patient care and paper of the health-care services a patient receives during hospitalization in a bundle the payment. in makes a lot of sense but it is a significant departure from the existing medicare payment methods right now. under the rules of this pilot, providers of able to distribute payments they deem fit among members of the team instead of in compliance with medicare's existing administrative pricing system. there are a number of other provisions in the affordable care at that are excellent opportunities to innovate and provide care more efficiently. the payment changes to address hospital-acquired ellises and unnecessary. missions. two areas of unnecessary expense that are so costly to patients as well as the medicare cost medicare, patience, and payers millions of dollars each year and these avoidable situations where people get an infection in the hospital or they are

readmitted just because the care the first time was not what was needed, they lead to tens of thousands of avoidable deaths and illnesses that are a real burden on the parents that we're supposed -- the patience with her supposed to be serving. through the newly established cms innovation center, we have both the authority and resources to take bold, innovative steps right now. the innovation center will test models and include establishing an open innovation community that serves as an innovation clearing house for best practices in the health-care renovation. as i said, there are lots of things going on that can show you can serve patients effectively, save senator from alabama. mr. presi cost.n >> you're watching live coverage on c-span2. start. i believe new start is deeply flawed and is a dangerous step towards undermining our national

security. mr. president, i believe it does not strengthen verification or transparency of russia's nuclear arsenal. mr. president, we negotiated this treaty with russia when our time may have been better spent focusing on nuclear threats posed by other nations. i believe the treaty is virtually unverifiable. simply put, it's the wrong approach to both reducing the arms race and reaching the ideal of living in a nuclear-free world. many people have expressed the numerous shortcomings of this treaty. mr. president, this evening i would like to touch on three. first of all, new start restricts future of our missle defense. president obama campaigned against missle defense and has systemically cut funding for it. it should not be a surprise to

anyone in america that i believe the administration lacks commitment to a robust missle defense system. but that does not mean the senate needs to support that. mr. president, new start links offensive reductions with missle defense. mr. president, i believe these must be decoupled. why? the treaty limits launch vehicles and restricts the conversation of intercontinental ballistic missles for missle defense purposes. converting nuclear intercontinental ballistic missles to conventional missles is also restricted in the proposed treaty. most egregiously statements made by senior russian officials insist, mr. president, that the treaty's language prohibits the u.s. from developing an anti-ballistic missle defense

system without russian consent. this, i believe, is completely unacceptable. mr. president, unfortunately russia's not only threat that the u.s. faces in this world. i believe it's inconceivable that the administration would agree to a treaty that imposes such restrictions on our national security. secondly, we've reached a point, mr. president, where we cannot make reductions in our nuclear arsenal without viable plans for a strong, long-term stratigic for modernization. again, russia is not our nation's only threat here. without modernizing our nuclear arsenal, the cuts necessitated by the new start treaty would likely encourage iran and other proliferators to build up their own arsenals rather than discouraging them as we would like. mr. president, the u.s. cannot

maintain a credible deterrent or reduce the number of weapons in our nuclear stockpile without ensuring that we have reliable warning command and control systems and that we put an emphasis on the land and sea-based delivery vehicles that give us the confidence that we need for protecting ourselves should the worst occur. the reduction of our nuclear capable bombers and land or submarine-based missles from 1,600 to 700 give the russians an immense advantage here. delivery vehicles are just one aspect of our nuclear triad, but they're a critical component to being able to deter adversaries and should not be restricted, i believe, under the new start treaty. mr. president, by some estimates russia maintains tens of thousands of small tactical

warheads that can be delivered by way of artillery shells, cruise missles an aircraft. yet, the treaty before us, which freezes missle launchers at 1,550 for each side willfully -- in tactical weapons. finally the most serious and immediate flaw, i believe, is the weakened verification requirements which are vastly less robust than those we had under start i. and it's puzzling to why they would do this. under start i, 600 inspections were conducted, mr. president. 600 inspections in the soviet union. new start requires just 180 inspections over the life of the treaty. hardly enough to ensure russian compliance. the russians, i believe, will be

able to encrypt telemtry. it will make it harder to know what capabilities the are russians are developing. you would ask, why did we agree to such? under new start, mr. president, there be -- there will no longer be onsite mobile assembly facilities. for 10 years before the end of start i, the u.s. used this monitoring because satellites do not provide the -- verification requirements are too weak to reliably verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. these measures will neither give us confidence in the process nor the assurance that's we need to assess the integrity of it. russia, as we all know, has a

long history of nuclear duplicity or cheating. yet, new start has substantially weaker verification mechanisms than start i. perhaps the clearest reason to suspect the true motivation behind the treaty is the inexplicable rush to verify it, to ratify it now. mr. president, shortcomings of new start are numerous, substantial and serious. the senate should have the time to examine the treaty's compliance provisions and ensure that loopholes are closed and deficiencies. mr. president, i believe the united states senate has a responsibility to the american people to ensure that first and foremost our country's negotiations have not unilaterally hampered in any way our national security. mr. president, i will not support subordinating u.s. national security to an

untrustworthy partner and neither should the united states senate as a whole. mr. president, i yield the floor. i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll.

quorum call: the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the quorum call in progress be vitiated. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. inhofe: mr. president, it's my understanding that in 45 minutes, we'll be having a couple of votes, one on my amendment number 4833, and one on the thune amendment 4841, having to do with the delivery system, mine having to do with verification. and i -- i -- that would mean that we would have 45 minutes to talk about this. we have already covered it pretty thoroughly.

