is producing this that i am bringing it. people how to become much more aware of the information their brain and and how it's produced. was it produced to inform or propagandize? help them understand or to record them to a costa back this is what this book is designed to do, help them use the process, the methodology of verification that treat seekers used to create their own news package. >> blurred, how to know what is true. >> we take you live now to the floor of the u.s. senate meeting in a rare sunday session to continue debate on the start arms reduction treaty with russia.

senators will vote at 3:00 eastern on an amendment to the treaty. the treaty supporters are trying to defeat all amendments because any changes to send it back into negotiations with russia. senators will also vote today on federal judicial nominations for districts in new york state and mississippi. you're watching live coverage of the senate live here on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the chaplain dr. barry black will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. for unto us. a child is born. unto us. a son is given. and the government shall be upon his shoulders. and his name shall be called.

wonderful counselor. the mighty god,. the everlasting father,. the prince of peace. king of kings,. we thank you. for this season. that reminds us of. your love for our world. we confess. that we sometimes. rush into your presence. breathless with our needs. calm our spirits, turn our thoughts to your majesty. help the members of this body today. to see your purposes more clearly. give them a passionate commitment. to keep your law,

until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream. we pray in your merciful name. amen. the presiding officer: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. the presiding officer: the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., december 19, 2010. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate,

i hereby appoint the honorable michael bennet, a senator from the state of colorado, to perfom the duties of the chair. signed: daniel k. inouye, president pro tempore. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: i'm meeting and having conversation with the republican leader to see if we can come to an agreement on the c.r. there are a few issues but nothing that we shouldn't be able to work through. following any leader remarks, the senate will resume executive session to resume consideration of the new start treaty. we have three hours of debate with respect to the risch amendment, the time divided, one hour under the control of senator kerry or his designee, two hours under the control of senator risch or his designee. no amendments in order to this amendment. at approximately 3:00 p.m. today, the senate will proceed to a series of three roll call votes. the risch amendment will be voted on. that's amendment number 4839. confirmation of a circuit court judge for the second circuit,

raymond j.laher, and confirmation of a district judge in mississippi, carlton refuses. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president. i ask that further proceedings of the quorum call be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that we divide the time appropriately among the three hours. i would use perhaps ten minutes at this moment in time. i apologize. we need to report. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the following treaty which the clerk will report. the clerk: treaty, calendar

number 7. treaty with russia on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask that the time be divided as follows. i ask unanimous consent that i be permitted to proceed for ten minutes, reserve the balance of our time. the senator from idaho will control the time of the republicans. they will proceed to use up all but ten minutes of their time. i will come back and respond, at which point they would have ten minutes held at the back end. is that -- the presiding officer: is there objection? mr. risch: that's agreeable, mr. president. the presiding officer: without objection, so ordered. mr. kerry: mr. president, let me begin very quickly. first of all, i want to say i thank the senator from idaho for his amendment, which -- and i appreciate the thought that he

has put into the consideration of this treaty and this role on the foreign relations committee and the work he has done over the four and this is now the fifth day of our consideration of this treaty on the floor of the senate. the amendment that the senate proposes to put into the treaty is an amendment to the preamble. so we have the same problem that we had yesterday, i just say that up front, the substance of what he is trying to put forward, we have a great agreement with in terms of the need to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. we'll say more about that afterwards. if the senator were willing to, i think we can find a way to incorporate into the resolution ratification a genuine, meaningful, adequate statement with respect to this linkage between tactical nuclear weapons and overall strategic

understanding. i'd like to do that, but i know the senator wants to proceed with this amendment first. i just want him to have that understanding that we're prepared to say something important and i think substantive about tactical nuclear weapons here. now, i'd like to just use a couple of minutes, if i may, to respond to a tum of comments -- a couple of comments made this morning by the minority leader on one of the morning television shows. first of all, obviously, i regret that he will not support the treaty itself, but we had an understanding that was probably going to be the case. it's not a surprise. but i find it disappointing given that the entire republican foreign policy national security experienced statesmen group that are sort of emeritus for our nation today. former secretary of state larry eagleburger, former secretary of

