came and said we let you in. yes you will be persecuted in your home country, yes you pose no terrorist threat whatsoever to the united states, yes you've lived here for a long time and you've been perfectly fine but now your terrorist and now your family is a terrorist. the administration has 80 or 90 of the groups and they sat on their hands in the blacklisting process has continued. we are not talking about flood gates or large numbers of people. this letter sent october 8th to the president has gotten no attention. i should say and let me amend that. let me amended that with thanks to c-span, the great c-span because my oppression is that since the administration realized that this panel was here that c-span would broadcast the facts to the american people suddenly calls are being made by the administration to the people who say we will sit down with

you. we are about to make this reform, we are on the verge of doing that. so i would say to everybody in this room, everybody on this panel lets keep the heat on, we kept it on the bush administration platts kebir on the obama administration. this is a season when this administration ought to get off its duff and understand the importance of family and justice and protecting us against real terrorists and the importance of the rule of law.

republican leader. mr. mcconnell: mr. president, over the weekend i indicated i would be voting against the start treaty. this morning i'd like to explain my decision in a little more detail, and i'll begin with the most obvious objection. first and foremost, a decision of this magnitude should not be decided under the pressure of a

deadline. the american people don't want to us squeeze our most important work into the final days of the session. they want us to take the time we need to make informed and responsible decisions. the senate can do better than to have the consideration of the treaty interrupted by a series of controversial political items. leaving aside for a moment any substantive concerns -- and we have many -- this is reason enough to delay a vote. no senator should be forced to make decisions like this so we can tick off another item on someone's political checklist before the end of the year. yet, looking back over the past two years, it becomes apparent why the administration would attempt to rush this treaty. and it's in this context that we discover another important reason to oppose it. i'm referring of course to the administration's pattern of rushing to a policy judgment and then subsequently studying the problem that the policy decision

was intended to address. a pattern that again and again created more problems and complications than we started out with. first there was the executive order to close guantanamo bay without any plan for dealing with the detainee population there. as we now know, the administration had no plan for returning terrorists who were held at guantanamo to yemen, and it's still grappling with questions how best to prosecute khalid sheikh mohammed. next was the president's rush to move the intelligence community from interrogating captured terrorists without any consideration as to how to deal with them. whether they were captured on the battlefield or at an airport in detroit. this became all the more concerning when the president announced his surge strategy in afghanistan which predictably led to more prisoners. and even in announcing the strategy itself, the president decided to set a date for withdrawal without any sense at

the time of what the state of the conflict would be in july of 2011. then there was the administration's approach on don't ask, don't tell. the president announced his determination to repeal this policy during his campaign before the military had time to study whether this change in policy was in the best interest of combat readiness, before senior enlisted staff and noncommissioned officers of the military had testified and before those who are currently serving had told us whether in their expert opinion the policy should be repealed. moreover, when the commandant of the marine corps suggested the change would harm unit cohesion, he was promptly ignored. the administration has taken the same cart before the horse approach on the treaty before us. in this case the president came to office, the long-term plan to reduce the nation's arsenal of nuclear weapons and their role in our national security policy. the plan envisioned a quick

agreement to replace the start treaty that was allowed to expire with no bridging amendment for arms inspections followed by efforts to strengthen international commitments to a nonproliferation treaty. reconsideration of the comprehensive test ban treaty and further reductions of nuclear arms over time. and he spoke of ultimately reducing nuclear weapons to global zero. in other words, the new start treaty was just a first step and it needed to be done quickly. leave aside for a moment the fact that the new start treaty does nothing to significantly reduce the russian federation's stockpile of strategic arms, ignores the thoufs tactical weapons in the russian arsenal and contains an important concession linking missile defense to strategic arms. we had to rush this treaty, according to the logic of the administration because it had become an important component in the effort to reset the bilateral relationship with the russian federation.

it was brought up for debate prematurely because it was the first step in a predetermined arms control agenda. the senate's constitutional role of advice and consent became an inconvenient impediment. the debate overt mccain amendment to strike the language in the preamble of the treaty was instructive. the language in the preamble concerning missile defense is harmful to our foreign policy because of how it will be viewed not by our president, but how it will be viewed by our allies in europe and by the russians. the result government opposed the bush administration's plan to place ten silo-based missiles in poland and a fixed radar installation in the czech republic. although the bush administration reached agreement with the government of our two allies and proposed ballistic missile defense posed no threat to russia's overwhelming ability to strike europe and the urpbgs russia sought to coerce our

eastern european allies. the mccain amendment would have removed any strategic ambiguity that the russian federation will exploit to intimidate nato members. many of our nato partners have been slow to accept the concept of territorial missile defense and rest assured that they will be slower to fund the program. it is certainly -- it is a certainty that if the language in the preamble survives and this treaty is ratified, the russians will mount a campaign to obstruct missile defense in europe. there is no good argument for having voted against the mccain amendment which would have significantly improved this treaty. the principal argument raised against the mccain amendment was that any amendment to the treaty would result in a state department having to return to negotiation with the russian federation. that may be true, or the amended treaty could be considered by the russian duma. in either case the argument

brings into question the senate's role in providing advice and consent to ratification. if it is the position of the majority that the treaty cannot be amended, as the senate was untaoeubl amend so -- unable to amend so many other matters before us these last weeks of this session why have any debate at all? this leads to the subject of verification, the second matter of serious concern. although the senate will meet today in closed session to discuss the flawed nature of the verification procedures envisioned by the new start treaty, the majority has filed cloture and stated that the treaty cannot be amended. the senior senator from missouri, the vice chairman of the intelligence committee, has provided his views to the senate on this matter, and i joan him in his concerns -- i join him in his concerns. senator bond has provided a classified assessment of the details related to verification and chances of breaksout of the

