>> i'd like to close the something positive that people can do to oppose this. i'm not writing any letters to congress. if no interest in politely asking them to adjust the position of their boot on my throw. the position of what we the position of what we is doing is we're telling people to opt-out of tsa abuse, is doing is we are telling people to opt-out of tsa abuse, make a choice for yourself and your family say you know, do not fly. it means you're going to have to put up with this. send a clear message to the industry that says no, we will not purchase your services again means we're going going to be abused. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, everybody. ..

more now on tsa security procedures including the constitutionality of body scanners. after that a security expert talks about defending against terrorism with smart intelligence and later a look at the effectiveness of current security. this is 12 hours and 35 minutes. >> those who are watching us on c-span or following the streaming video or the tweets along to you can learn more information about the conference and this topic at epic.org/events/tsa. we also have a trigger - tag which is scantsa. as for our program, we will have one more panel this morning. there will be a break for lunch. there will be a keynote speech next by bruce snyder and then our closing panel today will

look at next steps for the reform, and that is particularly interesting panel. we will have on that panel new york city council member david greenfield who has introduced a bill in the new york city council to simply ban on the airport body scanners in new york. we are also going to be joined by a staff member for congressmen jason shavit which many of you know is the person whose response to the legislation that passed the house in 2009 to prohibit the tsa from making body scanners to the primary screening technique in u.s. airports so we have a brief break between 12:30 and 1:30 we will be backed with a very good presentation by bruce snyder and then closing panel. so if we could get under way please with our third panel.

the biographies are included in the speaker package. they are available on the internet site, but it is a particular pleasure for me to be able to introduce our first speaker for this panel, professor jeffrey rosen from the george washington university law school, school fall. i think among all of the people that have written and talked about the significance of surveillance, the human body and privacy there is probably no person who has written as broadly and as thoughtfully more with a keen insight to a direction to law might take us than professor rose in the coup -- rosen. he is a frequent contributor to "the new york times," did a piece in fact in "the new york

times" magazine after he spent time in london looking at surveillance cameras and several important books. but as i said, this ability to one the one hand understand the broad significance of these types of technologies and the same time, sync how the courts and in particular judges and justices might assess this within our legal framework is all very fortunate to have with us today jeffrey rosen. >> thank you so much, marc, for those kind words. much of what i have learned about the young constitutionality of the body scanners has come from marc and the briefs and work and i am excited to spend a few minutes this morning is leaving the constitutional arguments for and against the body scanners. i have concluded -- was initially uncertain but i conclude that although it is not a knock down case there is a

strong argument the body scanners are a violation of the fourth amendment which protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects in unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic argument is that the body scanners needlessly invade privacy and also they are ineffective. aside from that they're great machines. the fact that could be designed in ways that protect privacy and that they don't work make them constitutionally unreasonable so as to have been discussing this morning it is possible to design body scanners in ways that provide just as much security without invading privacy. and what is remarkable about this is that the government knew this eight years ago. that was the time when officials at orlando international airport began testing the machines at the center of the current national uproar and the designers of the scanners but the specific northwest laboratories offer the government a specific choice

machines were naked machines. either could have the backscatter is designed to reveal naked images of the body or you could scramble the images into a nondescript blog. both were equally effective and identifying contraband and it's remarkable that european authorities that he dalia we did this question all the shows of the machine rather than the naked machine. a handful of european airports that have adopted these technologies such as the airport in amsterdam recognize that given the fact both machines are equally effective every attempt to balance privacy and security would favor the machines over the me get machines. mr. most european airports have declined to adopt the body scanners at all because of concerns about their effectiveness. why did the u.s. government to get different choice based with what seems like to an easy choice but made the wrong one? part of the problem is the u.s. government has never been treated at protecting privacy.

we've lacked effective privacy regulatory agencies such as those in europe which were central in raising concerns about the fact the to backscatter machine and the privacy office fell down on the job in approving these machines without demanding the blog alternative is ignoring the warnings of people like marc rosen rotenberg and epic and this was a needless controversy. all right, what is the relevance of the fact you could have blocked machines rather than make it machines for the constitutional analysis? the supreme court has not evaluate the airport screening technology but here's the broad framework. the supreme court has held that routine searches at the border and at airports such as magnetic machines, regular x-ray machines and also not intrusive pat-down don't require any degree of individualized suspicion. but mom routine searches like body cavity searches and strip

searches do require a degree of individualized suspicion so the basic question which you don't have to be a lawyer to figure out is parties naked machines strip searches or not? if they are and they require a degree of heightened suspicion and if they don't then they don't require it. now there is a little bit more document by the lower court opinions evaluating these machines. there is a ninth circuit ruling from 2007 which emphasizes a particular airport security screening search is constitutionally feasible provided that it's no more extensive and more intensive than necessary in light of current technology to detect the presence of weapons or explosives. that is a case called an earlier california case in the 70's called davis cup and the idea is if you can design a technology in a less intrusive way than it is presumptively unreasonable. and that opinion was reinforced by the 2006 opinion by the u.s. court of appeals for the third

circuit written by samuel alito the nature of this third circuit and now the supreme court. and in this case called hard well, judge alito stressed the procedures have to be both minimally intrusive and also effective. in other words, they have to be tailored to protect personal privacy and they have to deliver on their promise of discovering serious threats. alito upheld an airport check which involved walk through magnetometers, and then an alarm was set off there was a secondary search with hand-held wands and he said airport searches are reasonable is the escalating in fees of as only after a lower level screening discloses a reason to conduct a more probing search. so, you could apply the two tests, the technology has to be minimally intrusive and it has to be effective and see that these naked machines clearly failed both of these tests. they are not merely interested because they could easily be designed in ways that protect privacy rather than threatening to other words you could have the machines rather than the

naked machines and they are also not effective. the british member of parliament who evaluated the machines for the british government said that they would not have found chemical powders that were carried by the christmas trouser bomber, the christmas before last and in that sense they don't even detect the low contraband they are supposed to detect so that is the core of the constitutional case against body scanners. what is the case in favor of them? i think the case in favor of them would go something like the following: it was stress the court had never held that you have to adopt the least intrusive means possible in the heart will case judge alito had a footnote that sit in the airport screening context there could be more interests of methods than the magnetometer tests that are reasonable and judge satellite or in 2006 before she was a supreme court justice in the case regarding random warrantless searches in the commuters said what matters not whether the defendant could have devised a less intrusive

means of searching passengers but what it means they choose our constitutional on the privacy interest on a reasonable way. so those are two current supreme court justices who sit you don't actually have to choose the least intrusive means which could make the case more complicated. and then as the effectiveness, there are plenty supreme court and lower court cases that emphasize the court shouldn't second-guess law enforcement authorities when it comes to effectiveness. there is a second circuit subway case sitting at random checkpoints in the subway wasn't effective because he could choose another sidley station to go through and the court rejects that saying we should not and will not second-guess the minutia of the nypd decisions and basically they are going to defer on that score. so those are the strong arguments on the other side. you don't need the least intrusive means, and you don't have to prove that the technology is completely effective in order to work. i want to close by emphasizing the importance of the judicial evaluation of these technologies

in a way that translates the value of the framers of the constitution in light of new technologies. this is a time when courts are divided about how to think about broad searches. which just this week a case in california of holding the warrantless searches of salt salles phones on the grounds when you are arrested is often as like a cigarette packet the cops are allowed to open and other courts in this preposterous a cell phone that can contain our most private data like a computer that includes by year lease is much more like the paper the framers were determined to protect and should require a warrant and just a few minutes ago there was a fascinating decision here in d.c. striking down gps surveillance without a warrant. some other lower courts have said you can stick a gps device on the car and truck it door to because we have no expectation of privacy and public and the judge in the path pricking opinion objected that would in an unconvincing liberalism and said there is a difference between the fact your neighbor can see you for a moment and take a snapshot of you and

observing fee to tell the of your movements 24/7 which transform the nature of the conduct in public spaces. for me, this backscatter question is one of the center constitutional and civil liberty challenges of our age because it is all on necessary to have the etds of machines. he could have privacy protecting machines and it is important for charges rather than adopting the unconvincing argument that we surrender all the expectations of privacy at the airport we have to realize that these virtual strip searches are just as much of and in dignity and just as unnecessary as a real strip search and for that reason they are constitutionally unreasonable. thank you so much. [applause] >> thank you, jeff. our next speaker is ginger. council of the electronic privacy information center epic. she is associate director of our open government project that has become one of the lead attorneys in the case epic verse is dhs to

suspend the body scanner program i should mention also that she is the attorney who led the litigation in the open government litigation against the dhs regarding the technical specifications and the design of the devices. so maybe she will tell us a bit as well about the open government cases. >> s. res. marc mentioned we actually have several cases against dhs, and the current case to suspend the program is actually based on documents we got as part of another case, another lawsuit. that lawsuit was grounded in the freedom of information act request that we made to the department of homeland security and they repeatedly ignored. we even chile filed suit over that and you were going to start to see a pattern as i am talking to you that the agency repeatedly ignore requests and they try to do everything they can to obstruct our efforts to get any answers about these machines. as we ended up filing suit against the agency in this case and as a result of that lawsuit

we finally got some documents out of them. when we look at these documents we found several very, very interesting and important fact. first, we found that these documents showed that these devices were required by tsa and that its procurement specifications document to be able to store and transmit the images captured by the devices. so that graphic naked images actually capable of the in-store and transferred it is because the tsa required that the manufacturers make the machines capable of that. the documents also show the extent the traveler of these machines, one of the documents that we've requested was the traveler complaints coming and we got hundreds and hundreds of pages of traveler complaints. what you would expect people being very upset about their children being patted down concerns by pregnant women about radiation there were a number of people who cited the health risks the machines and then there was a sort of general pattern of complaints that we saw travelers not being informed

of the fact that they could opt out to beat the cultic of the pat-down not being informed of the machines were before the had walked through them, not being informed about the capabilities of the machines. basically tsa wasn't putting up proper signs in the airport. the documents also showed that these body scanners were not designed to detect powder and explosives. contrary to what they say they are not effective in fact as detecting explosives they are supposed to detect. and the documents also show that privacy filters could be turned off. so we would also previously final two petitions to the agency to ask for a formal rulemaking and noticing, the what about the public to protest in the agency's decisions to deploy these machines that were costing millions and millions of dollars to the public and that people were being subjected to before they could travel. again, the agency was obstructive. they ignored our petitions and they refused to either deny or request or accept. the just simply failed to

recognize our positions of petitions at all. with this in mind we decided we were going to file suit to suspend the program on the basis that the body scanners are in phases, unlawful and ineffective. the lawsuit was based on several federal statutes in the fourth amendment of the u.s. constitution. we based this on the administrative procedures act, the privacy act, the video prevention act, the religious freedom restoration act and the fourth amendment. so, for our kind of get minister of procedures act, they're planning based on the fact that the agency failed to properly process the petitions despite the fact that our petitions stated outright what we were asking for was a rule making. the agency simply never at which that. the didn't deny or accept. they simply sent back letters that were basically a copy and paste of the press release of the web sites about the machines are capable of. they failed to even acknowledge we have asked for a rule making and under the administrative procedures act, this is in fact

if rule and is subject to rulemakings and there should be an opportunity for public comment. again, this is part of the pattern of a destructive behavior on the part of the agency. the tsa apparently feels it doesn't have to answer to the american public for the decisions it makes and writes it violates. so the next play and was the privacy act claim. this technology allows for the linking of names and personally identifiable information with the graphic images. that is what our claim is based on and because of that this would trigger a system of record notice the would be required by the privacy act and tsa failed to undergo the system of records notice. our next plan is under the video prevention act to read this prohibits the capture of an image of a private area of an individual without their consent and we saw the claim was buttressed by the complaints that we saw. people were not been informed by tsa with the machines were, what

the machines were capable of. tsa has been misrepresenting to the public about the capability of the machine saying the machines cannot store and transfer images when in fact they can. the machines capture a very graphic image including the genitals of american travelers and project the image onto a screen for the tsa officer to look at. that image can then be stored and transferred by these machines through our tax claim some of the religious freedom restoration act and i am going to leave this up because she is the best person to speak to this. and our fourth or last claim is the fourth amendment claim which it think the professor did an excellent job of covering and i am just going to have a few small things from the brief. our argument on this, one of the arguments we made that we feel is very compelling is the fact under the case law the agency, weigel pure granted a wide amount of latitude in airport searches because the necessity of nussle security there is the requirement that the agency not

start with the most invasive of all methods. there has to be some sort of escalation of my kids. you start with a lesson based method and then when you were given a reason to escalate any can escalate to a more invasive method. you wouldn't start off with a basic strip search, strip search and full body cavity search. to the store with a magnetometer and this is the case law mandates, but in this instance, with these very, very invasive body imaging machines what they are starting off with is the highly invasive tactic instead of the less invasive tactic of the magnetometers. so this is based on the fact that they have decided to deploy this is primary screening and that primary screening sets of this tree in the face of tactic as the first thing that is used on american travelers. since it is the mission of the initial brief in november, the tsa has repeatedly tried to delay our lawsuit, which was really i think no surprise to us. but we actually are filing our

brief in this lawsuit today. that brief can be found on our web site as well as all of the other documents that i have mentioned, the pure command specification document, operational requirement that we got as part of our freedom of information act lawsuit, our initial become the agency's response and the brief that we are filing today. thank you. [applause] >> i injury pleased to welcome our next speaker. she is the legal counsel for the council of american islamic relations. we have worked with her in the pursuit of this case and she is one of the attorneys and also one of the petitioners involved in the case. nice to have you here. >> thank you very much, marc, and thanks to epic and to all of you all who are here today for this very important conference.

