kinds of days when we commemorate and pay tribute to those who have sacrificin who he who gave the last full measure of devotion to their country. and there are a lot of speeches given and commendations accorded to people that have served our country. but a lot of that will ring hollow if we're saying there's one group of soldiers that we may not want to have in the military. and if they -- if we want them in, then we're going to have to lie about it. and these are -- these are young men and women who are the definition, the embodiment of service and valor and courage. so you can't just get up as a politician every couple of months and give a speech about patriotism and then -- and then be willing to, i think,

undermine your argument and undermine our military by saying we just have to perpetuate a policy that really doesn't work and really is in conflict with who we are. i want -- i wanted to read a quotation from someone who has served in the united states congress for the last four years but someone who's also served our country, someone i know, and he's a friend of mine -- i put that on the record -- but someone we're very proud of, on the work that he did in both -- both forms of service, as a member of congress and serving in our military, and that's congressman patrick murphy. from bucks county, pennsylvania. from those who don't know our geography, on the season even ee of our state. he's been in the congress for four years. he'll be leaving this month. but he's been a champion of repealing this policy, and he speaks with a -- with an integ h an integrity and a commitment

which i think is unmatched. because he's not speaking about this policy theoretically. he's not speaking about this policy in a textbook sense. he's speaking and has -- has fought for the change in this policy from the vantage point of someone who has served and who served in the -- in situations where he could have been killed, sometimes every day of the week. here's a part of what he has said. many things he has said about this, but he said -- and i quote -- "the paratroopers from the 82nd airborne division in the army that i served with back in iraq in 2003 and 2004, they didn't care who you were writing letters -- who you were writing letters back home to, if you had a boyfriend or a girlfriend. they care whether you can handle your assault rifle, whether you can kick down a door, can you do your job so they can all come home alive?"

that's the challenge that he presents to all of us, congressman patrick murphy, former member of the 82nd airborne division. this policy on the battlefield is not theoretical, it is consequential in at least one sense. if we continue the policy the way it is, we're going to be less effective on the policy is. if we continue the policy the way it is, we're going to have less people serving. at a time when we really need extra help. we need soldiers on the battlefield. we need to continue to have young men and women who will volunteer to serve, knowing that once they volunteer, this isn't sending you to some base somewhere for a couple of years away from conflict. knowing that when you volunteer today -- maybe this wasn't true 10 or 15 years ago -- but today

when you volunteer, the likelihood of you seeing combat is very high. so there's a -- a special category i think of valor and integrity for those who are willing to volunteer and to serve our country, especially when they know they could be sent endow a firefight. -- they could be sent into a firefight. so you don't have to take the word of one or another united states senator, but i think we can take the word and base our judgment upon the experience of a -- a member of congress in this case, from the house, who has also served in the 82nd airborne division. and we should -- we should remember his words, what folks at home will care about, they care about whether you can handle your assault rifle, can you kick down a door, can you do your job so -- so all can come home alive, unquote.

so when we -- when we speak about this policy, this isn't theory, this is a debate at least about two very important principles, valor and whether or not we're going to affirm that valor of those who serve and who are willing to serve and whether or not we're going to have a policy based upon a core foundational principle of our democracy, which is integrity. and that's i think the basic question that we have before us. mr. president, i would yield the floor. mr. menendez: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from new jersey. mr. menendez: mr. president, it's time to stop discriminati discrimination. it's time repeal don't ask, don't tell. this is a policy that should have been repealed long ago -- long ago. it should have been repealed for its discriminatory nature. it should have been repealed

because the defense department's own report makes it clear that those who pointlessly cling to this discriminatory, wrongheaded, shortsighted policy by claiming the mantle of national security have absolutely no ground, no ground to stand on. don't ask, don't tell is a ridiculous notion, a bad policy, and a relic of a bygone era. it's keeping brave, able, educated, technically skilled, multilingual trained soldiers, men and women who want nothing more than to defend their country, from doing so. so defend their country from doing. so we're preventing them from making our military even stronger, making it better, contributing to what we need in a modern military force. in my view, mr. president, a vote to repeal this antiquated policy is a smart vote, it is

the right vote, it is the fair vote, it is a just vote. it is a vote to keep our military strong, keep good people in the military who want to serve. americans who now must remain anonymous, like an anonymous marine currently serving in afghanistan, who says -- quote -- "so far, the military has been my source of work and income for the last six years. i don't want that all taken away from me and me being discharged anything but honorably." he says -- quote -- "we face the same challenges as all other marines or soldiers but with an extra burden." or from another anonymous service member, a decorated midwesterner, a shining example of an american marine, a chestful of ribbons. like others, he's risked his

