concerned, i'll be in my office but if -- if people want more time, that's fine. but that was one of the conditions that some people wanted on your side and that's fine with me. we'll come in about midday tomorrow to resume consideration of the start treaty. mr. kerry: well, mr. president, reserving the right to object. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: so i understand that we now have a revised request which is that between now and the hour of 3:00, there will be an opportunity for senators to speak either on the amendment or

on the start -- or on don't ask, don't tell, and following the vote at 3:00 on don't ask, don't tell, it would then be a vote on the mccain amendment; is that correct? i agree with that. mr. mccain: is that agreeable to the manager? mr. kerry: i think that makes sense. mr. reid: i would ask that the agreement be modified to the effect here that -- as has been indicated. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection, so ordered. the request is agreed to. mrs. murray: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from washington. mrs. murray: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, i come to the floor today -- and before i speak, i would like to ask unanimous consent that -- that senator boxer of california be the next democratic senator speaking after i conclude and senator hutchison concludes from the republican side. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. mccain: reserving the right to object. what's the pending business before the senate? the presiding officer: the pending business is the motion

to concur to h.r. 2965 that. is the pending business. and as i understand the request from the senator from washington on the democratic side, that senator boxer will be the next democrat recognized. mrs. mur craymrs. murray: folloe republican leader. mr. mccain: maybe i'm wrong but i thought the time would be either -- mrs. murray: the senator is correct. i'm merely asking that the -- the presiding officer: the time will be equally divided between now and 3:00 and the senators may speak on either subject. mr. mccain: i thank the chair. mrs. murray: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, then i come to the floor this afternoon to speak and join in the effort to repeal don't ask, don't tell. mr. president, the senate is not in order. the presiding officer: the

senators will please take your conversations off the floor. thank youthe senator from washis recognized. mrs. murray: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, this policy has failed in its intended goals. it's done a tremendous disservice to the men and women who want nothing more than to defend our country and it's time for this policy to go. i want to begin this afternoon by talking about a true hero from my home state of washington named margaret wick. she joined the air force in 1987 and served honorably for 18 years as a flight nurse, rising to the rank of major. she was described in reviews and by her peers as being an exemplary officer, an effective leader and a skilled and caring nurse. but in 2004, her superiors discovered that she was a

lesbian, and act under the don't ask, don't tell policy, they suspended and ultimately discharged her. margaret lost the job she had given her life to and our country lost a talented and committed flight nurse. she didn't give up. she went to court. she called witnesses, she made her case, and in september of this year, u.s. district judge ronald layton ruled that she must be reinstated. judge layton said the government gave no compelling reason for dismissing major witt and that the application of don't ask, don't tell was not shown it further the government's interest in promoting military readiness. that was the right decision and it was amazing news for major witt. she is now working with disabled veterans in spokane, washington, but she says she is really excited to get back in the air and back to helping the troops that need her.

mr. president, major witt is a true hero. her commitment to our country should be recognized and honored, but she should never have been put in this position. she has the skills, the experience, the commitment to do her job, and the fact that she is a lesbian doesn't change that one bit. mr. president, there are so many reasons to repeal don't ask, don't tell, and to do it now. this policy destroys lives. we've all heard stories like margaret's. there are thousands like it. and for every one we hear, there are so many more who suffer silently, whose lives and livelihoods were devastated not because of something they did but because of who they are. men and women who were kicked out of the military and were forced to lie to everyone they work with, who go to sleep petrified they'll be found out and discharged, and who wake up dreading another day of mandated deceit and dishonesty.

it's wrong. it needs to end. mr. president, don't ask, don't tell is depriving our armed services of talented men and women at a time when we need our best on the frontlines defending america. we're fighting wars in iraq and afghanistan and we cannot afford to lose critical' assets simply because they're gay. and finally, mr. president, we also now know that repealing don't ask, don't tell won't have an adverse impact on the military. we've heard from military leaders who support this repeal. and the pentagon recently came out with their report that showed that repealing this policy would not inhibit their ability to carry out the missions that they're charged with. in fact, that report that said that 70% of service members believe that repeal would have little to no effect on their unit. mr. president, repealing don't ask, don't tell is the right thing to do. it's the right thing for our country.

