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>> the highest positions with regard to our foreign policy that their of remedial course, why? well, quite simply, because they have done something terribly reheart attack bl. the u.s -- remarkable. the u.s. armed forces have won some pretty tremendous battles. they've won every single major battle into which they have been sent. and yet our statesmen have managed to lose every single piece that has en-- peace that has ensued from those battles. now, when you lose the peace, you've lost the war. now, losing the war after losing battles is unremarkable, it's

natural, there's nothing to explain. but losing the war after you've won the battle, that's not easy. it takes a we cure y'all -- peculiar kind of talent to do that, and it raises some very important questions. how come? well, the gross answer that our statesmen's mistakes have not been mistakes of detail, they've been mistakes of fundamentals. vince lombardi used to say that the difference between winners and losers is in the blocking and tackling, and so he would room to teach these pros whether it's blocking, tackling ever since they were that high, how to block a tackle.

and this would win championships. neglect of these fundamentals would lead to defeat. i submit to you what has happened in our foreign policy elite that, in fact, they have missed the fundamentals, the foreign policy equivalent of blocking and tackling. now, they are most, this book is, in a sense, quite useless because in high affairs as in low affairs those who are in greatest need of remedial courses are least likely to pay attention to them. this is what happens in most schools, and this is certainly what happens at the highest levels. go and tell condoleezza rice and war christopher -- warren

christopher and people like ha that they're in need of remedial courses, they'll say, i am the great prince andrew. who are you? but, in fact, reality says all of the coherence veils little in the face of the results that they bring forth. consider these results. world war i. this was followed not by woodrow wilson's promise of a kind of universal peace, but rather by greater strife. the versailles settlement has not yet ceased to kill. iraq is, of course, one of the creatures of world war i. ask what is going to happen -- and what is going to happen there is still open to very, very deadly contention.

palestine, the entire middle east was reengineeredded after world -- reengineered after world war i very badly. the warned against and the notion that we should fix the affairs between the hashmites and the wahhabis, this was a trap the united states ought not to get into. but, no, people who assume themselves to be wiser thought that we should somehow become the arbiters of the world. and, indeed, the fact that we were not, we did not become the ash terse of the world -- arbiters of the world became an

item of, by which the, our foreign policy ruling class accused the american people of responsibility for world war ii. some of you may be old enough to remember a movie the title of which was "wilson "about woodrow wilson. the movie was made in 1944, and the heavy was none other than henry cabot lodge. the movie was so outrageous that when franklin roosevelt showed it to winston churchill, winston churchill walked out in a rage. [laughter] but the point of it was what every school child in america has learned, namely that the american people were unfaithful to their great leaders, woodrow

wilson, and that really started world war ii quite as much as, i said, adolf hitler. well, this, of course, was nonsense. worldworld war ii, it was certay necessary for frank lin roosevelt to -- franklin roosevelt to support stalin in 1941, but it was most certainly foolish for him to maintain that support after the battles of stalin grad and coursing in 1943. after those battles had changed the equation of power in the world. this led, of course, not to the peace that america's arms had won, but rather to half a century of very, very dangerous cold war. thereafter, you're all familiar with the surplus of power that the united states brought against the soviet union,

against the, against communist portions in the vietnam and how that surplus of power was translated to loss after loss. how come? well, because of a whole variety of ideas in which the, in which all of the schools of foreign policy establishment occurred. it purports to be divided into three international school, nationalists, realists and neoconservatives. in fact, these schools have far more in common than they have that divides them. quite simply, they all assume that the rest of the world is ready, willing and, indeed, eager to become just like they

are. the liberal internationalists believe that the rest of of the world ready to embrace development and to modernize, and so all that we have to do is give them help for modernization, and they will become just like us. the neoconservatives believe that the thirst, the people's thirst for democracy will lead them to become just like we are. or at least a lot her like we are -- a lot more like we are. while the realists believe that the ruling passion in the world is one for moderation. and that the realization of concrete interests, realization that all interests are ultimately compatible will lead everyone, really, to cooperate with us. well, all of this is really not true because it neglects the

individuality of foreign nations, the fact that foreigners really are foreign, that they really rule themselves, and they have their own ideas about their own interests. and that it is impossible for outsiders to shake those ideas. those ideas are theirs, and they will develop them as they wish. nothing we can do will change that. the best that we could do would be to take careful our own interests. but yet another thing that our realists, neoconservatives and liberal internationalists are united about is that, in fact, the world has common interests. we have, that, in fact, all of our interests are commensurable, all of our cultures are commensurable. prens concern parenthesis.

by the way, this is not only nonsense by itself, but it is contradicted by the way our foreign policy elites, indeed what i call our ruling class actually behaves. they will say that they recognize all other cultures as inherently e equal, but, of course, when they come in contact with american culture, the culture of most americans, they don't regard that as equal, you see. indeed, they have nothing but contempt for the culture of the average american. that is not a culture that they consider commensurable with their own. well, they do believe that they have a duty to reform the rest of the world. and, indeed, they have a duty to reform the rest of america.

i just had a conversation with, with one of the last president's advisers, former president bush's close advisers, and i asked how he felt about the outcome of the war in iraq. which, by the way -- for which, by the way, the bush administration never had a coherent objective. he said, well, it's true we really meant to improve the quality of that society, he said, but we underestimated how primitive those people really were. it occurred to me, and i told him that not only iraq, but the rest of the world is filled with primitives. primitive of defined as people

unlike the advisers to our presidents. people unlike our foreign policy establishment. and, in fact, i was going to say -- but i didn't have time -- that america itself is filled with people who our ruling class sees as primitive. tea party people, you see, who they would like to reform, but whom they believe are beyond redemption. never the less, they want to reform them. how do they want to reform them? well, these people would never think of themselves as imperialists. no, no, they wouldn't, as the british did, clamp down and tell locals that some of their customs are absolutely unacceptable. by the way, the british banned

wife burning in india, that sort of thing. but our people would never presume to tell muslims that, for example, female circumcision's a bad idea or thing like that. or they would not forcibly reform for societies. well, what then do they want to do? well, they want to build nations, and they want to do it with a minimum of force although they're certainly willing to use some force. a minimum of force. not war, the dictionary meaning of the term. a minimum of force and a maximum of hectoring, a maximum of rhetoric. now, theodore roosevelt who was not like these folks called this kind of thing peace with insult. the worst of all policies.

it doesn't result in anything other than making enemies. but foreign policy officers don't understand that. they don't understand that because they have wrapped what they do in a, in a cloak of language that appears to make impossible things possible. for example, they speak of an international community as if the such a thing existed. of course, the bed rock, the foundation of international life is something called sovereignty. sovereignty which means that every government is inherently unquestionable about its own internal practices. goes back to the tree te of -- treaty of westphalia of 1648.

and that it is the sole judge of what it is owed and owes. and that it is, and, therefore, every government reflects it own ethos and the ethos of its own people, its own purposes, the purposes of its people and that these purposes often clash. what happens when these purposes clash? well, you read any of the classics on these matters, and you quickly come to the realization that, yes, war is the arbiter of major human differences. but that is not what our foreign policy establishment believes,

that war meaning killing on a massive scale so as to destroy the enemy's capacity to resist, they don't believe there's such a thing really accomplished anything. the only thing that really does accomplish changes in antagonists is, well, what is it? nation building. what is that? well, again, that involves perhaps a little pit of force and an -- bit of force and an awful lot of bribery. and when that doesn't work, then what do you do? well, then you try some more of it, or you find an exit strategy. what tuz that mean? does that mean? well, it means figuring out how

to get out of it without looking too bad. [laughter] but in reality that simply ends you up with more enemies than you started with, enemies who, by the way, then have developed -- by then have developed contempt for you. which, of course, is highly dangerous. now, this language warps, this language of our foreign policy establishment warps their understanding of the tools of international affairs. for example, take the term "soft power." well, we all know -- those of us who read and those of us who lead real lives -- that this ths such a thing out there as

prestige and that prestige counts for a lot. your reputation precedes you very often. and very often you don't, if your prestige is of a certain potency, you don't even have to do anything to get your way. your prestige goes before you. genghis khan, for example, his forces would ride into european towns, and people would offer their necks to be decapitated because they knew that if they didn't do that, they would certainly be tortured to death. that was genghis khan's reputation. and so people said, look, if you're going to kill us, please, kill us this way. what do people do nowadayses when confronted by american

diplomats? why, they most certainly don't say, well, we'll give you whatever you want. rather, they say, well, what can you give to us? what can you give to us in exchange for us not bothering you too badly? and if american troops come in, well, they know they don't have to fear the kind of campaign that genghis khan would run against his enemies, and they know they can take pot shots at them in relative safety. so reputation really does matter, but the concept of soft power doesn't reach that. the concept of soft power which you may read about in full detail in joseph nye's book by

that name boils down to this: that being perceived as being nice actually moves people to do what you want. thousand, we all know that -- now, we all know that this isn't true, but yet this is how, this is what is being taught in our schools, and this is, in fact, reflection of thought at the highest levels in washington. being nice moves people to do what you want. thus, joseph nye calls europe, quote, the superpower of soft power. if you show yourself sufficiently harmless, people will do what it is you want. oh, and by the way, if someone on the other side shows themself to be terribly frightening and harmful, why, people will simply turn away from him.

