quote -- "the options we provided in this process focused on ensuring america's ability to continue to deter potential adversary, assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. this rigorous approach rooted in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities" -- and here are the key words -- "supports both the agreed-upon limits in the new start and recommendations in the nuclear posture review." the n.p.r. so, general chilton is on record in a number of places as very precisely and specifically saying that the options which were provided, including the one which was adopted here, rooted

in the strategy, rooted in the provisions this a, the guidance which was laid out by president bush, supports the agreed-upon limits in the start treaty. i don't know how much more precise and i don't know how much more significant you can get with the words of the commander that is in charge of these weapons. as to the 1251, the report says up to those numbers. it is not specifically committed to those numbers. and the important thing about that report is not just that it says up to i think in at least two of the three cases, but it also says that it is important that we remain flexible as to this number. to the 700 force structure that's in the treaty retains the nuclear triad, retains all three delivery legs. general chilton on that point

said we're going to retain a triad of nuclear delivery systems. and if there's a failure in one of the delivery systems, we can rearrange our posture and posture within the treaty limits to compensate. some have said that the united states would have to make significant reductions to reach the 700 level and the russians will have to make none. according to general chilton, this argument is a distraction, because what he said is that the new start limits, in his words, "the new start limits the number of russian ballistic missile warheads that can target the united states. missiles that can pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation, regardless of whether russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits without a new start treaty, upon ratification," general chilton said, "they would now be required to do so." and that certainty is very important to our strategic commander, general chilton, because he said that -- quote -- "the constraints of the treaty actually constrain russia with

regard to deployed launchers and deployed strategic weapons and that is an important element as well. without that, they are unconstrained." he explained that the limits were important because without those limits -- quote -- "there would be no constraints placed upon the russian federation as the number of strategic delivery vms or warheads -- vehicles or warheads they could deploy. and i think it is important to the united states," he concluded, "that there be limits there, limits that we would also be bound by, obviously." so, madam president, general chilton is not only comfortable with the limits in this treaty, it was his analysis that formed the underpinning for the 700 limit. he doesn't need the strategic -- the additional 20 strategic nuclear delivery systems to maintain our strong deterrence. and other than to kill this treaty, there is no reason to add these20 additional systems.

we should respect -- these 20 additional systems. we should respect general chilton's judgment that the u.s. can maintain an effective deterrent and that such a change would kill this treaty. i yield the floor and i thank the chair. the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: madam president, i do want to be recognized for the purpose of explaining -- further explaining my amendment number 4833 and also to respond to the senator from massachusetts. before doing that, i would ask if you the senator from south dakota has any responses he'd like to make at this time and then i'd like to keep the floor. mr. thune: thank you. madam president, i thank the senator from oklahoma for giving me an opportunity. the presiding officer: the senator from south dakota. mr. thune: -- giving me an opportunity to respond briefly, if i might, to some of these issues. one of the issues, too, that general chilton, the stratcom commander, i think testified to was an assumption that there would be no cheating.

and as i said before, there are -- history is replete with examples of the russians cheating on these agreements. and furthermore, what they agreed to was a -- not a -- the treaty is 700 but what general chilton and the nuclear force structure plan would call for is 720. it's 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles up to 420 icbms and up to 60 bombers. now, again, that adds up to 720 and that's all this amendment does is simply makes consistent what the nuclear force structure plan, as outlined by general chilton and others, would be with what the treaty requirements would be as well. and again, i want to make one point about this because i said this earlier, but we have 856 launch vehicles, delivery vehicles in our arsenal today. the treaty calls for 700, so we're making 156 delivery

vehicle reduction to get down to the 700 number. the russians today are at 620. they are already below the 700 number and they're headed down even lower, to somewhere in the 400 range. and so we have made a significant concession with respect to delivery vehicles at no cost whatsoever to the russians. and i would point out also, madam president, that -- that the concern i have, as i said before, in taking a 720 number and reducing it to 700 assumes, again, that even if you -- if you keep the 240 submarine-launched ballistic missile delivery vehicles, assume that, and if you assume 420 icbms, you would have to reduce the bomber inventory down to 40 to get under the 700 level. and i think most people understand that it is the bombers, the heavy bombers, that have given us the extended deterrence. they are visible, they are

recallable, they are psychological, they are political. you can put them into a theatre, they can loiter, they can persist and that is a powerful, powerful deterrent to those who would lick to proliferate -- like to proliferate nuclear weapons. and so if we take our bomber fleet and reduce it down to the levels that would be talked about under this treaty, we are putting at great risk, in my view, madam president, the triad. now, a lot of these bombers need to be updated and they're getting older. we need a next-generation bomber which i think is going to be need -- it's going to be critical that that also be a nuclear bomber. but i think it's important to point out that this particular treaty, relative to where we are today and to what our needs could be in the future, particularly as it pertains to bombers, the need for extended deterrence, we are reducing to a level that i think makes many of us uncomfortable and gets below the number that was proscribed in the nuclear force structure plan, as has been outlined. 720 as opposed to 700.

the 700 number is -- is well below where i think we need to be and is it put in peril the triad, which has served us well for a long period of time. in fact, in the early stages of the cold war, it was the bombers, the heavy bomber, that provided the bulk of the work. and when we developed icbms and slbms, now some of the bombers have been converted to conventional use. they've been doing a great job in that mission as well. but it we're going to have extended deterrence into the future, we are going to need to have a very robust bomber fleet that is nuclear capable. and a 700 number puts that in great jeopardy. madam president, with that, i'd yield back to the senator from oklahoma. mr. levin: would the senator yield just for one question before he yields to the senator from oklahoma? the presiding officer: the senator from michigan. mr. levin: if senator thune would yield for a question. is it not true that the section 1251 report says that the numbers which they talk about are up to numbers in the case of both icbms and the nuclear bombers? mr. thune: that is -- my

understanding, madam president, through the chair, that is correct, it is up to -- it states the 240 slbms, up to 420 icbms and up to 60 bombers. mr. levin: so that the 720 number is not proscribed by the the1251 report. that's the total of the three numbers, two of which are up-to numbers; is that correct? mr. thune: that -- madam president, again, to answer the senator from michigan's question, i believe to be the case. that's what the 1251 -- it is not proceed scriptive. all i -- proscriptive. all i'm simply saying if you were to make an assumption, that you were going to take the additional vehicles out of the bomber fleet, you would take that from 60 down to 40 at a time when we have almost 120 bombers in our inventory that. is a significant reduction in our ability to provide extend tendeeddeterrence and the bombee the best form of extended deterrence. mr. levin: i thank the senator and i thank the senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: it's my intention

now -- i made my presentation earlier on and a similar presentation yesterday, and the senator from massachusetts responded -- i'd like to respond to his responses just to clarify some of the things that might be a little unsure. first of all, the senator from massachusetts every senator on our -- that every senator on our side most importantly, unbelievably experienced negotiators who put this treaty together have made a lifetime trying to understand these kinds of relationships in ways and he wanted to expand, which i appreciated, as to how qualified these people were. but here's the problem we have and i think it was articulated by the senator from south dako dakota, that we have a constitutional responsibility. we take an oath of office to uphold the constitution, and one of the things that is up to us -- not somebody else, us, is to provide for a common defense. and article 2, section 2, of the constitution specifically gives us the -- not just the right but the obligation for advice and consent.

and -- and quite often we talk about all these smart people who have agreed with this. well, that leaves one group out and that's us, and we happen to be the ones who are accountable to the people through our elections. the senator from massachusetts also said that the treaty itself, said, talking about the amendment, my amendment, he said that the -- he proposes an amendment to the treaty itself which we all understand now after two votes that it would -- it would kill the treaty. what he's essentially saying, if you amend the treaty, it's dead. i think and that -- that we -- and i think that we need to stop and reevaluate what our responsibility is, not just the constitutional obligation. as the c.r.a. has outlined in its study on the role of the treaty process and the senate, the amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. they amount, therefore, to senator counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed upon by the united states and the other country. if the senate gives its consent to new start with amendments to

the text, the treaty is sent to the russian -- to russia for its approval with the amendments. so both the russian duma and the united states senate have the constitutional right to change the portion of this treaty and it's up to both of them to -- so this reinserts us back into the process. and i -- i feel that is exactly what our -- our founding fathers wanted us to be doing on these treaties and that's what we're trying to do. the third thing that was stated by the senator from massachusetts was talking about the concept of the type i inspections and the type ii inspections. it's a new one. well, it is a new process because type ii inspections are inspections on -- on formerly declared facilities. obviously on the start i treaty, we didn't have formally declared facilities. they came as a result of the -- of the -- of the first treaty.

now, the type i refers to inspections of icbm bases, submarine bases, air bases to confirm the accuracy of declared data, on the number and types of deployed and nondeployed warheads located in icbms, slbms and heavy bombers. and i -- so i -- i would say that it was -- that type ii inspections weren't even addressed in the first -- in the first treaty. the senator also said that -- he said that, we say it again, th that -- he said, "we ought to send this back but it doesn't rise to the level, in my judgment." now, he talks about the level, the significance. all these amendments are significant. each one of us who is an author has a little bit of bias as to -- because we've studied a little bit more in our particular area. i can't think of anything that's more significant than verification. you know, this -- the

interesting thing that was brought out by the senator from north dakota, was general chilton's support. and i'm reading from the report right now. it said, "general chilton's support for the new start levels was predicated on no russian cheating or changes in the geopolitical environment." well, there historically they've been cheating on everything. let me just go ahead and reread what i had said before. we had the meeting, the convention in 2005 and then again five years later, in 2010, came out in may or june of this year, and in the -- that one, talking about biological weapon convention, in 2005, the state department concluded that russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapon program and that its nature and status have not changed. that's what they said in 2005. now, five years later, the new report came out and it says that the -- the state department report states the russia

confidence-building measure in declaration since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether or not its biological program was terminated. therefore, they're saying the same thing five years later and so they lied five years ago and it appears that they have not done what they -- or they cheated, i should say, and they haven't done -- chemical weapons, the same thing. in 2005, the state department assessed that -- quote -- "russia is in violation of its chemical weapons convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declarations of production of and development of facilities." then again in 2010, five years later, the state department again stated that there was an absence of additional information from russia resulting in the united states being able to ascertain whether or not russia has declared." well, again, if it's -- if we're predicating all that general chilton said on the fact that cheating has all of a sudden miraculously stopped, then this

is a great reform measure and i -- but i'd like to see the evidence of it before we assume that that is the case. the senator from massachusetts also stated the people responsible for verification of this treaty would never have been sent to the united states, this treaty would never have been sent to the united states if the treaty did not have adequate verification measures. so it ta÷ -- it talks about all of these verification measures. then he says, it is the judgment of our military, our state department and our intelligence community that the -- that these measures are adequate. well, that may be true with the current -- those that are answering to our president who are strongly in support of this treaty. but if you look at the state department and the military and the intelligence of the past, those comments who -- ho those who commented -- those who commented, james baker states that the start treaty is weaker

than its predecessor, testifying to congress in may of this year, and i happened to be there, testifying that the start treaty does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one of the diverse obligations under start i. this complex part of the treaty -- i'm still quoting -- crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads were allowed than were allowed in the past. insofar as military is concerned, richard perle, former secretary of defense in the reagan administration, he stated on december 2, just a few days ago, "that the new start has very weak verification regime. one that establishes a dangerous precedent and lowers our standard for verification." here's the military way in. he goes on further to say "new start's verification provisions would provide little or no help at detecting -- are off limits

to the u.s. inspections or hidden from our u.s. satellites. james woolsey, i think when you talk about the intelligence, i have a bias with james woolsey. he's from oklahoma. some people don't know that. he was the director of central intelligence from 1993 until 1 1995, he was adviser of the salt i negotiations, delegate at-large to the start and defense and space negotiations. he stated on november 15th, that this treaty, unlike the original start treaty, russia is free to encrypt teleimtri -- there is no longer the requirement for permanent on-site monitoring of russia's primary missle production facility. which under old start helped us

keep track-new mobile missle -- mobile missle entering the soviet force. he goes on and on and that is agreed with the former assistant secretary of verification, compliance and implementation at the u.s. department and state department and pointed out on -- on the 12th of july that the new start has glaring holes in its verification regime. new start is much less verifiable than the original start. now, i only say this because my friend from massachusetts talked about the military, the state department, the intelligence community. one thing that's engained in our system is we have -- ingrained in our system, if we have a president who is commander in chief, he has a lot of influence over the state department and the military. so i think we've heard from some very well-respected people along those lines. then one of the arguments -- or rebuttals that the senator from

massachusetts had against my opening statement yesterday was that be -- we have fewer sites now than we had during the development of the start i treaty. well, this is true, we do have fewer sites. but i think an argument can be made to be very persuasive because most people agree with the fact, if you have fewer sites, you need more inspections. former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security john bolton stated on may 3 of this year that while verification is important in any arms control treaty, verification becomes more important at lower warhead levels. brent scowcroft weighed in the same thing, it provides a buffer because they're high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can

become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating -- vulnerable to cheating on arms control limit concerns about hidden missles and the actions of nuclear third parties. in may of this year in front of the senate foreign relations committee, former secretary of state james baker, summarized that the new start verification regime is weaker than the predecessor, saying -- quote -- "that it does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the -- and then he goes on to say it's more significant as you reduce your number of inspected facilities. and, further, the senator from massachusetts responded to me by saying that they're going to demand the same number of inspections of our military bases as and we'd have to be prepared to host them three times more as the inspections. well, that's true. this is bilateral. everything that we're asking

them to do we have to do too. i like that idea. that means -- he went on to talk about the inconvenience we'd be going to. but my amendment applies to both the united states -- my amendment increases the inspection to both sides which improves confidence, trust, and transparency. it improves our ability to catch the russians cheating and deter the russians from cheating. so i'm fully aware that we have to do the same thing that the russians have to do. furthermore it was stated that by the senator from massachusetts and his response -- in his response to my statement -- quote -- "so i think it's one thing to ask our stratigic nuclear forces to do thrine bases, three bombers and three icbm bases. russia has three submarine bases and 12 icbms. so we're not on parity there. furthermore he stated in a

letter from secretary gates said this last summer said -- he stated he sent him about whether or not the russian would cheat on this treaty in a manner that would be militarily significant. he said, quote, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the joint chiefs commander, the u.s. stratigic command and i assess the russians will not be able to militarily significant cheating. in other words, they're not going to cheat. again, this is the conversation they've had. they talked about -- he talked about -- the senator from massachusetts that -- a senator: would the senator yield for a moment? mr. inhofe: for a moment for a question. for a question. mr. kerry: i think -- i just want to be clear. the senator read my words accurately, which were the quote of the general who said militarily significant. i don't think he said they wouldn't. mr. inhofe: you don't think --

excuse me. mr. kerry: on the issue of cheating, madam president, what he said was he didn't think there would be anything militarily significant. in other words, that had an impact on us. again, this is military that we can go into which we will probably in the classified session. but i think -- i just want that distinction to be clear. mr. inhofe: i thought that's exactly what i said. i podle for the -- i apologize for the misunderstanding. the analysis of the n.i.e., and the potential for russian cheating or breakout kerms that the treaty's verification regime is effective and they're saying it's not. i have to -- i have to always be a little suspect of what comes out of the n.i.e. all of us are. we don't take it as gospel. this actually a true story, back in the clinton administration, august 24, 1998, i asked the question how long will it be

before north korea has a multistage rocket and the response that came back -- this is the 24 of august 1998 was five to 10 years. seven days later on the 31st of august 1998 they fired a three-stage rocket. so i think we need to look at the -- the -- some of the intelligence estimates. they have been wrong in the past. when you're talking about something as significant as the issues we're talking about here, about the threat that's out there, then we have to be right. then the quote from the -- the senator from massachusetts quoted, rice, she said that the new start treaty reinstates verification of russian nuclear forces which lapses with the expiration of the original start treaty next year. well, meaningful verification was a significant achievement of president reagan and george h.w. bush and its reinstatement is crucial. i agree with that.

she's not saying that she supports this. she's saying she supports something, some kind of verification. because at the lapse of the last treaty, there is none today. so anything's better than none, so i think that's what she's saying. she also agreed the next statement she made in "the wall street journal," on december 7, still there are legitimate concerns about new start that must and can be addressed in the ratification process. implying that's there's nothing wrong coming through, having amendments and going back and forth and between the duma and the united states senate coming up with a new treaty. one of the statements that the senator from massachusetts stated in response to mine were -- he said finally i'd like to point out we address the importance of this verification question in -- in the resolution verification, that requires that before a new start can enter into force an every year after, the president has to certify to the senate that our nation technical means in conjunction with the verification activities

provided for a new start treaty are sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of russian compliance with the provisions of the new start treaty and timely warning of the russian preparation. well, here's the problem i have with that, i say through the chair, to my friend. the president can only certify what he knows. and our intelligence experts are telling him what they are seeing in russia. now, this amendment provides the president with more information. so i would think if that's the concern, that -- that we -- that we would want to give the president the -- more information. and, lastly, i see the -- the senator from arizona is here, and i know he wants to be heard. let me mention one last thing that my good friend, the senator from massachusetts, stated. he was talking about the -- about the fact that these are -- are killer amendments and i think it's worth restating what we said before and that is the

c.r.s. as outlined the role of the senate and the treaty process -- quote -- "the amendments are proposed changes in actual text of the treaty. the amount -- they amount to senate counteroffers that offer the original deal agreed upon by the united states to the other country. if the senate gives its consent to new start with amendments to the text, the treaty is sent to russia for approval with an amendment. that means that they would do -- we go back and forth and hopefully come out with a treaty that would be workable. according to the 2000 and 2005 state department reports on arms compliance russia has a bad habit of cheating on these -- on these -- these agreements. in fact, i think we've covered that to -- adequately at this time. with that, i yield the floor. mr. kyl: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl: madam president, i might just take a couple of minutes to talk about the thune

amendment and the inhofe amendment. with respect to the inhofe amendment dealing with verification, we're going to go into an executive session of the senate at 2:00 this afternoon. an opportunity for all senators to examine classified materials that have been presented by our intelligence agencies, some of which relates specifically to the treaty and in particular the verification of the treaty. it's too bad that it's not possible for us to discuss with very much specific specificity the -- the nature of the intelligence that -- that we will be discussing, but i'll just say that i think it's a good thing that we would be voting on the inhofe amendment following that session because a lot of the material that we're going to be exposed to in that executive session relates to the verification provisions of this treaty and passed experience with verification. that's about all that i want to say right now except that i

would hope that colleagues would attend that session because their vote on the inhofe amendment, i think, would be partially predicated on their being briefed in that executive session. with respect to the thune amendment, i very much support the thune amendment as well. and the reason is because the -- the whole point of this treaty was to reduce the nuclear warheads and the delivery vehicles of the russian federation and the united states. so those -- those are the -- that's the essence of the treaty. there's a lot more to it, but it reduces to 1,500 the actual warheads and reduces to 100 the delivery vehicles. there is a counting rule of the delivery vehicles that we don't need to get into here. it is 700 deployed vehicles with another 100 that could theoretically be deployed at a later date.

but 700 is the number. and that's important for a couple of reasons. as we have talked about before, the russians will actually have room to build up. there are a lot of different estimates of the number of delivery vehicles that they are planning on having, but because missiles and bombers and submarines are expensive, the russians could -- could be well below that number in a few years. and so that number doesn't help the united states at all. the russians are already below it by at least -- well, over 100, and they will be going lower than that. one unfortunate consequence of that is that they are merving their icbm delivery vehicles in a way that obviously is going to be much more destabilizing. throughout the cold war, both sides developed missiles that allowed them to put more than one warhead on the top of a missile. and the problem is that that's very destabilizing in a potential nuclear conflict

because of the notion that you lose it if you don't use it. and so it was an incentive for either side to launch their missiles before the other side could attack them and destroy them. if you hit one missile silo and that missile in the silo has eight warheads on it or ten warheads on it, you've killed ten warheads, not just one, and those warheads, the way they work is when the missile gets up to the top, those warheads are splayed out and each one has a different trajectory down to potentially eight or ten different targets. so they are very destabilizing. the incentive is for the person doing the first strike to strike first to kill them all so that the other side doesn't have that capability coming back at you. well, both the united states and the then-soviet union recognized how destabilizing this was and moved toward a single warhead

per missile, which is much less destabilizing, obviously. and since one of the benefits of this treaty is allegedly the stability that comes from it, one is very troubled by the idea that unfortunately that isn't the way it works. the treaty is much more destabilizing, not stabilizing because of this incentive for the russians to put more than one warhead on each missile. the united states by contrast is limiting our missiles to one warhead apiece. now, in a way, that puts us at a big disadvantage. another way it puts us at a disadvantage is we're above the 700 and we're going to have to retire a lot of our delivery vehicles to get down to 700. so the treaty is not symmetrical in this regard. they could actually build up to 700. we will have to bring down to 700. it's also not symmetrical because our obligations around the world are much more diverse than is -- than are russia's obligations. russia will be defending russia.