life. but like other marines denying who they are, he was deeply apprehensive about seeking the medical care he needed when he got home for fear of being outed and losing everything he had worked and sacrificed for. everything he had served for. he suffered in silence, careful in whom he confided, saying -- quote -- "you never know who you can trust." an arabic linguist, someone whose talents we sorely need against some of the enemies we have today, named blu copus, was discharged under don't ask, don't tell, even though he was never identified as gay and his accuser never revealed himself. imagine that. in a country that values the rule of law and justice that your accuser never has to reveal

themselves, never be subject to cross-examination, never testing the veracity, the truthfulness of what they're saying and yet have this person be discharged. mr. president, this is no way to run a military. we're talking about patriots. we're talking about men and women who want to serve, who are serving, who yearn to serve, who put their lives on the line. when a c-17 from the 436th airlift wing flies into dover, delaware, when rows of flag-draped coffins finger a hangar and the solemn dignity of fallen heroes brings silence and tears to all of us as a nation, do we ask the faith, the color, the sexual preference under those flags? i think not. listen to the arguments and rationale of those military

leaders who know best. former secretary of the army, clifford alexander, said -- quote -- "the policy is an absurdity and borderline on being an obscenity. what it does is cause people to ask of themselves that they lie to themselves, that they pretend to be something they are not. there is no empirical evidence that would indicate that it affects military cohesion." former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general shalikashvili, said -- quote -- "within the military, the climate has changed dramatically since 1993. in conversations i've had with service members make clear that while the military remains a traditional culture, the tradition no longer requires banning open service by gays." three-star retired lieutenant general claudia kennedy said -- quote -- "army values are taught to soldiers from their earliest days in the army. those values are loyalty, duty,

mutual respect, selfless servi service, honor, integrity and personal courage. we teach our soldiers that these are the values we expect them to live up to." she goes on to say, "i believe that as an institution, our military needs to live up to the values we demand of service members. military leaders need to respect all service members. we need to recognize that loyalty and selfless service are exhibited equally by service members of every color, gender, and sexual orientation." and i think about her words, mr. president, selfless service. when you voluntarily, in an all-volunteer military, when you come forth as an american and say, i want to serve my country, i am willing to put my life in

harm's way in behalf of the defense of the nation and my fellow americans, does that somehow get diminished, that selfless service get diminish the because uruguay? i think about personal courage. when you are on the battlefields and you are being shot at and when you are protecting those who are in your company, and when you are injured and when you are bleeding, does that personal courage get diminished because uruguay? certainly not. certainly not. and most convincingly and to the point, retired navy admiral -- vice admiral and u.s. congressman, jo joe sustak, he d this -- quote -- "we have to correct this. it's just not right.

i can remember being out there in command and someone would come up to you and start to tell you and you just wanted to say, no, i don't want to lose you, you're too good, too valuable." mr. president, let's take the advice of these military leaders who know that this is a bad policy and it should be repeal repealed. it's a policy that the pentagon report itself says if repealed, presents little risk to military readiness or cohesion, little effect on morale. in fact, 62% of service members responded to the pentagon's own survey that repeal of don't ask, don't tell would have a positive or no effect on morale. the presiding officer: the democrats' time has expired. is that correct? there are 15 minutes from -- allocated to senator kerry. he's not on the floor. i would anticipate that he would

see no difficulty. mr. menendez: as a member of that committee, i would ask unanimous consent for one minute to finish the statement. the presiding officer: hearing no objection. mr. menendez: thank you. let me close by quoting from a letter from the human rights campaign. i think it puts it purposely and exactly. take a moment to truly comprehend the lives ruined over the last 17 years because of this discriminatory law. the soldiers, sailors, airmen, translators, doctors, and more whose military careers were ended, whose livelihoods were threatened, whose friendships were cut off, all because the forces of bigotry and fear held out for so long. they can never get those years back. but i hope they know that their sacrifices meant something, their courage and integrity helped a nation understand what it means to serve, and more than anything else, helped bring about historic change. that's the vote i hope that we'll have, mr. president, one that creates historic change and honest -- and the courage, the integrity, and the service of these -- honors the courage, the

integ rirkts aninteg rirkts andf these men and women. mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. kyl: i note the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

ms. klobuchar: i ask that the quorum call be vitiated. the presiding officer: without objection. ms. klobuchar: i appreciate the senator from arizona and massachusetts allowing me to speak for a few minutes here. i want to lend my support -- strong support as a cosponsor of the repeal of don't ask, don't tell. i've always believed, mr. president, that the commitment of our top military leaders is critical to successfully implementing the repeal of this policy. since february of this year we have heard testimony from defense secretary gates as well as chairman of the joint chiefs staff admiral mike mullen. to this day both approve appeal of the policy.