state colin powell, former secretary of state jim baker. i mean, you run the list of all of the formers secretaries of state on the republican side, former secretary of state condoleezza rice. they all support this treaty. the military supports this treaty. the leader of the strategic command, current and the past former seven support this treaty. the national intelligence treaty supports this treaty. i -- i really hope that in these waning days of this session, as we approach this holiday season, which is so focused on the concept of renewal and hope and peace, that we could find the ability in the united states senate to embrace in a bipartisan way the security interests of our country, but i want to address particularly the

notion about more time on this treaty. we are now in the fifth day of this treaty. let's debate today. even if we had a cloture filing tonight or something, you would still have two days more of debate before that ripens and you vote on it, after which you then have 30 hours of debate, providing that it would pass. so we're looking at the prospect of having more days of debate on this treaty, a simple, simple building block on top of the start i treaty, we are looking at having more days of debate on this treaty than the start i, start ii, moscow treaty all put together. so i think the united states senate -- which is appropriate -- has time to focus on this treaty. and i thought we had a good debate yesterday. the president said regardless of russia's actions, as long as i am president and as long as the congress provides the necessary

funding, the united states will continue to develop and deploy effective missile dwens to protect the united states. i -- i really would hope our colleagues would give credence to the secretary of defense, secretary of state, the military, the president of the united states, and to the budget , because the chairman of the appropriations committee informed me yesterday they have fully funded the modernization once again in the c.r., just as we did in the previous c.r., as a sign of good faith of the direction we're going in. so all i can say is we have bent over backwards to meet the concerns of our colleagues in a completely nonpolitical, a political, totally bipartisan, substantive way that meets the security concerns of the country. i hope we can find reciprocity with respect to that kind of action here in the united states senate. so i reserve the balance of my

time, and we will respond appropriately on the substance of this amendment at the appropriate claim. mr. risch: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from idaho. mr. risch: first i want to thank the chairman of the committee and the ranking member of the committee for the cooperation that we have had throughout this matter, and i -- as i said when i started my debate on this, i really believe everyone's working in good faith, in the best interests of the united states to attempt to develop and ratify a treaty that will be in the best interests of the united states. i was particularly encouraged this morning to hear the chairman of the committee indicate that he believes that the substance of what we're talking about here is an important issue, and i know he believes that. i know that the intelligence community believes it. i know that a lot of other

parties that are involved with this believe that this is a very important issue. and we're going to talk about why this is an attorney issue as we go forward. after all, when we're dealing with a subject like this, we're talking about the security, the people of the united states of america, it is not a partisan issue, it is not a win or a loss for anyone. it is developing the best that we can possibly do to protect the american people. i am nonetheless disappointed by yesterday's vote regarding missile defense. i'm going to talk about that a little bit when i get into the substance of what we're talking about here, but missile defense, that issue, just like the issue i'm going to talk about, that is the strategic versus tactical weapons issue, is one that has been around for a long time. it's not new. it's something that -- a couple

of issues that were around 40 years ago when the people who originally brought us to the table with the russians did the work that they did. as i said before, those people were real heroes. those people were patriots and did a great job of getting uts to the table with the russians at a time when that issue was probably the most important issue facing the world. a lot of us grew up in an era where we remember having air raid drills. i remember going to friends' houses who actually had shelters in their home so that if indeed there was a nuclear war, that they could take shelter in their home. they had it stocked and what have you. it's hard to believe that was the situation 40 years ago, but it was. most people today don't have a recollection of what a serious issue that was.

but those people were real patriots who brought us to the table on this. that was 40 years ago. as i said before, the world has changed greatly in 40 years. unfortunately, the dialogue regarding strategic missiles has not dramatically changed in the last 40 years. we have been focused almost exclusively on numbers. to the great credit of those originally involved and to the great credit of the ranking member, senator lugar, who is here with me today, those numbers have been dramatically reduced. we started out with each side having over 6,000 weapons that could be launched on the other side, and we have continuously ratcheted that back to right now under this treaty we will ratchet back to 1,550.

