the same rules. i don't believe it will have the unit at all. frankly i think it will make it better because a lot of the software packages talked about and jerry talked about will become more robust and they're going to get cheaper as more and more people use them. the reason is that widespread today is because having collected the widespread. >> host: how should solid business in europe you have to collect? >> guest: well, oddly my employers two weeks ago said that a $500000 in remote sales. so if your retailer this is part of the mainstream fairness act. our view is if you make remote sales of less than $500,000 in this country and make your copy you would not have an obligation to collect a mistake, other than where you have an obligation to collect. >> host: so a guy who sells tenements on ebay --

>> guest: they have to collect sales tax in the state. >> host: mr. peterson, let's start with you. what is the main street >> host: mr. peterson, let's start with you. what is the main street >> host: mr. peterson, let's start with you. what is the main street >> guest: it is, let's start with you. what is the main street >> guest: it is authorization from congress to state, giving them the ability to let retailers collect their sales tax. the governor wants the ability for their tax law to apply to everybody making cells in the privacy. the mainstream fairness act includes a lot of conditions actually. it only allows the state to have the authority of the state has done all the streamlined supplication. i won't we all disagree whether or not there's enough of those in there and i think it's a legitimate conversation, you would be a lot to authority. you are today by the court to get that authority. they would not begin to see the

fairness act. it would also grant to have tribal government on this country and they would have the same authority. it would give retailers the ability to go to federal court on sales taxes, which they don't have the authority to do today. it would require states to pay compensation to every retailer in the country which is something i don't think half the states today pay compensation to retailers. jerry used the phrase unpaid taxes. and that the states come a little more than half the states they are unpaid tax collect yours. this would be an obligation on every state to pay some compensation to retailers. not enough, but certainly much more than they pay themselves. >> host: well we oppose -- we think of congress granted the states all a bit too much. one of the things that is an

example, not just to be unpaid. the streamlined sales tax board has not sat for compensation should be. but even going further recently in intent to get massachusetts to join, there is -- they came up with a rule on how you figure of sales-tax or items for the first hundred dollars are free and then they charge tax after that. massachusetts had a different way to calculate wants to go over the $100 threshold than the streamlined sales tax. and they give an exemption to massachusetts. if congress passed it the mainstream fare as it is now the governing board can just change those rules without any input. congress would have lost that authority and we don't think that succeeding that authority to the governing board is the

right way to go. let's get some really true simplification here. and we don't think that they have it. i think scott and i would disagree on that, but we agree that's where the discussion should be here. we also -- i have to say one thing before you -- we disagree that it's $20 billion. we've done some studies that show it's about four or 5 billion in lost revenue for state. research says that 3 billion across the country. a lot of that stems from the fact that a huge amount of remote sales are business sales. some of them are pretax. they are wholesale type things and so there are no sales tax usually goes to that. other states really do a lot of business. and so the taxes were collected. in an awful of retailers, e-commerce is done by people who have physical stores and if

gates and they are required to collect, so we think that the number -- the amount lost is much lower. there isn't a pot of gold under the rainbow. post away from princess a number of times now. what is the quill versus north dakota case from 1992? >> guest: quill was a cadillac sales, similar to a staple selling most of those type of things. they said you owe sales tax on what you sold to north dakota residents. they should have collected it and you owe us the sales tax and they want the supreme court to try and receive it. the supreme court found -- there is a case basically that they found, that this was impact interstate commerce and it was an interference with interstate commerce because of the burden

that north dakota would place on an out-of-state retailer, somebody with no physical presence within the state. so they said you'd have to have a substantial presence. but the court did also say that congress has the authority or the power to grant the authority to the state to require out-of-state retailers to collect the sales tax, which is why representative delahunt represented the main street fairness act and that is my gist of it. and scott, disagree if i said it wrong. >> host: scott peterson, to think we'll see a supreme court is called amazon versus state of texas at some point? >> guest: you are going to see a supreme -- you are going to see at least a federal court case with amazon versus somebody is they are in court right now with new york. they are in corporate now at carolina. they will be in court with texas. so at some point in time there will be an amazon versus some

state that at least gets to a federal level. >> there've been several state attempts to try to collect these taxes in different ways as you mentioned north carolina, texas. colorado has tried to collect. when that kind of streamlined sales tax method be preferable to these individual state kind of a times to do different things? >> guest: well, the states are trying -- other than colorado states are trying to define this physical nexus and physical presence. and that sense, trying to push the boundaries and find out what the boundaries of those art. not that the new york cases. that's a north carolina did. that's what rhode island had done that. and so those are all within the rubric of the rubric. i think we will see more of that, more attempts.

i think that other states around watching what happens in new york ended north carolina in the court cases to decide whether or not they want to take that step with this affiliate tax increasing nexus. but in many states the marketers who have affiliate would just cancel those in rhode island. and so, in rhode island probably is a loss. the antitax boss doing this because they lost income to the state in which people pay taxes on. in colorado, it is a reporting requirement, so you have to report remains of iphone and get shipping and billing address of everyone with something sent to colorado. not really a tax collection, but a reporting. >> it that way -- talk about cumbersome. that seems like would be fairly cumbersome, just as cumbersome as collecting tax.

>> guest: dma right marketing association is an colorado and i think there will be an injunction hearing shortly on that we'll see what the court is. >> host: scott peterson, when you are working with the state of south dakota and the tax policy department, was this an issue? >> guest: yeah you say we been talking about doing this for a decade. we got to the sales tax in 1932 and two years later did that did the huge taxes because they wanted to start collecting their sales tax. it's 100 pack sales tax base. we did everything we could to get sales tax collected. as a veteran sales attacks, i was under instructions to be as aggressive as i could be in

finding an exit from a physical presence to get everyone to play. >> host: and? >> guest: we were -- >> host: let's take l.l. bean as an example. located up in maine -- >> guest: they have a legal obligation to collect sales tax where they have stores presumably distribution facilities, but i don't know how they actually distribute the products. they would be subject to the colorado reporting requirement presumably because of their size. i assume they might be subject to new york. i don't know how they market. i don't know if they have affiliates. we were never successful in getting them to collect. >> host: what is the next step in furthering this policy or the policy debate? mr. cerasale, what will we see next? >> guest: i think we will see court decisions.

i think what happens in new york, what happens in colorado will then set a new framework a new ground-level of where we are. i think that scott's group will continue to try and get more and more states to join the streamlined sales tax agreement. we will probably fight the mainstream fairness act in congress saying that they really have the streamlined. i like the phrase that does not do anything here. hopefully it's streamlined in name only and goes into more streamlining. i think that eventually as remote sales become larger and larger, it may well be that states will start to streamline more. >> host: final word. >> states won't have any choice. they'll do whatever they have to do.

you'll start seeing amazon type stuff everywhere because the internet is truly amazing and it's revolutionized this country and you can't get the bill's tax for the sales tax will die. >> host: this is "the communicators." .peterson with the streamlined sales tax government. jerry cerasale, direct marketing association and grant gross with the idg new service which serves "pcworld," "infoworld" and "network world" magazine in 400 websites worldwide. thank you gentlemen for being on "the communicators." >> guest: thank you for having us.

>> it's hard to get here and it's also hard to leave here but all of us to leave in the senate always continues. >> search for farewell speeches in your firm attorney members in the senate and house on the c-span video library, with every c-span program from 1987. within 167,000 hours all online, all free. it's washington in your way. >> today in the senate, continued debate on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. in this hour and 15 minute portion of florida debate will have an senate senate that minority mitch mcconnell foreign relations committee john kerry and ranking member richard lugar. >> mr. president, over the weekend i indicated i would be

voting against the s.t.a.r.t. to expla treaty.in this morning i'd like to explainn my decision in a bundle morebvious detail you cannot begin but the most obvious objection. first and foremost, a decision of this magnitude should not be decided under the pressure of a p fin terrifying. the american people don't want us to squeeze our most important work into the final days of thee session. i they want us to take the time wenf need to make informed and responsible decisions.ve the the senate can do better than to have the consideration of a treatyer interrupted by of controversial and political substa items. so leaving aside for a moment any sensitive concerns, and we enough have many, this is reason enough no senor sho to delay that no senator should be forced to make decisions like checkst this so we can kick off another item on someone's political l checklist before the end of the becom appar year. you're looking back over thempt to rus past two years, it becomes apparent why the administration would attempt to rushs this

re treaty. opp and to some this context that we discover another important reason to oppose it. adration i'm referring of course to thegment administration's pattern of studyin rushing to a policy judgment and pol then subsequently studying theo problem that the policy decision was intended to address.blems a pattern that again and againt created more problems and complications then we started outrs with. to close first there was the executive order to close guantánamo bay without any plan for dealing with the detainee populationration hado there. for as we now know the administration hadrn no plan for returning terrorists who were held at guantánamo to yemen. it is still grappling with questions about how to best prosecute khalid t sheikh moham mohammed. next was the president rushed to remove the intelligence community fromng interrogating t captured terrorists without any consideration as to how to deal batefie ld with them. whether they were captured on the battlefields or an an airport in detroit. mor this became all the more

unced concerning when the presidentanistan announced his surge strategy in afghanistan, which predictners. blueblood two more prisoners. and even in announcing thewithdrawal without strategy itself, the president decided to set a date for th withdrawal without any sense of the time of what the state of the conflict would be in july ofstration's a 2011. then there was the administration's approach onnnounced don't ask don't tell. durg the president announced his determination to repeal its policy during its campaignnter before the esmilitary attempt to study whether this change in policy was the best interest of combat readiness before his senior staff had testified and before before those who are currently had told us whether in their should expert opinion, the policy should be repealed. moreover, when the commandant of the marinehe corps suggested theinistratn has higher the administration has taken t the same approach on the the

presi treaty before. in this case, the president came long-rm p to office with a long-term plan rol to reduce the nation's arsenal of nuclear weapons and their role in our national security thetart policy.eaty tha was the plan envisioned a quick agreement to replace the s.t.a.r.t. treaty that was allowed to expire with no bridge and amendments for arms instructions followed by efforts to strengthen international commitments to areconsidation of non-proliferation treaty. we consideration of the comprehensive test entry in further reductions in nuclear arms over time. and it ultimately reduce nuclear weapons to global zero. fst in other words, the new s s.t.a.r.t. treaty was just a first step in the needed to beside done quickly. leave aside for a moment the the fact that the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty does nothing to significantly reduce the russian as, federation stop the strategic tac arms, ignores the thousands of the tactical weapons in the russianins an arsenal and contains an