treaty's warhead limits which is available for all senators to review. to quote the vice chairman of the intelligence committee, "i have reviewed the key intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and heard from our intelligence professionals. there is no doubt in my mind that the united states cannot reliably verify the treaty 1,500 limit on deployed warheads. i agree with the conclusion that the new start treaty central warhead limit of 1,550 cannot be conclusively verified. the new start treaty allows the russians to deploy missiles without a standard or uniform number of warheads. the limited number of warhead inspections provided under this treaty also limits the access of our inspectors to an upper limit of 3% of the russian force. it can be said this treaty places higher confidence and trust -- in trust than on

verification. compounding these concerns is the history of russian treatyy violations. as the state department's recent report son arms control compliance make clear, the russians repeatedly violated provisions of the start treaty, the chemical weapons convention, the conventional forces in europe treaty and the biological weapons convention. this is not a track record to be rewarded with greater trust. it's a reason to take our verification duties even more seriously. despite my opposition to this treaty, i hope the president remains committed to modernizing the nuclear triad. the war on terror required an expansion of our nation's ground forces, the marine corps, the army and our special operations forces and our near-term readiness. as we continue the effort to dismantle, defeat and disrupt al qaeda, we must also plan for the threats that our country will face in the coming decades.

we must invest not only in the delivery systems and platforms that will preserve our nuclear delivery capability, such as the next-generation bomber, nuclear submarines, and a new intercontinental ballistic missile, but also in the strike aircraft and navy forces required to control the pacific rim as economic growth and the military capabilities of china increase. although the president decided there is value in pursuing a disarmament agenda, this country may determine in the coming years to place a greater reliance upon the role of strategic arms and we must remain committed to defense modernization. our nation faces many challenges in the coming decadesme economic, some strategic. it would seem shortsighted to think that as north korea, iran, and others work to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities we could draw our arsenal down to zero. so i will oppose this treaty. i thank the chairman and ranking

members of the foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence for the service that they provided the senate in reviewing it. it's unfortunate that something as important as the senate's consideration of a treaty like this one was truncated in order to meet another ash terror deadline or the wish -- ash tear deadline or the wish list of the liberal base. and it is also unfortunate that we would be deprived of this role. as debate over this treaty has intensified over the past few day, these and other concerns have become increasingly apparent to a number of senators and to the american people. we should wait until every one of them is addressed. our top concern should be the safety and security of our nation, not some politician's desire to declare a political victory and host a press conference before the 1st of

the year. americans have had enough of artificial deadlines set by politicians for attention. they want us to focus on their concerns, not ours, never more so than on matters of national security. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate will proceed to executive session to resume consideration of the following treaty which the clerk will report. the clerk: treaty, calendar number 7, treaty with russia on measures for full reduction and limitation of strategic defensive arms. the presiding officer: the snoer fro--the senator from mas. mr. kerry: thank you, mr. president. i'm delighted to be able to say a few word words in response toe minority leader. he and i came to the united states senate together, in the same class, and i appreciate the

difficulties of his job and certainly the difficulties of corralling any number of the different personalities. the same is true for the majority leader. these are tough jobs. but i would say to my friend from kentucky that just because you say something doesn't make it true. and our friends on the other side of the aisle seem to have a habit of repeating things that have been completely refuted by every fact that there is. our old friend, patrick moynihan, used to remind all of us in the united states senate and in the country that everybody is entitled to their own opinion, but they are not entitled to their own facts. john adams made that famous statement that facts are stubborn things, and facts are

stubborn things. the facts are that this treaty is not being rushed. this treaty was delayed at the request of republicans. this treaty was delayed 13 times separately by senator lugar to respect their desire to have more time to deal with the modernization issue, which the administration has completely, totally thoroughly dealt with in good faith. i'd like to know where the good faith comes from on the other side occasionally. they put extra money in. they sat and negotiated. they sent people to arizona to brief senator kyl personally. for weeks we delayed the process of moving forward on this treaty in order to accommodate our friends on the other side of the aisle. and now, fully accommodated,

with their requests entirely met, they come back and say, oh, it's being rushed. well, mr. president, today marks our sixth day of debate on the new start treaty. that's a fact. six days of debate on the new start treaty. now, they'll come to the floor and say, well, we had an intervening vote here, an intervening vote there. sure, mr. president, that's the way the united states senate works. and that's the way it worked when they passed the first start treaty in five days. we're now spending more time on this treaty than we did on a far more complicated treaty, at a far more complicated time. the fact is that if we go through today, which we will, on this treaty -- and depending on what happens with cloture and when the other side decides they want to vote, we can be here for nine days on this treaty, which is more time than we would have spent on the start treaty, start

ii treaty, and the moscow treaty. the time it took other senates to deal with three treaties, these folks are complaining about for the time to take one treaty. and it's going to be more time. it's astounding to me, and i hope people in the country will see through it. when the leader comes to the floor and says that our national security is being driven by politics, we really need to step back for a moment and calm down and think about what's at stake. this treaty is in front of the united states senate, not because of some political schedule; it's because the republicans asked us to delay it. we wanted to hold this vote before the election. and what was the argument then by our friends on the other side of the aisle? oh, no, please don't do that. that'll politicize the treaty. and so, in order to not politicize the treaty, we made a decision on our side to accommodate their interests.