i don't want to in any way denigrate the fact that we have greatly reduced the number of those strategic weapons on each side. having said that, one has to wonder really what is the difference between 6,000 and 1,550. if either party pushes the button at 6,000 or at 1,550, the world is over as we know it. although it's important to talk about numbers, i think that in today's world, because of changing conditions, we really should be as much focused on a couple of other -- well, at least two other issues, one being the missile defense which we talked about at great length yesterday. and the other is the relationship between strategic and tactical weapons. frankly, we have been pacifying the russians regarding missile

defense and regarding strategic versus tactical weapons in order to get these treaties. now, i understand when you're doing treaty work, when you're negotiating these kinds of things, it has to be a give-and-take proposition. having said that, these two issues have really moved to the forefront and have really moved to importance compared to simply the bear number of weapons and the -- the bare number of weapons and the verification process. i don't want to denigrate the verification process that is important. well, today russia is not really the threat to us when it comes to nuclear issues but it was 40 years ago. indeed there was no other threat to us other than russia 40 years ago.

today most everyone agrees that the likelihood of russia pushing the button and us pushing the button and destroying each other is very, very unlikely. we have a 40-year history where we've been through good times and bad times and neither party, with the exception of the cuban missile crisis, neither one have really come close to or even remotely close to or even threaten to push the button and start a nuclear war. in my judgment, and i think the judgment of people who deal with this regularly, russia is not really the nuclear threat that it was 40 years ago. but there are threats out there that indeed are as bad or really worse than what the russian threat was 40 years ago. how many people believe that the rogue countries -- north korea and iran -- would not threaten

us at the very at least threaten us to push the button if they indeed had the ability to immediately push the button? we all know, without getting into the intelligence details which of course i can't do but has been reported in the press, both of those countries are working feverishly to get themselves in the position where they can have a nuclear weapon mounted, poised and ready to go so that they can, when they sit down at the table with us, look us in the eye and say, look, we're going to push the button if you don't -- fill in the blank. our media today mocks really and jokes about ahmadinejad and kim jong-il as being dysfunctional people i think is the kindest way of putting it, but they won't be joking about it if they

put themselves in the position where they are able to threaten us with pushing the button or pulling the trigger on us with a nuclear attack. we really need to be focusing on, as i said, the other aspects of this, starting with missile defense, because if we sit across the table from kim jong-il or his representatives, or ahmadinejad, and the best we have to offer is a retaliatory strike, that really isn't nearly as effective as having an umbrella over the top of us that can knock an errant missile out of the sky. we need a robust missile defense system. and i believe, as we said earlier, that this treaty chills that. because no matter what you say, if you read the independent statements that were made by the parties, the russians have said that if we go forward with

improving either quantitatively or qualitatively our missile defense system, this is grounds for withdrawing from this treaty. well, i don't think we should have a treaty in place that in any way chills the thinking that we have about what we do to protect the american people with a robust missile defense system that could knock out of the sky an attack by either north korea or by iran or even an accidental loss -- an accidental launch by the russians, which although remote, is a possibility. well, today let's talk about something that we can agree on, and that is the importance of tactical weapons in this discussion. as the distinguished chairman mentioned in his opening statement, the importance of the tactical weapons issue is a

matter which we should be concerned about and which we should talk about. and i'm delighted to hear his offer that assuming this goes by the by which i suppose it will in the vote, that we can talk about getting something into the ratification document as opposed to into the treaty. the first thing, for those that aren't on daily speaking terms with this issue, the difference between strategic weapons and tactical weapons is very simple. it's distance. a strategic weapon can reach out across the continents and reach your enemy on the other side of the ocean. a tactical weapon is an in theater weapon. it's a short-range weapon that can be used on the battlefield. and those are the differences between the two. it's a huge difference in a lot of different ways. although we all agree that it is important -- an important issue,

and we all talk about it, nothing is done about it. indeed, according to the statements that have been made, before we ever sat down at the table with the russians on this issue, it would agreed that we would do nothing about this issue. i would hope and i would urge that the president of the united states, the state department and all those others involved will pursue this issue aggressively and quickly once we have this treaty behind us one way or the other. what i want to do here is i want to amend a preamble to the treaty that once and for all lays this issue on the table and tells the russians that this is an important issue and that we are no longer going to look the other way and ignore this issue. they have the advantage on us on this issue. everyone agrees to that. but this is what i want to put into the preamble, and it's not

