these older workers, they think they're entitled to everything because if hundreds of millions of years of experience. how do we get rid of them? we're going to design our organizations got maximum flexibility. a mightily, china is gradually more university graduates. let's go there. but it's all part of a dynamic and we're all competing to make a living. and i think once we see this, that will change, too. thank you everyone. i will be around and would love to hear your remarks. [applause] >> for more on author ted fishman visit tedcfishman.com. >> booktv is on twitter. follow us for a regular update on a programming and news on nonfiction books and authors. twitter.com/booktv.

>> michael mandelbaum director of the american foreign policy program at johns hopkins school of international studies finds that the era of expensive u.s. foreign policy is coming to an end due to financial constraints. he talked with foreign affairs editor james hoge at new york university several global affairs for just over an hour. >> thank you, and welcome. nice to have you back. michael is also a repeat offender. is the program before because mike was always writing a book. i think we're up to 12 now, 11 at 12? anyway come in that range. he is a good friend. is also someone i admire greatly. he is not only a wonderful analyst for affairs, global affairs, but he's a beautiful writer. and i was telling him earlier today and we chatted that the book has got all sorts of wonderful ways of some of them quite funny, of addressing one

or another of the problems we deal with in the world today. now, more formally, who is michael mandelbaum. he is a christian herder, professor of american foreign policy and director of the american foreign policy program after john's hopkins university school of advanced international studies, which is based in washington. he's a former faculty member at harvard and columbia universities, and the u.s. naval academy. he is the author, co-author, 11 previous books. his current one which will discuss tonight is called "the frugal superpower: america's global leadership in a cash-strapped era." let's start with the first part of the title, frugal superpower, because it's so, maybe we would not be without power altogether, will have a very important role,

but in the front part of it, frugal, does it go with a superpower, at least not in our history as michael points out in his book. we got very used to spend whatever money it took to have the position we have in the world to be the underwriter issue of a global prosperity and global security. that's an era that is coming to an end. and as michael put in his book, it's going to be an unavoidable entrenched in american foreign policy, in part because of some past obligations, if you will, the key related liabilities such as the debt that we're all carrying now and the wars that we have fought and so on. but there is also some new liabilities coming to alone, what caught my eye to a great extent was the retiring baby boomers play a not significant role in your analysis of what is

entrenched in foreign policy. >> that's right. and thanks for having me on the stage with you again. it's always a pleasure. and thanks to nyu for playing host to this event. the government already has very substantial obligations. we borrowed a lot of money between 2001-2007, and they we borrowed even more to deal with the financial meltdown of the recession in the last few years. by the amount of money that we borrowed and we therefore owe dwarfed by what the country owes to the retiring baby boom generation. that is, americans born between 1946-1964. day, that is weak, start to retire next year or and those retirements are going to break the bank. the cost of social security and medicare are going to skyrocket because there are so many boomers, 78 million of us, the

largest age cohort in american history. now, we have gotten into the habit as a country of not raising as much revenue as we pay out as a government come and we bridge the gap with borrowing, increasingly from foreign governments, especially the chinese. but the boomers are going to be so expensive in retirement that we will not be able to borrow all the money we need even from the chinese. and that means, i believe, that despite what politicians promise, actually in this election season, benefits are going to be cut and taxes are going to go up. and that's going to change the political climate. that would mean that all the familiar signposts of our politics of the last generation are going to come into question. one of the things that will come into question is the american role in the world. i think the american public is going to feel much less generous about supporting the far-flung, and in my view on all extremely

constructive international activities of the united states, with their social security is being cut and they're having to pay more in taxes. so the united states is going to have to be frugal in its foreign policy as you point out really for the first time since the beginning of world war ii. we have gone seven decades without looking at the price tag in the way we're going to have to do. so that's the first part of the title. we will have to be frugal. the public will stand for nothing else, but i also believe the best states will remain the world's only superpower. i don't think anybody else will take our place. there are lots of things in the world that we don't do them, they won't get done, and if they don't get done and i discuss these very things deny states does in the frugal superpower, if they don't get done the world will be a worse place to all of us, not just americans, will be poorer and less secure. >> will get into some of the things we need to do and some things will give up.

that's why would like to start which is one of the ways we start reducing costs is the way of deciding what policies we should follow rather than what the threat is. you're not going to do anymore. what are some examples? one that struck my eye was a -- a humanitarian intervention, and democratic prophet isaiah and. i these things going to go by the wayside because i think it will go by the wayside. since the end of the cold war -- the cold war, somalia, bosnia, haiti, kosovo, iraq and afghanistan, and these military interventions and varied motives but they all end with the united states spending a lot of time and effort trying to build working governmental institutions in these countries. use the fully term we've got

ourselves involved in nationbuilding all over the world. now, whatever you think of those particular missions, whether you're for them or against them, i think we can get into that because they're just too expensive and the public won't pay for them. none of them has been all that popular with the public. the afghan war was popular in the beginning because it came about in response to an attack on the united states and everybody supported retaliating for that. but now almost 10 years on that war and nationbuilding that involves has become unpopular. and so although i think members of the foreign policy community, members of the government see this kind of activity as a way of the future. there's a lot of talk about reorganizing the defense department and converting the state department so that its officials will be better at doing the things that we've done in these countries. i think the public won't permit and it's not going to happen. >> on that last point, hillary

clinton's big quadrennial report is out, and it seems to be she's saying exactly the same thing you're saying the public will put up with it. diplomacy and development are two big slogans at the moment and they both suggest that any civilian way we are going to try to do the same thing we're doing with the military. >> she has said that. secretary rice said that. people in washington are very enthusiastic about these kinds of missions and about trading our foreign personnel for doing the. i just don't think it's going to happen. i think at the end of the day the american public will simply vote thumbs down. and at the end of the day the american public gets to decide what we do and don't do in the world. there's much to be said for these humanitarian missions. we've got a lot of good around the world. we've done some harm as well i suspect. but for better or for worse i think that the economic pinch