i just think that we need to have an understanding of what we're talking about in terms of verification. there are only 180 inspections that are authorized by the new start treaty, and that's over a ten-year period, so we're talking about 18 per year. versus the 600 inspections over 15 years in start i. if you do your math there, that would be 40 a year in start i down to 18 a year in start ii, or in new start. one of the arguments for that is that we have fewer sites to inspect, and for that reason, we don't need to have as many inspections. i would just disagree with that pretty strongly. one thing that all the experts seem to have in common and agreeing is that the -- once you get down to fewer sites, that the verification becomes more

important. john bolton had said on may 3, he said -- quote -- "while verification is important in any arms control treaty, it becomes even more important at lower warhead levels." and i think they all agree. brent scowcroft said the same thing. he said -- "current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate, and vulnerable to cheating, to cheating on arms control limits. concerns about hidden missiles and the other actions." so he's saying the same thing. james baker said the same thing. he said that -- when testifying just recently, that the new start verification program does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that

verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under start i. this complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past. do your math and it figures out. if you have 10 warheads, you are -- that you are going to be inspecting and they hide one, that's just 10% of them. if it gets down to two and they hide one of them, that's 50% of them. that's what they are saying, that we need to have more, not less. of course, this is less. in fact, if you do the math a little bit further, the -- as was said by the senator from massachusetts, he said, and i'm quoting him now -- quote -- "so i think it's one thing to ask our strategic forces to do that ten times a year or less than once a month. it's another thing to be waiting for 30 inspections a year." we have -- again, quoting him -- quote -- "we have two submarine

bases, three bomber bases and three icbm bases. now, on the other hand, russia has three, three and 12. so they actually have 18 and we would have eight. which means if you do the math further that they would be able to cite to inspect our one site every two years while we would able be able -- only be able to inspect every two years, they would be inspecting it every one year. so that's the reason we should be doing this. the other is -- people keep forgetting about it because it's not fun to talk about, but the fact is that they cheat and we don't. this has been -- everyone has talked about this. you know, we have something that was set up to try to measure who is cheating, who is not cheating. we had the start treaty's joint compliance and inspection commission. that commission reported -- they actually had two reports. one report was in 2005, one in

2010. the report in 2005 that was on biological weapons convention in the state department concluded, and i'm quoting from the report of 2005, russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program, and that is its nature and status have not changed. that was after it had been in force for five years. that was 2005. in 2010, that same commission comes back and the report states russia's confidence building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapon program was terminated. again, so we have the biological weapons program that is reported in 2005 and 2010, saying that the program is not -- they're not complying with. in other words, they are cheating. that's -- if you sign an agreement, then you're cheating. that makes sense. chemical weapons, same thing.

2005, the state department assessed that russia is in violation of its chemical weapons convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development facilities. so that's what they said in 2005, that they are cheating on the chemical weapons obligations that they made, their treaty obligations. then that same commission in 2010 still talking about chemical weapons said the state department again stated that there was an absence of additional information from russia resulting in the united states being unable to ascertain whether russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities and all of its chemical weapons development facilities. so, again, they state in 2010 that they are still cheating. so it's always difficult when you look at these -- the senator from massachusetts said well, wait a minute now. we have to do the same thing

that they have to do and under your amendment if we're going to have three times as many inspections, that we have to do three times as many and they have to do three times as many. we have to prepare for them here. i said yes, that's my point. we need to have more inspections, and we want these inspections to take place, and we want to be sure that the russians also adhere to their commitment for inspections, which they have never done in the past. so when you look at this, we -- we see that there are -- there are problems with this. and i don't think when you talk about using the argument that we can't change something as you're changing the treaty, you know, i think that's what we're supposed to do. we're supposed to be involved in the treaty. the senator from massachusetts was talking about the number of people that were involved in this thing. the military and all these others in putting this thing together. well, guess who is left out? us. that's what the constitution under article 2, section 2, says

that we in the senate are supposed to ratify the advice and consent. well, we have been advised but we haven't couldn'ted yet. that's what this is all about. so the process works this way. if we do pass an amendment such as my amendment that will be voted on in just a few minutes to triple the number of inspections, that would change the treaty, and i understand that. that means it will have to go back to the dumaa in russia, and they then would have to look at the treaty and decide whether or not that's -- that they would agree with it, and if not have them make a change. then it comes back to us. it goes back and forth, and this is what our forefathers had anticipated would happen. because of all the people that they talked about, the senator from massachusetts talks about who are drafting this, that one thing they all have in common, they are not answerable to the people. we are. we were both elected. i say to the chair, he was elected, i was elected.

and therefore, we are -- we are the ears and the eyes and the confirmation of the public, and i think that's our constitutional obligation. it's very clearly stated. so we do have serious problems. one thing that's kind of in the weeds a little bit complicated, when you talk about my amendment triples the number of inspections under the new start from the types under the start i treaty, we had two types of inspections. this is critical. type one refers to inspections of the b.m.w. bases -- the i.b.m. bases, submarine bases, air bases. these are the delivery systems to demonstrate very clearly that we are going to be able to look at those sites and see if they are carrying out their obligations under the treaty. type two refers to inspections at formally declared facilities. now, they say that we have more -- we have more inspections right now. that's because we didn't even have type two facilities in --

in start i treaty because when you talk about formally declared facilities, we're talking about facilities that are closed down. and so we want to inspect to make sure that they are closed down. so that the test that they use to see whether or not they are closed down is the -- is that they talk about degree. that's how you satisfy to see whether it's type two sides have been treated properly. they can have debris left over from closing one site and then close -- and then leave five open that are supposed to be closed and scatter the debris around and use it again. there has been testimony that that's what they would do. now, i would be glad to yield, since we are going to have two votes coming up at 6:00, on the thune amendment as well as my amendment, if the senator from south dakota would like to talk about his, and then i would be glad to resume my discussion. mr. thune: mr. president? the presiding officer: the

senator from south dakota. mr. thune: i thank the senator from oklahoma for yielding some time. we're going to vote on his amendment and then on the amendment that i offer. both address important subjects in this treaty. the senator from oklahoma is dealing with the issue of verification and pointing out the shortcomings in the treaty with regard to that very important issue, and the amendment that i will have voted on deals with the issue of delivery vehicles, which in my viewment is a critically important -- in my view is a critically important element in this treaty as well. as i said earlier today on the floor, what this amendment does is very straightforward and very simple. it just increases the number of deployed delivery vehicles which are the bombers, the submarines and the icbms allowed for in the treaty from 700 to 720. and just in terms of background about why that's important, i want to inform my colleagues in the senate about why it is important that we get that number up to 720.