extensive. it is in the preamble. it's not in the treaty. i've heard the chairman of the committee say over and over again that the preamble doesn't mean anything. it means very little. and with all due respect, i disagree with that. i would compare it to the preamble of the constitution of the united states. it means a lot and is frequently quoted in court cases on constitutional issues. this is what i want to put into the preamble. quote -- "acknowledging there is an interrelationship between nonstrategic and strategic offensive arms, that as the number of strategic offensive arms is reduced, as this treaty does, this relationship becomes more pronounced and requires an even greater need for transparency and accountability and the disparity between the parties' arsenals could undermine predictability and stability." now that is a factual statement

that, on our side virtually everyone agrees to. obviously the russians, i suspect, probably agree to that but don't want to talk about it. the problem in its simplest terms is we are greatly, greatly outgunned by the russians at this time on the tactical front. right now on the strategic front -- and i don't want to -- again, i don't want to say anything that isn't reported in the press. but what publicly is talked about and disclosed is that we have approximately 2,100 strategic weapons. the russians have approximately 1,100 strategic weapons. and i'll -- from an intelligence standpoint i'm not confirming those numbers, but that's what is reported in the press, assuming that those numbers are

accurate or modestly accurate. we obviously are not in parity. we're in a little better shape than the russians are from a strategic standpoint. but when you consider the fact that neither we nor the russians believe we will ever reach into our strategic stockpile to use, it doesn't make a lot of difference, the fact that we have 1,000 more than they do. the fact is is it really a difference if either one pulse the -- pulls the trigger? probably not that much of a difference. on the tactical side, however, that is a very different ball game. as we all know, we have defense treaties. obviously the biggest one is nato. but we have defense partnerships with many countries around the world. and under our nuclear defense umbrella, many, many countries take refuge. it is here that the tactical weapons become important.

and these, these tactical weapons, as i said, the russians have a 10-1 advantage over us on -- and just as importantly, again, without getting into intelligence details, they have a vast array of weapons, not only delivery systems but the weapons themselves which, again, outgun us and is a serious problem. and, thirdly and just as importantly, they continue cranking out every day new designs, new technology, new development and new production of these tactical weapons, continuing to add to the disparity between us and the russians. well, this disparity in our nuclear posture is, i think,

very well demonstrated by the report that congress commissioned. called "america's strategic posture." it is in a book -- it is published in a book and is commonly known as the perry schlesinger report. and i'm going to refer to that just briefly because i think probably this, as much as anything, is what people use as a guide to describe where we are as far as our posture on this technical -- on this tactical weapons issue. again, that's what i'm focusing on with this particular amendment. first of all, let me say that the russians are relying on more tactical nuclear weapons. the commission report at page 12 explains that -- and i quote -- "as part of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces, russia's

military leaders are putting more emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear forces, what they call nsnf. particularly weapons intended for tactical use on the battlefield. russia no longer sees itself as capable of defending its vast territory and its nearby interests with conventional forces. so in very short order, they have explained why are the russians doing this, why do they have us 10-1 on this part of the issue, and why do they continue to develop them. well, they don't have the money, they don't have the resources, and they don't have the ability because of the large territory that they have to defend with conventional forces, and so they reach for these tactical weapons that are smaller and more easily deployable. there's a description of the tactical nuclear threat in this document at page 13, which, again, i want to quote because i

think, again, it says it as concisely as it can be said. as the cold war ended -- this is a quote." as the cold war ended and as noted above, these nsnf, nonstrategic nuclear forces, short-range weapons, were reduced under the us businesses of the p.n.i.'s -- that's presidential nuclear initiatives -- and also the treaty on intermediate range nuclear forces of 1987. nonetheless, russia reportedly retains a very large number of such weapons. senior russian experts have reported that russia has 3,800 -- let me repeat that -- 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads, with a large additional number in reserve. some russian military experts have written about use of very low-yield nuclear scalpels to defeat nato forces. the combination of new warhead designs, the estimated