admiral mullen outlined it pretty succinctly. he said no matter how i look at the issue, i cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we have in place a rollsy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens. our country is literally asking our service members to lie. earlier this year secretary gates called for a study of the repeal. that study involved comprehensive polls of the u.s. military. after the december release of the report on the implementation of the repeal, we know that the majority of our military members, 70% of active duty military and national guard and reserve have said that this change will not have a negative impact on their ability to perform their duties. so what we have here, mr. president, is this, we have the support of the top brass of our military of the united states. something that was incredibly important to implementing this

policy change. we've checked that box. we have the support of majority of the soldiers in the field who basically have said they can live with this policy change or they can live serving with a soldier who admits that they are gay. and the last thing that we have here, mr. president, is this body, this chamber, and today is the day that we check that box. today is the day that we vote for the repeal. thank you, mr. president. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the remaining republican time be equally divided between senators mccain, kyl, and sessions. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kyl: thank you. mr. president, one of the members on our side -- mr. kerry: before the senator gets going, i think we -- we have an understanding. how much republican time remains at this point?

the presiding officer: just under 31 minutes. mr. kerry: they will each have 10 minutes. i think senator kyl and senator sessions will speak, at which point i will have an opportunity to speak and senator mccain, since it's his amendment would speak. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kyl: thank you. during one of the last votes, a member came to me and said, i have not been able to follow this debate. what exactly is the mccain-barrasso amendment? with all of the to and fro coming to the start treaty and then to the don't ask, don't tell. i thought it would be good to recapitulate what the mccain-barrasso amendment is and why it's important. what the amendment does is to remove from the preamble language that relates to missle defense. this treaty was supposed to be about offensive stratigic weapons, not about missle defense. in fact, we were told by administration spokesman that it wouldn't relate to missle

defense. sure enough, there the words are. why are they there? they're there because the russians insisted that they be there. why did they insist they be there? because for decades the russians have been fixiated on u.s. missle defense. trying to find ways to reduce the effect of our missle defense on riewrch stratigic capabilities. they it with president reagan, he said no. they tried it again in the treaty -- the first start treaty. they tried it again in the moscow treaty of 2002 and they tried it again here. the difference between this treaty and the previous times is that the united states always pushed back and said, no, we're going to rely on missle defense. and it's a moral thing to do and we're not going to get into quid pro woes with you where with -- quid pro quos with you. in the start i treaty when the russians said in the signing statement we find this inner

relationship and the united states should not advance its missle defense capabilities, the united states pushed back strongly in our statement and said, no, that would not be a grounds for withdrawal from treaty and the russians need to understand that. they never did withdraw even though we did withdraw from the a.b.m. treaty so we can build missle defense systems. once again they have put it in the preamble and then in their signing statement made very clear their intent the inner relationship between the two means if our missle defenses are developed to the point where they consider it qualitatively or quantitatively better than it is currently, then they would have the right to withdraw from the treaty that. that would qualify as one of the exceptional circumstances under article 14 which is the withdrawal clause of the treaty. why do they want to do that? obviously to put pressure on the united states not to develop our missle defenses in a way that they don't want. they will threaten to withdraw from the treaty if we begin to do that.

some presidents, i expect the existing president, for example, would, therefore, be wary about going forward with missle defense plans if that means that the russians would withdraw from the treaty. my colleague, senator kerry, says that the preamble is a meaningless document. it is a throwaway document. it doesn't mean that much. he he also says, however, if we change one comma in the preamble, it will be a treaty-killing amendment. at first i said, both of those things can't be true. it can't be both meaningless and of ultimate importance it would kill the treaty if we changed it. on reflection, i think that senator kerry actually has it right. to the united states it's meaningless. our negotiators didn't care what the russians put in there. it didn't mean anything to us. but it means everything to the russians. that's why i think that senator kerry is right. this would be a big problem for the russians. why is that so? because even though we were willing to walk away from this,,