that is what the ideology says. i submit to you that reality says quite something else. the rights of people being moved by honor, fear and interest. that is not what joseph finish ye talked -- nye talks about. interest, by the way, is the least of these powers. honor is the, is the second most powerful because it does lead people to sacrifice their lives for the right wrongs, to avenge themselves, to do the right thing. but the fear is often the most powerful moving factors. it takes an awful lot to

overcome fear as hobbs has pointed out to us and as all of us know. and to -- few things can overcome fear. one of them, of course, is fear of god. now, i hate to keep on harping on joseph nye, but joseph nye really is -- teaches at harvard -- he's very much a representative of our foreign policy class. you can read joseph nye's book on soft power and not read one word about what pope john paul ii did in poland and his role in the fall of the soviet empire. john paul, because of john paul you had a million people in the central square at warsaw chanting, we want god. we want god.

you can imagine the feelings of the, of poland's communist elite holed up in their offices above the square watching a million people yelling, "we want god," and fearing that the pope might just say something that would leave them to go get their, their atheist tormentors. but he doesn't recognize that. nye doesn't recognize that, and nye does not recognize, does not take seriously that a certain politicized belief in god has led any number of muslims to want to kill americans. and does not recognize the fact that a certain lack of belief in

god prevents the american government from taking those threats, those murders seriously. moving on in regards to diplomacy. the peculiar language of our foreign policy establishment would, would have us believe that this thing called diplomacy exists and exerts power regardless of what it says. that mere contact is she e ductive concern seductive. well, in fact, it is not. words, we all know from our experience, are meaningful not for the harshness or softness of their sound, but for the realities to which they point be.

you can, you can say whatever you like, but if, in fact, you are pointing to key mare as, you have no reason to hope that anyone will believe you. shakespeare's line, i can call up spirits from the vast deep, and the answer to it, why, so can i, but will they answer you? [laughter] will they come? you can, you can promise a foreign government anything you want. you can threaten anything you like. but a sent cent person at the other end will ask themself, what are the chances of that happening? the point of all this came in

the 1960s when the u.s. government invented the concept of a declaratory policy. this concerned nuclear weapons, but it was applied in other realms as well. what is a declaratory policy as opposed to a real policy? and what is the point of a diplomat going to another one and saying, well, this is our declaratory policy. oh? [laughter] the diplomat will say, well, that's nice to hear about that, but now tell me about the real one. and what is the evidence that what you're telling me is for, is for real, that you are, in fact, going to do the things that you say you're going to do

in this or that circumstance? where is the evidence? the words have to be plausible. in a week i point as an example -- in a book i point as an example of goody proposal si the spartan general who, very simply, made offers that the ore side could not -- other side could not refuse. such an offer is defined by asking far less than one is able to compel. the, the person who is asked will be happy to comply with a request which he knows is less than the asker could compel by the force that he has. force in excess of demands is

called solvency. force that is inferior to the demands or demands that are greater than the capacity to enforce them is called bankruptcy. yeah. and bankruptcy is quite as deadly and discrediting in international affairs as it is in finance. then, of course, there is the concept of war itself. what is, what is this thing called war? is it, in fact, is it a reasonable thing to do? the well, it is reasonable only insofar as you plan to make it so. it is reasonable only insofar as the operations that you, that

you design were they to be successful actually bring about the peace that you want to live with. designing operations because of their own feasibility or designing operations because they might be pleasing or to one concern to a domestic constituency or a foreign constituency, designing operations for any other purpose than bringing about one's own preferred peace is, quite literally, senseless. to put it most plainly, you should know whom you are shooting and what good their death would do you. if shooting persons a, b and c will not bring you the peace that you want, then by all means

don't shoot them! yeah. find somebody else to shoot or stay in bed. [laughter] war really must be conceived to bring about peace, otherwise there is to point to it. otherwise there is no end to it. the purpose of all movement, ultimately, is rest. what is the state of at which you are aiming? and will this motion bring you to that rest? these are questions that are not asked by our foreign policy establishment. nor because our foreign policy establishment ask whether, against whom we should secure the home front. security is so terribly important. homeland curt, oh, yes, we know all about that.

every time we go to the airport, we know about homeland security. but against whom are we, are we being secured? well, we're being secured against everybody. that means we're being secured against nobody. deciding against whom to secure yourself is as important as deciding who your enemy in war is. indeed, it is exactly the same thing. precisely the same thing. does this involve profiling? absolutely. you have to decide who it is you're worried about. the, there's a good reason why israelis are not worried about orthodox yews -- jews blowing up their airplanes. and, indeed, it's a good reason for us not to worry about orthodox jews blowing up our airplanes. and generally, it is a good, it would be just as prudent for us not to worry about grandma and

grandpa blowing up our airplanes. but it would be terribly, terribly useful to worry about people from certain countries blowing up our or airplanes or people of a certain religion of peace blowing up our airplanes. or, for that matter, blowing up all sorts of other places. but that is common sense. and common sense is certainly not part of our foreign policy establishment. in, as a substitute for common sense, they would have us use intelligence. now, mrs. paolucci certainly remembers daniel patrick moynihan with whom i worked in the u.s. senate. a man of many flaws but of some intellectual capacity. one of his favorite sayings was intelligence is not to be confused with intelligence. [laughter]

well, we have right now an intelligence community, if you want to call it that, that costs us some $60, $70 billion a year. what do we get for that? what do we get, what kind of intelligence is injected into our foreign affairs by these, by this army of people working in tremendous secrecy? what are they trying to figure out? could they figure it out that, perhaps, saudi arabia is tul of wahhabis? you didn't need 60 or $70 billion to tell you that. did you need to know, did that tell you that 15 out of 19 hijackers on 9/11 were saudis?

no, no, you didn't need it for that either. do you, perhaps, need it o o tell you that every of arab government supports the causes for which 9/11 was perpetrated? no, you don't need it for that either. so what do you need them for? well, you need them to tell you about the whereabouts of minor players in afghanistan. or in iraq. but, gee, why do you need that? suppose you killed all of those minor players. would that bring you peace? would that bring you the peace that you want? the no. so why are you spending all of

of that money, all of that effort for that? let me put in a little parenthesis here. they don't do a very good job of that either. because you, i'm sure, remember that last december 30th a man walked into a meeting of our advanced base, cia pace in pakistan -- base in pakistan. i'm sorry, afghanistan. and blew himself up together with a number of c irk a folks. -- cia folks. that was not the story. that is not what is to be remembered. what is to be remembered and our media has forbe gotten is that that man had been supplying cia with information about all of those little bit players in

afghanistan. and, of course, on the basis of that information it was that these drones carry missiles were being targeted. we had been shooting people, killing people in afghanistan and pakistan on the basis of information supplied to us by someone who, in fact, was working for the other side. had always been working for the other side. how many other such people are there who have managed to hold on to, to their, to their feelings, have not blown themselves up but continue to supply erroneous information? i don't know. but i did work for the senate intelligence committee for eight years, and i can tell you that we do not have any counterintelligence, and i can assure you that intelligence without counterintelligence is considerably worse than useless. considerably worse. and that is what substitutes for

common sense in our, in our foreign policy establishment. all of this leads me back to the beginning of my point, namely that a book that offers a remedial course in state craft to incompetent statesmen is kind of useless. because at least in one sense they are not going to read it. they're not going to study it. they are not going to be brought back to common sense by such a book. of what use is it then? well, this brings us back to isi which aims to put books that teach common sense into the hands of the next generation. and perhaps the next generation will actually look at results and say, you know, what, what

our leaders have done with the vast resources at their command, that has not been good. perhaps we can do better. and perhaps we can look into old ways of doing these things better. and here's a book that, in fact, teaches those old ways, recounts those old ways. proudly, the book begins by saying there's nothing new in here. there's absolutely nothing new in here. the if you read -- [inaudible] he probably said it even better than i did. but here i'll try to say it in modern english, and i hope that you will find it interesting. so thank you. [applause]

>> we have some time for questions, and i'll ask mr. codevilla to repeat your question when he's heard it from you so that everyone can hear the question. >> yes, sir. >> two questions. first, how have your grapes done? [laughter] >> this was an excellent year. [laughter] slow-ripening fall. couldn't have been better. >> very good, thank you. your lecture kind of reminds me of the book i studied from far too many years ago, and it sits on my book shelf, and i can't remember the author and the name of it. seemed like it was politics among nations. >> oh, yes, house watertown. >> there you go. he was a realist and and perhaps you would say machiavellian in his approach to state craft.

but through your theme there i get hints of, perhaps, maybe a degree of isolation in that when you say some problems are insoluble, you can't change character, the difficulty of getting people to comply, also the business of emphasizing a very strong defense and willingness to use it when necessary. is that correct as part of your theme? >> no, sir. >> okay. [laughter] >> the question is did you detect in my presentation a bit of isolationism payoff my statement -- because of my statement that some problems are insoluble and that one ought to, one ought to not imagine that one can imply change the world?

and my answer is, no, that is most certainly not isolationism, nor is it realism in the, in the sense of morgan thaw. first the question of isolationism. hi point is that -- my point is that the one focuses on one's own needs, one's own problems successfully, one will have done one heck of a lot. that does not necessarily mean not involving one's self in the rest of the world. it means doing so when necessary for one's own purposes. it's not a question of isolating one's self, it's a question of focusing on one's own, on one' own needs. for example, let me contrast

theodore roosevelt with woodrow wilson. theodore roosevelt took the panama canal and was very much in favor of the annexation of hawaii and puerto rico for that matter. but he was, he was doing it, he was in favor of those things because he wanted america's outer works to be set and to be as potent as possible. woodrow wilson invaded mexico, invaded several nations in the caribbean, including nicaragua, for the purpose of improving them. vastly different purposes. neither was an isolationist. in fact, isolationism is not a descriptive term, but an epithet

that some throw at others. but it was a matter of a different per e spect bive. perspective. henry cabot lodge was most certainly not an isolationist although he certainly portrayed that. he was very much for a variety of involvements, but he wanted to be involved from the standpoint and for the purpose of the united states of america. as regards hans morgenthau, look a lot of other realists, he believed and wrote that all men are moves by the same motives, and he called his universal motive power. everyone wants to maximize power. well, that ain't necessarily so.

some people are moved by desires other than for power. he does not understand, he does not allow, mar again thaw -- morgenthau at least in his original edition did not allow for diversity of human motives. and yet we know that people do act for very different reasons which happen to be their own. next? yes, sir. >> i remember reading or hearing somewhere not too long ago that back in the 1920s the head of the american communist party said that the american people will never, never vote for socialism, but if you call it liberalism, they'll, they'll buy

it every time. and here we are now after 40 or 50 years of liberalism down in washington given to us by people with those thick resumés that we hear about. and i believe that our current occupant of the white house would be well advised along with his secretary of state to invite you down there and have you give a discussion to those folks. [laughter] because you certainly make a lot of common sense. and the, my question is with regard to the upcoming elections, we see a large tidal wave, tsunami of the tea party-inspired republicans. >> yeah. >> do you think that after november and, of course, after

january and, hopefully, we can -- the republicans can regain control of the senate -- do you see any possibility of any common sense being restored to the american government? >> the question is do i see any possibility that common sense will be stored to the american government by the electoral changes that may be forthcoming. >> [inaudible] >> of course, of course. given -- >> silent majority. >> given that you have a tidal wave of public opinion which is at least as important, probably more important, than any particular electoral result, what are the chances that this will drum some sense into ruling class? be that with regard to foreign

policy or domestic policy. generally, the answer is no. i don't think it would drum any sense into them. it will diminish their power somewhat. and it will most certainly increase their fears, and that may be, that may substitute for common sense. to some extent. but to learn? that takes humility, and i don't think that our ruling class has learned the meaning of the word humility. certainly, they have lost, they have subjected the united states of america to grievous losses domestically as well as internationally. but i don't see any humility in the pages of "the new york times". i don't see any humility this journal of foreign affairs. i don't see any openness to other points of view. or at least very, very little.

the ruling class' reaction, i think, was tip tied by the -- typified by the republican, trent lott, who said, ah, when the newly-elected folks come here, we're going to just co-op them. and can they will try, and they will succeed to some extent, but they will not succeed otherwise. and can, ultimately, to answer your question this election cycle is by no means the end of that tsunami because i believe that something radical has happened to american public opinion in the last two years, three, four years. the bush administration having been as much responsible for it as obama administration. the american people's realization ha we are not led -- that we are not led by the sharpest knives in the drawer. [laughter]

despite their protestations. yes, sir. >> you gave illustrations that kind of pointed to negative performance -- >> yes, sir. >> -- of the state department and/or intelligence department. can you give us any positive? you did mention theodore roosevelt. [laughter] but can you give any positive ones? and is there any other nation in the world today that, as you observe them, they appear to be implementing the positive traits that you say are good foreign policy can have? >> yes. look, i am an unabashed admirer, fan of john quincy adams. i cannot think of an american who embodied prudence, wisdom and an understanding of the peculiar needs of the united states of america as much as john quincy adams.