production capacity for new nuclear warheads and precision delivery systems such as the isekander short-range tactical ballistic missile -- known as the ss-26 in the west -- opened up new possibilities for russia to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts. that's at page 13. there is a lack of russian transparency on this particular issue. now, one of the things that this -- that this treaty does that we're talking about today -- and i think everyone concedes that this is one of the important aspects of this treaty -- is it gives us transparency with the russians, at least to some degree. one could argue the degree, but at least there is some transparency. not so with tactical weapons. this is what the commission said ." like china -- "russia, like

china, has not shown the transparency that its neighbors desire on such matters. it has repeatedly rebuffed u.s. proposals for nonstrategic nuclear forces transparency measures, and nato's request for information, and it is no longer in compliance with the -- with its p.n.i. commitments, presidential initiative commitments." so that describes the transparency problem on page 13 of this particular report. there is a need to have effective deterrence against russian tactical weapons. again, the report points this out." even as it works to engage russia and assure russia that it need not fear encirclement and containment, the united states needs to assure that deterrence will be effective whenever it is needed. it must also continue to concern itself with stability in its strategic military relationship with russia. it must continue to safeguard the interest of its allies as it

does so. their assurance that extended assurance remains credible and effective may require that the united states retain numbers of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense." again, this provides a description of the serious issue that tactical weapons puts on the table. well, there is a concern, a very substantial concern about the imbalance between strategic and tactical weapons. as i said, on tactical weapons, we're not only balanced, but we probably have an advantage of a thousand, but who cares if neither party really believes it's going to be used. so then you turn to the tactical weapons which are, obviously, very different. this is what the commission says -- quote -- "but that balance does not exist in nonstrategic nuclear forces where russia enjoys a sizable new mexico cal advantage. as noted above, it stores

thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the urals. the united states deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear-sharing agreements in nato." let me say that again." the united states deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in nato." precise numbers are classified but their total is only about 5% of the total -- only about 5% of the total at the height of the cold war. strict u.s.-russian ee qif lengths in the numbers is unnecessary, but the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some u.s. allies in central europe, and to this senator personally, if as reductions continue in the number of operations of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, this imbalance will become more apparent and

allies less assured. further, in this report, they say the imbalance favoring russia is worrisome, including for allies, and it will become more worrisome as the number of strategic weapons is decreased, which is what, of course, we're trying to do with this treaty. dealing with this imbalance is urgent and indeed some commissioners would give priority to this over taking further steps to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. unquote. obviously, for the reasons i said because nobody believes that we'll ever reach the strategic nuclear weapons to use. u.s. policy should seek reductions in russian tactical weapons, and i think everyone agrees on that, and that is precisely what i'm attempt to go do with this amendment -- attempting to do with this amendment to the preamble. the -- the strategic posture commission says u.s. policy should be guided by two principles. first, the united states should

seek substantial reductions in the large force of russian nonstrategic nuclear forces. second, no changes to the u.s. force posture should be made without comprehensive consultation with all u.s. allies and within nato as such. all allies, depending on the u.s.-nuclear umbrella should be ensured that a change in its forces do not apply a weakening of the u.s. extender, u.s. deterrence guarantees. they could perceive a weakening if the united states and nato does not maintain other features of the current extended nuclear deterrence arrangement than the day-to-day presence of u.s. nuclear bombs. some allies have made it clear to the commission that such consultations would play a positive role in renewing confidence in u.s. security assurances. finally, the commission, the

perry-schlesinger commission, endorsed capital reductions talks. the commission is prepared strongly to support negotiations with russia in order to proceed jointly to further reductions in our nuclear forces as part of a cooperative effort to stabilize relations, stop proliferation and promote predictability and transparency. a large russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons must be considered in this regard. well, obviously, everyone's concerned about this. i'm not the only one concerned about this. obviously, the commission isn't the only one concerned about this. members of this body are and have been for a long time concerned about this. my distinguished colleague from maine, senator collins, wrote to the secretary of state on december 3 of 2010, and she stated -- quote -- "the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly their vulnerability for theft

