focus. relative to the overall security to the united states and the world, it is, frankly, more important than reducing and controlling stratigic nuclear weapons. briefly on senator risch's amendment, the amendment would add a statement to the preamble of the treaty which addresses the relationship between the nonrelationship and stratigic offensive arms. that is, the relationship between the stratigic and tactical nuclear weapons. senator risch's amendment is correct in that as the number of stratigic offensive arms is reduced, this relationship becomes more pronounced and requires an even greater need for transparency and accountability and that the disparity between the parties' arsenals could undermine predictability and stability. we are reducing stratigic nuclear weapons under this treaty. by doing see we're making tactical nuclear weapons much more important and much more

relevant and, therefore, we should seek to achieve great transparency and accountability on both our side a as well as on the russian side. that brings me to the second amendment which is not pending but which is filed and which i'm a cosponsor and that is senator lemieux's amendment. that would require the u.s. and the ruins enter into negotiations within one year of ratification to address the disparity in nuclear weapons. both of these amendments address what i believe is one of the most crucial issues and one of the issues the treaty should have addressed but didn't and i urge my colleagues to support both these amendments, but particularly today the risch amendment. the presiding officer: who yields time?

the senator from idaho. mr. risch: the proponents of the amendment have how much tiesm leftimeleft? the presiding officer: 15 minutes. mr. risch: we've 15 minutes left, other than my 10 minutes of closing? the presiding officer: that's correct. mr. risch: i would yield the floor to senator sessions. mr. sessions: mr. president, i would be asked to be vied of four minutes. mr. president, i think senator risch is correct and senator chambliss is correct to make the point that tactical nuclear weapons are more available for theft and to transship than stle-- than strategic nuclear weapons and it is a high policy of the united states to reduce the risk of

terrorists obtaining weapons of this kind, and this treaty does nothing about that. it does nothing about tactical nuclear weapons, which the russians care about; it is a big part apparently of their defense strategy. and they gave not one wit on it. and whereas our president, who says he wants to move towards zero nuclear weapons in the world, a fan taft cal view -- a fantastical view really, one which endangers our world, creates instability around the world and would he create more national security risk -- did not negotiate this in any effective way. i think that was a failure of the treaty, a failure of negotiations, another example of the fact that we wanted the treaty too badly for what i guess is primarily public

relations matters rather than substantive matters. that's just the way i see t and so the russians have been steadily reducing our strategic weapons. we're reducing ours. and this strategic relationship has been moving along. it does not have to have a treaty. we'd like to have a treaty. i think the russians would probably like to have a treaty. but it's not essential that we have one, if they won't agree to some of the things that are important, like tactical nuclear weapons. i do think that this is a weakness in the treaty, and i'm disappointed our negotiators didn't insist on it. as mr. mr. fies said, he said tt the -- you just have to say no.

and then you can move forward once the russians know we're not going to give. but they will push, push, push until you -- they are satisfied you are not going to give on it. and then they will make a rational decision at that point whether to go forward with the treaty or not go forward with the treaty. he said "no" on curtailment of missile defense in 2002678 the russians insisted, insisted, insisted and he said finally, no treaty. we don't have a treaty with china, with england, we don't have one with india. they have nuclear weapons. we don't have to have one with you. we'd like to. and at that point the russians conceded and agreed. so i don't think we negotiated this at autumn. we do not need to continue with this large disparity between tactical weapons an in the unitd states and russia. i appreciate senator risch for

raising it. i'll perhaps talk a little later about the national missile defense question and president obama's letter. but president obama's letter -- the presiding officer: the senator has consumed four minutes. mr. sessions: i'll finish up. mr. kerry: will the senator yield for just a question? mr. sessions: on my time or yours? mr. kerry: we can share the time. depends on how long you take to answer. mr. sessions: well, i'm not giving up any time on this side on the president's letter. what it fails to acknowledge is that we were on the cusp of implanting a g.b.i. in europe about 2016, and that was completely given up in the course of these negotiations. this is the same missile we have in the ground in alaska and california. that was given up, and we're now proceeding with a phase iv theory that might be completed

by 2020 if congress appropriates the money for the next five congresses, and some president who's then in office, not president obama ten years from now, is still supportive and pushes it through and congress passes it. so this is a big mistake. we made a major, major concession on national missile defense, and even put words in the treaty that compromise our ability to do the new treaty, because -- the statement of mr. putin that we'll be obliged to take action in response did not say just g.b.i. it also referred to the capabilities of an sm-3 iib that would be what the president said is going to be deployed in 2020. i thank the chair and thank senator risch and yield the floor. mr. barrasso: mr. president?