that all americans, especially american taxpayers, especially american voters are going to do in a decade ahead, suddenly all these obligations that the government has in the way that the government is going to have to respond to them, that pinch is going to make people very, very stingy when it comes to these kind of humanitarian missions. so i know that officials in washington think that this is the future, but i think they are wrong. >> i have to tell you, michael has developed this line of thinking which is skepticism for longtime. when i was just beginning as head of foreign affairs, the clinton years, he wrote a piece to be called foreign policy social work. and i've got to tidy the people in the clinton administration were dead treaties because of such a what he was saying was don't get diverted into all these things which are not maybe first run concerns of us from

the point of her own prosperity and security, a well moderated six ways to sunday. i'm afraid that's what happened. >> it did happen. and the public has never been very happy about it. but the public has been relatively permissive because these nations seem to be things that we could afford. when they come to be things that people believe we cannot afford, then the public will call it off spirit the other sort of area we see some real retrenchment is the furtherance of democracy around the world, but you've been a great deal about this in your career. but i don't suspect you may just give it up altogether. it is not only a basic value but it is always the view as being part of making the world more stable and secure for us. what you see going forward? what are some limitations you put in that? after what we plan to do about

democracy in the world be on our own shores? >> the united states has always favored the spread of democracy and always will. and i trust that we will never give up our commitment to democracy. at her commitment to democracy around the world rose out of our basic commitment to democracy at home. that's not going to change. the question is what do you do about it? we've always talked to talk in a recent years we have walked the walk, too. we have spent lots of money can hundreds of billions of dollars and over 4000 lives and trying to bring democracy to iran. the verdict, it's made real progress to the extent that it makes progress toward democracy, that justifies investment in essays has made there. but we're simply not going to be able to afford that kind of investment. so why we will continue to proselytize rhetorically, why we

will continue to make speeches, while we were continue to cheer from the sidelined in favor of democratic forces everywhere, we're not going to spend much money among democracy in the future. >> okay. so we'll touch on a couple things that we may have to give up or cut back on, what you are also quite giunta the things we have to sustain commitments on. for example, stability and security in europe, east asia. nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as best we can. and last but not least, in fact, most you say protection of the free flow of oil at and i want to depart from that because this is one of the central parts of this book which is oil, and our dependence on it, is the biggest single foreign policy failure of the last seven decades. and psycho it's the biggest challenge that we face going forward, anything more urgent,

why? why isn't that big a video? >> that is the message of "the frugal superpower." i would say, wouldn't say it's fallen on deaf ears in washington, because most people in washington, including members of congress agree with me. they're just not going to do anything about it because they think it is political suicide to do what needs to be done, which is raise the price of gasoline considerably. a gasoline tax which i favor on the order of the ones that the europeans and japanese day, and they paid two-and-a-half three times as much per gallon of gasoline as we do come is probably the least popular public policy proposed in the entire united states. nonetheless, i do think as you rightly say that it is the most important foreign policy measures that the united states can take is the reason is this. if you look around the world and you look at the countries that make trouble for us, all of them depend on oil revenues and all of them use the revenues they

get from the sale of oil to make trouble for the united states. there's iran which uses oil revenue to try to get nuclear weapons, to try to evict the united states from the middle east. and to destroy israel. there's russia whose leader, mr. putin, uses the oil revenues that the kids to try to thwart the united states and europe your there is venezuela what its leader, president chavez, is the leading anti-american voice in the western hemisphere. and the last but certainly not least, there's saudi arabia. saudi arabia is little different than these other countries. saudi arabia is actually an ally of the united states. but it's also true that some of the revenues from oil that included saudi arabia find their way into the hands of terrorist groups, including this group that attacked the united states on september 11, 2001. ..

>> begins with the united states because we're the largest consumer. ask the way to consume less oil is to have a much higher gasoline tax. if we all pay more for gasoline, we'll all use less, and it will also produce substitution, alternative sources of energy to oil will become commercially

viable, and over time the world can wean itself from oil. if we get the price of gasoline high enough then, say, lek call-powered cars become commercially attractive, and when they do, lots of private money will flow, and the development of ever more powerful wateries which is really what is needed -- batteries which is really what is needed to make electric cars good enough to substitute for gasoline-powered cars. so that's a roundabout way of saying that the most important thing we could do to further american interests in the world and in the long run lower the costs of foreign policy by weakening our adversaries is to start weaning the world from oil with a higher gasoline tax. now, as you have pointed out to me in the past, jim, this is politically a nonstarter, and i'm well aware of that. i don't think there's any be elected official in the united states of america who actually has come out publicly in support of this measure. but i am modestly optimistic

that we will get a higher gasoline tax within the life span of, i would say, everyone in this room, and be some of us are not spring chickens. so let me explain briefly how i think this is going to come about. i think it will come about for economic rather than environmental or foreign policy reasons. because of the enormous obligations that the united states faces, as i've said, we will come to a point where we will all realize that we've got to get serious about reducing the deficit as we're not serious now. and if and when we get serious about reducing the deficit, that will mean two things. it will mean cutting benefits, but it will also mean raising taxes. raising taxes is going to find its way onto the national agenda, whatever politicians say. and if and when the question before the country is not whether we should raise taxes because it's the answer to that that everyone gives as no, but

rather what taxes we should raise, then a gasoline tax and even a broader energy tax, a carbon tax begins to look, well, not exactly attractive, but less unattractive than the other taxes we could raise. so i believe, i certainly hope that a gasoline tax is going to come in as it were through the back door. >> in the meantime, i suppose we've just got to get more energetic about conservation efforts that can be done without a gas tax because it is going to be a while before we get it. i mean, look at the current political campaign going on. adversity to taxation is at a high water mark, it seems to me. >> it is, indeed. and yet, you know, in this campaign some people -- notably the celebrated tea party -- are saying that the size of government is too big, that we've got to reduce the eyes of government. size of government. and that proposition, it seems to me, is unarguably true if you

define the appropriate size of government as that size for which the american public is willing to pay. because, clearly, we have a bigger government than what we're willing to pay for. well, if we elect next month lots of people who go to washington saying government is too big, if they're serious about doing something about it, then they're going to have to look at a whole range of programs. and once you start cutting programs, especially programs that are important to lots of people like social security or medicare and you really cannot avoid cutting social security and medicare because that's where most of the money is -- >> right. >> once that's on the table, then tax increases have to be on the table as well. then you get into a process of negotiation and bargaining and compromise in which everybody is going to have to hold his or her nose and accept something that he or she doesn't like. and one of the things that i think is likely to be accepted