it is the right thing for our military. it is the right thing for major witt and thousands like her. and it's the right thing for people lycra beck ca -- people e rebecca. she's a young woman from spoa dmain my home state. -- spokane in my home state. she wrote me a letter and told me she's a senior at eastern washington university. and her dream for years has been to join the u.s. army. she wrote to me -- and i quote -- "i believe the military is an honorable calling, one of self-sacrifice and dedication, and i would be proud to call myself a soldier." but there was a problem. rebecca told me that the very sense of honor that called her to serve her country was preventing her from acting on her dream because, she told me she's a lesbian, and she's very proud of who she is. and as long as the official policy of the united states army is to ask her to bury that pride

and tell her to keep secret a large part of who she is and to ask her to live what would essentially be a lie, she simply won't be able to serve our country. rebecca told me that nothing would make her happier than to be able to graduate this coming spring and start her journey standing up for our nation. she doesn't want to feel that she should be ashamed of who she is and she shouldn't have to. we need to repeal don't ask, don't tell so that young women lycra beck can won't stop dreaming of growing up to serve our country. and so that every man and woman in our armed forces can serve their country openly and with pride. mr. president, we've heard of the stories of the lives this policy has ruined. we've heard from top-ranking military officials that it simply doesn't work. we have heard from service members that they, too, want it to change. and today, this afternoon, with an historic vote, this country will move a step forward in

being proud of every man and woman who serves their country. for far too long men and women with courage to serve our nation have been asked to hide the truth about who they are. it's shameful. it's a bad policy. today it will end. i look forward to the vote this afternoon, mr. president, and the courage of this senate to stand up and do the right thing today. thank you, mr. president. i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from texas is recognized. mrs. hutchison: mr. president, i rise today to talk about the start treaty. we have been debating the start treaty off and on throughout the last few days, and there will be an amendment voted on for the resolution after the 3:00 vote on don't ask, don't tell. i want to talk about the amendment and the treaty itself. the start treaty is seeking, of course, to limit the strategic,

the long-range nuclear weapons that are currently in the united states and russian inventory, for a total of 1,550 warheads for each country. while these limits require some reductions in the number of delivery vehicles and deployed warheads, both countries possess, a change in the counting of warheads will allow both countries to cut hundreds of them on paper with no actual reductions. for example, under start i, each deployed delivery vehicle was counted as carrying a specified number of warheads regardless of how many warheads were actually equipped on the missile or bomber. new start abandons these rules, instead only counting the number of warheads actually equipped on deployed missiles. in addition, strategic bombers

each count as one warhead, regardless of how many warheads they are actually carrying. i also have reservations because the new start limits our ability to conduct extensive and robust verification activities to ensure compliance with the treaty. the ability to adequately and thorough liver fight enforcement of the treaty is crucial not only to ensure both parties are holding up their end of the bargain, but also as it relates to possibly one party losing missiles that they're not accounting for and maybe they have disappeared without even that country's knowledge. that has happened in the past. it is said in many quarters that some of the deteriorating

warheads in russia have somehow gotten through the underground into other countries like north korea or iran. so it is very important that we have a verification system that keeps count. i am concerned about the ability to conduct on-site inspections because it's been reduced in this agreement. under start i, the united states conducted more than 600 inspections over the course of 15 years. in new start, that number has been substantially reduced to only 180 inspections over the course of ten years. there are only two basic types of inspections in new start. type one inspections focus on sites with deployed and nondeployed strategic systems. type two focus on sites with only nondeployed strategic systems. each side is allowed to conduct

ten type one inspections and eight type 2 inspections annually. under the previous start treaty, there were 12 types of on-site inspections as well as continuous on-site monitoring activities at certain facilities, even though, as has been mentioned on this floor in the debate, there are fewer facilities. this is a pretty drastic reduction in the ability to actually have the on-site investigations. because weapons inspectors will only have ten opportunities per year to inspect just 2% to 3% of russia's force, we will be more reliant than in previous agreements on the full cooperation of russia. mr. president, i really don't know how we could have reached an agreement to substantially reduce our most effective method