i appreciate you all coming to date. as marc mentioned my name is nadhira al-khalili come on in an attorney at the cair, council on american islamic relations. cair started in 1994, and we are a grassroots civil rights organization. we have approximately 30 chapters across the united states and about 20 states and our mission is to enhance the understanding of islam, and we don't claim to represent all of the approximately 7 million muslims in the united states of america but we hope to at least represent the majority of the moderate mainstream muslims in the united states. when i started working at cair, we but slowly get in constituent and complaints of this machine i went through. i went through this machine. i don't know what it is or was told what it is and i wasn't told that i had an alternative to go through it. so we slowly started to research

with the machine was and found out that it was very problematic and downright unconstitutional and unlawful, and we hooked up with epic, which really was a great opportunity for us and as ginger mengin we currently have a case in the d.c. court of appeals where we are asking the tsa to suspend the ait program. i am a petitioner all lawsuits under the federal statute called the religious freedom restoration act. and as the petitioner, it is my contention that is a muslim, as a member of the islamic faith, that i am being kept from practicing my face. i anderson and there is an earlier panelist that said all terrorists are muslim. clearly we do not agree with that and i feel like i should have the right to practice my face and i am going through the airport and so as you can notice i am dressed from head to toe and i am dressed head to toe every day of my life and i feel

like if i go through a body scanner that violates my modesty right in my religion to not be seen on -- unclothed. so is my argument that this particular program is not the least restrictive means for the government to advance a compelling interest than it infringes upon my right to practice my religion. now i would also like to state that obviously other people have objections to this. people of other faiths who have modesty concerns within their face, and of course people that have no faith who still have modesty concerns but, you know, this is one of the several ways that we try to get the program stopped and, you know, just one of the arrows so hopefully it will work. currently the government is arguing that i don't have standing and that it's what is the bird, don't have standing

and the claim is baseless. those are their arguments. so, on march 10th is the oral argument for the case, so hopefully you can all turn out for that. so that is a little bit about the invasive news and the unlawful unless about the ait's program. but other people have talked about the ineffectiveness and i don't necessarily -- i am not a security expert and i don't necessarily want to talk about the ineffectiveness, but i am happy to be here to represent the perspective of someone who is coming from a safe community. now i believe i am a civil rights advocate who just happens to be a member of the face community and a civil rights -- as a civil rights advocate i think we should look at the bigger picture which is what we are doing here in this conference. to look at the moral issues of this program and the ethical issues and the health and safety and privacy issues and just, you

know, really think about how shocking this is to be such an affront to our civil rights. it was he alluded to earlier, but my question is what's next for the government? what other things is upper government thinking about right now that we don't know about that they are going to roll out and surprise us with? so i am looking forward to the last panel which is talking about turning points and different suggestions and what to do next because i think this is a part of a bigger issue where the united states being turned into a police state and we are the people and we are the ones that should be objecting to it. so i hope we can have a very lively discussion later this afternoon about the next steps and goals and programs and different ways to combat this both legally, grassroots, everything so that once we deal with this issue we are prepared

to deal with the next issue that we know is coming down the pike. thank you very much. [applause] >> okay. i am going to introduce now our final panelist. i mentioned that one of the wonderful things about organizing this event as we began to try to identify people and topics is that we realize that there were so many people out there for different reasons who share our concerns about the use of body scanners, and i think you see that in particular with regard to the legal arguments, the challenges to our being brought to the body scanner program that we are also very interested to learn that there were to harvard law school students who apparently had a lot of three time. [laughter] and you know, having their own flight brought in a part of a case to challenge the airport body scanner from them so i am very happy to welcome jeffrey

redern and anant pradhan. >> thanks to epic for inviting us. we are excited to hear from all these people and share some great experience. so what makes a second year law student filed a lawsuit against the united states government? [laughter] well, i consider myself a little l libertarian, so on a daily basis. but what was remarkable about this case is that as i started looking at the case law, i found that the justifications for the searches were really quite shaky. now there has been a lot of case law in the so-called administrative searches. these are searches that everyone has to go through regardless of whether there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

and the courts have come up with a basic framework where on the one side we are going to look at how intrusive is the scene on the other side what is the government needed that is being served and how effective is? what is different about this case from almost all of the other administrative cases is that in the other cases the courts have always held that the intrusion is minimal so it's not that hard to do the balancing test. we have something like over here and we have got planes bombing of okay i think we are going to let this go to the end of the doj is trying to say this is just one incremental little step that because we are forced to walk through metal detectors it stands to reason we should be forced to walk through these strips search machines. but the supreme court has made it clear that this is a very different situation. just two terms ago there was a

school strip search case that some of you may be familiar with. i'm missing my quote here. justice souter writing for the court said that there is a quantum leap from the backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. the meeting of such a search and degradation is subject to any reasonable field placed a search that interested in the category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. so this is really unprecedented. really the only at the ministry of searches that has gone this far are in prisons. outside of prisons this is as far as they have ever tried to push it. now, how do you weigh something heavy on one side and something heavy on the other side? the stockman tests the judges try to implement normally they try to say okay we actually have something light, it's easy. when you're looking at something on both sides, our position in

our case is going to be that you need to have more scrutiny on both sides. so i don't think it's really tough to say that this is very interested. but our argument is that because it is so intrusive that a normal difference to law enforcement, to you know, the exhibit interest in the national security has to be less. the only way we can do this balancing is if the courts are going to look at the evidence and assess whether or not this is effective because otherwise the courts have abdicated their judicial responsibility to enforce the constitutional limits of government. now, the language of the fourth amendment is not technical pettit protect us from unreasonable searches the language of the three-pronged tests and circuit splits, a reasonable standard is anchored in our everyday experience of common sense. the supreme court has said that

public opposition can be evidence of an reasonableness and i think this means we all have a duty to express our outrage because this is going to help all of the suits go forward if we just shut up and let it go and figure that, you know, this is just one more thing it is too much for me to worry about than it is a lot easier for a court or a judge to say you know what, i don't think this is that unreasonable because people aren't complaining that much. so that is something we can all do to help keep these cases moving forward. my co-counsel or plan to sign this is going to talk about another troubling issue in this case regarding jurisdiction. >> thanks. so basically we are in a different position than i guess

i picked in that we file our case and trial court and federal district court and they are now in the appellate court. this makes a substantial -- there is a big difference here in that in the trial court there is a whole procedure of getting witnesses, getting discovery, getting information from them without necessarily meeting the freedom of information act requests, and so for a number of reasons we are trying to stay in the trial court. there is a little statute we didn't know about before we file a case that is presenting quite a problem it is 46110. go ahead and look this up. it is a huge payment in the way that it's been applied. basically what the statute says is that final orders issued by the tsa must be reviewed by a court of appeals, but goes further in that the promise findings of fact by the the minister of supported by at the ministry of evidence is conclusive. to the reason this is

problematic is that in order that the administrator were to issue would then be reviewed by the court of appeals, and as long as an administration could marshal a record, which i hope any reasonable or any competent at penetration could do a substantial record those findings are conclusive. what we are trying to do is essentially avoid this for a number of reasons. the key being that we didn't -- no one here actually knew that there was an order issued. it kind of happened in a fact secret sort of way. basically what tsa does is issue secret service which i call super secret directives. basically behind closed doors the issue these orders that see you have to do xy and z and this is how the procedure is going to go. but it varies from airport to airport, mechanism to mechanism, with the do, who gets screen, who doesn't get screened, how the various things changed based on the various different

circumstances. now the question is how can these the final orders that can only be reviewed if we don't know when they are issued and be, we don't know what they said. so, our contention is that they can't actually be final orders and thus we don't need to go to the court of appeals to have this surgeon. the other very important thing is that in that statute final orders must be reviewed within 60 days. but if you don't have a time, if you don't know in the order is issued, how do you file a it is kind of a black box. so basically, the tsa statute allows them to set the rules, choose the form for reviewing the rule and then have the rules reviewed based on whenever they want to say and then it is deemed conclusive. for those reasons we believe the super secret directives cannot possibly be final orders and that is the significant problem that we are facing right now in

>> i'm afraid to admit i've spent quite a bit of time with that section 46610c and it is as you said a problem. i want to begin by coming back to professor jeffrey rosen who has now heard from the various petitioners about the claims and i'm wondering if you have any initial response and then i will have a follow-up for you. >> my first response is how proud i am to be sitting on a podium with people doing this civil liberties work, what a wonderful thing is that second year law students are defending the constitutional values in the most direct way possible and your vivid account moral issues that are instinctive the dignitary issues that gets to the heart of the matter and

ginger's explanation on the constitutional problems with these machines but also the statutory ones is very persuasive. i'm supposed to play what can i say. is the supreme court going to buy these arguments? predictions are hard. i think it was good to court justice souter in the strip search case that was 8-1, only justice thomas dissented, eight members understood the danger of strip searches. i think if i had but ten seconds at the beginning of an oral argument the solicitor general has to try to persuade the court, i would say this ladies and gentlemen, the court has held a quintessentially reasonable searches one that reveals dangerous and guilty contraband and no innocent but embarrassing information. bald sniff which reveals drugs but no diaries to be a backscatter machine is the antithesis of an unreasonable search. it reveals a great deal of innocent but then there is an information and is very unlikely to reveal contraband or guilty

information. that is the core of the case of reasonableness and welfare court fight? who knows. unlike our heroic students urging the court to actually look at empirical evidence like public opinion or polls, the court tends to decide the fourth amendment cases just with our share generalizations that are not supported by empirical evidence. there's a wonderful study by christopher at vanderbilt who said the court's predictions of what people perceive to be unreasonable there are no relation to the actual intuitions of people and students in focus groups. now there's another great danger which is the longer these machines remain up and running their greater possibility there is that the court will find that expectations of privacy have adjusted to them. justice scalia said in the thermal imaging case years ago that cutting edge technology that isn't in general use is presumptively unreasonable and contains intimate details in the home without a warrant.

but given the jurisdiction of challenges that face by the time a court of appeals ruled on this and the supreme court actually heard it, it might be two or three years down the line. but by that point people have gotten used to it and the court might have said is a result become constitutionally unreasonable some time is of the essence. it's important these students move forward. i wouldn't predict the court would buy it, but i see that all of our colleagues here have a very strong case these are in fact constitutionally unreasonable searches. >> so ginger, we now have jeff and anant who have filed their lawsuit and you have been at this for some time both in building a record through the freedom of information act litigation looking fairly closely at the legal fees. what would be your advice to them? which arguments do you think they should pursue? and by the way, since they are in district courts and have the opportunity to maybe do some discovery what would you like them to find that you haven't been able to obtain?

>> i would like them to find the source of testing that we have been asking the agency to undergo, the health testing, the testing for whether or not these are actually effective against covered explosives and we certainly have indications they are not the agency continues to insist their effect machines. i would like to see the result of the testing for that ansar as experts go probably to call and security experts who could actually speak to the effectiveness who could actually speak to the radiation experts who could actually speak to the radiation risks and i think all of the would be excellent to bring in. >> i see that you are taking notes, which is excellent. nadir come to have raised some troubling concerns from the face based community about the impact of these new screening procedures, and i was up late last night working on that brief that ginger mentioned and the

government said in its answer to the brief. well of course people don't have the right to fly. so this is in their assessment really not a big deal. but i was wondering if you could say a little bit more about the impact is of people who have faced exceptions, objections, and with the practical consequences are when the government undertakes this kind of the procedure. some thank you for working on the brief by the way. the practical consequences are i would say about 60% of muslims that live in america are from immigrant communities who still have contact with homes and family members and ancestors and ancestral homes and other countries which are virtually impossible to get to unless you are flying. so the fact that tsa says people don't have to fly, some people

do have to fly, and we do recommend that people, right now because there is no other alternative that people go ahead and off for the pat-down because that is at least done for some what of the same gender but the fact that this has infringed upon people's right and ability to fly is very disturbing in the muslim community and we hope that we can get this taken care of as soon as possible. >> i was thinking that even mike roberts, who objects to the current screening procedures if he were invited to speak at a conference and let's say london or brussels would probably not be driving his car to go to that event. let me come back to jeff because i want to push him a little bit on what the supreme court might to. he has been a great observer of the supreme court and helped us to understand first of all justice o'connor's role as a swing vote and may be justice

kennedy's vote but on these privacy issues, justice alito's emerging as a very interesting jervis, court. you mentioned his opinion in the early your airport case, the hartwell case, and we know justice o'connor herself was deeply suspicious of no suspicion searches and was wondering what your sense is if we probe a bit more deeply with the current court has said that similar issues where they may come out of the actually do get this case. >> it's hard to predict. after all, marc, with your encouragement, hope they predicted in an op-ed alito plight inherent a mantle as the fourth amendment values. several students and colleagues and friends wrote in and said this is wishful thinking. alito has voted in favor more frequently than any other justice in criminal cases.

he's a former prosecutor and has been most pro prosecution just as there is an argument that he is by no means has o'connor libertarian instruments. the difficulty is this is a court that is closely divided in the fourth amendment cases and tends to side against the fourth amendment claims. this is in part not only because of the emplacement of the alito and, but justice breyer for all of his many virtues is no fan of stricken down unreasonable searches he tends to favor the government and vince or backward to applaud searches and he is by no means a sure vote either. a piece that might be relevant is the bond case from a few years ago involving the inspection of luggage on a bus and a majority of the quarter think it was a closely divided decision written by rehnquist of all people who is more of a state's right for the amendment guy said people on buses expect to have their luggage touched or

brushed by accident but not letting the interests of the fondled, basically that is too much and when you travel he shouldn't have to have your bags fondled, and i think he rides the shovel a lot and says this is a we always have our backs fumbled, just get used to it and he didn't have a problem with the issue. he was in short justice sotomayor would do. she held broad surges and was head of pro-government experience in fourth amendment views haven't been reviewed either. the strip search case there was a gender element and i guess if i were to say when did fourth amendment values tend to win a wendi could imagine their own privacy being violated. so the one case where drug tests in schools were fine, they were okay for all sorts of context but when the judicial candidates

were drug tested the court was shocked and struck down. this is to say we can only hope the supreme court is doing a lot of traveling the next couple of weeks and months and that they're going to go to plenty the indignity of being search because that is their best hope for at least checking these things down to read >> maybe we should invite them to foreign conferences. wonderful. we have time for questions of people do have questions we will get the microphone circulating and also people who are following us on tour, you are welcome to tweets some questions and we can ask some of our panelists. yes, please. >> good morning to read my name is judy and i am very curious to know there are a lot of advocacy centers around privacy rights and of course a lot of issues that you are speaking about

include privacy issues. i'm very concerned with the public health effects. obviously these untested machines which have a lot of already generated a lot of region's scientific community supporting the dangerous effects of the radiation. my curiosity is what would the legal implications of these public health risks say in five years there is demonstrable evidence of a public health affect. would there be a potential suit to be brought against the u.s. government, and of course wouldn't the cost of that not only in public health in the public self-interest, but the cost to the taxpayers, you know, even cellini -- eventually mean? >> i can't really speak to it from the perspective, but i think that would certainly come against any argument of the government [inaudible] it would certainly cut toward

the interest and privacy cut against the public interest that they would be asserting so i think that is probably the most i can say on that. >> i'm just looking at some of the factors the courts have evaluated in deciding whether the government discretion as reasonable and it includes the public nature of the search, the length of the search, notice given to the passengers only visual inspections and whether the search is abusive or unusually interested and also with the doesn't directly cover the health sector could certainly argue a search that the standards of the fact is intrusive, abusive, not minimally invasive and example a cavity search the causes harm would surely be even more unconstitutional than a strip search the didn't cause physical harm and for that reason i think you would very much support the idea these are not intrusive. >> it could against any assertion of a legitimate public interest. if you're public interest is to

protect the public and protect the safety of the travelling public and then the machine you are using to do that is creating a safety problem for the traveling public it's going to be very hard argument to make. >> [inaudible] test machines which cannot potentially longer lasting generations longer affect. something from the first panel of easily for the question of why is the fda taking and accountability, why haven't these machines then pressed through rigorous inspections. they are exposing the public to these risks so to me it would seem to open at a very wide ramifications for any sort of collection on the part of people's willingness either in the psychological -- basically remain forced to compromise between the psychological lummis and the sexual wellness for assault survivors of people going through these machines.

>> i would be curious to know what the legal next step would be. >> i can say a little bit more about this. we did not raise again in passing in our opening brief the health objections largely because we didn't feel that we had the expertise but to the extent we did raise them, the government attempted to answer our brief by saying that they had contacted a variety of organizations and basically been given gold stars by those organizations in terms of the technologies so this created an opportunity for us to reply which we did. we pointed out first of all that the government had relied on studies not based on the operational use of the devices, and one of the points that scientists and engineers have made is that you can't evaluate, you know, say here this conference you can't evaluate the safety of a car without actually looking at its history and its record to understand whether or not it is well-designed to carry a family

for 50,000 miles or something that the second point that we made re the way that the administrative procedures act is supposed to work. in other words a federal agency may have a few it may have reached a judgment about what it believes is the best way to, you know, address this problem. but under the apa, it has an obligation to give the public the opportunity to offer its views, it's contradictory evidence and then to look at all this information to make a judgment that is reviewable by a court. now you see what happened here, the department of homeland security basically short circuit in that process. they didn't want contradictory evidence. they simply wanted a place before the public their assessment and leave it at that. one of the things i think you are hearing today is not only are there strong substantive objections such as the religious objections and so forth but also very significant procedural concerns about how this decision

was made. and this is significant because wherever you may come down on the substantive factor objections maybe you would agree with a religious argument, 80 were not so concerned about privacy, stultz and you have to believe that the government agency is making these decisions do so in a fair and local manor and so a big part of our case is actually the claim that that didn't happen here. so that is a long answer but i think that is how we get to your issue. >> i can also speak to a little bit in the sense that we do file a claim about the health and this is why being in the district court means so much more in that we can have -- if we get to steal the district court we get to march in the witnesses and have that debate about the health effects of the scanners. what we have seen in some of the briefs is they got studies from the american medical is a sedition and the fda as more clause stating to give you the check mark it's good to go but we don't get to see those studies and none of the studies

are public information so we have to take them at their word. not the benefit of being in the trial court is that we get to contest that a lot more so than just having affidavits and we have been contacted by some scientists who actually would like to state that one way or another as out in the media. >> the tests the government continues to cite are undertaken not necessarily to determine the safety of these machines but to determine the output of radiation from the machine in a test setting again as marc said not be operational setting, so there are also -- if the agency is going to be using machines that are dosing people with radiation he needs to ensure that they are properly maintained. we've seen in hospitals there are machines adjusting people with far higher radiation the bears' ' because they are not properly maintained. there is no evidence the government has taken the proper

precautions to ensure these machines are properly maintained >> i think we have another question in the back. >> this is to anyone on the panel talking about the safety of the machines. what about the fact the airport -- i don't know of any of you have ever tried when you're flying to watch the agent to take their gloves when they check you because they're actually physically contacting one person's body and then taking the same gloves that have who knows what on them and physically touching your own, but among the agents are waiting there always, picking their noses, rubbing their hair, wiping their face with them and i have never heard anyone of wants mengin this problem because if one person has a disease it can be transferred by the gloves and they are pressing people ask the tsa basically for to you and tell you know i'm going to use the same glove the just croaked someone with on your private parts. have there been any studies into

this or any one speak about this part, because some of them use the same gloves for hundreds of people of the same airport. they don't change them. the have no need to come and no one is going to make them because they aren't listening to us asking them politely to change them. >> that's an interesting point. has anyone -- >> i can speak from experience because i've been padded down a number of times now. part of a -- the actually in pretty sure my understanding is the do have to switch the gloves, and the reason being because after the cut you down the actually do a chemical scan of their beloved, and so part of the test is to make sure that you don't have chemicals on you after they've had you down. so if they were not to switch the gloves every time the you'd get chemical residue from somebody else. so i can't be sure -- it might be a one-off or they aren't following procedure, but their procedure -- again, it's supersecret so we can't be sure, it would seem to indicate that they have to switch clubs.

>> they have to switch dhaka gloves if you go to an airport and watch, your chance of seeing them do that from one person to the next is pretty darn slim. i mean, you can begin airport here and stand and watch all day and watch them never change gloves because we have seen that. >> the question of the gloves and the second of the pat-down might be relevant to a constitutional analysis we haven't discussed. should the court evaluate the body scanner and the interest of pat-down together or should they be two separate procedures? my instinct is it is the same procedure because if you choose not to go through the body scanner and you have to do the pat-down come if you're dimare would be that the pat-down is just as intrusive as a strip search. it's not quite a body cavity search but it is not a routine search, and therefore it should be considered constitutionally unreasonable to offer as an alternative to a virtual st search something that comes close to a virtual body cavity

search. the counter argument would be that you don't have to go through the -- you don't have to smadi and you should just be doherty the body scanners and isolation near the secondary pat-down shouldn't be part of the analysis. we haven't talked about that, but what do you think? >> that is a good question, gentlemen, you to think. i'm not sure at this point. but what i wanted to do at this point because we have just a couple of minutes and i thought i had made a very good point earlier what the best opening statement might be for the petitioners, the attorneys pursuing these challenges and giving each of our attorneys on the panel just a brief opportunity to say what they think the most compelling argument is, the most compelling legal argument to suspend their part body scanner program. how would you answer that? >> you're going to start with me? i need a minute to think about that. >> nadhira, would you like to

take that? >> they're all so very compelling. i can't pick one. but first, i would argue for the freedom restoration act i think it's very compelling and, you know, because there are so many americans that have sincerely held religious beliefs that if nothing else our government listens to that argument and really takes into account this country has such a strong faith and if they can do something less intrusive they should go with that so people have their religious freedoms. >> actually one of the things i have learned from that which is interesting is that even where the government establishes the compelling interest, it still has a burden to show that it is pursued the least restrictive alternative and it's not just the tide goes to the runner situation. i think they have some work to do on this. >> absolutely.

>> yes? >> i'm ready now. >> okay, good. >> the most compelling argument against them is by placing these machines and airports, but the tse is doing is requiring that people trade away their privacy for the illusion of security. you are not getting security with these machines. the ineffective. the machines are highly invasive quote so they are taking a high amount of your privacy site and that is the most compelling argument. ..

they were far more intrusive than the paper searches of desk drawers and iris at the framers of the fourth amendment were determined to prevent. we have to condense ultimately the supreme court that a virtual strip-search is even more of an indignity than those general warrants and diary searches. the framers would have been appalled at the idea that hundreds of millions of travelers in order to get through the airports could we visually and virtually stripped naked and they must strike down the naked body machine as a violation of the.essential right as brandeis called it, the right to be. >> oh boy that was great. thank you also much for a wonderful panel. we will break for lunch and be back in his room at 1:30. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> have a conversation over lunch and we are going to start the second half of the program with a discussion from bruce schneier who is i must say one of the most -- people in student science, one of the real pioneers and how to have dialogues with everyday people about some very complex issues. bruce, who coined the phrase security which you have heard quite a bit of, the morning session of the conference. in his book, beyond fear, thinking sensibly about security in an uncertain world, introduced us to a perspective on security post-9/11 that talk about being rational and the trade-off between security and it is not a matter of being

completely 100% secure, but the degree of security you can expect a stone the things that you might be able to do. getting us to put our feedback on the ground after being placed in a state where it was zero tolerance for any chance of anything possibly happening. bruce will talk more in depth about that but i want to give you a little more background. bruce is well-known in the security world but his ability to speak in concrete terms to people have made him a rock star among those of us who value the benefits of advanced technology, but also can understand some of the risks that may be present in the adaption of technology if we aren't careful about their spec patients of technology can actually achieve coupled with what human beings need to be able to do along with the policies that have to be put in place and really thinking through the policy consequences of choosing technology in lieu of the ability of people to

manage themselves within the security environment whether it is a matter of making lifestyle decisions or how we use technology in our day-to-day lives. i won't delay his introduction anymore. i think you will do a better job at that than i ever could. would like to introduce you to bruce schneier who will be talking with us about restoring sanity to airport security. thank you, bruce. [applause] >> good afternoon. let's start by reviewing the past 20 or 30 years of airport security and we take away guns and bombs in the terrorist used box cutters. we took away rocks cutters and knitting legals and they put in explosives and their sneakers. we screened footwear, they tried liquids. we limit liquids they hide a bomb in their underwear. we use full-body scanners they hide a bomb in a printer cartridge. we now believe it or not banned

printer cartridges over 16 ounces and they are going to do something else. this is actually a stupid game and we should stop playing it. it is not security, it is security theater. now this conference is primarily about body scanners so let's talk about them for a minute. the purpose of body scanners is to detect petn. this is what it is all about. petn is a plastic explosive. is what the shoe bomber used. is with the liquid bomber used. it was what was in those yemeni printer cartridge mail bombs. it is in iraq. it is in afghanistan. guns and personal bombs are passé. petn is the terrorist tool of the future. the problem is that petn is really hard to detect. no scanners and no puffers can detect it. dogs can and swaths can. so the tsa hopes in peaceful

body scanners that not that they can detect petn but that they can detect the bulge in your clothing. when you are trying to carry petn through security. that is what they are trying to do. now, once you know that the way to get around this is pretty easy. you know petn is very stable. you can roll it into any shape you like. that is one of its selling points. you can roll it then. ed luttwak said you can make a shirt out of it. you can put in a body cavity. you can put it in your mouth. moreover you can put it in your mouth and go in and out 10 times or 20. however much you need. and none of this is new. none of this is surprising. none of this is a secret. and the iata talks about these machines not being affected, these are exactly the sorts of

techniques they are thinking about. and when israel does deploy these machines this is exactly why. on the other hand, if petn is really hard to explode. again it is very stable. the underwear bomber could explode his in the shoe bomber could explode his. we were told that the mail bombs from yemen would not have worked. it is hard to get this right. so last november president obama made a speech where he talked about full-body scanners and ejections. one of the things he said was that these machines he was told are effective against the kind of threat that we saw in the christmas day bombing. now that is precisely the wrong way to think about security. is actually lousy threat modeling and is in fact this is the kind of thing the tsa administration is thinking we have serious problems because what that shows is a strong backwards bias.

this would have been effective against what the terrorists did last time. it focuses on the fact that their tactic -- it focuses on their tactic and not about where the tactic was in time. because in fact the underwear bomber chose his tactic precisely because the machines weren't in place. and you can't go back in time and sticks that. the next attack as we see again and again will be something different. terrorists are adaptive and they choose their tactics based on the security that is in place. so if we are putting these scanners in place because it will detect what happens christmas 2009 we are getting this very very wrong. now there are basically two kinds of terrorists. there are amateurs, like the guy who flew a plane into the austin

federal building. just someone who decides, wakes up one day and decides to want to do something nasty. and they there are professional terrorists. think of 9/11, stuff that is well plan, well-funded and thankfully much rarer. ready much any security securities going to stop the first kind. and pretty much no securities going to stop the second kind at the airport. does anyone actually think that the tsa screeners you know with their machines and taking away bottles of water is going to uncover the next plot hamid attack duke of which they have never heard before? that just doesn't make sense. you know we have to recognize that airport security is the last line of defense and it is not a very good one. alright, so it is right to ask what would work. what does work? the first thing that works is

intelligence and investigation. any terrorist attack is a series of events. there is planning, recruiting, funding, training, getting there, execution and aftermath. our best defenses are at the beginning and end of that process. intelligence investigation here and emergency response here. focusing on the general risk and not specific plots is much more effective. we are at our worst when we have to guess the plot correctly. and all these individual risks are rare and the way to defend against them is to look for the commonalities and put your defenses they are. and a lot of these measures are largely invisible by intelligence gathering and then some of the soft things, building bridges with potential

terrorist communities or weakening social bonds within terrorist organizations, lots written about this that i'm not going to go into. arresting plotters like media fanfare. i think giving terrorist the status of enemy combatants is just way too good for them. i think, and criminals would make this less attractive career path. so it -- what is it mean for airport security? the most effective airport security happens not at the airport. this is what caught the liquid romer's. they were arrested in a london apartment before they got to the airport. this is what uncover the yemeni printer cartridge mail plot. this is actually what failed on the christmas day underwear bomber plots. it was the stuff that happened not at the airports. again it is security doesn't require us to guess the plot correctly. security doesn't depend on us guessing the tactic of the

targets, but you know if we defend against tactics or targets this only makes sense of tactics and targets are few. there are three tactics and five target to defend against to tactics and four targets we are a lot safer. if there are hundreds of tactics and millions of targets really the best to do is you force the bad guys to make a minor change in their plans. fold body scanners at laguardia they have to drive to iceland. not a big deal. or if we defend the airports completely and they go bomb shopping malls instead we are not any safer. the general solutions are much more if. i'm not interested in security that just make the bad guys make a minor change in what they are planning on doing. so that being said, airports and airplanes still deserve some special attention. there are four basic reasons.

one, they are for better or worse a favorite terrorist target. two they have kind of unique failure characteristics. a bomb goes off on the bus and get other people die and some people are injured in some people get away unharmed. the same thing happens on airplane, crash happens and everyone dies. fairly characteristics but much more severe because what people are doing flying through the year. air. airplanes into the national symbols, british air, air france, jal. cert airplanes our national symbols and airplanes also fly too far in countries where the terrorists might actually be. again less true in the u.s. but european airlines fly to some pretty touchy hotspots around the world. so what works at the airport? something we do know that works is pre-9/11 security. detecting obvious guns and bombs. that works. it works against the amateurs.

and also it works against some of the more professional plots. it worked against the two, the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber. think about it. decodes the screen for obvious guns and bombs the underwear bomber, his bombmaker had to build an inefficient bomb. instead of using a fuse or a timer or something any normal person would to explode petn, he had to resort to some liquids and a syringe and 20 minutes in the bathroom and setting his pants on fire and it didn't work and then the passengers subdued him. that is a security success. right after that happened, secretary napolitano got on the camera and set the system worked. she was uniformly vilified for it and i'm thinking terrorists in custody, nobody harmed. what more do you want from a

success? that is what the system looks like. and that was pre-9/11 security and passenger vigilance. that was at work there. and so a lot of stories, we haven't heard any today but certainly can google them and they are easy to find about tests some percentage of guns get through. and if this happens it is a big media fanfare. some this past month dr. airport security. he forgot he had a gun in his bag. and this was a big deal. i don't think the story should buy do you. they usually don't bother me. first off you are never going to get 100% security of the check once. we can't even keep guns out of prisons. we can't possibly keep them out of airports but more importantly, the effects of getting caught are severe. and if you go to a tsa

checkpoint with a gun and a tsa agent captures that they have to call the fbi and at the very least ruin your day. so that means that even if the tsa isn't perfect they let 10% through let's just say, you can't build a plot around getting a gun through. because the odds are too great. you are going to get caught in the affects effexor to severe if you get caught. compare that to a plot involving liquids. you try to go through airport security with a bottle of liquid, tsa agent says bottle of liquid toss it in the trash and you get to go through. which means the cost of failure is the row. if you have a liquid bottle-based plot, just try again and again and again. one and 100 times you will get through. because there is no effects of getting caught, you must have

100% effectiveness in order to be effective. so i think we need some rationality there. either liquids are dangerous in which case the fbi is called and they ruin your day or they are not in which case you should take them on board. just half-and-half does not work and even tsa agents take this dangerous bottle of liquor imported in the trash about 2 feet from them with the other dangerous bottles of liquid, which get probably hauled away by the trash man with everything else at the end of the day. canine screening works for baggage. there are certainly logistical problems there. i don't know if the airports are set up to channels and whatever dogs require, but those do work and we see them use by department of agriculture for international arrivals to screen for food contraband. behavioral profiling works. this is hard to do correctly.

it is easy to get wrong. this is not racial profiling. this is not gender-based or dress based, but they some behavior. we know these things work and they are very hard to train for. and we also need to close the non-passenger security holes. a lot has been written about this how easy it is for airline employees to buy screening. behind the counter where they take your ticket at the door to the other side. and you can just go back and forth. vehicles, you know other airport employees, cleaners. this is much less scrutiny there than we would like. someone earlier mentioned civil aviation and the lack of screening there. really sense 9/11 two things that made us safer when you look at passengers. the first one is reinforcing the cockpit door and the second one is convincing passengers they need to fight back.

we saw that work with the christmas day underwear bomber. i just read a news article today. there was a turkish airlines flight that was hijacked going from oslo to istanbul. the terrorist said he had a bomb the passengers did not believe him and quickly learned the truth. and the plane landed safely. again, passenger vigilance. pretty much everything else is security theater. and most importantly, we need not to be terrorized. that is what we can do. security based on fear doesn't work. because it tends to focus us on the specifics of what has happened rather than the broad threats. you know we have this need to rewrite history. the same thing with what obama said. this would have rewritten christmas history last year. the solutions are look backwards

instead of forwards. we need to do something. the phrase all i can think about it as we say something must be done. this is something. therefore we must do it. and that is kind of illogic you see. because we are scared. and we also tend to focus on the severity of the event while it knowing the probability of the event. because it happened because it occurred, it is fixed in our mind is a threat. we don't think about how anomalous the threat is. and whether the risk, the actual rational risk is comparable to our fear. so i went and pulled some data on airplane terrorism just to get some numbers. so, in the 2000, in the past decade we have had 469 passengers, this includes crew and terrorists, that were killed as a result of violent passenger incidents. this is on planes. 265 of them, more than half,

were 9/11. there is no -- back then no fatal incidents since the -- in 2004. this is the longest streak since world war ii. 2000 death toll was the famous same as 1960s, substantially less than 1970s and 1980s. 2001 was the fourth most violent year for violent passenger incidents. that is after 1985, 1988 and 1989. the 80's were ugly. of course a lot more people are traveling in the past decade than they were in the 80's. so we have seen, ken and i pulled the numbers, 22 passengers killed per 1 billion and that is in the 201,990s which is about six times safer than previous decades. that was 1960s with 191 plane death. in the united states in the past

decade we have had incidents on six airplanes. four on september 11, the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber. that is one incident per 16.5 million departures. our eyes right now of being on a terrorist plane is about one in 10.5 million. that is about 20 times greater than being struck by lightning. that is the mathematics. i would like to see more of us except mathematics of terrorism. the risk is rare. is very rare that the risk isn't zero. i don't think you know, sort of a six grading aside we can never stop a crazed loner like the fort hood shooter. all airport security would do is make him start shooting outside of the airport security gates. and sometimes you can do everything right and still have it come out wrong.

think about rare events is when they occur, it is not always evidence of a systemic failure. sometimes it is evidence of --. so there is a counter story i think we should all adopt in the counter story is one of in some ability. we should simply refuse to be terrorized. we should not override -- overreact. we should not become defensive. there is inherent risk in living in a free society. and that is a risk our country's founders embraced and that is a risk i think we should. i think we should roll back the fear-based 9/11 security measures. simple things. stop telling people to report suspicious activity. they already do that when it is truly suspicious. they don't need to be told. when you are told to watch her neighbor, the report things like they dress funny and their food

doesn't smell good and they talk in a funny language. when you prime people to report suspicious they end up reporting different. and different is not inherently suspicious. and living in a society where suspicious of each other doesn't make us safer. by increasing her feelings of fear, of helplessness, the government will solve all of our problems if we just kept quiet and did what they told us to. it doesn't work, doesn't make us safer against terrorism and natural disasters come against anything. and we need to recognize that terrorism is rare. it even after 9/11 terrorism is rare. the most dangerous part of your airplane flight is still the taxi ride to the airport. that as as in change and i probably will never change.

automobiles kill more people every month in the u.s. the 9/11 did. last january's earthquake in haiti killed more people than terrorism pitts at the beginning of time. you watch movies and tv and you start thinking that terrorism is easy. it turns out it is not. i get asked all the time where all the terrorist attacks? it is hard. this is hard to do. it seems easy but it is hard. terrorism is hard and it is easy to make mistakes. 9/11 just barely worked. i do have some problems with the system but we also got really unlucky. making public policy based on that kind of rare event doesn't make sense. and lastly, terrorism is not a transcendent threat. it is not, cannot destroy our country. i cannot destroy our way of

life. is only our reaction to terrorism that can do that. if we reduce the freedoms inherent in our society we are doing the terrorist work for them. if we engage in fear-mongering we are doing the terrorist work for them. the more scared we are the more effective the terrorist attacks are. in fact, if we get scared if terrorists succeed even if their plot fails. if we are in domino go than the terrorists failed even when their attacks succeed. and that is all i have to say. [applause] >> we have a few minutes left so i wanted to open it up for a couple of questions if we can get those in. >> let's start over here.