is a gasoline tax. now, if you, if you follow the campaign today, you don't even get a whiff of that. you don't hear anybody talking about that. but it seems to me that the logic of what a lot of people are saying leads, intellectually are, to that point. >> okay. there's going to be view of leadership, the question is what's going to take its place in terms of sort of global management of stability and so forth. and one answer would be, well, there'll be somebody, one singular player to take our place. well, there isn't any. the one that might come closest is china, and they don't have the interest in playing that role. they may later in the history, but they don't know. so we're going to have to have more cooperation, more partnerships. at a time in which we have rising powers who even when they want to be cooperative, they have different priorities, different aims than we do. are we looking at more difficult

time rather than a less difficult time in getting cooperation from potential partners? >> i think we're looking at a more difficult time, and that's one of the points i make in the frugal superpower. first of all, i very much agree with you that no individual power or group of powers is going to take the place of the united states. china is certainly becoming richer and more powerful, and it is playing a larger role in its own region. but china has no vision of playing a global role, and in any event it's important to keep in mind that for the foreseeable future china will be home to hundreds of millions of very poor people. and the first priority of any chinese government will be trying to lift those hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. i don't see the european union playing the role of a global superpower either. they really can't get their act together to act as a unit in security and political affairs, although they do a little bit were the in economic affairs.

now, the e.u. is the natural partner for the united states. these are our traditional allies, these countries are all democracies, they share our values. there are differences between the two sides of the atlantic to be sure, but the kind of world that we want is basically the kind of world that the europeans want. so from my point of view the stronger and the more active europe is in foreign policy, the better it is for us because that lightens our load. but i don't think that's going to happen. the kinds of economic burdens that we face in the future will be even heavier for the europeans. their societies are aging even more rapidly. their social programs are even more generous. they're going to struggle to pay their version of social security and medical care. the united states is actually in a better position going forward than the european countries because our population is growing. our work force is not dwindling. but the populations of every

major european country are due to shrink. so they are not going to be in the mood to pitch in and give us more help than they do now. we're likely to get less help from them, and that doesn't bode well because as i argue in the book, the united states -- for all of our faults and shortcomings -- does important and constructive things if the world. in fact, i argue that the united states is the world's de facto government, providing to the world some although not all of the services that governments provide to the societies that they govern. if and as the united states does less, that means that the world will get less golfer nance, and that's -- governance, and that's not a good thing. >> well, on two fronts, one is the economic. perhaps europe can still be looked upon as a very crucial partner for us. but on the maintenance of security and stability in the world, they're not even up to self-defense anymore. i mean, they've cut the defense

budget be so much, and it looks like more is coming. so as we look outward and look around for partners and ways to stabilize or keep stability where it is in the world, i doubt we can look to europe. what's your opinion? >> i must, regretfully, agree with that. the europeans are doing very little now to help us maintain global security, and i fear they're going to do even less in the future. the american government is reaching out to rising powers such as india and countries in southeast asia and east asia that are concerned about china. our traditional allies, japan and korea and, also, vietnam. and i think in east asia other countries are sufficiently concerned about the possibility that a rising china may impinge on their interests that they're willing tacitly to cooperate with the united states. and if china becomes a threat, i think they would join with the united states. but i don't think they're

willing to be active, and they're certainly not willing to give us any help in any other part of the world including the part of the world where i think we face the largest and and most serious immediate threat, namely the middle east. >> can yeah. i wanted to ask you one more question on this front though. if there is a vacuum, at least a partial vacuum because of our retrenchment, history would say there are players who would be tempted to take advantage of that, and can the two big ones we would have to worry about are china and russia. now, a classic realist theorist would say there's no argument here. you never saw these problems without first class power conflict at some point. what's your own view on how likely it is that we're going to be heading if not tomorrow, in the foreseeable future into a much higher level of conflict in the world? >> well, russia and china, as you note, are the major potential troublemakers in the world, and i devote a chapter of the frugal superpower to them.

neither of them is altogether satisfied with the status quo, especially in their respective regions. each of them has grievances, even of them has -- each of them has changed that it would like to make, neither of them is about to become a large version of denmark. so there is a potential threat from both of those countries. my best guess is that neither one of them is going to act in a way that would threaten the status quo so severely that the united states and other countries would have to respond in military fashion. i don't think on balance that we're going to have to return to the kind of policy of containing china and the soviet union that we practiced during the cold war. for china the most important thing is to sustain economic growth. economic growth depends upon a stable and open international economic order where china can trade, where it can sell its

goods abroad and receive foreign investment, and for china to challenge the political status quo in east asia would, i think, risk disrupting the global economy and be thereby inflicting damage on china. so i think the chinese will be relatively prudent about what they do. as for russia, the russians, i think, are a little less prudent although, of course, they depend on the global economy to sell the one product that, of theirs that the world wants to buy, namely energy. russia is really a one-crop economy. so they have that consideration militating against making trouble in europe, but there's another reason that i'm cautiously optimistic that russia won't make a huge amount of trouble in the years and decades ahead. a reason that doesn't apply to china and that is that whereas china is becoming stronger, russia is becoming weaker. the russian population is shrinking, the russian economy depends almost exclusively on

the export of energy. the russians might like to make trouble, but i think -- knock on wood -- that they're not strong enough to do so. >> yeah. one figure that you've got in there is that it's about 150 million people now, and by 2050 russia may be closer to 100 million population. think what that is just compared to us. we're 300 million already. >> and growing. >> and growing. let's turn to the middle east, and then i want to come to the audience. when you have a question, put your hand up, wait for the mic, tell us who you are, and we'll go from there. try and keep it concise and one question per customer. but the middle east. several things you point out about it. number one, it is home to what is probably the most fervent and if it continues on its nuclear path, the most reckless radical power, iran. another thing you point out, of all the reasons in the world in which there are potentially