of enforcement. in fact, a recent state department report issued by the tko*epld said -- by the obama administration said not withstanding the implementation of start, a significant number of long-standing compliance issues that have been raised in the start treaty's joint compliance and inspection commission remain unresolved. defense. i am also concerned that proposals under the new start treaty may restrict u.s. missile defense capabilities which could threaten our national security. now, mr. president, of all the concerns that have been raised, i think this is the most important. it also is part of the amendment that we are going to consider this afternoon. russia and the united states each issued unilateral statements when they signed new start that clarified their position on the relationship between start and missile

defenses. the official russian statement said the treaty can operate and be viable only if the united states refrains from developing its missile capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. contrary to claims by the obama administration that missile defense will not be negatively impacted, a review of the text of the treaty shows otherwise. the most obvious limitation on missile defense is found in article 5, paragraph 3, of the treaty. this -- it says this prevents converting existing intercontinental ballistic missiles, icbms, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, slbm launchers into

launchers for missile defense intercepters. the administration says it's more expensive to actually convert than to create new ones. well, we need to have the flexibility. whether we convert or whether we create new ones should not be limiting on the united states. not on the defense side. u.s. planning and force requirements might have to change in the future to respond to evolving world threats during new start's tenure. it is important that our nation be able to adjust our military defense systems if needed. we're not just talking about russia now. we're talking about adjusting our missile defense capabilities against any other country in the world, including rogue nations that we believe have nuclear

capabilities. we are not sure how far developed they are, but we know north korea is trying to have a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. we know iran is too. we know pakistan has them. and though pakistan is an ally, it is a fragile government at this point. why would we in any way link our own missile defense capabilities with the evolving threats out there regardless of our present good terms that we have with russia center why would we -- that we have with russia? why would we do that? that is a unilateral capability that our country must insist that we keep for our sovereign nation. the mccain amendment would

take out of the preamble to this treaty, recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced and that current stpreupblg defensive arms -- strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic defensive arms of the parties. we want to take that out. it is absolutely essential that we take this out of the preamble. and, mr. president, i would ask unanimous consent that i be added as a cosponsor of the mccain amendment. the presiding officer: without objection. mrs. hutchison: mr. president, we need to assure that our defenses are not in any way inhibited by this treaty,

because we must defend against countries that perhaps are not enemies of russia. but they might be ours. and to in any way to restrict our defenses is not necessary to assure that we have mutual offensive lowering of numbers. so, i am very concerned about this particular segment. and if we can adopt the mccain amendment of which i am a cosponsor, it would take me a significant way toward believing that this treaty would be worthy of ratification. mr. president, i am seriously concerned that although it is clear that a number of restrictions will be placed on the united states under this treaty, that the same is not necessarily true for our partner to the treaty, russia.

dr. keith payne, former assistant secretary of defense, noted new start's limitations are of little real consequence to russia because russia's aged cold war strategic launchers have been reduced below new start's ceilings. additionally, many defense analysts predict russia will have fewer than 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2012. russia defense expert mikhail baranov makes the same point. the truth is, he says, russia's nuclear arsenal is at or even below the new kraoepbgz. already -- the new ceilings. at the time of the signing of the treaty, russia had a total of 640 strategic delivery vehicles, only 571 of them deployed. it therefore becomes evident

that russia needs no actual reductions to comply. if anything, it may need to bring some of its numbers up to the new limits, not down. so that brings me to the second really, really major point that concerns me about the treaty, and it is the modernization capabilities for our warheads that are part of our arsenal. now, we can do something about this outside the treaty and still go forward with the ratification. but so far we have not had the assurances that would allow us to know that our modernization could be done. according to the 2010 nuclear posture review, today's nuclear weapons have aged well beyond their originally planned life. and the nuclear complex has fallen into neglect.

mr. president, it has been 18 years since our arsenal has been tested in any way. 18 years. i share the concerns of my colleague, senator kyl, who has been a leader on this issue. we must assure -- and we can do it in a separate side ratification resolution -- ensure that the united states has a strong plan that provides for a nuclear modernization program that assures that if we did need to deploy because a rogue nation that is not part of any treatyies or is a part of a treaty but isn't going to comply, we need to assure that our deterrent is real.