>> hi, how are you? are you familiar with the care flight? what are your thoughts on that? is that an effective way to try to prevent prescreening are just what are your thoughts? >> in general i tend to be very suspicious of separating people into two categories, the screen as category and the scream our category because as soon as you do that you and invite the bad guys as a way to get into the screen less category. that is not true for everybody but it is true for everything. i've generally been again secure flight. i would rather see random screening rather than screening based on data that shows up there are some pretty good arguments in favor of that kind of system that you know in fact

he is likely to change his stripes on the next flight but in general i do worry about a system like that. you also about possibly the system to get hacked. there are a lot of arguments about screening pilots and we shouldn't screen pilots. it makes no sense. fly the airplane and crash the airplane, why screened them? we are screening people and pilot uniforms and neither we have a system that verifies who pilots are or we just screen everybody and many incidences are better to screen everybody uniformly or difference is randomly then it is to put people in categories and verify we are putting the right people in the right category. i tend to worry about those systems for those reasons. there is a hand over there. >> i wonder if you can talk about the politics of terrorism? bureaucrats who have responsibility for running these kinds of security systems and

politician politicians who have ultimate responsibility seem to react that as long as they have an answer to this happened last time and we do something to stop it, that's that seems to be a political defense. is there so much a change the political dynamics of this so that we will get more rational decisions out of politicians and bureaucrats? >> i think politicians as followers opposed to politicians as leaders. when people are scared they want to be less scared and then you get to something must be done. i will do this thing and it will make you less care. as opposed to leaving and saying you know making a churchill like speech and saying look, this is life. we must be stronger than this. but if you think about it, the political reaction is to overreact. the talk i just made couldn't be made by a politician. imagine after 9/11 there were two politicians. one says we are all going to die

and do all these things in there is me saying come on, get a life. fast-forward five years, if nothing happens this guy takes credit for it. and we saw president was due that are go that is proved by policies are working. actually that quote was from what's his name? donald rumsfeld. i am thinking that there were no attacks before 9/11 and he didn't have any policy. what does that prove? and fast-forward five years, if something happens he is still proven right and i'm out of a job. so there is a political tendency to overreact, to look like you are doing something to solve a specific previous threat because leaving his heart and leaving his dangerous and leading might get your head cut off. now there is also the politics

of institution out a. once the tsa is in place a lot of their security is protecting their careers. if they don't defend against terrorists last year in the terrorist do it again they are going to look stupid and someone is going to get fired. they have actually banned printer cartridges greater than 16 ounces. now the terrorists use the cereal boxes next time. they could say we never thought about cereal boxes. they used printer cartridges and that is why we banned them. if they use printers cartridges again no one will stand for that. but i believe fundamentally this is politicians as followers, not as leaders. politicians who are leaders, match and the speech president bush could have made after 9/11. you know and that would have been true leading. >> anybody wants more of what he is writing, this book called schneier non-security with a

picture on it. >> thank you. >> this is a good. here is my question. on the subject of overregulating people and under regulating corporations, during the hijack to cuba which as you recall in 1968, 69 and 70 there were many of them from the u.s. to cuba. some of us, including a number of aviation security specialist demanded that the faa require the toughening of cockpit doors and the strengthening of latches. in the 1970s, in the 1980s, in the 1990s. the faa refused to require the airlines to do this as the cost was $3000 an aircraft. and the result of course was 9/11.

the planes could have been hijacked but could have been taken over to be used as weapons of destruction. the interesting thing is that in the 9/11 report, the authors chose not to focus on this issue. this one singular engineering change that could have prevented 9/11 and maybe prevented the need for this conference. a simple regulatory change, and in many discussions, on all of this terrorism and all the precautions and all the machines, it is almost never mentioned. why? >> a couple things and it is not just cockpit doors. before 9/11 the airlines have resisted every security measure. it was one exception and that is the i.d. check because the i.d. check actually solve the business problem the airlines

had which was the reselling of discount tickets and they were able to do it while blaming the government without actually having to implement any kind of rule themselves. but aside from that the airlines have fought everything. it was a little different after 9/11. there are a couple of things going on. one of course the airlines don't want to spend the money. primarily because it seems that when there are terrorist incidents it doesn't affect the airlines in specific that air travel in general. select airline a it's a terrorist attack people don't say i'm not going to fly airline a then i'm going to play b instead. i'm not going to fly. there wasn't a benefit for an airline to say we have reinforced cockpit doors and you should fly us. so that competition mechanism tends to fail in situations but specifically the public tends to look at the airline system as a

whole rather than the airline specifically. certainly i think it was a serious problem. it was a cheap solution. it was the obvious solution and it was obvious for decades that airlines were able to successfully fight events of 9/11 when they capitulated really quickly. >> thank you. that'll have to be her last question. we need to get onto the next next panel. thank you very much. the next panel will be on pulling the plug, strategy. troy stock who is counsel with -- then councilman david greenfield of new york city councilman member and jim hopper with the cato institute. i want to start this panel, and

the associate director of the electronic privacy information center. you heard a lot about our litigation of lawsuits that we filed. what i wanted to make sure people understood about this particular issue is that ethic has been working on this issue since the summer of 2005, when we did the first webpage on it, looking at the technology and the consequences of using ant and the privacy implications that would accrue if it were actually put into place. it was at the pilots face of the technology being used by the psa as a pilot project. we began with bringing in and trying to encourage more dialogues between privacy advocacy organizations and the psa as well as the dhs chief privacy officers and 2007, many organizations voiced a lot of concern about thoughts regarding

the implications of applying this technology primarily because we could see how the public would react. the agency was not able to see as clearly the consequences of technology as advocacy organizations could basically because they believe that technology would be the magic way to solve the ills that they could detect with their current screening process. what we needed to do and what we have been trying to bring courage is a dialogue, more transparency on the part of the agency, the utility to allow the public to comment, the ability of policymakers and decision-makers to better understand the options that are before them and what this panel will be doing the last panel of today's conference will be doing, is talking about strategies to move us forward next steps and what we should be thinking about doing on the policy front, on the

decision-making front regarding our elected officials. so i wanted to begin with looking at it from the perspective of what has happened in the past, beginning with troy stock who is with congresswoman jason chaiffetz office who played it incredible leadership role in getting one of the largest nonpartisan votes i guess in the previous congress and one that i have been in d.c. for a while one of the largest i have seen and i know him quite a while. it was really an outstanding both. he offered an amendment to the transportation security administration authorization legislation that would have imposed congressional oversight and accountability and restrict how the agency can actually use and display this -- to play this technology and put in place firm

privacy protections that would be assured because it would be a part of the law and not under the agency's own discretion. next i want to move over to what is currently happening with a discussion being offered by councilman david greenfield from the new york city council member who has taken a leadership role in introducing legislation that would ban the use of whole body scanning technology at new york airports which is a very important role that airport authorities of the local jurisdictions can play because they in fact can take on the responsibility of making sure that travelers writes are protected, that privacy, civil liberties are protected. they have the option of being able to do that and i think his ability to get the new york city council to consider this had to move this legislation forward speaks volumes about how

intrusive this technology is when we are talking about the center of our nation's concern about the events post-9/11, that there is a line in the sand and it has definitely been crossed and we are looking forward to hearing from councilman greenfield. last, what we want to consider is where do we go from here? what is the future going to look like? fortunately for us and for you here as well as those participating in a conference on line we have jim harper who is the director of information policy studies for the cato institute. jim also serves in the interest of the public as a member of the homeland security data privacy and integrity advisory committee which is actually the committee, the advisory body within dhs to help guide the agency regarding

privacy and security matters. staff is also present with us at the table, which i didn't know was going to happen so i'll have to let you introduce yourself. >> this is what it happens when you invite former cia officers to participate at the last minute. >> is good to have you. your training is very good. but i tell you, what i would like to do is let troy stock speak and then of course let you speak and then we will go on to the councilman and then we will wrap up the panel's presentation was jim harper. so without further ado, i will allow you to begin troy. >> thank you. thanks to e.p.i.c. for having this and for inviting us. when we first started, i will

kind of go through the story but as we introduce our bill and worked on this e.p.i.c. was extremely helpful in helping us with the language and was kind of advocacy and so we appreciate them. the way my boss congresswoman chaffetz from utah sort of became interested in this was kind of just by chance. as a congressman obviously he flew back and forth to his district every week basically in the salt lake airport was one of the first airports to have the whole body imaging machines. they were one of the trial airports so he just happened to see this. this. he saw what was going on and it was just come i think we have since become more informed and nowhere near mr. schneier who just spoke but have come closer to expert on this issue. at the time it was just sort of this intuitive gut feeling that you have that these just didn't seem right that this was too

much of an invasion of privacy and as a newly-elected congressman i think he said hey i can actually do something about this. said the initial push that we had, we had a stand-alone bill that was banned, what was then called whole body imaging. tsa renamed them the advanced imaging technology machines. what our original bill did and what the amendment did, does the same language, was to ban the use of these as primary mandatory screening devices. we didn't want to go so far as to say the should never ever be used in any circumstance. we thought there might be a role if some other really good reason showed a certain individual needed additional screening that there might be a use for this technology but just to have everyone have to go through these without any reasonable

suspicion we thought was just far and above what needed to be and that was an invasion of privacy. and then as lillie said we were able to get that attaches an amendment. it was a 310 yes those. it was very bipartisan and i think as this conference shows, it is an issue that brings people from both ends of the political spectrum together. my boss and patrick's boss probably don't agree on a whole lot. we can discuss that later but they agree on this and they are not the only two of different ends of the political spectrum. so we are happy that test. installed in the senate and i can talk later more about what we wanted it going forward and we plan on reintroducing a similar bill that will have that same provision and we will also address the pat-downs, the new

enhanced pat-downs that weren't really a concern when we first introduced our bill. that is sort of background on how -- and we can take questions later. >> thank you. i would like to hear from your colleague. if you could do a brief introduction of yourself. >> i want to again thank e.p.i.c. for putting this on and mr. holt wants to extend his thanks for what you are doing here today in inviting him. as i indicated that have been with mr. holt for several years now and i handle the full range of security issues including this one. and i am not going to essentially rehash everything that mr. holt said this morning. i do want to echo just about everything that my colleagues troy has had to say today. if there's anything we can and whether we are republicans and democrats it is that the senate is the enemy when it comes to actually trying to get anything accomplished on behalf of the american people and i am hoping

you know that we will be able to make progress on this issue that administrator holt was very supportive of mr. chaffetz's work. there are many things i would be happy to give in detail on it but i don't want to monopolize. i will hold the rest of that for the q&a session. >> thank you. councilman. >> thank you very much and you know i want to thank e.p.i.c. for bringing this conference together. out to thank all of you who are here today and i know we are sort of the last panel and things have given up a few folks stuck around and that we appreciate that. you know actually came to learn about the concerns about the series breach of privacy by the tsa much in the same way learned about a lot of what was going on outside of my immediate world by chatting with my wife. might ask -- my wife is here with us today and my wife and i haven't been on a vacation in a while. as my wife if she wanted to get his way for a few days. she looked at me squarely in the

eyes, not if we are fine. i don't want to go through those full-body scanners. until the appointed time i heard about the scanners but the way they were being described by the tsa seemed almost innocuous, advanced imaging technology. i read the stories in the paper the new york city airports would be among the first in the nation to begin using this technology that let us americans my reaction was that is great, safer airports. once my wife brought this concern to my issue -- issue to my concern is my wife was concerned with the scanners i should look into them and the more looked into them the more paul that became. i discovered the tsa was in essence engaging in safety theatrics. for starters while we would advanced imaging technology the more apt description would be naked body scanners. what's more, the scanners did not work as advertised. readily available internet research confirmed the scanners would not pick up some look with powders and thin plastics. all of these seems to be the

preferred materials of modern tears. after doing the research i discovered serious concerns as to whether this was even the best available to elegy out there today. someone who has been active in politics on my life by doug samore and it became clear, lobbyist one of the largest and a picture of these regimes was the former secretary of homeland security. if that wasn't bad enough after the failed bombing attempt on christmas day by the so-called underwear bomber at the same former secretary of homeland security ran around the country proclaiming if only we had these naked body scanners we could have prevented this bomber. the former secretary neglected to mention several things. one, the bomber originated in a foreign country. the united states would not have made a difference. according to the gao it was not clear that even if the bomb had gone through these machines it would have picked up the powder explosives and three perhaps the most important fact that the former secretary was compensated by the same folks who manufacture the supposedly magical machines.

in short politics as usual. the truth is how they worked in the political arena i'm used in hundreds of millions of dollars being spent on unproven technology akin is one company have the inside track. it is outrageous but sadly it is a frequent occurrence. what i am not used to is the government violating our fourth amendment privacy rights simply because the corporation was trying to make a few bucks. it quickly became clear to me to my constituents as well as new yorkers across the five boroughs have been comfortable with these invasive naked body scanners so is the new york city new york city councilman elected representative nearly 200,000 people i thought it was my responsibility should give them a voice not to mention the millions of frustrated air travelers subject to these ineffective scans in new york city home to the country's largest airports. the first thing i did was they put in the legislative request to ban full-body scanners and all of the city. after all drawing on lessons learned in orlando florida where

tens of thousands of images were saved there was no question that landis city council have the authority to ban these machines from government buildings in new york city. additional in the legislative request i also included a ban on the use of the scanners in new york city airports. the legal rational behind it was simple. new york city actually owns the land airports operate on. the port authority leases and operates the land however considering new york city actually owns land i believe he we can regulate what takes place on that land. our legislation has over a dozen members of the city council who supported and quite frankly i fully expect the port authority to sue the city if this legislation becomes law. but that is beside the point. i've no problem with the lead legal challenge because i would have for the first opportunity to weigh on this port issue. i agree to uphold the charter of the city of new york the constitution of of the state-of-the-art in the constitution of the united states of american they take those responsibilities quite seriously.

i firmly believe that these ineffective and invasive scanners by late new yorkers fourth amendment right to privacy. so the question of next@chris minus uphold colleagues around the country to follow my lead and introduce legislation banning the scanners from all of the city's buildings including their airports turquoise local elected officials who live pork and legislate in the communities we represent they really have the most interaction with their citizens and consequently we also have the best understanding of their daily needs and concerns. there is no questions our citizens are concerned about naked body scanners and there is also no question we have the ability to do something about it by banning those from our municipalities. thank you. [applause] >> thank you councilman and thanks for everyone on the panel and the way for running us and e.p.i.c. a great conference here today. a lot of good stuff has been shared and got out there for more and more people to understand these issues better.

not only am i here because i'm a department -- member of the advisory committee. i hasten to add that nothing i say here will represent the views of the committee or contradictory views of many of my friends on the committee leadership bercow and hello to you. i hope you are watching. on the dhs privacy committee we have reviewed the scanning machines several times and in several different for us but we have never been formally asked to comment and never formally commented. i will say this though and i think given the review to ask as we have had on the committee, the tsa privacy officer has been about -- done about the best job he can do in trying to make a system if privacy protection system at the detroit airport in fact long before last christmas review the systems in place designed to prevent people getting assess to the images created by these machines so again i think they have done the best they can but it raises the

question how do you make privacy protected a fundamentally invasive technology? and to the extent that friends of mine at tsa and dhs believes that they have got this right, i think they have mistaken one important thing which is what privacy is. privacy in its core is control and control over information about yourself. so when someone from outside if you comes and says i am going to do this to you now and the facts of what gets exposed are going to be the same as before. is a deprivation of control without regard to what happens with the data. you are taking away persons a person's control. think about this as a mental exercise. think about this. if somebody came to your front door instead, i am going to put on a blindfold and i am going to put plugs in my ears and i'm

going to stand at your bathroom while you shower, nothing happens to you at all. your privacy will be perfectly well protected. do you believe it? of course not because we exclude people from the bathroom as an exercise of control. likewise he put likewise he put on clothes as an exercise of control and when a machine deprives us of that control no one out of reassurance can restore that control. we have made decisions as individuals about how we are going to walk through the world and the machine that undoes that undoes their control and that since our privacy. another error in all these errors are in good judgment or rather in good faith. to have a risk tolerance for the u.s. public that differs from the u.s. public's own risk tolerance. the dhs is a security organization. is not a privacy organization and it is also for the efforts of people on privacy. is fundamentally a security

organization. is also not a risk managing organization. is part of a larger risk management process wordpress is for the security element. other parts of society have to focus on privacy as we are doing here. others have to focus on cost-effectiveness. so far again and again i've seen in the area of this technology and many other policies and programs the dhs saying things are risk-based. they sprinkle the word risk around in their documents like parsley on emile. but it is just parsley. is not the mail. and really i think going forward one of the strongest points for advocates on this site, this side represented here today of this issue is risk management. dhs should be press continually to actually do risk management, actually release its risk management so he can be the subject of public discussion and debate an improvement so we can actually learn whether this program and this technology is

cost justified, is privacy cuss just -- cost justified and so on. i think one of the greatest weaknesses of this program that is yet unsung is the time cost, watching some of these videos that have gone up to dispel what someone said about what happened to them at the airport for example, you can see it takes maybe seven seconds, make it five seconds make it 10 seconds per person to go through one of these machines. with 700 million in the united states each year you are talking about probably more than $100 million in time cost to american travelers in addition to the cost of the three people it takes to run these machines are go but those time costs are going to be what really make people squeal if it gets to the point where this is a mandatory procedure for all people to have to go through. i regrettably when i collaborated with u.n. any others on the real i.d. levin

national i.d. in law that we successfully fought back so far, regrettably i think a lot of state legislators got really worried about their constituents privacy when they saw how much it was going to cost to implement this national i.d.. i think that is what we will see here as this goes forward, if it does, a lot of our government officials, some exceptions are out here early, obviously representatives on this panel but a lot of our government officials will start to realize this is a privacy problem when they realize how much gosh darned time it takes at the airport in how much it costs in dollars. so i think pressing on the risk issues are going to be the best big picture way of going forward and that will help a lot of other programs that are probably not validated. ultimately we as a society this is very long-term and not easy to do but we are set to be pressing on it in a group like this here can do a lot. we have to come out of this post-9/11 hunch where retreat and i think bruce is key with a good description of how to really think better about this

stuff, where retreat terrorism as an existential threat. it is not. where we cast by her own responsibility for security believing it is going to be provided by somebody else. is telling the last line of security and successful one and most of these attacks have been individual on the plane. is a real part of our security. is not one we want to rely on but when we do it has succeeded. so a lot of security is our job. government leaders are going to follow us, and american citizens becoming more confident in expressing our endowment olivia sifry country rather than kowtowing to the success of the terrorism strategy and in scaring us into submission. i look forward to the q&a obviously. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. i have to say this is a great last panel in our conference like this. the thing that i think is very interesting about the department of homeland security is the

newest, the largest, the wealthiest federal government, barely there -- but it definitely has deep pockets and taxpayer dollars is the best way to put it. but it also has proven to be resistant to make yourself available, more transparent to the public which i think also helps it harden its shell. there is a turtle mentality going on there and they are waiting for the storm to pass and then they will come out and they will continue in the direction they are going. to reach a particular point from out there. i'm not going to ask you to talk about where that point might eat, but that type of of technology we see being deployed in airports, there were other forms of that technology out there. there are some forms that are portable, mobile that are being

pilot tested or even deployed but what we learned what we find out and we start working on these issues, think there is a mindset that we are also combating. i want us to get to some ideas from the panel. what do you think is the most critical shift in mindset that has to happen either on the part of the department of homeland security, and the part of elected local, state or federally elected officials or the part of the citizens are the traveling public themselves in order to turn the corner or to make this change from the mindset we have been following post-9/11 to the way we will reestablish the role of government and the role of citizens and the role of agency employees? ..

of the technologies the design. there are even some really way out their stuff where they want to measure a person's heart rates, the movement of their eyeballs and things like this from a distance and then compare the reactions to different stimuli and things like this we are talking about mobile

lie-detector machines and these are programs condemned horizon but it's important to keep them on all the different things the dhs is doing as far as shift in mind set i will go into people need to understand if this is the shift of understanding that it will help to dispel what we are still living under. terrorism is a strategy that seeks overreaction on the part of the victim's state so its not all terrorists are separate strategists, the act of dhaka and motives including the the sense of belonging and gained membership and that kind of thing but it acts in ways that is of course, not ourselves off our feet and we hear it all the time people say well what makes us safer that's precisely what they shouldn't be saying. they should see does it make it safer because of the doesn't this is terrorism working. the other thing and i think a smaller group of people would be involved in this but they should

be is get in the habit of asserting your rights. people in this room will tend to do that, maybe people watching on line or on tv haven't gotten used to it but when you insert your right you can have enough power and the strip search machines are a good example because on a small number of people decline to go through the machine requiring the tsa to give a pat-down they are coming up the works. they're raising the cost of having this technology in place, having this program in place and that's good because this program probably shouldn't be in place. this program provides too little security at too much cost in terms of dollars and privacy. so asserting york writes even once by one person makes a much bigger difference than if the to separate themselves out across the entire population. >> okay. i think the challenge that we face are the issues the we discussed at this conference. the reality is it is a very

difficult change the mindset of individuals and as elected officials, most elected officials simply follow the lead of their constituents. so i am not convinced by telling people you know, you folks need to pay more attention they are actually going to pay more attention. for me, this situation here of the body scanner is actually the sort of super bowl of privacy. i will tell you why because it is simple to understand, right, you know, i tell people when they say what is a top of the scanner they say imagine that tsa had a new rule to get on your plans you have to walk through and make it they say i'm not going to walk through naked that's ridiculous. that's what's happening. they are requiring you to walk through naked. does it matter that your neighbors don't see you but the reality is that someone behind the screen is looking in your naked body and i think people find that very offensive to one of the things i try to do is encourage people to speak out because that's really how he liked officials respond. when people call or write to us

or e-mail us we as elected officials feel pressure and we respond so one of the things i did is created a website similar to what epic has which is www.reporttsaabuse.com and my fury is to have a few setting airport i'm going to take your information and forwarded to a prosecutor's office because we know for a fact that these tsa agents are poorly screened in some cases actually have criminal backgrounds. so they have an opportunity sadly enough to abuse individuals, and so for me i think this is a unique situation where we have to encourage people to speak out against situations they had, and the best way to do that is to reach out to your elected local official in the till the official whether it is your local legislator or a member of congress or state legislator i had a very bad experience and this is simply unacceptable, and that is how elected officials respond. >> thank you. i wanted to hear from the

perspective of the new congress. we have some bipartisan that is happening here and it is a beautiful thing. especially on this particular issue i think there are cost issues that are on the table, hundreds of millions of dollars, contracts linked. will there be investigations to find out what has been done has followed the requirements set out by the congress oversight of the agency spending of funds and whether the technology actually does what it is being sold to be doing and then what can be done to recruit some of those funds, what can be done to stop the deployment of not just whole body imaging and airports but also looking at other hand settings where the agency may be looking to technology or advanced balancing systems. any thoughts? >> sure. my boss mr. chaffetz is going to be ordered guess is now the

chairman of the subcommittee on the oversight and government reform committee that has stressed action over homeland security, foreign affairs and national defense. and so one of the things we want to do is what you were talking about, is to have sort of robust hearings on basically all the issues that have been talked about today can terms of it is this really effective, have you looked into the health concerns raised, on and on and on the issues you talk about that have been raised in this conference it's great to do this among us and it's even better to have someone from tsa having to testify under oath before congress and to really answer some of these tough questions because i know that is something that my boss is looking to do i hope and i suspect doing that that will have bipartisan

support in doing that and i guess will go from there. we will have the hearings and get some answers or won't get answers and i think to kind of the earlier question our hope is that something like that can help sort of changed the debate and help people to understand that this is all security theater they are giving up all sorts of rights and exchange for basically no security. you always hear this you give up some security for liberty or give up some liberty for security and where to draw the line and it is a false debate. it's not always a false debate in this case you are giving of liberty and because these don't really work that well and we are not doing your part security the way we should be you are not getting any more security and i think once the american people realize that the public opinion will sort of a snowball in our

favor. >> that we pick up on your cost. how much money is poured into the upper one of security since 111? about $360 billion through fiscal year ten. that is before billion. what are we getting for our money? that is part of the question we have to ask what are we getting for our money? this is at least part of the way i answer it. shortly after the war and afghanistan kicked off, then secretary defense rumsfeld paid a visit to my home state of missouri and gave a speech at the air force base kind talking about the road ahead if you will. and this is one of the most memorable quotes. we have two choices.

either we change the way we live for we must change the way that they live. we choose the latter. the problem is the opposite has happened and that $360 billion in just talked about is one prime example of that. if it hadn't been for the 9/11 intelligence failure we never would have spent that money. that is money that would have gone for roads, bridges, education or to be bipartisan here in the taxpayers' pockets. and that is how al qaeda unfortunately is winning and goes back to what bruce was saying in the previous talk that he gave. that is what the cost we are dealing with, so we can't just measured purely of the dollar's almost a third of a trillion dollars. that is a lot of money even by washington standards. we can be getting a lot more for our money and better and to that end i will quickly back to one

of the things talked up this morning and that is this complete disconnect and this gets me going as a former intelligence officer. the complete disconnect between having the transportation security agency come to the hill on november 18th of 2010 and said in a room with several hundred staffers and dillinger the unclassified and reporting quite frankly recitation of the al qaeda threat and then segue into a very graphic demonstration of these pat-down techniques and to see the complete disconnect between the two. they are running everybody from these machines and they are putting down your grandmother and your children, and that no intel to back it up. as said this morning the cops don't roust each and every one of the self our beds every morning and say what are you going to come today? yet that is exactly how we are treating the flying public. and that is the single greatest thing that i can cast a change

in the short term. that is the key thing. we've got to mandate that if these kinds of invasive pat downs and the use of these machines are going to take place assuming that issues and related issues can be addressed it's got to be tied to intelligence on a bad guy. that in my judgment is the single biggest change we can make a what directly and immediately help the fleeing public and probably saved a whole lot of the 360 billion at the same time. >> i like what you said, and you are obviously doing some clear thinking and it's nice to see bipartisanship i hope will hold together on this. there is an interesting dynamic going on shift back in people's thinking of this in light of the fact there is so much distaste for the strip search machine solved by the strip search everyone is going back to that. we need it to be intelligence base or to profiling.