having accommodated their interests, they now come back and turn around and say, oh, you guys are terrible. you're bringing this treaty up at the last minute. i mean, is there no shame ever with respect to the arguments that are made sometimes on the floor of the united states senate? is the idea always, just say it, just say it, say it enough. go out there and trapt and somewhere it'll stick, maybe in the right-wing blogosphere or somewhere else, people get agitated enough and believe somehow that this is being jammed. this treaty is on the floor for the sixth day. it's a simple add-on treaty to everything that has gone before over all the years of arms control. and it's a simple add-on treaty and extension of the start i treaty. this is not a new principle. it's not complicated. it's particularly not complicated, mr. president, when the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the director of

national intelligence, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, every prior republican secretary of state all say, ratify this treaty, rat nigh it now, we need it now. -- ratify it now. we need it now. seriously, i scratch my head. the place where we have arrived at, where the national security interests of our country are going to get wrapped up in ideology and politics and all of the things that have commanded everybody's attention over the course of the last couple of years. we did have an election a few months ago -- a few weeks ago. it has been much referred to by our colleagues. and it did signal the need to do some things differently. one of the things it signaled to do differently is something like the start treaty, where the

american people expect us to come to the floor and do the nation's business, particularly the business of keeping america safer. we've had an excellent debate so far. the two amendments that were proposed were rejected overwhelmingly, 60-30, i think, was the last one. we had a number of people that were absent. but 60-30 is a pretty pronounced statement by the united states senate. it seems to me the senator from kentucky just seder the major argument -- the senator from kentucky just said the major argument for not approving one of those amendments is that it would require us to go back and renegotiate. no -- no, mr. leader, that's not the major argument. that's an argument that underscores the major argument. the major argument is, the language has no meaning. the language doesn't affect missile defense.

the major argument are the fac facts, the substance, the substance of which is the preamble language has no impact whatsoever on what we're going to do with respect to missile defense, and everybody who has anything to do with missile defense in this administration has said that. that's the major argument. in addition to which the major argument is also that henry kissinger and donald rumsfeld and secretary gates have all said that that language that has no legal impact is just an expression of a truism, the reality that offense and defense have a relationship. i mean, are we not capable in the united states senate of ov overlooking nonbinding, nonlegal, nonimpacting language that acknowledges a simple truth about the relationship of

offense and defense in the nature of arms control? that's all it does. that's the major argument. it just happens that, in addition to having no impact on our defense and no impact legally and no impact that is binding, in addition to that, it also requires going back to the russians and regorkting the treaty -- and renegotiating the treaty. and as we'll show in the classified session today, there are a lot of reasons why that doesn't make sense from the security interests of the united states of america. so, you know, it's not that we shouldn't do our job of advice and consent, but our job of advice and consent requires us to process the facts. it requires us to think seriously about what those facts are and how they impact this treaty. and if the senate does it job of thinking seriously about this treaty, it will separate out language that has no impact and no meaning whatsoever on our

national missile defense plans or on the treaty itself. now, i don't know how the president could make it more clear than in the letter that he wrote to the united states -- to the leadership in which he said, as clearly as possible, "the united states did not and does not agree with the russian statement. we believe the continued development and deployment of u.s. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the russian federation. regardless of russia's actions in this regard, as long as i am president" -- president obama said -- "as long as the congress provides the necessary funding, the united states will continue to develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the united states, our deployed forces, and our allies and our partners." i don't know how, mr. president, you can make it more clear than that. those are the facts. those are the facts.

it is my understanding that today the joint chiefs will all be submitting an additional statement for the record here to make it clear that it is their view that this treaty has absolutely no negative impact whatsoever on our missile defense and that they believe it is entirely verifiable, and they want to see it ratified. so the issue of advice and consent here is whether we're going to follow the advice of those that we look to on military matters, on defense intelligence matters, on security matters, those state statespeople who have argued these treaties and negotiated these treaties through the years. the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the joint chiefs, the commander of the u.s. strategic command -- this is secretary gates speaking -- "and i assess that russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant

cheating or breakout under the new start." "our analysis of the n.i.e. and the potential for russia cheating or breakout confirms the treaty's verification regime is effective." so, mr. president, i hope that facts will control this debate, that the security interests of our country will control this debate, that those who have created this record for the united states senate to weigh -- we have been on this treaty for a year and a half, not just for six days. 60 members of the united states senate -- armed services committee, foreign relations committee, national intelligence committee, the national security working group, which i cochair with senator kyl -- have all met and considered this treaty. some people have gone to geneva to actually meet with the negotiators. the negotiators have met with us here before the treaty was even

signed, we were weighing in on this trevment and we've considered it in over 21 hearings and meeting over the last course of months. this is not six days. let's not kid the american people. this is not six days. three other treaties, one of which had no verification at all. that treaty received a 95-0 vote. the american people voted for us to stop the politics. they voted for us to act like adults and do the business of this country, and i believe voting on this treaty in these next hours and days is our opportunity to live up to the hopes of the american people. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from indiana. mr. lugar: mr. president, a great deal of our day will be spent on discussing the verification regime of the new

start treaty. a part of that will be in closed session. but i want to initiate additional debate this morning on the new start verification regime. the important point is that today we have zero on the ground verification capability for russian strategic forces given that start 1-expired more than a year ago. opponents of new start's verification regime emphasized a peculiar argument, in my judgment. on the one hand we're told we don't need new start because it's a cold war relic and modern aptproefps arms control should be -- approaches should be sought. on the other hand opponents lament the start i verification

regime. i would ask my colleagues which one should it be? should we prefer modernized verification for a post cold war that reflects the lack of an arms race and our military's desire for a flexible force structure? or should we resort back to cold war verification? mr. president, the fact of the matter is that president bush's moscow treaty approved by a vote of 95-0, as the chairman just mentioned, contained no verification whatsoever. some would cite this as a modern approach to arms control; failed to mention that the moscow treaty explicitly relied on start i's verification regime. as i noted start i expired more than a year ago. i would point out parenthetically, mr. president, that at numerous hearings of the

senate foreign relations committee, those who extolled the virtues of the moscow treaty, as i pointed out, ratified 95-0, indicated we were in a new day. when we asked in that particular context how about verification, they said there's already verification under start i. we pointed out even then it would expire in december of 2009. but it was fully anticipated by those advocating the moscow treaty that we would have another start regime by that point or that verification apparently would not be needed at all. some senators say we could have just extended start i and kept the moscow treaty in place. this again overlooks the fact that our military in particular disliked aspects of start i and advocated for a more flexible approach in start ii or the new