the presiding officer: the senator from wyoming. mr. barrasso: mr. president, could you let me know when i've used four of the five misseens that i'm going to have here. i rise today to support the amendment by my friend and colleague and next-door neighbor on the foreign relations committee as well as my next-door neighbor of state, senator risch. i want to discuss the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, also known as tactical nuclear weapons. while the united states and russia have a rough equivalence in their strategic nuclear weapons, there is a significant imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons, and it favors russia. russia currently has a 10:1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, and it is expected that the number of tactical nuclear weapons in russia will continue to grow. well, this imbalance directly impacts our security commitments to nato and to our other european allies. mr. president, i've been to the hearings in the foreign relations committee as a member of the committee. we hear that there were

statements by former secretaries of state of both parties. henry kissinger testified before the committee. he said that the large russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons unmatched by a comparable american deployment could threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrents. and former secretary james schlesinger called this imbalance russia's tactical nuclear weapons, he casted eight the frustrating, vexatious and increasingly worrisome issue. and in the past, many current members of the united states senate have expressed their concerns with russia's tactical nuclear weapons. even vice president biden when he was a member of this body, when he was on the foreign relations committee, spoke and said, we were hoping in start iii to control tactical nuclear

weapons. they are the weapons that are shorter-range and are used at shorter distances referred to as tactical nuclear weapons. well, mr. president, as i look at this and work through this, it seems that clearly this administration did not make tactical weapons a top arms control and nonproliferation objective in the new start treaty. the negotiators of this treaty did not make this issue a priority. and they gave in to pressure from russia to exclude the mention of tactical nuclear weapons. so i want to point out that while the administration failed to negotiate the reduction of russian tactical weapons in the new start treaty, it did allow a legally binding limitation of u.s. missile defense, and that's, i believe, a mistake. so i disagree with those who argue that ratifying the new

start treaty is needed in order to deal with tactical nuclear weapons in the future. now, i believe that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should have been addressed together with the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons in the new start treaty. the administration lost a real opportunity by not negotiating a deal in this treaty. it is unclear what leverage will remain for us to negotiate a reduction in russian tactical nuclear weapons. mr. president, the risch amendment tries to resolve the complete failure of the administration to address russia's advantage in tactical nuclear weapons in the new start treaty. the risch amendment acknowledges the interrelationship between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic range weapons, which grows as strategic warheads are reduced. the risch amendment seeks greater transparency -- the presiding officer: the sn te

senator has consumed four minutes. mr. barrasso: thank you, mr. president. mr. president, the risch amendment seeks greater transparency, greater accountability of tactical nuclear weapons, and the risch amendment recognizes that tactical nuclear weapons can undermine stability. so with that, mr. president, i support this amendment. i urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment and i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from idaho. mr. risch: i understand we've four and a half minutes left, plus my ten minutes at the very end. the presiding officer: that's correct. mr. risch: and senator corker has indicated that he would like to take those 4 1/2 minutes. so i would yield the floor to senator corker. mr. corker: thank you, senator. i appreciate that very much, mr. president. i appreciate the courtesy. i wanted to follow up -- i think senator kerry was down here earlier today talking a little bit about proceeding. i know we have people in the cloakroom wondering how we go

forward with the amendment process. so i just thought, if i could enter into a conversation with him through this, this, unlike most procedures, where you have a 60-vote cloture, you're -- your ability or your strength on the issue itself rises because it actually takes 67 votes or two-thirds of those voting to actually ratify a treaty. so it is not like when a cloture vote goes by here and you go from a 60-vote cloture from 51. in this case you're actually strengthened because it takes more votes after cloture to actually pass this piece of legislation. and i just wanted to, if i could, to verify with senator kerry the process of actually offering amendments, not just on the treaty, because i know we're still on the treaty, but also on the resolution of ratification where i think numbers of amendments might actually be approved and accepted.