and misuse for nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers important now." senator collins focused on another aspect of this that we haven't really talked about that much, but certainly strategic weapons have very, very little opportunity. in fact, in the united states, no opportunity for access by terrorists. not so much on the other side, but clearly there is a great difference between tactical and strategic weapons, primarily because of the way that they are -- primarily because of the way that they are deploying. but senator collins said also -- quote -- "president obama's 2010 nuclear posture review echoes the concern of nuclear terrorism. the threat of nuclear war has become remote, but risk of nuclear attack has increased. today's most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear

terrorism. al qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. that probably summarizes as clearly as anything the discussion i had at the outset about the difference of 40 years ago versus today and the -- and underscores what in my judgment is so important about moving this dialogue forward instead of getting -- staying in the rut of where we were 40 years ago and focusing just on numbers. well, again, it's not just the republican side of the aisle. almost two decades ago, the sort treaty, another nuclear arms reduction treaty, was discussed here on the floor of the senate, and a number of my colleagues from the other side of the aisle raised this exact question regarding tactical weapons and also underscored how important

it was to take on this issue. and, again, even though we have advanced 40 years, nothing has happened, nothing has happened in the last ten years. and ten years ago, the distinguished members of this body underscored how important it was to take this issue on, and nothing has happened. then-senator biden said on july 9, 2002, in this room, "my question is if the impetus for this treaty was going down to 1,700 to 2,200, related to the bottom line of what our consensus in our government said we are going to need for our security and the rationale of the treaty was in part to avoid this kind of debate that took place over tactical nuclear weapons, then it sort of reflects that this is what the president thinks are the most important things to proceed on relative to nuclear weapons. does he think that dealing with the tactical nuclear weapons are not that relevant or that important now, or that things as they are relative to tactical

nuclear stockpiles are okay? talk to me about that. do you understand where i'm going?" well, i do, mr. vice president, because that's where i'm going today, but nothing's happened over the last decade. my distinguished colleague, senator dorgan, said in this room when we were talking about that treaty -- quote -- "and this treaty deals with only strategic nuclear weapons, not theater nuclear weapons. there are thousands and thousands of theater nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear weapons that go on the tips of artillery shots. that is not part of the agreement. it has nothing to do with this agreement." he was right then and he is right now as to this agreement. senator reed, senator reed from rhode island, stated -- quote - "the treaty does not specifically address the problem of tactical weapons or merve icbms. the number of russian tactical

nuclear weapons is believed to be between 8,000 and 15,000, while the united states has approximately 2,000. russian tactical nuclear weapons are subject to fewer safeguards and are more prone to theft and proliferation. these are the proverbial suitcase weapons often discussed in the press which are the ones that are most mobile, most difficult to trace and detect, and the treaty does not deal with these weapons at all." senator reed was right then on that treaty, and he's right on this treaty. senator conrad stated regarding that treaty -- quote -- "i was therefore very -- i was therefore disappoint thad a requirement for russian tactical warhead dismantlement and united states inspection rights were not part of the treaty of moscow." well, he was right, and his disappointment i share today on this, and i think everyone shares that disappointment, and that's what i'm trying to move

forward with this particular amendment. senator conrad went on to say -- quote -- "the disconnect between the ability of the united states to maintain current strategic force levels almost indefinitely and russia's inevitable strategic nuclear decline due to economic realities gave our side enormous leverage that i believe we should have used to win russian concessions on tactical nuclear arms. well, i am encouraged that the resolution of ratification before us includes a declaration on accurate accounting and security, it does not mention russian tactical nuclear reductions. i have prepared a corrective amendment and would welcome the support of the chairman and ranking member of the foreign relations committee." thank you, senator conrad. i expect him to come through the door any moment and join me as a cosponsor on this amendment. he had an amendment to the last treaty, that's exactly what i'm trying to do on this treaty. finally, senator feinstein in talking about that treaty said

"the treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons. as my colleagues know, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the number and location and secure storage of russian tactical nuclear weapons, smaller and more portable than strategic nuclear weapons, they are vulnerable to theft or sale to terrorist groups. yet, the treaty does not even mention that. this a glaring oversight in the dangers posed by tactical nuclear weapons especially now in the postseptember 11 world of global terrorism warrants the immediate attention and action by both russia and the united states. she also said "this treaty marks an important step forward in the relationship between the united states and russia and reduces the dangers proposed by strategic nuclear weapons. nevertheless, i am concerned that the treaty does not go far enough, and i believe its flaws must be addressed if we truly want to make the threat of nuclear war a thing of the past."

well, what's changed in the last ten years, indeed in the last four years when it comes to tactical weapons? not much. just as my colleague said ten years ago, we have -- we should have had in these negotiations tremendous leverage over the russians on this particular issue. we have 1,000-warhead advantage on them. they're already under the numbers. i'm still not clear what we got when we agreed the number would be 1,550 when they were already below it and we had to get down to 1,550. i'm not sure what we got from that but it seemed we should have gotten something in that regard, and that something had to do with tactical weapons. well, as i'm winding down here, let me correct one thing that is out there in the public domain, and that is the state department's web site.

the state department has a web site up that addresses this treaty and deals with many questions surrounding this treaty and answers for the public, for the media and for anyone who wants to go there and learn about this particular issue. one -- i want to focus on one particular aspect of that, and that is the part that deals with tactical weapons that i'm dealing with. the state department web site, i suppose it's under "frequently asked questions." the question -- quote -- "why doesn't the new start treaty cover tactical weapons?" that's a really, really good question. why doesn't the new start treaty cover tactical weapons? well, it goes on and states that, from the outset, as agreed by presidents obama and the president of russia, that the issue of tactical weapons would not be raised. i guess that begs the question

why wasn't it. nonetheless, the question still out there, why doesn't it address that? this is what the state -- they state here -- and i quote -- "deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until after a start successor agreement had been concluded was also the recommendation of the perry schlesinger congressional strategic posture commission. that's an knack rat statement, and you -- that's an inaccurate statement. you recall as i read from the perry schlesinger report that that's an inaccurate statement. some members from the perry solis skwrer commission -- from the perry schlesinger commission were disturbed by the fact that the web site said they recommended they put this off. in december 13, 2010, several members of the commission wrote to senator kerry and ranking member senator lugar and were protesting that particular

statement on the web site. and they said -- i'm going to just quote, i'm going to put the letter in the record but i'm going to quote just some small parts of this. the letter said "as members of the strategic posture commission, we write to provide our own reality check that this does not resemble the recommendation the commission made on russian tactical nuclear weapons." and it goes on to say "the commission specifically said at page 67 of its report that 'the imbalance favoring russia is worrisome, including for allies. and it will become more worrisome as the number of strategic weapons is decreased. dealing with this imbalance is urgent and indeed some commissioners would give priority to this overtaking further steps to reduce the number of operationally deployed

strategic nuclear weapons." mr. president, i'd like to have included in the record the letter of december 17 that i referred to to senator kerry and senator lugar from members of the strategic posture commission. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. risch: so, let me conclude. here we are 40 years later, and indeed a decade later than our most recent foray into this. and really other than the raw reduction of numbers of strategic weapons, really not a whole lot has changed. but the world has changed dramatically, and i would urge and i would suggest that our approach with russia on these very important issues needs to likewise change.

and it hasn't. once again in this senator's humble opinion and a number of other senators also, we have been bested by the russians on the missile defense issue. they have convinced us if we even think about improving either quantative or qualitatively missile defense issues, they will withdraw from this. once again they convinced us before we ever sat down at the table that they won't talk about nuclear weapons. so that,'s wrong. that's wrongheaded thinking. it was wrong to approach this treaty with that type of thing on the table. and so when we're all done here and the high-fiving starts and champagne bottles are opened and fancy documents are signed, before everybody gets all worked up about what a great and glorious thing that this treaty

is, i would say it's missing some really, really important things. number one is missile defense. i guess we already crossed that bridge yesterday. but the other is the oh, so important issue of tactical weapons. those senators -- fellow senators, this is your opportunity. if you want to press the restart button with russia, this gives us your opportunity to really, really press the restart button with russia and take up this issue that is so important and indeed in the minds of many, more important than the issue of strategic weapons. with that, mr. president, i yield the floor. i'm going to yield the floor to senator kyl. mr. kyl: thank you, mr. president. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: let me compliment senator risch on a fine statement on a very important aspect of this start treaty. he covered the waterfront very