start. under start, the united states conducted inspections of weapons, their facilities, their delivery vehicles and warheads in russia, kazakhstan, ukraine and byelarus and these inspections fulfill a crucial national security interest by greatly reducing the possibility wee. we would be surprised by future advancement in russian weapons technology or deployment. only through ratification of the new start will united states technicians return to russia to resume verification. new start verification should not be evaluated by cold war standards. during the cold war, we wanted to constrain the arms race and kpwaouf stability by encouraging -- improve stability by encouraging a shift away from icbms with multiple warheads. neither of these objectives remain today. start was negotiated at a time when the former soviet union had

more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on more than 6,000 missiles and bombers, most of them targeted against united states and our allies. under new start, the united states and russia each would deploy no more than 1,550 warheads for strategic deterrence. seven years from entry into force, the russian federation is likely to have only about 350 deployed missiles. this smaller number of strategic nuclear systems will be deployed at fewer bases, as has been pointed out earlier in the debates. while we inspected 70 facilities under start, many of these have now been shut down in recent years. under new start, we'll be inspecting only 35 russian facilities. it is likely that russia will close down even more bases over the life of the treaty.

both sides agreed at the outset that each would be free structure its forces as it sees fit. a view consistent with that of the bush administration. as a practical economic matter, conditions in russia preclude the massive restructuring of the strategic forces. for the united states, the new start treaty will allow for flexible modernization and operation of u.s. strategic forces while facilitating transparency regarding the development and the deployment of russian strategic forces. the treaty protocol and annexes contain a detailed set of rules and procedures for verification of the new start treaty. many of them drawn from start i. negotiators took the experience of on-site inspections that was well honed during start i and tailored it to the new circumstances of today. the inspection regime contained

in new start is designed to provide each party confidence that the other is upholding its obligations while also being simpler and safer for the inspectors to implement, less operationally disruptive for our strategic forces, less costly than the start regime. secretary gates recently wrote to congress that -- and i quote -- "the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the joint chiefs of the commander u.s. strategic command, and i assess that russia will not be able to achieve military significant -- militarily significant breakout under new start due to both new start verification regime and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned u.s. strategic force structure." end of quote. that is a very important

statement, in my judgment, mr. president, that secretary gates with the affirmation of all the above officials of our government say that russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under new start given the verification procedures that we have outlined. predictably, recent verification and compliance reports covering start have chronicled cases where we disagree with russia about start i implementation. yet, despite these issues, neither party violated start one's central limits. we should not expect new start will eliminate friction, but the treaty will provide a means to deal with such issues constructively as under start i. the resolution of ratification approved by the foreign relations committee of the

senate requires further assurances by conditioning ratification on presidential certification prior to the treaty's entry and force of our ability to monitor russian compliance and on immediate consultations, so a russian breakout from the treaty will be detected. for the first time in any strategic arms control treaty, a condition requires a plan for a new start monitoring. some have assert that had there are too few inspections in new start. the treaty does provide for fewer inspections compared to start i, but this is because fewer facilities will require inspection under new start. start i covered 70 facilities in four soviet successor states, whereas new start only applies to russia and its 35 facilities. therefore, we need fewer inspectors to achieve a

comparable level of oversight. new startles maintains the same -- new start also maintains on-site inspections. end of quote. that's start i. namely ten per year. baseline inspections that were phased out in new start are no longer needed because we have 15 years of start i treaty implementation and data on which to rely. if new start is not ratified for a lengthy period, the efficacy of our baseline data would eventually deteriorate. new start includes the innovation that unique identifier as -- quote -- "u.i.d.'s" be affixed to all russian missiles and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. u.i.d.'s were applied only to russian rogue mobile missiles in start i. regular exchanges of u.i.d. taeu at that will provide -- data

will provide confidence and transparency of the location of 700 deployed missiles, even when they are on nondeployed status, something that start i did not do. the new start treaty also codified and continues important verification enhancements related to warhead loading on russian icbms and slbms. these enhancements allow for greater transparency in confirming the number of warheads on each missile. under start i and the i.m.f. treaty the united states maintains a continuous on-site presence of up to 30 technicians. they conduct phopb to, final spweuf russian cohesion systems using solid rocket motors. while this portal monitoring is not continued under new start, the decision to phase out this arrangement was made by the bush

administration in anticipation of start i expiration. with vaster lower rates of russian missile production, continuous monitoring is not crucial as it was during the cold war of asbm's during the cold war. the moscow treaty's verification shortcomings were dismissed during debate in the senate in 2003 because we were told there would be time to fix them before start 1 expired, something we failed to achieve. so, mr. president, the only binding treaty regime of any kind in place is the moscow treaty which itself will desire in december 2012. the moscow treaty contains no counting rules and no verification. mr. president, to illustrate the benefits of new start compared to the moscow treaty, we will have data on the number by type

of the deployed, fixed land-based icbms and slbms and their launchers. this is not in the moscow treaty. secondly, we will have data on the number by type if they exist of deployed and nondeployed rogue mobile and rail -- road mobile and rail mogul icbms and their launchers and the production of icbms. this too is not in the moscow treaty. we will know thanks to new start, preinspection procedures, the actual number of warheads in place on each icbm or slbm subject to the inspection. the warhead inspection portion of a new start inspection on a deployed missile is used to confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the actual number of warheads in place on a designated deployed icbm or slbm. this is not in the moscow treaty. and we will now have data and inspections for the number of

warheads and icbms and slbms. for the first time we will have identification and tracking of all nondeployed russian missiles, not just the road mobile missiles, a unique verification it system under new start. we will have declarations, notifications and inspections on the aggregate number of deployed missiles. we will have data on the technical parameters for ballistic missiles through technical exhibitions inspections for missiles. and we will have data on the number by type of deployed heavy bombers, both those that are equipped for nuclear-capable weapons and those that are not. and the number by type of formerly nuclear capable heavy bombers, training aircraft and heavy bombers, conventional munitions that no longer carry

nuclear munitions. we will have data communications on delivery vehicles. we will have tracking, notification and inspection of the production of icbms for mobile launcher device icbms to confirm the number of icbms for mobile launchers of icbms produced. and we will have data and inspections on the elimination of declared facilities. mr. president, the bottom line is that every senator should ponder today that we have zero on-the-ground verification capability for russian strategic forces, given the fact that start i expired on december 5, 2009. those who wish to reject this treaty and rely on the moscow treaty enjoy the same result: zero verification -- because the moscow treaty contained none.

mr. president, i appreciate that we've had vigorous debate not only on the verification procedures but likely upon missile defense and for that matter the entire negotiation of the treaty. but i would say that, in my judgment, it is very important, given the outline that i've explained this morning, no verification -- none anticipated until we pass the new start treaty -- unless there are those -- and there have been throughout the history of these debates -- who simply do not like treaties with the russians, who would prefer no treaty, who anticipate that someday perfection may come and some negotiation will take place that is purely not in sight if rejection of this twret to be recorded. i believe it's imperative for our national defense and our national security, mr. preside

mr. president. that is a personal judgment. it is one that i strongly advocate. this is why i believe the progress on the new start fret is extremely important for the national security of our country. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from oklahoma. mr. inhofe: mr. president, procedurally, we have two amendments right now that are pending, my amendment number 4833 and the thune amendment number 4841. mine is concerning verification. his is concerning delivery systems. we will have, it is my understanding, up until 1:30 when we go into closed session, to debate these. it would be my hope that members who want to debate would confine their debate just to these two amendments because if they don't and if we let the time get beyond us, there won't be as many people -- the people won't be heard on these amendments. ei know that the senator from north dakota wants to speak, and i would just encourage anyone wanting to speak on the treaty, other than these two amendments,

defer to those who want to speak on these amendments. i ask now a unanimous consent that -- i ask not a unanimous consent request. it is just something that i think is the appropriate thing to do. these are very significant amendments, both of them. i would comment also that -- and a good way to do that, if someone wants to talk about the treaty other than these two amendments and there is somebody that wants to talk about the amendment, i would hope that they would defer to who wants to talk about these two amendments. leat me that i can a comment about thabout the comments of te senator from massachusetts. when you talk that we have been on this treaty for years and months and all that. i would remind him, i am in a unique situation because i am on both the armed services and foreign relations committee. we have had a lot of hearings. in the foreign relations committee we've had 16 hearings, a total of 30 witnesses. of the 30 witnesses, 28 were in

favor of the treaty, two were opposed to the treaty. what we attempted to do is to get a broader exposure to this very significant treaty, this issue, and i think that for that reason we do need to take more time because we've only heard one side. then, on the other thing, the idea stated that this is just an add-on from the other treaty. let's keep in mind when the start i treaty came up, that was between two superpowers. the ussr and the united states. and that's not the scene today. one of the problems i have with this treaty is it is a treaty between the united states and russia. when -- this is not really whe where, in my opinion, where the threat s the threat is with iran. the threat is with north korea. every time we get an assessment on north korea, we're wrong. they have more than we believe they have. our intelligence will confirm that we have.

then we're put in a position where we know that they're trading with countries like iran. and iran right now has -- is in a position to, according to our intelligence, not even classified, they would have a delivery system with a nuclear warhead by 2015. so there's where we -- the issue of missile defense comes in. and i know that the argument we've gone back and forth on this thing -- an missile defense. i would still say this: that when you have the russian foreign minister lavrov saying we have not yet agreed on the missile defense issue and we're trying to confirm how the agreement reached by the two presidents correlate with the actions taken unilaterally by washington and added that the obama administration had not coordinated its missile defense plans with russia. and when you have one of the -- very opening day on april 8 in prague, the russians saying that the treaty can operate and be

viable only if the united states of america refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively and qualitatively. now, we can sit around and say, you know, that this isn't going to affect that. but, nonetheless, that's on record. that's down there. so we have some russians who really believe that. that's not on my amendment. i just wanted to comment that there's a reason for take the time here, and i'm not going to get into the debate as to whether or not we should have done it before the election or after the election. i will say this: a lot of the things have come up in this lame-duck have come up because the chances of getting these things through are greater than they would be after eight or nine new senators come n but the fact is, these eight or nine new senators have all joined in a letter asking us -- asking us in here, could you refrain from ratifying this very significant treaty until we have a chance to look at it because we're the ones, we're the new -- the senate coming n so anyway, i

think that's a good argument. let me get back to my amendment, 4833, and kind of kick it off here, i know we have a lot of people who want to talk about this amendment. and let me just share my thoughts first. the -- right now there are, under the new start treaty, 180 inspections over ten years. that's 18 a year. versus what we had in the start i, 600 over 15 years. do the math there. it's a drop from 40 inspections a year to 18 inspections a year. in just a minl say why i believe that it's necessary, it would be good to have actually more than we had during start i. the inspections under new start, they inspect to verify the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery systems that have fundamentally changed from those of start i. in start i -- start i required some of the elimination of

sites. so we didn't at that time have to set up a mechanism to look and see if these are actually eliminated because we knew at that time that they were. but now we have no way of knowing whether those sites have been reactivated. we don't know that. in fact, the test is being used under this new start treaty would be to view the debris. the debris that she is that systems were eliminated. well, it could very well be that they could destroy a system, there would be a lot of debris. and there could be three 0 or four more systems that they don't destroy. and they could spread the debris around. it is not a very good test as to what is actually happening. now, under the other -- the second problem i have is that under the new start 24 hours of advance notice is required before an inspection, which is quite a dramatic increase -- under the old start treaty was nine hours advance notice. and i think if you walk into this and assume the russians

aren't going to cheat, that's fine then. but i'm not willing to do that. because in a minute i'll document the things that they said they would do they have not been doing. so, if anything, i think we should have certainly the -- no longer a warning than under the old start treaty of nine hours. the amendment triples the number of inspections under the new start from the two types of inspections specified under the new start treaty. type 1 and type 2 inspections. type 1 inspections refer to the icbm bases, sandinistan bases, the air bases to confirm -- accurate data on the number of deployed and nondeployed warheads located on icbms, slbms, and heavy bombers. type 2 refers to inspections at formerly declared facilities to

confirm that those facilities are not being used for the purposes inconsistent with the treaty. that would have been inconsistent with staimplet. -- with start i. yot that's what we talked about a minute ago. i don't see that there's any verification in terms that is meaning follow verify on the type 2. but type 1eu7b specks would increase from 10 to 30 a year. type 2 it would increase from 8 to 24. a total of 54 inspections. on july 20, 2010, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy -- that's james miller -- testified before the senate arms services committee -- i was there. he said that russia cheating or break out, as they sometimes say -- a kinder phrase -- under the treaty would have little effect because the u.s.'s second-strike strategy nuclear capability. well, i just disagree with that. i mean, you know, and if this is something where we have people

who agree and disagree, certainly we should fall down on the side of protection for the united states. and i think, as you get to the argument saying that we need -- we don't need as many inspections because we have a smaller number of facilities to inspect or the smaller size of the nuclear arsenal, as in new start, the larger the impact of cheating has on strategic nuclear balance. this is kind after hard thing for people to understand. but increasing the number of type 1 and 2 inspections is critical to the new start verification because the total number of inspections has been dramatically reduced. so by having the facilities reduced means they are much more concerned. let me quote a few of the people that have weighed in on this issue. the former secretary of defense, harold brown, explained -- we're taking about back in 1991. this goes all the way back to 1991 when they were looking into

the future and saying, this is something we think is going to happen. harold brown, who was the secretary of defense at that time, 1991, explained why in this case in his testimony before the senate foreign relations committee on the original start treaty. this was october 23, 1991. "verification will" -- looking into the future, where we're today -- "verification will become even more important as the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases because uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of the total force as occurrence." now is he the only one who believes this? no, because former secretary of arms control, john bowl ton stated just this year may 3, he said "while verification is important in an arms control treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels." that's where we are now, lower

warhead levels. in 1997 brent scowcroft said, "current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively sensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes." now, listen to this. he said, "as force levels go down in the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits, concerns about hidden missiles and the actions of nuclear third parties." yesterday when we were having this debate, i commented -- or acknowledged -- that we -- both the senator from massachusetts and i have been aviators for a number of years. i recalled going across siberia in a flight across the world. he look down there at time zone after time zone after time zone of wilderness. that's not the way it is in our country. that's what brent scowcroft was

saying. that as the force levels go down and the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate to cheating on arms control limits, concerns about hidden missiles and actions of nuclear third parties. and then in may of this year, the senate foreign relations committee, former secretary james baker, summarized the new start verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to congress that the new start verification program does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under start i. this complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past. so i think we have this unanimity of people who believe that as the level comes down, the inspections become more critical. and i think that we also have to

look at the fact -- and i know it's not nice to say and this offends a lot of people -- but russia cheats. every arms control treaty we had with them -- we had a recent thing. i think it was in the summer of this year with the report on foreign country compliance. and this is what our report said. it starts out with the start, it says there are a number of long-standing compliance issues, such as obstruction to u.s. right-to-inspect warheads raised in the start treaty warhead compliance that remain unresolved when the treatyy expires. biological weapon convention. in 2005 the state department concluded that -- quote -- "russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and that it is, its nature and status have not

changed." this was in this report that we had. in the 2010 report, the state department report states this: "russia confidence-building measure declaration since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapon program was terminated." they said the same thing five years later that they said back in 2005. we don't know right now. they were supposed to be eliminating that program, the biological weapons convention. they didn't do it. chemical weapons, in 2005 the state department assessed that -- quote -- "russia is in violation of its chemical weapons convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development facilities. in 2010, the state department again stated that there was an absence of additional information from russia resulting in the united states being unable to ascertain

whether russia has dedeclared all of its chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities and all of its chemical weapons development facilities. all they're saying is now, five years later, after they have been warned in 2005 that they have to do this, that they are in noncompliance, they are still in noncomplains. that's chemical weapons. conventional forces, the report ♪ russia has resulted in no one compliance. a report says according to u.s. officials, the u.s. believes russia moved short-range nuclear tactical warheads to facilities near nato allies as recently as this spring. i think if you look at the record of russia, they don't tell us the truth. they agree to something, then they don't do it. that's why verification, probably it may be the most significant frailty in this new start treaty that needs to be

addressed. for starters, i just want to repeat that we have fewer inspections now under this treaty. the idea that you can determine by the debris that remains after something that was supposed to be destroyed is, to me, it's a nonstarter. the advanced notice, the fact that we now give them advance notice three times as long as we did at one time, and weapons decrease, be i think everybody agrees that we need to have more of the opportunities to inspect. lastly, the fact that russia cheats. now, i would yield the floor at this point. and i don't see anyone around that wants to talk about these two amendments. so i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from north dakota. mr. inhofe: i yield. --

would the senator yield? mr. dorgan: of course. mr. inhofe: i would like to ask the senator since there may be some that would like to come down and talk on these amendments, how long -- the general subject is the missile defense or the treaty, about how long he'll be talking on something other than specifically these two amendments? mr. dorgan: mr. president, i would estimate about 15 to 20 minutes maximum. mr. kerry: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from massachusetts. mr. kerry: mr. president, i spoke yesterday to most of the arguments. i don't think there is a need to go back over most of them. i appreciate the arguments and concerns of the senator from oklahoma. i think i'll let that stand where it was, and we'll see if another senator comes to pick up. i yield the floor. the presiding officer: the senator from north dakota. mr. dorgan: mr. president, this is a very significant and important issue. as i indicated previously, we deal with a lot of issues here in the h united states senate, some less relevant, some more

important. we often treat the serious too lightly and the light too seriously. in this case i think everybody understands that negotiating a treaty with the russians dealing with arms reductions is critically important. that's what this is. i don't think when you talk about nuclear weapons that there are other issues that are similar to it. if, god forbid, before sundown today we learn that a nuclear weapon has been obtained by a terrorist group or a rogue nation and detonated in the middle of a major city on this planet earth, and hundreds of thousands of people are killed, life on earth will change forever. this is a big issue, a very important issue. i just described the horror of a circumstance where a nuclear weapon was detonated in a major city on this planet.

we have 25,000 nuclear weapons that exist on this planet. and question is, are we able to find a way to systematically reduce the number of nuclear weapons and, therefore, reduce the threat of the use of nuclear weapons? while at the same time trying to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations. these days it seems to me the question of the nuclear threat is very different than when previous treaties were negotiated. and the reason for is that is we have found a new enemy on this planet. it's called terrorism. terrorists who are happy to give up their lives as long as they can take the lives of others. that terrorist threat and the threat that a terrorist organization might acquire a nuclear weapon and then very happily detonate that nuclear weapon and kill hundreds of thousands of people, innocent people, that is a very serious

problem. and that's why there is a new urgency to not only arms control and arms reduction negotiations, but to the passage of treatyies that are in fact negotiated. we have successfully negotiated various arms control treaties. i will not go through the list of successes as i did previously. but we have been very successful in reducing the number of nuclear weapons and the number of delivery vehicles, bombers and submarines and intercontinental ballistic missile missiles. we have fields where sunflowers go when missiles once were planted aimed at our country. that is a success, in my judgment. there is just no doubt that what we have done over the years has been successful. and, yet, there remains on this planet some 25,000 nuclear weapons. now, i have listened to this

debate, and i don't believe there is anyone involved in this debate that represents bad faith. i think there is differences of opinion. i believe people who come here and offer amendments believe in their heart that they're pursuing the right strategy. but in some ways it also seems to me to be kind of the three or four stages of denial. that is you take a position, and when that is responded to, then take a second position. i wasn't there -- if i wasn't there, i didn't do it. if i did it, i'm sorry. the stages of detphaoeurl pretty interesting to -- denial are pretty interesting to me. let me go through a few of them. some are very worried in this chamber if we proceeded with start without adequately funding the nuclear weapons complex and funding the necessary investments in our current nuclear weapons stockpile, the investments for modernization, the investments for life

extension programs and so on, if tkwaoe that without add -- if we did that without adequate funding for that, that would be a serious problem. the fact is president obama proposed adequate funding in coordination with those who are raising that question, particularly senator kyl was raising that question a great deal. he and i talked about it a substantial amount because i chair the subcommittee that funds the nuclear weapons complex and the life extension programs and the modernization programs. while most other areas of the federal budget were being trimmed or frozen or held static, we increased, at president obama's request, the nuclear weapons line-item in the budget that deals with modernization and lifetime extension programs and so on. we increased that by nearly 10% in the past fiscal year. and then another 10% in this fiscal year. and then on top of a 10% increase and a 10% increase,

another $4 billion increase thrown on top of all of that. i don't think anyone can credibly suggest there is now a problem with funding. the president kept his promise and then did more than that. two 10% increases taking us to $7.6 billion. and then on top of that, adding another $4 billion in five years. it's hard to find another part of the budget that has been as robustly funded. again, as chairman of the subcommittee that funds this, i believe that we have done what was necessary and much more to satisfy the concerns expressed by those who worried that the funding wouldn't be there. this president said it will be there. he made those proposals with two big increases, and then an even larger third increase. that ought to just lay to rest that subject for good. will our current stockpile be properly maintained with life extension programs and modernization expenditures?

the answer is, yes, it's clearly kwrefplt the funding -- it's clearly yes. the funding has been made available and there ought not be debate about that any longer. now the question of time. some have said, and i heard this morning on television one of my colleagues say, well, this is being rushed through at the end of a session. that's not true. that's an example of what i described previously on the floor of creating a nude tph*u reality and -- creating a new reality and inventing a reality and debating off that new invention. that's not true rushing that through. we have had meeting after meeting after meeting. i'm on the national security working group. all through the negotiation with the russians of this treaty, republicans and democrats on that committee were called to secret session and briefed all along the way to say here's what's going on. the negotiators who say here's where we are, here's what we're doing. we were always kept abreast of all of that.

and so, there's nothing at all that is running away quickly at the end of a session to try to get this done. this is -- in fact, this has been delayed much longer than, in my judgment, i would have preferred. but, nonetheless, we're here. and it seems to me that this ought not be part of the routine business of the congress. this is an arms control treaty, nuclear arms reduction. this ought to be one of those areas that rises well above that which is the normal business in a congress. but there is just no credibility at all to suggest this is being rushed. i can just recall day after day sitting in secret sessions with negotiators telling us along the way, here's what we are doing. they met with republicans and democrats. we met all together in a room in the capitol visitors center and had briefing after briefing after briefing on the national security working group, and it includes most of those in this chamber who have spoken on this

issue. it is not the case that there is somehow members -- there were members of congress uninformed about what was happening. all of us were informed. this administration, i thought, did an exceptional job of coming to us to say we want to keep you advised and informed of what we're doing. it just isn't the case at the end of this session it's being rushed through. it should have been done a few months ago. i wish it had been, but it hasn't been. so, therefore, we find ourselves at this intersection. we shouldn't let anybody believe that this is being pushed and rushed without time to consider. all of us have had ample time over many, many months and over a year before that while the negotiations were taken place to seriously consider and be a part of what this is and what it means for our country. the other issue that's being raised constantly is it will limit our capabilities with respect to missile defense. again, it is just not the case. i understand what people have

been reading in order to make that case, but every living secretary of state from the republican and democratic administrations have come out in favor of this treaty. everyone. the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff has made a very assertive strong statement in support of this treaty. they didn't do that because somehow we are limited on missile defense. in fact, the president has written to us and said that is not what exists with respect to an agreement between us and the russians. it just is not. yesterday it was -- well, this doesn't include tactical weapons. no, it doesn't. we do need to include tactical weapons. i wish it had been part of the moscow treaty. it wasn't. i wish it would be part of this treaty. it wasn't. that doesn't mean we should stop progress on the strategic weapons limitations, a reduction of the number of strategic nuclear weapons. why would you not take the progress in the area of limiting strategic nuclear weapons and

delivery of vehicles -- airplanes, missiles, submarines and so on -- with which those weapons are delivered. why would you not take the progress that exists with respect to limiting strategic weapons? of course we should do that. i don't disagree with those who are worried about tactical weapons. so am i. so is this administration. all of us would have loved to have an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons five or six years ago. but that was not the case. so now we work on this and this provides measurable reductions in the number of nuclear warheads and measurable reductions in the delivery vehicles for those warheads -- bombers, missiles, submarines, and so on. it would be unthinkable, it seems to me, for our country to decide, no, this is not the direction in which weement to move. -- in which we want to move. as indicated earlier, on every occasion when we have debated the issue of arms control and arms reduction, understanding it

is our responsibility it falls on this country, the united states to assume the leadership -- on every occasion when we have debated the issue of trying to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on this planet and reduce the number of delivery vehicles and the threat from nuclear weapons, we've done that exclusive of this new threat which now casts a shadow over everything that we talk about, and that is the threat of terrorism. a new threat in the last decade. terrorists who are very anxious to take their own lives, if they can kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of others. the specter of having a terrorist group acquire a nuclear weapon and detonating that nuclear weapon on this plan eliminate is change life on the planet as we know t and so it is a much more urgent requirement that we finally respond to this by continuing this relentless

march to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and to try to make certain that we keep nuclear weapons out of the hand of terrorists, to reduce the number of rogue nations that would have nuclear weapons. that is our responsibility. it's our leadership responsibility in this country. the signal we send to the world with respect to this vote and others dealing with arms control and arms reductions is unbelievably important. and that's why this vote in this chamber at this point is so urgent. now, i mentioned terrorism, and it is -- it's now a few days before christmas. last christmas we were reminded about terrorists once again. a man got on an airplane with a bomb sewn in his underwear. he was preceded bay man getting on an airplane with a bomb in his shoe. and the list goes on.

perfectly interested in bringing down an entire planeful of people. they were interested -- terrorists were -- in killing several thousand americans on 9/11/2001. but they are even more interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon and killing hundreds of thousands of people somewhere in a major city on this planet. that's why this responsibility, the responsibility to negotiate, continuing to negotiate and negotiate and negotiate treaties that represent our interests -- yes, they have to represent our interests; and this one does. look at the list of people who support this treaty. i've brought out before charts that show all of the republicans and democrats, the folks who have worked on these things for so long -- secretaries of state and military leaders and former presidents. it is -- it is our responsibility to make progress here. and i -- frankly, aim -- as i said, i don't suggest there's bad faith on the part of anybody who stood up with their opinion.

that's not my susmghts i think people of this chamber are people of good faith. but it seems to me that some have not yet understood the increasing urgency now to address this issue. this issue is in our national interest. this issue with the russians, this treaty with the russians was negotiated very, very carefully representing our national interests. yergs on verification -- yes, on verification representing our national interests. it represents our interests in every other way -- missile defense -- we didn't give up anything with respect to missile defense. and so as i hear some of my colleagues come to the floor very concerned about these issues, all of them -- all of them -- are responded to easily, in my judgment. the money -- we're spending more money than has ever been spent on the nuclear weapons complex to make sure that our nuclear weapons work.

the previous head of nnsa said "i would have killed for a budget like they now have for the life-extension program and the modernization program." i would have killed for that he said. he was the man who ran the nnsa program under the previous president, president george w. bush. so money is not an issue. clearly that's not the an issue. time -- this is not being pressed into a tiny little corner with an urgent time requirement. this has been delayed and should not have been delayed. but it's sufficiently important to stay here and do this and to hope that the work that's been done on a bipartisan basis in the committee can be supported by the entire senate. let me say that i started earlier -- and i know it's easy to compliment people in this chamber and you don't compliment those with whom you disagree, i suppose. but let me compliment, if i might, senator kerry and senator lugar, because the work they

have done, which is very strongly bipartisan, to bring this treaty to the floor of the senate for ratification is, i think, a representation of the best of the united states senate. it's the way this place really ought to work. searching out, holding hearings and hearings and hearings, the best thinkers on all these issues, to come and give us their advice about these matters. they did that. there's nothing -- nothing that this issue is represented by respect to pushing it into a tight time frame. they have done this the right way, the right kind of hearings, the right kind of consultation, and now we've come to the floor of the senate and said, this is urgent. let's get this done. and so i just wanted to come today. i was driving to work this morning and i was seeing they're building the martin luther king jr. memorial over on the mall.

and i recalled a what he had said once. he said, the means by which we live have outdistanced the ends for which we live. he said, we've learned the secret of the atom and forgotten the sermon on the mount. well, the secret of the atam is something we have recently learned. in more recent years the specter of having more nuclear weapons on this planet and the spectrum of terrorists obtaining one, results in our proceeding to ratify treaties. it is, as i indicated, it is our responsibility. this responsibility for stopping the arms race rests on our shoulders and, yes, we must do it in our national interest, protecting our self as we do. but, in my judgment, this treaty meets every one of those measures and i'm pleased to support it and pleased to be here to say, i hope the rest of my colleagues will look at what senator chirr and lugar have done and come to the floor of the senate with robust support for the what i think is some

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