mr. kerry: mr. president, the senator -- mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, the senator from tennessee is absolutely correct, obviously. the key question here is, is there sufficient support to ratify the treaty? and once we get to that sort of question postcloture, when and if that is invoked, that's what the threshold would be for the passage of this item. it is not as if you have cloture and all of a sudden, boom, 51 votes necessary to pass it. secondly, i would sty my colleague -- i want to emphasize this -- if the majority leader were to put the cloture motion in this evening, it doesn't ripen until tuesday. and so we would have the rest of today, all of tomorrow and tuesday to have amendments, continue as we are now, and then if it did pass, we'd have another 30 hours, which as we

all know, takes the better part of probably two days. so we're looking at conceivably thursday under that kind of a schedule -- and i know a lot of senators are hoping not to be here on thursday. so i think that's quite a lot of time within the context of this. but the senator is correct. the answer is to his is "yes." mr. corker: if i could ask one other question. if a senator colls to the floor and wants to offer -- if a senator comes to the floor and wants to offer an amendment not on the treaty itself -- which we realize are more difficult to pass because of what that means as a result of our negotiations with russia, but if they wanted to offer an amendment on the resolution of ratification, which is something that might likely be successful and accepted, it's my understanding, all they have to do is come down an offer that he amendment, call up -- or ask unanimous consent to call it up, is that correct? mr. kerry: mr. president, without the help of the parliamentarian -- but obviously

we're expwield to do a lot by unanimous consent here. and that is one of those things. we will not object obviously. we want to try to help our colleagues be able to put those amendments in. it would be without objection on our side. mr. corker: so, it is my understanding to be able to track with other senators -- talk with other senators who have an interest in the treaty itself and would like to do some things to strengthen it, it is my understanding that what i just heard was the chairman of the foreign relations committee would be more than willing to accommodate unanimous consent requests to actually offer amendments to the resolution itself and that he knows of no one on their side that would -- at present that woul would objeo that. so if people wanted to go back and forth between the treaty and the resolution itself, they now can do that on the floor. mr. kerry: that's correct. mr. corker: thank you, mr. president. mr. kerry: i thank the senator from tennessee. mr. president, i will yield five minutes to the distinguished

chairman of the armed services committee, senator levin, to be followed by seven minutes to the senator from oregon. i would as -- i would ask the senator from oregon, is that enough time, is seven minutes enough time for the senator from oregon? thank you. i would thank the chair and reserve the balance of our time. mr. levin: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from michigan. mr. levin: mr. president, the risch amendment states a concern which is a legitimate concern. i think probably everybody would agree to that. this concern has been there in the start i treaty. it was there in the moscow treaty just a few years ago. that we need to address the imbalance or the -- yeah, the imbalance, i guess is a good word, between the number of strategic nuclear weapons that exist on both sides and the nonstrategic nuclear weapons. but that was true during start i

in 1991, when president bush negotiated it. there was no effort to, in effect, kill the treaty with an amendment stating that concern, although it was a concern then. during the moscow treaty debate here in 2002, i believe senator biden again raised the same concern about this imbalance. it is a legitimate concern, but you don't kill a treaty because there's some legitimate concerns about issues. the russians have concern about our large number of warehoused warheads. we have a big inventory of warheads compared to them. they have a concern. we could state that as a fact, the russians have a concern about the number of warheads that we have. but putting that into the treaty kills the treaty. we could make any statement of legitimate concern. if it's in the treaty text, it will kill the treaty. now, senator biden in 2002, i

believe -- or it may have even better in the first start treaty -- raised this issue about the imbalance and it was a legitimate issue, but there was no effort to kill that treaty which had been negotiated by president bush by inserting a legitimate concern into the treaty. there's a number of legitimate concerns. the russians have legitimate concerns about our conventional capability, about accuracy, about our encryption capabilities. they were not addressed adequately for the russians in this treaty, but they have a concern. should we state in the treaty the fact of legitimate concern -- excuse me. yeah, should we by an amendment attempt to insert in the treaty the factual statement of a legitimate concern, just kills the treaty. and that's what concerns me, as to why it is that there is such