well, and i only wish that there were more than two other colleagues on the senate floor to hear this debate. part of the reason that i suggested a long time ago that it was not a good idea to bring the start treaty up just before christmas is members would be preoccupied especially if we tried to go through saturday and sunday. here we are on a sunday afternoon, and there are four senators, including -- and then in addition to the presiding officer on the senate floor. so this is a shame because it's an important issue. yesterday the senate rejected an amendment by senators mccain and barrasso. what they said was that there's some language in the preamble of this treaty that states the interrelationship between strategic defensive and offensive weapons, and that's not a good idea based upon how the russians intend to use that language. the argument against it was it's just a statement of fact. it's nothing more than that. there is an interrelationship between defense and offense.

in effect, what's the big deal? mr. president, the risch amendment is also just a statement of fact. in fact, the language of the risch amendment is virtually identical to the preamble language dealing with missile defenses except it in a sense substitutes tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons for missile defense. it states the interrelationship, and i can't imagine anyone would deny that interrelationship. the perry schlesinger commission cited by senator risch confirms that interrelationship. as i said, i can't imagine anyone denying it. and i can't imagine anyone denying the fact that as we reduce our strategic offensive weapons, then the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons becomes all the more important, especially because of the large difference between the russians and everyone else in the world. it is said to be about 10-1, russia vis-a-vis the united states in tactical nuclear

weapons. and all the more discouraging because there's no transparency in what the russians have, and their military doctrine is to actually use those weapons. our strategic offensive weapons are a deterrent to an attack. to the russians, tactical nuclear weapons are a battlefield weapon just like artillery. there's clearly an interrelationship between the two. it clearly would be to our detriment if we reduce our strategic offensive weapons down to the point that these tactical nuclear weapons could create an imbalance in power. and because the united states has commitments to 31 other countries, it is very important to them, especially the european countries, who are in the back door of where the russian tactical missiles could be most effective. so yesterday we were told that we had to defeat the mccain amendment because it was simply trying to remove from the

preamble this statement of fact of this interrelationship. today we have the risch amendment which is simply to insert a statement of fact about an interrelationship between the strategic and the tactical. there is no principled argument against the risch amendment. the only argument is the russians wouldn't like it and they would require that we renegotiate the preamble. i can't think of a better argument for the risch amendment. we should renegotiate the preamble. and all of the statements that senator risch quoted from democratic senators then, one of the most eloquent by the vice president who was then a senator who said we've got to negotiate any reductions of these tactical nuclear weapons of the russians. we should have done it in the 2002 treaty. this was a missed opportunity by the bush administration. that should be our first order of business. so the obama administration, with vice president joe biden comes into office, and was that

their first priority? no. was it any priority? no. did it get included in the treaty? no. why? because the russians said yet, all the risch amendment would do is simply insert the words into the preamble. remember, this is the document that is meaningless. it's just a throwaway piece of paper, so what harm could there be in making this statement of fact of the interrelationship. ace said there,'s no principled argument against it. the only argument would be the russians would require some renegotiation. i say fine, let's bring it on. that should have been negotiated when the treaty was negotiated, not now after the fact. i appreciated the fact that senator risch put into the "congressional record" the statement of the six commissioners of the perry schlesinger commission who had to correct the state department web site which wrongly asserted that they did not believe that we should attack this problem of the disparity of tactical nuclear weapons.

senator risch quoted from the commission report that noted the urgency of dealing with this problem. but did the obama administration negotiators deal with the problem? no. why? because russia didn't want to. okay, sorry. we're sorry about that. but when they asked us to deal with missile defense and we said not in this treaty, they insisted that we put language about missile defense and the interrelationship between that and strategic weapons in the preamble. and more importantly, not just language about the interrelationship, but the fact that as strategic numbers comes down, that relationship becomes more important because defense becomes more important. precisely the same point about tactical nuclear weapons. people should understand one other thing. there is not a huge difference between strategic and tactical weapons. the actual explosive power of some tactical weapons exceeds that of some delivery weapons. onis