large problem, the middle east is the place where we have the least reliable allies either now or in many prospect. >> that, unfortunately, is the case. iran is a very aggressive power. it's made no secret of its desire to dominate the region, overturn regimes it doesn't like and replace them with regimes that it favors, control the world's sly of oil, invictim -- supply of oil, invict the united states. so iran is generally a rogue power and, unfortunately, the surrounding countries are simply not very strong, especially the oil-producing sheikhdoms of the gulf. i don't think anybody really expects saudi arabia to be able to defend itself. israel certainly is able to defend itself and is our one reliable ally in the region, but israel is not going to be able to deal with iran on its own. so whereas in, say, east asia we have a country that is in some

ways like iran -- namely north korea -- we have a lot of strong allies there. south korea, japan and china which is not exactly an ally, but i think can be depended upon to try to keep north korea from doing anything too dreadfully provocative. but in the middle east we have nothing, and that means that stability in the middle east, the prevention of the radicalization of the middle east with the possibility that the world's oil supplies will come under the control of a hostile, radically anti-western regime -- that is the government of iran -- that, unfortunately, seems to depend almost exclusively on the united states. and that's not a distant challenge, that's a challenge for today. >> yep. now, once again we, meaning the united states, is pushing very hard for an israeli/palestinian settlement. now, not everybody, but a lot of people who are pushing us down this road now and in the past have said, look, this is the key to a whole bunch of other

problems as well, and if you can get this one settled, the whole thing will calm down. do you agree with that? or is that -- >> no, that's pie in the sky. it would be nice to have a settlement between israel and be its arab neighbors, especially the palestinians and syria. incidentally, i don't think any such settlement is imminent because i think the syrian regime depends upon it conflict with israel for whatever legitimacy it now enjoys. i think this syrian government would no more give up its conflict with israel than it would fly to the moon because once it did that, the people of syria would start looking at the regime and can say why are you so incompetent? why are you still in power? in i don't think prospects are all that bright for a negotiated settlement. perhaps they're better with the palestinians, but that's not going to soft the problem. there are -- solve the problem.

specifically, iran is certainly not going to give up its aspirations for domination in the region and its aspirations to evict the united states even if there is an us railly -- israeli/palestinian settlement. so i'm afraid the one really has nothing to do with the other. doesn't mean it wouldn't be a good thing to have a settlement, but it wouldn't solve our problems. >> okay. let's start right over here. mic coming your way, i hope. there we are. and by the way, i've been asked to ask you all to make sure you hold the mic particularly close because c-span is going to miss your question otherwise, and so a larger audience there would be disappointed at not getting your question. go ahead, sir. >> right. you've made some very good suggestions on entitlement programs, but i haven't heard you say anything about cutting our military commitments which are very, very, you know,

expensive. why do we need troops in the europe, for example? >> well, i'm glad you mentioned the defense budget because i do have a section in the frugal superpower on the defense budget, and i do believe it will be cut. and i think we're seeing the beginnings of what will be a powerful trend already with secretary of defense gates proposing over several years $900 billion -- $100 billion worth of reductions and proposing to dissolve an entire command, the joint forces command in virginia. the defense budget has actually shrunk since the end of the cold war quite considerably as a proportion of our overall economy. at the end of the cold war, we were spend being something like 6% of gdp on defense, now it's down to 3%. but in absolute terms that is a very large number. and as pressure comes to bear on the major entitlement programs in the united states -- and as i

say, i think that is going to happen in the years ahead -- the defense budget will not be spared. it will not be sacrosanct. parts of the defense budget will be cut. we will not be spending as much on defense in the future as we are today. because everything is going to be on the table, and next to social security and medicare and medicaid, the defense budget is the largest item in the federal budget. and when it comes time to make severe cuts, everybody is going to take a hit including the pentagon. >> but it reminds me of the gas tax problem. it is deeply unpopular, in this case, with congressmen because there are probably more subcommittees in the u.s. congress that are devoted to one aspect or another of that defense budget than anything else. and trying to get that defense budget cut is going to be a political problem as well as a judgment on what we need for security. >> it's not easy to cut the defense budget for precisely the

reason that you specified, jim, and there's another reason that it's hard to cut the defense budget, and that is that it provides the united states with forces that, i believe on the whole, we put to good use. it's good to be powerful. we're the good guys in the world, and the more powerful we are, the better off we and the world are. so it does require a different political context than the one in which we are living now and the one in which we are going to conduct the 2010 midterm election. and my analysis in the frugal superpower depends on the proposition that this political context will change substantially in the years ahead and in the first chapter of the book i outline my reasons for believing that. if everything stays the same politically, then my predictions will not come true. but in order for everything to stay the same we'll have to repeal the economic laws of gravity, and not even the mighty united states can do that.

[laughter] >> yes. yes, ma'am, right here. >> colette, faculty here at the center. i'd be interested to hear your assessment of u.s. policy towards pakistan, fragile state, nuclear armed. and given what we would like to do in afghanistan as we move ahead, how do you see strategically in terms of the balance of power what u.s. priorities should be vis-a-vis that country? >> well, pakistan is the 2010 version of the problem from hell. for american foreign policy. we need pakistan in order to conduct the campaign in afghanistan because most, although not all of our supplies go through pakistan. so we need a friendly pakistan. pakistan conducts a two-faced policy. on the one hand, it is in many ways helpful to the united states and is happy to accept the military aid that we give

it. on the other hand, we know that parts of the pakistani government are supporting our enemies in afghanistan. parts of the pakistani government -- the isi, the intelligence wing of the government we have good reason to believe is supporting the taliban, and it also supports radical groups that commit acts of terrorism in kashmir and against india. but we know that some of the terrorists whom we have caught trying to commit terrorist acts in the united states have been trained in terrorist camps in pakistan. so we would like the pakistanis to be not two-faced, but one-faced. we'd like them to shut down their assistance to the taliban. we'd like hem to shut down the camps -- them to shut down the camps that are used to support terrorists. but the pakistani government is both unwilling and unable to do that. the pakistani civilian authorities are weak, and when we press them to do the things we want them to do, they say, you know, we don't have the

power to do that. and if we try to do that, our government will collapse, and they may well be right. and if we were to say to them, okay, we'll go in and do it, they say, well, then you'll make an enemy of pakistan, and pakistan to make things even more complicated is a nuclear-armed state. so what we do is keep paying them, keep nagging them and hope that things will improve without any particular reason to believe that they will. >> oh, what a hopeful note. yes, ma'am. right here. [laughter] and i agree with every word of it, unfortunately. >> hi. my name is talia haggerty, i'm a student here. the argument has been made that our presence in the middle east is what creates the radicalism and the extremism that you were referring to, but you said that protecting the world's oil sources is up to us. can you be more specific about what we need to be doing there and comment on if that argument has any validity? >> well, the american presence

in the middle east, especially the military presence, undoubtedly offends some of the people living in those countries. although it's also true that the place where that presence is largest, namely iraq, is a place where on the one hand our presence is resented, but on the other a majority of iraqis -- if you believe the polls -- don't want us to leave just yet. they want us to go eventually, but not now. so so in iraq at least the attitude toward the american presence is ambivalent. but from an american point of view i think we have an interest in minimizing our physical presence in that part of the world, and yet we do have the responsibility for insuring the free flow of oil. so that creates a dilemma for us, and what we are trying to do is walk that tight rope minimizing our actual presence while doing what we think is necessary, mainly with naval forces, to assure that the world

can depend on the flow of oil from that part of the world where as it happens two-thirds of the world's readily accessible, proven reserves of oil are located. now, let me add one other point here and that is if iran gets nuclear weapons, our task is going to become even harder. and according to some analyses, that will require us to have a much larger troop presence in that region than we have now, and that is yet another reason for us to do everything we can to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. but as with pakistan, this is a problem, alas, with no easy answers, probably with no good answers. >> let me throw in a couple here. to give a small bright light on the stories we're telling tonight, you point out that if there is a retraction of america's position in the world, there's at least one possible

benefit and that is we might make fewer errors. and you name two big ones, iraq war and the expansion of nato into, right up to the borders of russia. on the last one, why has that been such a problem? you go, you say that we may have created an alienation with russia that will last for years. they, obviously, had a much more dangerous view of nato than we do or than europeans do. >> well, nato expansion was ill-advised in the 1990s because there was no particular reason to do it, and the reasons that the american government gave at that time to promote democracy in the countries that were being taken into nato were purely hypocritical. on the one hand, the countries that joined were solid democracies, and on the other hand if nato were really a democracy-promoting instrument as it isn't, then we had an enormous stake in bringing into

nato the one country where democracy was most in jeopardy, namely russia. but the administration at the time, the clinton administration, made it clear that russia would never be invited to join. now, nato does not pose a military threat to russia. but it is, it is a way of excluding russia from europe. it's a way of making europe, making russia a second class citizen in european security affairs. and those of us who opposed the expansion of nato in the mid 1990s predicted -- and it wasn't just me, it was virtually all people with real expertise in russia including the late george cannon -- we feared that at a delicate time in russia's political evolution this would turn the russian political class against the united states and, indeed, that is what has happened. the russian political elite is reflexively anti-american, and that, alas, is not just true of the russian political elite,

it's true of the russian people. putin spouts anti-american rhetoric regularly, and one reason i believe he does that is that it's popular. it plays well in russia. and the unpopularity of the united states, i believe, goes back to the ill-advised decision to expand natoment now -- nato. now, when people ask me what should we do about it, my response is it's both too late and too early to do anything about it. i think at the end of the day russia probably should be admitted to nato, but we cannot admit to nato the russia of today, a rather aggressive atock rassi, an aggressive, bullying autocracy run by a group of people who are in power mainly to steal the oil revenues. so we have to hope for the political evolution of russia that will make it once again what it was at the 1990s, a fit partner for the united states and the west with.

but to go back to your original point, we made that mistake out of overconfidence. we made that mistake because we were so powerful, we could afford to do anything. well, we're not going to have that mindset in the years going forward -- >> haven't we already begun to make some modifications because of this? i mean, for example, we won't maybe officially admit to it, but ukraine and georgia are not about to be let into nato anytime soon. >> that, that is certainly true, but that is yet another ill consequence of the decision to expand nato. because once the decision was made, then -- and the administration said we will admit any country that wishes to join. well, georgia certainly wishes to join, and yet we are not going to include it because it's too dangerous, because it's too close to russia, too far from the united states and has already fought a controversial war with russia. those of us who oppose nato expansion in the 1990s predicted that this point would come when we would

unintentionally and artificially redivide europe. we have no interest in a divided europe where some countries are in our alliance and some countries are outside, we want a united europe. and as i say, i think we can eventually get there, i hope we can eventually get there, but that will require an internal change in russia. meanwhile, we have to hope both for a positive evolution of the russian political system toward a more democratic regime and, i'm sorry to say, a continuingly weak russia. >> weak big countries can be a problem themselves just because they're weak. that's in the case of russia, it could lash out in one or another direction because it is a declining power both in population and economic activity and security capabilities, the rest of it. the other one is china which is exactly the opposite, a rising power to go back to the defense budget which has been mentioned.

china has a very sustained modernization of its military campaign underway, and the creation for the first time since about the 15th century of a blue collar navy. if there were -- neither china, nor the united states is looking for a major conflict. that, i think, we could stipulate. but there is taiwan sitting there, there is tibet, there are other flash points for a major conflict between these two states. if we have blue collar navies suspiciously looking at each other across the china sea, i tend to get worried. are you worried? >> yes. >> and how much of a problem is the military campaign of china? >> i think you put your finger on what is, perhaps, the greatest danger we face from russia and china. in writing the chapter on russia and china in the frugal superpower, i came to the somewhat surprising conclusion -- i say surprising because it surprised me when i came to it -- that, in fact, we

may have more to fear from a weak and unsuccessful china and a weak and unsuccessful russia than from strength in either country. the legitimacy, the stability of both governments depends upon two things. one is economic progress, and both have done very well over the last decade. russia really only because of the rise in energy prices. and second, the second basis of legitimacy is nationalism. the regimes claim that it is defending the national interests against countries that would impinge on it. three guesses as to which country they often have in mind. it has a red, white and blue flag. well, if those countries, if be russia and china do poorly economically, if economic growth stops or even reverses, then these two regimes neither of which has democratic legitimacy, neither of which has been freely elected will revert to its other

basis for legitimacy and popularity,s that is nationalism. and each of them might calculate that in order to remain p popular it has to whip up nationalist enthusiasm, and that means finding a foreign enemy. and we are the logical candidate. or if we're not the logical candidate, the logical candidate for nationalist, a nationalist outreach, a nationalist initiative on the part of china and russia would be a country that would look to us for protection. taiwan and east asia, maybe ukraine in europe. so an unsuccessful russia and china especially economically might be a greater threat to the stability of europe and east asia and be, therefore, a greater problem for the united states than if these countries continue to be economically successful. >> the only thing i would add to that, michael, is china at the moment is being quite successful

in many respects, and nationalism is still on the rise ferociously. when you go there, you can just sense it in the air. and every time there is a even minor infraction between china and the united states, you see it balloon up. in fact, every once in a while you read stories about the chinese leadership being worried itself at what it's set off. >> well, if nationalism is powerful now in china when the government is not encouraging it -- >> right. >> -- imagine how much more powerful it might be if government in it political desperation decides that it own salvation lies in fanning the flames? it could be even worse. >> not all threats are military or security, to state the obvious. some are economic and some are values. and one phenomena we have going on in the world right now is if not a threat, it certainly is a challenge both to us economically and to us in terms of value, and that is the rise

of state capitalism. by that i mean capitalism in which the government plays a dominant role in where the economy goes, who gets what and so on. and it's linked to almost always with one-party political system that allows for a certain kind of efficiency. the most obvious example be is china. how concerned are you that state capitalism in, with its political linkage as well is a real threat to the sail about of the democracy in market economics elsewhere? >> well, we know that you can have capitalism without democracy. >> yes. >> and in my last book, "democracy's good name," that i had the privilege of discussing with you, i explore the relationship between the two. so the fact that china is capitalist and economically successful without being democratic is nothing new.

and i would l note that state capitalism is, after all, a form of capitalism. it just involves a larger role for the state. it's on one part of a spectrum which goes all the way to the united states where the role of the state is much less important, but they are still part of the same family of economic systems. so that's, that's one point. the second point i would make is that china has done very well with its state capitalist model, but we can't be sure, and the chinese cannot be sure that it will continue to do well. in fact, many students of the chinese economy believe that in order to sustain p the very -- sustain the very high rate of economic growth that the chinese have achieved for the last three decades, they're going to have to modify their system. they're going to have to have less government intrusion. that state capitalism that they have is going to have to have more capitalism and be less of the state. so it's not clear going forward

that this model will work so well for the chinese. that, of course; only the future can tell us. >> do you see any signs yet that china -- it may be aware of it intellectually but certainly not in action -- is becoming more aware of the need to change its political system to some degree? >> there is an awful lot of discussion in china about changes in the political system. i've been surprised at how wide the latitude of permitted discussion is. in fact, as far as i can see there's really only one taboo subject in chinese political discussion, and that is the supreme role of the communist party. that you're not allowed to challenge. and that is a huge exception. no doubt about it. because as long as the communist party monopolizes power, you're not going to have real democracy in china. nonetheless, the chinese political discussion does include permitted discussion about free speech, about elections, about federalism,

about checks and balances. so i think the chinese have come a long way. there is still this huge hurdle that they have not gotten over and may not get over anytime soon. but i don't think it's true to say that political discussion in china is frozen. >> not anymore. on one of my recent trips i visited a couple of think tanks that i've been to a number of times before, and the directer said when i showed up this time almost casually, just said, look, we can talk about anything you want except tibet and taiwan, okay? [laughter] and he didn't look at the ceiling at the mics this time. but one phenomena i've noticed, in the '70s when i was a reporter and used to go to the soviet union from time to time, i was struck by the fact that they had reached the point where the police borrow, the ruling central government and political mechanism felt it could no longer know enough about what was going on around the country

unless it unleashed the press. but there was one really tough rule that was down. it wasn't written anywhere, but everybody understood it which was you can blame the mayor of petersburg for the fact that the bread is steal. do not -- stale. do not connect it in any way to the kremlin. in other words, respondent was cut off at the provincial level. i notice some of the same thing going on in the china. if yo i go to some of -- you go to some of the provinces, you'll find tough reporting, but it doesn't involve way -- beijing. >> there is a worry that dictators throughout history and especially in the 20th century have had which can be summed up by the phrase, give them an inch, and they'll take a mile. [laughter] >> right. >> can and that tends to happen, and it did happen in the soviet union. gorbachev opened up the political system and was astonished at the avalanche of criticism that he received. now, the chinese leaders are

mindful of the soviet example. they do not want to go down that path. but they seem to be edging toward that path. so they may, ultimately, meet the same fate. >> yeah. recently they've begun to ease up somewhat on the labor force which is a recognition, i think, of the fact as labor gets somewhat more organized and gets richer itself, it cannot be be treated quite as casually as it's been in the past. >> there were strikes in china in foreign-owned factories. the workers demanded higher wages, and they got them. >> and they got them. we're about ready to close out, but we've got time for one or two more questions. yes, michael? >> michael oppenheimer. you've spoken about the inevitable retrenchment in the american engagement in the world. not due to intent, but to just the fiscal limitations. but you've also acknowledged that the threats don't

conveniently go away in that world. in fact, in some respects they get worse. so you've set up this tension for us. what's that world look like in 15 years when we have retrenched, we're spending less in the military, we have less physical presence, presumably, in the world, our security commitments are less reliable, the world has become more dangerous? but the world hasn't left us alone. we're still a target, presumably n that system. in that system. how do we respond in 15 years or so to the inevitable threats and sort of the tug on american engagement that hi to haveically we've -- historically we've almost always responded to? >> we are going to have to set priorities, and that will mean not doing some of the things that we've done in the past. there's a lot of interest in sending forces to sudan to rescue the beleaguered peoples of sudan. maybe if this were the early

1990s, we would do it. but we're not going to do it now. we might have done more in haiti after the earthquake 20 years ago than we're doing now. we will have to make choices, and we will not do some things that we would like to do and that if we did them would make the world a better place. >> you do say when it's all done, that it is going to be a more dangerous and disorderly world with. and then you have one comment that i, that really echoes with me to allies or people who don't even want to have to consider ourselves allies but discovered how important we were. and that is that the world is going to learn that they may have been uncomfortable with an america that was too powerful. they're going to be even more uncomfortable with an america which is too unpowerful. >> if you didn't like an america that was too strong, wait until you see an america that's too weak. it'll be even worse.

>> michael, thank you very much. it's a terrific session. [applause] over here we have -- >> for more on michael mandelbaum and to read his recent essays, visit foreignaffairs.com and search his name. >> brad meltzer, why an nonfiction? >> well, the truth was, is it's for my son, and eight years ago onfo the night my son was born i said, i'm going to write a booki that lasts his whole life. and ib was coming back from the hospital, and at that great moment when you t can dreamo anything for your child, yourin child can be anything. can be the president, can be an nice person, can be a generous person. and with all that idealism, i said, i'm going to write a booke that's going to last his whole book. i came home and started writingo rules for him to live by. yeah, there you go, pictures of it.n i said, one, you'll love god. i said, two, be nice to the fat kid in class. you know, things i just thoughti were important for him to know,

but the truth was i knew nothing about being a father. i knew nothing. so a friend of mine then told me this amazing story about the wright brothers. and every time the wright brothers would go out to fly their plane, they'd bring enough materials for multiple crashesbi which means every time they wen out, they knew they would fail. they would crash and rebuild, and that's why they took off. i said, i love that story. i want my son to hear that story, my daughter, i want them to know that if they have a dream and they work hard, theyf can do anything in this worldh with. and i said that's the book i'm going to write, not a book full of rules, but a book full of heros. 50 heros from rosa parks to mr. rogers to jim henson. >> who is barbara johns? >> barbara johns is a teenager, and i wanted the book to haveh famous people. yes, it has someone like martint luther king jr. or abraham lincoln, but i wanted it to have regular people., and barbara johns was a high

school student, almost an unwitting civil rights activist. barbara johns at a time, in basically saw a school bus with ride by her, and her schood bus was broken down and,b basically, saw another schoolo bus drive by that was full of the white kids that were going to a good school.s her school was a horrible school, and she organized a walkout. she said, you know what? we're going to protest it. we're going to say, forget abouo it. shet is one of the unknown people, and her test case as they walked out was one to have the cases used in this brown v.e board of education. and where did it come from?o a teenager.e a teenager is one of the people who's with responsible for it. so the book is filled with --o there's a book named frank, and frank is a police officer. and he found out about a boy with leukemia who also wanted to be a police officer, so he had a little motorcycle course made for the boy, a uniform made for the boy, and frank finds out that the boy goes into a coma.

so this police officer goes to the boy's hospital room, and he says to the boy, he puts -- as the boy's unconscious, he says to the boy, i want to put little motorcycle wings on him. so he pins little motorcycle. wings on the boy's chest at which point -- true story -- thu boy wakes up out of his coma and smiles. the boy eventually goes backy into the coma, eventually dies.m but on the way home from the funeral, frank looks at his buddy and says, you know? we made that kid really happyd for just one day. we should do that for other kids. and that's how the make-a-wish foundation is born. i said, i never knew that story, i want my son to know that story. that's what heros for my son is really about, sharing dreams anc changing the entire world. >> we've only got a few minutes with our author, brad meltzer, and we'd like to hear who your heros are. 202-585-3885 in the east and central time zones, 585-3886 for those of you in the mountain and

pacific. go ahead and start calling in the now. who is on the cover here? >> you know, it's funny,ou everyone thinks it's my son. i have two sons. my publisher wanted me to picky between my kids. i'm not that stupid. you can't pick between your boys. so that's actually my very goodn friends rusty and elizabeth, it's their son.d we kept i it a family affair. the last hero in the book is my mother. h and my mom died two years ago. from breast cancer -- >> carrie meltzer.di >> carrie meltzer. and before she died, mye publisher was shutting down, and i didn't know if anyone wouldg take over my contract, i wasdi terrified that these were my last moments of watching my career.c and i called my mom, and i said, mom, i'm so nervous about this. and she said to me, i'd love yo if you were a garbage man.we she wasn't taking a crack, but she was saying i don't care what youge are, i love i yo. and to this day i say those words to myself, just soaking in her strength.r but for anyone out there, theh

best hero in the book, they'reh on the last two beige pages because they're blank, and theyr say your hero's photo here and your hero's story here. and i promise you you take this book, you give it this holidayg season or on a birthday and you put their picture in there and you write one sentence about your father, your grandfather,fh about what they mean to you, that will be the most beautiful page in the book. i wanted to say thank you for being my hero.o >> you've included two contemporary u.s. presidents inu this book. who are they? >> yeah. you know, the book has no politics, so nobody's in it for political reasons. i included george h.w. bush and barack obama. again, not for political reasons.u bush is in there because of this amazing story of when he was in flying, he was one of thes youngest pilots in world war ii, and there's the picture of him. as his plane was going down, he had two men on the plane withas him.e as the plane crashes and is crashing into the ocean, he maneuvers the plane so they can get out before he can and uses.

that moment of selflessness. he lets them out first, he jumps out and is crashing this ocean. he's vomiting, he's crying, he's believing -- he's terrified. when i saw him and i heard thisg story, he told me he still thinks of these guys all the time. and here's the guy who became the president of the united states and never told anyoneve that story, never ran for it,or never self-promoting. i want my son to have that humility. and barack obama's in the book, again, not because of anybar political reason.f no one knows where he's going to be in the end, but what heat represents whatever yourr politics are is one of the greatestne ideals in the all of america and that is that anyone can be president.pre i want my son to know thatw anyone can be president, i want to know anyone can be president.k so they were both put in for nonpolitical reasons. >> how did you get to know george h.w. bush? >> i write thrillers andsh? mysteries for a living, and one day i got a letter from a real person who said i like your books a lot, and it was a fan

letter, but it was written by george h.w. bush. and i don't care what your politics are, you're the former president and you write me ar letter, i'll send you a free book. so he'so helped me with research for a lot of the novels. >> brad meltzer is our guest, first call from maryland. goir ahead, please.e >> caller: yes, brad. i wanted to thank you for i creating such a wonderful book. i think it's extremely important that people really understand that, you know, heros are not just the people that are famousa but i like that you put inare people who are not famous and a kid would have an opportunity -r not only your son, but anyone who's giving this gift to their family -- to let them know thatw ordinary people not only can do extraordinary things, but also be truly extraordinary by burr suing their goals -- pursuingu their goals and dreams and going after it and trying to make a difference.er so i want to thank you for this, for giving me something to share with my family.