a determination to try to kill this treaty by means of an amendment which states a legitimate concern which has been true during the last two treaties negotiated by two president bushes. that's what troubles me. and that was the difference that senator corker pointed out, between seeking to amend a resolution and seeking to amend a treaty. so to senator risch, through the chair, i happen to share the same concern that the senator has about this imbalance, as chairman of the armed services committee. this imbalance existed in 2002. it existed in 1991. and we ought to address it. but we don't address it by killing this treaty, and that's what this amendment does. now, despite the absence of this language expressing a legitimate concern, we have support for this treaty by former president george h.w. bush, secretaries brown, car liewchy, cohen,

perry, and schlesinger support this treaty without this language. it was true that former secretary schlesinger said, for instance, he has a concern about this imbalance. i think we all do. he stated that concern. he still supports the treaty without this language, without this expression of concern. secretaries albright -- former secretaries of state albright, baker, christopher, eagleburger, kissinger, powell, rice, schultz support the treaty without this language. they have the same concerns. as a matter of fact, i believe that it was senator sessions -- it may have been someone else -- who said that former secretary kissinger has expressed this concern. in fact, quoted, i believe, from secretary -- former secretary kissinger's writing on this issue. he has that same concern which senator risch and all of us have about this imbalance. but without the language, former secretary kissinger still

supports this treaty. so all i can say is, i think there's a legitimate concern which is expressed in this amendment, it's a concern which has existed and needs to be addressed, as former senator biden said when he was debating a treaty, but not to kill a treaty by expression of a legitimate concern. and so that's what i think the issue here is, not whether or not the language in the risch amendment expresses something which is legitimate but whether or not the absence of that concern being expressed in the treaty should be enough to vote for this amendment and to kill this treaty as a result and to force it back to an open-ended negotiation which we have no idea where that would lead. so i hope we defeat the risch amendment not because we disagree with what the concern is but because, understanding that concern, we don't want to do damage to the treaty and kill a treaty which does so much for

the security of this nation. i yield the floor, and if i have any time left, i yield the balance of my time. the presiding officer: the senator from oregon. mr. merkley: mr. president, i'd like to add a few dmoants those of the senator from -- comments to those of the senator from michigan. first of all, i'd like to observe that this treaty encompasses fairly modest reductions in our strategic force. we are looking at icbms reduced from about 450 to about 420. in some cases those icbms being reduced in terms of the number of warheads they're carrying, but modest reductions. when we look at submarine-launched ballistic missiles, we're looking at a fleet of 14 trident submarines, we're looking at keeping all 14 of those. reducing the number of silos on each submarine from about 24 to 20. so, again, a modest reduction. indeed, two of those subs will be in drydock at any one given

point in time and they do not count against the numbers in this -- in this treaty. in bombers, we're looking at 18 stealth missiles currently and keeping -- stealth bombers and keeping all 18 or b-2, as they are known. we look at a modest reductions in our fleet, our aging, ancie ancient, antique fleet of b-52's, modest reductions there. so the -- in its entirety, what this vept represents is modest changes to the existing structure negotiated by a republican administration and maintenance of verification regimes incredibly important to our national security. it's in that context that we have to look at various amendments being raised that if they were sincere about their purpose, they be added to the resolution we're passing, but if their real spurp to kill -- purpose is to kill the treaty, then, of course, it comes in the

form of an amendment to the treaty which would effectively, in fact, do that. and so let's look at the structure of the issues that were put forward here. the first, the goal of this start treaty is to address strategic, not short-range tactical nuclear weapons, which have never been covered by a treaty, including those negotiated by a republican administration. second, tactical nuclear weapons are categorically different than strategic arms because they do not pose an immediate catastrophic threat to the united states homeland that strategic weapons do. with shorter range and smaller yield, they are intended for battlefield use. and i would note the quotation for general chilton, commander of the united states strategic command, who said, "the most proximate threat to the u.s. are the icbm and slbm weapons because they can and are able to target the u.s. homeland and deliver a devastating effect to this country. so we are appropriately focused in those areas that are of

particular -- we are appropriately focused in those areas in the particular treaty for strategic reasons. tactical nuclear weapons don't have the proximate threat that icbm an and slbms do." i also note that if you look at this from the russian perspective, we have tactical weapons deployed in europe, numerous european nations have tactical weapons which can reach the soviet -- or the reach the russian federation, formerly the soviet union. meanwhile, because of our superiority at sea, the soviet -- or the russian tactical weapons do not represent the same kind of threat to the united states. i'd then note that we have already addressed this issue in the senate ratification resolution, which states, "the president should pursue, following consultation with allies and agreement with the rush federation, that would address a disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the russian federation and the united states that would secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a

verifiable manner." so it's already in -- in the resolution of ratification. and then i would note that gates and clinton, secretary gates, secretary clinton, said in a letter, "we agree with the senate foreign relations committee's call in the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the new start treaty to pursue an agreement with the russians to address them." tablght catactical weapons repra thorny issue because it involves the european powers, it involves disparities of geography. it is why it's been so hard to link them in the foos a nuclear treaty -- foos past to a stratc nuclear treaty and why they are not done so in this case. but it is the commitment by the secretary of defense, by the secretary osecretary of state, e president and by the senate to pursue this issue that is important and that is what is before us now. so in terms of addressing this issue, if there are changes that need to be made to the language, to the ratification resolution, that would be appropriate. but ending this treaty, which

greatly enhances the security of the united states of america by providing the appropriate verification protocols, is absolutely essential. thank you, mr. president. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, how much time do we still have? the presiding officer: you have 16 minutes remaining. mr. kerry: 16? and the senator from idaho has 10? the presiding officer: 10 minutes. mr. kerry: so somehow we're going past the hour of 3:00. okay. a senator: unless, of course, you want to yield some time back. mr. kerry: do you want to yield some time back? let me use a portion it was and i'll yield some back at the end, mr. president. first of all, both bill perry, former defense secretary bill perry, and jim schlesinger have been mentioned and the commission that they served on. let me make certain that the record is clear about their

position with respect to this treaty. secretary perry said the following, "the focus of this treaty is on deployed warheads and it does not attempt to counter or control nondeployed warheads. this continues in the tradition of prior arms control treaties. i would hope to see nondeployed and tactical systems included in future negotiations, but the absence of these systems should not detract from the merits of this treaty and the further advantage in arms control which it represents." jim schlesinger, from the same commission, said, "the ratification of this treaty is obligatory." i wish more of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle were here to hear jim schlesinger's comments, but he says ratification is oh blib obligat. and the reason it's oh blig story you really -- obligatory is you really can't get to the

discussion you want to have with the russians regarding tactical unless you show the good faith to have the strategic verification and reduction structure in place. now, mr. president, let me just say, supposing that the senator from idaho's language was adopted here. would it mean we're reducing tactical nuclear weapons? no. would it get you any further down the road to be able to reduce them? the answer is not only would it not do that, it would set back the effort to try to get those reductions because the russians will not engage in that discussion if you can't ratify the treaty, and if they pass this amendment, this treaty is, as senator levin said, it's de dead, it goes back to the russian government with a provision that is now linking those weapons in a way that they haven't been willing to talk about, even engage in the

discussion at this point in time. so in fact, we'd be setting ourselves backwards if that amendment were put into affect. what's oi ronic, he's amending a component of the treaty that has no legal impact whatsoever. there's nothing legally binding in the language that he would pass that would force them to negotiate. so it's a double setback, if you will. i simply say to my friend on the other side and i talk to him privately about this and i think he's open-minded on it. we have language in the resolution right now with respect to nuclear weapons. we're not ignoring the issue. the language says we call -- the senate calls on the president following consultation with allies to get an agreement with the russian federation on tactical nuclear weapons. now, i'm prepared in the resolution of ratification to

entertain language as a declaration that would also make the senate's statement clear about how we see those nuclear weapons in terms of their threat and i hope that would address the concerns of many of our colleagues on the area side of the aisle. but the bottom line here is that senator risch's language not only does it make any progress on the topic that he's concerned about, it actually sets back the capacity to be able to make the progress that he wants to make. now, if you want to limit russia's tactical nuclear weapons, and i do and he does, and i think all 100 united states senators do, then you have to pass the new start. you've got to approve the new start. and if you reject it, you're forcing a renegotiation which never gets you not only to the -- to the -- to the tactical

nuclear weapons, but which leaves you completely questionable as to where you're going to go on the stratigic nuclear weapons, which means the world is less safe, we've lost our leverage significantly with respect to iran, north korea. we have certainly muddied the relationship significantly with respect to russia, we've unpushed the restart button and we've opened up who knows what kind of can of worms with respect to a whole lot of cooperative efforts that are important to us now. not the least of which, i might add, is the war in afganistan where russia is currently cooperating with us in providing a secondary supply route and assisting us in other ways with respect to iran. so i -- i just say let's not do something that we know unravels all of these particular components. any time you -- you change that resolution ratification, it's like pulling, you know, a piece of string on -- on a sweater or

aian roll and -- yarn roll and everything unravels. one piece undoes another piece and undoes another piece. that's not where we want to go. so, mr. president, i hope that we will say no to this amendment and proceed on. i will reserve the balance of our time. the presiding officer: who yields time? mr. risch: mr. president, under the u.c., i believe i have the last 10 minutes. am i correct on that? i think that was the u.c. the presiding officer: the chair believes that is correct. mr. risch: okay, thank you. so when i start at the conclusion of my 10 minutes, we'll vote. the presiding officer: the chair believes that is correct. mr. risch: thank you.

the presiding officer: correction, the senator from massachusetts still has 10 minutes remaining. mr. risch: my understanding is that he can use that at any time and get the last 10. mr. kerry: unless the senator says something completely outrageous, which he has mogd to not do -- managed to not do in the last three hours, i will not need to use it. mr. risch: thank you, senator. i'll try not to disappoint you in that regard. well, mr. president, fell year senators, distinguished chairman and ranking member, i think certainly we've had a civil and a good airing of an issue that is of considerable concern to i think every member of this body. i'm -- i'm a little disappointed

in that we started out acknowledging that it was a -- a very deep and serious concern to every member of this body as it was to the commission in their report on america's stratigic posture and i felt along the line a little bit the concern was denigrated and i -- i want to back up on that one more time and say that in my judgment and in the judgment of members of this commission, the issue of tactical weapons exceeds in severity and concern the issue of stratigic weapons. now, i understand one might argue that you're arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, as opposed to which -- which really is of the most concern. but i've come back to -- and the reasons i gave as to why i think that the tactical issue is more

important than the stratigic issue. and that is on the stratigic issue, we're in about the same position we were in 40 years ago with the exception, and admittedly an important exception, that the raw fums are down. -- numbers are down. when we started this each party had about 6,000 warheads. as i said, if either party pulled the trigger and launched 6,000 or some significant part of that, obviously that's -- that's the -- the teeter ens that each -- deterrence that each party was counting on that neither would do that. today we're down to and with all due respect to my good friend from massachusetts, the numbers reported in the press are 1,100 and 2,100 and i understand that there's intelligence information that we can't go into here. but in any event most people would agree that we have the advantage in numbers from a

stratigic standpoint. and, indeed if -- if the numbers are even close to that, the -- whether it's 6,000 warheads or 1,000 warheads, when someone pulls the trigger, the party's over for this world. and so focusing on the raw numbers when we've got a 40-year history that we aren't going to do that and they're not going to do and most people agree that neither side is inclined to pull the trigger, what are the real concerns? the real concerns with an accidental launch from them, although remote, possible, but more importantly an intentional launch from a rogue neighbor. one would look at north korea or iran in that regard. and so in my judgment, the two issues that really need to be focused on are the defensive

missle issue and the tactical nuclear weapons issue. now, let me say, i agree with my good friend from massachusetts and senator levin, that geography is such that tactical weapons -- the issue of tactical weapons is substantially more important on a direct basis to the russians than it is to us. afterall, we have oceans on each side of us to the east and to the west which the russians don't enjoy. they've had a 100-year history of seeing invasions come by land and enter immediately, which we don't have. and so in that regard i will concede certainly that the tactical issue is important for them. and the good senator from massachusetts makes a good point in that i -- i think they would like to relocate, if they could, their tactical weapons to be focused more on the chinese threat and perhaps more on the