the russians got it in here and it means everything to them because it creates the pred cat for their withdrawal from the treaty. that's what they're trying to establish here. i'll close this point by quoting from dr. rice who wrote an op-ed in "the wall street journal," in which she said we need to do something about this in our ratification process. she said there's legitimate concerns that must be addressed in the ratification process. i'm quoting, "the senate must make absolutely clear in ratifying this treaty the u.s. is not reestablishing the cold war link between offensive forces and missle defenses. it is worrying in this regard it's a -- as it recognizes the interrelationship between the two. what this language does is removed that -- remove that language from the preamble. thereby removing the thorn, removing the contention, the potential and almost certain conflict that is due to arise between our two countries when the time comes that we do build

a missle defense that the russians don't want, they say we're going to withdraw from the treaty. we say you can't do that. that's not extraordinary circumstance. they say it is. we eye deent fried it -- identified it at such at the time of the signing of the treaty. do we pull back or our missle defenses or withdraw from the treaty? that's why this is important. the amendment curings the problem by removing that language from the preamble. now, mr. president, the remaining time, i'd like to briefly respond to four points that the president made in his weekly address today relates generally to the same subject. one of the first points he made is, he talked about the number of nuclear weapons, about 25,000 on each side and the decades that have ensued since the cold war. he said that progress would not have been possible without stratigic arms control treaties. yes, it would have. it was happening anyway. both sides were willing to withdraw their delivery vehicles

and warheads down because they couldn't afford to keep them. after the cold war, the united states, under president bush, said we're reducing ours. russia, you can do whatever you want to do. the russians came to us and said, gee, we need a treaty. we said, why? we don't care how many you have. we're reducing ours. we said, okay, if you want a treaty, fine. it was a three-page treaty. it had no connection with the missle defenses or other things that the russians wanted. it didn't require a treaty to bring those levels down. how about the delivery vehicles? this treaty fixes the number of delivery vehicles above where the russians are now. they could build up to the level of 140 as i recall to get up to the level of 070. the spoint both countries are reducing the levels to the point that they need. not because of an arms control treaty, but because it's in our national interest to do so. secondly, the president said without the treaty we'll risk turning back the progress in our

relationship we made with russia. i'll turn back to what henry kissinger and others said who always warned don't predicate the support for a treaty on improving your relationship with someone. the treaty should relate to reducing arms or whatever the subject of the treaty is and not based on anything other than that or you get into always trying to piece the other side and risking that they will withdraw from the treaty. third, the president said it is about the safety and security about the united states of america. i have yet for anybody to tell me what it is, what threat we are reducing by agreeing with the russians that both of us are going to reduce our delivery vehicles and warheads. the russians don't have to reduce theirs. they can build up under the treaty. i don't think we see a big threat there. finally the president said every minute we drag our feet is a minute that we have no inspectors on the ground at the russian nuclear sites. we need to continue the good relationships, but you can't

trust them, so we have to get the folks on the ground verifying what's going on right now. as i pointed out before, the administration created this problem on its own. we could have had a bridging agreement. we could have extended the verification provisions of the start treaty. the ruins didn't -- the russians didn't want to do that. that doesn't me that we have to agree that we will abide by their wishes when it comes to verification. my colleague says you can't get them to do something, so we signed the treaty the way the russians wanted in this regard and we just have to live with that. the administration might have to live with that, but the senate is not rawber stamp. and it -- a rubber stamp. it seems to me the senate has a right to say let the verification procedures lapse, you didn't have to do that. senator lugar had a bill related to the extension of the legal regime where by both sides would be able to have presence in the other country. we knew that was a problem at the time. for some reason the administration didn't pursue it. i suppose because the russians

said no. that doesn't mean that the united states senate has to say, okay, if the russians say no, then i guess we have to go along with that. the point here is, mr. president, i don't think that any of the arguments that president obama has made here require that we ratify this treaty this week. and i would just urge my colleagues to seriously consider what dr. rice has said, what senator mccain and others have said about the necessity of cleaning up this preamble so we don't reestablish the delinquent missle defense and prohibit the u.s. ability to proceed with u.s. missle defense plans in the future. mr. sessions: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from alabama. mr. sessions: mr. president, i would ask to be notified after

six minutes. i want to thank senator kyl and senator mccain for their leadership on this issue. and state that i believe the mccain amendment is perhaps the most critical amendment this -- that will be raised during this debate walk the future of missle defense is critically important for america. i chaired the -- the subcommittee on stratigic forces and armed services committee. i'm been a member of it for years and i know how long in the history of awful. this it's -- all of this. it's gone on for a great deal of time. i believe that missle defense is critical to our national security. we invested billions of dollars over 30 years plus and now that we're deploying in alaska and california, it is proving to be a heeld that wil -- a shield thl work. we had plans to deploy a site in