important concession of linking missile defense to strategic arms. we had to rush this treaty according to the logic of the had administration because it had become an important component of the effort to reset the bilateral relationship at the russian federation whichitas brought up for debate prematurely because it was the first step in a predetermined th arms control agenda. the senate'sat constitutional role of the consent became an inconvenient impediment. s the debate over the mccain the amendment to strike the language in the preamble of the treaty was instructed. the language in the preamble concerning missile defense is no harmful to our foreign policy because of how it will be viewed not by our president but how it will be viewed by our allies in europe and by thethe bus russians. is the russian government oppose the bush administration's plan to place time solid baseixed r missiles in poland and aad facen the radar installation in the czech aeement republic. although the bush administration

reached agreement with the government over to allies and the proposed ballistic missile tt to defense pose no threat to russia's overwhelming ability to strike europe and the united sought states, russia set to course are european allies. it's worth knowing that neither poland or the czech republic ratified the agreements to go forward with a plan which the obama administration canceled.guity thathe the mccain amendment would've federa removed in a strategic ambiguity that the russian federationtion willte n exploit or to intimidate natoo members. concept many of our nato partners have been slow to accept the competent territorialef missile fund defense and rest assured that they will be slowed upon the preambl program. it is certainly -- it is the certainty of the language in there preamble survives in this treaty mount is ratified and the russiansefensen will campaign to obstruct missile defense in europe.in there is no good argument formproved this having voters against the mccain amendment, which would have significantly improved. this

ame to treaty.treaty w the principal argument is against the mccain amendment was that any amendment to the trigger would result in the state department having to return to negotiations of the russiane federation. that may be true.sian or the amended treaty could be considered by the russian duma. in either case the summits will and providing advice to ratification. be if it was the majority that the treaty could not be amended as the senate was unable to amend some of the other members before us these last weeks of the session, why have any debate atll? all? this leads us to the subject too the of verification. concern a second matter of serious disc concern.wed although the senate will meet the today in closed session to discuss the flawed nature of the verification procedures and the vision by the new s.t.a.r.t. has treaty the majority has failed cloture and stated that they cannot be amended. h the senior senator from sen missouri, vice-chairman of the

intelligence committee has provided his views to the senate on this matter and i join him in his concerns. rated senator bond has provided classified assessment of the details related to verificationreaksout o t and chances of russian breakout s and the limits which is t available for all senators to com mi review. ha to quote theve vice chairman of ability the intelligence committee, ieard have reviewed the key ielligenc intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and heard from our intelligence mind professionals. there is no doubt in my mind that the united states cannot reliably verify the treatieseployed 1550 amendment undeployed t warhead.warhead adequate conclusion of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty central work of limit of 1550 cannot be treaty conclusively verified.issile the new start pretty about thember of russians to deploy missiles without a standard or uniform number ofs. warhead.ed uer

a limited number for the treatylso l inspections provided under this treaty also limits access to l inspectors to upper limit of 3% russi an of the russian force.igher c it can thus be said that this treaty places higher confidence and trust them on verification. compounding these concerns isussian that history of russian treaty violations. as the statet' department's recent reports on man's control compliance made clear the v russians had previously violated visions of mr. treaty, the chemical weapons convention to conventional forces in europe treaty and the biological weapons convention. r this is not a track record to beur rewarded with greater trust.e there is a reason to take our verification duties even moresetted seriously. despite my opposition of this the treaty, if the president remains committed to modernizing the nuclear nuc triad. an expa ns the war on terror has requiredn's ground an expansion of our nation's army a

ground forces, the marine corps, the army and our special operations forces and ournue the eff near-term readiness. to as we continued the effort to a dismantle, defeat and disrupt al mus qaeda, we must also plan for the threats our country will face in the coming decades. we must invest not only in the a nd delivery systems and platforms that will preserve our nuclear delivery capability such as the interctinent next-generation bomber nuclear submarines and a new the intercontinental ballistic missile, but also in the strike aircraft and naval forces required to control the pacificconomi realm of economic growth in the military capabilities a of china. value in although the president decided there is value in pursuing aountry disarmament agenda, this country may determine in the coming upon years to place a greater reliance upon the role of w strategic arms and we must remain committed to defense modernization.ecades, so our nation faces many challenges in the coming decades,om some economic some strategic.

it would seem shortsighted to think that north korea iran and other to require nuclear weapons capabilities we could drop our arsenal down to zero. the f so i will oppose this treaty.ces, i think the chairman and ranking members of foreign relations armed services and intelligence re vi for the serviceew that they unfortu provide a defendant inna reviewinge it. it's unfortunate something as important as the senate's consideration of the treaty lateror as one was truncated in order to meet another arbitrary deadline of the wish list of the liberal the base. and it's deeply troubling to pick a legislative body charged with a solemn responsibility of unf advice and consent would be deprived of this row because that would condemn unionss negotiating partners. past the debate over this treaty has intensified over the last and fewsenators days, these and other concerns have become increasingly apparent to a number of senators and to the american people.

we should wait until everyone of them is addressed.f our top concern should be the safety and security of our nation, not the politicians desire to declare victory and host a press conference before the first of the year. americs h americans about more than enough of artificial timelines set by set politicians eager for attention.thei r they want us to focus on their concerns not ours never more so than on matters of nationalso i eld th e security. mr. president, i yield the floor. >> under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. r es out ofum the previous order, buty which it will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the following treaty, which the clerk will report. reducon >> treaty, calendar number strategic seven, treaty with russia some fro numbers for further reduction limitation of strategic offensive arms. >> the senator from massachusetts. >> thank you a mr. president. i'm delighted to be able to say t a few words in response to the

minority leader on a great t respect for theo minority leader, the even do when i came to the united states senate together in the same class and i appreciate the difficulties of this job and certainly the difficulties of corralling any number of the p different personalities.tyeader. same is true for the majority theater. these are tough jobs. but i would say to my friend s from kentucky that just because you say something, doesn't makehe it true. aisle and our friends on the other side of the aisle seem to have a habit of repeating things that have been completely refuted by every fact that there is. our old friend patrick moynihan used to remind all of us in the tha

united states senate and the country that everybody is entitled to own opinion but they are not entitled to their own facts.hat john adams made that famous facts statement that facts are the stubborn things and facts are stubborn things. the facts are that this treaty is not being rushed. this treaty was delayed at the republins request of republicans. this treaty was delayed 13 times separately by senator lugar to respect their desire to have more time to do it themo the modernization issue, which the administration has completely, totally, thoroughly dealt with in good faith. i want to know what the good faith comes from on the other side occasionally.they they put extra money in. they sat and negotiated.

w they sent people to arizona to brief senator kyl personally. for weeks we delayed the process of moving forward on this treatyand in order to accommodate our friends on the other side of theul aisle. i now fully accommodated, with their requests entirely meanteing rus they come back and say it's been rushed. well, mr. president, today marks our sixth day of debate on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. that's a fact. the 16th of debate on the newthe s.t.a.r.t. treaty. now, but come to the floor andt's the say we had intervening voteenate here, intervening vote there.tart sure, mr. president that's the in fi ve way the united states and it works and that's the way worked ine the past the first s.t.a.r.t. treaty in five t days. tre where's now spending more time c on this treaty than we did on a far more complicated treaty at a far more complicated time. and the fact is that if we gowhat

happens through today, which we well one decid this treaty and depending on what happens from cloture on the other side decides they want to is me vote, we can be here for nine days on this treaty, which is sta more time than i would've spent s on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty start wh entrance s.t.a.r.t. ii treaty and the moscow treaty. the time it took them to do it t three treaties, these folks are complaining about the time it took for one treaty and it's going to be more time. it's astounding to me and i hopees to people in the country will see our nional to it when the waiter comes to the floor and says that our national security is being driventics by politics. thi we really need to step back for a moment andke. calm down and think about what's at stake. senate, this treaty is part of the united states senate not because of some political schedule. it. it's here because the republicans asked us to delay it.befo we wanted to hold this vote beforen. the election.?

oh what was the argument then by her friends on the other side ofize the the? no, please don't do that.and that will politicize the treaty. and so, in order to not politicize the treaty, we made the decision on our side to accommodate their interests. y haven't accommodated theirerri bl interests, they never come back and turn around and say you guys are terrible.i you are bringing this treaty upo the at the last minute. are i mean, is there no shame either with respect to the arguments is t that are made sometimes on thedea floor of the united state and senate? is the idea always just say it just say it enough. co-author and repeated in rht-wing repeated it will stick. get maybe the right-wing blogosphere orh some of people get agitatedy is on e enough into it somehow being d. jammed. this treaty is on the floor fory the sixth day. it's a simple add-on treaty tof arms everything that is done before sim overall fears of arms control. ext

and it's a simple add-on treaty not a n and extension of the train oneit's treaty. this is not a new print both.ed. it is not complicated. it's particularly not staff, complicated, mr. president, when the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the director of national intelligence, the secretary of defense the secretary of state every prior republican secretary of state all say, ratify this treaty. ratify it now.d it we need it now. honestly, i sort of scratched my scrat head and baffle minded at the place we have seemingly arrived at, where national security, are interests of our country are going to get t wrapped up in thing ideology and politics and all of command the things that i've commanded everybody's attention over the course of the last couple of- a few

w years. a we did have an election a fewolleag months ago, a few weeks ago that has been much referred to by ourhings colleagues. do ..ly is something like the start treaty, where the american people expect us to come to the floor and do the nation's business, particularly the business of keeping america safer. we've had an excellent debate so far. the two amendments that were proposed were rejected overwhelmingly 60-30, i think was the last one. we had a number of people that were absent. but 60-30 is a pretty pronounced statement by the united states senate. it seems to me the senator from kentucky just seder the major argument -- the senator from kentucky just said the major argument for not approving one of those amendments is that it would require us to go back and renegotiate. no -- no, mr. leader, that's not

>> no, mr. leader, that's not the major argument. that's an argument that underscoring the major argument. the major argument is the language has no meaning. the language doesn't affect missile defense. the major arguments are the facts, the substance. the substance of which is the preamble language has no impact on what they are going to do with respect to missile defense, and everybody who has anything to do with missile defense in this administration has said that. that's the major argument. in addition to which the major argument is also that henry kissinger and donald rumsfeld has said the language is just an

expression of reality. we have a relationship. are we not capable in the united states senate of overlooking nonbinding nonlegal, nonimpacting language that acknowledgeing a sample truth about the relationship of offense and defense in the nature of arms control? that's all it does. that's the major argument. it just happens to that no impact on the defense or impact in on the binding, in addition to that it also requires going back to the russians and renegotiating the treaty. as we'll show in the classify session today, there are a lot of reasons why that doesn't make sense from the security interest of the united states of america. so, you know it's not that we shouldn't do our job as advise and con spent but our job of advise and consent requires us to process the fact it requires

us to think seriously and how it impacts the treaty. if the senate does it's job of thinking seriously about the treaty, it will separate out language that has no impact and no meaning whatsoever on our national missile defense plans or on the treaty itself. i don't know how the president could make it more clear than in the letter that he wrote to the united states -- to the leadership in which he said as clearly as possible the united states did not and does not agree with the russian statement. we believe the continued development deployment, including qualitative and quantitative improvements do not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the russian federation. regardless of russian's action, as long as i am president, president obama said as long as the congress provides the necessary funding, the united states will continue to develop

and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the united states, our deployed forces, and our allies and our partners. i don't know how mr. president you can make it more clear than that. those are the facts. those are the facts. that's my understanding that today that joint chiefs will all be submitting an additional statement for the regard here to make it clear that it is their view that this treaty has absolutely no negative impact whatsoever on our missile defense. and that they believe it is entirely verifiable, and they want to see it ratified. so the issue of advise and consent here is whether we are going to follow the advise of those that we look to on military matters, or defense intelligence matters, or security matters, those states people who have argued these treaties and negotiated these

treaties through the year. the chairman of the chief, the joint chief the commander of the u.s. strategic command, this is secretary gates speaking. and i assess that russia will not be able to receive militarily significant cheating or break out under the new start. >> our analysis of the nie and the potential for russian cheating is effective. mr. president, i hope that facts will control this debate, is that the security interest of our country will control this debate, that those who have created this record for the united states senate to weigh. we have been on the treaty for a year and a half not just six days. 60 members of the united states senate, armed forces, foreign relation committee national intelligence committee national

security working group which i cochair with senator kyl have all met and considered this treaty. some people have gone to meet with the negotiators. the negotiators met with us here before the treaty was signed we were weighing in on the treaty. we considered it in over 21 hearings and meetings over the course. this is not six days. let's not kid the american people. this is not six days. three other treaties, one of which had no verification at all. that treaty received the 95-0 vote. the american people voted for us to stop the politics. they voted for us to act like adults and do the business of that country. and i believe voting on this treaty in the next hours and days is our opportunity to live up to the hopes of the american people. i yield the floor. >> senator from indiana.

>> mr. president the great deal of the day will be spent on discussing the verification regime on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. part of that will be in closed session. but i want to initiate additional debates this morning on the new s.t.a.r.t. verification regime. and the important point is that today we have zero on the ground verification capability. the russian strategic forces given that s.t.a.r.t. i expired on december 5 2009 more than a year ago. opponents of new s.t.a.r.t.'s verification regime have emphasized the peculiar argument in my judgment. on one hand we are told that we don't need new s.t.a.r.t.,

because it's a cold war relic. there's more modern approaches to arms control that should be sought. on the other hand the opponents and passing of s.t.a.r.t. i cold war verification regime. i would ask my colleagues which one should it be? should we prefer modernized verification that reflects the lack of an arm's race and military desire? and resort back to cold war verification. mr. president, the fact of the matter is that president bush's moscow treaty approved by a vote of 95-0, mr. chairman just mentioned contained no verification whatsoever. some who sight this as a modern approach to the arms control failed to mention is the moscow treaty explicitly relied on

s.t.a.r.t. i's verification regime. as i noted s.t.a.r.t. i expired more than a year ago. i would point out mr. president that at numerous hearings of the senate foreign relations committee, those who had the moscow treaty, as i pointed out ratified 95-0 indicated that we were in a new day. when we asked in that particular context how about verification? they said there's already verification under s.t.a.r.t. i. we pointed out even then it would expire in the december of 2009. but it was fully anticipated by those advocating the moscow treaty we could have another start -- s.t.a.r.t. regime, or that verification would not be needed at all. some say we should have been

extent the s.t.a.r.t. i and kept the moscow treaty in place. this is the fact that our military in particular is the light aspect of s.t.a.r.t. i. and advocated for a more flexible approach in s.t.a.r.t. ii or the new s.t.a.r.t.. under s.t.a.r.t., the united states conducted inspections of weapons, their facilities, their delivery vehicles and warheads in russia, kazakhstan and bull reduce. we have russians technology or deployment. only through radification will the technician return to rejewel verification. new s.t.a.r.t. verification should not be evaluated by the

cold war standard. we wanted to improve the race by encouraging shift away with multiple warheads. neither of these objects remains today. s.t.a.r.t. was negotiated at a time when the former soviet union had more than 10000 nuclear warheads on more than 6,000 missiles and bombers. most of them targeted against united states in our lives. under new s.t.a.r.t. the united states russian each would deploy no more than 1500 warheads for strategic deterrence. seven years from entry in the force the russian federation is likely to have only about 350 deployed missiles. the smaller number of strategic nuclear systems will be deployed at fewer bases. as has been pointed out earlier in the debate. while we inspected 70 facilities under s.t.a.r.t. many of these have now been shut down in recent years.

under new s.t.a.r.t. we'll be inspecting only 35 russian facilities. it is likely that russia will close down even more bases over the life of the treaty. both sides will be free that each will be free to structure it's forces. a view consistent with that of the bush administration. as a practical economic matter conditions in russian preclude a massive restructuring of it's strategic horses. for the united states, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will allow for flexible modernization and operation of the u.s. strategic forces while facilitating transparency regarding the development and the deployment of russian strategic forces. the treaty, protocol and annexes contain a detailed set of rules and procedures for verification of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. many of them drawn from

s.t.a.r.t. i. negotiators took the experience of on-sight inspections that was well honed during s.t.a.r.t. i and tailored it to the new circumstances of today. the inspection regime contained in new s.t.a.r.t. is designed to provide each party confidence that the other is upholding it's obligations, and also being simpler and safer for the inspectors to implement. it's disruptive for the strategic forces, less costly than the s.t.a.r.t. regime. secretary gates wrote to congress and i quote the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the joint chiefs, the commander in the u.s. strategic command, and i assess that russia will not be able to achieve military significant cheating or break out under new

s.t.a.r.t. due to both new s.t.a.r.t. verification regime and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the strategic force structure. end of quote. that is a very important statement. in my judgment, mr. president. that secretary gates with the affirmation of all of the officials above in our government say that russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or break out under new s.t.a.r.t.. given the verification procedures that we have outlined. predictability we have chronicled cases where we disagreed with russia about s.t.a.r.t. i implementation. yet despite the issues, neither party violated s.t.a.r.t. i's central limits. we should not expect that new

s.t.a.r.t. will eliminate friction. but the treaty will provide a means to deal with such differences constructively as under s.t.a.r.t. i. it approved by the foreign committee of the senate requires further assurances by conditioning ratification on presidential certification prior to the treaty's entry and force of our ability to monitor russian compliance and on immediate consultations so the russian break out from the treaty be detected. for the first time in any strategic arms control treaty the condition requires a plan for a new s.t.a.r.t. monitoring. some have asserted there are too few inspections in new s.t.a.r.t.. the treaty does provide for fewer inspections compared to s.t.a.r.t. i. this is because fewer facilities will require inspection under new s.t.a.r.t.

s.t.a.r.t. i covered 70 facilities in four soviet states, whereas new s.t.a.r.t. only applied to russian and it's 35 city. therefore we need fewer inspectors to achieve a comparable level. new s.t.a.r.t. also maintains the same number of entry inspections. end of quote, s.t.a.r.t. i namely ten per year. baseline inspections that were phased out and new s.t.a.r.t. are no longer needed because we have 15 years of s.t.a.r.t. i treaty implementation and data on which it rely. and of course if new s.t.a.r.t. is not ratified for a lengthy period, the efficacy of our baseline period would eventually desperate. new s.t.a.r.t. includes that unique identifiers as quote uid, end of quote be affixed to all

russian and nuclear bombers. uid were applied only to russian mobile missiles in s.t.a.r.t. i. it will provide confidence and transparency regarding the existence and location of 700 deployed missiles even when they are on nondeployed status. something that s.t.a.r.t. i did not do. the new s.t.a.r.t. continues important verification enhancements related to warhead loading on icbms and slbms. they were agreed to during s.t.a.r.t. i and confirming the number of warheads on each missile. under s.t.a.r.t. i and the inf treaty, the united states maintained a continuous on side presence of up to 30 for russia. the conduct monitoring, a final

assembly of russians strategic system using solid rocket motors. while this portal monitoring is not continuing under new s.t.a.r.t., it was phased out by the bush administration in anticipation of s.t.a.r.t. i expiration vastly lower rates of russia missile production continuing monitoring is not crucial as it was during the cold war of the -- during, rather during the cold were. the russian treaty's verification short comings were dismissed during the debate in the senate in 2003 because we were told there would be time to fix them before s.t.a.r.t. i expired. something we failed to achieve. so mr. president the only treaty regime of any kind and place is the moscow treaty. which itself, will expire in december of 2012.

and the moscow treaty contains no counting rules and no verification. now, mr. president, illustration and the benefits of new s.t.a.r.t. compared to the moscow treaty we will have data on the number by type of deployed and the fixed land based and sobms and their launchers. this is not in the moscow treaty. secondly we will have data in the number by type if they exist of deployed and nondeployed road mobile and rail mobile icbms and their launchers and the production of mobile icbms. this too is not in the moscow treaty. we will know thanks to new s.t.a.r.t. preinspection procedures. the actual number of warheads in place on each icbm or sobm subject to the inspection. the warhead inspection portion of a new s.t.a.r.t. inspection on a deployed missile is used to conform the accuracy on the

actual number of warheads in place on a designated deployed icbm or slbm. this is not in the moscow treaty. we now have data and inspections for the number of warheads and icbms and slbms. for the first time we will have identification and tracking of all nondeployed russian missiles. nondeployed. not just the road mobile missiles. a unique verification situation under new s.t.a.r.t. we will have declaration notifications, and inspections on the aggregate number of deployed missiles. we will have data on the technical parameters were ballistic missiles through technical exhibitions in sections for missiles and we will have data on the number by type of deployed heavy bombers both those that are equipped for

nuclear capable weapons and those that are not. and the number by type of formerly nuclear capable heavy bombers training aircraft and heavy bombers, equipped for conventional that no longer carry nuclear. we have no nuclear launchers and delivery vehicle. we have a tracking, notification, and inspection of icbm for mobile launchers to confirm the number of icbm for mobile launchers of icbms produced. we will have data and exceptions on the elimination of the cleared facility. the bottom line is that every senate should ponder today that we have zero on the ground verification capability for russian strategic forces. given the fact that s.t.a.r.t. i expired in the december 5 2009. those who wished to reject this

treaty and rely on the moscow treaty enjoy the same result. zero verification. because the moscow treaty contains none. mr. president i appreciate that we've had vigorous debates not only on the verification procedures but likewise on missile defense and for that matter, the entire negotiation of the treaty. but i would say in my judgment it is very important given the outline that i've explained this morning, no verification none anticipated until we pass the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. unless there are those and there have been throughout the history of these debates who simply do not like treaties with the russians. who would prefer no treaty. who anticipate that come day it