threat from the south from other countries and we ought to help them out in that regard by entering into negotiations in that regard on the tactical weapons. but i come back to them, the tactical weapons are an important issue. senator levin says they are a concern. senator levin says we shouldn't kill this treaty simply because of a concern. and i agree with senator levin. i have not from day one said that we ought to kill this treaty. i have said from day one everyone has convinced me and i think virtually everyone else, that we are much better off with the treaty than we are without a treaty. and i think everyone has worked in good faith in that regard. but on the other hand having said that, i don't think we should then throw in the towel and say, well, okay, we will agree to any treaty and that

brings me point to of where we are. we are exercising our constitutional right that every one of us has, not only our right, but as a -- but a duty as a united states senator to advise and consent on this treaty and any other treaty put in front of us, and that's where i have problems. the position we've been put in is these negotiations have gone on, the treaty has been negotiated, it has been signed by the president, and it's been put in front of us and what we're told is it's a take it or leave it. if you don't vote for this, you're voting to kill the treaty. now, i disagree with that. i think simply because we amend the preamble to this treaty is not a killer. indeed, my good friend from massachusetts tells us the treaty doesn't -- the preamble doesn't mean anything, it's throwaway. the language is throwaway.

it really doesn't mean anything. well, it does mean something particularly when it comes to the context in which you interpret and you react to the treaty. so to everyone here i say, you have the opportunity to set the restart button with russia. and we can do it by focusing on what is an extremely important issue which most everyone here agrees is an extremely important issue but nobody ever does anything about it. so let's tell the negotiators, go back to the table and at least agree that the interrelationship between a stratigic and tactical weapons is a really, really important issue. and we're not just going to go on like we have over the last 40 years. the times have changed that we trust you're not going to pull the trigger on us and you trust that we're not going to pull the

trigger on you. but this issue of tactical weapons where we enjoy, if you would, a 10-1 disadvantage to the russians, we have are tactical weapons that are out there that can be much more easily gotten a hold of by terrorists than stratigic weapons. we have tactical weapons that continue to be designed, continue to be manufactured, and continue to be deployed by the other side in violation of their -- their admittedly individual presidential initiatives needs to be addressed and it's so important that people on this commission said that it really should be addressed before stratigic weapons. you have the opportunity to put that in here. there is no intent to kill this. it is an intent to make it better. we have the right. we have the duty. we have -- we must advise and

consent. i urge that my colleagues vote in favor of this very good amendment. thank you, mr. president. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i think conscious has time expired on their -- the presiding officer: the senator from idaho has slightly less than a minute left. mr. kerry: mr. president, let me just say as i yield back time providing -- mr. risch: is the next -- is the vote -- mr. president, the next vote going to be on this amendment or are the judges going to be voted on first? the presiding officer: that is correct. the next vote is on the risch amendment. mr. risch: thank you. mr. kerry: i will yield back the time momentarily. i want to say one inning, the -- one thing, the two principal officers are bill perry who says the absence of the -- the b

absence of the tactical nuclear should not detract from the merits of this treaty and he is in favor of our ratifying this treaty and jim schlesinger who was his co-author, who worked with republican presidents as secretary of defense and secretary of energy said that the ratification of this treaty is obligatory. i yield back the balance of my time. mr. risch: can i have my last minute? the presiding officer: the senator from idaho. mr. risch: mr. president, and, senator kerry, i respect that. i would remind everyone that i filed the letter dated december 17, senator kerry and senator lugar from six members of the commission including james schlesinger, which says that dealing with this imbalance is urgent, referring to the tactical weapons -- dealing with this imbalance is urgent and some commissioners would give priority to this over taking

further steps to reduce the number of operationally deployed stratigic nuclear weapons. i agree both are important. i thank the good chairman, ranking member for a very good dialogue on this particular issue. i yield back my time, mr. president. i ask for the yaings. the presiding officer: i -- the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be a sufficient second. the question is on the risch amendment. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote: