longer range. that's the strategic definition. so, mr. president, i can't think of a principled argument against this. it's not as if we're saying the treaty has to be renegotiated. it's not as if we're saying we have to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. then-senator biden said after entry into force of the moscow treaty -- that was done in 2002 -- getting a handle on russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and nonproliferation objective of the united states. so why wasn't it a top objective of the biden -- of the obama and biden administration? let me just make a couple of other points, and i think there's some other colleagues that would like to speak to this. then perhaps there's some other quotations from some of the people who actually support this treaty who have said this is a problem that needs to be dealt with. one of the things that was --

that came up during the course of the negotiations involved a particular kind of russian tactical nuclear weapon. these are the weapons of mass destruction that could be deployed on submarines. they are basically cruise missile weapons. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. these could actually reach the united states when deployed on submarines. so as far as the united states is concerned, it's a distinction without a difference as to whether they are tactical or strategic. they could be used against the united states with submarines because they are delivered by cruise missiles. these are exactly the kinds of systems that were limited in a binding side agreement reached between the united states and the soviet union during negotiation of the first start treaty. why did the administration forgo a similar agreement in new start? in other words, you have a precedent, a particular kind of

then-soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapon was dealt with in a side agreement to the start i treaty because we understood its importance. this treaty doesn't inhibit in the least the russians' ability to deploy a cruise missile, submarine-based nonstrategic weapon. nuclear weapon. now, they didn't want us to have the ability to deploy conventional prompt global strike, at least not without counting it against the vehicles that deliver nuclear weapons. so that got into the treaty. the russians didn't want it so we acceded to their request. when we wanted to put something in about the cruise missiles that would be delivered by submarine, we can't do that, the russians said. i presume that the

administration made this argument. i don't know that they did with the negotiations. you see we, the senate, being asked to give our consent to this treaty be denied the negotiating record. the russians know what the negotiators said. we don't know. the state department knows, the russians know, but we don't know. i don't even know if the united states tried to get that same agreement that was in the start i treaty in this new start i treaty. i don't know. but it's not in there. so either we didn't try, negligence, or the russians said no. this is why it's important to recognize the relationship somewhere. now, maybe we'll get a letter from the president. maybe he will send another letter to senator mcconnell and say something about this, which, of course, doesn't mean anything vis-a-vis the russians. why didn't we do this in the preamble? well, we have a chance to do it now to correct the problem by adopting the risch amendment. just a final point. the resolution of ratification

actually recognizes this little problem. not very effectively, but it -- it recognizes the problem by calling on the president to pursue an agreement with the russians that would -- that would address this disparity in tactical nuclear weapons in the future. well, that's what senator biden -- then-senator biden asked to be done in 2002 when the last treaty was debated in the senate. we didn't do it. so now the resolution of ratification says, well, this is a pretty good idea. we ought to do that in the future sometime. well, our bargaining power in the future is gone. this was the treaty to do it in. what is the quid pro quo going to be when we go to the russians next and say now we want to talk about tactical nuclear weapons? they will say now we want to talk about u.s. missile defenses. how do you like them apples? what's the obama administration going to say? one theory i heard was -- and

this was from a knowledgeable source -- that the russians actually would like to move the bulk of their tactical nuclear weapons from the european theater to their southern border and their eastern border where they fear someday they may have to use these weapons against a potential invasion from china or from muslim states to their south. and that they might agree to a concession if the united states insisted that they move these weapons back from the european theater, they might be willing to do that. that's exactly the kind of concern that we have. the russians want to do that. they are prepared to move their missiles. they know they're going to have to do so for their own self-interest. they are waiting, however, until we say we would like to bring up this question of tactical nukes. they will say if you give us something on missile defense, we'll be happy to move them back from the european theater. that's the kind of thing we're looking at, mr. president. the russians are great chess players, the best in the world,

and they are great negotiators, and with all due respect to our -- i can't really blame our negotiators. i don't know whether it was because of a lack of direction from the chief or poor negotiation, but one way or the other, we got snookered. we got snookered on missile defense, we got snookered on conventional prompt global strike, we got snookered on tactical weapons. we got snookered on verification. all of these are issues we would like to deal with in the united states senate now during this ratification process. but senator kerry, the chairman of the foreign relations committee, has said we're not going to amend the treaty. so what are we doing here on a sunday afternoon? if we're not going to do it and he has got the votes to see that we don't do it, about all we can do is to make the case to the american people that this was a flawed process and a flawed treaty. and i hope, mr. president, that our colleagues will consider the prospect of making some changes here so that if, in fact, there

does have to be some renegotiation, we welcome that. i don't know why the other side believes that the u.s. senate is only here as a rubber stamp. you can't change the treaty, so just vote for it. and i think that explains why -- this matter of time. why do you need any time to debate this treaty? let's just get it over with. we have got to ratify the treaty here. why are you raising all these objections? we're not going to let you amend it. so why do you think that we need to take all this time? i think that explains their rationale. i heard one of my colleagues on the other side this morning on national tv say we have been on this treaty for two weeks. no, we have not. we have been on it for three and a half days. that's interspersed with all of the other stuff that we have been doing on the senate floor, which i won't bother to repeat. we're all well aware of it. but here we are on a sunday afternoon, we should be debating a very serious proposal by senator risch to simply put wording in the preamble that