will come and some negotiation will take place that's not in sight if rejection of that treaty were to be recorded. i believe it's impairtive for our national defense and national security, mr. president, that's a personal judgment. it's one that i strongly advocate. i believe that progress on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty is extremely important for the national security of our country. i yield the floor. >> the senator from oklahoma. >> mr. president procedurally we have two tending. my 4833, and the thune number 4831. my is delivery confirmation and his is delivery system. we will have information until we go into the closed session to debate these. it will be my hope that members want to debate will confine to these two. if we don't and let time get

beyond us there won't be as much people -- people won't be heard. i know the senator from north dakota wants to speak. i want encourage anyone want to speak on the treaty other than these two amendments. that's not a unanimous consent it's something that i think is appropriate. these are very significant, both of them. : amendments and there is somebody that wants to talk about the amendment, i would hope that they would defer to who wants to talk about these two amendments. leat me that i can a comment about theabout the comments of the senator from massachusetts. when you talk that we have been on this treaty for years and months and all that. i would remind him, i am in a

unique situation because i am on both the armed services and foreign relations committee. we have had a lot of hearings. in the foreign relations committee we've had 16 hearings, a total of 30itnesses. a total of half 30 witnesses. of the 30 witnesses, 28 were in treat favor of the treaty to were aempted opposed to the treaty and what we attempted to do is get a t broad exposure to this jury thi significant treaty, and i think for that reason we do need to take more take more time because we've heard only heard one side. side. then on the other thing, the idea that this is just an add-on from the previous treaty let's keep in mind when the s.t.a.r.t. cam treaty came that was between two superpowers. everyone understands that. states. the u.s.s.r. in the united states and that isn't the scene today. one of the problems i have withbetween unite d this treaty is a treaty between the united states and russia. where this is not really in my opinion is

where the threat is.t is the threat was if iran north korea.essment every time we get an assessment on north korea we are wrong. they have more than we believe they have.ill intelligence would confirm. we and then we are put in a posit position where we know they are treating with countries like -- iran and iran is in a positionven according to our intelligence a not even classified they wouldith a have a delivery system with a nuclear warhead by 2015. com so there is esthe issue of missile argumen defense comes and i weknow the'v o argumennt, we've gone back and forth on the missile defense. i would still say that when you have russia's foreign minister rus lavrov coming out and saying we saying haven't agreed on a missilen defense issue and we are trying to clarify how the agreement two reached by two presidents withh the the actions taken unilaterally

by washington and added that the its obama administration hadn't coordinated its missile defense plan in russia and the very 8 opening day of april 8 thean russians say that the treatyf the unit cannot break and be viable onlyrain if the united states of america refrained to the capabilities around d quantitatively andthis i't g qualitatively. now we considered out and say that this isn't going toha affectrecord. them that nonetheless that onso we he some record. that's down there. so we have some russians whoy believe that. that's not on my amendment. comnt i just wanted to clarify that there is a reason for taking the time here and i'm not going to get into the debate whether we should of the night before or thi after s:the election but i will come up say a lot of the things havee come from this lame-duck session have come up for the chance to are get these through are greater than they would be after eight or nine newthe senators come but or the fact is the eight or nine ag

new senators joined in a letterere, asking us and could refrain from roughly in this very significant i treaty until we have a chance to look at it because we are the senate coming in so that is a good their argument. let's get back to my amendmentre 48, 43 and to kind of kick it off pei kopnow we have a lot of ament. people who want to talk about this amendment and let me just share my thoughts first. the -- right now there are under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty 180 18 inspections over ten years. that's 18 of your verses what we had in the s.t.a.r.t. i 600 over 15 years. mat h do the math and that's 40 som 40 it's a drop from 40 inspections to 18 inspections and just ahy i b minuteel i will say why i believe it is necessary. h av would be good to have more than we had during s.t.a.r.t. i.

the inspections under the newn of s.t.a.r.t. nuclear weapon delivery systems that have i. fundamentally changedf the s.t.a.r.t. i and some of the elimination of the sides and so we did and at that time have to set up a mechanism to look to actua see if these are actually wer eliminated because we knew at o f that time they were but now we have no way of knowing whether. on't the sides, we don't know thatd and the test is being used under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty would be to view the degrees that shows the systems were eliminated. well, it could very well be they could destroy a system, there could be a degree in three or thereld be more systems that don't destroy s and say they ysdid and there is destr that the brief right there. couldpread spread the degree around. arnd. it's not a very good test as to what is anoctuallyw, happening. now under the other problem i

un have is under the newadvance notic s.t.a.r.t., 24 hours in advance notice is required before an dramati inspection which is quite ader dramatic increase under the old s.t.a.r.t. treaty was nine hours advanced notice and i think ifnd assume the you walk into this and assume cheatthat's the russians aren't going to cheat that's fine but i'm not willing to do that. i will document things the city n would do and have not been doing so if anything i think we should have certainly the no longer warning them under the old a wning s.t.a.r.t. treaty of nine hours.old st treaty now my amendment seeks to mitigate some of these negotiated disadvantages by increasing the number of inspections per year. the amendment triples the number of inspections under the new s.t.a.r.t. from the two types of the inspections specified under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. 1 type i and type ii. a type one refer to the icbm from a submarine bases, air bases to confirm him declared n um

data on a number of types of deployed and monte plight warheads located on the icbm and heavy bombers. 2 r type ii refer to inspections that were formerly declared facilities to confirm those u facilities are not being usedoses incstent for the purpose is inconsistent with the treaty that would havete beennt inconsistent with s.t.a.r.t. i. that's what we talked about a a minute ago. i don't see there's anyny verification that is meaningful to verify on the s.t.a.r.t. type 1eb type ii. but type i would inspect 31 and thank you to would increase from eight to 24 total of 54. on j inspections. on july 20, 2010, the principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, that t is james miller testified before the senate armed service committee.aid i was there.sia he said russia cheating or breakinder

out, sometimes to say in aeaty wou kinder phrase under the treaty be would have calittle effect becauses the u.s. second strike strategy nuclear capability. wit that. well, i disagree with that.ing where if this is something where we have people who agree andcertainl disagree certainly we shoulde fall down on the side of perfection toward the united states, and i think as you getaying t to the argument saying that wey don't need as many inspections because we have a smaller number of facilities to inspect or the siz smaller size of the nuclear impact arsenal as and new s.t.a.r.t.,cheating the larger h the impact the stregic cheating has on strategic nuclear balance, this is a kinds of hard thing for people tocreasing tumber understand, but increasing the number of type one and ii new inspections is critical to the new s.t.a.r.t. verification because the total number of inspections has been dramatically reduced. the so by having the facilities mucmore

reduced means they are much moreple that h concerned. ave let me quote a few of the people that have weighed in on thisse issue. the formerharo secretary defense brown explained -- we are way b talking back 1991, this was back to 1991 they were looking into e the future and saying this is something we think is goin tg to bro happen.wn harold brown, who is the secretary of defense had thated why time 1991 explained why in be this case in his testimony senate before the senate foreign the relations committee oron the original s.t.a.r.t. tecum this was october 23rd 1991.- looki verification will, looking into the future where we are today where 1991, verification will become even more important as thethe number of numbers of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decrease because of uncertainties of antage of given size become a larger percentage of the total force. is he the only one who believes this? formesecretar no. the former secretary ar arms thi

control stated just this year may 3rd, he said that while verification is important in an arms control treaty verification becomes even more important athere we are lower forehead levels. lower that's where we are now, over warhead levels. said, 1997 print scowcroft said current force levels provide ar kind of buffer because they areh to be highly enough to be sensitive to imperfect intelligence andhis. modest force changes.ce lev now listen to this,el he says as force levels go down and the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate andn arms conol vulnerable to achieving the arms control limits concerns about the hidden missiles and the actionsday whene wer e of nuclear third-party site. yesterday we were having this or debate on a comment or that acknowledged that both thetor from senator fromma massachusetts and i had been aviators for a numberears. of years and i recalled going

across siberia in a flight from abroad and i looked down there after time soon after time soon after times owner of thisme wilderness and you think of all the places you could be that's not the way it is in our country and tthat's what brent scowcroft for was saying that as the force levels go down and the balance of nuclear power can become ca to increasingly delicate and all ofontrol rubble to sheeting the armslimits control in it and terms about thir hidden missiles and actions of nuclear third-party. and then in may of this year themer senate foreign relations jame committee, former secretary james baker summarized the new s.t.a.r.t. verification regime is weaker than its predecessor new testifying to congress that the new s.t.a.r.t. verifications program does not appear ashat rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerousions a treaty obligations and provisions under s.t.a.r.t. want eve to read this complex part of the treaty is even more crucial whenlear

warhes are he were deployed nuclear warheads are allowed the and so t were allowed in the past. so i think we have the unanimityunanimit of people who believe that as level the level comes down the inspections become morehe critical.nd and i think we also have to look at the fact and i know it's not nice to say and this offends a lotpl of people across the streets t in every arms control we've had-- w we hade a recent -- i am glad it came out i think it was in the summer of this year with theign report on foreign country compliance and this is what the out report said. it starts out there are a number of longstanding compliance obstr issuesuc such as obstruction to the u.s. right to inspect or heads raised in the s.t.a.r.t. treaty commission that remained s tre unresolved when the treaty w expired on december 5th of 09. and then if unyou look they break

it down. c biological weapons convention. departmen in 2005 the state department concluded, quote, russia a maintains a mature offensivelogical weapons biological weapons program and that it is nature and status have not changed. this was in the report we had. so in the 2010 report of the state department report states this russia confidence-building major satisfactor since 1992 has not ment ed satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was t."erminated.hi they said the same thing five the years later that the setback in 2005. so we don't know.inatin their response to the eliminating the program, thepons c biological weapons convention and they didn't do it in 2005 d the state department has said quote - that quote, russia is in violation of its chemicalbligatio weapons convention obligation because its declaration was t incomplete with respect to the

declaration of production and development facilities.again in 2010 the state department again stated that there was an absence of additionalresulting in the information from russia resulting in the united states being unable to ascertain alf whether russia has declared alleapons of its chemical weaponsns stockpile all chemical weapons o production facilities and all of d its chemical weapons development alhey're facilities. fe so, all for your saying is now five years later after they had been warned in 2005 they have to do this they are still noncomplying and, less chemicalhemi ca weapons and conventional forces the report said the united states notes that russia's actions have resulted in the has non-compliance with the treaty obligations. "the wall street journal" recently reported according to the u.s. officials the u.s. u.s. believes russia moved short short-range nuclear warheads toarheads facilities near nato allies as recently as this spring. r so i think if you look at the

record of russia they don't tell the truth.they don do the agree to something and then they don't do it and that is whysignificant fr verification me be the most significant priority in the new b s.t.a.r.t. treaty that needs torters, be addressed. so for starters i just want to repeat that we have fewerthe inspections now under this treaty. the idea that you can determine by the degree that remains afteroyed i something was supposed to be destroyed is to me and mom fact starter. at the evidence to notice, the fact that we now give them advanced w notice three times as long as we one did at one time and the as the weapons decrease i think what everybody agrees we need to have to more of the opportunities to t inspect and last the fact that russia cheeks. now, i would yield the floor at this point and i don't see

anyone around that wants to talk so about these two amendments so i will yield the floor. >> the senator from north dakotathe senor >> mr. president, of course i inhofe: i would will yield. i would like to ask the senator be since there may be summed on the way down t to talk how long he may on these be talking on the general subject of missile defense or treaty, the treaty about how long he could be talking of something other than specifically the two amenents? amendments.would estim >> mr. president i would to estimate about 15 to 20 minutesum. maximum. >> mr. president? m >> the senator fromfficere massachusetts.r. president >> mr. president, i spoke yesterday on most of the arguments and i don't think there's a need to go back over.t i appreciate the arguments and t concerns a of the senator frome sena oklahoma. stand so i think i will let that stand where it was and see if another senator comes up. . >> the center fromi north dakota.

a very >> mr. president, this is a very significant and important issue as i have indicated previously deal w we deal with a lot of issues in the united states senate, some rant, less relevant, some more important and we often treat the too serious too lightly and theously. light to seriously. in this case i think every bhatia understands negotiating aealing treaty with the russians dealing with arms reductions is critically important and that is what this is. i don't think when you talk oer about nuclear weapons that there are other issues similar to it.orbid,efore if god forbid, before sundownas bee today we learn that a nuclear a weapon has been obtained by a terrorist group or rogue nationle and decimated in the middle of a o major city on this planet earth and hundreds of thousands of people a are killed, life on earth will change forever. very

this is a big issue, a veryhe important issue. i just described the horror of a circumstance where a nuclearajor weapon was detonated in a major city on this planet. exist we have 25,000 nuclear weapons that exist on this planet, and the question is are we able to find a way to systematically the reduce the number of nuclear the weapons and therefore reduce the o threat of the use of nuclear same time weapons while at the same time nuclearpons o trying to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists nas. and locations. these days it seems to me the question of the nuclear threat than is very different than when previous treaties weree negotiated. and the reason for that is we have found a new in any on this ha planet called terrorism. terrorists who are happy to give terr up their life as longor isas they can take the lives of others. o and so, that terrorist threat is

a threat a terrorist terrori organization might acquire acquire nuclear weapon and then very happily detonate that nuclearclear weapon and kill hundreds ofundreds o thousands of people, innocent vy people.erious that is a very serious problem and that's why there is a new urgency to not only the arms control and arms reduction negotiations but to the passage of treaties that are in fact negotiated. we have successfully negotiatedvarious various arms control treaties. will i will not go through the list of the success as i did but we h previouslyav but we have been veryucinghe successful in reducing the number number of nuclear weapons and the number of delivery vehicles bombers and submarines andubmari intercontinental ballistic missiles. we have fields in which missi le sunflowers grow and missiles once were planted with nuclear when warheads aimed at our country. our that's a success in my judgment,hat

and there is just no doubt that has what we have done over the years has been successful, and yet there remains on this planet some 25,000 nuclear weapons. lisned t now i have listened to this debate and i don't believe thereone is anyone involved in this that tha represents bad faith. i think there's differences ofere opinion, and i believe people who come here and offer amendments believe in theirpurs ui heart they are pursuing the in right strategy. to but in some ways it also seems t to me to be the kind of three or four stages of denial that is you take a position and when ke a that is responded to then take a position. second position. w you know, i wasn't there. if i wasn't there i didn't do i it, if i was there i'm sorry. the stages of denial are pretty interesting to me and let me go denial through a few of them.nteresti the first was the were very worried, some were very worried of in this chamber that if we are very proceeded with s.t.a.r.t. i

without adequately funding the nuclear weapons complex and funding the necessary in investments in our current stockpile nuclear weapons stockpile, the for investments for the invesents modernization of the investments for life extension programs and so on, if we did that without did adequate funding that would be ad be serious problem. well, the fact is president obama proposed adequate funding co in coordination with those who were raising that question raisg that que particularly senator kafeel was raising that question a great deal and he and i talked about a substantial amount because i chaired the subcommittee that sittee funds the nuclear-weapons complex and the life extension programs and modernization programs, and so while most other areas of the federal budget for being trimmed down or hel frozen or held static, we increase that president obama's request the nuclear weapons line-item in the budget that deals with modernization and lifetime extension programs and

so on we increase that by nearly 10% in the past fiscal a no year and then another 10% in this fiscal year. of and then on top of a 10% increase anotherre 4 billion-dollar increase thrown on top of all of that. i mean, ii don't think anyone canedibly credibly suggest that there is not a problem with funding. mor the president kept his promise and then did more than that. to 10% increase is taking us toand then $7.6 billion then on top of that $4 bil adding another $4 billion in years. five years. it's hard to find another partn of the budget that has been as agai as robust refunded. again, as the chairman of the subcommittee i believe that we and have done what was necessary and the much more to satisfy theried thathe concerns expressed by those who worried that the funding be wouldn't be there.e this president said it will be big there. he made the proposals with two

big increases and an even larger further increase, and that ought to lay to rest that subject for good.ned with will our current stockpile p currently maintained with life exp extension programs and expenditures?s the answer is yes. fding -- is clearly yes.clearl the funding has been made th available and they're oeu fght not availabl e to be debate about that anymore. now the question of time. some have said and i heard thisision one morning on television one of myough a colleagues said this is being rushed through at the end of then session. that's not true. the that is a mix it with what i described previously on the floor of creating a new reality n and then just inventing and reality and the beijing off of iting that new invention. that's not true that we are n rushingew this through. we have had a meeting afterave meetingha after meeting. i'm on the national security working group and all through the negotiation with the russians of this treaty o

republicans and democrats onsecret that committee were called to say secret sins and briefed all along the way to say here'se what's going on.e we the negotiators would say here is where we are, here's what do you're doing and we were always l of kept abreast of all of that. and so there is nothing at all that is running away quickly at the end a session to try to get this ha this done.han, in fact this has been delayed much longer than in my judgmenterred. i would have preferred but here. and it nonetheless, we are here and it ough seems to me this ought not be part of the routine business of the congress. this is an arms control treatyis oug nuclear htarms reduction. tha this ought to tbe one of those norma areas lthat rise is well above that which is the normal j business in the congress. but there is just no credibility at all to suggest this is being rushed. i can just recall day after day sitting in secret sessions with negotiators telling us along the way here is what we are doing.ns and

they met with republicans andll together democrats. we met all together in a room in the capitol visitors center and had a briefing after briefing after briefing on the national and security working group includes most of those in the chamber who ch have spoken on this issue. so it is not the case that there was somehow members of congress and informed about what was happening. this a all of us were informed. this administration i thought s did an exceptional job of comingou to us to say we want to keep you we advised and inform of what we case at are doing. ofs s it just isn't the case.es at the end of the session being rushed through. it should have bed en done a fewi months ago. i wish it had been but it hasn'teen. been and so therefore we find ourselves at this intersection, but we shouldn't -- it shouldn'tdy bieve let anybody believe this is and being pushed and rushed without time to consider all of us havee had ample time over many months aear and over year before that while ne the negotiations were taking place toseri seriously consider and

be a part of what this is and what it means for our country. the other issue being raisedur constantly is it will limit our capabilities with respect tot missile defense. again, it is just not the case.eo i understand what people have been reading in order to make that case but every living and secretary of state from the outn republican and democratic administrations have come out inyone. the c favor of this treaty. has mad everyone, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff have madeon a very assertive strong statement in support of this bec treaty. they didn't do that because somehow we are limited on has missile defense. in fact the president hasnot written to us and said that isment between not what exists with respect to an agreement between us and the russians. it just is not. yesterday it was well this doesn't include tactical weapons. nowe it doesn't come and we do need to include tactical weapons. i wish it had been part of the moscow treaty. be partf it wasn't. i wish to would be part of thet.

street. itwe wasn't. but that doesn't mean we should weapons stop progress on the strategic a weapons limitations reduction of the number of strategic nuclear weapons. why would you not take theogress in th progress in the area of limiting strategic nuclear weapons and the delivery of vehicles,rplanes, airplanes, missiles, submarines submanes and so on with which those weapons are w delivered, why would you notake you not take the progress that exists with respect to limiting course strategic weapons? of course we should do that and certainly i don't disagree at all of those worried about tactical weapons. are so am i.. so we is this administration. all of us would have loved to have had an agreement ofwould hav tactical nuclear weapons five for ten years ago if that wasn't possible and wasn't the case.so now so now we wwork on this and thisea provides measurable reductionsuclear in the number of nuclear in theelivery warheads reductions in the delivery vehicles for those mis warheads, bombers, missiles, submarines and so on.s to me, it would be unthinkable it seems

to me for our country to decidehich wee know, this is not the direction in in which we want to move. as i indicated earlier, on everyssue occasion when we have deviated the issue of arms control and arms reduction, understanding it is our responsibility it fallsntry on the shoulders of thiseso country, the united states, to -- o assume the leadership. on every occasion when we have to debated the issue of trying tos on reduce the number of nuclearlanet weapons on this planet and delivery reduce the number of deliveryhreat vehicles and the threat from nuclear weapons we have done that exclusive of this new threat which now casts a shadow for everything we talked about threaof and that is the threat of terrorism in a new threat in the anxio last decade. own terrorists who are anxious to take their own lives if they can kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of others, the specter

of having a terrorist group acquire a nuclear weapon andeapon detonated that on this planetn the will change life on the planet we as we know it and so it is a much more urgent requirementally that we finally respond to thiss by continuing this relentless number march to reduce the number of ke nuclear weapons and to try to kee make certain that we keep han nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists to reduce the number of rogue nations that would have nuclear weapons.espons that is our responsibility. it's our leadership na responsibility in this country. world the signal we send to the world and ot with respect to this and others arms dealing with arms control and arms reductions is unbelievable the important and that's why chamr at this vote in this chamber at s this point is so urgent. i now, i mentioned terrorism ands it's now a few days before remind christmas.ab lastou christmas we were reminded

m about terrorists once again. men got on an airplane with a his bomb sown in his underwear. g he was preceded by a man getting on an airplane with a bomb in lis his shoe and the list goes on. an perfectly interested in bringing down an entire plane full of kling people. they were interested terrorists and killing several thousand americans on 9/11 2001 butre even more interested in interest acquiringed i nuclear weapons andds of thou killing hundreds of tsahousands of m people somewhere in a major cityth's why on this planet.s that's why this responsibilityegotia the responsibility to negotiate,negotiat continuing to negotiate and negotiate, treaties that represent our interest yet they have to represent our interests and this one does. look at the list of people who support this treaty. broug i have brought up before charts the that show all of the republicanshave and democrats, the folks who have work led on these for so militar long, secretaries of state and military leaders and former

resp presidents. makprogress it is our responsibility to makean i -- progress here and i frankly --'s as i said, i don't suggest there anybody is bad faith on the part of anybody that stood up with an opinion. that's not my suggestion. people in this chamber are people of good faith, but itms to seems to me some have not yet understood the increasing urgency now to address thisational issue. this issue is in our national interest. the this issue with the russians,otiate the treaty was negotiated veryfully rntin very carefullyg representing our national interest. yes on verification representing our national and interest. it represents our interest in way every other way.we missile defense we didn't give up anything with respect to missile defense. and so as i hear some of myhe colleagues come to the floorissues, very concerned about these issues, all of them are in my jud responded to easily ingm my money

judgment.y than has money, we are spending more been money than has ever been spent s on the nuclear weapons complex to make sure that our nuclear weapons work and previously the head of nsa said itht would have killed for a budget like the now have for the life expansion programs and modernizationtion program. i would have killed for that heilled for that said. he was the man who ran the organization under the previouser president, president george w.eorge w. bush.so mon so, money is not an issue.rly that the clearly that's not in issue. time time? this is not being pressed into a ltle tiny little corner with anement. urgent time requirement. this has been delayed and should noted have been delayed but it is do sufficiently important to stay here and do this and hope the work that's been done on a commian bipartisan basis in the committee can beby supported by the entire segment.

let me say that i started earlier and i know it's easy to ts compliment people in this chamber and you don't complementree, those with whom you disagree ibut let me suppose, but let me complimentmight, s ifen i might, senator kerry and senator lugar because the work they have done which is very strongly bipartisan to bring this treaty to the floor of thes, i senate for ratification as ibest o t think a representation of the best of the united states ght senate. it's the way this place ought tout, holdin work.and hearis searching out, holding hearingshe and hearings and hearings, the best thinkers on all these thr a issuesdv to come and give us their d advice about these matters. they did that. not there is nothing this issue is repsented represented by with respect to pushing it into a tight time thi frame. rig they have done this the right way. the right kind of hearing the right kind of consultation ande to now come to the floor of the and

senate and say this is urgent.and let's get this done.o and so i just wanted to come to work t today -- i was driving to working they'r this morning and seeing they are ilding building the martin luther kingn memorial over on the mall, and i recalled what he had said once. means by he said the means by which we live have outdistanced the endsaid, we've for which we live.cret of the he said we've learned the secret forgotten adam but forgot the sermon on mnt. the mound. well, the secret of adam ise something we have indeed learnedsometh and in more recent years therecent specter of having so many nuclear weapons on this planet and the specter of terroristsctrum acquiring one requires us to be ever more vigilant and to proceed to ratify the treaties that we negotiate over a long period of time to read it is again as i indicated it is ouring responsibility to read this responsibility for stopping the arms race rests on our shoulders and yes, we must do it in ourrest national interest protecting

ourselves as we do.n my but in my judgment the treatyes meets every one of those p measures and i am pleased toope the res support it and be here to say i hope the rest of my colleagues and will look at what senator kerry and senator lugar have done andith come to the floor of the senate with robust support with wit and his outstanding work. mr. president, i yield the floor. now more of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty with jordan. she led the discussion on the issue of nuclear disarmament and urges the congress to pass the

s.t.a.r.t. treaty. this took place at the kennedy library. it is an hour-and-a-half. >> a good evening. i am david mccain ceo of the john f. kennedy presidential library foundation carry on behalf of my foundation colleagues, and the library director tom putnam of like to thank you for coming this evening. i encourage all of you if you are not already to become members of the library. i also encourage you to go to our website at jfklibarary.org to learn more about upcoming forums, the exhibits and activities surrounding the 50th anniversary of president kennedy's inauguration. particular thanks to the friends and institutions that make the forum as possible, think of america, the lead sponsor of the library for some serious. as well as boston capital, will institute and boston foundation along with our media sponsors of the "boston globe" wbur.

the forums will be broadcast on wbur and fi wgbh network. today's discussion is a timely one. the united states senate is currently pondering the the new s.t.a.r.t. to become the product of the first arms negotiations with russia and nearly a decade. at the moment it is unclear whether or not there will be a vote on the ratification of the treaty during the so-called lame-duck session. let me just paraphrase an article in "the washington post" this morning about the ramifications of failing to ratify the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. no more cooperation with russia on iran, but for progressive tendencies in russia new hurdles for russian membership and world trade organization a terrible example for nuclear countries such as china and india, slim prospects for better

nato relations and to top it off, the united states and russian presidents will look ridiculous. opposition to the treaty is all the more puzzling given the fact as the secretary of state hillary clinton recently said america's entire military leadership as well as six former secretaries of state, five former secretaries of defense three former national security advisers and seven commanders of the u.s. strategic command support this treaty and support it now. sometimes you wonder is anybody paying attention. because the world has now left with nuclear weapons for so many years and the cold war is over there is i believe something of a complacency about the nuclear threat. but no one should be complacent. because make no mistake about it, the threat exists.

the s.t.a.r.t. treaty aside there are thousands of nuclear weapons in the world today spread among many nations. the danger, of course, is that somehow, someday a terrorist organization or a terrorist state will either obtain or develop a nuclear weapons capability. to discuss these and other issues surrounding nuclear disarmament we have an extraordinary panel this evening. we are honored to have with us tonight her majesty queen noor she received her b.a. in architecture and urban planning from princeton university. cui and noor chairs the foundation that king hussein foundation international. which she founded in 1999 to build on her late husband's humanitarian vision. she is the commissioner of the international commission on missing persons, board member of refugees international, expert adviser to the united nations as well as adviser to numerous

other international organizations. she is also a founding leader of global sea role in international movement working for the world wide elimination of nuclear weapons. she represented global ciro at historic 2009 u.n. security council meeting which endorsed the goal of global ciro and she was an advisor to this year's count down to zero documentary about the escalating global nuclear arms threat. and if that isn't enough her family has a connection to this library. her father was appointed by president kennedy to have the federal aviation association in 1961. jonathan schell was the author of 13 books including his 1982 book on the peril of nuclear weapons, the feet of the earth, which received the "los angeles times" book prize and was nominated the to the surprise of the national book award and the national critics award. he was a staff writer at the new

yorker for many years, columnist for newsday and a fellow with the kennedy school institute of politics and shorenstein center for media. since 1998, he has been a senior fellow with this nation's institute and a correspondent for the nation magazine. his recent articles for the nuclear question have appeared in the nation, foreign affairs and harbors which he is a contributing editor. our moderator the saving is gramm allyson, founding dean of the kennedy school of government and the director of the schools science international affairs. he's also the douglas dillon professor of government. his book nuclear terrorism the ultimate catastrophe is now in its first printing and was selected by "the new york times" was one of the 100 most notable books of 2004. please join me in welcoming her majesty, queen noor, jonathan schell and gran allyson. thank you. [applause]

>> i got lost on the sequencing of things today. it is an enormous privilege and pleasure to be here tonight, and i done thank though library for inviting me to visit and choose a topic of -- that i thought would be of interest to all of you, and then for enabling me to participate with to such articulate and passionate and knowledgeable experts on the subject that brings us here together tonight. that is a particular privilege

and i am very humble actually to be in their presence. i have come to this issue -- well, actually not entirely knott -- i mean in part by way of president kennedy, and the spirit of his administration that confused me and so many of my generation. i was in middle school in washington, d.c. during his administration with that sense of optimism and idealism and responsibility to serve. he was one of my eagerly he rose alongside martin luther king and sargent shriver who founded the peace corps and became my goal as a young girl to join the peace corps and that is the period during which my social and political consciousness developed, and so it makes this a very special moment for me to be here in the building that

honors and keeps alive his memory and spirit and extraordinary contributions to this country and to the world. i look at of the historic steps toward zero the past few years from the perspective of my u.s.-based childhood under the terrifying shadow of the shameful images of hiroshima and nagasaki and the madd policy of mutual assured destruction. but also through the past life and work in the developing world and also as a muslim and a mother. for me as a global citizen that horror is compounded today by the growing threat of proliferation and nuclear terrorism which are increasing the odds of what president

kennedy warned about in a very important speech to the united nations, where he expressed his commitment and a realization and commitment to working for a world without nuclear weapons. and i see the potential for continuing and expanding what are already irrational arms races in regions like the middle east and east asia, increasing and security in those regions and eating up absolutely desperately needed human development resources especially now when so many populations in those regions are under severe economic pressures and destabilizing consequences of climate change. i believe we are at a nuclear tipping point. beyond which there may be no turning back. and yet at the same time witnessing the greatest opportunity in half decades to mobilize the international polling shows us is a majority

support and nuclear and non-nuclear states for zero. as a muslim, just to add, i share the moral and spiritual concern about the genocidal role of nuclear weapons first expressed by the scientists who created them and witnessed the horror of their destructive impact and were the first advocates for what we are talking about tonight. the holy korean declares that killing an innocent is tantamount one innocent life to an amount to killing all of mankind. well we know the terrorists are trying to buy build or steal a bomb and there's enough highly enriched uranium in the world today to build more than 100,000 bombs. we believe in a global cero the only way to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism is to train that swamp.

arsenals of doherty been reduced from the cold war high of 70,000 to the 23,000 in the world today. so that is a fact many people don't realize and that sets a precedent that should not be ignored. right now at global zero we are working to insure the ratification of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty by the u.s. senate come and that we will discuss later and i don't think there is any need for me to go into that in detail. we also come over the past few years since we launched global cero, the movement has grown to 300 leaders, former heads of state, national security advisers defense ministers military commanders from nuclear -- from the nuclear states as well as a non-nuclear states and hundreds of thousands of citizens worldwide. our commission has developed a step-by-step plan 40 eliminating -- it shows how nuclear weapons could be either eliminated

within two decades and in any case it lays out the steps to the elimination. we donated a great deal of media coverage and we've produced countdown to zero, he major theatrical film on the nuclear threat with the team behind in inconvenient truth. i think i will leave it to their and we will engage in further discussion but has a founding leader of global cero, it is again an enormous privilege to be here with how did you describe yourself, jonathan? you were there at the birth, you where the birth you were the berthing agent for global ciro. [laughter] and with gramm allyson whose career and commitment -- >> that's too much -- >> thank you all for being with us today for engaging in this discussion and thank you to the

library for making it possible for bringing everyone together tonight. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] [laughter] we didn't mean to be part [inaudible] there is a new film that has been created by the producer of the inconvenient truth movie about the climate for which our board and an effort was reworded in nobel prize and it's called countdown to zero. it's just now coming out and so we are going to see i think just a two-minute clip from this film that ends with the jfk speech

that her majesty referred to. so if this works we will see. >> we estimate there are about 23,000 nuclear weapons in the world. >> it has been focus on acquiring weapons of mass destruction in particular, nuclear weapons. >> the black market seizures -- [inaudible] >> iran, north korea, they are prepared to start treating nuclear weapons technology.

the objective of al qaeda is to kill 4 million americans. you're not going to get to kill 4 million by hijacking airplanes and crushing them into buildings. >> the united states launched a rocket we told the united states we were going to launch that. the russians opened up the command and control launch code and put it on the desk and said we are under attack. fortunately he didn't believe the military was telling him. >> highly enriched uranium is in the grasp of many countries. >> it doesn't take a manhattan project to make a bomb. >> we have to ensure number-one they don't succeed in detonating a nuclear weapon. >> it could kill over 100 million russians and americans within 30 minutes. >> america's commitment to seek

a world without nuclear weapons. >> would not be better to do away with them entirely? >> we would be better off without them. >> know what nuclear weapon. >> none. none. >> the weapons must be abolished before they abolish the spirit -- abolish us. [applause] >> can i add one thing? >> please. >> it has already been released in 85 cities in the united states. i think it has come to boston and will be released on dvd on the 23rd of november. a great christmas present.

[laughter] and something that should be circulated as widely as possible. >> good advertisement. >> i think that as any film device for capturing so much complexity the producer or producers -- >> [inaudible] >> lucey walker did an extraordinary job and you can say wilkie it could be a longer hero is a very engaging video so i would second of the queen's suggestion. let me go from the film for a second. you were involved i think as a consultant or helping them with respect. i would be interested in what you and jonathan would say about the film itself as a way of getting into this topic.

>> well, maybe jonathan would like to begin. i brought an international perspective to the film, and that's where i advise on various ways of looking at where the big picture is concerned, how it might be -- how we can make it resonate as compelling as possible and many different nuclear states not just for an american audience. so that is where on focus. but you jonathan, probably could address the bigger picture. >> i really wasn't very much involved to tell you the truth. but i think the way i see it is an attempt to add the missing piece to the puzzle. there's one wonderful development that occurred the last six or seven years no small thanks to global cero and that is that the official involved in the nuclear question during the cold war and thereafter a

specially those out of office on fortunately have almost unanimously embraced the idea of going to the zero nuclear weapons. that is something that is absolutely new. during the cold war and for the first decade thereafter you face a kind of steel wall of resistance from those folks coming and to me this movie reflect that wonderful change and to me it is like a door opening. the missing piece of the puzzle is public involvement since the end of the cold war it kind of plummeted. and so the opportunity appears and now we have this advocacy by the people who have been most involved in the issue and officials and so on but we don't have the public involvement and i think the movie really has taken a giant step in the direction of feeding that were bringing it about. i am very much encouraged to see hafed many people we have here

this evening. >> let me pick up from there because it certainly is often then observed plight and jonathan and i talked about that if you ask about nuclear weapons on the harvard campus, use a nuclear weapons people think wait a minute, that is what the cold war was about. the cold war ended before i was even born, if you are a freshman. so why is this still the subject? those of us who study the subject know that even though the cold war ended and the union disappeared in '91 the physical objects which are nuclear bombs, the material with which you could make nuclear bombs, like highly enriched uranium and plutonium for hundreds of thousands of years so they don't just go away. but in terms of public consciousness, i think that is

correct that most lead this topic is not very vivid, so you have fought a lot about that. >> well yes, because i grew up actually as a young child we went through and i don't know how many of you in the audience remember duck and cover and i was in school at california at the time and i was under a rickety wooden desk and that was supposed to protect me from a nuclear holocaust, you know between the united states and russia. the dow was terrifying to grow up with. that is something that didn't leave me for a very very long time. the present generation of young people who for example we have the student chapters now around the united states and one at harvard and in other countries throughout the world that are expanding at a reasonably fast rate right now and the students that are seeing this film are

quite stunned. first of all as you said they are not aware and they haven't been aware, there hasn't been discussion since the 19 etds about this issue. it hasn't been front and center as it should be. it's become much more complex and much more dangerous than over the years since 1945. they can't quite believe we haven't addressed it and at the same time was very heartening is that they are becoming very you know, they are very anxious to be engaged in this and to use their voices and helped mobilize others in their communities to get involved as well because as you said the key is public opinion and it's not only in this country, but the film we are going to take and have all been taken to the other nuclear states it is public opinion in all of the state's to have the support in some cases the courageous decisions that the leaders are already committed to but need the grassroots support for it or to turn the mind set

of leaders that have used nuclear weapons as status symbols to support their own domestic credibility or under the guide if necessary security to secure their states' against the neighboring hostile states which is an argument that this perhaps the two of you can develop that further. >> what about the public direction? why don't you go first? >> no, please. [laughter] >> you know, i think it's a very peculiar situation and we are in the 65th year of the nuclear age, and i think we've developed the conviction during the cold war that it was kind of a two powers to buy like to see for the period but in actuality the

shape of this dilemma was the knowledge of how to build a nuclear weapons was the and to be available to all. the scientists back in 1945 understood that and said so, and that of course is nuclear proliferation going beyond states even to terrorist groups. so i think that this new underlying reality which is really in the sense a deep reality of the nuclear age and the cold war is beginning to surface now were beginning to see it and i think gramm has written eloquently on the subject and i think the movie picks up the story too. and so it's kind of like something that is just poking its nose out from under water again and people are beginning to see it and react. but we have to encompass and a grasp with the new shape is. we can't go on with the goldcorp -- cold war rhetoric we have to see how it is approaching us which is some new avenues and

some new directions. >> well i will offer at least -- i struggled with this and i think the -- during the cold war it was such a vivid reality that there might be a war that would kill us all so as i grew up in college and i worked in the defense department we were genuinely come field about stability and president kennedy, we would object to the cuban missile crisis in 1962 and had a confrontation over missiles in cuba, which president kennedy fought had a one of three chance going to nuclear war so the people who live through that experience in the government, both of the american government and the soviet government never

got over its. they felt the same of nuclear burning in the air and that idea the wonderful former republican chairman of the armed services committee recently said you know, i was asking him how do things look and we were going back and forth. i'm there for three weeks and no one asked me about new s.t.a.r.t. or nuclear weapons. i talked to my colleagues in the senate and they said citizens are not interested in this. you're the one that asked me about this not the fellow with the club or the person who i'm going to her house to have coffee and some constituents. so i think that, and i applaud

very much the film as a way to try to raise consciousness but i still don't think that somehow it's broken through sufficiently. i think that is one that requires a lot more imagination and why i think it is so exciting for somebody like you to be taking a serious interest in raising the consciousness. >> we have screamed the film of the festival a variety of locations this year and an old friend of mine was there, george lucas, and i was tapping his experience. how could we ensure what would he suggest in order to get to this film a lot and widely circulated and his response is one that reflects the belief of a number of different experts which is it is and whether a

dirty bomb is going to go off any major city likely in either the united states and europe, but it could be anywhere. it's just the question of when. in his comment to me was you are really not going to make progress on this until the first doherty bomb goes off. now, and used as i was by the spirit of president kennedy and so many others as i mentioned earlier, i am devoting myself to try to minimize the likelihood a dirty, will go off even though we understand the perspective of those who feel it is inevitable, and that that is the moment at which we will mobilize. but it will also have a devastating repercussions in terms of the psyche of people in every country of the world and impact on the kind of world we live, what is the nature of the society will be after something like that would take place so we

have to work to prevent it from occurring i believe, and that's why i'm involved. >> president obama tickets this issue i would say. so i don't know, again, from the audience, how much you track the conversation, but when he first got the speech in europe, back in april of 2009, and nato and prague and said it's not about nuclear weapons and the steps is to talk about nuclear weapons in april and prague you are worried about a financial meltdown there is 100 issues and he said let's talk about nuclear weapons. you then got the chance in september of 2009 to go to the u.n. as the leaders do every year and it just happened that the u.s. was the chair of the security council. so he said we are going to talk

about nuclear weapons. and he said forget about it. i'm not going to talk about nuclear weapons at the security council in the midst of a financial crisis. it is a september 2009. .. which david referred to in the

introduction, which is a modest reduction, not to mandate not significantly different from the trendline, but this right from president kennedy and president reagan and then basically reduce the number of nuclear is struggling for life in the u.s. senate. so how much sense can this make? i don't want to be discouraging on a friday night but it's encouraging. what is encouraging you? >> well, there's lots of encouraging things. you mention that we had a president that committed the united states for critical weapons. that's a very big deal. if you let the public how would you how would you like to get rid of nuclear weapons, 70% to 75% say yes i don't think they care a lot about it. but there's no big roadblock. i was mentioning before it the majority of retired officials. i think all current as well as

former secretary of defense had signed up for a world free of nuclear weapons not to speak to the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. i have to say that the longer, the more decades that i think about this issue the more serious than the one greco and melissa will happen to which how is it that in 2010 this very modest absolutely commonsensical treaty that simply takes a few steps along a path that has been since president kennedy may not pass in the senate. let me give you another example. something fewer than 100 of nuclear weapons in europe. now those are weapons from u.s. nuclear weapons. those who put their to prevent a soviet attack on nato forces in western europe.

the last time i looked, the cold war was over in the soviet union wasn't there anymore. so this is a betterment of the amendment is a sort of shadow that's what over from the cold war. and yet today there is a meeting in nato and early reports are that they will be able to withdraw those tactical nuclear weapons. what i'm trying to say here is that for all the positive energy that does not exist in favor of cutting back in reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons that they are incredibly tenaciously dug into our world. they have a sort of momentum that seems to proceed from the weapons themselves almost as if human beings were irrelevant. i don't know where that comes from. maybe queen noor or will have some.