central europe. the bush administration noartd with the pols and the czechs and they signed agreements that they would allow a radar base in the czech republic and missle base in poland. when president obama was elected, the russians immediately started pushing back on our missle defense plans for reasons i've never fully understood. i mean, we're only talking about 10 defensive missles against hundreds -- hundreds, maybe thousands of thousands russian launched vehicles. it would in no way threaten their power. some experts, and i'm inclined to agree, it related more to the russian concern that we have a defense relationship with the czechs and pols. but i don't know. for some reason it's been a big deal and they've pushed back very hard. the bush administration has a --

in "the wall street journal," op-ed said that they pushed back on it at that time.and they saio proceed with missile defense. and he said, no deal. and they insisted. they said, no deal. they said, we won't have a treaty if you don't agree. he said, well, we won't have a treaty. we don't have a treaty with england, india, pakistan. we don't have to have a treaty with you. we're bringing our numbers down anyway. and you're bringing yours down anyway. but we'd like to have a treaty, but we're not going to limit our missile defense. and the russians signed that treaty. so now we come and they start the same bluster against the obama administration, but, unfortunately, they gave in. these negotiations started early in the year. the treaty negotiations started

in march of 2009. and by september of 2009, president obama unilaterally announced, to the shock of our polish and czech allies, that we're not going forward with the polish site. much to the delight of the russians, who'd achieved a significant victory in a negotiating point that had gone on for many, many years. so to say that this treaty has nothing to do with missile defense is not correct. and, did the russians say "thank you," we're so glad that -- we'll be glad to work with you on the treaty? no they still wanted language in the treaty that put them in a position to walk away from this treaty anytime they wanted to, if we deploy a missile defense system in europe.

and they got it in there, in the preamble. and it leaves not just an ambiguity, as i think i said earlier, it's really a misunderstanding, or a disagreement, of a central iss issue. repeated russian statements indicate they believe if we move forward quantitatively or qualitatively with a missile defense system, then they would have a right to get out of the treaty. and i can hear what would happen in the senate if we start deploying a missile defense system in europe and a lot of our colleagues would say, oh, if we do that, the russians will get out of the treaty. we can't do that. it will make it difficult. in addition, the system we were going to deploy was the g.b.i. two-stage missile in central europe, in poland. the president stopped that. it was ready and able to be deployed by 2016. it's the same system we have in

the united states except it's two-stage instead of three. and the national intelligence estimate shows that iran can reach the united states with an icbm -- and now they're developing nuclear weapons -- they can do it by 2015. so we were trying to get this system in by 2016. but when they canceled this thing, it caused a big uproar. the white house says, well, don't worry. we've got a new plan, one that i never heard about, a member of the strategic committee. we got a new plan. we're going to do an sm-3 block iib. well, have you started on it? no. is it under development? no. it's a bigger missile than the sm-3. the presiding officer: the senator has consumed six minutes of his time. mr. sessions: i thank the chair. and so it's a different thing. and it would be ready only by

2020. so i contend that this administratioadministration, ase negotiations over this treaty and their too-anxious desire to get this treaty, too-anxious desire to reset the relationship with the russians, which we of course would like to do, made a very serious error in capitulating on the third site, sending shock waves among our sovereign nation allies in central europe that used to be a part of the soviet empire, and they have made concessions that are significant. as a matter of fact, they pretend it had nothing to do with the treaty, but i would say that there's no doubt anyone -- anyone -- no doubt that the abandonment of the polish site was a way to gain support of the

russians as part of the negotiations in this treaty. and we now have this ephemeral vision of a 2020 entirely new missile system for poland that may or may not ever reach fruition. so that's what one of my concerns are. this mccain amendment would say, let's get this straight with the russians. let's make congress know that it requires a new negotiation with the russians. so be it. maybe we can reach and understanding and you should never enter a treaty or any contract in which the parties have a serious misunderstanding or actual disagreement son a critical part. i thank the chair and would reserve the balance of the time on this side. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, would you please inform me when i've used the first four minutes? the presiding officer: yes. mr. kerry: mr. president, our cleelings on the other side of the aisle are fighting against a phantom.