i asked at an armed services committee hearing at what point between the range of 500 and 1,100 delivery systems that general james cartwright, the viruses chairman of the joint chiefs of staff would be comfortable and where we would -- where we would avoid making our triad into a diad. he said, and i quote -- "i would be very concerned if we got down below those levels about midpoint. "meaning he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below about 800 delivery vehicles. now, they have made a distinction, the administration has, between deployed and nondeployed, that there are 800 there, and he has subsequently said he could live with a 700 deployed number. but the fact of the matter is, mr. president, that the concern that was voiced initially about dropping down below that midpoint level i think suggests that we need to at least increase up to where the

administration's -- i guess you would call it their force structure plan, nuclear force structure plan settled and that was 720 delivery vehicles. and so the amendment raises from 700 to 720 the number of delivery vehicles. as i said earlier in my remark, the -- if you look at what the 1251 report says, it says up to 60 nuclear capable bombers, up to 420 deployed icbms and 240 deployed submarine launch ballistic missiles on 14 submarines. and so i'd like to, if i might, mr. president, -- mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i ask unanimous consent that this interruption not show up in the senator's remarks. i would ask the senator if he would yield to me for purposes of unanimous consent. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: i thank the senator. i ask unanimous consent that the time until 6:00 p.m. today be for debate with respect to the pending inhofe amendment 4833

and the thune amendment 4841, with the time divided between the leaders and their designees, with no amendments in order to either amendment. that at 6:00 p.m. the senate proceed to vote in relation to the inhofe amendment. that upon its disposition, the senate proceed to vote on the thune amendment with two minutes of debate equally divided as provided above prior to the second vote. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i thank the senator from south dakota. mr. thune: mr. president, if i might just continue. so if you add up to 60 bombers, up to 420 icbms and 240 deployed slbms, you get a number of 720 delivery vehicles. that's what the nuclear force structure plan calls for, and yet the treaty stipulates specifies 700 delivery vehicles. and so there is a 20 delivery vehicle gap there which i think is important. and frankly, if you ask the question about where does the -- would those reductions come from -- and obviously, it would

come from either icbms or bombers. people have suggested it doesn't have to come out of the bombers. if you reduce the number of bombers from the 60 specified in the nuclear force structure plan to get down under 700, you'd have to take the bombers from 60 down to 40. as i said earlier today, we have about 96 b-52 nuclear bombers, about 20 b-2 nuclear bombers those are total deployed and nontkhroeufpltd you're talking about a significant number of the bombers we can deploy at any time in the treaty if you get it down to the 700 number. the question as to whether or not that would come out of icbms or come out of bombers to get from 720 down to 700 could be a combination of both.

the thing that concerns me is we have a bomber fleet that is aging. most of our bombers are pre-cuban missile crisis era bombers. about 47% of them are. we need a next generation bomber that will fulfill that role, survivable in the modern air defenses we're going to encounter, sophisticated air defense systems being employed by some of our potential adversaries around the world. when you think about what we need in terms of a next generation bomber, we need to field one sooner rather than later. and it needs to be nuclear. when asked the question about whether or not the next bomber would be a nuclear bomber, the military and the administration have been very ambiguous on that point. they haven't been able to answer clearly with any degree of certainty about whether or not the follow-on bomber would in fact be a tphaoerbg bomber -- a nuclear bomber which would suggest to me the bomber wing of

the triad is a lot less than the other two legs of the triad. that being said, let's assume for the moment if we have up to 60 bombers, we have up to 420 icbms and 240 submarine launched ballistic missiles. you're talking about a 720 number, not a 700 number. that's why i think this debate is important and why we try to make consistent and get those two numbers to match up. the other point i want to make, mr. president, is that with regard to delivery vehicles in the treaty, we start out right now with about 856 delivery vehicles if you add up icbms, submarine launch ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. we will end up down at 700. we're going to take about 15 of our delivery vehicles, retire those and get down to that 700 number. the russians, on the other hand, start at about 620. they are already well below the 700 number called for in the

treaty. and it's been suggested that through attrition, and they will probably get down to somewhere in the 400's in the delivery vehicles. so this particular provision in the treaty costs them nothing. we give up 156 delivery vehicles. they give up nothing. in fact, they can come up to the 700 number. they can increase the number of delivery vehicles they currently have to come up with that 700 number. so i think it's important to point out the difference that exists today and the disparity that exists between the russian number of delivery vehicles and the number the united states has at our disposal and the number called for in the treaty and why that disparity is so important. now, just one final point if i might with regard to the nuclear posture of the country. we also have to defend not only the united states, but about 30 other countries around the world that fall under the nuclear umbrella and under our

deterrents. the russians have none. these delivery vehicle numbers become even more important when you -- given the geographic realities that the united states has to deal with in terms of our strategic nuclear forces and what they are expected to do in terms of providing extended deterrents not only to the united states but to many of our allies around the world. so i think it's really important in this treaty debate, this particular part of it, that we get a vote on this amendment, mr. president. and it's been suggested that if we have to, this amendment gets adopted, it will have to go back to the russians. that's part of our role, advice and consent here in the united states senate. if it were just consent, we would be nothing more than a rubber stamp. we have a critical role here and that is to look at these issues and where there is disagreement to provide our advice. in a very straightforward way we vote on an amendment that would

increase from 720 the number of delivery vehicles specified in the treaty. that would be a very straightforward amendment and one that would then go back obviously to the russians, but certainly consistent with the senate's traditional historic role of advice and consent. defense secretary schlesinger, former defense secretary schlesinger testified to the foreign relations committee in april 2010 -- and i quote -- "as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate though barely so." end quote. well, barely so does not seem to be good enough for me, mr. president, when you're talking about the important obligations that we have in defending america's vital national security interests as well as those of many of our allies around the world. i don't think settling for barely enough or barely so is sufficient. and so i would hope that my colleagues would support this amendment. i think, as i said earlier, the triad is critical to our nuclear

deterrent and maintaining both icbms and slbms, but then also having a very robust bomber component of that is critical. and that's why investing in a next generation, a follow-on bomber that is nuclear is really important. and i think that the ambiguity that surrounds the question, the uncertainty that surrounds the question about whether or not a follow on bomber would be nuclear speaks volume about the commitment to that leg of the triad. but it's also important to remember, mr. president, that bombers are the best form of extended deterrence. if you want to make those who would proliferate nuclear weapons pay attention, you send a bomber in. a bomber is very visible. it is recallable. survivable. it brings great psychological and political advantage to our country when it comes to trying to discourage proliferation by other countries around the world. and so i hope my colleagues will

support this amendment. it is an important amendment. the delivery vehicle issue is, to me, critical to this debate not only in terms of of the numbers but also the modernization of those various elements of triad. the triad over time has given us great survivability, great flexibility. if ever called upon, we want to be as prepared as we possibly can to encounter any threat that might exist to the united states, any nuclear threat that might exist to the united states. i hope my colleagues will support this amendment. i will yield back time and yield to the senator from oklahoma who i think wants to talk about the verification issue as we lead up to the 6:00 vote. mr. inhofe: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: first of all, i concur in everything the senator from south dakota said, and i join him in encouraging people to vote favorably on his