the united states has an understanding with 31 other countries that our nuclear umbrella is available to them for their nuclear deterrence as well. and so this requires a -- a more sophisticated defense plan on our part as to how we would deliver various warheads to what targets, and it essentially expands the number of weapons that we need. so it's a big deal to get down to the number of 700. and as senator thune has noted -- and i won't repeat this -- before the treaty was negotiated, a lot of our military people were testifying that -- to various numbers that obviously led to the conclusion that 700 was way too low. some, as dr. schlesinger, for example, has said that 700 might be barely enough. the problem is that, a, even below -- we're even going to go below 700 if we proceed with something that the

administration wants to do, many of us here want to do, and that is to develop what's called a conventional prompt global strike. the conventional prompt global strike is using an icbm but with a conventional warhead on it, not a nuclear warhead. the strike had a target of potentially a rogue nation or some terrorist group or some place where you have actionable intelligence that is a very short life, you want to destroy a target, you obviously don't want to use a nuclear warhead, but you want to get there fast, and it's a long ways away, so you might need to use essentially the same kind of missile that you would use to deliver a nuclear warhead. well, the russians didn't like that, and so they said if you do any of those, you're going to have to count them against your nuclear delivery limit. so if we did 25 of those, let's say, then instead of 700 missiles to deliver, or vehicles to deliver nuclear weapons, we would only have 675. and that's why the thune amendment talks about going back after 720, which without getting into classified material i

believe represents a number that more closely approximates what people think is really going to be necessary for the united states on into the future. the other thing that's troubling about it is that the administration has yet to commit to a full triad nuclear capable, even though they have said they are fully committed to the triad, which means bombers, submarines and icbms. they have not been willing to say that the new bombers that we build will be nuclear capable or will have cruise missiles that can deliver a nuclear warhead. so while they say triad, they're not willing to commit to anything but a diad. and the problem with that is that there is much less stability and capability if you only have two ways of delivering your nuclear weapons. if there is something wrong with your icbm force -- remember about two months ago, the power went out in several states and our icbms were actually down for -- i forgot what it was --

an hour and a half or something like that because they didn't have any electrical power. well, obviously, nothing happened during that period of time, but a single point of failure is never desirable in a military context, where if one thing goes wrong, a lot of weapons or capability is taken off the table. and the problem is if you get down to just two ways of delivering these weapons rather than the three that we have today, you're going to be much less capable, your deterrent is going to be -- is not going to deter as much, and that's what senator national taxpayers union is trying to get at here. let's at least modestly increase the number of delivery vehicles we have. it is a modest amendment, it's an appropriate amendment, and we just satisfy from reuters today sag we already knew, but it's just the latest iteration of it. russia warns u.s. not to change nuclear pact. in fact, what they're saying is the senate can evade all it wants to, but if it makes one

change, one comment, one thing is different in the treaty, then -- well, then what? well, as my colleague, senator kerry, said we would have to see if the russians are willing to agree to it or otherwise they would have to renegotiate that part of the treaty. what's wrong with that? unless you think that the u.s. constitution was really stupid to give the senate a role in this, it doesn't seem to me there is anything wrong with the senate saying, you know, you have got about 9/10 of it just fine, president obama and president medvedev, your negotiators. these negotiators are good, smart people and they are dedicated public servants, but they are not necessarily the last word in this. the u.s. senate is the last word, according to our constitution. we gave our advice. the administration didn't take our advice in two specific ways. but yet, they expect us to give them their consent to the treaty. the reality is the senate should not be a rubber stamp. in the first start treaty, we said you have not dealt with a subject here that needs to be dealt with, the potential for

russian submarine launched cruise nuclear weapons. we need to have a side agreement on that. it didn't blow start up. we did a side agreement. the world did not end when the senate said no to the comprehensive test ban treaty. the predictions were that this was going to destroy our relations with russia forever. it didn't. here we are today now told again, if you change one thing in this treaty, then russia won't go along with it and our relationship could deteriorate significantly. well, if our relationship depends upon ratification of this treaty exactly like it is, then it's a lot weaker than the president and vice president are making it out to be when they talk about this wonderful new reset relationship. surely, it can stand the senate making a modest change to the treaty. if it can't, then i don't buy the argument that this is a wonderful reset relationship. so for my colleagues who say we will not abide by any amendments to the treaty, i say well, then

you have just said that the senate is irrelevant in the treaty process, we might as well just forget about having the senate consider these treaties in the first place. senator thune and senator inhofe have good amendments. i'm looking forward to supporting both of them when we return from our executive session this afternoon. i urge my colleagues to do the same. i would be happy to yield for a question. the presiding officer: the senator from south dakota. mr. thune: the senator from arizona made some good points, i think, about the importance of the triad in maintaining our -- our nuclear capability deterrence. i'm interested in knowing if the senator is aware that even if you assume the numbers that are in the 1251 report that would take the number of bombers down to 60 -- and it's up to 60, but the treaty calls for 700 delivery vehicles, which if you took that out of the bombers would take you down to 40. that we have even taking it to 60 would cut in half the number of nuclear bombers, and is the senator also aware that bombers are the best vehicle to enforce

extended deterrents. the icbms, the missiles that we have, our adversaries sometimes can't see those. a bomber is visible. a bomber can be sent into a theater. it has the impact, psychological impact, political impact, it is recallable, something that could be out there that makes those who proliferate nuclear weapons even more concerned about the capability that we have to respond. and the -- the importance of maintaining that leg of the triad is, in this senator's judgment, critical, and it sounds like one senator is saying he understands it as well. but i want to know if the senator was aware that the limits that are imposed, not only in the 1251 report but more importantly in the treaty would significantly reduce the number of nuclear bombers that we have at our disposal today. mr. kyl: madam president, to senator thune, i wasn't aware that it would be cut in half. i was aware it would be drastically reduced. and that -- that is a huge, huge

reduction, especially if the administration is unwilling to commit that we are even going to have a nuclear-capable bomber force in the next generation of -- of our triad. they have been willing to say we have a great triad today. that's true insofar as it goes, but part of that triad on the bomber force, for example, are b-52's that were designed when? back in the 1950's and built in the 1960's and 1970's. we have got to replace all three legs of our triad. the decision has been made on the submarine. that's a good thing. but the decisions haven't been yet made on the icbm or on the bomber force. and one of our concerns about modernization is that modernization of the nuclear warheads is fine -- i mean, it's necessary, but if we don't also modernize our delivery -- method by which we deliver those warheads, then modernizing our warheads is of little significance. and the final point to your question of senator thune, of

course, is that the other countries, including russia and china, are all modernizing both their warheads and their delivery vehicles. so the united states doesn't want to get caught in the position where we're down to a very few workable weapons, especially the bomber force, which as you noted can also be called back, unlike the missiles that are launched either from ground or from submarine. once they are launched, they are launched. at least a bomber could be called back. mr. thune: and the -- i guess that the senator -- the concern he raised and the observation i would make as well with regard to a follow-on bomber, next-generation bomber, many of our bomber fleet today, 47%, i think is pre-cuban missile era, so they are older, they need to be replaced. we need a next generation bomber. and the question that you raised about the ambiguity coming out of whether or not a next generation bomber would, in fact, be nuclear is a real concern because that would put

at risk the existence of the triad, which i think allows us to maintain the flexibility, the versatility that we have today in terms of nuclear deterrence. and so i would echo what the senator from arizona has -- has voiced as a concern about this discussion of next generation bomber and whether or not, one, that it will be done, and two, that it will be -- that it will be a nuclear bomber. mr. kyl: mr. president, i would just conclude by saying i hope that we have just a -- at least just a short moment or period of debate following the executive session so both senator thune and senator inhofe can make a brief closing argument to remind our colleagues about what this debate has been all about. i regret that more of our colleagues are not on the floor to hear the debate. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: madam president, of course we will accommodate hopefully some brief statements prior to the -- prior to the votes, and i'm confident we can agree on some reasonable period, hopefully not more than five minutes or something like that to summarize.

but let me just say to my friend from arizona, madam president, because i heard him saying fairly passionately that what's the point of having the senate involved if it can't advice and consent and can't amend the treaty. none of us on our side are arguing that we shouldn't have that right, that we don't have that right, that this is not a worthy debate and that we shouldn't debate a legitimate attempt to -- to amend the treaty. that's not what we're saying. in fact, if i thought it was a flawed treaty and if i thought there were enormous gaps in it, i would try to amend the treaty, i'm sure. and i think if that were true, we wouldn't have had a 60-30 vote against doing it yesterday. 60 senators made the judgment we don't want to, we don't think it rises to that level. so i would simply say to my colleague, it's not that the amendment isn't -- you know, that we shouldn't have the debate and that somehow not

doing this now rejects the notion that we're capable of doing it. it's that we don't think it's a good amendment. we don't think the amendment rises to the level where it raises an issue that it merits. -- merits sending the treaty back to the russians. so we would retain that right, and i would protect that as long as i'm a united states senator, to give that proper advice and consent. but i believe we gave the proper advice and consent and we rejected an amendment, as i hope we will reject these other two amendments, and i'll further the arguments with respect to that later. i think the senator from pennsylvania is waiting for time. mr. casey: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania. mr. kerry: could i just, madam president -- the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: could i ask the indulgence of the senator from pennsylvania just for a moment. let me also reiterate, i don't know where this constant questioning of the triad keeps coming from, because the secretary of defense, in

testimony as well as in letters, not to mention the defense department through the joint chiefs and others have repeatedly stated their commitment to a viable, forward-going triad. the triad is not in question here. there will be a triad. we're committed to the triad. and i'll have something more to say about that later. i yield the floor. mr. casey: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania. mr. casey: madam president, i'd ask consent to speak for up to 15 minutes. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. casey: madam president, i rise to speak about two or three topics in this debate on the start treaty, but first and foremost, one that speaks directly to the amendment that is pending, and that's the question of verification. the ability for the united states to verify by way of inspection and other means what the russian federation has in terms of its nuclear weapons.

first of all, i would say as a foundational principle in this debate, nothing in this treaty will in any way compromise the safety, security, effectiveness and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. that's critically important that we make that point, and i think the american people understand that. but as the american people are listening to this debate about verification, inning it's important to outline the distinctions between this amendment and i think what is, in fact, the case in the treaty. the treaty itself allows each party up to 18 short-notice, on-site inspections, and that is each year, with up to ten so-called type i inspections conducted at operating bases for icbms, strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and finally

nuclear-capable heavy bombers. so that's the type i inspections. up to 18 of those, which are short-notice inspections. secondly, under the type ii inspections, these are conducted at places such as storage sites, test ranges, formally declared facilities, and conversion or elimination facilities. so some have asked whether or not we lose any valuable elements of the original start agreement's inspection regime. the under secretary of defense for policy, james miller, replied to that question -- a similar question that i posed during the senate foreign relations committee hearing on the verification of the new start treaty, the hearing that i chair. he said that under new start, we'll conduct, as i said a moment ago, 18 inspections per year for 35 sites.

so 18 inspections, 35 russian sites. under start i, there were 28 inspections for 70 russian facilities. so we're going from a regime of verification -- regime, a verification regime, where there were 28 inspections for 70 sites to one that goes to 18 inspections for 35 sites. the ratio is actually better under this treaty in items of the numbers of inspections and sites. mr. miller, under secretary of defense miller, said that the ratio of inspections to facilities is -- quote -- "improved under the new start treaty relative to the original start treaty." so that's under secretary of state miller. that's not my words but his. admiral mike mullen, chairman of our joint chiefs of staff, reiterated this point on march the 26th of 2010 when he said

that the new start -- quote -- "features a much more effective, transparent verification method that demands quicker data exchanges and notifications." in addition, this does not take into account that some of the inspections under the new start treaty allow us to do two inspections at once. two inspections at once, unlike the first start treaty. i'd also say that the inspection regime that we have in place under this treaty has also been changed to reflect the current security environment and an enhanced relationship with the russian federation and more than a decade of our experience in conducting inspections. the new start inspection regime is simpler and cheaper than that which was conducted under the original start treaty.

we conduct fewer overall inspections under this new treaty because there are, in fact, fewer sites in russia to inspect. and we've gotten better at inspecting. in the years where this has transpired. madam president, i would also say that we're standing here today on december the 20th of 2010, 380 days without inspectors on the ground in russia. that's one of the reasons why i'd say that ratification of this new start treaty makes us safer, that not ratifying this treaty, in fact, makes us less safe. one of the reasons for to -- not the only reason but one of the reasons -- is that 380 days have passed without inspectors on the ground. this is, in a word, unacceptable to our national security. i think the american people believe that as well. so we need a vote on this

treaty. and while i and many of our colleagues that have worked on this believe that there is a sense of urgency, we also believe that the views of the other side of the aisle have been engaged in a serious deba debate. we've had day after day now of debate on the floor. of course, all of the debate here over the last week, almost a full week now, all of that was preceded by months and months of work on the foreign relations committee, the intelligence committee, and other parts of the united states senate. this is not new. the president made an agreement back in the spring of this year. we passed ou out of our committe this treaty back in the fall. we've had a lot of work, more than 900 questions have been asked of the administration and more than 900 questions have been answered by the administration. something like 20 separate

hearings among the several committees. so we've had a lot of time and a lot of work put into this, and this is -- the pace of this, in my judgment, has not been too fast but it's been done with a sense of urgency to finally, to finally, after all these months of work, all these months of debate, all these months of hearing, we're at a point now where we can -- we can ratify this treaty. so i think in the end there's going to be bipartisan and broad support for ratification and we look forward to that vote. my decision to support the new start treaty came after informed study of this issue as a member of the foreign relations committee, and it's based in large part on relying upon and asking questions of folks like admiral mullen, just to name one. as someone who has spent years in the service of this country concerned about and doing something about the defense and

the security of this country. so often we hear in this chamber that we should respect the opinion of commanders on the ground and we should. we hear that in the context, have heard it in the context of the war in iraq, continue to hear it in the context over the war in afghanistan. we should respect and take into consideration the -- the determinations and judgments made by commanders on the ground. those who have direct experience with military questions and in this case have direct experience with the defense of our country. i think when it comes to the new start treaty, we should apply the same rule as well when it comes to admiral mullen or any other military leader who has an opinion about this treaty. the commanders on the ground as it relates to this treaty, mr. president, have spoken and they have done so without equivocation and, i would argue, unanimously. on this vital treaty, in this

national security issue, they have spoken with one voice. we need to take action to secure our country. we need to take action to defend our country. we need to make sure that we're taking actions that will result in a nuclear arsenal that will be safe, secure, effective, and reliable. and one of the steps to get there is to make sure that we ratify -- ratify this treaty. but let me move to -- to one other topic, and i know we have colleagues here that are anxious to speak. let me just ask how much time i have left. the presiding officer: the senator has 7 1/2 minutes remaining. mr. casey: thank you. i'm going to speak about missile defense and i may be able to do it within that time or less. i, first of all, want to commend the work by this administration

for the letter that was sent recently that reiterated once again the united states commitment. i would argue this is an unwavering commitment to missile defense, consistent with the goal of having a nuclear arsenal and having a defense for this country but especially as it relates to the nuclear arsenal that is safe, secure, effective and reliablement -- reliable. this treaty, this new start treaty, does not place any constraints, no constraints whatever, on our ability to defend ourselves. over the past few days, this has been made clear by chairman kerry on the floor making these strong arguments as well as those made repeatedly by our uniformed military leadership. let me just give you some flavor of that by reading the followi following. this is -- this is a -- this is a quotation from lieutenant general patrick o'reilly, who

thinks that the new start treaty could actually provide more flexibility, more flexibility in implementing our missile defen defense -- our missile defense plans. he said -- and i quote -- "the new start treaty reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program in several areas. for example, m.d.a.'s immediate-range lv-2 target booster system used in key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the new european phased adaptive approach was accountable under the previous start treaty because it employed the first range of the now-retired trident i slbm," and then he says, "under new start, this missile is not accountable. thus, we will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with regard to launch

locations, telemetry collections and processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures and operational realistic intercept geometries." now, that's a -- that's a very technical summation by lieutenant general patrick o'reilly. he's the director of the missile defense agency. he's not just some -- making some casual observation in a -- in a think-tank or even as a member of congress. we -- we listen to a lot of voices here and many of them are respected voices. but i think when we're listening to the missile defense agency director, who's a lieutenant general, and who talks about this new start treaty providing more flexibility as it relates to missile defense, i think we should listen very carefully. now, i know that republicans here in washington have over many days now directly or

indirectly tried to assert that this administration is not committed to missile defense. they are wrong, and i think the record is very clear. the president made clear that this administration is inalterably committed, my words, to a missile defense that is effective, and i would argue as well to a missile defense that ensures that we have a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear arsenal. it's also a missile defense that's capable of growing and adapting to threats posed by countries like iran. i've heard a lot of folks here on both sides of the aisle stand up and -- and make statements about the threat posed by iran's nuclear program. we should listen to voices that are concerned about that in the context of making sure that this ratification is consistent with that, which it is consistent with our efforts to ensure that

iran does not have that capability. so what -- what are these capabilities? well, here's a quick summation. we currently have 30 grande-based interceptors at fort greely alaska. defense undersecretary flournoy and general cartwright asserted that we will continue to further augment the ground base interceptor systems noting that these -- quote -- "u.s.-based defenses will be made more effective by the forward basing of t.p.y. radar which we plan by 2011." the european phase adaptive approach is a network of increasingly capable sensors and standard -- standard missle iii

inacceptors though provide a capacity to address near-term threats while also developing new technologies to combat future threats. the first range to be completed in 2011 will deploy ages ships and sm-3 interceptors in the northern theater to protect our troops and allies from short-range regional ballistic missle threats. the second phase expected to be operational by 2015 will be upgraded sea and land-based sm-3 in both central and southern europe to expand protection of the continent. the third phase will introduce a more capable version of the sm-3 that is currently under development. which will provide full protection for our allies in europe for short, medium and intermediate range missles. the plan for 2020 will field an

even further improved sm-3 missles to augment current defense of the u.s. homeland from iranian -- iranian long-range missles. so whether you look at it from any of these three points of view -- or each of these three points of view, meaning the three phases, we're going to have in place a system which will defend our homeland and will also help our european allies. let me conclude with one quotation. i mentioned admiral mullen before the joint chiefs, this is what he said about the phased adaptive approach, the joint chiefs, combat commanders, and i, also fully concur with the phased adaptive approach as outlined in the ballistic defensive review report. as with the nuclear posture review, the joint chiefs and combatant commanders were deeply

involved throughout this review process. so whether it's the joint chiefs, whether it's the combatant commanders or whether it's other commentators as well, we are going to make sure that in the aftermath of the ratification of this treaty and consistent with and as part of and because of the ratification of this treaty, that our missle defense will be as strong as it can be and we're going to make sure that without a doubt we're going to protect the american people and we're going to take every step necessary to make sure that our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from florida's recognized. mr. lemieux: i ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 10

minutes on the new start treaty. the presiding officer: the senator's recognized. mr. lemieux: i ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside and amendment -- temporarily set aside and amendment 4847 be called up. the presiding officer: without objection, the senator's recognized. the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from florida, mr. lemieux, for himself an mr. chambliss proposes amendment number 4847. at the end of article 1 -- mr. lemieux: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from florida. mr. lemieux: i ask that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. lemieux: i offer an amendment to the new start treaty concerning stratigic nuclear weapons. i have a lot of concerns about this treaty and many of those concerns have already been expressed by my colleagues. i have concerns about the verification procedures and that they are weakened from the previous start treaty. i have concerns about the linkage of missle defense

systems with stratigic offensive weapons. those concerns have been addressed as well. and i share them. but the biggest concern i have about this treaty is its failure to deal with what are called tactical nuclear weapons. now, to those of -- those folks at home who are listening to this, it's probably not readily apparent. tt wasn't initially -- it wasn't initially to me the difference between a stratigic nuclear weapon and a tactical nuclear weapon. a stratigic nuclear weapon is usually considered to be a large vehicle like an intercontinental ballistic missle, slbm. it travels over a long range. they can also be delivered by submarine or long-range bomber. a tactical nuclear weapon is generally much smaller in size. it has a smaller range. it has a delivery vehicle. it may be on the back of a truck, for example. in many ways, in the world that

we live in today, where we are not in this cold war atmosphere with the former soviet union, the tactical nuclear weapon is of much more concern than the stratigic. i mean, the great fear that we all have is that one of these nuclear weapons would get in the hands of a terrorist. a tactical nuclear weapon by its very nature is portable and it could be something that could be -- capable of being moved by one person or as i said before on the back of a truck. now, why this treaty doesn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons is beyond me. i realize that in the past when we were in the cold war environment with the soviet union, that we didn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons because we were concerned about the big missles that could cross the ocean an strike our country -- and strike our country. we were concerned about missles being delivered from submarines. bombs that could hit the homeland. that makes sense. we're in a depletely different

environment now while we should still be concerned with those stratigic weapons, the tactical weapons are actually much more of a danger to us because those are the very weapons that could get in the hands after rogue nation. those are the very weapons that could get in the hands after terrorist. and this weapon -- this treaty doesn't have anything to do with that. it doesn't address it at all. it would be as if weing with going to enter into a treaty about -- as if we were going to enter into a treaty about guns and we had a big negotiation and a treaty where we talked about long arms, shot guns and rifles, but we failed to talk about pistols. it doesn't make any sense to me. it doesn't make any sense to me because these are the very weapons we should be the most concerned about. it also doesn't make sense to me because of the disparity between how many tactical nuclear weapons we have versus how many tactical nuclear weapons that the russians have. this treaty about stratigic or bigger long-range nuclear weapons limits the amount of those weapons to each country to

around 1,500. but the russians have 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons and we have 300. so the russians have a 10-1 advantage over us in tactical nuclear weapons. if we approve this treaty, the russians then will approximately have 4,500 nuclear weapons and we'll have 1,800. that doesn't make a lot of sense either. a 10-1 advantage on the tactical nuclear weapons. so i think that it's incumbent upon us to realize that we have to have a treaty on tactical nuclear weapons. it should have been part of this treaty. it wasn't part of these start treaty's in the past because the total number of weapons that the united states had and that former soviet union had was immense. when we had 20,000 or 30,000 stratigic nuclear weapons, the

fact that they had 3,000 tacticals didn't really matter. it wasn't an important number in the overall scheme. but now that we're in this new world where we're concerned about nuclear proliferation, where we don't want terrorists to get these weapons, plus the fact that they're going to end up having 4,500 and we're going to end up having 1,800, it does matter. it matters a lot. so what my amendment would do, mr. president, it says that within a year of the ratification of this treaty, the russians and the united states must sit down and negotiate a tactical nuclear weapon agreement. it doesn't require that it be resolved within a year. it requires that it be started. now, that seems, to me, i'm a little bias, but that seems to me eminently reasonable. i'm proud that are senator chambliss and senator inhofe have joined me on this amendment. who can be -- could be against having the russians and the united states sit down within a

year's time of negotiations and begin the negotiation on tacticals? who would be against that? you will hear from my friends on the other side who are defending this treaty and voting down all of the amendments offered on this side of the aisle that we can't amend the treaty because if we amend the treaty it's a poison bill. the russians will not accept it. if that is true, then we're not really fulfilling much of a function here, are we. under the constitution there are some special privileges that imbued to the senate. one of them is the treaty privilege, the treaty power. where all treaties must be confirmed by the senate on a two-thirds vote. now, if we can't amend it, all we're doing is either saying yes or no. to me, that limits our ability. and if my friends on the other side think this is a poison pill, i ask them to look at language. i'm just putting in the treaty if they would accept this that within a year's time that we would sit down at the table and

enter into these negotiations on tacticals. not a heavy lift it seems to me. now, they will say, look, we can't do this because the russian duma, their parliamentarian body will not accept this. what does that say. if their legislature will not accept the amendment, if the treaty is as it is now as negotiated by the united states, and i have said before, i have concerns about what's there for verification. i have concerns about missle defense. but putting that aside, if it goes the way it's been drafted and agreed to between the president and the leaders of russia, with just this one amendment that says that the two sides will sit down within a year's time will the russian parliament not approve that? and if they don't approve it, if they will not say that they will sit down wayne year's time and -- within a year's time and negotiate about the 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons they

have, about the security of those weapons, about our ability to verify where they are and about a reduction of them because of the disparity in the 3,000 they have to the 300 we have, what does that say about the russians? what it says to me is that they're not in good faith trying to really come to an agreement about nuclear weapons. would we want this treaty if the russian duma said, we're not going to agree to sit down within a year's time to talk about tactical nuclear weapons? so i think this is a very important amendment. and i have great respect for the people who are -- stood up and support this treaty. i think there are problems with it, but i don't see any reason why a fair-minded person couldn't agree within a year's time the two parties should sit down and talk about what, to me, is the most dangerous part of our nuclear challenge with russia and that is these

tactical nuclear weapons. we don't know where they are. we don't know what they're doing. we can't verify them. and there's a 10-1 advantage that the russians have over us. mr. president, my amendment is at the desk. i asked that it be called up. and i hope we have an opportunity to debate this amendment as we wrap-up our consideration of this treaty. with that, mr. president, i yield back the remainder of my time and i yield back the floor. mr. hagel: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from north carolina. mr. hagel: i rise in support of the senate ratification of the senate arms treaty, the secretary of defense, the secretary of energy and the entire uniform leadership of our military believes it is in our national interest. former secretaries of state from previous administrations of both political parties have also endorsed the new start treaty. relations between the united states and russia have evolved beyond what they were during the