it will fail in the future to what i call a policy free zone. why is that? i don't know. so there are positive things but there's some mysterious momentum for inertia they that's getting in the way. >> also the other side of the queen of what she was insane is president obama has had a partner in president medvedev throughout this. out of time. and they have made joint commitments. but it was preceded a joint statement and commitment had been reiterated time and time again. the history of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty is a nonpartisan history as a reference by mentioning kennedy, reagan president herbert walker bush and it has nonpartisan or bipartisan -- bipartisan support that's how it passed through the first committee of the senate. so i think that is important. i can't speak to the history of

the psychology of man well enough to answer that question. but one book american prometheus is a wonderful book about the beginning and about oppenheimer and the other scientists and the mentality. there is a struggle at play that is there today, really within the u.s. government. and it's quite extraordinary as you've both said that we keep repeating history. and what is different today as you authority heard is not only are there nine states and the potential for more proliferation among state, but there are these nonstate terrorist which is the film by reference to as the trailer did. mom stayed at various who are poised -- who are trying very hard to acquire weapons grade material that is not a care in

many parts of the world. and then you have states like pakistan where competing forces for control of pakistan have said they will use the nuclear arsenal of pakistan to hit the united states. they've actually said that. these are not forces to be dismissed lightly. those were the in-state that have arsenals. but also among these nonstate nurse. and there's quite a chilling image in the count down to zero of a former soviet -- a citizen of a former soviet state trying to sell etu two people he believes represent our members of a terrorist organization that would use this highly

enriched uranium to referred to the dating purposes. he is secure and has criticized duration of life is to have a martini. and this is just one snapshot of what is going on. and you can imagine. you can see what motivates people who might well have access to these poorly stored materials in the former soviet union and possibly elsewhere. and the only way, as i said earlier, is to drain the swamp if we want to protect ourselves from the use of those materials by nonstate at yours. so it's not just a question in these nuclear states are beginning to accept that in fact nuclear weapons made them less secure then in fact providing security. >> so again, just another footnote. one of the mainstays artistic elements and the film for me was

the follows of oppenheimer, who was the mastermind for the nuclear bomb and then became haunted by what she had done and there is a fantastic set of pictures that i just recovered from time to time in the film, one of which was in that clip, which was the very black and white image that you saw. i may go back. i mean, this is like preaching to the choir in the sense here are three people -- disagree. >> maybe we can work -- >> i will try to stir. >> i think you were trying to get a better understanding of why anybody could disagree, it would be the proposition is

being argued. so if you like the devil's advocate for a minute. and one part that jonathan wrote about in his first book, which is what are the big obstacle is obviously to getting zero? there's a half dozen, but let's talk about this one specifically is what she read about in 1982. excuse me, we've already learned how to make nuclear weapons. you can't just invent. you can't forget how to make nuclear weapons. if we can't just invent nuclear weapons, that even if we eliminated all of the weapons could make another nuclear weapon. so how many is too many? according to zoom out it is too many. so zero is the right number.

well okay if whereas hero today, how many days away are we from one? or if one is not the right number, 10 or 20. so, when i worry about this problem, i think we have to recognize your proposition with why we can't disagree because we don't know how to make nuclear weapons. so somebody would actually lead to more nuclear weapons of all nuclear weapons were eliminated. so that the person who made or the party who may make nuclear weapons is one that is threatening to me then i need to think about whether i need to be ready to make nuclear weapons, to on a timetable that's not too far off from your timetable. so jonathan how to read this

and checked nuclear weapons? >> well, you can't of course. just the other day queen of the ugly phrase but that's fine because the whole nuclear subject is full of ugly phrase is. and this one is the undescended debility of nuclear weapons, very quickly. [inaudible] [laughter] >> very dramatic. i have to restrain myself from giving an overlong and figure because this is a question that i've given a lot of thought to. it's perfectly true that you can't just invent nuclear weapons and therefore it's perfectly true that a world without them is under threat of their return and what people call that is breakout. but what i came to believe pretty soon after writing that look that graham mentioned is

what people are forgetting is that if it comes to that those who are threatened by the nuclear weapons also have the same ability. it's understandable for them too. and so, when you actually look at what the balance of forces are at zero, it doesn't turn out a vicious one country that's going to pop up with a nuclear weapon and start ruling the world. that country is on very short order, probably going to face other nuclear powers and not to mention the mass conventional light of the world. and so i like to speak of weapons as they turned, that is deterrence that still survive as one component of what's there. in other words, it's not such a big watershed. it looks like when the last piece of hardware is assembled. and actually when you think about it, it turns out that there can be nothing other technically speaking at least

then some technical arrangement whereby you've driven it back a certain point. if you've gotten rid of all nuclear weapons material. maybe he just pulled apart the weapons and put the components in different places. but there's no absolute zero in technical terms. the only way you can get to what i would call an absolute zero is a political decision. that's a really a legal matter that you say these or then and their production, not only their use, but their production would be a crime against humanity for any purpose with the weather. but that is a state beyond what might serve as a kind of interim zero on the way to this deeper political absolute. i hope that makes sense and wasn't too long. >> isn't all that speculation better than nine states and perhaps more with nuclear weapons? >> i think that's exactly right. thus the comparison people often fail to make.

these because a few good with the merits or demerits without nuclear weapons, without comparing it to her current world, which is one of spreading technical know-how, as the party discussed. and we're sort of at a point in the nuclear age which was the case of the very beginning what was going to spread even beyond states to groups that are not state and all that flows from that. so you have to compare our vesting and the immediate and near future of our current path, with the admitted dangers they do persist in a world without nuclear weapons. >> let me say i absolutely understand and that is a strong part. but let's talk about stalin. submit no problem and killing 25 million russians. so the fact that he has a blog

or that he's agreed to do something, whether you have to do something drastically, excuse me, that's his business. so now in a world in which there were nuclear weapons had been eliminated and they at least have to ask myself how many days were we from enough nuclear weapons to make a significant difference in terms of the threat. he gets there what is his timeline? let's imagine i think well, how do i even know what his timeline this? if i think it's six weeks, months, should i be prepared, just what you said? i say okay, let's just be prepared. we know we have only not only

intentions, but of course he may suspect us of having no one contentions. so he watches. >> very suspicious guy. >> u.s., very suspicious. >> so he watches -- jonathan is playing the american hand. stalin is watching it. he says, could you think he could be getting started today? well, he might. so maybe we should get started to be sure we don't fall behind because we don't want him to get there before i do or vice versa. the least in political science. for security studies, this is called risk of an instability that comes from offense dominance. because if i get there first i just agreed that you're not going any further. and if you do, it will be one nuclear bomb.

if you keep going how about two or three or four. the jonathan, tell us how you handle that dilemma. >> well, those are the toughest questions for sure. in the first place, as they say the actual gut the nuts and bolts of an abolition agreement can't be anything but an agreed -- an agreement where both technical terms. so the starting line is the same. now, i am prepared to admit that if you have a major stake a formerly nuclear states such as russia or the city union was of stalin that seeks to breakout, then probably the only thing is

to breakout yourself. and i think an abolition agreement such as proposed by global zero they actually depend on the readiness of those great powers to do it. i don't think that there's any magical machine that enforces the treaty upon the major nuclear powers. but you have to make a political judgment to begin with but that's where you are. then, otherwise you get into the very subtle time. in other words in evaluating how much is a worthwhile in power to keep a nuclear advantage for the day a period of a month or two months or whatever would have been decided in the lights of political suspicions and the lights of political reality. i think if you look into that

question and i don't want to go on too long but it turns out that it's worth a lot less in that time. that she might be facing them would seem that first rush when people say you know the land of the blind the 11 night stands forth. >> the foundation this argument too, so why was she to say about the general topic? >> one of the facts to date of course is no nation has been able to develop weapons grade materials without detection by intelligence agencies since 1945, to date. the other is for example the global zero plan, you know encompasses a semi-reasonable plan verification, safeguard, intrusive inspections which is also part of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. one of the arguments being made by many because as the

s.t.a.r.t. treaty lapse on the first of december, since this time and many are considering there's been no inspection of the russian arsenals and vice versa. but the point is that there are a variety of steps that would form a part of an agreement that include a very intrusive site of safeguards and verification procedures. and the other as i said fact that i'm not sure if perhaps in the future that can be somehow worked around, but to date, there has been no manufacturer of weapons grade material without detection by another state. so you're not talking about a few months after a weapon goes off. you're talking about a period of time after the detection of the process starting to create weapons grade material. that may be a smaller timeframe. at least today it is.

>> exactly. i think there is great reassurance to be had in the record of an inspection where you can think of iraq after the first cold war and other examples. but it's been rather encouraging. >> i think the record of the iaea and its inspection of the places that it's allowed to inspect his outstanding and actually it's record about what was the reality on the ground in iraq before the 2003 invasion turned out to be a whole lot better than american intelligence. let me take one more angle and then we're going to get some questions from the audience where you think you're supposed to be filling out a card if you had one and then we'll collect them and bring them in. but queen noor you get a sense to see this from a non-american even though you i guess were a

former american. >> in my heart. >> you are extremely american friendly come from a country that's american friendly, but still are able to look a little bit outside and americans are so preoccupied with themselves in our view of the world. so what would americans mostly miss about this topic, you know from an international earth seems odd? >> well, i think because they have the luxury of growing up in being educated in this country it became easy to consider myself a citizen of the world what they lived and worked in other countries without that in any way diminishing my attachment to this country or jordan or any other. i feel that what is missed a lot of it is in the film count down to zero and that was the reason for creating it and i'll see you

both have described it as being -- making the reality of the current state of affairs that although history that has taken us at this point very accessible to any audience. i think that one of the areas that is not discussed, that is extremely important in the larger international community when looking up the subject and looking at the tensions that have been increasing in terms of frederick and international discourse over proliferation in particular is the fact that much of the international community views the nuclear state positions, if you will to date

as having been a position of having double standards. i realized from the start actually. but certainly as today that is a beery important issue that needs to be tackled and by global zero or at beeston international multilateral framework that brings together the nuclear states -- it needs to be preceded by u.s. -- the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and then another commitment to cuts by the united states and russia. but that 96% and all the nuclear weapons there. that needs to be preceded by those, another stage of cuts. and then you have a chance of bringing, setting up the multilateral process that will bring and most if not eventually god willing all of the other nuclear states. and it's critical that that

process leads to a commitment to a set of requirements and responsibilities in standard that apply to everyone equally. and then i think you have a dynamic -- to begin to have a dynamic place that will create very clear out layers if on nuclear state don't come on board and its proliferation continues for nonnuclear states have agreed to the goal of zero. a may not have articulated that very well. but the double standard is a very important issue that resonates around the world that is never discussed in this country and man is critical when you're looking at countries like iran or looking at north korea are looking at india and pakistan or israel or the king of any potential new nuclear state. >> now, i think that's absolutely a key thing.

and that's why i'm very much in favor of a firm and highly articulated commitment to a world without nuclear weapons as an immediate factor in the non-proliferation effort because nuclear powers that have decided seriously and believably to do without nuclear weapons themselves are going to be much more committed and much more persuasive in arguing, pressuring what have you other states into either rolling back their own arsenals or rolling back the nuclear programs and not heading down that path. i think the commitment -- i like to say that i'm in favor of a frontload approach. right now we have a sort of take a step in wait and see what the next step would be. it didn't work for going a

tremendous force for non-proliferation by taking the gradual approach. >> queen noor can you underwent a double standard proposition . i have on a couple of haitians when serving in the u.s. government, found myself trying to explain why nuclear weapons are good for the u.s. and that for somebody else. now of course there's a better weapon creatures, but if you're not a diplomat, conveying that without smiling is difficult. so i think there's no question but that is an issue. i think there's another question that i wanted to raise which is if without nuclear weapons let's imagine without nuclear weapons, but big military asymmetries. they