all of this argument that they have been going on for several days o now is about language tht has no binding impact on this treaty whatsoever. senator kyl acknowledged that yesterday. he also acknowledged that if you change it, it requires this treaty to go back to the government, the russian government, and then we don't have this treaty, we don't have any verification for whatever number of months follow. now, i'll come back to that in a moment. a moment ago senator kyl said, the russians didn't want to continue the verification methods of start i $of stamplet and he somehow insinuates that because they didn't want to continue it, what we have here is something less than what we ought to have for ourselves. mr. president, we didn't want to continue the verification and process of start as it existed. in fact, the bush administration was told that. and he knows that. this is phantom debate what we've got going on here. the target is really the treaty

itself, not this language, because this language doesn't have any legal binding impact on the treaty. but i'll share in a moment the impact of what it has. let me point out, they are supplanting -- our friends on the other side of the aisle are isupplanting their judgment for the judgment of secretary gates. now, we have the right to do that. we can do that. but i ask people to weigh whether secretary gates, who was appointed by george bush and held over by president obama, has anything except the interests of our country at heart when he makes this statement -- quote - -- quote -r committee -- "sir, so you know, the russians can say what they want. but as secretary clinton said, these unilateral statements are totally outside the treaty. they have no standing. they're not binding. they never have been." now, you know what the soviets said at the u.s.-soviet negotiations on nuclear space arms concerning the interrelationship between

strategic defensive weapons compliance with the treaty? this is start i. here's what they said in connection with the treaty between the united states of america and the union of soviet socialist republics on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, the soviet side states the following. "this treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the treaty between the u.s. and u.s.s.r. on the limitation of antiballistic missiles at signed in 1972." that was their signing statement. just like this signing statement. guess what, mr. president? the united states of america saw our national security interests in getting out from under the a.b.m. treaty. we got out from under the a.b.m. treaty. this language, just like the language we're debating today, meant nothing at all. and they stayed in the treaty. they didn't pull out. so we're debating something that has no impact whatsoever on this

treaty or on our lives today. let me go further. secretary gates said, "from the very beginning of this process more than 40 years ago, the russians have heritted missile defense. rate it's because they can afford it and they can't. we're tabooing able to build a good one. we're building a good one and they probably aren't. and then he said, "and they no longer want to devote the resources to it so they try to stop us from doing it through political means. this treaty doesn't accomplish that for them." now, my god, after cepha severa, either the secretary of defense -- how about the general, lieutenant general patrick o'reilly, whose job it is to defend the united states against missile attack, he's the man who runs this agency. day to day. you know what he said? he said, "relative to the recently expired start treaty, new start treaty -- this treaty we're voting on -- actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile

defense program. mr. president, we have our own leader of the missile defense agency telling us that this is an advantage for the united states of america. now, aim up to four minutes? thank you t let me get to the heart of this argument about why this is so critical. you know, the other side is trying to minimize, you know, saying, well, you can't say the language has no legal binding. it is not that important. and then turn around and say, we can't change it. that's the nub of their argument now, that we have to be able to change it because if we don't change it, somehow nonbinding language is enough for us to say, let's have no verification at all. ha! that's a strange trade-off. here's why it matters. because the preamble is in the instrument that's transmitted to the senate, even though it's not the binding component of it, the rules have. the rules by which we all play

are that if there's a change, if you change a comma, if you change one word, that change has to go back to the government, to russia, and they have to decide what they want to do. now, why is that important relative to this language? because the public position that they fought for in this negotiation was to achieve binding restraints on u.s. missile defense. that's what they wanted. and as secretary gates said, as every general and admiral who's looked at this -- admiral mullen, general chilton -- have all said, they didn't get that. they didn't win that point. we won that point. but in any negotiation, when somebody needs something to be able to feel good or deal with their own politics, sometimes you let them have a little something that's meaningless to you but may mean something to them. that's what we gave them. take it away, mr. president, you open up this whole treaty. then they have to figure out how

they deal in other terms with those politics, and i will wait until the classified session that we're going to have on monday. and in that -- i can't go into this here, but i'll lay out in that classified session why this treaty is good for the united states and why we believe reopening it would be dangerous. that's why this amendment is dangerous, mr. president. because it will reopen this, and it will force -- it will -- you know, doesn't constrain us in the least, and the extent to which that is true, i think, will be seen to a lot of our colleagues in that session. now, to make this even more clear, the president of the united states has written a letter today to majority leader harry reid and to the ranking -- the minority leader, senator mcconnell. and in the letter which senator reid has shared with me, it

says, from the president, "the new start treaty places into limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs. as the nato summit meeting in lisbon last month underscoardz, we're proceeding at base pace with the missile defense system in europe designed to provide full coverage for nato membersen the continent as well as deployed u.s. forces against the growing threat posed by proliferation of ballistic missiles. the final phase of the system will also augment our current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles from iran targeted against the united states. all nato allies agreed in lisbon that the growing threat of missile proliferation and our article v commitment of collective defense requires that the alliance develop a territorial missile defense capability." and it goes ton talk about that capability. then he says, and this is critical with respect to this debate, "as of today" -- the

president's letter to the leadership. "in signing the new start treaty, the russian federation issued a statement that expressed its view that the extraordinary events referred to in article ivx require a buildup to the united states of america such that it would give threat to the russian federation. article 14,(3)as you know, gives each party the trite withdraw from the treaty if it beliefs its supreme interests are jeopardized." the united states did not and does not disagree wit agree witn statement. we believe that the deployment of defense systems including quantitative and qualitative improvements to such systems do not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the russian federation and have provided policy and technical

explanations to russia on why we believe that to be the case. although the united states cannot circumscribe russian's rights under article 14, paragraph 3, we believe that the continued improvement and deployment of u.s. missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the new start treaty. and, therefore, would not give rise to circumstances justifying russia's withdrawal from the treaty. regardless of russia's actions in this regard, as long as i am president and as long as the congress provides the necessary funding, the united states will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the united states, our deployed forces and our allies and partners. my administration plans to deploy all four phases of the epaa. while advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or

timing of the later phases of the epaa, one reason this approach is called adaptive, i will take every action available to me to support the deployment of all four phases. sincerely, barack obama, the president of the united states. mr. president, i think this letter speaks for itself. i think the facts of history, i think the testimony of secretary gates and of all those others who have come before us that make it clear that the united states has no constraints on missile defense whatsoever make clear this amendment is not necessary and this amendment carries with it dangerous implications for the ultimate ratification implication of a treaty. i reserve the balance of my time. mr. mccain: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: how much time do i have? the presiding officer: just about 13 minutes. mr. mccain: i'd like to reserve at least the last three

minutes for my colleague, senator kyl. the presiding officer: very good. mr. mccain: as we all know, we'll vote very quickly on the amendment to the new start treaty. i've offered this amendment along with the senator from wyoming, and, you know, this amendment is really an important and seminole one. it's focused on a key flaw in the treaty, the inclusion in the preamble of the following clause -- and i want to read it in full. and we've read it before. and i don't understand how the letter that the senator from massachusetts just read would not then force us to negate the -- the comment -- this part of the treaty which says -- and i quote -- "recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced and that current

strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties." this language carries a lot of historical significance and strategic weight because it recognizes an interrelationship between nuclear weapons and missile defense. some believed this type of linkage was appropriate during the cold war when the united states and the soviet union were existential enemies with the means to annihilate each other. but it's not appropriate for today, when the united states and the russian federation, for all of our differences, are not devoted to one another's destruction and when one of the greatest threats to our national security comes from rogue states, like iran and north korea, which are developing nuclear weapons and increasingly better means to deliver them. in today's world, with so many new and constantly evolving threats, the united states can't be limited in the development,

deployment, and improvements of missile defense systems that we deem to be in our national security interest. i'm concerned, as are many of my colleagues, that the russian government believes this clause from the preamble confers a legal obligation on the united states which constrains our missile defenses. ever since president reagan proposed a strategic defense initiative, the russians have sought to limit our strategic defensive arms. they've sought to limit our missile defense programs through legal obligations, and, failing that, through political commitments or agreements that could be cited to confer future obligations. words matter. words matter. to open ourselves up to this type of political threat by accepting an outdated interrelationship between nuclear weapons and missile defense is wrong.

furthermore, by saying that -- quote -- "current missile defenses do not undermine the treaty's viability and effectiveness, this clause from the treaty's preamble establishes that future missile defense deployments could undermine the treaty. thereby establishing a political threat that the russian federation could use to try to constrain u.s. missile defenses. in short, we have handed the russian government the political tool they have sought for so long to bind our future decisions and actions on strategic defensive arms. imagine a world a few years from now when, god forbid, an iran or north korea or some other rogue state has deployed longer-range ballistic missiles and a deployable nuclear capability much earlier than we assessed. imagine that we are faced with a situation where unforeseen events compel us for the sake of our national security, that of

our allies to improve our current systems or to develop and deploy new systems in order to counter a new and far greater threat than we expected. then consider what the russian federation said in a unilateral statement at the signing of the treaty. this is a statement of the russian federation, something that if the senator from massachusetts is correct, we should be able to clarify by asking for a statement from the russian federation repudiating what they said at the time of the signing statement. this is what they said. "the treaty between the russian federation and the united states of america on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms signed at prague on april 8, 2010, may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america." there is clear language.

that is clear, unequivocal language and i'll repeat t. "whereas there no qualitative or quantitative buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america. consequently, the extraordinary events referred to in article 14 of the treaty also include a buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the russian federation." that is a very clear statement. it's unequivocal of what the russian federation is saying. one of the things that senator graham and i and others have said, hey, why don't we just drop a letter to the russian ambassador or to vlad or whoever it is and say, clarify this, will ya? are you standing by your statement that you made at the signing? is that the russian federation official policy, it has not been revoked? this is the russian

interpretation of what our two governments have agreed to in the preamble. they seem to believe that this clause limits u.s. missile defense systems. they seem to believe that the language of this clause about -- quote -- "the effectiveness and viability of the treaty" means that any buildup or improvement in u.s. missile defense systems would undermine the treaty. and they seem to believe there is a clear and legal binding connection between what was agreed to in this clause of the preamble and article 14 of the treaty, which establishes the rights of the parties to withdraw from the treaty and the conditions under which they may do so. in short, the russian government seems to believe that this nonbinding political agreement is the pretext for a legal obligation under the treaty itself. and if the united states builds up its missile defense, russia will withdraw from the treaty. now, let's listen to what the russian leaders have said. i mean, this is not made up.

this is what they have said. i quote -- "the russian foreign minister on march 28, 2010 -- this year -- here's what he said. "the treaty and all obligations it contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now present in the sphere of strategic defensive weapons." what could be more clear? and here he said again in april of 2010 -- april this year -- "linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the accord and is legally binding." i mean, if there's any clarification from that statement in the preamble, he just gave it, at least what the russian version it. here's president dmitry medvedev on november 30, 18 days ago -- "either we reach an agreement on missile defense and create a full-fledged cooperation mechanism, or if we can't come to a constructive agreement, we will see another escalation of

the arms race. we will have to make a decision to deploy new strike systems." and finally, here's prime minister vladimir putin speaking on "larry king live." and, larry, we'll miss you. i've quoted him so many times on "larry king live." on december 1, 2010, "if the countermissiles will be deployed in the year 2007 along our borders or 2015, they will work against ou our nuclear potential there, our nuclear arsenal, and certainly that worries us, and we are obliged to take some actions in response." this is a troubling situation and it must be corrected by this body. i'd like to quote again from a recent op-ed by former secretary of state condoleezza rice in the "wall street journal." quote -- "the senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this treaty, the

united states is not reestablishing the cold war link between offensive forces and missile defenses. new start's preamble is worrying in this regard, as it recognizes the interrelationship of the t two." now, that's a statement by our former secretary of state, who, by the way, wants this treaty ratified. but she also wants us to fix this. this amendment fixes it. this amendment. and i appreciate the letter from the president of the united states. i'm very grateful for it. but the fact is, letters are letters and -- and presidents don't last forever. but binding treaties do until they are either broken or they are revoked. and to have right in the beginning, at the preamble, a clear, unequivocal statement that any improvement in our

defensive weapon -- missile systems will then be grounds for withdrawal from the treaty is not anything that we should let stand. simplist way is to -- i'm finishing. and i -- the senator from wyoming and i have proposed the amendment to simply strike the language from the preamble itself. i urge my colleagues to support the amendment. and i yield the remainder of my time to the senator from arizona. the presiding officer: the senator has about 2 minutes and 10 seconds remaining. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. does -- is there any time remaining on the democratic side? the presiding officer: 25 seconds. mr. kyl: would anybody like to take 25 seconds? senator levin will take the remaining 25 seconds. mr. levin: i would be happy to take it. mr. president?

the presiding officer: the senator from michigan. mr. levin: mr. president, i put most of my statement in the record since i only have 25 seconds. but general chilton, who's the comarntcommander of our strategc command, told the armed services committee on july 20, "as the combatant command also responsible for synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations and advocacy, i can say with confidence this treaty does not constrain current or future missile defense plans." and the balance of my statement i'll have to put in the record. the presiding officer: time has expired. the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. to say that the treaty doesn't constrain the united states misses the point of the argument we've been trying to make here over the course of the last day and a half. what the russians have done is established a legal pretext for withdrawal from the treaty. they've been very clever about it. up to the time that we've been told the president has sent us a letter, there was no pushback from the united states. now, i haven't seen this letter on it's a little hard to comment