cold war. within this context and in the face of aging nuclear stockpiles, stratigic arms reduction is in the best interest of both nations. new strati with strengthen strategic nuclear weapons ability and modernize our triad of nuclear weapons and ensure our flexibility to deploy effective missle defenses. it will also promote stability, transparency, and predictability in the u.s.-russia relationship. the treaty limits stratigic offensive nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles through effective verification and compliance measures. our negotiators ensured the united states would be able to protect our ability to field a flexible and effective stratigic nuclear triad composed of land-based intercontinental ballistic missles,

submarine-launched shrift missles and stratigic bombers. our negotiators ensured that the united states can enable modernization of our stratigic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons they carry. simply put, our country is better off with new start as opposed to not having a treaty at all. there has been no former verification system in place since the last treaty expired a year ago. mrs. hagan: new start re-establishes a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that provides access to russian strategic nuclear capabilities. specifically, nuclear warheads and delivery systems. it ensures a measure of predictability and russian strategic force deployments over the life of the treaty. access and predictability allow us to effectively plan and undergo strategic modernization efforts. failure to ratify the treaty will prevent us from obtaining

information on russian strategic nuclear weapons capabilities. without the treaty going into effect, the united states will have no inspectors on the ground and no ability to verify russian nuclear activities. this will result in our country losing insight into russian strategic nuclear force deployments. it would also complicate our strategic force strategy and modernization planning efforts, as well as drive up costs in response to the need to conduct increased intelligence and analysis on russian strategic force capabilities. secretary of state hillary clinton, secretary of defense robert gates, secretary of energy steven chu and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff admiral mike mullen have expressed their support for senate ratification of new start. all indicated that ratifying the treaty provides our country with an opportunity to negotiate with russia on tactical nuclear weapons of which russia holds a

sizable advantage. tactical nuclear weapons are the most vulnerable to theft and most likely to end up in the hands of rogue states and terrorist organizations. it is important to understand that we will not be able to obtain russian cooperation on tactical nuclear weapons without ratifying new start. the treaty will not affect our ability to approve our missile defenses, either qualitatively or quantitatively, to defend our homeland against missile attacks and to protect our deployed forces, allies and partners from growing regional missile threats. secretary of state clinton and secretary of defense gates have testified that our fazed adaptive approach to overseas missile -- our faced adaptive approach to overseas missile defense is not constrained by the treaty. senate ratification of new start will demonstrate the united states is committed to reducing nuclear weapons, which is

important as we advance our nonproliferation goals. this will assist us in obtaining international consensus regarding nuclear weapons proliferation challenges from rogue states such as iran and north korea. it will also send a positive message in achieving consensus with other countries on nuclear issues. it's important to keep in mind that the united states and russia hold over 95% of the world's nuclear weapons. if the two nations that possess the most nuclear weapons agree on verification and compliance and are committed to nonproliferation, it will improve our ability to achieve consensus with other countries. failure to ratify the treaty will have a destabilizing -- detrimental effect on our ability to influence other nations with regards to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. it will also send conflicting messages about the administration's emphasis and commitment to the nonproliferation treaty. additionally, failure to ratify

new start would send a negative signal to russia that may cause them to not support our objectives with respect to dealing with the iranian nuclear program. as secretary of defense gates has said, without ratification, we put at risk the coalition and momentum that we have built to pressure iran. the debate over new start has facilitated a consensus to modernize our nuclear deterrent. the director of the national nuclear security administration, mr. thomas d'agostino, indicated that for the first time since the end of the cold war, there is broad national consensus on the role nuclear weapons play in our defense and the requirements to maintain our nuclear deterrent. the nnsa and the three national laboratories support senate ratification of new start, and congressional approval of the president's budget to invest in nuclear security and

modernization. our nuclear enterprise and stockpile have been negligented for too long. consistent with the recommendations in the nuclear posture review, we need to move forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and control structure, continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery systems, maintaining a safe, secure and effective stockpile, and revitalizing our aging infrastructure. on december 1, the directors of the three nuclear national laboratories signed a letter to the senate emphasizing they were very pleased with the administration's plan to spend spend $85 billion over the next decade to upgrade the nuclear weapons complex. they believe the requested amount will further a balanced program that sustains the science, technology and engineering base. they also believe that the proposed budget will support the abilities to sustain the safety,

security, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by new start. the nuclear posture review also recognizes the importance of supporting a highly capable work force with specialized skills to sustain the nuclear deterrent. it emphasizes three key elements of stockpiles stewardship -- hands-on work on the stockpile, the science, technology and engineering base, and the infrastructure at the laboratories and plants. i share the concerns expressed by secretary chu regarding our ability to recruit the best and brightest nuclear scientists and engineers. we need to infuse a sense of importance and financial stability to the stockpile stewardship and life extension program. nuclear scientists and engineers need to believe that the united states government cares about nuclear life extension.

an effective science technology and engineering human capital base is needed to conduct effective nuclear weapons systems lifetime extension programs, increase nuclear weapons reliability, certify nuclear weapons without the need to undergo nuclear testing and provide annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance. i hope that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me in voting to ratify new start. i yield the floor. mr. casey: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from pennsylvania is recognized. mr. casey: thank you, mr. president. i rise just for a few moments to comment upon the amendment that our colleague from florida just spoke about a few moments ago. this discussion and really the

debate we had yesterday on tactical nuclear weapons and how that was addressed was the subject of a long debate yesterday. i wanted to reiterate some of those arguments because we had this -- this debate yesterday. it's an important debate. first of all, if you listen to a couple of folks who have not just experience but have -- have a real interest in our urgent priority of addressing tactical nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that this -- the best way to address that issue is, in fact, to ratify this treaty. just give you by way of example, the polish foreign minister, if you wanted to highlight a country that has -- that has much at stake when the question is raised about russian or -- or russian tactical nuclear weapons, you could point to few, if any, countries that have more at stake than poland.

the polish foreign minister, mr. sikorsky said, and i'm quoting -- "without a new start treaty in place, holes will soon appear in the nuclear umbrella that the united states provides to poland and other allies under article 5 of the washington treaty, the collective security guarantee for nato members. moreover, new start is a necessary steppingstone to future negotiations with russia about reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals and a prerequisite for successful revival of the treaty on conventional forces in europe." so that's the -- that's not a commentator here in washington. that's the foreign minister of poland who has -- his country has a lot at stake in this debate. i would also say that we -- we have had a lot of discussions about the treaty and what's in the treaty or what would come about as a result of the treaty, but it's not as if these --

these arguments just landed here when the bill landed on the floor. we had months and months of hearings in the senate foreign relations committee. our ranking member, senator lugar, was not just there for those hearings but -- but played a leading role in reaching the point -- helping us reach the point where we are now. we have a treaty on the floor because of his good work over many, many months, and i would argue in his case many years on this issue. the same is true with the presiding officer. sitting in those hearings and asking questions of the relevant -- the relevant parties, many of them military leaders. but i would note for the record -- and i'll close with this -- that the -- the vote by the senate foreign relations committee included a resolution of advice and consent to ratification. subsection 11 on tactical

nuclear weapons says, and i quote -- "the senate calls upon the president to pursue following consultation with allies an agreement with the russian federation that would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the russian federation and the united states and would secure and reduce tactical and nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner." it's right in the resolution, and i would argue that that addresses squarely this amendment. mr. president, i would yield the floor. the presiding officer: the majority leader is recognized. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent that the names that i refer to the clerk now -- that's in addition to the office employees, be granted floor privileges during today's closed session and the list be printed in the record. the presiding officer: without objection, so ordered. mr. reid: i ask now, mr. president, as if in legislative session that we end

in morning business. i ask consent the committee on commerce be discharged from further consideration of h.r. 81 and we proceed to it right now. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 81, an act to amend the high seas driftnet fishing moratorium protection act and the magnuson-stevens fishery conservation and management act to improve the conservation of sharks. the presiding officer: without objection, the committee is discharged and the senate will proceed with act. mr. reid: that being the case, mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the kerry-snowe amendment at the desk be agreed to, the bill as amended be read a third time and passed and the motion to reconsider be laid on the table. that any statements relate to go this matter appear at the appropriate place in the record as if given. the presiding officer: without objection. it is so ordered. mr. reid: it is my understanding, mr. president, the hour of 1:30 having arrived

or shortly will arrive, that we will recess pending the call of the chair, is that right, until the closed session is completed? the presiding officer: the senator is correct. under the previous order, the under the previous order, the funding of the government through march of 2011. will resume life senate coverage when members are back

here on c-span2. in the meantime a look at some of today's floor remarks on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> mr. president over the weekend i indicated i would be voting against the s.t.a.r.t.ng treaty. this morning i would like to explain my decision in a little more detail. and i will begin with the most obvious objection. first and foremost, a decisionai of this magnitude should not bed decided under the pressure of ah deadline. the american people don't want us to squeeze her most important work into the final days of thee session. they want us to take the time we need to make informed and responsible decisions. the senate can do better than to have the consideration of a treaty interrupted by a series of controversial political itema moment any substantive concernse and we have many, this is the reason enough to delay a vote. know senator should be forced te

make decisions like this so we can kick off another item oncklt someone's political checklist before thehe end of the year. yet looking back over the past two years it becomes apparent w why the administration would attempt to rush this treaty. and it is in this context that t we discover another important reason to oppose it.he i am referring of course to the administration's pattern of rushing to a policy judgment and then subsequently studying theth problem that the policy decision was intended to address. a pattern that again and again created more problems andrt complications then we started ws out with. first there was the executiveor order to close on time of day without any plan for dealinget with the detainee population we there. as we now know, the administration had nost plan or terrorist who were held at guantánamo to yemen andg are still grappling with questions of how best to prosecute khalid sheikh mohammed.ne next was the presence rush to

remove the intelligence community from interrogating captured terrorists without anya consideration as to how to deale with them. whether they were captured on the battlefield or in an airport in detroit. this became all the more concerning when the president announced his search strategy ih afghanistan, which predictably led to more prisoners.ing and even in announcing theo strategy itself, the president decided to set a date for withdrawal without any sense at the time of what the state of the conflict would be in july oe 2011. then there was the administration's approach on "don't ask don't tell".ounc the president announced hisn determination to repeal this policy during his campaign before the military had time to study where that this change in policy was in the best interest of combat readiness before senior listed steffen onommi commissioner officers had testified in before those who are currently serving had tolder us whether in their expert opinion that policy should bepi

repealed.ant moreover when the commandant of the marine corps suggested the change would harm unit cohesion, he was promptly ignored.es the the administration has taken the same cart before the horse approach on the treaty before us.nt in this case the president came to office, the long-term plan to reduce the nation's arsenal ofeo nuclear weapons and their role in our national security policy. the plan envisioned a quick agreement to replace the s.t.a.r.t. treaty that was allowed to expire with no bridging amendment for arms by effortsalollowed to strengthen international commitments to a non-proliferation treaty. reconsideration of thereat comprehensive test ban treaty and further additions ande nuclear arms over time. and he spoke of ultimately reducing nuclear weapons tohe global zero. in other words the new a s.t.a.r.t. treaty was just a first step and it needed to be done quickly. leave aside for a moment the

fact that the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty does nothing to submit or reduce the russian federation stockpile of strategic arms, ignores the thousands of tactical weapons in the russian arsenal and contains an important concession electing missile defense to strategic arms. we had to rush this treatyo according to the logic of the administration because it had become an important component of the effort to reset the bilateral relationship with the russian federation. it wasia brought up for debate prematurely because it was the first up in a predetermined arms-control agenda. the senate's constitutional rola of advice and consent became an inconvenient impediment. the debate over the mccain amendment to strike the preamble of the treaty was instructed.he the language in the preamble concerning missile defense is harmful to our foreign policy because ofil how it will be viewed, not by our president by hide how it will be viewed bype our allies in europe and by the

russians. theth russian government opposed the bush administration's plan toen place 10 silo-based missils in poland and a fixed radar t installation in the czech republic. although the bush administration had reachedre agreement with the governments of our two allies and the proposed ballistic missile defense pose no threat to russians overwhelming ability to strike europe and the uniteds states, russia saw sought to course their eastern europeanrce allies. it is worth noting that neither poland nor the czech republic ratified the agreement to go forward with a plan which the obama administration canceled. them a cane amendment would have reproved any strategic ambiguity that the russian federation will exploit to intimidate nato members. many of our nato partners havewt been slow to accept the concept of territorial missile defense and rest assured that they will be slowed upon the program. it is a certainty that if the language of the preamble survives, and this treaty is ratified, the russians will

campaign to obstruct missile defense in europe.ther there is no good argument for having voted against the mccain amendment which would have significantly improved this treaty. any amendment to the treaty would result in the state department having to return to negotiation with the russianon. federation. that may be true or the amended treaty could be considered by the russian duma. in either case the argument brings into question the senate's role in providing advice and consent toof ratification. if it is the position of the majority that the treaty cannot be amended, as the senate was unable to defend so many matters before us the last week of theru session, why have any debate at all? this leads us to the subject of verification. a second matter of serious m concern. although the senate will meet today in closed session to discuss the flawed nation of verification procedures

envisioned by the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, the majority has filedty cloture and stated that the treaty cannot be amended. the senior senator fromha missouri, the vice-chairman of the intelligence committee hasie provided his views to the senate on this matter and i join him in his concerns. senator bond has provided a classified t assessment of the details related toed verificatin and chances of russian reg out of the treaty warhead limitss which is available for all senators to a review. to quote the vice-chairman of theve intelligence committee, ii reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and heard from our intelligence o professionals.s n there is no doubt in my mind that the united states cannot reliably verify the treaty's from 1550 on deployed warheads. i agree with the conclusion that the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty'sea central warhead limit of 1550

cannot be conclusively verified. the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty allows the russians to deploy missilesu without its standard or uniform number off warheads. the limited number of warhead inspections provided under this treaty also limit the access of our inspectors to an upper limit of 3% of the russian force. t it can thus be said that thisher treaty places higher confidence and trust then on verification. compounding these concerns is the history of russian treaty violations. as the state department's recent reports on arms-control compliance make clear, the russians have previously violated provisions of the s.t.a.r.t.is treaty, the chemicl weapons convention, the conventional forces of europe treaty and of biological weapona convention. this is not a track record to be rewarded with greater trust. t it is a reason to take our verification duties even more seriously.

despite my opposition to this pe treaty i hope the president remains committed to modernizing the nuclear triad. the war on terror has required an expansion of our nation's ground forces, the marine corps, the army and our special operations forces and our near-term readiness. we as we continue the effort to dismantle, defeat and disrupt al qaeda, we must also plan for the threats that our country will face in the coming decades. we must invest not only in the delivery systems and platforms that will preserve our nuclear delivery capability, such as the next-generation romer nuclear submarine and it new air continental ballistic missile butil also with a strike aircrat and f naval forces required to control the pacific realm as economic growth in the military capabilities of china increase.e although the president hassu decided there is value in pursuing a disarmament agenda,et this country may determine in the coming years to place a

greater reliance upon the role of strategic arms and we must remaingi committed to defensen modernization. our nation faces many challenges in the coming decades, some economic, some strategic. it would seem short-sighted to think that is north korea, iran and others were to acquire nuclear weaponsea capabilities e could draw our allison all downe to zero. so i will oppose this treaty. r i thank the chairman and ranking members of the foreign relations armed services and intelligence for the service that they have provided the service in renewing it. it is unfortunate that somethind as important as the senate consideration of a the treaty like order to meet another arbitrary deadline or the wishth list of e liberal base. and it is deeply troubling to think that a legislative body charged with a solemn respond civility of advice and consent would be deprived of this role because it would inconvenience our negotiating partners.

as debate over this treaty has intensified over the past few days, these and other concerns have become increasinglyre apparent to a number of senators and to the american people. we should wait until everyone of is addressed. our top concern should be theit safety and security of our nation, not some politicians desire to declare political victory and host a press conference before the first of the year. americans have had more than h enough of artificial timelines set by politicians eager for attention. they want us to focus on their concerns, not ours, never moreur so than on matters of nationaltn security. mr. president, yield the floor., >> under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.ed under the previous order these senate will proceed to executivn session to resume consideration of the following treaty which the clerk will report.reat >> calendar number seven treaty with russia on measures for a

further reduction and limitatiof of strategic sense of arms.in >> the senator from massachusetts. >> thank you mr. president.at i'm delighted to be able to sayd a few words in response to the minorityo leader. i have a great respect for the minority leader. he and i came to the united states senate together. in the same class, and i appreciate the difficulties of his job and certainly the difficulties of corralling any number of the different personalities. the same is true for the majority leader. these are tough jobs. but ien would say to my friend kentucky that just because you say something doesn't make it true. and, our friends on the other side of the aisle seem to have o habit of repeating things that

have been completely refuted byc every fact that there is. our old friend, patrick moynihan, used to remind all ofn us in the united states senated and in the country that everybody is entitled to their own opinion but they are not entitled to their own facts. john adams made that same statement that facts are stubborn things and facts are stubborn things. that facts are that this treaty is not being rushed. this treaty was delayed at the request of republicans. this treaty was delayed 13 times separately by senator lugar, to respect their desire to have more time to deal with the modernization issue, which the administration has completely,

totally, thoroughly dealt with in good faith.he i would like to know where thehe good faith comes from on the other side occasionally.th they put extra money and. they sat and negotiated. they sent people to arizona to brief senator kyl personally. four weeks wfoe delayed the process of moving forward on this treaty in order to accommodate our friends on the other side of the aisle, now fully accommodated with their request entirely met, they come back and say oh, this is being rushed. well, mr. president today marks our sixth day of debate on thet. new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. that is a fact. six days of debate on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. now, they will come to the floor and say well we had an intervening phot here or an intervening vote they are. sure mr. president that is the way the united states senate works and that is the way it worked when they passed the first s.t.a.r.t. treaty in fivee days. we are now spending more time on

this treaty than we did on a far more complicated treaty at a far more complicateda time and the fact is that if we go through today, which we will, on thisng treaty and depending on whatnd happens with cloture and when the other side decides they want to vote, we can be here for nins days on this treaty. which is more time than we would have spent on the s.t.a.r.t.aty, treaty, s.t.a.r.t. ii treaty and the moscow treaty. the time it took other senates to deal with three treaties, these folks are complaining about for the time to take one treaty and it is going to be more time. it is astounding to me and iry hope people in the country willa see through it when the leader comes to the floor and says that our national security is being driven by politics.e we really need to step back for a moment and calmed down and think about what is at stake. this treaty is in front of the

united states senate, not because of some politicalt' schedule. its is here because the republicans asked us to delay it we wanted to hold this boat before the election and what was the argument than by her friends on the other side of the aisle?p oh no, please don't do that. soi that will politicize the treaty. and so in order to not politicize the treaty we made a decision on our side to accommodate their interests. having accommodated their interest they now come back and turnro around and say you guys e terrible. you are bringing this treaty up at the last minute. i mean, is there no shame ever with respect to the arguments that are made sometimes on the floor of the united states senate? is the idea always just say it, just say it.pt save enough, go out there ande repeated and somewhere it will stick, maybe somewhere in the right wing blogosphere somewhere else someone will get agitated enough in believe somehow that

this is being jammed. this treaty is on the floor for the six today. it is a simple add-on treaty to everything that has gone before overall the years of arms control and it is a simple add-on treaty and extension of the s.t.a.r.t. i treaty. this is not a new principle. it is not complicated. it is particularly notairm complicated mr. president, when the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the director of national intelligence, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, every prior republican secretary of state, all say ratify this treaty, ratified it now. we need it now. i mean honestly, i sort of scratch my. head in bafflement t the place we have seemingly arrivedou at where national security interests of our

country are going to get wrappen up in ideology and politics and all of the things that have commanded everybody's attention over the course of theve last couple of years. we did have an election a few fw months ago, a few weeks ago. it has been much referred to by our colleagues. iand it did signal they need to do some things differently. one of the things that signaled the need to do differently if somethings like to s.t.a.r.t.an treaty, where the american people expect us to come to the floor and do the nation's business, particularly the a business of keeping america safer. d we have had an excellent debate so far. the two amendments that were proposed for rejected overwhelmingly. 60-30 i think was the last one. we had a number of people that were absent but 60-30 is a pretty pronounced ape and by the united states senatero.eems

it seems to me this senator from kentucky just said, the majornao argument for not approving one of those amendments was that it would require us to go back and renegotiate. no, mr. leader, that is not the major. argument. that is an argument that underscores the major argument.a the major argument is the. language has no meaning. the language does not affect civil defense. the major arguments are the facts, the substance, the substance of which is the preamble language has no impact whatsoever on what we are going to do with respect to missileng defense and everybody who hase anything to do with missile defense in and his administration have said that. that is the major argument. a in addition to which the major argument is also bad henry kissinger and donald rumsfeldece

and secretary gates have all said that language that has no legal impact is just an expression of a truism. the reality that offense and defense have a relationship. i mean are we not capable in the united states senate of overlooking nonbinding, nonlegal, non-impacting language that acknowledges a simple truth about the relationship of offense and defensese and the nature of arms control? that is all it does. that is the major argument. t it just happens that in addition to having no impact on our defense and no impact legally and noll impact that is bindingi in addition to that, it also requires going back to the russians and renegotiating the t treaty. and as we'll show in a s classified session today, there are a lot of reasons why that doesn't make sense for the

security interests of the united states of america. t so, you know, it is not that we shouldn't do our jobs as that our job of advise and consent requires usit to process the facts.nk it requires us to thinke and seriously about what those facts are and how they impact this treaty and if the senate doesngs its job of thinking seriously about this treaty, it will separate out language that hasno no impact and no meaning whatsoever under national missile defense plans or on the treaty itself. i don't know how the president could make it more clear than in the letter that he wrote to the leadership and which he said as clearly as possible, the unitedd states did not and does not agree with the russian statement we believe the continued development and deployment of u.s. missile defense systems including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems do not and will not

threaten the strategic balanceio with the russian federation.ns bogardus of russia's actions in this regard, as long as i am president, president obama said, as long as the congress provides the necessary funding the united states will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the united states, our deployed forces and our allies and our partners. i don't know how, mr. president, you can make it more clear than that. those are the facts. those are the facts. it is my understanding that today, the joint chiefs will ali be submitting an additional statement for the record here to make it clear that it is their t view that this treaty hasmpac absolutely no negative impact whatsoever on our missile-defense and that they believe it is entirely verifiable and they want to seeo it ratified. so the issue of advice andgoin consent here is whether we are going to follow the advice ofo

those that we look to on def military matters, on defense intelligence matters, on security matters. those states people who have argued these treaties and negotiated these treaties through the years. the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the joint chiefs and the commander of the u.s.mman strategic command, mr. secretary gates speaking, and i assess that russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or our break out under the new start. our analysis at the nie and the potential for russian cheating or our breakout confirms the treaty's verification regime is effective. so mr. president, i hope thatil facts will control this debate,t that the security interest of our country will control this debate, that those who have created this record in the united states senate to way, we

have been on this treaty for a half, not just for six days.te 60 members of the united states senate, armed servicesna committee, foreign relations committee, national intelligence committee, the national security working group, which i cochaired with senator kyl, have all met and considered this treaty. some people have gone to geneva and actually met with the negotiators and the negotiators have met with this here before the treaty was ebert. we were weighing in on thisvmen treaty and we have considered it in over 21 hearings and meetings over the course of the last month. this is not six days. let's not kid the american peo people. this is not sixs days. three other treaties, one of which had no verification aty all. bad treaty received the 95-0 vote. the american people voted for us to stop the politics. they voted for us to act like

adults and do the business of this country and i believe voting on this treaty and theseo next hours of the day is our opportunity to live up to the hopes of the american people. i yield the floor. >> the senator from indiana.eat >> mr. president, a great deal of our day will be spent onin discussing the verification regime of a new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, and a part of that will be in closed session. but i wants to initiate additional debate this morning on the new s.t.a.r.t. verification regime. the important point is that today, we have zero on the ground verification capabilities the russian strategic forces, s given that start one expires on december 5, 2009, more than a year ago. opponents of news s.t.a.r.t.

verification regime haveverifica emphasized a peculiar argument in my judgment. on the one hand we are told that we don'tli need news s.t.a.r.t. because of the cold war relic and more modernec approaches to arms control should be sought. on the other hand opponents laments the passing of start one cold war verification regime.rt i would ask my colleagues which one should it be? should we prefer modernized verification for a post-cold wat that reflects the lack of an arms race and their militaries desire for flexible forcede structures or should we resort back to cold war verification's? now mr. president the fact of the matter is that the moscow treaty approved by a vote of 95-0 mr. chairman just mentioned, contains no

verification whatsoever. some who cite this as a modern m approach to arms control failed to mention that the moscow treaty explicitly relied on s.t.a.r.t. i verification regims as i noted, s.t.a.r.t. i expired more than a year ago.oi and i would point outti parenthetically mr. president vetted numerous hearings and the foreign relations committee, those who extol the virtues of moscow treaty, as i point out ratified 95-0 indicated we were in a new i day. when we ask in that particular context how about verification, they say there is already verification under s.t.a.r.t. i. we pointed out even then itn would expire in december ofbut 2009.y but it was fully anticipated by those advocating the moscow hav treaty that we would have

another start -- s.t.a.r.t. regimeat by that point or verification apparently would not be needed at all. some senators say we could have just extended s.t.a.r.t. won and kept the moscow treaty in place. this again overlooks the fact m that our military in particular dislike aspects of s.t.a.r.t. id and advocated for a more flexiblefor approach in s.t.a.r. ii board the news s.t.a.r.t.. under s.t.a.r.t. the united states conducted inspections ofp weapons, their facilities, their delivery vehicles and warheads in russia kazakhstan and these fulfilled a crucial national security interest by greatly reducing the possibility. we will be surprised by future advancements and russians weapons technology or deployment only through ratification of the new s.t.a.r.t. when united

states technicians returned to russia to resume verification. new s.t.a.r.t. verification should not be evaluated by cold war standards.we during the cold war we wanted to constrain the arms race and improve stability encouraging a shift away from icbm's with multiplenc warheads.e neither of these objections remains todays.. s.t.a.r.t. was negotiated at ahe time in the former soviet union had more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on more than 6000 missiles and bombers. most of them targeted against a and allies.tes under new s.t.a.r.t., the united states and russia each would deploy no more than 1550 warheads warheads for strategicf deterrence. seven years from entry into the forest the russian federation it likely to have only about 350 deployed missiles. the smaller number of strategic nuclear systems will be deployed

at fewer bases as was pointed out earlier in the debate. w wildly inspected 70 facilities under s.t.a.r.t., many of these have now been shut down inn recent years. under new s.t.a.r.t. we will be inspecting only 35 russianel facilities and it is likely than russia will close down even morf bases over the life of the treaty. now both sides agreed at the outset that each would be free to structure its forces as it sees fit. a few consistent with that of the bush administration. as a practical economic matter conditions in russia preclude ae massive restructuring of this strategic forces. but the united states, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will allow for flexible modernization andflex operation of u.s. strategic forces while facilitatingnd transparency regarding the development and deployment ofth

russia's strategic forces. the treaty, protocol and annexes contained a detailed set of v rules and procedures for verification of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. many of them drawn from start one -- s.t.a.r.t. i.pect negotiators took the experienceh of on-site inspection that was a well-honed during s.t.a.r.t. ici and tailored it to the new circumstances of today. the inspection regime contained in new s.t.a.r.t. is designed to provide each partyar confidencei that the other is upholding its obligations while also being simpler and safer for the inspectors to implement the us operationally disruptive strategic forces, less costly than the s.t.a.r.t. regime. secretary gates recently wrotes to congress and i quote, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the joint chiefs, the

commander of u.s. strategic command and i assess that russia will not able to achieve military significant -- millet terry significant cheating or breakouts under new s.t.a.r.t..n due to both new s.t.a.r.t. verification regime and the and inherent survivability and flexibility of the u.s. strategic forcegi structure, and of quote. that is a very important statement in my judgment mr. president. secretary gates with the affirmation of all the above inl our government. say that russia will not achieve militarily significant cheating or breakouts under new s.t.a.r.t.. s given the verification procedures that we have outlined. predictably recent verification and compliance support covering s.t.a.r.t. have chronicled cases

where we disagree with russia about start one -- s.t.a.r.t. i implication. yet despite these issues, neither party violatedal s.t.a.r.t. i central limits. we should not expect that new s.t.a.r.t. will eliminate friction but the treaty will provide a means to deal with such different constructively as under s.t.a.r.t. i.y the ratification approved by the foreign relations committee of the senate requires further assurances by conditioning ratification on presidential certification prior to the treaty sentry and force. to monitor russian compliance and on immediate consultations should a russian breakout from the treaty be detected. for the first time in any strategic arms control treaty, a condition requires a plan for a new s.t.a.r.t. monitoring. a some have asserted that there are too few inspections in new

s.t.a.r.t.. p the treaty does provide for fewer inspections compared to b s.t.a.r.t. i. but this is because fewer facilities will require inspection under new s.t.a.r.t.. s.t.a.r.t. i covers 70 facilities in four soviet successor states whereas new s.t.a.r.t. owning applies to russia and is 35 facilities.to therefore we need fewerch inspectors to achieve a comparable level ocof oversight. new s.t.a.r.t. also maintains the same number of re-entry vehicle on-site inspections as s.t.a.r.t. i. namely, 10 per year.base baseline inspections that were phased out in new s.t.a.r.t. are no longer needed because we have 15 years of s.t.a.r.t. i treatyt implementation and data on which to rely. unfortunately new s.t.a.r.t. is not ratified for a lengthyacy

period, the the others could cfr baseline data will eventually deteriorate. this includes the innovation that unique identifiers as quota uid's end of quote be affixed to all russian missiles and nuclear heavy bombers. uid's were applied only to russian road mobile missions in s.t.a.r.t. i. e regular exchanges of data willha provide confidence andtro transparency regarding the existence and location of 700 deployed missiles, even when they are on none deployed status. something that s.t.a.r.t. i did not do. the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty codifies and continues importane verification enhancements related to warheadte loading ons russian icbm's and sob and's. these enhancements were to during agreed s.t.a.r.t. i implementation allow for greatern transparency in confirming the number ofeads warheads on each missile.

under s.t.a.r.t. i and the inf treaty themed united states maintains a continuous on-site resins of up to 30 technicians in russia to conduct monitoringe final assembly of russian chichi systems using solid rocket motors. while this portal monitoring is not continued under newth s.t.a.r.t., the decision to phase out this arrangement was made at the bush administration in anticipation of s.t.a.r.t. i's expiration. with vastly lower rates ofru russian missile production, continuous monitoringdu is not r crucial as it was during the cold war of asp and's or rather during the cold war. the moscow treaty's verificatiom shortcomings were dismissed during debate in the senate in 2003, because we were told therf would be time to fix them before

s.t.a.r.t. i expired, something we failed to achieve. so mr. president the only binding treaty regime of any kind in place is the moscow treaty, which itself will expire in december of 2012.be and the moscow treaty contains no counting rules and no c verifications. now mr. president illustration of the benefits of new s.t.a.r.t. compared to the moscow treaty, we will have data on the number byve type, deployd land-based icbms and slbm's and their launchers. this is not in the moscow treaty.ly certainly we will have data on the number by type of deployed in non-deployed road, mobile ana real mobile icbms and their launchers. and the production of mobile icbms. this too is not in the moscowco treaty.ill we will know thanks two new start for inspection procedures

the warheads in place on each icbm or slbm subject to theion inspection. the warhead inspection portion of a new s.t.a.r.t. inspection on deployed missile is used toyf confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the actual number of warheads in place on r designated deployed icbm or slbm. this isth not in the moscow trey and we will now have data and inspections for a number of foreheads and icbms and slbms. this is not in the moscow treaty. and for the first time we will have identification and tracking of all non-deployed question -- russian missiles, not just the road mobile missiles. a unique verification situation under new s.t.a.r.t.. we will have declarations,no notifications and inspections on the aggregate number of deployel missiles. we will have data on the

technical parameters for ballistic missiles to technical exhibitions and sections for missiles and people have data on the number by type of deployed heavy bombers, both those that are equipped for nuclear-capable weapons, and those that are notn in the number by type of formerly nuclear-capable heavy c bombers, training aircraft and heavy bombers equipped for conventional munitions that no longer carry nucleart munitions. we will have data and inspections on the elimination of strategic nuke we are launchers and delivery vehicles. we will have tracking, p notification and inspection of the protection of icbms for mobile launchers of icbms to confirm the number of icbms for mobile launchers of icbmspr produced.l and people have data and inspections on the elimination of declared facilities. mr. president the bottom line is that every senator should pondet

today that we have zero on the ground verification capability for russian strategic forces, given the fact that s.t.a.r.t. i expired in december 5 of 2009. those who wish to reject this a treaty and rely on the moscow treaty enjoy the same results, zero verification because the moscow treaty contains none. now mr. president i appreciate that we have had vigorous debatv not only on the verification procedures but likewise upon missile defense and for thatgott matter the entire negotiation of the treaty. but i would save my judgment, ii is very important, given the outline that i have explained this morning, no verification, none anticipated until the past the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty unles- there are those, and there have

been, throughout the history of thesero debates who simply do ns like treaties with the russians who would refer no treaty, who anticipate that someday protection may come and some negotiation will take place that is purely not inside if if rejection of this treaty were to be reported. i believe it is imperative for our national defense and national security mr. presidenta that is a personal judgment that one that i strongly advocate and that is why believe the process on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty is extremely important for the national security of our country. flo i yield the floor. >> the a senator from oklahoma.e >> mr. president procedurally we have two amendments right nowume that are pending. my amendment number 43 and the thune amendment 4811. minus concerning verification and hisses concerning delivery systems. we will have it is my

understanding up until 1:30 when we go into executive closed deb session to debate these. it would be my hope that members who want to debate would confine their debate to these two amendments because if they don'm and we let time get beyond us, there won't be as many people,he the people won't be heard o these amendment. i know that the senator from north dakota wants to speak andj i would just encourage anyone wanting to e speak on the treaty of it then these two amendmentsa differ to those who want to a speak on these amendment.- i that is not a unanimous consent request. it is just something that ik is think is the appropriate thing to do.gn these are very significant amendments, both of them. i would comment alsome that any good way to do that if someone wants toea talk about the treaty other than these two amendments and there is someone who wants to talk about the amendment i would hope they would to defer to those two want to talk about ao minute. let me take a comment about the opening statement of the senator from massachusetts.

you know, when you talk about the fact that we have been on this thing longer than any other treaty for years and months and all that, i would remind him it is kind of a unique situation because i'm both on the armed services committee on the foreign relations committee and i can tell you that wevi have hd a lot of hearings, that is true but in the foreign relations committee we have had 16 hearings, total of 30 witnesses. of the 30 witnesses 28 were in t favor of the treaty, two were w opposed to the treaty and what t we attempted to do was to get a broader exposure to this very significant treaty issue and i t think for that reason we do need to take more time because we have only heard one side. than on the other thing, the idea stated that this is just an add-on fro tm it previous treatr let's keep in mind when then s.t.a.r.t. i treaty came up that was really between twon superpowers. i think everyone understands a that.

and that is not the scene today. one of the problems i have witha this treaty is it is a treaty between the united states and russia. this is not really in my opinioh where the threat is. the thread is with iran. the threat is with north korea. every time we get an assessment on north korea we are wrong. they have more than we believee. they have had. our intelligence will confirm that they have and then we are put in a position where we knowr that they are trading with countries like iran and iran right now has, is in a position, according to our intelligence not even classified, they would have a delivery system with a nuclear warhead n by 2015. so therere is where the issue of missile defense comes in and i know the argument, we have gone back and forth on this thing, missile defense, i would still say this.ave and you have russia's foreign

minister lavrov coming out and m saying we have not yet agreed on the missile defense issue and we are trying to clarify how the agreement reached by two presidents correlates with the actions taken unilaterally by washington and added that the obama administration had not corrugated its missile defense with russia. in rush of the treaty cannottes break and be viable only if the united states refrains from developing its capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively. we can sit around and say that this isn't going to affect out but nonetheless that is onso record. so we have some russians that really believe that. that is not on my up minute. i just wanted to comment that there is a reason for taking the time here and i'm not going to get into the debate as toho whether or not we should haveio done it before the election orct after the electionio but i wille say this, a lot of the things

have come up in this lame-duck session have, because the chances of getting these things through our greater than they would be after eight or nine new senators come in.ht but the fact is, these eight or nine new senators of all joineds in a letter asking us, asking un could you refrain from ratifyin this very significant treaty until we have a chance to look at it because we are the ones, we are the new senate coming in. anyway, i think that is a goodck argument. i am just going to get back toad my amendment, 4833 and kind of v kick it off here.ant i know we have a lot of people want to talk about this amendment an.d m mr. chair let e give my thoughts first. right now, there are under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, 180rs inspections over 10 years. that is 18 a year, versus what we had in the s.t.a.r.t. i and 600 over 15 years.h

do the math there and that is 40 so it isct dropped from 40in inspections a year from 18 inspections for your. in just a minute i will say whys i believe it is necessary it would be good to actually have more than we had during s.t.a.r.t. i.nder the inspections under new s.t.a.r.t., they inspected w verify the elimination of nuclear weapon deliveryli systes that have fundamentally changed from those in the s.t.a.r.t. i.i s.t.a.r.t. i required some of thef elimination of sites and se we didn't at that time have tok set up a mechanism to look and see if these are actually eliminated because we knew at that time that they were, but now we have no way of knowing whether those sites have been reactivated. we don't know that and in fact the test is being used under this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty would he to view the degree, the degree that shows that systems were eliminated. well it could very well be that they could destroy a system. there could be three or more

systems they don't destroy and say they did and they say they there is that debris rightan there. spread the debris of around. it is not a very good test as tp what is actually happened. now, under the other problem, the second problem i have under the newhe start mac is 24 and a advance notice is required before an inspection which isc quite a dramatic increase under the old s.t.a.r.t. treaty, it was nine hours advance notice and i think if you walk intoussi this and assume the russians's aren't going to cheat, that is fine then but i'm not willing to do that exist in a minute i will document the things that they said they would do. so if anything i think that we should have certainly no longer warning than under the old s.t.a.r.t. treaty of nine hours. my amendment seeks to mitigate some of these negotiated disadvantages by increasing the number of inspections per year. the amendment triples the number of inspections under the new s.t.a.r.t. from the two types of inspections specified under the

new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. type one and type two inspections. type one inspections referred to the icbm bases, submarine bases, the airbases to confirm accurate declared data on a number of types of deployed in non-deployed warheads located on icbms, slbm's and heavy bombers. type two refers to inspections formerly declared facilities ton confirm that those facilities are not being used for the purpose of inconsistent with the treaties. that would have been h. inconsistent with s.t.a.r.t. i.s well, that is what we talkedt's about a minute ago. i don't say that there is any verification in terms of meaningful to verify on the type , but type one inspections would increase from 10 to 30 inspections a year. type two would increase from eight 8 to 24, total of 54 inspections. now on july the 20th of 2010,

the principle deputy undersecretary of defense forie policy, that is james miller, testified before the senate armed services committee, i was there. he said russia cheating or breakout is they sometimes they as a phrase under the treaty e would have little effect because the u.s. second-strike strategyl nuclear capability.ree well, i disagree with that.th i mean, you'd know if this is something where we have people who agree and disagree certainly we should fall down on the side of protection for the united states. i think as you get to the argument saying that we don't need as many inspections, because we have a smaller number of facilities to inspect or a smaller size of the nuclear arsenal as in new s.t.a.r.t., the larger the impact cheating hasan strategic nuclear balance. this is kind of a hard thing fod people to understand, but

increasing the number of type one 1 and two inspections istart critical to the new s.t.a.r.t. verification because the totalns number of inspections has been dramatically reduced so by f having the facilities reduce means theyuc are much more concerned.we and let me quote a few of the people that have weighed in on this issue. the former secretary of defense, harold brown, and we are talking about back in 1991.all this goes all the way back to i 1991 when they were looking into the future and saying this is something we think is going to happen.en harold brown, who is the secretary of defense at thatti time, 1991, explained why in this case in his testimony before the senate foreign relations committee on the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty. this was october 23, 1991.l" verification will looking into the future where we are - today, verification will become evenil more important as the number of strategic nuclear weapons on eachnu side decreases because

uncertainties of a given sizeag become a larger percentage of the total force as occurred.cu now he is the only one who believes this?au no. former secretary of arms control, john bolton, statedy just this year may 3, he said that while verification is important in an arms controlatio treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels. that is where we are now, blower warhead levels. 1997 brands grow croft said current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively sensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force t changes. now listen to this.s he said his force levels go down in the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits, concerns about hidden missiles and thecto

actions of nuclear third w parties, yesterday we were having this debate. i commented or acknowledge that both the senator from massachusetts and i have been aviators for a number of years and i recall going across siberia and flying around the world. i looks down their in timezone after timezone after timezone aa this wilderness, and you thinkaf of all the places things can be. that is not the way it is in our country and that is what brentte scowcroft was saying, that isan the force levels go down and the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits and concerns about hidden missiles and actions of n nuclear third parties. and then in may of this year, the senate foreign relationsec committee former secretary james baker summarized the new s.t.a.r.t. verification is weaker than its predecessor testifying to congress that the new s.t.a.r.t. verification program is not appear as

rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under s.t.a.r.t. i. this complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads arealo allowed then were allowed in the past. i think we have this unanimity of people who believe that as the level comes down, theio inspections become more critical and i think that we also have to look at the fact, and i noticed not nice to say and this offends a lot of people but russiaot cheats. every arms control treaty we t have had with them, we had a recent thing -- and i'm glad it came out.nk to think this was in december of this year, with the report on foreign country compliance and this is what our report said. it startsid out, it said there a number of long-standing compliance issues such as

obstruction to u.s. right to inspect warheads, raised in the s.t.a.r.t. treaty joint compliance and inspection commission thatai remained unresolved when the treaty t expired on december 5, 2009 and then if you look, they break ite down.nt biological weapons and conventional. state department concluded that quote, russia maintains a sure offensive biological weapons program and that its nature and status had not change.n this was in this report that we2 had so in the 2010 report, the state department report states this. russia's confidence-building measures in the decoration sincu 1992 has not satisfactorily documented whether it's biological weapons ibi program d terminate. they said the same thing five years later that they said back in 2005. so we don't know. right now they are supposed be eliminating the biological weapons convention and they

didn't doo it.eapo chemical weapons, 2000 by the state department says quotevi russia is in violation of its chemical weapons convention obligationsig because its declaration was incomplete witho respect to declarations of reduction and development facilities. in 2010, the state department again stated that there was an r absence of additionalg in information from russia u resulting in the united statesee being unable to ascertainl o whether russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpiles, all chemical weapons production facilities and all of its chemical weapons development facilities. so all the iy are saying is nowt five years later after they have been warned in 2005 that they have to do this and they are noncompliant, they are still noncompliant in that its chemical weapons. in the conventional forces the report said that the united states notes that russia's actions have resulted in h noncompliance with its treatyesl obligations. "the wall street journal"

recently reported that according to the u.s. officials, the u.s. believes russia has moved short-range tactical nuclear warheads to facilities near nato allies as recently as this spring. so i think, if you look at the record, of russia, they don't tell us the truth. they agree to something in the they don't do it and that is whe verification probably maybe the most significant frailty in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty that needs to be addressed. so for starters, just want to repeat that we have fewer inspections now under this y treaty. the idea that you canmi determie by the degree that remains aftee something was supposed to be destroyed is to me, it is a nonstarter. the advance notice, the fact that we now give them advance notice three times as long as we did at one time, and the weapons decreased i think everyone agrees that we need to have more

of the opportunities to inspect and then lastly the fact that russia cheats. now, i would yield the floor at. this point and i don't see anyone around that wants to talk about these two amendments, so i will yield the floor.rt >> the senator from north dakota.e >> mr. president, of course i will yield.?rse. i would like to ask the senator since there may be some on theie way down to talk about these amendments, the general subject of the missile-defense or the treaty, about how long you'll bg talking on some of the others in specifically these two amendments?ly m >> mr. president i would estimate about 15 to 20 minutes maximum. >> mr. president? >> the senator fromffic massachusetts. mr. >> mr. president i spoke yesterday to most of the arguments. i don't think there is a need to go back over them.

i appreciate the arguments inhe the concerns of the senator from oklahoma. thi so, i think i will let that stand where it was and we will see if another senator comes to pick up. >> i yield the floor. >> the senator from north dakota.nd >> mr. president, this is a very significant and important issue as i've indicated previously. we deal with a lot of issues here at the united states senate sum less relevant, some more important and we often treat this serious too lightly andri delight to seriously.hi in this case the think everybody understands that negotiating a treaty with the russians dealing with arms reductions is critically important. and that is what this is. i don't think when you talk about nucleark weapons that thee are other issues that are similar to it. if, god forbid, before sundownt today, we learned that a nuclear weapon has been obtained by a terrorist group or a rogue

nation and detonated in the middle of a major city on this planet earth and hundreds of thousands of people aree killed, life on earth will change forever. this is a big issue, a very important issue. described the horror of a circumstance where a nuclear weapon was detonated in a major city on this planet. we have 25,000 nuclear weapons that exist on this planet, and the question find a way to systematically reduce the number of nuclear weapons and therefore reduce the threat of the use of nuclearwe weapons while at the same timeut trying to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations. these days it seems to me the question of the nuclear threat is very different than with previous treaties were negotiated. and the reason for that is, we

have found a new enemy on this planet.nemy it is called terrorism. terrorists who are very happy to give up their life as long as they can take the lives of others. and so, that terrorist threat and the thread that a terrorist organization might acquire a nuclear weapon, and then very vr happily detonate that nuclear weapon and kill hundreds ofl thousands of people, innocent people. that is a very serious problem. .. and arms reduction negotiations, but to the passage of treatyies that are in fact negotiated. we have successfully negotiated various arms control treaties. i will not go through the list of successes as i did previously. but we have been very successful in reducing the number of nuclear weapons and the number of delivery vehicles, bombers

and submarines and intercontinental ballistic missile missiles. we have fields where sunflowers go when missiles once were planted aimed at our cou planted aimed at our cou judgment. there is jus jt no doubt that wh we have done over the years has, been successful. and yet there remains on this 2 weapons. listene to now, i'd listen to this debate,e i don't believe there'shis anyone involved in this debate that represents bad faith. i think there's differences of e opinion, and i believe people who come here and offernd in they are pursuing the right strategy. see but inms some ways it also seeme to me to be kind of three or eour stages of denial.ak that is, you take a position and one that is responded to, and pt take a second position. you know, i w wasn't there, if t was there i didn't do it.