and that's stuff we've seen before. if you have very precise intelligence obviously you use it but if your intelligence is something loose like someone flying into the united states for many of 13 countries you really haven't got much to go on and so i'm worried we are going to move back to a debate we have six or seven years ago on should we know more about all of our passengers, deep background checks on them we have to have a strong buy the system so we need to start building a national i.d. and so on and so forth. we had that debate and went away and rightly so. the solution in this area and i will cite another statistic bruce snyder had a lot of good ones the last decade there have been 99 million domestic flights to the united states carrying 7 million passengers. that is carl and there have been zero bombs detonated on planes. the bombs snuck on were coming from overseas and they didn't successfully detonated. that is by almost anyone's reckoning into a small risk.

very small risk of something really bad happening. risk acceptance, risk acceptance is almost swear word inside the washington, d.c. bulkeley but something i get to see because my special job this is an area there might not be better security measure we should be taking in lieu of this there should just be not this. we are going to open up for questions, but it got to think that we are going to have a new term for the spirit of stinking pinball security theater but anyway i digress. i would open up for questions for the audience and if there are some from the boat audience if you could tweet them to the twitter feed that we have. >> i don't mean to complicate things, but i want to go off a

comment that troy made about in some issues there is a trade-off between security and human rights for liberty and this one does not. having worked on these issues with colleagues from the aclu the bill of rights defence committee which was a catalyst to work with the agency of the local level and resolutions against the patriot act, against the racial profiling, a whole cluster of issues we saw after 9/11, that effort was successful the local level test and 400 resolutions and i hope that you will work with us now on the ordnances the bill of rights defence working on it, www.dorc.org. but my question is isn't it the case it certainly seems to us that so often security and human rights will be good together and what we are seeing is a whole cluster of issues that involve illegal invasive overly broad

harsh counterproductive ineffective action, and i'm thinking of the patriot act which is up for renewal again next month and my question to you, council member greenfield, is can we get an ordinance, not just a resolution that will be against that in new york as we did previously in the resolution basis around the country again and that the federal level is there any hope are we just whistling past the graveyard here is it too late to hope that we can finally get backed the individual rights of suspicion again and reverse things like the patriot act and the massive warrantless surveillance? a whole cluster of issues. the fbi infiltration of peace groups it doesn't just stop with the standards they are emblematic of this over broad security approach, but i would like to ask all the panelists and in your policy perspective what do we have? >> i want to start fighting to

make some good points and you know, just to reiterate what jim said a moment ago to think of the very important point is that you know, in many cases i think that we have a small perspective that bidder is more, right? i'm sorry, more is better. more isn't always better. so, this is a typical question jim pointed out that i get all the time people ask me if we are not going to use these machines what are we going to do? the answer is we are doing okay without these machines, right? these are not magical machines and in fact what is the most effective is a simple trick to google will tell you these machines do not actually work and so i think that, you know, we have all of us have a responsibility and on the local level, you know, one of the - what is innovative about what we've done is we are trying to pass an actual wally in the resolution, resolutions are great and we pass a lot of them that we need to pass a law that bans something i think that actually has more teeth and then quite frankly, the federal government has to pay attention and then the authorities very

quickly, on the phone and say we would love to get together and talk about your thoughts and when you are planning on doing and we have over a dozen co-sponsors. so there is no question there's a lot of areas of concern. one of the areas of concern is the recent decision coming out of california is the police can actually searched for yourself phones. do you know what i have on my cell phone? my entire life. everything. so basically you can now do a warrantless search on my entire life by peeking into my cellphone. that's very disturbing and there is no question the local level we have to do what we can but we shouldn't short the responsibility of my friends to the left of me who in congress actually bear the primary responsibility for taking action on these gross violations of privacy. >> i have for now being someone who works for a member of congress, and i'm not a member

of congress i don't want to speak for my boss and specifics on the patriot act for a sample, but i will say in general in terms of this congress and some of these issues and i think a lot of what you mentioned sort of the gps wireless truckers and the cell phones, a lot of this technology based where there are new technologies that sort of have privacy implications and oftentimes fourth amendment implications we haven't faced before and as you mentioned courts across the country are sort of struggling with this and sometimes they are on the side of just law enforcement and looking at the phone is no deal i think the court cases just like looking at pack of cigarettes, and then on the other hand think about what we have on our phone needy that should be private, you should probably need a warrant to look at my phone. and so, in general those issues what i would say, and congress is just getting started on this i don't know if this is right but this is my hunch, with a lot

of the new republican members who in the house are coming in a lot of tomorrow, you know, sort of limited government individual liberties and individual freedom i think many of them would be receptive to some of those arguments and that these sorts of areas will be some where we can have sort of this issue and interesting kind of left right bipartisan agreement as we were on these issues and we try to find the right balance. >> if you heard my boss this morning in his quip about wondering whether or not we would have a fourth amendment read on the floor or the house today you kind of get a sense of where he is at. he of course as opposed to the patriot act is to defeat what became known as the protect america act, the flawed amendment act so his record on

civil liberties, the promotion, the protection of civil liberties without compromising the security of the country is very, very well-established. i agree i think there will be opportunities to try to do this but i will also tell you as someone who worked in the intelligence community for many, many years whose spouse still works in the intelligence committee and has a lot of friends in the intelligence community we are going to get an avalanche, and i mean an avalanche of pressure to simply pass the patriot act reauthorization straight up. i guarantee you, and i will predict to you we will see a statement of the administrative policy from this president asking for just that. that's sad, that is tragic in my opinion but i think that is what we are going to see. so if you to change the dynamic you've got to talk to your neighbors. you've got to line up every blog, every last tool you've got

at your disposal to educate everyone that you know about the consequences of allowing the to go forward because adding that is the great fever i personally have and i will use the old fraud and now the chief. you throw a frog into boiling water and he jumps right out. but you put one in there and just turning up slowly and it's one of those classic acronyms he's just going to cook right there. that is what is happening to our liberty in this country because it is being taken away from us. we are allowing it to be taken away from us bit by bit and it sounds reasonable and it sounds very rational. we've got to do what is necessary to keep the bad guys at bay. nobody disagrees with what is reasonable and necessary to keep the bad guys at bay but it's not reasonable and rational to see if i were a california citizen that my cell phone is up for grabs to take a look at so we have got a lot of work to do.

that work is going to be done by you all and the councilman hit the nail on the head. you've got to line up the phones and get e-mail going you just make it an issue. that's how you are going to have a chance to try to rule this fact. >> briefly your question to me goes to what i call the strategic player of security the individual stops the attack whether or not the strip search machines work. the strategically arista furthest outlier one of the furthest out layers don't give people a reason to want to come and attack the united states it's smart, makes good sense and strategy. regard that as a cost of our foreign policy at least. and second, don't need it fun to attack the united states.

i see don't make it fun almost the size of the because if you read the people who are actively studying terrorism, we think of them of course because of their affect, we think your geopolitical lectors because of what osama bin laden says. most are not geopolitical actors. they are people with nothing else to do. they want to be part of something that's a big community can put the american president in the eye that's huge. if they can knock the united states of its game that is what they want to be a part of, as a part of our job in responding to that, though strategically year to our security is not being knocked off hour game. it is being brave and not worrying about it. it's arresting as bruce said terrorist suspects without making a big deal about it. throw them in prison blues or worse yet, the orange jumpsuits and put them away having found them criminally liable. they are criminals, not dramatic antiheroes. that is what some of what you're

going to, lots of u.s. policies have helped my terrorism stronger. >> thank you so much. the gentleman in the very back standing. thank you. >> mr. harper mentioned vigilance as part of the protecting airlines or air plans. i was wondering what panel fault of the idea of allowing select passengers to carry guns as a way of defending then. >> there was an ad on tv other day for it was a football and and all the guys that have super bowl rings were allowed to go right through security and all the guys that don't have to go through the machines and what not and i think was jimmy johnson, he had a machete with him and the security guard was like well, go on.

if i knew everybody on the plane if i knew him well enough i would be all right with whatever weapon on the plane. myself, my risk assessment is probably not to be on the same plan with strangers who have guns that can do that much damage. >> everybody should be about to make their own risk assessment and frankly airlines should be able to advertise the risk assessment that they make and to plan and get it wrong. i would much rather be debating what single policy the government should have for all of us. i would much rather have airline security be disbursed to the people and businesses to have an interest in it. if an airline and its most important something we sealed after 9/11, its most important and airline paid the price if it failed to secure its infrastructure. >> i don't think it is a good idea for one reason you are basically -- if there would be would-be terrorists you're putting the gun on the plane. to have to remember that average citizens are not trained if a

terrorist who is trained in terms of activities as far as grabbing a gun or as far as attacking an individual especially in close quarters so you have a terrorist that goes on a plane and has a gun you are making it a little too easy perhaps for the terrorist simply to attack the other person and by the gun in close quarters told think it's a good idea. >> thank you. >> thanks for a much for your presentation especially jim. [laughter] one of my concerns people on the panel earlier today when asked what would you do other than the body scanners is intelligence and rely on intelligence and also kind of an illusion you should be looking at other people, not my daughter, not my

grandmother with the implication being some sort of profiling is perhaps justified, inconvenient for other people who are not like me, makes them go through the body scanner, not me because i'm obviously good. so my concern about the intelligence is the art of homeland security showing the dhs agents around the country as chip said and anybody whose politics are a little bit critical for their comfort zone so i have a concern about relying on the intelligence, the intelligence we are seeing going on is just really not very good. estimate i will take a quick stab at that. as mr. holt indicated this morning, we are not talking about profiling on the basis of any kind of ethnic religious or

other characteristic. here we are talking about specific actionable data on specific individuals. that is how the system ought to actually work and at least in theory if you listen to general petraeus and the folks over in the theater this is the approach that they tried to accuse with respect to the predator drawn attacks the the use regularly on a daily basis to go after al qaeda and taliban related leadership. and now i am not going to make a statement one way or the other about the wisdom of that particular approach. i simply offer it as an analogy about how we intelligence when it is used in a targeted and a calibrated way can actually have an effect. the issue that you and chip have raised with respect to kind of this whole domestic surveillance problem i think is somewhat of a separate issue and i say that

because dhs at least with respect to how their screeners and the folks that operate in their reports are supposed to go about their business is very, very discreet from the very irresponsible behavior the fbi for example is engaged in with respect to the thomas martin senator incident and others that the doj inspector general issued their report on have to refresh my memory chip was out early lead last year when they put that one out there is a discrete issue there is an issue that does need to be addressed and it gets to this larger mentality, this larger surveillance statement mentality that has kind taken hold in this post 9/11 world supply due to weakened >> those problems out even though to a certain degree they are somewhat related. >> i want to thank you. we are right at the close but i have a couple of things that i

think our observations about the lessons learned by those on the outside of the national intelligence, national defence will enforcement who work in policy regarding privacy and civil liberties. electronic privacy information center we think technology is wonderful, and we have lots of it and love to use it. but we also noticed that in a policy framework there was an advisory committee that congress had in place that would help us figure out what was real and what was and when they were looking at technology and funding technology or allowing the agents riding into the legislative proposals requirements regarding technology and it's kind of given way that technology is a lot like butter. there are few things that are not improved if you added.

policy that isn't well crafted were understood and implemented in ways that are appropriate along with the capacity to men beings to actually manage the technology that they are now relying on for critical things the real prospect that if people are put into an environment where they are told technology is there to the job but their ability to get to be vigilant, be responsive, be alert will be seriously impacted so the thing you're protecting against you actively solicits happening and in this context we're talking about people's lives. we are very interested in not having bad outcomes. we don't want to see bad outcomes. we don't want to see another attack. but we also understand that there are a host of things that are happening on a daily basis in the lives of individuals that cost lives, cost help that cause

a great deal of harm that are not being focused on and i think the thing that most of simplifies the post-9/11 mentality of the focusing on one kind of threat was in 2005 when we saw hurricane katrina hid new orleans. we had the department of homeland security that also had the federal emergency management agency. that agency had a bad reputation for president clinton took office, the rehabilitated the agency and turned it into something that when a disaster happened it wasn't called the second disaster. it actually brought health and was affected. watching what happened to orleans is a metaphor for what has happened to the nation been so focused on one type of disaster looking behind us constantly preparing to have that rematch. there is no rematch. there is only tomorrow and the

next day which we cannot see clearly that we can anticipate certain things will be true. there will be another hurricane out there somewhere. there will be another earthquake. there will be another flood. there will be another tsunami, there will be something. there will be man-made, non-man made things we will have to deal with. we've got to have a mind set regardless of the source of the disaster. you look at the before. how can we compare individuals to be their best resource to each other because the most immediate help we are going to have in any disaster is the person right next to you commit yourself and the person right next to you. the ability to be able to weather the storm until more significant help will our life is training and preparation a making those resources available to individuals. but it first begins with the mindset to read this nation wasn't founded by people who were cowards, people who were fearful.

people can hear some voluntarily and some involuntarily. but when they can hear some people were here and how to deal with the arrival of people they had never seen, technology the didn't understand. we figured out how to make it to this point. together, we made it. but now we're facing a challenge of our own desire and our own making. we will make it and survive it but we have got to be honest with ourselves and with each other. the demand we place on government that it must protect us from all harm and threat of a particular type meant that when we were faced with a different type of threat and nearly 2,000 people died of new orleans. that is unacceptable. and if you want to find the source we have to look in the mirror ourselves because we did not say to our government as the people to its government trying to prepare for a threat that already happened is unacceptable we will look to the future with

the same passion and spirit that helped found this country. we have got to do better than this and to begin the process we've got to demand more of ourselves as citizens then we can look them square in the audience and we can demand more of you as our representatives. i want to thank you for sticking out today. [applause] [inaudible] you have got great feedback from the panels that have been here getting good ideas about what we need to do as citizens, what we need to do as advocates and what we need to do as those who are elected officials, those serving public service we don't disrespect people who serve our country who serve in public service. we appreciate what they are doing but we also know we shouldn't be asking the impossible of them. thank you very much for your time today and i look forward to continuing this discussion and dialogue at epic.org. there's also the privacy coalition which is a list of organizations that have been working long and hard not only

on this issue but a number of issues and we invite you to visit our web site and learn more about the work of the advocacy community on privacy issues. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

this week marks the anniversary of the earthquake in haiti. now, a look at pt from activists who recently traveled there. this is a little less than an hour and half. >> welcome and good afternoon. welcome to brookings.

i am a senior fellow and deputys director of the foreign policy program. we are very honored to have with us an incredible panel to talk us about the tragic earthquake in haiti that took place almost exactly one year ago. that we are here today really at aear momentous time to step back andy reflect on the challenges that haiti visas, the terrible tragedy and to take a moment to take stock of the circumstances and how to move forward and a best possible way for all concerned. we are going to have a fullfor discussion, and we will proceedn in the following week. we are first going to hear from our honored guest, sean penn, who is the founder of the. j.p-haitian release organization and then you will also hear fron

paul weisenfeld who is the senior deputy administrator for the u.s. agency for international development bureau for latin america and the caribbean is. they will each speech from the podium for about ten minutes and then we will take some questioe and answers. we will then turn to our panelists and i will introduce them in a moment and we willille take an very brief break mr. pen cleaves rn 3:00 and then we will continue the discussion until we 3:30. c now let meo introduce our panelists. let mr. penn is ame two-time academy-award winner, and you have their biographies i am notm goinge to recount them in detair it's an incredibly impressive rereer in film, writing as a inc journalist and increasingly as a humanitarian and his work innit.

haiti has been particularly haih remarkable. he's also done some work in new orleans after the hurricane i katrina, but recently he hasleas been spending all of his time a when he's not on thef film set n seems in haiti, in it port-au-prince working side by side with the victims of the earthquake. side his organization runs the earthquake. can send port-au-prince and established the first emergency location in the country.mp in he's worked port-au-prince and established the first emergency relocation in the country. he's worked quite closely with u.s. military. it will be interesting to hear his thoughts on that. he's been commended with many different awards from the u.s. military and we're very honored to have him here. we will then hear from paul weisenfeld. he's had over 18 years of

experience at usaid and served as the coordinator of usaid haiti's task force in the aftermath of the earthquake, has a lot of field experience in countries like per rur, zimbabwe and egypt and he will give us a sense of how things look from a usaid perspective. we'll take some q and a, we'll go back to the panel and hear from samuel worthington, president and ceo of interaction which is a partner in hosting this event. interaction is the largest alliance of u.s.-based international non-governmental organizations with 190 members. he's also very involved in interagency standing committee at the united nations and i will come back and make an announcement about their work in a moment. we also have the privilege of hearing from two other speakers. beth ferris is the director of

the brookings project on internal displacement and also senior fellow here at foreign policy. she's an expert on force migration, human rights, humanitarian action, the role of civil society, she's just returned, as many of our speakers have, from haiti. she's spent many years in geneva working for the world council of churches, teaches and writes extensively on these topics. and then we will hear from claude jedat, director of habitat for humanitarian haiti and he's been running that position since 2004. habitat for humanity has been in haiti for 27 years so they have a long-term perspective on the issues of shelter and housing on the island. he's also a member of the interim haiti reconstruction commission which is the body that is co-chaired by prime minister of haiti and former president bill clinton that will

also be hearing about in the course of the discussion. as you know from the press attention on this anniversary, a lot of people are asking what's going on, why aren't we seeing more progress on reconstruction. i think the job here is to really with these experts explore some of the complexities of the situation, both of the happenings on the ground and overall international response to it. one question that we'll want to focus on is more than the immediate response and logistics but also the rights and dignity of the haitian people involved in this disaster. and in that spirit, there is a new document that we have been here at brookings very involved with in particular, a project on internal displacement, which is the guidelines, the operational guidelines, on human rights and natural disasters. we have copies for you out front. this document was adopted by the

interagency standing committee which is a body affiliated with the united nations and is the highest humanitarian coordination body that we have in the world. and these principles, i think, put front and center the whole range of rights that are implicated in natural disasters and how to think about them in an intelligent way. as you know from the statistics, the earthquake killed over 200,000 people, displaced 1 1/2 million people, the infrastructure is ruined in port-au-prince, the capital city. you'll hear a lot more statistics. i will not go through them all. i think it is clear that there's very strong political will on the part of governments and the general public to help haiti. the outpouring has been tremendous, but we're now in this window where the immediate crisis is past us and there needs to be action on reconstruction. this is where it really takes a

long time to get moving. it's in a planning phase. you don't see as much of the progress as you'd like to see on the ground. and that situation, how long does that situation last and where can things go wrong, what are the trade-offs to really show tangible progress for the haitian people, is one of the key questions i think we'll be talking about today. so with no further ado, let me ask sean penn to come to the podium. >> thank you. well, in the last days, beginning yesterday and today, we understand that the office of the american states is going to make a recommendation that the candidates supported by the president of haiti, jude sillstein, drop out of the race and the run-off be between martelli and manigot.

whether the president will accept this proposition remains to be seen. the assumption is that an official announcement and cep response will follow the anniversary an the attendant media. in either case, just to frame the circumstances that we're talking about today and that you'll hear a lot of various perspectives on, to go back to the beginning, we had a country with a rather broken infrastructure and void of infrastructure in many ways prior to the earthquake. government offices, close at 4:00 on the afternoon. an earthquake that happened at 5:00 in the afternoon and 60% of government buildings collapsing on those committed enough to stay after hours and killing so many of the valuable resources, human resources and human beings

in haiti. this is to say that while so much of the attention is going to be at the slow pace of things, that the interconnectedness of a human population so severely traumatized with such a chaotic disaster as an earthquake where infrastructure, building codes, mixed so poorly and created so much damage, this, in the best of circumstances, would be a venture that took some enormous patience and a kind of, i think, re-education of cultural interpretation and media coverage. patience that would be more human than commercial and one that we should be pushing very hard to see in the coming year.

when the international donors conference toward a new future for haiti was held in march of last year, $9.9 billion was pledged over the next three years. of this amount, more than $5 billion was pledged for 2010-2011. pledges that range from the offer to build a senegal-based haitian consulate to an imf pledge of concession on loan and debt relief. so here we are, january 10th, 2011. while the world media will focus on haitian election fraud and call for re-elections and recounts, it would be worth our considering our own closet. how would it be if we were to do a redo of the donors conference with caveats -- no nation may diminish the value of their initial pledge and no nation may pledge in-kind donation or

diversified pledges. this translates into a conference which would allow the haitian government and the haitian people to hold donor nations' feet to the fire by requiring not cash but tangible components of reconstruction. this would look like france, stating that it would rebuild eight hospitals that were destroyed, repair and pay out debt on the 22 that were severely damaged. as a coalition, all donor nations would commit that every haitian have access to potable water and drilled wells with filtration or decellenization units so every haitian would have access to clean water by 2012. with each nation responsible for a city and outlying area, including the mountainous and remote areas who are attic lar risk of mortality as they suffer cholera with a lack of clean water accessible. 2012 is a year for visionaries.

with an already-severely malnourished infrastructure, haiti faced a devastating earthquake that killed nearly 300,000 people. 300,000 human beings in ten seconds one year ago. not to mention the nearly 400,000 with largely devastating injuries. since that time, tens of thousands have been killed from flood and mudslides, hurricane tomas put port-au-prince in the crosshairs of catastrophe. for nearly a week and a near-miss, sending aid organizations into a virtual lockdown and panicking an already-vulnerable population. then the recent elections and the doubts in their legitimacy showed that, though a resolutely civil society, this recent and passionate expression is synonymous with a traumatized culture finding its first voice since the most devastating disaster in human history

occurred just one year ago. this is where it gets tricky. because as we have seen, the media will report on chaos, death and destruction, and with our haitian partners burgeoning emotional readiness and make no mistake, there is still mourning to do. the alchemy that is our culture's lack of patience, their country's immediate needs are going to be at odds. because what will potentially be newsworthy tragedy in the upcoming months of social struggle surrounding elections will be the perception of a chaotic and unsolvable set of problems at the most solvable moment. if the media and if we in the international relief community, and our donors, stand beside this expression of the people, and stand beside the current

government and whatever future government they may choose, 2012 will be the beginning of a triumph that has never been seen so tangibly on a small island nation of 10 million an hour and a half from our shores. how did we do it. how did we change the failed dynamic of relief work of the last several decades. we can start by looking at the common thread of failure. i've been in haiti since mid-january, 2010. i came with a fresh eye, but not without experience. as you might be surprised to know that creating and sustaining an effective ngo is not at all unlike producing a film. as i've said several times before, the stakes are immeasurably higher but the process is nearly identical. in our ngo, jphro, today our

burn rate is approximately $1 million a month. in film our burn rate is about $120,000 a day which adds up to about three times the burn rate of my ngo. the number of staff is approximately the same. cash-for-work programs pay far less to the equivalent for fees of crowd scenes, comprised of members of an extras union. we break it down to department heads and areas of operations. in one case, money adds up to entertainment and given a little care, perhaps a few provocative thoughts gifted to the culture. and the other case, in the ngo case, it adds up to the preservation of lives, of men, women and children, and with a little luck, human hope and independence. this brings me back to the thread of failed aid in haiti

and the front row seat that i have had had in this past year. in film, if we fail to provoke an audience, we fail a medium that is obliged to more than entertainment. with its power to be big cultural medicine. and when we fail that, it is due to our reliance on cliche. so here is a cliche that you often hear in the ngo community. here's a cliche that, as much as any, is as hollywood as anything i've ever seen and should be given its final coffin now. don't give them fish, teach them to fish. what fish? what school? what building inspector? what building code? what materials? of course, we have to support

haiti with training, parallel training. but that can also be the smokescreen that teach them to fish, the smokescreen that leaves hundreds of thousands of vulnerable and unsanitary camps through next year's hurricane season. we've got to put the fish there. the time for action is now. one year after the earthquake we're facing challenges with donors on issues like camp management. i'm hearing every day that more and more ngos are relieving themselves of the role of camp manager because the funding is drying up for those activities or because the job's just too hard and they no longer want to be in such a difficult position. camp management f, for the reco, is not about keeping people in the camps but about helping people return to viable secure communities or to reach their chosen durable solution.

those who left the camps up until now were among the easier to help. there were host family opportunities. for example, we have a rubble removal outfit, a heavy equipment wing. you identify an area of operations with the population of your camp. you go, you remove the rubble. get other ngo partners, find transitional or permanent shelters, or repair shelters. and then offer opportunities for those families in camp to move back into those neighborhoods. those options have been largely exercised. and what remains in the camps today are those in the most desperate of circumstances. those who have no alternative. there's no shortcut in haiti. i will give an example. to date in port-au-prince,

temporary shelters erected number about 7,000. that's in a year. what is needed to get all of these families back in to -- minimally -- hurricane-resistant structures, homes that are not on tarps on mud banks, on top and flood zones on top of each other where one match could light the whole camp on fire. where disease, infections, can spread like lightning. so where you had as many as 1.8 million at one point, coming down dramatically to 1.2, and now at about 750,000, but now going to be the slow part. now it's going to be the tough part. 7,000 shelters were erected, 400,000 is what would be needed.

given that the shelters themselves are all single level, they will not spread in the areas available, and so this goes back to decentralization which is going to be mandatory to make this country work again. so all of the things, whatever happens in port-au-prince, and what have happens with the international community, is going to have to be complemented by business interests and aid diversifying into other areas supporting the cities outside of port-au-prince and the remote areas and of course, agricultural interests. there's got to be more rubble removed. more shelter an housing solutions. more water and toy lets, roads, hospitals, schools, jobs. we've got to offer them a way out of the camps. landowners are getting