>> guest: thank you. >> host: now, who's your hero? >> caller: my hero would be my a mother. she was a african-american froma the south, had a ninth gradeh education, raised my brother ani i. i have my master's degree, and my brother works on wall street. >> guest: you're exactly right. you're -- >> host: all right.a >> guest: and that's exactly right. you know, the thing is that weg all know and say, oh, our heros are george washington, martinge luther king jr. and abraham lincoln or eleanor roosevelt,an lucille ball, but the real heros are the ones we live with every day.y and that is vital. you want to talk about the herol who i spent my time with is my son. my old oest son, jonas, i wrote the book for him. this is a moment i've waitedo eight years for, right?ed it's called heros for my son, and this is it, i'm presenting it to him, and he doesn't care about eleanor roosevelt. he doesn't care about rosa parks. he goes looking for the athletes in the book.r

and he's flipping through, and he finds a picture of robertohe yes clementi. i tell my son it means nothing to me being a famous athlete. it doesn't make you a betterhlet person, doesn't make you nicer. i say to him, you know what selling a lot of books means? nothing.s a it doesn't make me smarter,e nicer, anything. it means people buy the book.es' so he's reading about roberto, and he's in the book not becausp he played baseball, in there. because there was an earthquake in nicaragua. and roberto sent three planeloads of food and medicine over to the victims. all three planeloads werends stolen, they were confiscated.fo so he sent a fourth, and he said i'm going to get on the plane ws myself and make sure it getss there.er and he gets on the plane, ando the plane crashes in the ocean killing everyone onboard. he's not a hero because he diedd he's a hero because of why hed got onboard.

and my son's reading this, and i'm waiting for him to be so inspired, but he looks up at me and he says, dad, this is sad. and i realize in that moment i've broken his heart for the first time. so the next day i think, oh, my gosh, the book has backfired in' my face, i don't put the book out for him to read. he comes racing into the room on his own and grabs the book byow himself and says, dad, who are we reading tonight?d i said, what about roberto? is he said, i like him. and i said, why?r he said, because i gave his life to save those people. it's for a way to share. you know, we all complain aboute there's no good heros in thewe world, we focus on athletes,h celebrities. we have a say in the who ourt kids emulate, and i wanted this to be my say. >> host: florida, you've got about 15 seconds. go ahead, hi. >> caller: thank you very much. my hero is a man named fry. this was a man from an old white protestant family who went to marseilles and saved, basically,

the intellectual class of europe. from the nazis. so many using so many ruses to get pass ports and visas for them to quote out of france -- get out of france and nazi-occupied france into spainn and eventually to the united states and save them and savev their bodies of intellectual work for the western world. that is a hero. >> host: thanke you. thank you, caller.. >> guest: great hero. in fact, we put in the book in that list that you have, my favorite person is -- i had anne frank in the book originally. mete geese is actually the woman who saved and hid anne frank's family from the nazis.d here the nazis come rushing in, and they raid her house. and at that moment she can say, oh, i didn't know they were up there and could apologize.

she never apologizes, and what she instead does is she tries to bribe the nazis, don't take these people away.ese so the nazis tear up her place, they go rummaging through herr stuff.ce, the one thing they discard ande forget about is thisy one red book, anne frank's diary.r the woman that history doesn'ti really know about -- she actually died last year --does basically, she's the one who saves the diary, she preserved it, and when ott to frank came back and said my daughter's dead, she never read the book. she kept it for anne frank. she handed it to the father ands said this is your daughter's legacy to you.t and that's the reason we haven anne frank's diary.m >> host: very quickly, brad meltzer, how much research, political research goes into your thrillers? >> guest: you know, listen, ica wish we didn't live in a world where we get our jokes and where we don't get our news from comedians anddo we just get jok, but i realize over the years people like to get the real facts out of my books.

and i take that seriously.o i take that trust seriously. t and so it takes me at least six months before i can even start writing a thriller.c if i'm going to show you the secret tunnels below the white house, i'm going to find out where they are. and i can make up whatever icret want, but i like getting it right. >> host: how many books have yog sold? >> guest: of this one?ow at least ten copies to my family.? [laughter] the publishers always say, oh, we have x million copies in print. the only ones that matter are. the ones to my family. m my mom, god bless her, i'll tell you this story. i went to borders' headquarters a couple years back, and theye said to me guess where yours books sell more than anywhere else?o i said, i don't know, new york city. eight million new yorkers in one place. no. i said, washington, d.c.? i write thrillers about washington. no.e the number one place where myshi book sold was the boca ratonne florida borders one mile fromo the furniture store where my mother used to work which means my mother single handedly beat

eight million new yorkers.y >> host: brad meltzer's been our guest.: here is his nonfiction book, "heros for my son." thank you, sir, we appreciate your time. >> guest: thank you very much. >> here are the top ten best-selling conservative books from human events.com.

>> watch several of these programs online, go to booktv.org and enter the author's name or book title in the search bar located in the upper left-hand corner. >> every weekend booktv brings you 48 hours of history, biography and public affairs. here's a portion of one of our programs. >> why when we hear the president and others talking about the fact that we must make government efficient for the people, did our founding fathers actually design the government to be inefficient? ask yourself that question. because this is a model for inef