if i did, i'm sorry. detphaorl t the stages yof denial are pretty interesting to me. let me go through a few of them. prty inter the firstes was they were very worried, somewhat worried in this chamber that if we proceed with s.t.a.r.t. withoutith adequately funding the nuclear weapons complex and funding they in necessary invevestments inst our stockpile, the investments forin modernization, the investments for life extension programs anda so on, if we do that withouthout adequate funding for that thatfr pruld be a serious problem. fac well, the fact that president obama propose adequate funding in coordination with those who were raising w that question,orw particularly senator kyl wasreat raising that question a greathea deal. he andnd i talked about it a substantial amount because irish chaired the subcommittee that tr funds the nuclear weapons lif complex and a life extension programs and the modernization programs your and so while most other areas of the federal

budget were being trimmed or frozen or chilled static, we increased that president obama's request the nuclear weapons lind item in the budget that deals with modernization and lifetime. extension programs into one. we increased that by nearly 10%i in the past fiscal year. 10% and then another 10% in this top fiscal year. and then on top of a 10%se and increase and a 10% increase, another $4 billion increase from the top of all of that. i mean, i don't think anyone cai problem withe funding. the president kept his promise, and then did more than that.s two, 10% increases taking us to, $7.6 billion on top of thatanot4 adding another $4 billion in five years.er it's hard to find another part of the budget that has been asas robustly funded. again come suas chairman of thee

subcommittee that funds there is thelieve at we have done what satisfy the concernshose expresd by those who were worried thate the funding wouldn't be there. there., he made those proposals with two big increases, and then an evenr larger third increase. that ought to just lay to rest a subject for good.aintained wh will our current stockpile be properly maintained with life e? extension programs and modernization expenditures. the answer is yes, it's clearlys yes.clearl the funding has been made available and ought not be not e debate about that any longer. the question of time, some havei said and i heard this morning on television one of myf colleaguee say this is being rushed through at the end of a session. of that's not true. that's an example of what i described previously on the floor of creating a new realityw and georges in getting a reality and debating off that new invention. it's not true that we are

rushing this through.invent we have had meeting after meeting after meeting. i'm on the national security grp working group, and all through the negotiation with the russians of this treaty, on republicans and democrats onsect that committee were called it a secret sessions and briefed all ay the way, say here's what's hs going on. to negotiate with the here'se what we are come here's what wet are doing.east we were always kept abreast of all of that. and so there was nothing at all that is running away quickly at ge this the end of the session to try to thiss -- in get this done. muc lon this is, in fact, this has been delayed much longer than in my,e judgment i would have preferredt but nontheless, we are here. t it seems to me this ought not be part of the routine business of the congress. contr this is an arms control treaty,o nuclear arms reduction. t this ought toha be one of those areas that rises well above that which is the normal business and a congress.at

but there is just no credibility at all to suggest this is beingy rushed. i can just recall day after day sitting in secret sessions with negotiators telling us along the way, here's what we are doing they met with republicans and al democrats. we met altogether in a room in i the capitol visitors center ande had briefing after briefing worg after briefing on the nationalif security working group. this it includes most of those in hae this chamber have spoken on thic issue. was somehow members, members of congress uninformed about what was happening. all of us were informed. us this administration i thought yu did an exceptional job of comina to us and saying we want to keep you advised and informed of whai we are doing. it just isn't the case that the end of the session is being rushed through. it should've been done a fewi months ago. wwish it had been, but itre, hasn't been so, therefore, we find herself at the intersection. shouldn't but we should let anybodys

believe this is being pushed and rushed without time to consider. al of us have had ample time mh over many, many months.aear and over a year before that while the negotiations weree taking place, to seriously consider and be a b part of whan this is. and what it means for our country. the other issue that's beinglimr raised is it will limit our capabilities with respect toagat missile defense. i cant it is just not the case.r i understand what people have been reading in order to make that case, but every living dem republican and democratic favor of this treaty. staff everyone. the chairman of the joint chiefn of staff has made a very a sort. of strong statement in supportma ss theyile didn't do that because s somehow we are limited in missile defense. exi in fact, the president has reads to us and said that is not whats exists with respect to an

agreement between us and the russians. it just is not. doesn't include tacticaloesn't. weapons.d no, it doesn't. ttical we do need to include tactical e weapons. i wish it had been part of the w moscow treaty.ar it was a. i wish it would be part of't med history.top it wasn't. that doeprsn't mean we should sn progress on the strategic weapons slimitations, a reductn of the number of strategic nuclear weapons. do not take the progress in the area of limiting strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, airplanes, missiles, submarines and so on e with which those weapons are delivered, why would you not take the progress that existsitc with respect to limitingof coure strategic weapons? of course we should do that. do and certainly i don't disagree at all with those are worried about tactical weapons.are worrd so in my. so is thiscal administration. all of us would have loved to have had an agreement of loved tactical nuclear weapons five and 10 years ago.clear w that was not possible.ars ago work oson n this, and this provs

measurable reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and measurable reductions in the delivery vehicles for thoseissie warheads, bombers, missiles,ould submarines and so on. it would be unthinkable it seemo to me for our country duty sideo no, this is not the direction in which we want to move. as indicated earlier -- as ie indicated earlier on every occasion where we have debated the issue of arms control and arms reduction, understand it is our responsibility, it falls on the shoulders of this country, p dean united states, on every occasion where we have debated the issue of trying to reducehis the number of nuclear weapons or this planet and reduce the thret number of delivery vehicles and the threat from nuclear weaponsf we've done that exclusive of this new threat which now casts a shadow of everything we talk e about. and that is the threat of

terrorism.e. a new thread in the last decade. terrorists who are very anxiousn to take their own lives if they can kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of others. group the specter of having a terrorist group acquire a nuclear weapon onng this chat we change life on the planet as wem know it.e and so it is a much more urgenty requirement that we find respons to this by continuing this the relentless march to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and tw try to make certain that we keep nuclear weapons out of the hands ofof terrorists, to reduce thewh number of rogue nations that iso would have nuclear weapons.nsib. thatit 'sis our responsibility. it's our leadership responsibly this country. w the signal we send to the worldi with respect to this vote ands others did with arms control and orms reduction is unbelievably p important. and that's why this vote in this chamber at this point is so

urgent. now, i mentioned terrorism ands it's now a few days before chrie christmas.ab lastou crisis we were remindedn about terrorists once again. a a man got on an airplane with a bomb so into his underwear.on ae he was preceded by made getting his shoe.oe and the list goess on. perfectly interestingly in bringing down and it tighter- life of people.cans killing several thousands of 9/ americans on 9/11, 2001. are but are even more interest incqa lequiring a nuclear weapon andnp killing hundreds of thousands of people somewhat in a major cityy on this planet.esponsibil that's why this responsibility,a the responsibility to negotiate continue to negotiate and negotiatere and negotiate, trees that represent our interests. ad yes, they have to represent our. interests, and this one does. p

look at the list of people who i have brought up before chart to show all other tokens ande t democrats, the folks have worked on these things for so long.andl secretaries of state andit military leaders, former presidents.ido it is our responsibility make progress here. --s and, frankly, as i said, i don' suggest there's bad faith on the part of anybody who stood up with their opinion. that's i think people in this chamber are people of goodle faith. but it seems to me some have not yehat understood the increasingd urgency now to address this n issue. this issue is in our national rn interest.is ty with this issue with the russians, this treaty with the russians was negotiated very,te verytionl carefully, represent ours national interest. yes, on verification representto our national interest.sents ours it reprtsesents our interests iy every other way, missile defense.anytng with we didn't give up anything with respect to missile defense.

and so if as i hear some of my colleagues come to the floor very concerned about these issues, all of them, all of thel are resinponded to easily, in my judgment. the money, we are spending more money than it's ever been spent on the nuclear weapons complex to make sure that our nuclear weapons work. and withhold was preceded ahead in an essay said i would have killed for a budget like they tw th programs other modernization program. i would've killed for that, he said. he was the man k who ran the nsa organization of the previous president, president george w. bush.rge w. so money is not an issue.. timecards this is not being pressed into a tiny little corner with an urgent time requirement. this has been delayed. del it should not have been delayed, but it is important to stay here

and do this and to hope that the work that's been done on athe bipartisan basis in the committee can be supported by the entire senate. let me say that i started earlier, i know it's easy tohis complement people in this complt those with whom you disagree, ir suppose, but let me covenant if i might senator kerry an bdy senator lugar it does the work they have done which is very strongly bipartisan to bring this treaty to the floor of the senate for ratification is ibest think a representation of the best of the united statesought senate. it's the way this place really ought to work.d heari searching out holding hearings and hearings and hearings, the best thinkers on all thesetheide issues, to come and give us th their advieyce about these matters. they did not. and there's nothing that this r

issue is represent with respect ne pushing it into a tightdo timeframe. they have done this the right way.way, the the right kind of hearing, the right kind of consultation. and now come to the floor of the senate and say this is urgent. let's get this done. wante and so i just wanted to comewasd today, i was driving to workas this morning and i was saying,bi there goes the martin luther o king memorial over on the mall. and i recalled what he said once. the he sai md that means by which w live outdistanced the ends fored which we live. he said we learned the secret of the adam and forgot the sermon on the mount. well, the secret of the ad istam something we have indeed marned, in more recent yearsin the specter of having so manyper nuclear weapons on this planet and the specter of terrorists ever more vigilant and to proceed to ratify treaties thatr

we negotiate over a long period of time.i it is again as i indicated, it g is our responsibility. this responsibility for stoppin, the arms race rest on our do shoulders. i and yes, we must do in ourelf a interest, our national interest. butmeas in my judgment history e every one of those measures andi i'm pleased to support it and pleased todone be here to say, i hope the rest of my colleagues s will look at what senator kerry and senator lugar have done and come to the floor with robust support for what i think is some outstanding mr. president, i yield theto spk floor. speak to in a minute that i'vema been at the desk, but before you that i want to make some generam observations as well about where we are with regards to this process because i do believen that there's been a lot said abt rep about republicans not wanting to vote on this or trying to delay this. but i think you have to admit that we have now talked about missile defense, which i think t is a very valid issue with

respect to this treaty, very h significant issues of a treat to missile defense. with a discussion about tacticas weapons, which in my judgment also is a very important issueo relative to our national security interests and interest of our allies around the world.e and without a debate about off, from oklahoma, his debatete is currently pending.re those are all very i think about and substantive issues to debatd and discuss with regard to this ene am treaty. deal w the a minute that offer will deal with the issue of delivery vehicles which is something that treaty is concerned, and so i would simply say that i thinkd it's consistent with our role, f the united states senate, to give osha's consent if that's to what the founders had intended t we could rubberstamp this. but we haved a role in this s process and that was to look atf

in great detail these issues and make sure that the united states national security interests are well served by a treaty of thisd important. and so i think that the words of the treaty matter. pr i think the word of the preamble matter. tha and i'mt not going to relitigate the debate that we are ahead one this missile defense but i do believean that if you have language on a preamble to a document like this, not unlike preamble that we have in our constitution which is frequentlf quoted, it has meaning. and to suggest that the preamble doesn't mean anything, that it's a throwaway, throwaway language to me really misses the point. s obviously, at matters to someone. i think it matters greatly to the russians, and rsi don't thit that if it didn't it would be in there. belie and that's why i believe that having this linkage betweenssile offenses missile defense and, ad our office -- offenses strategi boms in the preamble come isn't of a reason. somebody wanted it in their obviously and i think it's okay beyond what has been suggestedha

here on the floor of the united states senate.o aue as and i would also argue as well d that the signing statement which we have talked about what the russians made it very clear that stat in a signing prague in apri april 2010 treaty can operate and be viable only if united states of america refrains fromy developing its missile defense capabilities qualitatively oroue quantitatively. and if you ti be that back to t article 14 to withdraw thehe treaty, where he talks about being able to withdraw fortional exceptional circumstances you st can survey see the pretext bysis which the russians may decide to withdraw from history.issile d i missile defense is not an inconsequential issue. is it is a very important issue and with regard to the treaty.oted and the minute i was offered on saturday, voted upon, attempted and, unfortunately, that failede i hope we have subsequent of missile defense because ith e certainly think it's an unresolved issue in my view and

the view of many of us. and that offernt today, mr.ld sy president, is very straightforward and modest. it would simply the numberf of deployed delivery vehicles. in other words, bombers, the yubmarines, and land-basedreat missiles allowed for in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty from 700, then 720.er simply adds 20 additional vehicles to the number.to theat in order to match up with the administration's plan presented to the senate forde fielding 72d delivery vehicles rather than ts the 700 called for in the text of this treaty.ask, before i continue i would ask, mr. president, the center of asa massachusetts scott brown theo s attitude is a minute. objectio >> for those watching thibes debate and may be unfamiliar with some of the terminology used in these arms controlsehict treaties, such as the term delivery vehicles it's important to understand that delivery nucr vehicles simply means the nuclear triad of systems. in other words, bombers, submarines and land-based inter intercontinental ballistic or missiles, our icbms but

sometimes referred to as launch vehicles. this triad delivery vehicles isy very viable because it is resilient, survivable andcause t flexible.me that meaning that if, god forbid, wee would separate nuclear attack those who attacked us can never be sure that they have not doubt our ability to respond with a nuclear strike. obviously, without the means to deliver nuclear weapons an adversary adversary would not exist our ability to respond to a nuclear attack. as the number of deliveryponsiby vehicles goes down it becomes more and more important to make they work as intended. and as members get reduced and impa it begins to have an impact, ont whether m we can effectivelyoulv retain the triad making it morea likely that our nation would have to eliminate a leg of the triad. mr. president, on july 9, 2009 d come and armed services cartw committee hearing i askedof general james cartwright the vice-chairman of the joint chiefs about the administration's commitment at rategi that time to reduce our the strategic delivery vehicles to

somewhere in the range of 500, 21100 systems. and to specify at what point in this range he would be concerned that delivery vehicle reduction would necessitate many are nuclear triad into a dyad.ght general cartwright responded. he would be very concerned ever got down below those levels mpo" about midpoint, end quote.oncerd mean he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell belo. 800 delivery vehicles. mr. president, the c treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700. generl sbstantially below the number that general cartwright stated . year and a half ago. now the treaty makes this oddnd distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles it the treaties propose will pointa out the total cap for the treat is 80is0 deployed and nondeployn systems. and, of course, there's a little general cartwright in the committee report accompanied thh treaty stating that he's comfortable with the distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles and thell overall limit to deliveryt's

vehicles. but it's important, mr. president, tntopr understand tht the administration has not a articulated how they will of deployed nuclear force. conforming to the number of 700. instead of the administrationdey has present a plan for how it will deployed 720 delivery motin vehicles. beh and that is the motivation behind this amendment. i find it very troubling the to administration has yet to articulate how they will deployed a nuclear forceo structure that would conform too the number of 700.ve plan f comprehensive plan for deliverys vehicles for structured industries was required tose present under congress under 12r section one, defense authorization bill known as the 1251 report provides a veryonceg troubling lack of specificity nw concerning force structure under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. specifically the administration fact sheet on the section 1251. report explains that the u.s. this nuclear force structure under this treaty could comprised of

up to 60 bombers of the 420 240 icbms and 240 submarine launched ballistic missiles youo thenl only number that is a certainty in the 1251 report is fhat the number of slbms. numbeo now i hope the members from states with bomber bases and icbm bases will pay attention te this important point. deployment at the maximum level under the explanation provided1 by the administration 1251 report add up to 720 delivery vehicles, is mathematicallyhe ua impossible for the united states to make such a deployment and to be in compliance with treaties limit of 700 deployed strategicr nuclear vehicles.ll be clearly additional reduction respect to u.s. force structure under this treaty,un alynd obvis those will come out of the bombers and/or icbms. acknowlgen now secretary gates and admiral mullen acknowledged in a hearine before the senate armed serviced committee on june 17, 2010, that

further reductions would still be required to meet the treaty'n central limit. it went on to argue that becausn you are essential in seven years to reduce its forces to these limits they did not find it necessary to identify a final force structure at this point. meaning the senate will commit y the united states to delivery vehicle force of 700 withouthat knowing how that force will bec. composed.oblem ofot and mr. president, compoundingfa this problem of not knowing what the final force structure will look like is the fact that obamp administration conceded to rush and it is to place limits ons bt conventional prompt globaled strike systems by counting conventionally armed strategic ballistic missiles against there 700 allowed for delivery vehicles. for those who are on the money i with prop global strike and ao program that would allow the united states to strike targets anywhere on earth withttle as conventional weapons in as little as an hour.an imp

development of the systems is ak important niche capability that hi-value tar ould allow us to attackns high-value targets or fleetingrs targets, such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, missile threats, and recent defense science board report states, and i quote, the most mature optionr for prompt longer-rangeissile." traditional strike is theacy ballistic missile, end quote. and in building on the legacy of these intercontinental ballistic missile weapon systems provide a relatively low risk path to a. conventional weapons system with global reach. m and again, end quote. to yet this treaty, mr. president, will not permit us to develop this low risk concept foron conventional prompt global strike without having an impact on the central limit under this treaty of 700 delivery vehiclesu to be very blunt, this treaty was supported negotiated, for every icbm our slbm deployed with a conventional warhead, onr

less nuclear delivery vehicle tu rll be available to the unitede states. fors this one for one reduction in ls the deployed nuclear forces is one we cannot afford that the levels of the delivery vehicles allowed under this treaty.stra when the command of u.s.chiln, strategic command testifiedee on before the armed services committee onf april 22 of 2010 t specifically said that we couldw not replace a deterrent effects of nuclear weapons with a conventional capability on a one-to-one basis or, and i quote, even 10 for one basis, treaty proponents will point oue that there are other potential new conventional prompt global strike systems on the drawing f board that may not fall under the treaty's limitations such as the hypersonic glide delivery vehicle. but why are we tying the hands of future administrations who may need to quickly field such coerting systems, especially since carrya converting icbms to carry the conventional warhead on the mosh

advanced systems we have right now ont conventional prompt global strike. rat the senate should not ratify the treaty without knowing what kind conventional prompt global conventional prompt global strike systems may be counted triad at a much reduced deliverf vehicle limits. defense, an has been on treaty implications for conventional r prompt global strike proposals will not be readyea until early 2011. ts trea if we pass this treaty nowails senators won't know the details of thiors important issue untilo the treaty enters into force when it's too late.ide a adopted by a member would try to hedge against issues that aret raised against the prompt global strike nicheke capability and it impact on the treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles. for the 700 delivery vehicle diy limit and conventional prompt global strike count against that number we will have fewerrike cn disincentive to develop and deploy conventional prompt promp global strike as a result.the

moreover, why should we accept these constraints in a treaty that was supposed to be about strategic nuclear weapons? mr. president, while we are required under the treaty to cut the number of delivery vehiclese to the bone, russia will not have to make any similar cuts ty their delivery vehicles.ecei leading one to wonder what we received in return for thisuires significant concession. the treaty as essentiallytions requires the united states tos, make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles, as russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits v and would drastically reduce its arsenal s with or without is treated as as congressional research service writes ethical russia grossly620 has 620 launchers.nchers and this number may decline to this would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters into force because rush is misss

eliminating older missiles asewr they age and deploy newer missiles at a far slower pacen than that needed to retain 700pd deployed launchers, end quote. t so i want to just put a finer mp point on that, mr. president. especially what we're doing hern is in our arsenal about 856 deliveryab vehicles today.day. we are reducing that down to sig 700.ni so we're taking a significant haircut, significant cut in a u. number of delivery vehicles tha, would be available to us. the russians on the other end are currently only at 620 launchers, delivery vehicles already well below the 700.ey'rw and on the attrition path that b they are on would very soon be down to about 400 deployed launchers, and 444 total launchers. so the united states made huge ryve concessions with regard to delivery vehicles in this the treaty, and the russians haveoi. conceded nothing on this point.

and it seems to me at least this is another area in which we madt significant concessions and received very little in return.u mr. president, we arers findinge ourselves in the number of delivery vehicles we negotiate even though we have security tmorements to extend our 30 countries while russia haseas given the gateographic realities that we do within the world, the united states strategic nuclear forces are part of how theextend united states provide extended e deterrence. as we face an uncertain future with other nations like china nuear continue to modernize their nuclear forces, we will need to be able to hold more potentialo targets at risk to deter theft that means we need to be very careful about reducing delivery vehicle levels. this amendment would simply use the administrations 1251 report force structure plan of 720 for delivery vehicles rather than the current number of 700 7 reflected in the treaty. f the mr. president, to my colleaguess

will probably warn that evenler this modest amendment is a, of treaty killer amendment.hall but article ii, section two of y the constitution says that theot and with the device and consent of the senate to make treaties. on the other side admonishes usb about treaty killer amendments r it becomes apparent that we aren supposed to be a rubberstamp fot this treaty.t our wanting us to provide our should consent but not to provide our advice. it should be made clear what a treaty killer amendment is, in a minute seeking to remedy an issue with the treaty theemed russian steamrollers on during thye negotiation process by whiw new s.t.a.r.t. proponents do not wish to adopt because protecting america enters will ignore theos russians and perhaps jhoeopardie entry into force of the treaty. one thing should be clear, mr. president. the senate cannot kill newugges. s.t.a.r.t. in the way that somei are suggesting.rtith if the senate gives its consente to new s.t.a.r.t. with america's attacks, that just means the treaty set to russia for its approval with the amendment, the

ball will then be in russia's court. lin crs has outlined a study in the proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty.fore, they amount to center count --go senate counter offers. simply put again, mr. president, and a member to wthe treaty tee will not kill the triggerednt ability merely requires russian consent to the mm as a matter of international negotiation. choes if russia chooses to reject the amendment it will not be thenata senate to kill for the treaty but the russian government. prei a side note, mr. president. rec i albelieve it's important to recall that general chilton supports for new s.t.a.r.t. levels was predicated on nohe to russian cheating. he testified at the senate arme services committee on april 22,e 2010, that one of the posture review was completed was quote and a second that the russians and the post-negotiation time period would be compliant with the

treaty, end quote. it's been pointed out in many times russia has been a serial h violator of armsow control agreements.ion, so, mr. president, in conclusion reducing u.s. strategic nuclear forces, especially with delivery systems is a very serious matter that has received insufficient c attention. we have little to gain and muchh to lose if we cannot be certaine that the numbers of new s.t.a.r.t. are adequate. i think it's worth noting former defense secretary schlesinger testified to the senate foreign relations committee and again, quote, as the steady context a strategic nuclear weapons the numbers specified are adequate,e though barely so, end quote. again this is a modest amendmens that takes into account the administrations own forcedelivev structure plan of 720 delivery m vehicles.in this amendment would simply give the administrations 1251 report force structure plan of 720 makt

delivery vehicles and make that deceiving for delivery vehicleso under the treaty, rather than hee current number of 700 that't reflected in the treaty today. so mr. president, i would ask ms colleagues to support this amendment. i would simply say that with regard to maintaining a triad, a system of bombers, icbms and slbms, that in order to do that than 700 number, 700 number ceiling makes that veryif complicated. if you assume 420 icbms at 240 slbms, that please you room for some bombers but not a lot of room. and, frankly, if you go down from the 720 number to the 700 0 number, that would mean if you went to 700 you took it out of bombers you would be down to t $40. we have about 96 b-52's, 20 capable or nuclear weapons that we use with nuclear launch

vehicles to use for extendedgsdn deterrence around the globe today. going down to a number around 40 would be a two-thirds reduction in the number of bombers that wl have of able to us to provide that type of extended deterrence.it s strikes me, mr. president, that wetrik are getting perilously cs to this number to moving from a triad to a dyad. and furthermore tying our hands when it comes to our ability tol have the necessary delivery ever vehicles at our disposal, if and when that time would ever come.. so again very, very straightforward amendment, takes the number from 700 to 720. and is consistent with the 1251 ad report and what the of administration said they can hot accommodate in terms of launch vehicles. and i hope that my colleagues will supportld it. mr. president, i yield the flo floor. >> mr. president? >> the senator fromut massachuse >> mr. president, before i say a few words about the mm but let me see if i can get an agreement from my colleagues.