tracks almost identically the wording that's already in there relative to missile defense, and this would relate to tactical nuclear weapons. why wouldn't we do that? unless we just don't want to change the treaty in any way. mr. president, i don't think we should be wasting our time here. the advice and consent clause of the constitution meant something. the administration didn't follow our advice that we gave them when we passed the defense bill last year, on missile defense, on prompt global strike. so we don't have to give them our consent. or at least we can say let's make a few changes. a change like this that i -- i can't see any principled argument against. but there will be an argument and the argument will be, well, the russians won't like it, we'll have to renegotiate. i will be interested to see if there is any other argument against it. so, mr. president, i hope my colleagues will gradually filter in here on a sunday afternoon, turn off the football game, come

in for a few hours of edification about some very important matters to the american security, and at the end of this afternoon when we vote, support the amendment of my colleague, senator risch. the presiding officer: the senator from indiana. mr. lugar: mr. president, let me just state at the outset that the amendment offered by the distinguished senator, senator risch, would in essence determine nature the treaty. we have been down this trail yesterday with a long debate about missile defense, but in fact the net result of amending the preamble and the text of the treaty is to kill it. that's the issue before the

senate. there may be members in our body who do not like the treaty. there have been some, apparently, from time to time who have not been prepared to support any treaty with russia. i've recited at least from my recollection of previous debates that many senators simply said you can never trust the russians. you can't deal with the russians. simply what we ought to be doing is to build up defenses of our own so that regardless of what the russians have, what the russians intend to do, that we are prepared for that. indeed, that was some of the argumentation at the time that president ronald reagan first seriously got into these issues, and there were persons at that point and there may still be persons who believe that somehow or other, a complex system of

missile defense could be set up that would protect our country against intercontinental ballistic missiles flying in from russia, from north korea, from iran, from whoever might ever obtain them. that argument has gone on for decades, and to this point, there has not been scientific backup that such a comprehensive missile system could be created, quite apart from what its expense might be and quite apart from the lack of attention and recognition to what else is going on in the world. indeed, it is a curious fact that in this debate, some senators have argued that the russians are one thing, but a rather diminishing focus as far as they are concerned, that the real problem is not however many intercontinental ballistic missiles the russians may have, how many warheads that are aimed at our military installations in

our cities, but rather that developments of a few nuclear weapons in north korea or the possibility of development of some in iran ought to be the focus for those who are moderate as opposed to those who are still talking ancient history. now, let me just be very clear, we're talking this afternoon about an amendment that terminates the treaty, and that means we have no new start. and some senators will say well, that is fine. now let's go back to work. let's send our negotiators into the fray as if for some reason or other we anticipate the russians after this rejection are eager to engage, and in the meanwhile, mr. president, let me just say that for what i would call an indefinite period, while these negotiations might come

about, although it is dubious, given at least the rejection not only to the russians but the impression to the rest of the world that we will have an inability once again to -- to inspect really what is proceeding in russia. and in other parts of the debate, we may talk about the verification procedures and their add -- adequacy. some senators have already suggested that in their judgment, those verification procedures may lack the adequacy that would give us the confidence, even though the number of bases on which russia has weapons has decreased by at least a half, and it's a very different situation with regard to inspection. but at the same time, many of us have lamented since a year ago december 5 that we have not had so-called boots on the ground.

that is, americans inspecting what is proceeding. i think that's very important. if we reject the treaty today by passing this amendment, that problem will continue. i believe that that has to be faced squarely, regardless of what senators might feel ought to be in the treaty or left out of it. and i would just say that each day that goes by, i don't predict that the russians are going to construct something especially new and different, but we have come into a mode of feeling that although in a way that may be important, it has not been important enough for us to take up this treaty, even though it has been clearly signed by two presidents of the united states and russia for some months. thank goodness we finally have the treaty before us. i would say that the costs associated with requiring renegotiation of the treaty, i believe, far outweigh the

benefits the senate might gain by demanding new treaties, new changes in due course. i would say from my perspective, a rejection of the treaty today will make further limitations on russian tactical nuclear arms far less likely, not more likely. the united states has made clear that any future nuclear arms reduction agreement with russia should include tactical nuclear weapons, and i share that objective. some critics have overvalued the utility, however, of russian tactical nuclear weapons and undervalued our determent to them. only a fraction of those weapons, that is, the russian tactical weapons, could be delivered significantly beyond russia's borders. pursuant to the i.n.f. treaty, the united states and the soviet union long ago des tried --

destroyed intermediate range and shorter range nuclear arm ballistic missiles and ground launch cruise missiles, which have a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. in fact, most of russia's tactical nuclear weapons have very short ranges. they are used for homeland air defense. most, as has been suggested, are tkwoetd to the chinese -- are devoted to the chinese border or are in storage now. a russian nuclear attack on nato countries is effectively deterred by nato conventional superiority. our own tactical nuclear forces, french and british nuclear arsenals and u.s. strategic forces. in short, russian tactical nuclear weapons do not threaten our strategic deterrent.

our nato allies that flank russia in eastern and northern europe understand this. i can we need to underline that, mr. president, because we have nato allies, we have discussed this subject very frequently, and our nato allies would seemingly be the most in harm's way of the short-range tactical nuclear weapon. it could be a very short range into the baltics, for example, or into poland. but the nato allies have all strongly endorsed the new start treaty for the reasons that i've suggested. they understand the deterrents that are already present to the russian use of these particular weapons. it's important to recognize that

the size differential between russian and american tactical nuclear arsenals did not come to pass because of american inattention to this point. during the first bush administration, our national command authority with full participation by the military deliberately made a decision to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons we deployed. this goes back to the first bush administration. a deliberate decision to reduce the number. they did this irrespective of russian actions because a threat of massive ground invasion in europe largely evaporated due to the breakup of the former soviet union. in addition, our conventional capabilities had improved to the extent that battlefield nuclear weapons were no longer needed to defend western europe.