he was followed by william stewart who worshiped him, and he was followed by other statesmen who did their best to follow him. up to theodore roosevelt. we have had a run of what sewn yangs including george w. bush. i cannot think of a more succinct negation of the founders' view of foreign policy, of a more succinct negation than george bush's statement in his 2005 inaugural that america will not be free until the rest of of the world is free. meaning we ain't never gonna be free. as for, as for effective foreign policy in our time, i think you

have to look at china. consider their vast internal problems. i wouldn't want to be the chinese leadership right now. they are sitting on top of a simmering volcano. how that's going to develop, no one can say. but sitting as they are, they are playing their hand this east asia -- in this east asia as competently as any geopolitician who come os to mind, one of my teachers. as any geopolitician would want. namely, strengthening military control over, over the periphery

while conducting a masterly diplomacy with regard to both the united states and japan. and meanwhile, intimidating the lesser powers in a very subtle game in korea. we're -- if you want to look at machiavelli, effective machiavellian diplomacy in our time, look to china. >> time for one more question. >> yes, ma'am. >> i need to fill a gap in my education here. you seem to indicate an american involvement in the problems in palestine many years ago. i thought it had been chiefly the british who were handling that or settling it with the

balfor -- could you tell me, please, what was the american involvement? >> i apologize if i gave you the wrong impression. what i said was that henry cabot lodge warned against our involvement in that, in that situation. you are quite correct that it was the british who crafted jordan and present day saudi arabia and really failed to help their clients, the people who, the hash mites who had helped to defeat the turks during the war and let the wahhabis of the neg, the saud family defeat them. which made necessary the establishment of jordan and of iraq. but, no, this was a british,

certainly a british thing. and, of course, the balfor declaration and the failure to support that, again, we are not the only power that has practiced feckless diplomacy. >> thank you. [applause] >> to find out more about the poaolucci book award, visit isi.org. >> we're here at the national press club's book and author night talking with veteran newsman jack fuller about his new book, "what is happening to news?" tell us, what is happening to news? >> what's happening to news is that the audience is changing fundamentally. and that's as much as anything else reshaping the way we're

getting our news. >> in what way? >> well, there are obvious ways. the attention span shortened, but there are deeper, deeper ways too. not the least of which is the information environment we live in today actually because of its, because of the way our brains are designed, built causes us to be much more drawn to emotional presentations of information. than we were in quieter times. and that's really manifested itself in the way people are trying to communicate with us. with a lot more intensity and often anger and passion and so forth than 15 years ago or 20 years ago, anyone would have thought is appropriate.

>> what are some examples of this phenomenon that you have in the book? >> just the commentators on cable news, for example. that's just one example. it's probably the most, most prominent example, but you can even see it in the rhetoric of written news, particularly commentary which is extremely intense. you certainly, you see it in the, in the internet world in the kinds of things that attract attention and an audience in the internet world are often not sort of neutral, disinterested reports of this or that, but, in fact, are rants about something. why is that? you know, why are intelligent people being drawn to that information? that's what i actually try to answer in the book. >> what do you see as the ultimate outcome for the news industry?

of the current attention span that the audience has? >> well, i think for young journalists it's a little bit scary but an exhilarating time. and the reason is that it's not enough for them to just do a little better than the masters of the craft, of the generation preceding them. they have to completely redo the craft. that's exciting. it's also scary was nobody has a template for how it's to be done. but i actually have confidence of that, that as journalists begin to really understand what's happening out there for the audience they're trying to speak to. and begin using their creativity to get a way to speak to them.

we'll see a renaissance. it'll be different. it'll be a different kind of journalism, it'll look different m some of the old practitioners of my generation will sniff and say this is not right and so forth. but the important thing is journalism that's verified and journalism that puts the message first, that is, decides what's important to say first and then figures out how to say that. not decides what people are going to be interested in first and tells 'em only b that. >> thank you very much for your time. >> booktv is on twitter. follow us for regular updates on our programming and news on nonfiction books and authors. twitter.com/booktv. >> up up next, roger ha