we have a lot of colleagues asking when we will vote comehae and we need and vote. v we've only had to vote on this treaty after six days. honestly i could move to table but i don't want to do that. bui don' at least not yet. not av i have asked the senator from south dakota if we could set up a time to have a vote in ohis m at 12:30.pared to i think you were prepared to debate.at len the senate from oklahoma wants to talk at length i think aboute the verification issue. ien don't think we are preparedy this point you in into a timeots agreement for any time certain on. votes, until we can get somn indication from our colleagues about who would like to speak on this and then it would be very oly c >> well, i would say to my colleague, we are getting into the six date of debate.o speak christmas is coming. it's surprising to me we don't have any indication he would like to speak on this amendmenti >> well, i think, mr. presidento

i should save mr. president, iut to the senator from massachusetts we do have a thinb others want to speak not only on this amendment but also on the amendment at the senator from oklahoma.oth very significant substantive toh amendments that deal ty, a fundamentally with the issues that are important to thisoff we are prepared at this point tu cut off that debate.mi and untilwa we get some indicatn from some of our colleagues about who else might want to come down here and speak to either of these issues, i would object to entering any kind ofct timeframe for the. >> i accept that, and the point i'm trying to make is nobody's,t i think we have not, we haveo allowed each of the priorup-or-o amendments to come to an up orhi down vote. we haven't table to them, which. isn't often used to practice year, as everybody knows. we could have debated all last night. there was nobody here to debate. now we are here debating. we are happy to have time for

debate, but i would ask my so wu colleagues if they could inquirs whom i want tot tr come so we cd at least try, out of courtesy to our colleagues, give them a migb sense of what the schedulee migd be and then we can set a time for debate, allowing everybody adequate time.verybody i'm not suggesting in any way that the topics that we discussed are not important that they impor they are important and are rthy o worthy of debate and worthy of discussion. we welcome that, but i would like to see pashtun i yield thei floor question, mr. president,.s >> in addition to what the are senator has said, comment that there are several people who said they want to go into the ho closed session first and address and his amendment it before vote i think that's a critical thing that i'm concerned with. i'm >> i am perfectly comfortable in we are able to set a timetablely after that close t session. i think everybody would feelneet good if we do try to find a

time, but i understand the need to want to have that session. and that's the senator'st' righw every respect as a we certainlym will do.e summit we can find a time when t we come out of that session wew could have a couple of those back-to-back and i think i would help a lot of people here. mr. president, let me just say i want to thank the senator from south dakota for his amendment.y it is one that is worthy of some discussion and obviously some of that discussion is going to have to take place in the context of a classified session. but let me just say to him, he b said that one of the argument that will be used is that thisn will result in going back to the russians and having to renegotiate the treaty. that's notl a casual argument. a i mean, it's not a small thing. but it's not the principal reason, it's one of the reasons obviously what i think is amendment is televised, but mos. importantly this enemy is unnecessary. on ou

-- rthis amendment is unnecessary. i think all of us on our siteof have a very clear understanding of the importance of thet to delivery vehicles with respect to our national defense. what but here's what we have to balance the comment of the senator from south dakotance the against. the president of o the united. oates, the secretary ofcoander defense, the joint chiefs of staff, the commander of u.s. thy arategic command, and otherse have all determined that we canr safely reduce our deployeddepled icbms and our deployed slbms -- and our deployed heavy bombers. the three legs of the triad thao they could be reduced to the 70e member. now, that figure was dead obviously after an enormous amount of thinking by all ofstrm those parties concerned, strategic command, the air forcm

folks, the navy, slbm and so did forth. afte and they did so only after seeing the results of force onor force analyses of exactly wheref that would leave us in terms of america's response, should there happily in the current atmosphere be the unlikely event of a nuclear confrontation.aboue tew obviously we need to thinkln about these things in that of so larger context, a sort of where we are today, what direction are we moving in, what's the kws, reality.with and as the senator knows withous going into any details, that force on force determination wan made, not just in the likelihood of a russian u.s. confrontation, att in the multiple, aconfront multiparty confrontation.ss som and again we will discuss some of that later.

now, so the senator's complaintt is that he is concerned that the administration has failed to does for state precisely how it's going to reduce the deployed icbms an and accountabc as it missiles and slbms, submarine launched a missile -- ballistic missiles. so how do you redistribute requirements of 700? well, again i want the senator,m the chairman of the armed services committee to weigh in here. i would you say very quickly the the administration has made it clear that it intends to maintain 20 launchers on the 12 ballistic missile submarines that we keep operationally deployed.ur meaning that our submarine force will account for 240 of the 700 limit. we agree on that.or erat leaves room for 460 deliv deployed a delivery vehicles leg combine for me to other legs ofe the triad, from the icbms and from the heavy bomber forces.

now, the senator also said that the administration has said 125t report that it has made a final0 decision on going all the way up to the 420 icbms. or all the way of his 16 bombers. that dec or somewhere in between. that decision has not been madet in other words, out of the total deployed a delivery vehicle limit of 700, the administration left itself some room toecision maneuver to make a decision oncs 20 of its icbms and bombers. and under the agreement we havea seven years, seven years of rooo here before we have to meet that limit. now, when asked about this sort of a variable time of seven years, general children, thecoa, command of our strategiccommittr command, told the armed services

committee for the record quote,n the force structure construct as reported section 1251 report ise sufficient to meet the nation'sw strategic current mission.treaty furthermore, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty provide flexibility to dn manage the force drawdown whiled maintaining an effective and ael safe strategic deterrent.he as a technical matter, thepresi senators anond then it would require the president to go now back to the russians, move the limit up from 700, to 720, even comfortable with the level that we happen. queion, and that's when you begin to get into question, hey, if they area comfortable and we can do whatni we need to do in this context, i might add, of a very different russia, very different u.s., very different set of strategic demands at this moment, why would we reopen the treaty for n

renegotiation? so i have more to say on this, earticularly on the subject of the prompt global strike because the prompt global strikeegativ likewise is not impacted numbe negatively by this, and are a number of reasons why we have we options as to how we arm certain out of the triad, we choose to do. i think it's important to point importantis, under -- there maye some concern i understand theeof geography of the senator's repre representation.rn so there may be some concern from some senators and the saite comments at the senator made. he said those of you who have people concerned with the icbmhe bases are the slbm bases, et cetera, or the bomber bases neen let me be clear that the administration has made it thr

clear, none of the three icbm be bases are going to be closed because of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. we arening maintaining all of t. what's more, the administration d te committed to the icbm force in the years to come here and it has updated 1251 report the minuteman iii will remain in service through 2030, and then e to be determined. and if people are concerned about cutting bombers, senators eeould remember that you meet n the new start max limits we're not going to need to eliminatewe any bombers. we plan to simply convert some bombers to a conventional role lo atng wherich point they would no longer count towards the treatyf limits. so with that stated as part of the record, i would yield five minutes, or such time as theichd senator from michigan would lika

ton consume.n >> my understanding that kind od info original we be going back and forth. i would like to be recognized, - >> mr. president, ieee understand that i think we had t the two senators both speaker outages like to you to the armes chairman of the armed services committee for five minutes and we'll come back.fice >> the senator from michigan. >> [inaudible conversations] a minute of standards and wouldt amend the treaty by changing what a a lot of the tree which t the number of deployedunder strategic forces that we have. under the treaty to limit of tha course is 700 with a critically important part of our military is that each side would have the ability to change the mix to reach a 700 as it suits our respective needs. of the amendment of senator thune r would alter the limit of 700 toe

720 deployed slbms, heavy bombers, equipped with nuclear bombs and icbms. now these limits as the chairman has just said, we are are agreed anal upon only after careful analysil by u.s. military leadership, is particularly general children.r he's the commander of our u.s.nr strategic command and the man responsible for these strategic systems.add senator kerry has quoted general children and i just want to add one additional quote of his,e which he testified to before thy armed services committee on july 20 of this year.e he stay the force levels in the treaty meet the current guidancu for deterrence for the unitedat states.uidanc and by the way, that guidance was laid out by president george quote, the options we providedlt

process focus on ensuringinue america's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustained strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. this rigorous approach rooted in deterrence strategy and poten assessment of potential adversaryti capabilities, here e the key words, supports both the agreed upon limits in the new s.t.a.r.t. and recommendationspe the npr.inumber so general chilton is on record in a number of places veryng precise and specifically sayingh that the options which wereptede provided including the one which was adopted here rooted in ated strategy, rooted in the gui provisions that the guidance which was laid out by presidentn

bush, supports the agreed upon limits in the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i don't know how much moremu mor precise and i don't know how much more significant you can get with the words of the commander that is in charge of it's a 1251 report. the report says up to those numbers. it is not specifically committet to t those numbers. tha it and important thing about the report is not just that he says up to.nk i think at least two of the cast three cases. but it also says that it is important that we remain flexible as to this number. is in the treaty retains the all nuclear triad, retains all three delivery t legs. general chilton on the point said that we will retain a triaa of strategic nuclear weapons assistance and if there's a nucr failure, technically and one of the nuclear systems and we caney rearrange our deployed forcearrr

structure and posture within thw treaty limits to compensate. mae summit said that the united significant reductions to reasol that 700 level and the russians would have to make none.said is but according to general chilton this argument is a distraction because what he said is that ths new start limits in his words, i the new s.t.a.r.t. limits the number of russian ballistic missile warheads that can target the united states, missiles thae can pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation,a u regardless of whether russiaitsf would have kept its missileut aw force levels within those limits without a new s.t.a.r.t. treatyt upon ratification general said,h chilton said they would now be trquired to do so. s and that certainly is veryhilto, important to our strategic conse commander, general chilton, because he said quote, the constraint of the treaty actuallysi constrain russia wits regard to deployed launchers ans deployed strategic weapons.. and that is an important elemeny

as well. without that, they arewere impor unconstrained. he explained that limits werewoe important because without thosen limits, quote, there would be nn constraints placed upon the russian federation as the numbee of sstrategic delivery vehiclesd are warheads they could deploy. the united states, he concluded that there be limits of their, limits that we would also be." bound by, obviously. so that, madam president, general childers of unaccountable with a limits industry, it was his analysis that form the underpinning for the 700 limit. he doesn't need a strategic gomedy additional 20 strategictn nuclear delivery systems to and other than to kill this treaty, there is no reason to add these 20 additional systems are we should respect trained to the judgment -- respect general

jones judgment and that such a i change would kill this treaty. i yield the floor and i thank the chair. >> the senator from oklahoma.sii >> madame president, i do want to be recognized for the purpose of explain, further explaining my and then it never 4833 and also to respond to the senator from massachusetts. the senator fromo south dakota t he has any responses he would like to make at this time, and i would like to keep the floor.pra >> thank you, madam president io thank the senator from oklahoma for getting an opportunity -- rtunit o the senator from south,o some dakota. general chilton, strike, assumpt commander i think testified toig was an associate that there would be no cheating. and as i said before there are,t history is replete with examples

these agreements. and furthermore what they agree- to was, the treaty of 700 butce what general chilton and the called for its 720. it's 240 submarine launched ballistic missiles, up to 420no, icbms.po again that add up to 720 and n that's all smm it does it simply makes consistent with theand ot, nuclear force structure plan as outlined by general chilton and others would be with what the wl treaty requirements would be ase well. and again i want to make one point about this because i said this or do.ch vehicles, we have 856 launch vehicles, in our arsenal making today. the treaty calls for 700. we're making 156 delivery vehicle reduction to get down to the 700 number.. the russians today are at 620.n'

they are already below the 700 number and they are headed down. even lower to somewhere in the 400 range.significant and so we have made areto significant concession with respect to delivery vehicles ate no cost whatsoever to the russians. and i would point out also, madam president, that the in taking a 720 number in agn, tha reducing it to 700 assumes agaie that even if you keep the 240sun submarine launched ballistice missile delivery vehicles, assume that, and if you assume 420 icbms, you would have to get reduce the bomber inventory down to 40 to get under the 700 level. and i think most peoplevy understand that it is the the have given us the extended they are visible.you canut they are recallable. t they arehe psychological. can they are political. you can put them into a theatero

they can loiter.o they can persist, and that is a powerful, powerful deterrent to those who would like to proliferate nuclearwe weapons. and so if we take our bomber fleet and reduce it down to the level that we talked about undey this treaty we are putting at t great risk in my view, madamto ndesident, the triad. updated a now, and on these bombers need to be updated and they are getting older. we need a next-generation bomb which i think is going toed be t critical about also be a nuclear bomber your but i think it's important to point out that this particular treaty relative to where wehe are today and what or needs could be in the future, it particularly as it pertains to bombers, the need for extended i deterrence, we are reducing to e level that i think makes many of us uncomfortable your and gets e below the number that wasplan, prescribed in the nuclear forceo structure plan as has been00 nue outlined, 720 asr opposed to 70. the 700 number is well below what i think we need to be, ands

which has served us welle for a longer time. in fact, in the early stages,of the cold t war, the bombers thas provide the bulk of the world.bn when we develop icbms andconvenu slbms, nosew some of the bombers have been converted conventionat use. that mission as well. but if we're going to have extended deterrence into the future we will need to have a very robust bomber fleet that is nuclear capable, and a 700 number puts that in great with t jeopardy.yield ba and so, madam president, without i yield back to the senator from oklahoma. >> with the senator yield for just one question? >> the senator from michigan ife spirit if everything which is your for a question? is it not true that section 1251 1251 report report says that the numbers which they talk aboutrsi are upn to numbers in the case f both icbms and the nuclearing, t bomber. president,st it is correct. sms, it states that 240 slbms and ups

to 60 bombers. so the seven and 20 number ishe not prescribed by the 1251ee report, thus the total of the three numbers, two of which are? is that correct?an's >> that, madam president, to enter the senator from's what michigan's question, i believe to be the case. that's what he 1251 report -- is not prescriptive.ive. all and sentencing is if you m make an assumption that you're e going to take the additional 20u delivery vehicles out of the0 dw bomber fleet you would take thav som 60 down to 40 at a time when we have about 100 come almost 120 bombers in ournde inventory. that is asymmetric in reduction and our ability to provide extended deterrence, and the bombers are the best form of extended deterrence.hank t >> i thank the senator and thank okhoma. the senator from oklahoma. >> the senator from oklahoma. >> is my intention now i have ie made my presentation earlier ona and a summer presentation -- yesterday.espond

the senator from massachusetts responded. i'd like to respond to his responses, just to clarify some of the things that might be allo little unsure.ssachusetts verst of all the senator fromoue massachusetts said that every senator on our side most import, importantly our experts negotiators who put this treatye together have made a leftationss hundred us to these kind ofxpan, relationships in the way anyonew to expand, which i appreciate iw people were. but here's the problem we have,e and i think it is articulate by the senator from south dakota,. that we have a constitutional oe responsibility. we have taken an oath of office to uphold the constitution were someone else but for us to, provide for common defense. and article ii, section two of the constitution specifically tt gives us not just the right by the obligation for advise andabl consent. smart peo and quite often we talk abouthi.

this, that leaves one could out and that is us. we happened to be the ones who aree accountable to the people o our election. the senator from massachusetts also said the treaty itself, mys talking about the amendment, my proposes and a minute to thetwoa treaty itself which we all understand that after to vote that would kill the treaty, at d least essentially saying if you amend the treaty is dead. andha i think that we need to sp and reevaluate, put ourresponsii obligation and not just a constitutional obligation as the crs is outlined and study in ali row of the senate and the treaty proposeds in theual changes in the actual text of the treaty. they amount therefore to senatea counter offers that alter the tr original deal agreed upon byates rtnight states and other sta countries. if theme senate gives its conset to new s.t.a.r.t. withan -- amendments to the tax that treaty is sent to russia for itd

approval with amendment. sate so both the russian governmenter and the united states senate have a constitutional right to change a portion of the streetio up to both of them. so thisss reassortants back into the process, and i feel that is exactly what our foundingtreatia fathers wanted us to bnde doing with history and that's what we are trying to do.ng thatas s the third thing that was stated by the senator fromut massachusetts was talking about the concept of a type one ii inspection and the type to new inspections. is a well,ca it is a new processtion because type two inspections are inspections on formally declaret facilities. obviously, on start one treaty we didn'tid have formally decla. facilities. they came ast a result of the t first treaty.tionsf icb now, thme type one refers to bas inspections of icbms, airbases

to confirm the accuracy ofed declared data, and the numberatn and type of deployed and nondeployed warheads located and icbms and slbms and heavy bombers. and so i would say that it was, that type two inspections were not even addressed in the first, the first treaty. sai the senator also said, he said, we say it again, he said we are to send this back but it doesn't now, h rise to the level in my now, he talks about the level oo significant.tle bitf all this amendment are significant. each one of us who is an author has a little bit of bias because with a little bit more in ourcat particular area. i can't pick up anything that's more significant thanhing verification. you know, the interesting thing that was brought up by the senator from north dakota was

trained to support.d, i'm reading from the report right now. is it general chilton support p for the new s.t.a.r.t. level wan predicated on no russian cheating or changes in the geopolitical environment. well, historically they have been cheating on everything. let me go ahead and just rereadd what i said before. we had the meeting the l convention in '05 and again five years later in 2010, came out in may or june of this year. and any talking about biological weapons convention coming to the other by the state department concluded that russia maintains a mature offenses biological nad weapon program, and its nature 0 has not change.now,e years that's what they said in 2005. now five years later the new report came out and it says that the state department reportences states that russia confidence building measure, decorations dm 1982 has not satisfactorily b documented whether or not itsmi.

biological program wasive yearst terminated. therefore, they are saying theie same thing five years later and so they lied five years ago, ant it appears they have not doneeal what they can or they cheated i should t say, and they haven't done -- chemical weapons.epartmn ..t chemical weapons convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declarations of production of and development of facilities." then again in 2010, five years later, the state department again stated that there was an absence of additional information from russia resulting in the united states being able to ascertain whether or not russia has declared." well, again, if it's -- if we're predicating all that general chilton said on the fact that cheating has all of a sudden miraculously stopped, then this is a great reform measure and i -- but i'd like to see the evidence of it before we assume that that is the case.

the senator from massachusetts also stated the people responsible for verification of this treaty would never have been sent to the united states, this treaty would never have been sent to the united states if the treaty did not have adequate verification measures. so it ta÷ -- it talks about all of these verification measures. then he says, it is the judgment of our military, our state department and our intelligence community that the -- that these measures are adequate. well, that may be true with the current -- those that are answering to our president who are strongly in support of this treaty. but if you look at the state department and the military and the intelligence of the past, those comments who -- ho those who commented -- those who commented, james baker states that the start treaty is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to congress in may of this year, and i happened to be there, testifying that the start treaty

oftifying that the start treaty as the one that verified the net diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under start one. si this complex part of the treaty is even more -- and it still quoting, crucial when we reach accord nuclear warheads and were allowed in the past. insofar as the military is concerned, richard perle, former assistant secretary of defense m in the reagan administration de, state and december 2nd, just a few days ago, that the new start has a lowering standards foritay verification. so here is the military way name. he goes on further to say thatdl new s.t.a.r.t. verification provisions would provide little or no hope in protecting illegal activity at locations the detec russians did notit declare are r off-limits to the u.s. inspecto. were hidden from a u.s. satellite.hen you

james woolsey, i think when you. talk about the intelligence sido of a bias at james woolsey. he's from oklahoma. he was the director of central intelligence from 198 to 1995. as advisor to the softwood negotiations up to 1970, aegotia declaration delicate lurch to this s.t.a.r.t. negotiations. he started on november 15th he treaty. unlike the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty, russia is for you to encrypt, to limit for a missile task, making it harder for us to know what new capability istri developing. there is no longer still pernent quoting -- the requirement for on-site of russia's facilities, which under old s.t.a.r.t. helped us keep track of new mis mobile missile entering the for. soviet force. so he goes on and on and i

disagreed with bipolar sector, t former assistant secretary forit verification of compliance at o the u.s. department of state department and pointed out onw the 12th of july that the newuch s.t.a.r.t. had glaring holes in hisab regime. only new s.t.a.r.t. is much less verifiable than the oldassachus i wanout to say this because mya friend from massachusetts talked about the military and intelligence community.who ismar hee thing engraved in our systet is up with the president as heam commander-in-chief, had a lot of influence over the state department intelligence and military. and so, i think we've heard some very well-respected people along thoseng lines.ents - then, one of the arguments thatg the senator of massachusetts had at my opening statement yesterday w was that we have fer site now than we had during the

development of the trade when he treaty.fewe sit well, this is true.es we do have fewer sites. made to be very persuasive because most people would agree with the fact that if you have fewer sites, you need more infol session. former undersecretary of state for arms control and national mo security state on the third of may this year that while in verification is important in ann arms control treaty, verifications becometr even mort imports and a warhead level. br and he spoke often weighed in on the same thing as did arnold kantor. current force lenders provide aa kind of offer because they arebe high enough to be in relatively insensitive to the imperfect intelligencence and modest chanr forces. as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate ane vulnerable cheating, vulnerablem to cheating on arms controlen md

limits, concerns about hidden missiles and the actions of nuclear thirday parties. front in may of this year, in front of the senate foreign relations committee, former secretary of state james baker said the newhn s.t.a.r.t. regime is weaker than its predecessor the new s.t.a.r.t. program does not appear as rigoroussi or extensie as the one that verified the new risk. he goes onto to say it's moreedr significant as you reduce the f. number of inspected facilities.y and further, the senator from massachusetts responded to me by saying that they're going to demand the same number of inspection of military bases ant host them threes times more as s the inspections. well, that's true. do this is bilateral. everything or asking them to do we have to do two.alk he went on to talk about thebu y inconvenience would be going

into, but my amendment applies to both the united states. it increases them in this process which will improve our ability to c end in turn determination to hav cheating. so yeah, i'm fully aware that w have to do the same thing the russians have tothia do. s furthermore, it was stated by the senator from massachusetts in his response to my statement quote, so i think it's one thing to ask for strategic nuclear mon forces to do that 10 times a year or less than once a month.e be waiting for 30 inspections a year. we have two summary basis, three bombers and three icbm bases and russia has three submarineases bases, three bomber bases and 12 icbms. so we actually are not on. we're the ferry. t

letter fromer secretary k. this last december. he stated he sent him about whether or not the russian troop would cheat on this treaty in a matter that would be militarily insignificant. he said quote, the chairman of the joint chieft of staff, joid chief commander and strategic command and iss the russians would not appeal to militarily significant cheating. in other words, they're not going to cheat.th this is its conversion. and he talked about in the senator from massachusetts. mom? he met with the senator's deal for a moment? for a question. >> i just want to be clear thatd the senator read my words g accurately, which were the quote of the general who said militarily significant -- i said

>> accuse you of cheating.g >> what he said was they didn't think it would b.e anything thet a fairly significant. we again, this is material that we can go into, which we will probably in a classifiedt session. but i think i just want that distinction to be clear.odle >> i thought that's exactly what i said. i apologize for the misunderstanding or a little massachusetts made the statement that the analysis of the nies, i national intelligence estimates for russian cheating that the regime is the fact that so forth and they are saying it's not. i have to always be a little testing of what comes out of thk nic ande a lot of us are. we don't take it as gospel. i convert back to a true storyin back in the clinton admintratio administration, august 24th b

1998. i asked the question, how long will it be until north korea n u alt multistage rocket? and the response it came back, this is the 24th of august 1998 was five to 10 years. seven days later on the 31st of august 1998, they fired a three stage rocket. need so i think we need to look at t some of the intelligence estimate as they've been wrong wrong in the past. when you talk about something significant are the issues were talking about here, butut thetoe thought here, then we have to bm ready.the the quote that the senator from massachusetts quoted, condoleezza rice and i actually agree with her quote. she said the new s.t.a.r.t. reis treaty hopefully reinstates on-site verification, whichthe laughs at the expiration of the original "star tribune" last year well, meaningful achment verification was a significant achievement of president reaganr

reinstatement is crucial. well, i agree with that. suppor obviously she's not saying she's supporting this. she said she supports in place reme kind of a verificationty, e because at the last of the last treaty there is none today. so anything is better than none. i think that's what she's saying. she also agrees that the next evening she made in "the wall d, december 7. start that must and can be addressed in ratification process, implying that there'sre nothingg wrong with coming through, having amendments, going backoi and forth, coming out with atese better c treaty. and i think last year when the senator of massachusetts stated in response - to my use of lessd point out to you verification and condition of the resolution ui t ratification.at req that condition requires that the e preside foreign new s.t.a.r.t. can intht every year after the president has to certify to the senate that our national technical vern

means in conjunction with the st verification activity provided t for a new s.t.a.r.t. treaty are sufficient to ensure the effectw is monitoring of russian compliance with the provision against the new s.t.ame.r.t. treaty and timely warning of th, russia hn preparation. well, here's the t problem i hai with thaten i say to the chair e my friend. he said the president can only e certify and our intelligence experts are telling them what they are seen and russia. and this amendment tells the coesident with more information. so i would think if that is thet concern, daewoo would ought to eeve the president more s information.romzona and lastly i can see the senator from arizona is here and i know he wants to be heard. the sen let me mention one last thing that my good friend, the senator from massachusetts stated. that theset' are killer amendmea and i think it's wortht restatig

what we said before. of and that is the rss outline ande set in the role the senate in a treaty process vote changes in e actual treaties. the amount therefore to someed n account offers that up for the original deal agreed upon by the united states in the country. then it gives its consent to nei s.t.a.r.t. with amendments, to the text. endment. the treaty is approval within amendment. and that means we go back and forth and hopefully, with a treaty that would be workable. according to the 2,002,005 state department reports on arms a bad compliance, russia has a bad habit of cheating on thesenk agreements. in fact, i think we've covered the adequately at this time. with that i yield the floor. >> madam president. >> senator from arizona.

>> if i might just take a couplu minutes to talk about bothne th. amendment and the inhofe mma.ith with respect to the inhofe mma,t dealing with transformation, we are going to an executive session at 2:00 this afternoon, an opportunity for all senatorst to examine classified materials, that have been presented by our ich intelligence agencies, some of a which relate specifically to the verification of it's too bad that it's notith possible for us to distress was very much specific specificitywe the nature of the intelligence that we will be discussing. but i'll just say that i think it's a good name that we would be voting on the inhofe mma andt following that session because a lot of the material were going to be exposed to relates to the verification provisions of this treaty and

verification. i that's about all that i want to say right now, except that i would hope that colleagues would attend that session because their vote on the inhofe amendment would be on thereth re being briefed in an executive session. with respect to the assumedell. amendments, i very much support the amendment as well. the reason is because the whole point of this treaty was to reduce the nuclear warheads and the delivery vehicles of theso russian federation of the unitet states. so that's the essence of the treaty. i mean, there's a lot more to it, but it reduces to 1550 the actual warheads it reduces r to0 700 the delivery vehicles.ountig now there's a special definition or a county borough of delivery vehicles that we don't need to get into here, but the reality is the 700 deployed vehiclesh with another 100 that couldloyed theoretically be deployed at a

t the 700 is the number. that's it a method portion for a couple or reasons. as we talked about before, the . russians will actually have room there are a lot of different estimates the number of delivery vehicles they are planning on having.ve but because missiles and bombers and submarines are expensive, the russians could be well below that number in a few years. alrb and so, that doesn't never help the united states at all. the russians are already below it by w at least over 100 they will be going lower than.that one unfortunate consequence of that is they are moving theirr icbm delivery vehicles in a ways that obviously is going to be di much moreli destabilizing. throughout the cold war, both tn sides developed missiles that allow them to put more than warheads, one more ahead on the top of the missile.lizing i a the problem is that it's very

destabilizing and a potential n nuclear conflict because of thee notion that you lose it if you t don't use it. and so, it was an incentive for either side to launch their t missiles before the other side t could attack them and destroy a them. if you had onend missile silo ar not missile inhe the silo has ye eight warheads on it or 10 warheads on the, you took 10 warheads, not just one. and most warheads the way theyto work is from the missile gets out to the top, those warheadssd are displayed out in each one has aas different tree down toet potentially eight or 10 ten different target. very so they are very destabilizing. the incentive is for the person doing the first-rate to strike t first, to kill them also the other side doesn't have the capability coming back at you. g esth the united states and the d then soviet union recognize how destabilizing this was then sine

moved toward a single warhead or missile, which is much less oneo destabilizing, obviously.reaty and since one of the benefits os this treaty is allegedly the stability that comes from it, one is very troubled by the idea but unfortunately that isn't the way it works. it is much more destabilizing,ut not stabilizing because of this incentive for the russians to sy put more than one warhead on one each vessel. the united states by contrast is limiting our missiles to one warhead apiece.r way i in a way that, that somebody bio disadvantage. another way that is a disadvantage as we are about the 700 were going to have to retirn a lot of our delivery vehicles to get down to 700.in this so the treaty is not symmetrical in this regard. if they could actually build upo to 700 years we will have toical bring down to 700. moreerse it's also not symmetrical because our obligations around the world are much more diverse.

than russia's obligation. russia will be defending russia. the united states has 3100 umbrella is able to send for their deterrence as well. so this requires a more plan on sophisticated defense plan on our part as to how we would deliver various warheads to a target.he and it essentially expands the number of weapons that we need.f so it's a big deal to get down to the number of 700. repeat and as senator thune has noted,w and i will repeat this, before the treaty was negotiated, a lot of militaryat people were -- testified that to various numbers that obviously lead to the conclusion of 700 was way w too low. time had come to dr./insert hady said that 700 night he barely enough. e the problem is that a commentbe0 were even going to go below 700,

if we proceed with something thr administration wantse to do, mas of us here want to do and that is developed what is called a conventional full on globalnal strike. the conventional prompt globalav strike uses an icbm with ake haa conventional warhead, not a nuclear warhead. o the strike had a target of a oro rogue nation or some terrorist have intelligence that is a vere short life and you want to want destroy target and you obviously don't want to use a nuclear warhead, but she went to get aws thereo fast and it's a long ways away. so you might need to use y of russians de same kind missile that she would use to s deliver nuclear warheads. the russians didn't like o thatr they said if you do any of those who have to count against nuclear deliveries with us. so we did 25 oadf those in thatf 700 missiles to deliver our vehicles to deliver nuclear weapons, we only had 675. and that's why the thuneut amendment talks about going bacr

to 720, which without getting too classified material i believe represents a number that more closely approximates whathe people think is really going to be necessary for the united states and the future. the other thing that's troublint about it is the administration has yet to commit to a fullmittt triad nuclear-capable, even though they said they are fully committed to the triad, which means bombers, submarines and t icbms. they have not been willing to say that the new bombers that wr built will be nuclear-capable ot will have cruise missiles that w can deliver nuclear warheads. so while the same triad are not willing to commit to anything, but a guy i'd.that there i the problem withs that is there less stability and less stability and capability if you only have two ways of delivering nuclear weapons. if there's something wrong with their icbm portion.cbms wer remember about two months ago the power went out in several

states and our icbms were down for a forgot what it was an hour and half or something like thatw because they didn't have an electrical power. obviously nothing happened in happ that periodened of time. but oa single point of failurey never desirable in the military context. if something goes wrong, a lot t of weapons capability is taken f off the table. and the problem is if you get te down to two ways of delivering these weapons rather than the three that we have today, you're going to be much less capable. our deterrent isin not going toa deter as much. at and that's what senator thune iy trying to get back here. let's at least modestly increase the number of delivery vehicles. that we have. it is a modest amendment. it's an appropriate amendment. s and readjusting from reuters today, something we already knew, but is the latest iteration ofruot it. clea russia warns u.s. not to changec nucleart, pack. s in fact, what they're saying is the senate can commit all it wants to, but if it makes one if change, changes one comment, one

thing is different in the treati will then want? what? and as my colleague said we have to see if the russians are t willing to agree to it otherwise they will have to renegotiate at part of least that part of the treaty. but what is wrong with that?olen unless you think the u.s. constitution was really to get the senate he will miss, it doesn't seem to me there's anything wrong with the senate saying you've got about nine tenths of it just fine, president obama and presidentidt medvedev for negotiators. i mean, these negotiators are good smart people with dedicated service but are not necessarilyt the last word. the u.s. senate is the last word according to our constitution. p the administration didn't take her advice into specific ways, but yet they expect us to give them their consent to the rubber treaty. the reality is the senate should not be ahe rubber stamp. on the first or treaty the

launched cruise nuclear weapons. we need to have a side agreement on that.e we did a side agreement. you know, the world did not ende when the senate said no to the i predictions for this was going to destroy our relations with russia forever. are it didn't end here we are todayn now i can. if you g change one thing in ths treaty, then russia will go along with it and our relationship will deteriorate significantly.xactly le it if our relationship depends on ratification of this treaty, the a lot weaker than the president and vice president are making it out to be when they talk about this wonderful new reset sene relationship. surely it could stand the senate making a modest change to the c, treaty if it can't, then i don'l buy the argument that this is a wonderful reset relationship. as

so for my colleagues who say we will not abide by any amendment to the treaty, i say then you just said t the senate isjust ft irrelevant in the treaty first process. we might as well just forget about telling the senate consider these treaties in the first place.cutive senator thune and senator inhofe have good amendment. i look forward to supporting both of them when we return to executive session this afternoon. i urge my colleagues to do theef same. t >> senator from south dakota. - >> senator from arizona made some good points about the importance of triad in maintaining our nuclear deterrence. i'm interested in knowing that the sender is aware that even if you assume the numbers that are in the report that will take ths number of bombers down to 60 and it's up to 60, but the treatyhe calls for 700 vehicles, which if he took that out of bombers that heuld take it out to 40.alf t even taking you to 60 would cut in half the number of nuclearbes bombers.e the best vehic as the senator is also aware

that bombers are the best vehicle to enforce extended we hav deterrent. the icbms, missiles that we have. our adversaries sometimes can'ts eat those. the bomber is visible.entnto the bomber can be center theater. itth has the logical impact, political impact. those it is recallable is somethingras that can be out there that makes those who proliferate nuclear weapons even more concerned about the capability we have twt weeks on.maintainin tha and the importance of maintaining that leg of the triad is in the senator's soun like judgment o critical and soundshe like one senator saying he understands as well.re i want snow of the senator was t aware that the limit that areimn opposed not only the toll that the one report, but the treaty, which significantly reduce the number of nuclear bombers we have at our disposal today. >> madam president, to senator h thune, i wasn't aware that they would be cut in half. i was aware would be drastically

reduced. and that is a huge, huge unwillo reduction, especially if the administration is unwilling to commit to we are even going to have a nuclear-capable bomber force in the next generation of they have our triad. they've been willing to say werd have a great triad today. onhe that is true insofar as it goesa but part of that on the bomber t force our b-52s that were designed back in the 50s and built in the 60s and 70s. three i mean, we have got to replace all three legs of our triad. su. the decision has been made on tg cbe submarine and that's a goodi thing. decisions have not been made on the icbms or the bomber force. one of our concerns about modernization is that modernization of nuclear warheads is fine. a i mean, it's necessary. but we don't also modernize our hich delivery method by which we deliver those warheads byhen modernizing our warheads as little significance. and the final point to your rusa

question, senator thune of all course is the other countries including russia and china are all modernizing but there were in their delivery vehicles. the united states doesn't want to get caught in the position of where and we're down a very fewd workable weapons, especially the bmber force, which as you noted can also be called back, unlike on they ar either from ground or submarine. once they are launched, they are launched. the state bomber can calledenatt back. >> i would guess the senator come the concerns he raised ista an observation i would make.r, m many of our bomber fleet today,, 47% i think it be cubic missal d era. and so, they are n older. they need to be replaced. ig needed next-generation amb bomber.ing ou and the question that you raised aboutt the ambiguity coming-out of whether or not a next-generation bomber would take the nuclear is a real

concern because that would put iad, whi atch risk the existence of the triad, which i think allows us to maintain the flexibility, versatility that we have today in terms of nuclear deterrence. and so, i would echo what the senator from arizona has voiced as a concern about this discussion of next-generation bomber whether it will be doneb. and that there will be a nucleat bomber. >> i would just conclude by omenng i hope that we have just a short periodt of debate both following the executive session and senato for both senator thune andour senator inhofe can make itore argument about what this is all about. i regret that more of our colleagues are on the floor to hear the debate.rry: mad >> madam president, of course we hell accommodate, hopefully t prior to the votes and i'md, confident we can agree on some o

result.d but let me just say to my friend from arizona, modern president because i heard him saying fairly passionately about what is the point of having the senate involved if they can't advise content and the amendmene treaty?at none of us on our side areot arguing that we shouldn't have that right, that we don't have that w right, that this is not a worthy debate and that we shouldn't debate it legitimate trty. to attend to amend the treaty. that's not what we're saying. in fact, if i thought it was a t flawed treaty and i thought i their enormous godsend, i would sure. and i think if that were true, we wouldn't have had a 6030 votes against doing it don't tnk yesterday. sixty senators made the judgment we don't want to, we don't so figure rises to that level. t i simply say to my colleagues, it is not that the amendment,

you know, that we shouldn't havs the debate and that somehow noti doing this now rejects the it' notion that we're capable of doing it. it's that went don't think it'st good amendment. we don't think the amendment rises to the level where praise is an issue merit sending thes. treaty back to the russians. that rightretain here at and i would protect that as long as i'm the united statee senator to give proper advice and consent. but i believe we gave the proper advice and can hunt and rejected the amendment, as they hope will reject these other twothink ther amendments and no further theti. arguments with respect to that later. i think the senator from ke time. >> madam president.pres >> the senator from pennsylvania aired senator fromania jusfor a massachusetts. >> let me also reiterate, i don't know where this constant from, questioning of the triad keeps coming from.

because the secretary of defense in testimony as well but some lenders, not to mention the defense department through the a joint chiefs and others have repeatedly stated their commitment to a viable forward . going triad. t the triad isri not a question mo here. that ehere will be a triad.i yield th we are committed to the triad in mr. ca on something more to say aboutp that later in the yearoffi befot >> madamo president. >> senator from pennsylvania.cet >> adam senator, i ask is that you speak for up to 15 minutes. >> without objection. deb >> i rise to speak about two or three topics in this debate on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. the first and foremost, one that speaks directly toha the amendmt that is pending.th and that's the question of ates verification. the ability for the united states to verify by way of the russian federation have inra

terms of its nuclllear weapon. what i would say as a matter of principle in this debate, nothing amiss treaty will in any week compromise the safetyticala security effectiveness and reliability of her nuclear arsenal. that's critically important we make that point and i think the. american people understand thatt as the american people are listening to this debate forve e verification it is important tos outline the distinctions between this amendment and i think what is in fact in the treaty. the treaty itself allows eachone party each each year without 210 type one inspections conducted at operating basis for icbms, strategic nuclear powered

illicit missiles summaries and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. that is the type of inspections, up to eight team of those, whicn are short notice inspections. secondly, under the type to, inspections, these are conducted at places of storage they, testy venges, formally declaredfacilin facilities and conversion and he conversion facilities. oginal some of us ask whether or not we lose a valuable element of the original start agreement inspection regime the under secretary of defense for policy, james millard replied to theenae question, a similar question i propose during a senate foreign relations committee hearing on the verification of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, the hearing that i chaired. under newst

ago, 18 inspections were 35 s. sites. so 18 inspections, 35 russiane r sites. under s.t.a.r.t. i were goingvei from a regime of verification i. 18 inspections. the ratio is actually betterthee under this treaty inrs terms of the numbers of inspections and i sites. mr. miller, undersecretary of defense miller says that of the ratio of inspections toelative t facilities is quoted approved under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty relative to the original s.t.a.r.t. treaty, unquote.at's so that is under secretary of state miller. that is not my words, but his. e admiral mike mullen, chairman o, the joint chiefs of staff

reiterated this point on march the 26th of 2010, when he said that the new start quoteffec features a much timore effect it transparent verification method that demands quicker data exchanges and notifications, tae unquote. in addition, this does not take into account that some of the inspections under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty allow us to do to inspections at once, to inspections i want him like the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i'd also say that the inspection regime we have in place under hs this treaty has also been changed to reflect the currentnd security environment in an enhanced relationship with the o russian federation and more than a decade of our experiencef and. conduct inspections. c the new s.t.a.r.t. inspection regime is simpler and cheaper than that which was conductedorn

tr treaty. we conduct fewer overall inspections under this new treaty because there are in faca fewer sites in russia to inspect. i was gotten better atrs whe inspecting in the years where this has transpired.ld als not ao president, i would also h say that we are standing here today on december the 20 ofut 2010, 380 days without in inspectors on the ground in ratn russia. o that's one of the reasons why i say thaty ratification of this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty makes itis safer but not ratified this safe. treaty in fact makes us less safe. one of the reasons for that -- not the only reason, but one ofi the reasons is 380 daynss have passed it on inspectors on the ground. this is in a word, unacceptablep to our national security. i think the american people believe that as well.

so we need a vote on this treaty. and while i and many of our colleagues have worked on this,e believe that there is a sense oe urgency.ide of we also believe that the views of the t other side of the aisle have been engaged in a serious debate. we've had yesterday now a debate on the floor., all o of course all of the debate here over the last week, almost a full week now, all of that was d preceded by months and months os work on the foreign relations o community in the united states. senate. this is not new.n theg the president made an agreement back in the spring of this year. we passed out of our committee is treaty back in the fall. we've had a lot of work. more than 900 questions have announced that the administration and more than 900 questions have been answered by the administration.

so w something like 20 separate hearings on the several committees. so we spent a lot of time and a lot of work in this.fast and the pace of this in my judgment has not been too fast, but it has been done with this on the version we do finally, tf finally after all these months of work, all these months ofre t debate, all of these months ofae hearing. we're at a point now where we bp can raartify this treaty. r so i think in the end there is t going to be bipartisan and broad support for ratification and we look forward to that.t treaty c my decision to support the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty came afters a informed study of this issue as a member of the foreign relations committee.n and it is based in large part on relying upon and asking questions of folks like admirable one, just to name oner someone who has spent years in the service of this country abot concerned about and doing

something about the defense in the security of this country.f so often we hear in this chamber that we should respect thewe het opinion of commanders on the ground and we should. we c hear that -- have heard tht in the context of the war in we iraq, continue to hear it in the context of the war inct afghanistan. we should respect and take into- consideration the determinationn of the judgments made by commanders on the ground. those who have direct experience with military questions and inhf this caseen have direct experiey with the defense of our country. i think when it comes to the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, we should apply the same role as well when it comes to admiral mullen orhew any other military leader who te has an opinion about this treaty. the commanders on the ground, as th have d it relates to this treaty, mr. presidenton had spoken.tion and they have done so without v equivocation and i would argue unanimously. on this vital treaty, and the sn

national security issues, they have spoken with one voice. we need to take action to securt our country.. we need to take action to defena our country. arsenal we need to make sure we are taking actions that will result in a s nuclear arsenal that will be safe, secure and reliable. and one of the steps to get ratify, ratify l this treaty.noe but let me move to another topic and i know we have colleagues who are anxious to speak. how let me just ask how much time it inve left. >> center has seven and a half minutes remaining. >> thank you. >> and may be able to do it within that time i was.

i first of all want to commendat the work by this administrationa for the letter that was sent recently to reiterated once again the united states ild arg commitment. is an miwould argue this is anom unwavering commitment to missile defense, consistent with the goal of having a nuclear arsenas and how they defense for thisth, country, but especially as it relates to the nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective and t reliable.tr this treaty, this new s.t.a.r.ts treaty does not place any constraints, no constraints pass whatsoever on our ability to defend ourselves. over the past few days, this has been made clear by chairman kerry on the floor, making thest strong arguments as well as by r those who have made repeatedly by our uniformed militaryyo leadership. let me just give you some flav r of that by reading th i following.th thisis is a quotation from that

lieutenant general patricklly o'reilly, who thinks that the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty could actually provide more flexibility, more flexibility n implementing ou missile defense -- our missile defense plans. he said and i quote, the new the constraints on the development of the missilein defense program in several areas.nge for example, nda's immediate village lv to target booster hoe system used in key test topone demonstrate homeland defensedape capabilities and components of the new european phase adaptivet approach was accountable under the previous s.t.a.r.t. treaty because it employed the first range of the now retired trade and want us all beyond."und and then he says under newounta. s.t.a.r.t., this missile is notn accountable, thus will have greater flexibility in

conducting testing with regard to launched locations, poetry ts collections and processing, thus more efficient test architectures and operationallye realistic intercept geometries, unquote. now that's a very technical summation by lieutenant general patrick o d'reilly. he is the direct heir of the missile defense agency.asual he's not just making some casuaa aen as a member of congress. tm we listened to a lot of choices here and many of them are respectede' voices. but i think what we are aieut listening to, the missile defense agency director, who as a lieutenant general.ty and it talks about this new s.t.a.r.t. treaty providing more flexibility as it relates to missile defense, i think we should listen very carefully. he now i know the republicans herey

in washington have over many days now directly or indirectly committe tried to assert that this administration has not committed to missile defense. they are wrong and i think the record is very clear. the president made clear that this administration is an altare boy committed, my words, to a missile defense that is the facw it. and i would argue as well to a missile defense that ensures that we have a safe, secure, affect good and reliable nuclear arsenal. it's also a missile defense ashs capable of growing and adapting the threats posed by countries like iran. on i've heard a lot of folks here up and make statements about the threat posed by iran's nuclearo program. we shall listen to voices that are concerned about that in the context of making sure that this ratification is consistent with

that, which it is, consistent with our efforts to ensure that iran does not have thet capability. he's so what are the capabilities? summation.s a quick gran we currently have 30 ground-based interceptors in fort greeley, alaska and brandenburg air force base in california, which defend the homeland. cartw defense under the secretary and general cartwright have considered that we will continul to improve and further augments these existing ground-based interceptor systems, noting that these quote u.s.-based defenses will be made more effect give by the forward facing a tty two we radar, which we plan on by 2011n unquote. in europe, the united states has worked to defend our allies in nato. the european phase is increasingly capable sensors ang

standard -- standard missile three interceptors that will provide a capacity to address near-term threats, while alsoleo developing new technologies to combat futureom threats. the first range to be completedn in 2011 will deploy ships and s3 three interceptors in the northern and southern european o theater to protect our troops and allies from short range regional ballistic missile secoa threats.ec the second phase estimated to be operationalte by 2015 will feel upgraded the atlanta-based sm three invoke the central and southern europe to expand protection of the continent.odua the third is will introduce a more capable version of the sm three that is currently under development, which will provide full protection for our allies in europe of short, medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles by 2018.the plan

and finally, the last phase. and for 2020 will field an even mi missile, with anti-icbm at euros to augment current defense of the u.s.an homeland fromt from iranian -- a rating among region as those. so whether you look at it for many of these eethree points ofo view for each of these three points of view, meaning the three phases, we're going to have in place a system, which will defend our homeland and will help our european allies. let me conclude with one one quotation. i mentioned to admiral mullen before the chairman of the joint chiefs. this is what he is said about the so-called phase of adaptivee approach. the joint chiefs combat commanders and i also fullyed approach as outlined in the ballistic missile defense revie, report. is that the nuclear posture review, the joint chiefs and combat combatantan commanders were dee.

involv process. so whether it is the joint chiefs, whether it is the combatant commanders or whether it's other commentators of the well, we are going to make sure that in the aftermath of the ratification of this treaty ishs consistent with and as part of t end is because of theissle ratification of this treaty thae ndr missile defense will be as a strong as it can be and we'reo going to make sure that without a doubt we're going to protectrt the american people ever goingra to take every step necessary tos make sure that our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, affect good and reliable. i yield the floor.to speak up t

>> the senator from florida. >> i ask unanimous consent s to . lemi speak out to 10 minutes on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> senator is recognized. >> i ask unanimous consent to b7 set aside -- temporarily set aside number 4047 be called a. >> without objection from the senators recognize. >> corp. will report the amendment. mr. chambers opposes amendment 4047 at the end of article i.the >> senator from florida. >> i ask the amendment be dispensed with. to >> without objection.tart >> i advice to offer an amendment to the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, between the united states of america and russiathid interning strategic nuclear weapons.by my i have a lot of concerns about this treaty.tion produres a many of those concerts have beem expressed by my colleagues. as concerns about the verification procedures and that they are weak and from the

previous s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i have concerns about the linkage of missile defenseons. systems with strategic offense of weapons. i sha those concerns have been addressed as well and i sharets them. failu but the biggest concern i hreave about this treaty is its failure to deal with what are called tactical nuclear weapons. not to those folks at home who readily apparent.ference it wasn't emotionally to the difference between what aweapon strategic nuclear weapon is anya tactical nuclear weapon. a strategic nuclear weapons ishe usually considered to be a large vehicle like an intercontinental ballistic missile and icbm. m it travelsis under a nuclearth eyrange. these can also be a submarine for long-range bomber.y much a tactical nuclear weapon is charlie much smaller s in size d has a smaller range and had them uclivery vehicle to construct

in today, when we are not in cod this cold war atmosphere withiet the former soviet union, the tactical nuclear weapon is of much more concerned than of the strategic. in the great fear that we all have is that one of these nuclear weapons would get in thl hands of a terrorist. a ta nctical nuclear weapon by s very nature is portable and could be something that is even capable of being moved by onehea person oryza said before in the back a truck. beyond now why this treaty doesn't doze what tactical nuclear weapons is beyond me. were t i realize that in the past incto the soviet union, that we just t didn't do what tactical nuclear weapons because we weremissles concerned about these big missiles that could cross the ocean and striker country. abo we were concerned about missiles being launched from submarines. we were concerned about heavy bombers f delivering missiles wn we have the c homeland. we are in a different we shou

environment now. and while we should still be the concerned with those strategicme weapons, the tactical weapons are actually much more of a danger to uso because those are the very weapons that could get in the hands of a rogue nation.s those are the weapons that coula get in the hands of a terrorista and this weapon -- this treaty doesn't have anything to do with that. it doesn't address it at all. ter it would be as if were going to enter into a treaty about stunts and we had a big negotiation when we talked about long namesw shotguns and rifles, but we've k got to talk about pistols. any it doesn't make any sense to met it doesn't make any sense to met because these are the very weapons we should be the most concerned about. it also doesn't make sense to me because of the disparity betweee how many tactical nuclear weapons we had versus how many . tactical nuclear weapons that the russians have. long-ra this treaty about strategic orwn bigger long-range nuclear

weapons limits the amount of those weapons to each country to around 1500. but the russians have 3000 a tactical nuclear weapons and we have 300. so the russians have a 10 to ons advantage over us in tactical nuclear weapons. if we approve this treaty, the russians then will approximately 1ve 4500 nuclear weapons and will have 1800.a that doesn't make a lot of sense either. a 10 to one nuadvantage on the i tactical nuclear weapons.t' so i think that it's incumbentuu upon us to realize that we haveh to have a treaty and tacticalav nucleae r weapons.ar treaty.trast it was a part of the start treaties in the past because ths total numberta of weapons that n united states had in the former soviet w union had was a man.nse

what we had 20,000 or 30,000 strategic nuclear weapons, that we had 3000 tentacles didn't nbn really matter. it wasn't an important number in the woverall scheme. to get these weapons, plus the fact that they're going to end up having 4,500 and we're going to end up having 1,800, it does matter. it matters a lot. so what my amendment would do, mr. president, it says that within a year of the ratification of this treaty, the russians and the united states must sit down and negotiate a tactical nuclear weapon agreement. it doesn't require that it be resolved within a year. it requires that it be started. now, that seems, to me, i'm a little bias, but that seems to me eminently reasonable. i'm proud that are senator chambliss and senator inhofe have joined me on this amendment. who can be -- could be against having the russians and the united states sit down within a

year's time of negotiations and tion ontime of negotiations and >> who could be against that? you will h now, you will hear from my a friends on the other side who dn are defending this treaty and ae voting outnd all of the mms beit offered on the side of the aisle that we can't amend the treatyay because if we amend the treaty it's a poison pill. the russians will not accept it. if that is true then we are notc fulfilling much of a function w. here, are we? some speci under the constitution there are some special privileges that are in the into the system. the trey one of them is the treaty all ts privilege. the treaty power. all treaties must be confirmedt. by the senate on a two-thirds ct vote. if we can't amend it, all we'rem doing is you're saying yes or no. to me that limits our ability. and if my friends on the other lall, i ask them to look at the language.just i am just putting in the treaty if they would accept events that within a years time we have to sit down at the table and entert

into these negotiations.eems to not a heavy lift it seems to mew they will say look, we can't do this because the russian parliamentary body will notparla accept it. what does that say? this. the russian duma, their t amendment, if the treaty as as negotiat it is not come as negotiate byei the united states, and i've sais before i have concerns about mie what is there for verification, i have concerns about missile defense.s but putting that aside if it goes the way it's been drafted o into agreed to between the president and the leaders of russia, with just this oneays amendment that says that the twe sides will sit down within a years time, with the russian parliamenparliament not a proof wat? and if they don't approve it, ie they will not say that they wiln

negotiate about the 3000 tactical nuclear weapons they ar have, about the security of they those weapons, about our abilitf to verify where they are andispi about a reduction of them have because of the disparity in the, 3000 they have, the 300 we have, what does that say about the russians? what he says he is they are note in good faith trying to really come to an agreement about nuclear weapons. ts would we want this treaty, if not going to a great to sit down within a years time to talk a about tactical nuclear weapons.t so i think this is a very important on them and i great tspect for the people who stoot up and support this treaty, i think there are problems withone it. but i eadon't see any reason whn fair-minded person couldn't agree that within agr years timd the two parties should sit downa and talk about what to me is the most dangerous part of our nuclear challenge with russia is

come and visit the tactical nuclear weapons. we don't know where they are. w we don'tth know what they're vey doing.an there we can't verify them and there is a 10 to one advantage at the russians have over us. so, mr. president, my amendmentt is at the desk. i have asked that it be callede. up and i do hope it will have the opportunity to debate this hope amendment in the coming hours ts and days as we wrap up ourhat, consideration of the street.e with that, mr. president, i get back to remain of my time and i >> mr. president,. >> the senator from north carol. carolina. >> mr. president, today i rise p in support of the senate as a nacation of the new strategic arms reduction treaty.cretary ee as secretary of state, secretarn of defense, secretary of energy and the entire uniform leadership of outir mpilitary in believes it is in our nationalrf interest. from former secretaries of state from previous administrations of boto endorsed the new s.t.a.r.t.ussia treaty. relations between the united states and russia have evolved

beyond what they were during the cold wxtar.fa within this context and in the e face of aging nuclear arms stockpiles, strategic arms reduction is in the best interest of both nations. with new s.t.a.r.t. will strengthen strategic nuclear weapons stability and enable us topons modernize our nuclear triad of systems, and ensures flexibility to develop and deploy effectivee missile defenses and conventional global strike capability. it will also promote stability, transparency, and predictability in the u.s.-russian limit s relationship. offensiv the limits, strategic offensive weapons and delivery vehicles through effective verification and compliance measures. our negotiators ensured the united states would be able to protect our ability to feel nu strategiccl nuclear triad compoa of land-based intercontinentallc

ballistic missiles submarines launched submarine ballisticarif trssiles and nuclear peoplend s having a strategic bombers.iatos our negotiators also ensured the dern united states can enable .odernization of our strategicoy delivery system and the nucleary weapons they carry. beer simply put, our country isposedt better off with new s.t.a.r.t. t as opposed to not having aormer treaty at all.on syste in p there has been no formal expir a verification system in place since the last treaty expired a year ago.lishes new s.t.a.r.t. reestablishes a strategic a nuclear arms controt verification regime that provide access to russian strategic nuclear capabilities. nuclear specifically nuclear warheads and delivery systems.f it ensures a measure ofstrategie predictability in russian lif strategic forces deployment over the life of the treaty. plan access and predictability allowo to effectively plan and undergo strategic modernization effort. failure to ratify the treaty

will present us prevent us fromi obtaining russian information.ds without the treaty going into effect the united states will ay have no inspectors on the grounn and no ability to verify russian nuclear activity. into this will result in a countryoy. losing insight into russian strategic nuclear forces deployment. it will also complicate a strategic force strategy and modernization planning effort as well as drive up costs and response to the need to conductc increased intelligence and analysis on russian strategic force capability.illary secretary of state hillary of de of defensecretary robert gates, secretary ofn energy steven chu, and chairmanm of the joint chiefs of staff admiral mike mullen have expressedul their support for senate ratification of new couny all indicated that ratify the treaty provides our country with an opportunity to negotiate with

russia on tactical nuclear weapons of which russia holds a sizable advantage. tactical nuclear weapons are thy most vulnerable to theft, and most likely they end up in thet. terrorist organizations.ble it is important to understand that we will not be able totaicl obtain russian cooperation on tactical nuclear weapon without ratifying new s.t.a.r.t.abilityt the treaty will not affect our ability to improve our missile defenses either qualitatively or tantitatively. quantitively, to defend our homeland against and to missile attacks and to protect our deployed forces, allies and missile threat. secretary of state clinton and secretary of defense gates haves testifiedea that a phased adaptr approach to overseas missiles defense is not constrained by the treaty.reaty. senate ratification of newll s.t.a.r.t. will demonstrate the united states is committed to reducing nuclear weapons whichis

is important as we advance our e oanproliferation goals.nonprolig gaternational consensusre regarding nuclear weapon proliferation challenges fromh rogue states such as iran and north korea. a c will also send a positivewitr message in achieving consensus with other countries on nuclearn issues. it's important to keep in mind d that the united states and 95% russia hold over 95% of the world's nuclear weapons. that the two nations that vifict possess the most nuclear weapons agree on verification anded compliance, and are committed to nonproliferation. it will improve our ability to achieve consensus with otheratiy countries. failure to ratify the treaty onde our ability to influenceith nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. it will also send conflicting messages about the administration's emphasis andran commitment to nonproliferation

treaty. additionally, failure to ratify new s.t.a.r.t. would send a negative signal to russia that they cause them to not support our objective with respect to dealing with the iranian nuclear program. without as secretary of defense gatesoad has said without ratification we put at risk the coalition andpru momentum that we have built to t pressure on iran. the debate over new s.t.a.r.t. has facilitated a consensus froe modernize ouarr nuclear deterre. the director of the national nuclear security administration, mr. thomas, indicated that for the first time since the end of the cold w war, there is broad national consensus of several nuclear weapons play in our defense. and requirements to maintain our nuclear deterrent. the in an essay and the three national laboratories support, senate ratification of new prident's bud s.t.a.r.t. and congressional approval of the president budget

to invest in nuclear security a and modernization. been our nuclear enterprise and stockpile have been neglected for toooo long.in the nar consistent with recommendationse and the nuclear posture review, we need to move forward with aur sustainment projects, includingd strengthening our nuclear command and control structure, t continued development and deployment of our triad of and felivery systems, maintaining a safe, secure and effective stockpile, in revitalizing our aging infrastructure.irectors o on december 1 the directors ofte the three nuclear national laboratories signed t a letter p the senate emphasizing they wera very pleased with thend administration's plan to spend g $85 billion over the next decade to upgrade the nuclear weapons complex.nt they believe the requested amount will further balance they program that sustains theering s science, technology and the engineering base. they also believe the proposed s

budget will support the ability to sustain that safety comes security, reliability and nuc effectiveness of our nuclear deterrence within the limit of 1550ds deployed strategic warhes and established by new s.t.a.r.t.ortance of the nuclear posture review also recognizes the importance of supporting a highly capable work bored with specialized skills to sustain the nuclear deterrent. it emphasizes three key elements of stockpile stewardship hands on stockpile, that sidesnd t technology event engineering base and a infrastructure at tht laboratories ands. plants. i share the concerns expressed by secretary chu regarding our ability to recruit the best and brightest nuclear scientists and engineers. we need to infuse a sense of importance and financial stability to the stockpile ext stewardship and life extension e program. nuclear scientists and engineerg need toover believe that the und

states government cares about and effective sides technology and a leading human base isr needed to conduct effective life nuclear weapons systems, lifetime extension program, ceri increase nuclear weapons reliability, certify nuclear ndergo weapons without the need to nuce undergaro nuclear testing, and e provide annual stockpilegh weapo assessments through weaponsues o surveillance. i hope that my colleagues on men both sides of the isle will join me in voting to ratify new s.t.a.r.t. i yield the floor.mry: tha >> mr. president. >> the senator from pennsylvaniw is recognized. >> i rise for just a few moments to comment upon the amendment that our colleague from florida just spoke about a few moments ago. this

debate we had yesterday on tactical nuclear weapons and how that is addressed was the subject of a long debate yesterday. i wanted to reiterate some of those arguments because we hadia and it's an important debate. first of all, if you listen to a couple of folks who have not just experience, but have a reat interest in our urgent priority of addressing tactical nuclear b weapons, becomes clear that then best way to address that issuejv is, in fact, to ratify this treaty. just to you by way of example the polish foreign minister, heo wanted to highlight a country that has much at stake when the question is raised about russian or russian tactical nuclear t ntapons. any, cou you could point to few if any

countries that have more at stake than poland.h fore the polish foreign minister said, and i'm quoting, without a new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in place,s holes will soon appear in themba nuclear umbrella that the unites states provides to pollen and other allies under article five treaty, thengton collective security treaty for nato members. moreover, new s.t.a.r.t. is a to necessary stepping stone to future negotiations with russia about reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals and a prerequisite for successfulentil revival of the treaty on conventional forces in europe. uncle.ashingto -- unquote.he forgn so that's the foreign minister of poland who had his country has a lot at stake in this debate. i would st also say that we've d a lot of discussions about thet ateaty and what's in the treatye our what would come about as a

result of the treaty, but it's- not as if these arguments just fl landed here when the bill landsh we had months and months of hearings in the senate foreign relations committee. our ranking member, senator thee lugar, was not just therefore those hearings, but played achie leading role in reaching thes re point, helping us reach theow. point where we are now. we have a treaty on the floor, y because of his good work over ce many, many months.is issue and i. same and argued his case many years on this issue. to say mr. with with the offic presiding officer, sitting in io those hearings and askingnsvantt questions of the relevanties,any parties. t many of them military leaders.er i would note for the record, and i will close with this, a that t the vote byio the senate foreign relations committee included a resolution of advice and consent to ratification.

subsection 11 on tactical nuclear weapons says, and i sent quote, the senate calls upon the consultation with allies and agreement with the russianispa federation that would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear weaponsstockpio stockpiles of the russianandould federation and the united states, and would secure and wen reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner, unquotes it's right in the resolution, and i would argue that that this addresses squarely this amendment. mr. president, i would yield the floor. >> spent on capitol hill to send has been in a closed session for nearly three hours examine classified subject matter even with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty with russia. as cq-roll call reports the close session is also giving lawmakers a chance to debate the matter in secret and to decide whether to support ratification. several of them is have been offered including one still pending by sender and half of oklahoma. it would require more

inspections of the russian nuclear arsenal and the treaty requires. live coverage -- next director of the white house office of health reform earlier today she talked about the administration's plans for implement a new health care law. this is from an event at the center for american progress in washington, d.c.. it's just under 90 minutes. >> hi, everybody. here in welcome to the center for american progress.ter i am the chief operating officer

here at the center, and i oversee the health team. and i want to thank you all for coming.vents today's event unaccountable organizations on how to make them where it's most effectivel is really kicks off theor centes work on lowering costs and efforts around payment reform. t reform. we believe strongly that to fulfill the profit -- to restore the process of the affordable health care act, we need to ensure we are lowering costs over the long term. that is why we have today's panel as well as a series of discussions taking place of the next several months and the year to really illustrate how we can talk about the promise of payment reform most effectively. howy's panel will discuss to make the affordable care act work in terms of accountable care organizations.

we have a great panel. leading off the panel is nancy- ann deparle. we are honored to have her as the president's counselor and the director of the white house office of health-care reform. she really led the effort. when i worked in the obama administration, i served on the health-care team under nancy- ann. she was a fantastic general leading the efforts and we are glad to have her. most importantly, she has a history of reform in these efforts because she was, as many of you know, the director of cms. she brought that expertise to the discussion of lowering costs, increasing quality, and making care better for all americans in the lead up to the legislation. we are honored to have her here today, my friend nancy-ann deparle. [applause]

>> thank you, neera. i am glad to be here today and i would think the center for american progress to bring this together to talk about the implementation of the affordable health care act and in particular affordable care organizations. neera and her team have been busy working on some of these issues including how to really make sure we are lowering costs in a way that makes health care more efficient and effective for patients. that includes the work you have done on collapse and other areas -- on co-ops. i want to think many of the people here today including some of those on the panel and my colleague john blum. they have created ideas to make this more efficient and effective for patients. our goal is to make sure that health care is high quality and high value.

the affordable care -- the affordable health care act have deliver the provisions. this is the nine month anniversary of president obama signing the affordable health care act. it seems like just yesterday in some ways. 2010 has been a remarkable nine months. on sunday morning before the bill passed in the house, president obama was already focused on implementation and made clear that he wanted the process to be careful and expeditious. our administration team has tried to achieve his vision. it is an incredible honor to work with many of you in this room on the president's vision making health care more affordable and accessible for americans. as we approach the waning days of 2010, we are finishing up the last pieces of what i call phase one of the implementation of the affordable health care act which really has two parts. one is setting new rules of the road for insurance companies and

gives consumers more control over their health insurance and, more importantly, more transparency over what is happening in the health insurance market. secondly is expanding in stabilizing coverage for some americans, especially early retirees, people with pre- existing conditions, and young people have been most at risk losing coverage. it has been a very busy nine months working on those two areas of phase one. we have implemented a patient's bill of rights that will give consumers an unprecedented protections. under the new law, americans in the new insurance plans of preventive services without additional out-of-pocket costs. nine adults will be able to stay on their parents plans until they turn 26. already, this change has brought relief to americans and their parents used to worry about how they would get coverage first starting out. consumers in new plans will have the freedom to choose their primary-care providers within their network without having to get a referral.

patients in the new plan to receive less services in an emergency room of a hospital -- who receive services in the emergency room of a hospital who are not covered. insurance companies will not be able to discriminate against children with pre-existing conditions. insurers cannot impose a lifetime limit on the care and annual limits are restricted until 2014 when they will be eliminated. consumers will have the right to appeal a decision made by their insurance company to an independent third party. these are just some of the new rights that americans have received and consumers have received as a result of the affordable care act that we have been rolling out over the course of the last nine months. importantly, we are also easing the burden on seniors by providing medicare enrollees have hit the construction drug coverage, called the doughnut hole, a $250 rebate to help

defray costs. by 2020, we intend to close the hole completely. starting this january, the prescription drugs that seniors purchase will give a 50% discount. over time, the doughnut hole will close. in 2014, the law will not only prevent insurance companies from denying coverage for pre- existing conditions, but it will ban insurers from charging people more based on their gender or healthcare status. i do not need it to you what news is that change will bring to the marketplace. all of these protections are key to ensuring that americans have access to quality coverage and can take advantage of the delivery system along with the private sector efforts helped to boost. if you look forward to 2011, we are now beginning to work in earnest on phase two of the implementation. again, this has two pieces as well. one, working with the state's deceptive changes for marketplaces where there will be affordable health care choices

for consumers and small businesses to have not had them before. we just had a meeting at hhs last week were 44 states and the district of columbia came to washington to work on the planning for setting up these exchanges. the second piece of the work we are beginning now is what we call a delivery system reforms, working with employers, hospitals, doctors, nurses, consumers, leaders in the health-care community and system to implement reform to our delivery system to make the health care system work better for patients and over the long run lower-cost. this is crucial work and it is why the timing of this conference and discussion today are sold important. i think everyone in this room agrees that while we have a very good health care system in the united states that we can improve it. we can improve the quality of care we provide. in a paper released today from the center of american progress

points out, our health care system does not reward doctors and hospitals today to keep patients healthy. in fact, it does the opposite. we pay more for more care regardless of the outcome which does not make sense. we all know that delivery system reforms need to happen to recruit patients safety and quality, to save lives, lower costs. in many instances, the good news is there are proven strategies we can implement to improve the strategies. that is why the affordable health care act makes delivery system reform that will take critical steps in keeping patients healthier and better preventing and manage elises. one delivery system reform is accountable care organizations. glenn hackbarth, i remember the discussion we had when we served together on medpac. it is kind of a wonky name. it can make it easier for doctors, nurses, and other

members to coordinate provided care. the council care organization program goes beyond the direct provision of care. it is a shared savings incentives aligned so the medicare accountable care organization program will encourage investment in the health information technology and innovative ways of delivering care that will improve the quality of care for patients. caner the new law, aco's deliver all the care beneficiaries need in a court did way to provide value to the medicare program and deliver improved quality of care to the patients. another aspect of the reform implementation efforts of interest to the people here today is a national pilot program on payment bundling. the law calls for a national volunteer pilot program that will encourage providers and