amendment. it seems like they, the other side, has had the opportunity to do a lot more testing, a lot more modernization than we have. i'm very much concerned. i want to elaborate on one thing. the fact that there is -- that the other side -- and i read all the quotes from the previous commissions that took place in 2005 and 2010 to demonstrate very clearly that the russians would sign a treaty and then they'll cheat. they won't comply with the treaty. we saw it in the chemical weapons treaty, in the biological weapons treaty, we saw it in start i. there is no reason to believe they're going to do this. in terms of verification, we have to try to do something where we are convinced knowing full well in advance they're

going to cheat. that brings up one thing i haven't mentioned before in this treaty. and that is the length of time that we have between notification and actually causing an inspection under the start i treaty was nine hours, and it's gone up to 24 hours in this treaty. in other words, if someone's going to hide so we won't know where to look and we might not be able to find something, why give them three times as much time as we did under start i when we know more today about the fact that they cheat than we knew before. the second thing is it becomes more important as you get closer to the inspections and as there are fewer facilities to inspect, each one becomes more important. and we have had an opportunity to see -- everyone seems to agree with that.

former secretary harold brown explained this in his testimony before the senate foreign relations committee. that was way back in 1991. he said verification would become even more important as the number of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases because uncertainties of a given size becomes a larger percentage of the total force. i think i used the example that if you had 10 and cheat on 1, that's 10%. but if you have 2 and cheat on one that,'s 50%. that statement is agreed with by john bolton who said -- quote -- "while verification is important in any arms control treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels." again he agreed. scowcroft, same thing. he said as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits, concerns about hidden missiles and the actions

of nuclear third parties. so i think everyone does understand and does agree that as they decrease, then each one becomes more significant in terms of being inspected. when we, in this amendment we're changing it from the 180 inspections over a ten-year period to -- what they would have under new start versus the old one which is 600 inspections over 15 years. do the math on that and you come up with 18 inspections a year as opposed to 40 inspections a year. now they say -- they're trying to say there are only 36 sites which means if this is true, we would only get to inspect there -- each site in russia once every two years. while the math works out, they would be able to do our sites once every year. that is something that is very concerning to me.

we've talked a lot about where we are in this process. we've talked about our constitutional obligations, about what we are supposed to do under the constitution. we talked about we are supposed to provide for the common defense. article 2, section 2 of the constitution gives the president the prime role, but we have to advise and consent. i saw something recently, just today i think it is, that came out -- yes, it was just today. it came out from foreign minister certificate -- sergey lavrov. he said i can only kwupbd score the strategic nuclear treaty worked out on our view of the national interests of russia and the united states. lavrov is saying in an interview, it cannot be opened up and become the subject of new negotiations. who is this guy telling us what we can do under our

constitution? and i find it almost laughable because it's as if all he has to do is say that and we have to follow course. he said russian lawmakers would closely examine the u.s. ratification resolution, and any declarations or notes accompanying it to ensure no significant changes were made. and if changes are made, then they have not kept -- upheld their responsibility. i only remind you that c.r.s. outlined in its study, it said the role of the senate in a treaty process -- quote -- "amends amendments or proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. they amount, therefore, to senate counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed to by the united states and the other country. if the senate gives its consent to new start with amendment to the text, the treaty is sent back over to russia and the duma

meets, and they decide what they're going to do with it. and then of course they make changes and then it comes back over here. this is something going on for 200 years. why all of a sudden are we in a abortion we're not going to do it, and we -- sudden are we in a position where we're not going to do it and we look at our constitutional duty as something in the past. i feel we have this obligation. i know every amendment that would have amended the treaty has been defeated. it's been defeated, quite frankly -- well not necessarily party lines but been defeated by and large by party lines. this is something very concerning to me. the other thing when we talk about tripling the number of inspections under the new start, we've heard it said several times there are fewer sides. i'd like to suggest to you that the type ii -- keep in mind type i of a site refers to inspections of c.b.m. basis,

summary basis, air basis, those facilities that are active today. the presiding officer: the senator's time has expired. mr. kerry: mr. president, how much time is remaining? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts, we have about 15 minutes -- 14 minutes and 45 seconds. mr. kerry: mr. president, did my colleague need to finish up a sentence or a thought? i'm happy to yield him a minute, if he did. all right. well, mr. president, i want to thank the senator from oklahoma for the discussion that we had yesterday and again today about verification. and i know it's an issue that he thinks is critical. i think every senator here is absolutely convinced that we need to have the strongest verification regime possible. the fact is, this treaty, the new start treaty, has exactly that. it has an effective verification

system. has it got a perfect verification system? there's no treaty that's ever been passed or one that could negotiate that's going to be that one-sided and be able to achieve that. but it has an effective verification system, which is the standard that we have used ever since president reagan negotiated those treaties and one of our great arms control statesmen, paul ninze, rulely defined that concept of effective verification. so i want to quote what secretary gates has said about this. and i don't node to remind colleagues, but i guess people in the public who don't necessarily focus on it might be imcted to know that of course secretary -- impacted to know that of course secretary gates was appointed by president george bush, and he was held over as secretary of defense by president obama and by everybody's judgment here in the

united states senate, he is a man of great credibility and distinct who has worked through many different layers of american government. it is one of the people i think we have great respect for. and he said in a letter that he wrote to senator isakson this summer, he said, "i believe that the number of inspections provided for by the new start treaty, along with other verification mechanisms, provides a firm basis for verifying russia's compliance with its treaty obligations while also providing important insights into the size and composition of russian strategic forces." now, i know the senator from oklahoma is concerned about the number of inspections, and he has several times raised the question of cutting the inspections from the original start to the new start. so i want to walk through it again, so we're absolutely clear. comparing the number of inspections under start i to the number of inspections under new

start is literally an apples-to-oranges comparison -- for three reasons. reason one: today we only conduct inspections in one country instead of four. under start i, we had byelarus, kazakhstan, ukraine, and russia. mr. inhofe: would the senator yield for a unanimous consent request? mr. kerry: i'd be happy to as long as i don't lose right to the floor. the presiding officer: the sno senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: i ask that the time be extended for 10 minutes, five minutes adid i believe for the senator from massachusetts and five minutes adid i believe for the senator from south dakota. the presiding officer: is there objection? carlucci i just want to make sure ow folks are okay because people were planning schedules around it. mr. kerry: i just want to make sure our folks are okay because people were planning schedules around it. no objection, mr. president. the presiding officer: no

objection. without objection. mr. kerry: secretary gates said this about the number of inspections. let me finish that thought about the difference. so when we had those four countries, we had 70 sites that were subject to inspection. under this treaty, there are 35 sites subject to inspection, but they're all in one country -- russia -- because all of the weapons were moved to russia after the fall of the soviet union. now, secondly, we're inspecting half as many facilit facilitiesd when we inspect those facilities, we, thirdly, have a two-tiered inspection. we've a type 1 inspection and a type 2 inspection, which allows us to be able to go in and look at the missile but also do an update inspection, which is sort of a general inspection of, you know, the up-to-date status of

the various things that we look at in the course of an inspection, which in effect really doubles the amount of inspections that we have. because under start i, if you went in and did an update insperks, that was t so we really have a two-for-one here. i think it is disingenuous to reflect at in the comments about how we count here. we are talking about a completely comparable inspection regime under start ii -- under the new start, as we were under start i. now, finally, would addressed this question of verification in addition to the question the ratification. that condition requires that before new start can enter into force and every year thereafter, the president of the united states has to certify to the senate that our national technical means in conjunction

with new start's verification activities are sufficient to ensure adequate and effective monitoring of russian compliance. so we're going to remain right in the center of this issue of verification every year that this fret is in force, and the united states senate is going to be part of that process. let me just briefly turn back to something that senator thune said earlier. he said that this treaty was negotiated with the assumption that the prostitutions weren't going to cheat -- with the assumption that the russians weren't going to cheat. can we've order, mr. president? the presiding officer: the senate will be in order. mr. kerry: mr. president, it's just not a unanimou accurate ths any such assumption whatsoever. that's why we have a verification structure here. and it's why we're taking this discussion so seriously. because we don't take people at their word. we have to verify.

and that's what the verification regime is for. let me also be clear what secretary gates said here. senator inhofe quoted the secretary saying that the russians would not be able to achieve any militarily significant cheating under this verification regime. that's the judgment of our intelligence community, but it doesn't mean that they think or that we think that they might not try to cheat. it means that if they do, that it's going to be -- if it's militarily significant, we will see it, we will know it, we will understand exactly what they're doing. and so we can respond, as secretary gates has, by increasing the size of our force, by increasing the alert level of ssbn's, on bombers. there are all kind of things

that we can do to respond the minute we notice that kind of militarily significant event. you have so it is my judgment that this amendment does not give us anything in the way of additional confidence, but it certainly will gives months of unnecessary and even counterproductive renegotiation of the treaty. and that means by reaching for three times of the number of inspections, we would guarantee that for months and months we've zero, absolutely none. that's the trade-off. i think we need to get our verification team back in place, and i think that's what's most imperative in terms of the national security interests of the country. now, i also want to thank senator thune, the senator from south dakota, for his amendment, and i thank him also for the constructive discussion that we've had about these numbers with respect to missiles and bombers in order to maintain our nuclear deterrent. i think this is another place

where it's pretty important for all of us to listen to our military. they've made the judgments here, and they've been very transparent about how they've made those judgments. and we've been able to query them, and the armed services committee, the foreign intelligence committee, the national security working group, and they have arrived at the judgment -- not a political judgment, at a military judgment that the treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles is perfectly adequate to defend our nation and our allies at the same time .as general james cartwright sad -- and he himself was a former strategic commander, he said -- quote -- "i think we have more than enough capacity and capability for any threat that we see today or might emerge in the foreseeable future." this amendment seeks to insert sort of our arbitrary judgment,

oh, we ought to have 20 additional. but i'd remind senators what lieutenant general frank clots, the commander of the air force global strike force command said. that is the command that oversees icbms and bombers. and just last friday he said, "i think the start treaty ought to be ratified, and it ought to be ratified now. " "this week. the military came to this conclusion after the department of defense conducted a very, very thorough review of our nuclear posture, including detailed force-on-force analyses. we shared some of that discussion in the classified session earlier. our nuclear commanders have done the math. they've run the scenarios, and they've concluded that we only need 700 delivery vehicles. general chilton, the head of the strategic command said the following: "the options we provided in this process focused on ensuring

america's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our alice and sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. this rigorous approach, rooted in deterrent strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the greed-upon limits in new start and recommendations in the nuclear posture review." now, i do know that the senator expressed some concern about our ability to field prompt global strike systems. mr. president, it's true that conventionally armed icbms will count toward the treaty's limits. but, again, let's listen to what the military says. secretary gates stated for the record that -- quote -- "should we decide to deploy them, counting this small number of conventional strategic systems and their warheads toward the treaty limits will not prevent the united states from maintaining a robust nuclear

deterrent." admiral mullen said, as far back as march that the treaty protects our ability to develop a conventional global strike capability, should that be required. and i'd also like to point to our resolution of ratification, condition 6, understanding 3, and declaration 3, all of which go toward preserving our ability to deploy conventional prompt global-strike forces. finally, the senator raised the possibility that we are moving from a triad to a diad. i want to be especially clear on this point. the administration has stated forcefully -- and again today reiterated in a letter sent to us by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, admiral mullen -- in which he reiterates the administration's commitment to the triad. as it said in the update section of the 1251 report, and i quote, "the administration remains committed to the sustainment and

modernization of u.s. strategic delivery systems. regarding heavy bombers," which the senator mentioned, that same report says d.o.d. plans to sustain a heavy bomber leg of the strategic triad for the indefinite future and is committed to the modernization of the heavy bomber force. to be clear, our existing nuclear-capable bombers will be in operation at least for the next 20 years and probably, at most, this treaty could be a 10- to 15-year treaty. so our existing bomb letters outlive this treaty and the administration has also made clear that we're committed to the triad in the resolution of ratification, including our nuclear bombers. i might add, they've also said they are not going to close bases, and they are not going to reduce the total number of bombers. so, madam president, i believe

that there should not be concern on these points, and p this treaty -- this amendment, once again, is one of those that would force the renegotiation of the entire treaty. i might just mention for my colleagues, one of the reasons that is so important to all of us, we can all remember negotiating around here many, many times on different bills, different pieces of legislation. we always begin that negotiation -- i can remember very well with senator george mitchell when he was majority leader and we did the very complicated clean air act reauthorization in 1990. and he would begin every authorization by reminding people that nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon. we negotiate that way here all the time. so if all of a sudden nothing is agreed upon and that is the twhai this treaty was negotiated -- if nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon, when you take one piece out of there and change it unilaterally, nothing is agreed upon.

and at that point, you reopen all of the other issues which are some of them contentious, which were dirvetion which meme may have a different view on and which will certainly affect our relationship at this point in time. if this weren't if this were so -- were so substantive that i didn't think we were buying a pick in a peke, then i would say okay, we have to do this. but on security people, our national defense community, our intense community, there isn't anybody who works on this day to day, our strategic command, our national missile defense command, all of them say ratify this treaty and that's what i believe we ought to do as soon as possible. i reserve the balance of our time. mr. kyl: madam president, i wonder if i might engage in a colloquy very briefly with my colleague from massachusetts and then propound a unanimous consent agreement. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. kyl kyl: first of all, there two votes scheduled in a few minutes on the thune amendment and the inhofe amendment. have we locked in the lemieux amendment yet?

mr. kerry: i don't believe. let me ask. madam president, i -- the presiding officer: no. mr. kyl: so, madam president, does my colleague anticipate that it is possible that there would be a third vote tonight depending upon whether senator la smiew ready to have that vote -- lemieux is ready to have that vote? mr. kerry kerry: i suspect the majority leader would be delighted to have another vote if we can. bumr. kyl: but it hasn't been resolved yet? at some point, just for the benefit of members, there could theoretically be a third amendment tonight if senator lemieux is ready to have that vote and if there is no objection by any other member. and the other thing i would like to, as i informed my colleague, i have the exact numbers here of the five amendments that i'd like to get pending and let me just make that request at this time. they are amendments number 490 4900 -- that's the mccain amendment -- amendment number 4893, kyl amendment; amendment number 4892, kyl amendment; amendment number 4867, kyl

amendment; and amendment number 4860, kyl amendment. now, these are all proposed amendments to the resolution of ratification. and what i would ask unanimous consent is that without -- i'll just read it here. that it be in order to call up five amendments to the resolution of ratification. provided further that following these be the only amendments in order to the resolution of ratification at this time and ask consent that following the disposition of the amendments listed, that the senate then resume consideration of the treaty. and before my colleague responds, i would also say this. i believe there are only other -- four other amendments pending, one of them is mine and i will agree not to waive my right to bring that up. i can't say for the others and i need to talk to those members during the vote, and i don't know whether they would want votes on their amendments or not. but in any event, there are no more than three of them, so it's a locked-in number. mr. kerry: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: reserving the right

to expob i don't intend to. -- object and i don't intend to. i just want to make clear that as we move to these amendments with respect to the resolution of ratification, we're going to preserve the right then to go back only to those three that are pending and the senator has agreed to make a good-faith effort to see if that can be reduced to simply one. is that accurate? mr. kyl: no, i'm saying that one of them is mine and i will just eliminate it right now. mr. kerry: but i understood, madam president, i understand the senator in our conversation earlier said he was going to try and see if the other two could also make the same decision that he has made 10 that we, in effect, have only one actually on the treaty itself. mr. kyl: madam president, i -- if that was an impression, i -- i will tell you i didn't -- i don't think i can do that but in any event, i did not intend to try to do that. what i'm saying is there were four all told. i would eliminate my one and there would be a fixed number of only three possibilities after that. mr. kerry: madam president, could we then say for the record

which amendment is being withdrawn at this point? mr. kyl: it would be the only kyl amendment remaining pending to the treaty. the presiding officer: if the senator would hold. there is no kyl amendment pending. mr. kerry: mr. president -- madam president, if i could say to my colleague, i -- the majority leader would like to work with us in this process. so i think what we should do, if i could ask my colleague to do this, and there's nothing -- there's no -- i'd like to take the moment if we can just to work through this with the majority leader and we could do it during the votes and then at the end of the votes, we can hopefully propound something that has his engagement. mr. kyl: madam president, i can tell my colleague that the amendment that i would be agreeing not to bring up is amendment number 4854. i misspoke when i said it's pending. it is filed. to the treaty itself. mr. kerry: i thank the senator. that helps us a lot. that clarifies it. what i'd like to do is work with

the majority leader and the -- and the senator from arizona and i'm sure we could come together on this and then at the end of the vote, we can propound an appropriate -- mr. kyl: madz kyl: madam presidm not willing to withdraw my agreement, what i'm of is we're not going to be able to get a unanimous consent before the cloture vote on the treaty and we're going to get iced out here. madam president, i've propounded a unanimous consent agreement. i would be happy to read it again. if there's an objection, fine. but die want to get agreement on this, if at all possible. the presiding officer: if the senator from arizona could repeat his request, that would be helpful. mr. kyl: i would be very happy to. i ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up five amendments to the resolution of ratification, provided further that following these be the only amendments in order to the resolution of ratification at this time and ask consent that following the disposition of the amendments listed, that the senate then resume consideration of the treaty. mr. kerry: madam president, reserving the right to object. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i personally am

supportive of our trying to do that. i have said to the senator in good faith, madam president, we need to have some -- we need to have some amendments to the resolution of ratification. we're working on them. i'm confident we will be able to accommodate his request but i'm in a position where i need to have the input of the majority leader to do that. i will personally advocate that we do it so at this moment only, i must object to that request but i will look forward to trying to propound it after the votes. mr. kyl: madam president, i do appreciate -- the presiding officer: objection is heard. mr. kyl: i appreciate the explanation. ordinary there will would have been information given to the two leaders and we did not do this in this case so i do appreciate his comment. the presiding officer: the senator from south dakota. mr. thune: my understanding is i still have a few minutes in which to wrap up the debate on this amendment. is that correct? the presiding officer: all of

the time has been used. mr. thune: i ask unanimous consent to have a couple of minutes to just summarize a couple of things here. i had five minutes which i think just got burned. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. thune: thank you. madam president, just a couple of quick points before we vote on this delivery vehicle amendment, and the first one is this because it's been observed today that this would impact prompt global strike and the supporters of the treaty have said it will not impact prompt global strike. but the fact of the matter is, that the 700 number of delivery vehicles, if, for example, we were to mount a conventional warhead on an icbm to strike a target in some geographic area that's hard to hit and we needed to get there in a short order, the icbm currently is the best way to do that. if we do that, it reduces the number of nuclear delivery vehicles we have one-for-one. so if we were to do that on 20 eyes icbms, we were to mount conventional warheads on those,

it would reduce by 20 the number of nuclear delivery vehicles that we would have. that is a fact in the treaty. and the final i'll make about the number of 700, because it's been pointed out that some military personnel in the country support that number, but i also want to mention that it's important to recall that general chilton's support from the new start levels was predicated, madam president, on no russian cheating. he testified to the senate armed services committee on april 292nd, 2010, that one of the -- 22nd, 2010, that one of the assumptions made when the posture review was completed was an assumption that the russians in the post-negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty, end quote. we all know, it's been pointed out many times here on the floor, how russia is a serial violator of arms control commitments. and so i think it's important, as we discuss the 700 number that people bear in mind that that number was agreed upon by our military commanders assuming that there would be no cheating by the russians. and there still is a conflict, madam president, between the 720 called for in the nuclear force

structure plan and the 700 in the treaty and all i'm simply saying is let's make those two numbers consistent, let's get the 700 number up to 720. and i think with that, madam president, i will yield my time and ask for the yeas and nays. mr. kerry: i yield back the remainder of our time. a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: is there an objection to asking for the yeas and nays? without objection, so ordered. is there a sufficient second? there appears to be.

the yeas and nays are ordered. under the previous order, the question is on the inhofe amendment. mr. thune: i as request the yeas and nays on the inhofe amendment. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: any senators in the chamber wishing to vote or wishing to change their vote? hearing none, the yeas are 33, the nays -- the presiding officer: are there any other senators in the chamber wishing to vote or wishing to change their vote?

hearing none, the yeas are 33, the nays are 64. the amendment is defeated. a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: there are now two minutes equally divided -- mr. reid: madam president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: for the information of senators, first of all, i would ask unanimous consent that the thune amendment be ten minutes in duration. employment without objection. mr. thune: number two, senator lemieux has an amendment that is pending. i would ask that that vote follow the thune amendment and that also be ten minutes in order. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: there be no amendments amendments -- mr. kyl: madam president? the presiding officer: the majority leader has the floor. mr. reid: let me finish my consent agreement here. if some don't like it, we can worry about that. i ask consent that we're going

to vote on thune. that will be a 10-minute vote. that's number 4841. that following that, we consider the lemieux amendment number 4847. prior to the vote, there be four minutes of debate equally divided and controlled in the usual form. that is, of course, with the thune amendment and the lemieux amendment. that upon the use or yielding back of the time, the senate then proceed to vote in relation to the lemieux amendment with no amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote. the presiding officer: is there objection? mr. reid: i would also say, madam president, that that will very likely be the last vote tonight. i have had a conversation with senator kyl and senator kerry. they are going to meet early in the morning to see if there is a way that we can work through some of these issues that are still outstanding on this. the one message i want to make sure everyone gets here, i snow everyone has lots of things to do this week, but on this most important treaty, no one needs

to feel that they are being jammed on time. as busy as we all are and as many things as we want to do in the next few days. so if anyone has any issues that they still want to deal with, talk to senator kerry or senator kyl or senator lugar who is the comanager on the other side. the presiding officer: without objection, so ordered. who yields time? mr. reid: i yield back the two minutes on our side. the presiding officer: without

objection. all time is yielded back. the question is on the thune amendment. the yeas and nays have been ordered. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators in the chamber wishing to vote or change their vote? the presiding officer: hearing norntion the yeas are 33, the nays are 64 -- hearing none, the yeas are 33, the nays are 64. the amendment is defeated. the presiding officer: there are now four minutes equally divided prior to a vote on the lemieux amendment. the senator from florida. the senate will be in order.

mr. lemieux: madam president, this amendment says simply one thing, that within one year's time of the ratification of this treaty, the united states and russia would sit down and negotiate a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. why do i bring this forward? because we know, and we heard a lot about it today in our closed session, that there is a tremendous disparity between the number of tactical nuclear weapons that our country has at 300 and the russians have at 3,000. 10-1. if this treaty is ratified, the russians will have 4,500 nuclear weapons, we will have 1,800. this is not a poison pill. you will hear that. it's not. it does not change a material term of this agreement. it just says, within a year's time, we will sit down and enter into these negotiations. and we need to put it in the treaty because that's the only way that we can make sure that it will happen. if we send this treaty with this amendment back to the russian duma and they don't approve it, what does that say? it says that they know that they've got a significant

advantage over us. it's the right thing to do. it's something i think all of our colleagues should be able to agree to. it's not a poison pill and let's approve it. thank you, madam president. the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: madam president, i'll be very, very brief. the presiding officer: the senate will be in order. mr. kerry: i completely agree with the intention of the senator here. all of us agree i think that we have to negotiate a tactical nuclear weapons treaty with russia. unfortunately, this, according to our nato ally, according to our national security representatives, will actually prevent us from getting to the place where we negotiate that because the first thing you have to do to get the russians to the table is pass the start treaty. if you pass the new start trea

treaty, we can engage in these discussions. if you don't pass it, they'll have no confidence you simply go back to ground zero and begin negotiating all the pre-start items again before you could ever get there. we just can't pass this unilaterally and order them to get there. we have to get into those negotiations. the way to do that is preserve the integrity of the start treaty and then we'll get to those agreements. we have that in the resolution of ratification. there is language that urges the president and embraces this notion of the senator from florida. i congratulate him for wanting to target it. it's important to target and we will do it in the resolution of ratification. i yield back any time. the presiding officer: the question is on the amendment. mr. bond: i ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there appears to be. the clerk will call the roll.

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any other senators wishing to vote or change their vote? seeing morning the yeas are 35, the nays are 62. the amendment is not have the constitutionally required majority. the presiding officer: without objection. the senator from iowa. mr. grassley: i ask to speak for less than seven minutes -- or about seven minutes as if in

morning business. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. is there an objection? hearing none, without objection. mr. grassley: mr. president, i speak today to honor an employee of the people of iowa and the senate who's retiring that's been on my staff for a long period of time. today i want to thank -- the presiding officer: order in the senate. please carry your conversations out of the well. mr. grassley: today i want to thank a longtime member of my staff who is retiring from the senate. mary day began working in my cedar rapids office in 1987 as a constituent services specialist, and in 1996 took over the responsibilities of being a regional director based in the same office. you'd be hard-pressed to find somebody in the region who

doesn't know mary day. it's no wonder. she is a tireless worker for the 14th-country area in eastern iowa -- 14-county area in eastern iowa and her infectious sense of humor, genuine demeanor and kindness was sought by those she came across in her daily travels around the region. there isn't anybody who knows the pulse of the community like mary. she's been through the good, the bad, and the ugly. she's seen historic floods and business downturns. through it all, mary has remained a good-hearted, conscientious and effective staff member. we spent many hours over the years traveling from county to to county in her region. mary wasn't always the most spirited or active person in the early hours of the day, but she was forever reliable and dependable, no matter what hour of the day.