that was a military judgment. in this atmosphere, maintaining large arsenals of nuclear artillery shells, land mines and short-range missile warheads was a bad bargain for us in terms of cost, safety, alliance cohesion and proliferation risk. in my judgment, russia should make a similar decision. the risk to russia of maintaining their tactical nuclear arsenal in its current form are greater than the potential security benefits, those weapons might provide. they have not done this in part because of their threat perceptions about their border, particularly their border with china, which apparently they want to give an impression to the chinese, or along a large

border or territory largely unoccupied or sparsely occupied by russians that these weapons might be utilized against the chinese. an agreement with russia that reduced, accounted for and improved security around tactical nuclear arsenals is in the interest of russia and the united states. rejection of new start, however, makes it unlikely that a subsequent agreement concerning tactical nuclear weapons will ever be reached. one of the basic points of the exercise we're now proceeding on, mr. president, is the passage and confirmation and ratification of the new start treaty means that we have another opportunity to move ahead with the russians around the negotiating table. rejection of the treaty does not offer a promising benefit for at

least the short run, maybe intermediate run for either country to proceed. the resolution of ratification encourages the president to engage the russian federation on establishing measures to improve mutual confidence regarding the accounting and security of russian nonstrategic weapons. that has been deliberately put into the text that we are discussing today. for this reason, i oppose the amendment becau i fact it would require renegotiation of the treaty. i've suggested, mr. president, that that is unlikely to come about very rapidly and very readily. one of the amazing things about the current situation was that with the expiring of the start treaty a year ago december, that we were able to get together with the russians admittedly on

a limited agenda. and those who are proponents of the treaty have said from the start that it's a limited agenda. small reductions in strategic arms, an idea once again a verification and the possibilities that having at least reached limited agreements, we might in fact meet again around the negotiating table. to think through the tactical situation and other aspects. and, mr. president, the very important objective we do have with the russians of limiting the building of nuclear weapons or an industry that could feel those in other countries. we believe it will be in the interest of the russians as well as our own to have that cooperation on the basis of our knowledge of how the systems

work and how that deterrence might be affected. mr. president, i appreciate very much the importance of the issue. but for the reasons i've suggested, i believe it would be unwise to adopt the motion of the distinguished senator. and, furthermore, i would not like to see the treaty completely obliterated today by the adoption of this amendment because that in fact would be the effect. i thank the chair and i yield the floor. mr. casey: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania. mr. casey: mr. president, i ask consent for the following, that i be permitted to speak for 15 minutes, to then be followed by senator cornyn right after me. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection, so ordered. mr. casey: mr. president, thank you very much. we're grateful to be here on a weekend talking about a critically important treaty for our country. this treaty has been the subject

of many, many months now of review by the senate foreign relations committee as well as other committees in the senate. there have been some, somewhere between 900 and 1,000 questions asked of the administration and answered, many, many months of work. i think we start with some basic fundamentals about the context within which this treaty is being debated. and i hope is ratified in the next couple of days. first of all, this treaty is consistent with and is entirely consistent with our concern about making sure that our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective and reliable. there is no question about that in terms of our goal. that underpins our national security and is in no way

reduced or compromised because of this treaty. first of all, i'd like to speak to the amendment by senator risch, and i'd like to reiterate the fact that any amendment to the treaty would require renegotiation with the russian federation. that would lead to a prolonged delay for the united states nuclear weapons inspectors to return to russia to get on the ground to inspect and to verify. as we sit here today on this sunday, we can say, unfortunately, that on this date -- sunday, december 18 of this year -- we mark the 379th day since we've had inspectors on the ground. that's a problem for our security. that's a problem for, obviously for verification. and that's one of the reasons, just one, but one of the reasons that we must verify -- we must

ratify this treaty. but let me get to the amendment by senator risch. senator risch and i serve on the foreign relations committee together. i am the chairman of the subcommittee on the near east and south and central asia. senator risch is our ranking member. we work well together. i think we have a basic disagreement about this amendment, and let me make some arguments about the amendment. this amendment involves what are known as tactical nuclear weapons. i recognize the importance of addressing the basic imbalance that exists with respect to the russians and the scores of tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal. it's important that upon ratification of the new start accord that we proceed quickly to negotiations with the russians on tactical nuclear weapons. but as we engage in this debate, it's also very important to clearly define what we're talking about for the american people. the congressional research

service says that the united states and the soviet union, what we used to call the soviet union, both deployed thousands of -- quote -- "nonstrategic nuclear weapons during the cold war that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict." these included nuclear mines, artillery, short- medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and gravity bombs. so we're talking about tactical weapons; in this case in the debate here tactical nuclear weapons which were not included in the new start treaty because this is a strategic weapons treaty. i think we can all agree that future negotiations must take place, must take place on tactical nuclear weapons. but the only way to get there, the only path forward on that, mr. president, is by finalizing new start and ratifying this

important treaty. our allies in europe are perhaps the most vulnerable to the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons. our allies in eastern europe are especially so. and yet, here's what polish foreign minister zakorsky wrote on december 20. "without a new start treaty in place, holes will soon appear in the nuclear umbrella that the u.s. tproeus poe -- provides to poland and other allies. the collective security guarantee for nato members. moreover, he says -- and i'm still quoting -- new start is a necessary stepping stone to future negotiations with russia about reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals and a prerequisite for a successful revival of the treaty on conventional forces in europe, the so-called c.f.e. treaty.

fill quoting the polish foreign minister, "in effect, new start is a sine qua non for arms control and nonproliferation issues that matter to europe to prevent iran from obtaining nuclear weapons." the polish foreign minister said this. he represents the very people under direct threat, direct threat from the russians and from their tactical nuclear weapons. he believes that new start should be done first -- first -- followed by negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. secretary general of nato rasmussen has said -- and i quote -- "the new start treaty would also pave the way for arms control and disarmament initiatives in other areas that are vital to the euro atlantic security. most important would be

transparency and reductions of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in europe, which allies have called, have called for in our new strategic concept." this is a key concern for allies, not only those close toast russia's borders in light of the great disparity between levels of russian tactical nuclear weapons and those of nato. but we cannot address this disparity until the new start treaty is ratified, which is another reason why ratification would set the stage for further improvements in european security. unquote. franklin miller, the senior director for defense policy and arms control under president george w. bush, said -- and i quote -- "if we don't ratify new start, we're back to the drawing boards on some sort of approach to strategic arms and the tactical are still going to get left behind. i do not see a treaty in the

future that will lump the large russian tactical stockpile in with the smaller strategic stockpiles on both sides. end of quotation from president george w. bush's director for policy in arms control. and final will i would note that in april 2009, both president obama and president medvedev indicated that arms control would be a step-by-step process with a replacement for the 1991 start treaty coming first but a more comprehensive treaty that might include deeper cuts in all types of warheads, including nonstrategic weapons following in the future. russian tactical weapons must be decreased, no question about that. and experts across the political and international spectrum agree that completing new start is the essential first step in reducing

russian tactical nuclear weapons. mr. president, even if this amendmenamendment to the treatyo be passed, the treaty itself would still be about strategic arms. nothing in the army would actually change that fact. but it would unnecessarily continue to delay u.s. inspectors returning to russia to verify nuclear weapons. so if this amendment were to pass, we not only make no progress -- no progress on tactical nuclear arms -- but efforts to decrease the weapons actually pointed at the american peernlg the russian icbms, would grind to an immediate halt. this is not acceptable, mr. president, to the american people, i would argue, but certainly not to many of us supporting the ratification of the treaty. and, as a result, i'll be voting "no" on the risch amendment. i'd also like to reiterate the resolution of ratification that

came out of the foreign relations committee. it covers this issue by calling on the president to -- and i quote -- "pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the russian federation that would address the disparity between the tactical weapons stockpiles of the russian federation and of the united states and would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner." unquote. so says the resolution of ratification. this bipartisan resolution passed the senate foreign relations committee by a vote of 14-4. so we've spent lots of time on this treaty. we've spent a good deal of time as well on this basic question. but i think we've got to do more than talk tough when it comes in this treaty and when it comes to making sure that our arsenal is

safe, secure, effective, and reliable. tough talk isn't enough. we need tough actions. the ratification of this treaty is one of those tough actions, to make sure that the american people are more secure. i would yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from texas. mr. cornyn: mr. president, i rise in support of the risch amendment and would refer all of us to the constitutional provision that we are discharging our responsibility under. of course, it's article 2, section 2 of the constitution that says that the president shall have the power by and with the advice and consent of the are senate to make treaties. the problem here, mr. president, is even though congress has told the administration about our concerns about constraining our

missile defense capability and has told the administration about our concerns with regard to the exclusion of tactical weapons that are covered by the risch amendment, that in reality the administration really doesn't want our advice but merely seeks our consent. and i believe this is -- this matter is being treated with the kind of gravity and seriousness in a bipartisan basis that it deserves. but there are some very real differences between those of us who think that this treaty is as good as we can get and that congress's role is really to consent to something negotiated without taking our advice, and those who believe that congress should play more -- and the senate should play more than a rubber-stamp role when it comes to matters as serious as this.

in section 1251 of the national defense authorization bill of fiscal year 2010, the senate did provide advice on these matters, but, as i indicated earlier, most of that advice was ignored in favor of a strategy of seeking our consent after this treaty was basically a fait accompli. it concerns me that -- and i admire our distinguished floor leader, senator lugar, who has a wealth of experience in this area, and i think we all acknowledge that. but it worries me that any attempt by the senate to offer amendments are called treaty killers. i don't really understand what our role is here if it's not to offer amendments to conform the treaty to what we believe is the best national security interests of the american people. well, one of the problems that i

think the risch amendment reveals is, by excluding tactical nuclear weapons, we are giving the russians a huge advantage, and i think increasing instability rather than decreasing instability. and what i mean from that is the congressional research service, mr. president, has written a document, a research document, dated january 13, 2010, entitled "nonstrategic nuclear weapons," otherwise called tactical nuclear weapons. and on pages 4, 5, and 6, they go through a distinction, a facl distinction between -- a factual disingtsz between the weapons. and i would ask unanimous consent that those majors be made a part of the record following the end of my remarks. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. cornyn: i thank the chair.

mr. president, the congressional research service points out that the distinct between strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons not covered by this treaty is frankly a muddled topic. now, we do know by exclusion what is left not included; in other words, intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers are included as strategic weapons and so thereby, everything that is not included, would be a tactical weapon. it's also, they point out on the pages that will be part of the record, that part of the definition can be determined -- or has traditionally been determined by the range of delivery vehicles and the yield of the warheads. mr. president, you think it's important to sort of -- i think it's foreign sort of try to as

well as we can graphically draw a picture of what we're talking about when we're talking about nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons. i have in my hand a report taken from jane's information group publications called stree strategic weapon as many as, naval fighting weapons and all the world's aircraft, that covers a nonstrategic, therefore tactical, weapon known as the sh-11 gorgon nuclear weapon. the reason i raise this example of a type of weapon that the russians have, which is not covered by this treaty, is that the yield of this weapon is one megaton, one megaton. if you look at the size of the

nuclear weapon that was used on hiroshima in 1945 that killed anywhere from 85,000 to 140,000 -- no one knows the exact number because of the radiation-induced injuries and the like -- but suffice it to say which caused devastation and brought japan to its knees in world war ii, that was, by contrast, a 10-kiloton nuclear warhead. in other words, this so-called tactical nuclear warhead not covered by this treaty is 100 times more powerful than the nuclear warhead that killed perhaps 100,000 people or more in hiroshima in 1945. so i mention this example -- and this is, by the way, an unclassified document; we doontsscan'tgo into here on thee

distinction on a continue usm between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. we're into the talking about -- we're talking about weapons that can wreak death and destruction that really, i think most of us hesitate to even contemplate. so this is not an inconsequential amendment. this is a very important amendment that the senator has brought. and, you know, i listened to him a little earlier -- i was in my office in the hart office building. but i listened to senator risch cite some very distinguished authorities on the other side of the aisle, and this comes from the congressiona "congressionaln march of 2003 talking about the moscow treaty. senator after senator -- senator

according to on be, the distinguished senator from north dakota; senator biden, now vice president biden, but then senator from delaware; senator reed from rhode island, a distinguished expert on the armed services committee and national security matters; senator conremarked the other senator from north dakota -- to a man, they noted and expressed concern about the failure to deal with tactical and nuclear weapons in the moscow treaty of 2003. the senator from california, senator feinstein, also noted the absence of any dealing with nuclear -- tactical nuclear wessments i mention this, mr. president, to say again, no one is talking about the visions among us. we are talking about a unified concern request the threat that tact -- with the threat that

tactical nuclear weapons poses. so i think it is simply a mistake. but it is a correctable mistake that the negotiators of this treaty and the administration have excluded tactical nuclear weapons. as others have stated, the united states has an advantage at this time of strategic nuclear weapons, so basically we're going to have to cut our stockpile while the russian federation, which does not have as many as this treaty would allow, would be allowed to build up to that cap. but in the area of tactical nuclear weapons, the russian federation has one classified estimate was anywhere -- around 10 times what the united states has in terms of tactical nuclear weapons. i was talking in my office with tom egostino, the head of the

national nuclear security administration, swuj who has long served in this area and who has confirmed that this tactical nuclear asymmetry is very real. according to hirnlg he said the actual numbers are classified, as i alluded earlier. but he confirmed that there is roughly a 10-1 ratio, roughly, give or take. he said there is a big difference between the two. it seems to me that from a bargaining standpoint, it would have made all the essential in the world for the obama administration to have insisted on reductions in the russian tactical nuclear weapons as part of the new start. if not now, i would say when? if not in 2003, if all of the colleagues whose names i mentioned i recallier thought it was good idea to deal with tactical nuclear weapons back in 2003, to me is strikes me as being even more important to do it now rather than kick the can down the road and to not take

advantage of the rench that we would have due to the russian's desire to maintain their arsenal of tac tactical nuclear weapons. but vice president biden recognized that this omission was potentially dangerous in 2003 and i'll just quote him. he said, "getting a handle on russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and nonproliferation objectivity of the united states government." so one has to question why that top objective remains unmet under new start. james is less injerks the former secretary of -- james schlesinger, the former secretary of defense, has testified that the significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises steadily as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. this is a sobering conclusion, mr. president, and it helps illustrate the importance of this glaring omission in the new

start treaty. simply put, this treaty in its current form represents a lost opportunity to compel the russian federation to downsize their tactical nuclear arsenal. this amendment provides an opportunity to lay the groundwork for that goal to be accomplished in the future. following the senate ratification of the start treaty, president george herbert walker bush committed the u.s. to unilaterally reducing our tactical nuclear weapons. not surprisingly, while the russians made a similar commitment, they failed to follow through and never completed those promised reductions. today, russia's widespread deployment of tactical nuclear weapons raises concerns with their safety and security. these weapons are often located at remote bases close to potential battlefields, sometimes far from central command authority. questions have been raised regarding the stability and reliability of those russian

troops charged with monitoring and securing those weapons. in 2008, secretary gates said that he was worried that the russians themselves didn't even know the numbers and locations of old land mines, nuclear artillery shells and so on that would be of interest to rogue states and terrorists. in addition, unlike strategic nuclear weapons, tactical weapons have very little transparency and very little accounting. the treaty should at least make a step in the direction to provide more transparency and an accounting requirement. achieving reductions in russian tactical nuclear weapons would also reduce the supply of those weapons that could be acquired by groups like al qaeda. tactical nuclear weapons are among those that are the most susceptible to theft or illicit transfer because they're relatively small and compact,

including so-called suitcase nukes. they are the most susceptible to theft or illicit transfer to terrorists and also rogue stat states. during the cold war, the soviet union was known to have produced and deployed tactical nuclear weapons like sometimes called suitcase nukes, as i mentioned a moment ago. these nuclear weapons, unlike large strategic weapons that new start would limit, are a terrorist's dream. they're easily concealed and highly transportable. they could all too easily be moved across our border and positioned in almost any building in the united states. additionally, the strategic posture commission in its 2009 report to congress found that russia's tactical nuclear weapons advance opens up new possibilities for russian efforts to threaten the use of new -- of nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts and threaten our allies.

the commission observed that there is a -- quote -- "evidently rising value in russian military doctrine and national security strategy of nuclear tactical weapons." and these fears are coming to fruition. as u.s. officials say that russia has moved tactical nuclear weapons to facilities near nato allies, several times in recent years, most recently this past spring. these actions again would run counter to pledges made by moscow that they would pull back tactical nuclear weapons and reduce their numbers. by ratifying the start -- the new start treaty without aaddressing this asymmetry, the united states would squander valuable leverage to negotiate a future reduction in russian tactical nuclear weapons. the administration says no matter, we must ratify the new start treaty and we can deal with the tactical nuclear weapons sometime in the future.

well, again, we didn't do it in 2003 when vice president biden and others pointed out the emotion and the potential danger, and here we are in 2010 being asked in a lame-duck session to ratify this treaty and leave tactical nuclear weapons excluded once again. it leads me to wonder whether, instead of the doctrine of trust, but verify, that we are bracing a doctrine of ignore it and it will simply go away. but we all know that it won't. russia would have little reason to agree to reduce its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in a future treaty without extracting concessions from the united states when we could fix this issue now if we would simply adopt the risch amendment. well, mr. president, i would join my colleague in urging the

adoption of the risch amendment and i would yield the floor. mr. dorgan: mr. president, i would ask if the senator from texas would yield for a question? mr. cornyn: i would be happy to yield for a question. mr. dorgan: mr. president, the senator from texas mentioned a statement that i and some others had made with respect to the moscow treaty, and i simply wanted to observe that then and now, i wish we had included tactical nuclear weapons. but then i voted for the moscow treaty, and i will vote for this treaty. and the reason for that is making progress on strategic nuclear weapons, reducing the stock of nuclear weapons and reducing delivery vehicles, it seems to me is major progress. this administration has indicated that it intends to move forward on tactical weapons negotiations with the russians. but i did -- i didn't want it to stand that somehow my concern back in the discussion about the moscow treaty, the lack of -- the concern about not including tactical weapons, would have had me voting against the treaty. i did not. i voted for that. and i will vote for this treaty because i think it advances the ball in a very significant way with respect to arms control.

mr. cornyn: mr. president, i appreciate the senator from north dakota coming out and making that statement. i didn't mean to suggest that he voted against the moscow treaty, but i did -- i do believe i accurately quoted his concerns which he's reconfirmed here in the failure to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. i would just say in response to my -- my colleague, that we are making a unilateral reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and the russians are not going to have to reduce any in their current stockpile because we have -- we're over the cap set by the treaty and they are under the cap. so it seems to me even further evidence that we have got -- we got -- we got outnegotiated on this, and particularly when it omits this important part of the nuclear arsenal and a threat to the stability of not only the region but also of the world. mr. president, i yield the floor. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts.

mr. kerry: procedural, so not to come out of any time, if i could ask that. i understand the senator from oklahoma wants to make a -- just insert an amendment and get it into the order, so i think we would both yield to him just to do that for that purpose. a senator: i thank the senator from massachusetts. the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. a senator: mr. president, following the disposition of the risch amendment will be scheduled to be my amendment number 4833 having to do with verification, numbers of inspections. i will be wanting to speak on this. i don't want to take time from the risch amendment but i'd ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the risch amendment for consideration of 4833. the presiding officer: is there objection? mr. inhofe: i now and that we return to -- the presiding officer: without objection. mr. inhofe: -- the risch amendment. the presiding officer: the clerk will report the amendment. the clerk: the senator from oklahoma, mr. inhofe, proposes an amendment numbered 4833. mr. inhofe: ask to dispense with the reading. the presiding officer: without objection.

mr. kerry: mr. president, i thank senator from oklahoma. mr. president, i will consume such time as i use for a moment here. let me say, first of all, again, i appreciate this amendment. there is not a lot of contention about the importance of addressing nuclear short-range weapons, tactical weapons, as we call them, and, i mean, the administration wants to do this as much as our friends do on the other side of the aisle and i think the senator from idaho knows that. let me just correct one fact for a minute that both the senator from texas and the senator from idaho said. they said that the russians will not have to reduce their strategic warheads here and that they're already below the number of 1,550. that is not accurate. and i won't go into detail here. we can reinforce this tomorrow

in a classified session, but the russians do have to reduce warheads under this requirement, not as much as us, but our defense community has made the judgment that because of our triad, which will remain robust, and for other reasons, we have a very significant advantage here. again, i'll discuss that tomorrow in the classified briefing. what i would like to say to my colleague here is that, again, i am 100% prepared to try to embrace this concept even further in the resolution of ratification but we cannot do it in a way that requires this treaty to go back and be renegotiated. and there's a simple, really simple -- this is not a complicated amendment -- there's a very simple reason why we should oppose this amendment as it is now, because of the

requirement that we go back. because if we don't pass the start treaty, if we can't reach a bilateral agreement on the age reduction of strategic weapons, there will be no discussion about tactical weapons. that's as plain as day. every negotiator, everybody who's been part of this process understands that. if we can't show our good faith to reduce and create a mutual verification system for strategic weapons, how are you going to sit in front of them and say oh, by the way, let's get you to reduce what is your advantage? it is an advantage, i acknowledge it. you go ahead and reduce it. they're going to laugh at us and we will have lost all the verification that we have today. now, it's not just me that says that. the fact is that, you know, secretary gates has been very, very clear about this and

secretary clinton likewise. secretary gates said this. let me quote him. i know you all respect him enormously. quote -- "we will never get to that step of reductions with the russians on tactical nukes if this treaty on strategic nuclear weapons is not ratified." it's a pretty simple equation, folks. this isn't a one-way street, where we can stand here and say, you got to do this and you got to do that, and, by the way, we don't care what you think about what we're doing, we're going to do what we want. that's not no the way it works. there's got to be some reciprocity in the process of reduction and verification and inspection and so forth. they've got things we don't want them to see. -- they don't want us to see. we've got stuff we don't want them to see. there's plenty in this agreement that we protect our facilities from them being able to intrude on them excessively, because our folks don't want them to. that's the nature of a contentious relationship, which

is the reason you have to argue out, negotiate out a treaty in the first place. now, if the secretary of defense is telling us, a secretary of defense, by the way, that we all mutually respect enormously but who was appointed to the job by president bush, if he's telling us, you've got to pass this in order to get to the tactical nukes, i think we've got to listen to that a little bit. now, let me just point out, i want the record to reflect i agree with the senator from idaho, they have an advantage -- they have many more tactical nukes. they have for a long time. and the reason is, they have different strategic needs. they're in a different part of the world. for a long time, the warsaw pact and nato were head-to-head squared off and so they saw a world in which they saw the potential of a land invasion.

and so for a long time, they had tanks and mines and other things that were nuclear capable. now, what happened is we, unilaterally, i might add, decided under president bush, i think it was, president george herbert walker bush, we decided this is dangerous, this doesn't make sense, doesn't make sense for us. so we unilaterally announced after the fall of the soviet union, president bush announced that we were going to ratchet down our tactical nuclear forc forces. and everybody agreed with that. it made sense. so when we -- we did that and what happened is, after that, president boris yeltsin in 1992 pledged that the production of warheads for ground-launched tactical missiles, artillery

shells and mines had stopped. they stopped it because we stopped it. and all of those warheads would be eliminated. he pledged that russia would dispose of one-half of its tactical airborne and surface-to-air warheads as well as one-third of its tactical naval warheads. the russian defense ministry said in 2007 that ground-force tactical nuclear warheads had been eliminated. air defense tactical warheads were reduced by 60%. air force tactical warheads were reduced by 50%. naval tactical warheads were reduced by 30%. guess what? that didn't happen with a treaty. it happened because of what were called presidential nuclear initiatives. our president made the decision, president bush, we didn't need them, dangerous, reduce them. the russians followed. now, we estimate -- i heard an estimate earlier of

2,000-something, 3,000 -- this is according to "the bulletin of atomic scientists." you know, we estimate they have a large inventory of operational nonstrategic warheads, 5,390 is the number here, tactical warheads, air defense tactical, et cetera. so they still do have more. and it still is a very legitimate concern to us. that is why -- that is why, my colleagues, in the resolution of advice and consent, we have the following declaration: the senate calls upon the president to pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the russian federation that would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the russian federation and of the united states and would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. that's one thing we say that's

tactical. that's in the resolution. you can vote for that. in addition we say, recognizing the difficulty the united states has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the russian federation, the senate urges the president to engage the russian federation with the objects of, one, establishing cooperative measures to give each party to the new start treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the other pared, and, two, providing the united states or other international assistance to help the russian federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of all of its tactical and nuclear weapons. so, mr. president, i'm prepared, if that language doesn't satisfy folks, let's go a little further. i'm happy to do that. but we're not going to do it in a way that precludes us from going to the very negotiations

that you want to have it just doesn't make sense. not to mention the fact that it puts the entire treaty back into negotiating play. who knows how long it will be. the estimates i have from the negotiating team could take two years, three years. we've already been a whole year without inspections, a whole year of not knowing what they're doing. ly talk tomorrow in the security briefing about the impact that has on our intelligence and the dissatisfaction in the intelligence community with a prolonged and continued delay in getting that. so i simply say to my colleagues let's do what's smart here. secretary clinton said, the new start treaty was always intended to replace start. that was the decision made by the bush administration. i want to emphasize again, president obama was not the person who trade the decision not to senate -- who made the decision not to extend start i.

neither of us wanted to do it because under this start agreement, we actually put in a better system and, one, let me add that general chilton emphasis reduces the constraints on missle defense. reduce them. so here's what secretary clinton says further, i would underscore the importance of ratifying the new start treaty to have any chance of us beginning to have a serious negotiation over tract kal nuclear weapons. now some -- tactical nuclear weapons. some senators are saying, why didn't they address them at the same time? why didn't they go in and say, why didn't we get this done? why didn't we get that done? for a couple of reasons. one, russia's tactical weapons are primarily a threat to our allies in europe. and knowing the differences of that equation to have linked our own strategic interests to that

negotiation at that time would have left us who knows how long without the capacity to get an agreement, number one. number two, last year when we began the negotiations on new start, nato was in the midst of working out its new stratigic concept. our allies were in the midst of assessing their security needs. so it really would have been impossible to really have that discussion without them having made that assessment and -- and -- and resolved their own security needs and definitions. but now nato has completed that stratigic concept. we've heard from a lot of european governments about new start. what do they say about new start? what do our allies say? we're not in this ballgame all alone. they are united in support for this treaty in part because they see it as the necessary first step to be able to have the negotiations that bring the

reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. let me quote sekorksi, poland's foreign minister said, without a new start treaty in place, holes will appear in the nuclear umbrella that the u.s. provides to poland and other allies, the collective security guarantee for nato weapons. new start is a necessary stepping stone to future negotiations with russia about its tactical nuclear weapons. so they believe you've got to pass start to get to this discussion. this is the lithuania foreign minister, we see this treaty as a prologue, as an entrance to talks about sub strategic weaponry, which is much more dangerous and quite difficult to detect and we living in east europe especially know this. and the secretary general of nato said this -- quote -- "we need transparency and reductions

of short-range tactical weapons in europe. this is a key concern for allies, but we cannot address this disparity until the new start treaty is ratified." i don't know how many times, you know, you sort of have to make this connection. general chilton, who's -- who's in charge of our nuclear forces said this to the armed services committee, "the most proximate threat to the united states, us, are the icbm and slbm weapons because they can and are able to target the u.s. homeland and deliver a devastating effect on this country. so we appropriately focused in those areas in this particular treaty for stratigic reasons. tactical nuclear weapons don't provide the proximate threat that the icbm and slbm do. the disparity in the russian and

tactical arsenals, i have are repeat, we want to address it i'm prepared to put something in here if the senator from idaho thinks we can find the language as we did with senator demint who has very strong language in here about missle defense, let's put it in here. but it doesn't put us at a stratigic disadvantage. secretary gates and admiral mullen stated in -- in -- in response to our questions for the record -- quote -- "because of their limited range and very different roles played by stratigic nuclear forces, the vast majority of nuclear weapons bush russian nuclear weapons could not directly influence the stratigic balance between the united states and russia." maybe you want to listen to what donald rumsfeld said to the foreign relations committee a few years ago -- quote -- "i don't know that we would ever want symmetry between the united states and russia in tactical nuclear weapons. their circumstances is

different. and their geography is different." general chilton said, russian tactical weapons do not directly influence the stratigic balance between the u.s. an russia. -- and russia. numerical symmetry exists in a number of weapons, we estimate that russia possesses when considered in the context of our total capability and given forced levels of structure in new start, this acemetery is not adessed to affect -- affect the stratigic ability of the united states and russia. we have a couple of other colleagues who want to say something. let me say to my colleagues about the process as we go forward here. there's some talk now that we're reefg a point we're on day -- reaching this a point. we're on day five, wednesday afternoon, thursday, friday, saturday, sunday. start i took five days.

if we filed a cloture petition at some point in the evening, for instance, we would still have two days before we even vote on that. two whole days before we vote on that and then presuming we were to achieve it, we have 30 hours after that which can amount to almost two days in the senate. that would mean nine days if we go that distance, we would have nine days on a treaty that is simpler than start i. we would have more days on this treaty, simpler on start i, than we had on all moscow start i, start ii treaties put together. the majority leader has given the time to this effort. we're giving time to it. we would have a time to vote on each amendment, deliberate each amendment, but i think it's important to us to consider a --

the road ahead here. i reserve the balance of our time. the presiding officer: the senator from georgia's recognized. mr. chambliss: mr. president, i rise today in support of the risch amendment and the distinguished senator from massachusetts just helped make the case as to why this amendment is so important. i -- in every hearing we've had in armed services and intelligence, every conversation i've had either in person, by telephone with every administration official, everyone who's in support of this, i raised the issue not of what's in the treaty as being the most significant thing in my mind, but the issue of what's not in there and that's the issue of tactical weapons. i hear what the senator's saying. and what you reinforce to me is that we've been talking to the russians about tactical weapons for over two decades and we have not yet been able to get them to sit down at the table with us. and if we get them now, when? i understand what the president

said that he's going to make a real effort to get them to the table, but we -- you get them to the table when you have leverage. the russians want this treaty. they want this treaty bad. we had the opportunity, in my opinion, to discuss tactical weapons with them to get them to the table for this treaty. but we didn't take the opportunity to do that. so i am rising today, mr. president, to talk about the issue of tactical nuclear weapons with respect to new start and the two amendments that have been filed on this issue, the risch amendment as well as an amendment filed by senator lemieux. we all know that tactical nuclear weapons is one of the issues that the treaty does not address and also an area where there's huge disparity between the united states and the russians relative to the numbers of weapons. perhaps most importantly, the intent of arms control treaties is to control and limit arms in order to create predictability

and security. and by not addressing tactical nuclear weapons in this treaty, we have left the least predictable and the least secure weapons in our nuclear inventories out of discussion. russia has somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000 weapons. i don't know what the numbers have been. there have been some numbers bantered around here. the numbers vary widely and the point is we don't know. and that is the real problem with tactical weapons. many of these nuclear weapons are near eastern europe in proximity to u.s. troops as well as to our allies. these weapons are different. not primarily in terms of how powerful they are because the warheads are in some cases similar in size to stratigic nuclear weapons. instead they're different primarily in terms of the range of the delivery systems. the russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons is at least 5-1.

could be as high as 10-1. again, we don't know because they won't tell us. it is also the case that the u.s. and russia both agreed in the 1990's to reduce tactical nukes. the united states has, but we don't know that the russians have. they said they have. but do we really trust the russians? we shouldn't. in fact, we have cited the -- and in -- we have cited the expansion of nato as a change in the -- in the stratigic landscape since then. tactical weapons are the least secure nuclear weapons in our nuclear inventories. they are deliverable by a variety of means and for these reasons are more of a threat of being stolen, misplaced or mishandled than stratigic nukes. it is a mistake and unfortunate that this treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons, because in an adwreement to reduce --