not only has mary been dedicated to the people of iowa but she has also served as a mentor, confidant and friend to others on my staff. her colleagues say that mary was their go-to person. she knew the bureaucracy inside and out and had sound advice on how to handle just about any situation. the people of iowa have been fortunate to have somebody like mary day working on their staff for the past 23 years. i have been privileged to have her represent me in such a well-respected and honest mann manner. so thank you, mary, for everything you've done for me and the people of iowa and as a servant of the united states senate. i also rise today, mr. president, to pay tribute to a friend and a trusted advisor. wythe wiley --

the presiding officer: just a moment, senator. can we have order in the chamber, please. thank you. mr. grassley: i'll start over, mr. president. i rise today to pay tribute to a friend and trusted advisor. wythe wilie heroically lost a two-year battle with cancer on saturday. wythe wilie was a person who left a mark. if you ever met him, you'd be hard-pressed to forget him. he was a iowa farm boy through and through, whether he was living in des moines or cedar rapids. he valued his friendships and he valued everybody he met along his life's journey. wythe had a passion for agriculture and particularly for cattle business but also for politics. he had one of the most astute political minds i've ever met. to sit and talk politics with wythe was an invigorating endeavor. his political sense and understanding of the issues at the state and federal level

never failed to bring additional insight to anybody who would listen. there's a saying among my former and current staff, "once a grassley staffer, always a grassley staffer." well, wythe was the epitome of that model. he worked on my iowa staff from 1981-1987. when he left, he had already left his mark but he was far -- he was far from helping people of iowa. during the time on my staff and years since then, wythe helped me by heading a committee to vet federal judicial u.s. attorney and u.s. marshal nominees. even when he was involved in government and politics, wythe's heart was always with his family farm. no matter where his professional career took him, he continued to

run the century-old farm near makokuota. cattlemen across the country and iowa knew few supporters who fought for their interests more than wythe did. he was president both of the iowa cattlemen association and also their national president, as president of the organization that's called the national cattlemen's beef association. he was in that position tireless in his advocacy to give iowa beef producers an opportunity to benefit from the market. i have a lot of good memories of wythe, including how he stole the tax council from my washington office and -- counsel from my washington office and ended up marrying her. they didn't think i knew much about it but i knew when susan started spending more and more time in iowa. wythe and susan were one of the first of several grassley office romances and set a precedent for

years to come. one last memory that i'll never forget is that when i learned that he was supporting my candidacy for the united states senate in 1980, at that time, wythe worked for the governor, who had backed my opponent in the primary -- primary. i can never thank him enough for his trust in me. especially when it wasn't an easy thing to do because of his closeness to the governor at that time. wythe remained a loyal friend and trusted adviser up to his death and for that i am forever thankful. i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from tennessee. mr. corker: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that amendment number 4904 to the resolution of ratification be brought up as pending.

the presiding officer: is there an objection? mr. kyl: reserving right to object. did senator corker ask unanimous consent agreement? the presiding officer: . to call up the amendment. mr. kyl: and to return to the treaty upon its disposition? mr. corker: that's exactly right. mr. kyl: mr. president, with that understanding -- might i ask the senator from tennessee whether he'd talked to one of the senators from south carolina about this? mr. corker: i had not. i attempted to do so. he was off the floor by the time -- mr. kyl: i don't have any objections as long as we return to the treaty so those who return to the treaty would

theoretically have those rights protected -- the presiding officer: is there any objection? mr. kyl: i would not object. i would simply note that i think we will need to have an understanding here that we will need to work through with our other interested colleagues a way forward on these things and having expressed that as a matter of good faith, i suspect that we can do that. mr. corker: absolutely. the presiding officer: without objection, so ordered. the clerk will report. mr. corker: mr. president, if i could, i also would like unanimous consent to accept the plod indications. it -- modifications. it is modified slightly. i want to make sure that is acceptable. was there a change?

mr. corker: is it all right if i speak? it was a modification that the staff or chairman had suggested. mr. kerry: mr. president, i have no objection. the presiding officer: without objection, the clerk will report. the clerk: the senator from tennessee, mr. corker, proposes amendment 4904, as modified. mr. corker: thank you, mr. president. also i'd like to ask unanimous consent now that we return to the treaty itself. the presiding officer: the senate is on the treaty. mr. corker: thank you. mr. kerry: mr. president, i suggest the absence of a quorum.

the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: i ask unanimous consent that the quorum call proceedings be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent to proceed as if in legislative session and as if in morning business in order to process some cleared legislative items. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask

unanimous consent that the judiciary committee be discharged from further consideration of h.r. 4748 and the senate proceed to its immediate consideration. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 4748, an act to amend the office of national drug control policy reauthorization act of 2006 to require a northern border counternarcotics strategy and for other purposes. the presiding officer: is there objection to proceeding to the measure? if not, the committee is discharged and the senate will proceed. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that a schumer substitute amendment, which is at the desk, be agreed to the bill, as amended, be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, with no intervening action or debate and any statements related to the bill be placed in the record in the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the homeland security and

governmental affairs committee be discharged from further consideration of h.r. 1746, and the senate proceed to its immediate consideration. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 1746, an act to amend the robert t. stafford disaster relief and emergency assistance act to reauthorize the predisaster mitigation program of the federal emergency management agency. the presiding officer: is there objection to proceeding to the measure? if not, the committee is discharged and the senate will proceed. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that the lieberman substitute amendment, which is at desk be agreed to, the bill as amended be read three times and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table and statements relating to the matter be placed in the record as if retd. -- as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: i ask unanimous consent that the judiciary committee be discharged from further consideration of h.r. 6412 and senate proceed to its immediate consideration. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 6412, an act to

amend title 28, united states code to require the attorney general to share criminal records with state sentencing commissions and for other purposes. the presiding officer: is there objection to proceeding to the measure? if not, committee is discharged and the senate will proceed. mr. kerry: mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table with no intervening action or debate and any statements related to the bill be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. kerry: mr. president, i suggest the absence of a quorum. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

quorum call:

quorum call: