space shom the u.s. russian nuclear cooperation efforts. we'll hear from the chief u.s. negotiator on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty and other arms control analysts. from the council on foreign relations, this is 55 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> okay we can get started, please. >> my name is cliff, the directorate the eurasia group

and i would like to welcome everyone to today's council on foreign relations committee. first, just a few housekeeping items. please come completely turn off not just put on vibrate your cellphone, blackberry, any wireless devices to avoid interference with our sound system here. as a reminder, this meeting is on the record. let me then proceed to introduce our guests. first, rose gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state for the bureau of arms control, verification and compliance. she recently served as most of you know as chief negotiator of the new strategic arms reduction treaty or new s.t.a.r.t.. prior to her current position she's been with the carnegie endowment for international peace where she works on u.s.-russian relations, and nuclear security ability to.he

stephen pifer is a senior fellow at the brookings center on the united states and europe and the director of the b brookings arms control initiative. the focus is on russia and officee and arms control broadly.rs retired foreign control officerd were identified as the department focus on u.s. relations with russia andl as eurasia as well as on the arms i control and security issues finally micah zenko for the conflict prevention in the o senate preventive action on thek the council of foreign relations. ersi he worked at harvard universityf school of government and a number of research positions. at brookings and the congressional research service and the planning office of the state department.

let me then begin our discussion and let me begin with you, rose. what, in your view, are thethe e lessons of the new s.t.a.r.t.u.r for the fuusture of the u.s. ars control negotiations and there - are two ingalls in mind here. u'at insights can you offer from what you've experienced on russian views on key issues and, secondly, what lessons does new s.t.a.r.t. offer on how any, any u.s. administration should handle the congress on an arms control treaty? >> excellent, excellent questions, cliff. and can by the way, may i just say how impressed i am that there are so many people interested in nuclear arms control at this hour of the morning. [laughter] i think it's absolutely terrific. but that was actually the first point, and i'd like to turn to your congressional point to begin with, actually, because the significant lesson of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty both negotiation and ratification process, in my view, for the congressional rich is that -- relationship is that it brought

this issue front and center again in our relationship with the u.s. congress and particularly with the senate. i was very impressed as the negotiator, i must say sometimes pressed as the negotiator because the senate was very, very interested through the course of the negotiations. we briefed them repeatedly, five times we briefed the national security working group starting back in the spring of 2009 as the negotiations were barely getting started and proceeding, then, through the summer and the rest of 2009-2010. shot only briefing -- not only briefing the national security working group which is chaired by at that time senator kyl, senator kyl and senator byrd, but also then chairing, the chairman of the foreign relations committee and the ranking member, senator kerry, senator lugar, of course, we were very involved with them throughout, but the armed services committee and the intelligence committees as well. so we had this kind of regular

dialogue going on. and then the ratification process came, and you all know what the ratification process was like. it was a very, very lively debate, lively discussion. but the core conclusion that i take away from it is that nuclear arms control is back as an issue of interest on the hill and one where a number of senators -- not all by any means, but a number of senators are willing and ready to engage. so as far as the future is concerned, i would just say, you know, continue what we've been doing which is to try to stay in very, very close contact as we proceed in new directions. but also to, to be aware that the interest level is going to be very high. and ined too, i yo -- indeed, you saw that. the you look closely at ratification, it calls for briefings, consultations, let's get in there and talk to them before, after and in the middle of nuclear arms controls issues. i think that's healthy, and i,

frankly, welcome the fact there is such a big interest on capitol hill. but it is a big lesson for the future that we also need to continue that and make sure that that due diligence is done. now as to the lessons we learned working with the russians, i would say, frankly, there were two lessons for me. first, the first lesson is that the cold war is, indeed, over. there were many cold war issues that we continue to grapple with, i'll get to that in a home, but the way -- moment, but the way the negotiations were conducted was, it was much different from when i was last at the negotiating table in geneva in 1990 and 1991 working on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. at that point we still had a very kind of, you know, set-piece way of of interacting with the russians. in the intervening period, 15 years of implementation of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty made a huge difference in how we interact with the russians on these issues, and particularly the fact that we had a great cadre of experienced inspectors and

weapons systems operators who came and participated in our delegation in geneva. and the russians did the same. that meant we had this very experienced team on both sides of the negotiating table who were used to interacting with each other at bases of strategic operating bases in the inspection process. it just made for a much more, i would say, rich dialogue and prepared dialogue. we really, i think, knew what we needed to do in the course of these negotiations to get through them and get a treaty that suited the present, the present stage. so that was the first lesson i'd like to underscore, the cold war really is over, and we've had a lot of experience, now, particularly on on-site inspection that's made a big different in how i we interact with the russians -- in how we interact with the russians on these issues. but the second point is, i would say, a realistic point but perhaps one that, you know, is a little more negative and that is that there are some cold war issues that continue to return

to the front of the agenda. and missile defenses and how we interact on missile defenses is, i would say, at the top of that list. it was a very important part of the ratification debate on capitol hill, but it's a longstanding issue. and it's an issue that we are now going to try to work very hard with cooperation with the russians not only in our bilateral context, but also in the nato/russia cop text. context. and that was such an enormous, enormous success of the lisbon summit back before the holidays that in those two contexts -- the bilateral and nato/russia complex -- we agreed on missile defense. ronald reagan back in 1983 when he launched the star wores initiative spoke about negotiation with the soviets, but now we really want to get off the dime on this, and i think it's going to be very, very important to scoping the future. so -- >> thank you.

sort of next tens in the order. steve pifer, what are the prospects for talks on tactical nuclear weapons in and in your view what might an agreement look like? >> okay. well, first of all, with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty taking each side down to 15150 strategic warheads, i think we really are at the point where it's hard to envisage further without talking about these numbers that are not constrained. but if we get into another round of negotiations with the russians on tactical weapons, there are going to be some difficult issues. there's a large disparity between the numbers in the u.s. arsenal and the russian arsenal. the russians have anywhere from three to eight times as many tactical l nuclear weapons, and when you have that kind of numerical disparity, it makes the negotiation more dliflt.

a second issue is over the last 10 to 15 years the russians have come to place hutch more weight on tactical nuclear forces because they see it as necessary to offset what they regard as conventional disadvantages vis-a-vis nato and perhaps more importantly, china. and this is nothing new. they've taken this page from they toe's book for most of the cold war when nato chose not to match the soviet union tank for tank but instead relied on tactical nuclear weapons. and the third issue which is going to make this complicated is verification. when you're talking about limits on and verification of limits on tactical weapons, you probably will not be talking about the delivery systems. because i don't think the american air force or the russian air force is going to want to limit f-16s and their counterparts whose primary missions are conventional. so you're talking about limiting actual warheads and, perhaps, even designing schemes where inspectors might have to go into

storage bunkers and count weapons. that's shot an insurmountable program, but it's going to pose a set of verification challenges that the united states and russia have not had to grapple with previously. so there's some difficult questions. i don't think they're insurmountable and, you know, one way to approach this is the question is going to be is given this large russian advantage, how do you persuade them, basically, to negotiate away all or part of that? and i think here the way to do this will be the united states under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will end up with a numerical advantage in nondeployed strategic warheads. under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, the russians are going to reach their reductions primarily by retiring and can taking out of service missiles, but most of the remaining missiles are going to have full warhead sets. the united states is going to take a different approach and would have the ability in the event that the treaty broke down to put a lot of those warheads back on the missiles. and the russians won't have any kind of matching capability.

so perhaps we've designed an approach that allowed you to trade an american willingness to accept p limits on nondeployed strategic warheads for russians might give rose or whoever is out there some negotiating leverage. and it may be actually, now, i think the time in terms of the next round really to move to an approach that talks about a limit on all nuclear weapons that would cover strategic, nonstrategic, tactical, deployed and nondeployed. and if you put them all into a single limit, that might allow some of these trade-offs, and you could have that kind of approach that would apply to deployed strategic warheads of the 1550 limit in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> before we move to bmd, would anyone else like to cover -- [inaudible] okay. micah, turning to ballistic missile defense then, i mean, several issues.

this interview, you know, one of the main issues that separate russia and the u.s./nato on bmd given that the u.s. is very unlikely to accept formal limits on ballistic missile defense and if anything came screaming out of the senate -- >> yeah. >> no formal limits. what types of understandings might moscow accept, and as an overall judgment in your view how likely is missile defense to disrupt u.s./russian nuclear cooperation? >> well, let me take the last one first. i mean, there are a buffet of further steps in u.s./russian nuclear and conventional force reductions and agreements that could be reached in 2011, 2012 and after the presidential elections in both countries. but if there's not a formal agreement or understanding on the future way forward on missile defense, none of these will likely happen. medvedev said recently either we come to an agreement on missile defense, or there will be a resumption of the arms race, and it's a very threat ping position, but this is a primary

concern for a lot of russian official and strategic thinkers that comes up over and over again. the primary russian concern is not the system which currently protects the united states from limited numbers of ballistic missile launches. the united states has roughly 24 interceptors in this alaska, six in california, these are intended to cover the entirety of the continental united states from a rogue launch from north korea, say, or an unauthorized launch from russia. but in the summer or the fall of 2009, the obama administration introduced what's called the european-phased adaptive approach policy which is a policy to create a missile defense shield over all of of europe in four stages, 2011, 2015, 2018 and 2020. there are some russians who with perceive that that system will put at risk its icbm force so could not have a reliable second strike against the united states. the administration, to be fair, has done a lot, a very good job through the presidential

bilateral working group and the nato/russia council to explain that these systems will not threaten russia's icbm force. technical experts in russia get this, but whether the policymakers get and receive it, that's another question. there's still more the united states can do internally to provide some transparency about what the out phases, specifically the 2018 and to 020 stages of this missile defense for europe will look like. we don't know what this looks like yet. the missile that will be in place in 2018 and 2020 is still in the design stages. even the earlier missiles which will be based upon ships in the mediterranean, that has not been tested yet. so we're still at the early stages for this, and the perception that this could threaten its force in the future scares russia. and then the final issue is, as rose hinted at, to quote secretary gates or to paraphrase him in june, the russians hate missile defense. they hate it. they've hated it since the late '60s, and as is secretary

said, there can be no meeting of the minds on missile defense. i don't think that's the case. in light of the nato/russia council meetings in the november, president medvedev came out with an early proposal for what joint missile defense could look like which i would call sincere but not serious. the, they, it has these three principles, one is russia wants to be a full-fledged partner in missile defense, second, they want to have shared early warning data, not shared -- shared early warning data, shared radar, shared sensors with two buttons, a two-button principle. one would be covering russia, one would be covering nato. and the third is what they call sector-based defense, assigning zones of responsibility for protection against ballistic missile defense. you talk to military planners in the united states, this is not going to fly. the poles did not come into nato to be protected from ballistic missiles from the persian gulf on behalf of russians.

russia does not have a missile defense system presently covering its territory. there is a new air defense system called the x-500 which they claim will be operational for missile defense by 2020, but i think there can be an agreement, and this is being worked in these groups, the working groups and the nato/russia council about joint threat assessments, what does the threat look like, and that's being done right now. there can also with a shared early warning of all ballistic missile launches. there was, for people in history, remember the jedc which was this joint data exchange center in moscow which was gown to be a place where russians and u.s. officials watched ballistic missile launches from various parts of the world, and they could both agree they came from these countries and not from each other. so i think there can be cooperation on shared early warning, threat assessments and potentially-shared radars which includes integrating russian

capabilities in the u.s. adaptive approach missile defense system for europe. >> i'd like to add on this missile defense cooperation point, some of you may have seen the minister of foreign affairs gave a press conference in moscow today, a very extensive press conference, and he commented that the pace at which we're getting off the ground on our discussions in the working groups, the presidential commission working group that deals with cooperation on nuclear security/missile defense matters chaired by my boss, undersecretary tauscher, and also some military to military discussions as well. so there's a very, very fast pace of activity, and i do think that both moscow and washington are really intent, as are our nato allies, in getting off the ground quickly and completing these joint threat assessments and moving on to looking at joint concepts and really trying to figure out how to put all

these pieces together. >> >> i think that's actually really good news because i think if you look at the next negotiation can, if russians are insis tent on something on missile defense and we've seen the senate reaction to limitations on missile defense, there's something of a trap there, and cooperation may be the way to get out of that box which otherwise could be a major obstacle in the next round of offensive arms reductions. >> rose, let me turn to a different type of issue. we now have the one, two, three agreement, the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. what, in your view s in it for both sides, and how can the u.s. government and the u.s. private sector best pursue avenues opened by this new and really rather major agreement. >> uh-huh. yes, a lot of people have been focused on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and the missile defense cooperation, those aspects. but there was really a major, major step forward in moscow this week when am bad door

buyerly exchanged the paperwork to wring in the so-called one, two, three agreement, the agreement for nuclear cooperation. this happened on tuesday the 13th, day before -- 11th day before yesterday. when i was an assistant secretary of energy back in the late 1990s, we were working on a one, two, three agreement and trying to, you know, move that forward. so it's really been a longstanding initiative, one that both sides have been very intent on bringing to force, and it has finally happened. and there are really, i think, three areas of enormous benefit for both countries. first of all, the area i am most familiar with is the non-proliferation cooperation, having in place an agreement for nuclear cooperation of this kind really helps us to advance our nuclear non-proliferation cooperation. it helps for our technical cooperation when our scientists get together and work on very detailed, technical projects, for example, on new sensor

systems and that type of thing. there's been a history of very, very successful u.s./russian cooperation. but a one, two, three agreement will facilitate and ease that cooperation in the future. also will help with some very, very nitty-gritty counternuclear terrorism issues like nuclear forensics. when we have, you know, some fissile material that is acquired and we're concerned about it, you know, being part of a possible terrorist not or something like that, the nuclear forensic process will be facilitated through the one, two, three agreement. so it's very, very significant. second area is civil nuclear cooperation. again, that's on a government of-to-government basis where our two countries are working together and cooperating, and deputy secretary of energy is the chairman of the commission, bilateral commission with the head on the other side. there's a bilateral commission looking at ways to advance civil nuclear cooperation, that means

advanced reactors, advanced fuel cycles, a number of arenas of that kind. so that's very, very important. and then the third area is on the commercial front. it will facilitate cooperation between u.s. companies and russian companies that are engaged in nuclear energy projects. again, for the development of new reactors, new fuel cycles, new fuels and, overall, does address the issue of consent rights. that is, when the united states has a deal with another country for, for nuclear fuel purchase, the united states has consent rights over the final disposition of that fuel. so having a one, two, three agreement in place addresses that issue and facilitates commercial cooperation as well. so three very, very important areas where this one, two, three agreement will make a big difference and, really, i think, will allow us to advance nuclear energy cooperation on the

u.s./russian front overall. but i welcome it, as i said, because of the advantages i see forthcoming in our non-proliferation cooperation. you know, i wanted to underscore for this audience i didn't really know it, i was looking back through dan's recent materials from his trip to moscow this year. the united states and russia have worked to repatriate 760 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium back to the russian federation to be disposed of. that's quite a few nuclear bomb withs' worth of highly-enriched uranium. and that, again, has not required the one, two, three agreement. that's pursuant to this international partnership that president obama launched last april at the nuclear securities summit here in washington to get highly-enriched uranium, blew i tone yum, fissile materials that could be used in nuclear weapons into programs to dissuppose of

them or to better protect them. so russia's been a great partner in this regard, and i think it's really, really worthwhile underscoring the way this partnership can now be enhanced and further developed because of the one, two, three agreement being in place. >> with one final question from me for micah. as -- it's a political/economic one, sort of moving the space a little bit. russia faces presidential elections in 2012 and a worrisomely tightening fiscal landscape involving large deficits. how could these political/economic factors effect russian policy on the nuclear front? >> well, the -- if you want -- a very interesting perspective on russian policy making, look at the president's speech to the nation, the state of the union address that the russian president gives november 30th of last year. and he goes through the litany of problems russia faces, familial, societal, government and the environment, and there's

just a long, long list of problems that russia faces, and the solution to all of them are greater political tension and money. you throw money at these problems, the final issue president medvedev discusses is foreign affairs, defense/national security. and he lays out this agenda to over the next ten years spend $700 billion on improving defense systems including conventional weapons, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and it ain't all going to happen. they just don't have the money to do it. you know, if oil stays around $100 a barrel, they get closer, but they still don't have the capability to do the modernization that they want. so based upon both the need to restructure its conventional weapons forces, to bring some sort of rationalization, some -- for example, russia recently created what the unite' version of daughter 35 pa is which is how to do better research. they consolidate their air defense and and missile defense into one sort of strategic command. they're trying to rationalize

the process while also sort of of making incremental improvements on nod earnization. so -- modernization. so based upon the need to come down to the levels that steve mentioned just by retiring old systems and not building nuclear weapons, russia wants for power purposes and the respect that nuclear weapons have garnered them over the last 50-60 years, they want an additional agreement that provides transparency and predictability on u.s. and russian nuclear weapons at lower levels for both those reasons. >> thanks to all of you. we now invite audience members to join in on the discussion. and, again, a few procedural comments. please, wait for the microphone, speak directly into it. please stand, state your name and affiliation, and, please, maybe most importantly, keep questions and and comments really on point and concise so allow as many be members as possible to speak. so the floor is now open. yes, sir, please.

>> i'm hank gaffney from cna, and i worked 13 years on nato nuclear weapons. and i carefully read all the russian statements of doctrine as they've been coming out. i never see the word "tactical." this notion that they're relying on tactical, they're relying on strategic which is what nato relied on. i think a lot of you really know that the sigh op was involved in nato responses very early on after two days of conventional battle, but that's a concept of deterrence they're advancing, not a war-fighting. and it includes strategic weapons, and we shouldn't forget that. and i just wondered, does anybody up there know of their statements where they use the word "tactical"? >> hank, that's a good point. i would just note two things.

first of all, we've tried to be very careful and precise and, indeed, if you look at the resolution of ratification that came out of the senate, it refers to nonstrategic nuclear weapon withs. and i think it's a good point to be considering, you know, because the use of the word "tactical" does have a number of imprecise aspects to it. so that's a very important point. i do see the russians refer to "tactical" nuclear weapons, but it's in comments on what we have to say, it's not in their own doctrinal writings, so i would agree in that regard. >> might actually suggest that one thing that could perhaps be done between now and the next round of negotiations is maybe some in these working groups actually beginning to talk to the russians, what would be a common theme for cat guiding nuclear weapons? i suspect when we talk about strategic, nonstrategic, tactical, we may have a

different way of classifying than the russians do, and having a common language on that, i think, would facilitate another round of talks. >> and the council years before the sort of warmer feelings that sprung out of lisbon's summit, they do have these joint definitions which the russians presented their definitions of what tactical means, and the u.s. presented its definitions of what tactical means, and those could be a starting point for how both sides conceive of what tactical nuclear weapons are. >> yes, ma'am. please. you, yes. the microphone here. thanks. >> hi. sally horn, independent consultant. i have a question for all of the panelists. i was struck by what you said, cliff, about what are the lessons that could be learned from the debate on the hill and the actual negotiations. i'd like to ask if you could take that a little bit further in terms of what are the lessons that could be learned in terms

of the perceptions, you know, for example, some recent russian public writings have suggested one of their key concerns is not today, but what might happen in the future which is suggestive of of a policy concern about what direction might we go and how might that impact their concept of their deterrence? when you look at some of the writings of the senators on the hill, what you also take away from that is some concern about policy concerns. not the numbers, not, not even their tactical or questions about the technical aspects of verification, but underpinning it all is a broader policy concern about direction. i'm bond withering if you might -- wondering if you might speak to the question of what lessons might be learned about what you perceive as this underpinning of perceptions and views, and how do we deal with that moving forward in the era of further cooperation with the

russians? .. and the other states who happen to have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capability. thank you. >> it seems to me if the russians are looking at the discussion that took place during the course of the ratification in the u.s. senate they're going to see is a very strong policy attachment and it's reflected throughout the ratification to missile defense, and that may have something of the opposite but the unintended impact of making the russians press even harder in the nextt veund of negotiations for somere kind of limits on the u.s.ti missile defense.limits on my guess in the end is that the russians finally accepted during the newrussians s.t.a.r.t. negotiations finally

during the new start negotiations that it was a very effective tone, they looked at the new s.t.a.r.t. period and said we would announce ten years to 20242021 and when we look at the approach that described a very good indication, with defensive forces. but if you are talking about a follow-on agreement of 20205 to 2030 or 2035 the russians have a lot less clarity about where missile defense is going to be and there is concern on the russian side. one way to counter that is to extend their offensive force. one of the issues that will come up in the next round will be the russians perhaps even harder for constrained on missile defense and that is why i hope very much

this pact with nato russian cooperation can be developed because that may be the way to get out of that. >> part of the question gets to how robust are you on relations overall and indeed over the last several decades there have been many peaks and valleys in the relationship. we go through difficult times in any bilateral relationship but it seems we have been on quite a roller-coaster ride with regards to the relationship with russia. one of the core reason the obama administration has been so intent on its new policy has been to try to in short that we have a robust relationship across a number of policies.

we are here to talk about the s.t.a.r.t. treaty and where to go another nuclear arms control but i would like to wonderscore that if we notice our relationship with russia has undergone great strengthening in the last couple years, the 123 agreement, little notice that something like the afghanistan transport agreement. that was reached at the same time that we were doing our first joint understanding with the russians in support of the new s.t.a.r.t. negotiations in july when president obama went to moscow. little recognized but in fact now we are transporting an enormous amount of material for combat operations in afghanistan through russia. that is a great change in how we did business in the past and a great amount of money because of

shortening up the transport lines. those very robust cooperative projects that in this end will help to get us through the tough times. i want to bring that to your attention and say that i believe we have come a long way in strengthening and adding some robust elements to our bilateral relationship. >> the issue of other countries i believe there's another agreement between the united states and russia on strategic and tactical that can be reached before you address other countries. the specific country that you need to talk about is china. we know china, based upon they don't have much transparency in their nuclear system. secretary gates was invited and visited the second artillery corps of few days ago which was an unprecedented visit for someone in the pentagon but there is so much little

transparency on behalf of china and weather nuclear system looks like and the conception of their nuclear doctrine and what they think of nuclear weapons control and yet years of that to happen. wild repercussions in this dialogue build momentum in the united states and russia with other agreements. >> looking back. please, ma'am. >> thank you. mary beth sheridan from the washington post. a question for rose gottemoeller. is there any timetable or tentative timetable of when follow-on negotiations might begin or is it going to depend on other factors like progress on missile defense? >> we have already gotten underway, i would say first of all i want to give an advertisement for what i have done. i am not endorsing them but --

>> bill ahead. >> very interesting papers on the future of where we go from here. i am not endorsing anything specifically but there's a lot of good discussion going on both here and in moscow. it is enormously interesting, the kinds of writing we are seeing being done in moscow, and also there has been beneficial discussion of this when the chairman of the defense to committee came to worse off for an interim parliamentary meeting. in his remarks for that conference, there is a lot of work going on in moscow to try to study what the options might be for future non-strategic negotiations. in and out of government in moscow and washington, a lot of

work is going on but is one more phase and we are not ready to go to the point of setting any scheduling place for out right negotiation. there are lots of consultations and back and forth about where we go from here. >> toby please. >> congratulations. i have two questions. the first is talking about amendments. not about negotiations, many arms control agreement going through the senate. >> you may have noticed all of you in december, a lively debate

in the senate, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and ratification. during that period our russian colleagues not commenting on the debate. and not commenting on there debate for the federation council. and the next several weeks, we are not going to speak about it. the second thing i would say is i take a different lesson away from the ratification debate. and interest and discussion with the new s.t.a.r.t. debate in the senate proved it to me. not only a debate around ratification perce but a long

series of discussions we have throughout the negotiations process. i do think we have sparked a new interest so i am looking forward to continuing that debate and discussion and frankly it has laid the foundation for the ratification debate. i can't predict what will be next. great store of substantive knowledge, a store of interest. that is natural. it is part of a healthy debate as well. we have in place good conditions for future work on topics overall. >> let me comment on the russian

resolution, there should be a number of russian understandings that will probably -- just as i think if you go through the u.s. senate's ratification and read the russian discussion there is an implication the russians are cheaters on arms control. you will see that language. the most important thing will be do the russians in this end will not require the treaty. the important thing, hyperventilating over the language with ratification, question is at the end of the day is the treaty ratified? >> please. microphone. >> to what degree does the complexity of destroying and inspecting warheads slowdown the process of reducing numbers?

>> that is a very good question. for those of you who have tackled these issues over the years you realize up to this point arms control treaties have dealt with delivery vehicles and launchers, large items, missiles, bombers that we can see with our satellites and also therefore count more easily. future negotiations and president obama has already clearly laid out this path, weather he signed the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in april of 2010, he said next we will be tackling non-strategic nuclear warheads and non deployed nuclear warheads. this is part and parcel of the nuclear posture. it is part of a consistent policy development going on in this administration. you are quite right. the next phase is going to be a

complicated one because we will be grappling with smaller objects that are more difficult to address in terms of monitoring and verification, elimination, the entire range of activities. i will say in my view the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty puts in place some important innovations with regard to the entry vehicle on-site inspection. they are pursuing more interest of reentry vehicle on-site inspections implementing this treaty that will push open the door in my view to more intrusive measures that involve warheads. we are beginning to take some steps in that direction certainly in terms of the research study work that has to be done on the activity inside and outside government that are referred to a moment ago. >> in the first row.

>> hunts benedict, congratulations. i want to go to the non-strategic tactical question and put it in the european context a bit more. two questions. first, what we do with a small number of u.s. nuclear bombs deeply in five european countries. the question is is it important to keep that small number still in europe as a bargaining chip for the future? v nato strategic concept didn't settle the issue. the second question is given the fact that as steve said, looking forward to negotiation which we might lump together, non strategic and non deployed systems, that may take a long time. is there an interim step you

might take that might create a zone in which you would remove the non strategic systems as an interim step to the broader negotiations? >> my colleagues may want to comment on this as well. i would just refer you -- i would refer everybody who hasn't had a chance to look at it, the remarks secretary clinton made past april when she spoke about these very issues with the nato foreign ministers. that federal remark is that the core of our policy with regard to this very issue and she does take note of the fact that further reductions involving non strategic nuclear weapons must take into account overall negotiating. in other words, these are the kinds of things that we would

involve in a negotiation rather than unilateral action. that is a very important mark to look at and i refer all of you to them if you are not familiar to them. it lays out a policy very succinctly in my view. very interesting proposal. there are a number of proposals in and out of government. i am not at this stage in my own deliberation or with my interagency colleagues ready to endorse the -- my colleagues may have some other things to say on that. >> when you look at just europe now, there is a lot of pressure building up in european countries basically to say we don't use american nuclear weapons in europe anymore but the american extended deterrence can be extended by strategic forces like forces now extended to japan, south korea,

australia. if you look forward i see three ways american nuclear weapons could come out of europe. one would be is the result an individual country decision? right now there is -- the german air force -- to their designated aircraft and designated weapons' between 2015 to 2020. and not only program to have nuclear capability. if the german air force goes out of business the personal that puts a lot of pressure on holland and belgium. that is one way. a second way to do it would be as a nato policy, nato is withdrawing all nuclear weapons. the third way that is most preferable is to put the new negotiating mix and hopefully i am not sure how large as a a bargaining chip it would be but hopefully we could use them to get something in terms of russian readiness for

non-strategic nuclear-weapons. clearly feathered way is the most preferable. >> one more time. >> good point. unless nato figures it out, for first wave may be the default mode. the point you made about the interim step of doing something, certainly there might be the negotiation in withdrawing nuclear weapons away from borders in centralized storage and locations in the interior, i would be nervous about -- those pushing this junk -- that generates a host of problems and because they are fairly transportable i am not sure it buys you all that much.

>> to echo steve's third point, they should be done in a consulting way with the allies. if you look at the decision in the nuclear posture, retired the tomahawk missile which provided at the time tactical nuclear deterrent to u.s. allies. that was retired on the basis of many complications with u.s. allies to make sure they were still comfortable with u.s. deterrent support through conventional systems and offshore strategic weapons. if you look at the trends within europe, weapons that are based on classified estimates. in 1990 there were 4,000 u.s. nuclear weapons the year and now there are 200. now probably in five places. at one time eight types of bombs. now there's one bomb. it has been a sort of steady stream down. what you are left with is a

small number that could potentially be bargained away if the russians make cuts in their tactical nuclear weapon forces which are primarily based in operational status in bases third nato allies. and the split within europe between basically history and geography from russia. the country's closest to rush are least comfortable with nuclear weapons in europe. countries for this to our most comfortable. nato should make a decision for the entire alliance based upon article 5, commitments the united states makes. only collectively should that be done. countries put a call for u.s. nuclear forces, it is a bad starting point for nato. >> we go to the back somewhere, anyone?

>> price mcdonald, you as institute of peace. thank you for mentioning possibilities of additional cooperation between the united states and russia and i hope you will be able to elaborate more on that next week when you are speaking at a conference, the national academy of science is holding on future technical cooperation of science diplomacy. small plug for all interested. going beyond that, several comments about bringing in additional nuclear power as you go to lower levels. i want to ask in addition, certainly from a quantitative point of view that makes sense. the numbers the u.s. and russia have are higher than the others. but another dimension of arms control is qualitative limits. there are qualitative limits even in the new s.t.a.r.t. with verification. given how sticky a multilateral

nuclear arms negotiations might be, might there be some merit in establishing a completely separate -- you wouldn't want to muck up the fallen s.t.a.r.t. agreement but separate negotiating for where these non quantitative issues could be discussed for two reasons. for what ever value it might have and to get our feet wet if you will in what would eventually be a multilateral negotiation and i throw that out to all three of you. >> perhaps i will start because already some activity underway in that regard but it emerged in the aftermath of the treaty review conference that took place in may of 2010 in new york. out of that came an action plan agreed to by consensus. very important. one of the items in that action plan was to get together and

show progress -- non-proliferation and nuclear energy cooperation. again, it is not well-known but in london in september of 2009 there is an interesting conference where all members of the b5 started to talk about verification and transparency technology. the very kinds of things you are talking about. b5 has agreed to continue that process pursuant to the review conference, action plan and government and the french announced in september that they will host the second of these conferences to talk about verification and transparency, cooperation. that is a very welcome step. we are planning to hold this conference in the first half of this year and it will get together and continue basically

along the same trajectory that was lost by the london conference. i welcome this very much. basically setting up a process that will be very beneficial. the next review conference already on the horizons of thinking about showing results in that context. just in terms of beginning to shape dialogue and discussion allow all members of the p 5, important issues of this kind. it is not been advertised a lot but it is out there for all to see. you are interested, a very worthy project that we will be continuing now. sometime -- i think it will be later in the spring. it will be in the first half of 2011. >> these consultations can be important. there is room for one more

negotiation. the numbers between the united states and russia and everything else. having consultations that allow you to get measured transparency with regard to britain and france and nuclear china plans to do. one concern you mentioned from time to time is the united states and russia come down. chinese will make a huge investment. i am not sure i buy into that. the chinese talk about their nuclear forces, where they plan to go and weather doctrine is. that makes people more suspicious. if you have these consultations with greater understanding about chinese forces in particular, that make the united states and russia more comfortable in terms of the reductions we might negotiate in their bilateral challenge. >> we are out of time. i would like to remind everyone that this meeting has been on

the record, i like to thank our panelists and all of you for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations] ..

>> next come a discussion on president dwight eisenhower's 1961 speech on what he called the military-industrial complex. president eisenhower used his final address to criticize the relationship between civilian contractors, the u.s. military in congress. we'll hear from his

granddaughter, susan eisenhower pianola former government officials. this three-hour event is hosted by the cato institute. >> good morning. welcome to the cato institute. i name it christopher preble, di director of foreign policies po here. it's my distinct pleasure to open today's proceedings. i want to begin by thanking myd. charles mccabe in pulling this together and also our marketing department to helg romote it into a conference it department for what they do depr behind the scenes to make it run so successfully. i should also thank the s construction crews who i'd told her about to stop their bettero type that for a little while. i think all of you who are stope watching online and c-spanll of are watching online at c-span, who are watching on cato.org. for those of you in the

auditorium, i want to ask that you please turn off your phones. silent isn't good enough, because it does interfere with our sound system. to please turn off your phones and silence any other noise-making tnoise-make ing devices you might have out of courtesy to attendees here. as a courtesy to our attendees, make room here in the auditorium. we have had an overwhelm ing response to this event. we're expecting a completely full crowd and also a number of people will be watching on television set outside of this room and i'm sure they'd like to join us all here in person. so if you have a space next to you, slide every toward the wall or invite someone to sit down next to you. on january 17th, 1961, president dwight david eisenhower delivered one of the most famous speeches of his storied career. the full text of the speech is available in the handout that you all should have received. those of you who are watching

online or on c-span can access the speech via the internet. we have a link to the speech. in this address, eisenhower warned the american people of the burdens imposed by a large and seemingly permanent military establishment. something that the nation had managed to avoid for most of its history. in one of the most frequently quoted lines from that famous speech, he charged his countrymen to be on guard against a military industrial complex acquiring unwarranted influence in the halls of power. eisenhower called on an alert and knowledgeable citizenry to balance the need for effective defense against the nation's peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. for decades, scholars have suggested ways to restrain the military industrial complex and to limit its effect on civil military relations, the economy and our political system.

by any objective measure, efforts to control the expnansin of the military industrial complex have failed. in inflation adjusted terms, americans will spend more than twice as much on national security in 2011 than they did in eisenhower's last year in office and without a nuclear armed adversary to justify those costs. so today we explore why these spending patterns have persisted for 50 years and what, if anything, can be done to effect meaningful change. ourspeak er today, it's my distinct pl distinct pleasure to welcome her to the cato institute, mrs. eisenhower. her complete bio as with all the other speakers are in the packet that we passed out. i call attention in particular to her long and distinguished career as a commentator on national security policy and

also energy policy. she is perceptive and outspoken observer, occasional critic of u.s. policy. it's a pleasure to welcome her back to cato. susan? >> chris, thank you very much for that nice introduction. what a pleasure it is to be back at the cato institute. we have a wonderful panel here to discuss one of the important aspects of dwight d. eisenhower's farewell address. i have worked in the national security field a long time, myself, so i'm going to be an interested consumer in the panel's deliberations here today, but i think my function really in getting this event started is to say something about the man who gave the speech in the times in which he lived. again, scholars have examined this speech in great detail over the years. certain things about the speech

have now become known that weren't before. it's one of those amazing stories about how to be careful with what's in your garage. it turns out that the son of the speechwriter, malcom moose, was moving the lawn mower to a different part of the garage and discovered five boxes left from his father's life. his wife said it's time to clean it up and get it out and discovered in these five boxes were malcom moose's notes about the crafting of the farewell address. this collection was given to the eisenhower library. many of those documents were just recently released. we know eisenhower had been planning to give this speech for a long time. it was not the afterthought many historians had suspected. it was a very deliberate speech that eisenhower was planning to give. he played a writ call role in the crafting of this. as a matter of fact, malcolm moose later told my father the

president was the architect, we were simply the carpenters. and you know, for anybody who knows the way eisenhower wrote, you can hear his phraseology throughout this speech. in any case, it is a reflection of an eight-year career. to me, i think the fascinating thing is the farewell address is really a bookend to the first major speech he gave of his presidency which was called "a chance for peace." this was given in 1953 just after the death of joseph stollen. in any case these two speeches most important of which we are marking on the 17th of january really underscore the transformational times in which dwight eisenhower served as president. i think one of the reasons we're here today to discuss its relevance is there is a contemporary resonance to this speech because we are, today, also living in transformational times. these transformational times are

actually in some ways no that different except that i think it would be fair to say that the united states is not in as strong a position as it was in 1953. after all, in 1953 though money was constrained and the united states was the world's largest cred creditor nation and we were really the country that emerged from world war ii as preeminent globally, today we have many rapid changes in technology as they did back in the 1950s. the united states, today, is changing its position on the world stage. either voluntarily or involuntarily, but we feel that those changes are under way. again, today we have economic constraints the way we did in the 1950s as i just mentioned, but at a slightly disadvantaged situation. and we have changing views of threat assessments. that's exactly up lly one of ts of these bookend speeches of the

eisenhower era. we have a set of changing world values, how eisenhower observes this. as he gives his speech. and frankly, there's also a very radical changing way in which we communicate. back in the 1950s, television was the new technology. every president from eisenhower onward had to master the usage of this new medium. today, of course, we speak a lot about the internet and of course the blogosphere which has really changed so many things. so to take ourselves back to 1953 for a minute, that was an extraordinary year. it was a game changer many in m ways because of the death of joseph stollen. then in august of 1953, the bomb was tested by the soviet union which broke the u.s. monopoly on this fearsome weapon. it's rather interesting that

eisenhower despite these important changes was really willing, able and politically courageous enough to link this defense spending with domestic spending. i would challenge any political leader today to try to draw equivalences eisenhower did in his chance for speech. he said, quote, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children, the cost of one heavy bomber is this. a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. it is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. we pay for a single fighter with a half a million bushels of wheat. we pay for a single destroyer with new homes that would have housed more than 8,000 people. this is not a way of life at all in any true sense. under the threat -- under the cloud of threatening war, it is

humanity hanging from across. well, if this isn't relevant from a contemporary point of view, i don't know what is, as we have seen extraordinary figures of what the defense security complex, we can call it that today, is spending. since 2001, these expenditures have risen by 119%, and of course, discussion about how we're going to reign in costs are on our agenda today. let me just close by saying something about transformational times and then an observation about transformational leadership. i believe dwight eisenhower was a transformational leader. this guy had guts. you see reference to it in his farewell address. the original film is "all

business all the time." it's spoken in a very somber, very serious way. he did have political courage. we could go into that if the seminar today were on dwight eisenhower, which it is not, but i would point to any number of decisions including the handling of the suez crisis just before the election of his second term. this was something that was so potentially controversial that he figured that he might even not be elected for taking a decision like that but was prepared. we need to only mention, of course, the imposition of federal troops in little rock in 1957. these were tough decisions by somebody who i believe in his own frame of reference would say that he was putting america first. one of the critical parts of the farewell address is his references to bipartisanship. it is rather amazing with the democratic congress that this republican president manage to get 80% of his legislative

agenda through congress and manage despite the rampup during the cold war of military spending, managed to balance the budget three times in eight years which was the cold war record. in any case, we, today, will mark this speech that raises a number of very important and intriguing issues like the military industrial complex. also i would say the scientific technological elite which is another idea that eisenhower advances. but there are certain parts of this speech that i like because of this changing environment in which he was addressing the public. he was worried about a changing american values. americans by 1961 were newly prosperous. there was a new television culture that was emerging. americans were increasingly

bitten by the desire for good life. and eisenhower worried about these values. he linked, in this speech, as he did many times during his presidency, defense spending or defense posture with our economic health and what he called a third pillar which was he referred to as spiritual. in fact, i think i would interpret that as our moral authority. in any case in his speech, and i just mentioned one wonderful example, he was worried about how america would project itself as it emerged as the global leader. imagine how useful it would have been after 9/11 if we'd had a president say, quote, any failure traceable to arrogance or lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both home and abroad.

that tells us how we should think about who we are in these changing times. as a member of the eisenhower family, it's deeply gratifying that perhaps among his biggest legacies are these two speeches that i mentioned. the fact that an idea and a set of ideas that he advanced 50 years ago could still serve as a platform for debate today is, indeed, a wonderful thing. i'd like to just say, i knew my grandfather very well. i knew this even as a kid. he was playing for the long game. how many times in his speeches does he mention his grandchildren? and of course, i'm one of them. but we're all one of them. we are the grandchildren of that generation. eisenhower was playing the long game so much that i discovered to my great distress that he put a time capsule in his house in getties bur gettysburg. it's buried in one of the walls

and to my distress it's not to be opened until 2056 which means that i'm long gone. doesn't seem fair, does it? this is so eisenhower. to be talking to generations still to come. only in this timeframe it's not 50 years, it will be 100. thank you. >> thank you. now, let many introduce my first panel today. one short programming note which you probably noticed. professor andrew was forced to withdraw from the program late yesterday because of the bad weather in boston. he sends his regrets. andy has one of the feature essays in this month's "atlantic monthly." i recommend it highly. the good news, bad news is depending on your perspective,

andy prepared his remarks and i get to read them. i will not do this service. i'm going to try my best to deliver a few passages from andy's remarks then i will introduce our other speakers today. title of his essay is "who's army?" the interaction of civilians and soldiers takes place in two distinct and different domains. on the one hand is the relationship between senior military officer s and senior civilian officials. on the other hand is the relationship between the armed forces of the united states and american society as a whole. call this civil military relations for the rest of us, fakie i taking place. a well known principle is set to exercise a governing influence, civil wrol implemented by the congress and executive. the principle of civilian control by no means guarantees

effective policy. it however serves against the danger posed by military dictatorship. students of civil military relations see the control as foundational. in the realm, another well known principle once exercised a governing influence. this was the conviction that national defense qualifies as a collective responsibility, citizenship and military service being inextricably linked to one another. andy continues, truth to tell, in the actual implementation of these principles, americans have always played fast and loose, whether in the elite domain, the reality of civil military relations has seldom conformed to the theory. he goes on later, the vast apparatus of the national security state affirmed and institutionalized the exalted role senior military officers had come to play. in the 1950s and 1960s when

presidents ventured into the white house rose garden to make a national security announcements, they took care to have the joint chiefs of staff with ribbons lined up behind them. the message was clear, look, i have consulted the chiefs, they concur, therefore, my decision deserves to be treated with respect. the officer corps' ultimate responsibility and loyalty to the constitution remained in tact was beyond question. yet the implausibility made all manner of schenn thhenanigans impermissible. -- his innocence remains in tact and he's free to do as he pleases. this describes the way the principle of civilian control actually works in washington. politics is a blood sport.

the making of national security policy is nothing if not political with blood and treasure, power and access, ego and ambition on the line. so senior officers learned how to lobby, aly with strange bedfellows, manipulate the nemea and play off the congress against the white house. that's how you get things done in washington. later andy writes, the ideal civilian control stands in relation to actually existing civil military relations as the ideal of the common good stands in relation to actual existing politics. it represents an aspiration rather than a fact. it will never define reality. responsibility for this unhappy circumstance does not lie with one side or the other but with both. to insist senior officers and senior civilians should find a way to work in harmony recalls rodney king's appeal during the 1992 los angeles riots, can't we

all just get along? any such expectation of human behavior in politics lies in the face of the record of history as with the poor, the competition for power will be ever with us. now, when generals overreach, they should have their hand slapped. when ignorant or arrogant civilians ignore military advisers and thereby commit costly blunders, they should be called to account. inside the beltway, civil military conflict is not a problem to be solved. it is a situation to be managed. elite civil military relations require constant policing. whenever evidence of inappropriate conduct leading to defective policy becomes evident, folks like me rush to write op-peds decrying the latest civil military crisis, in quotes. this is necessary and honorable work, once critics raise the ruckus, the internal self-correction kicks in. it's the same thing when people get up in arms about potholes or lousy service at the bureau of

motor vehicles. to quiet complaints and preserve status and prerogatives the people in charge respond. corrective action might tepid tend to be partial or cosmetic. andy concludes, that's the boast best we can hope for. this periodic awareness of dysfunction in civil military relations distracts attention from the significant problem of dysfunction in the realm of civil military relations for the rest of us. he closes on a note that many of you will be familiar with from his past writings. pertaining to civilian responsibilities as part of the whole. rather than harmonizing military policy with political values, the all-volunteer force seemingly accomplished something

much trickier. it reconciled american culture, adversed to the idea of corrective civil -- political elites in washington that exercising global leadership required the availability of large forces ready for instant action. the creation of a new class of warrior professionals made everyone happy. those residing outside the beltway could live their lives unbothered by the prospect of being summoned before the local draft board. somewhere around 2004 or 2005 americans began awakening to the real implications of having deep sixed the citizen soldier. if americans don't like the way the army is used, they need to reclaim it. this can only happen by resuscitating the tradition of the citizen soldier. i have no expectation this will happen any time soon, he writes. indeed, i judge the likelihood of essentially nil, the entire national security establishment remains wedded to the

all-volunteer force and anything that could increase popular influence on policy. worst, our civil culture continues to have a low tolerance for anything that's collective obligation. the only people willing to consider a military obligation tend to be too old to serve. yet on one point i am quite certain. as long as the tradition of the citizen soldier remains, reversing the militarization will remain a pipe dream. the halls will resound with calls for peace but war is likely to remain a permanent condition. in washington people will wring hands over the unseem bli state of conditions between elites as brass hats and politicians maneuver against the other for advantage. that's their problem. the problem for the rest of us is a far greater one. grasping the implications for our democracy, moral as well as political, of sending the few to engage in endless war while the many stand by, passive, mute and

whether they like it or not, deeply complicit. those, again, are the words of andrew, who due to the storm in boston was not able to join us. i hope i did a service in rendering his remarks. the good news for the rest of us is that our other three speakers managed to get here through the rain, sleet and gloom of night. i'm going to introduce them very briefly. again, their bios are in the package. they're going to speak in the order they're listed here on the sheet. our first speaker today is major general charles dunlap, retired major general in the u.s. air force, distinguished legal scholar. i've gotten to know charlie a little bit over the last few months. we are both members of the warlord loop and enjoy exchanging ideas there. he is a legal scholar. he also is a distinguished strategic thinker and has written about this topic we discussed today. that is the state of civil

military relations. the first thing i ever read by charlie many years ago was an article entitled "observations on the military coup of 2012." our second speaker is larry core. he began with a stint in the u.s. navy on active duty then retire retired after a number of years in the reserve. i've known larry over the years and on a personal note he and i had a chance to travel a bit. he's one of most impressive story tellers i've ever encountered and he'll regale us today in stories. our third speaker, lawrence wilkerson, a retired colonel in the army after a distinguished 31-year career, several of those spent as an assistant to general colin powell as noted in his bio as well as an assistant to ambassador richard hos on the policy planning staff. colonel wilkerson now teaches

and has commented extensively on national security policy and again the state of civil military relations. with that, join me in welcoming general dunlap. [ applause ] >> thank you very much, chris. >> could you speak from the podium, please? >> okay. >> thank you. >> that does go up if you need to adjust that. >> chris, thank you very much for those kind words. i'd like to thank the cato institute for sponsoring this very, very important symposium. and, ma'am, it is an honor to have heard your remarks. can i differ with you on one point? you said the remnant of the speech has -- the entire speech still has contemporary value. i think it's one of these things we ought to make every kid, if we can make any kid do anything, read as they're growing up

because it has so much relevance to society today. i know we're going to have another panel later this morning that's really going to focus on the industrial complex portion of the speech, and we're focusing kind of on the military side. but just as a scene setter, let's remind ourselves of the differences between 1961 and 2011. specifically with respect to the department of defense budget. as you know, or as you may know, in 1961 it consumed almost twice as much as the gross domestic product as it does today. i think it's 9.6% versus 4.7%. my colleague will certainly correct me on this. in addition it consumed 49% of the discretionary budget, and today it consumes a smaller portion. but probably even more important was the relative size of the

armed forces. the active duty armed forces in 1961 was about 2.4 million as opposed to 1.4 million. so we have a million less americans serving from a much larger population base. but as professor basovich, believe me, it's tough to follow him, he's one of the great intellects in the area of civil military relations. as he pointed out, i think the most significant thing is the rise of the all-volunteer force. allow me to differ with my colleague, professor basovich, a little bit here, is that i don't think that the psychology of the typical person in the active duty, full-time active duty military today is really the elite professional. many people in the armed forces, and this is a problem from time to time, do conceive of themselves as citizen soldiers, even those who aren't in the guard. they conceive of themselves as the classic yoman farmer who

goes to serve in the military and will eventually leave the military to go on and do something else with their life. and for that reason they have a very strong sense of their rights and privileges as americans. and this shapes the american military in ways that, perhaps, other armed forces aren't shaped. and i also think that probably one of the most significant influences on civil military relations, particularly as we look forward, is the kind of wars we've been fighting for the last decade. as you know, we've been fighting essentially a counterinsurgency type of conflict. and what our policy has been, what our strategy has been, it's one where supposedly we win hearts and minds by doing principally nonmilitary task. we have grown a whole generation of officers and enlisted personnel in our military who have been told by the department

of defense that stability operations, in other words, learning how to run civilian institutions, governments, schools, enterprises, is on a par with combat operations. so in other words, their mindset is very different. they're not focused on what president eisenhower would have thought is fighting the external threat. this has lots of implications. when you send a young man or young woman to a remote location and you tell them virtually to be the mayor or send a lieutenant colonel to a remote location and tell them to virtually be the governor of that area, they take on that mission with the energy that you would want people in the armed forces to take on. but it leaves them with a different idea of what their role is. now, we ask them to come back to the united states and completely abandon that kind of mindset.

and i think that that's going to be very difficult. and just as one canary in the mine, i would invite you to read the article written by a marine lieutenant colonel, published in official u.s. government publication, "joint force quarterly" this fall, wherein he opines that military officers have the responsibility to disobey lawful orders if it conflicts with their moral view of the world or as a way of offsetting unwise policies. as chris pointed out, almost 20 years ago i did write an article called "the origins of american military coup 2012. "as i go back and read it now, i'm thinking i'm not a very smart person but i'm disturbed by what i read. here's the central issue that we have. what is the appropriate role of the armed forces in policymak g

policymaking, understanding that you really can't do anything in the defense area that doesn't, you know, involve policy. and to what extent should the expertise and how should that expertise be expressed? lets me address one of the things that andy raised. the role of retired generals. as a retired general i have some interest in what this should be. it is kind of ironic, here we have president eisenhower who was a retired general who became rather involved in politics and policymaking. but since that time, since 1961, a number of things have been put in place that really do limit the role of retired generals. especially in relationship with the industrial complex. recently we saw secretary gates implement some rules that will make it very difficult for

retired military officers to be mentors to active duty. i think this is quite unfortunate. there was a perception that retired generals are making all this money and it is, i think i'm well compensated as a retired general. i will tell you, on the day i retired i made less than a brand new lawyer who never practiced a day at a top washington law firm. i, believe me, i'm very happy with the compensation and i'm very grateful because i came into the military with $200. i left with $201. i'm very happy with it. i'm very well compensated. it does give you a perspective. it's a tragedy to me, i think as we talk about what we're facing, we're spending $2 billion a week in afghanistan. we're not buying airplanes and ships and things like that.

in fact, another one of the changes is we're really down to about six major defense contractors. i worry that we're not going to have the competition that we once had that made our weaponry the best in the world. we are who we are, not because of our military, per se, but because of the capitalistic system which provides the kind of creativity and innovation which allowed our troops in the field to have the best equipment and the most modern equipment. i think that that is in jeopardy today. but returning now to the role of retired generals, much has been put in place and there's been much criticism of retired generals getting involved in politics and endorsing. i personally think that's a little unseemly for a retired general to endorse a candidate. it's one thing to run for office. it's another thing to wind up behind the candidate. but on the other hand, i'm not as worried about it as some people are.

i think that the american public pretty much knows the difference between an active duty officer and retired officer, because if they didn't, i think we'd be talking about president clark and some other people. and i don't think it has all that much impact on the average person. even though the polls over and over show the respect that military officers have. at the same time, i would rather have for benefit of a democracy, i would rather have retired generals speaking out in public than meeting behind closed doors, among themselves, and talking quietly to different people in organizations. you know, general jack king, and you know, he did -- he was one of the principle moving forces

behind the counterinsurgency strategy, but he did that all behind the scenes. if you read bob woodward's book, general casey, of the army, was not happy about that. we have to reconcile, how can we exploit the expertise and do it in the right way so that the understandable tensions are accommodated? finally, i would like to make one other observation that concerns me. the nature of today's threats is such that the military is becoming more and more involved in domestic security. i would suggest to you that there aren't very many models where you take the armed forces and use them for internal security, and that's been a good thing for democracy. some of these threats, in particular the sybra threat,

we're seeing the attempt to leverage the capabilities to help protect their to midwedome systems. i think we need to be very, very cautious about this and ensure there is oversight, that there are firewalls between the domestic law enforcement role and the national security role to make sure that we don't have any kind of a -- and the reason i say this is because the armed forces are the most trusted institution in american history. i'm not sure i'm 100% comfortable with that honestly. is it a good thing the armed forces are more trusted than the supreme court? is it a good thing the armed forces is more trusted than the ko congress? is that a good thing? be that as it may, that popularity underpins the success of the all-volunteer force. in other words, people are

willing to send their sons and daughters to join an organization which is perceived as so trusted and so respected. if the armed forces becomes involved in domestic security in a way in which it is perceived that they're invading the privacy and rights of the average american, that could upend the admiration that the a armed forces needs from the general public in order to sustain itself to have the best and brightest continue to volunteer and serve. i do want to get to your questions. i'm going to cut my remarks right there. and i very much look forward to it. and thank you again. [ applause ] >> thank you, chris, very much for inviting me and having this. it's a great privilege to be on the panel with people like andy

basovich and even with only with his words and with general dunlap and colonel wilkerson. i've always admired their work. larry speaking out about how the bush administration got us into that mess in iraq. i remember general dunlap writing an op-ped in "the new york times" about hey, we ought to stop and think whether we want to go whole hog with counterinsurgency. we have other things we need to worry about. in looking at eisenhower's speech, a couple of things are important to keep in mind. you have to remember that president eisenhower in a sense last control of his defense budget after sputnik. what happened was, those of you who were alive at the time, i happened to be, was a sense of panic. you had this committee come in and talk about all this horrible stuff and what the soviets were doing. eisenhower was criticized for being soft on defense if you can

imagine that and basically the budget began to go up and it continued under kennedy. i think that was obviously a concern. in his original draft of the speech, he said military congressional complex. the reason he didn't do that, he was supposed to give the speech in front of congress which did not happen. he gave it before the american public. so in effect that word would have been in there had he known, you know, what the venue is. and i think obviously that's important. he also mentioned, this is relevant to what general dunlap said, he was also concerned about military officers going to work for defense companies. so in other words, a lot of the issues that are still there are, you know, are relevant. you know, if you go back and read the gaither committee, it was followed by groups like team "b," for example, and this year with the defense review came out, they brought a bunch of

people in and talked about, you know, we have to spend more on defense and, of course, if you've been following the papers lately, the chinese are coming now. okay, you know, they just got -- you know, it always amazes me. the chinese are building planes. so are we. chinese are building missiles. so are we. we're going to tell them they can't. every time i see one of these things about what the other side is doing, about how this could be to some intended consequence. reminds me of a story i heard recently when i went to the middle east. it seems this ederly couple who have been marriedy eied many ye. to say the least, the passion had gone out of the romance. they decided to go to the holy land. while they were there, the man passed away. somebody came to the woman and said, look, you can have your husband buried here for $50.

she said, how much will it cost to bring it back home? guy said, $5,000. she thought for a couple seconds, said, i want to take him back home. guy said, doesn't make any sense, why are you doing this? she said, you know, i heard y r years ago a fellow was buried here and after three days i rose again and i don't want to take a chance. all right, well obviously, you know, anything could happen, but i think it -- i think this is what president eisenhower was warning us about. i want to take a little bit of issue with what general dunlap said, because in preparation for my speech today i read this series of articles in the "boston globe" by brian bender. he talked about the fact that 80% to 90% of the retired generals, the last three and four stars are working at defense companies or doing consulting for defense companies, but worse than that, then they get put on boards by the pentagon to evaluate what we should be doing. i do think it is something we need to be concerned about.

now, eisenhower also was concerned that other people following him, obviously, would not have the military stature that he had to argue with the generals. and eisenhower used a wonderful term when the military would go behind his back and play games. he called it legalized insubordinati insubordination. i remember testifying before the senate. i supported clinton's attempt to drop the ban on gays in the military. i accused the generals at that time and the admirals of legalized insubordination. senator mccain got all upset. i said, that was ieisenhower's term, not my term. people didn't realize that. but it's worse than that. i think andy basovich made a, you know, a point. we don't have that many people who go into the service, so it's not just a question of whether you're a general or admiral or done all these things or you're

in congress or you're working in a civilian job in the pentagon or in the other agencagencies. if you don't have any military experience you're afraid to challenge them. richard cowen had a wonderful op-ped article in the "washington post" recently and talked about the fact this is just like a -- people are afraid to challenge it. it's very challenging. look when general petraeus testifies. look at their medals. look at eisenhower, bradley, one or two things. it's very interesting. nobody knows what those medals are. chris mentioned i was on active duty. we used to day say live in '65, alive in '75. you get them all. and get up there and people say, oh my goodness, they were probably at the battle of the bulge these people or something like that. very few of -- i mean, for example, general petraeus doesn't get his combat action

badge until he goes into iraq as a two star general. okay? admiral mullen served on a destroyer off the coast of, you know, vietnam. okay? this -- these were not the band of brothers, you know, for example, or anything like that, but people then, you know, they don't want to challenge them. now, chris mentioned about my stories. i'm going to tell you a couple i think are relevant to what we're talking about. as many of you know, i had the privilege of working in the reagan administration as assistant secretary of defense and trying to deal with a lot of issues that are still with us. you know, military pay and benefits and things like that. so i was talking one day at a meeting. i said, you know, the military retirement system is killing us, going to have to do something about it. and i thinks you know, too many good people are leaving after 20 years and getting half pay. can't we kind of cut that down then give them an insensitive to stay until 30? anyway, we're at this meeting and this admiral said to me, he said, if you do that the

volunteer military will end, nobody will join. i said, admiral, give me a break. i said, when i came into the service, you know, 22, you don't think you're going to be 30, let alone 40 or 50. he said, oh, you were in the service? yeah. what did you do. >> i was a naval flight officer. he said, why didn't you say something? i said, it has nothing to do with what we're talking about here. he says, well, i would have paid attention to some of the bs you've been putting out. okay, i think, see, that's what happens. again, richard cowen made a wonderful point. if you've been in the service, you realize military people are great people. not all of them are. they make mistakes. and again, let me give you another example of, you know, how it's important to be able to challenge them. not only was i in the navy, i taught at the navy college. i made a lot of changes in the

navy budget. admiral came down to see me and. you made all these changes in the budget. i said, my job is your budget has to support the president's strategy and it's not. and he said, you know, that's the problem. i said what do you mean? the president has the wrong strategy. well, no, that is i think important and i think that's what happens. people don't want to stand up against this priesthood now and it is a problem. there's something else and again general dunlap mentioned it. more and more military people are becoming involved in military campaigns because the candidates are looking for them to put the good housekeeping seal of approval on them. and i think we have to be very careful about that. it started when president clinton had a lot of problems, you know, before he ran about his military service and lack thereof and all this, people were concerned and so admiral crowell, former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff endorsed

them and i know admiral crowell. and stayed at his house and remember him from my days at the navy war college but then he got the job of ambassador to the court of st. james. i said that's wrong. and then about a week later i ended up in a dinner sitting next to him, okay, but that i think we have to be careful of and when bush and cheney were there, you know, at the republican convention, it looked like, you know, a meeting of the west point alumni association, with all the people up there endorses him and even president obama, they were looking, in fact, i worked on the pain and people would say do you know any generals we can get to endorse us because they were worried? it's politically cute among the democrats who are worried about being soft on defense. when you go back and look at it it was the democrats who got us into vietnam. eisenhower wouldn't have gone that. at least from what we know. they increase defense, you know,

defense spending. clinton actually spent more on defense than former -- the first president bush had projected on -- in other words, they're very, very concerned about that. the other thing that i think is important is how the military have learned to manipulate the media. in bob woodward's book they talk about the fact they were discussing about whether we ought to add 30,000 more troops to go to afghanistan and according to bob, well, general petraeus was leaking the stuff to "the washington post." now, in my view, that's the worst -- that's sort of a double worst -- first of all, you shouldn't be doing that but, number two, to do it anonymously, okay, to me, that's even -- even worse and then, of course, he gets called out on it and said well i won't do it again. the question is why would he do it in the first place? okay, and again, general

petraeus, still very upset about me. i almost fell off my chair in 2004 right before the election. about a month before i opened up the paper and i read this op-ed by general petraeus that says, a, how well the training is going in iraq and, b, how well the war is going and first of all i thought that is not true. if you read that we would have won the war in 2005 but why is a general writing right before an election? okay, was it his idea? was it the administration's idea and leads me to something else, i think if i ever go back in the government i want to say no admirals on the sunday morning talk shows. that's not your job because you're in a no-win position. you go back and read what jenniers and pace said about iraq, it looked like it was going much better than it was. now, let me conclude with this.

i think we can handle a dilemma created as people talked about about the all-volunteer force and some of andy's points by going back to something that i got personally involved in and that was keeping draft registration for the president. bill, you may have been at the meeting. you know, we had to make that decision because president reagan had campaigned against it because carter had brought it back after the soviets invaded in afghanistan. and my job was to bring this to the president's attention because we had to make a decision if we didn't, it would expire automatically. and in doing that, the point we made, i made, i still believe and the military made it, as well, the all-volunteer force is a peacetime military. and one of the arguments i made to the president was even if you don't -- you know, think that you ought to call up people that's necessary from at least

from a military -- if you get into a prolonged conflict you have a moral responsibility because we're telling people if you volunteer and you spend one year in a combat zone you're going to get at least two years at hoe, one to rest and recuperate and another to get ready to come back. i don't know what persuaded him but he did keep it. where i think the uniform has fallen down here, they should have insisted when we went into iraq, okay, you can be for or against, i happen to be against it but the president wanted it, the congress supported it. they said, okay, you want to go into iraq, activate the selective service system because that would have done two things, one, not only would it have relieved the pressure on the men and women. what we've done is criminal sending them on back-to-back-to-back deployments and it would have got americans to ask a lot more questions.

it's them over there. they can go and unless you volunteer it doesn't really impact you. that's what we need to do. we need to ask more questions about why we do this and finish from a quote from richard cohen's op-ed where he said, you know, the thing about war is too important to, you know, to leave to the generals, it's also too horrible to leave it to them alone. we should be involved. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> okay. i want to thank the cato institute also for having me here today and identify myself with remarks of dr. bacevich who i hope i'll see tonight if he makes it out of boston. i want to come at this -- also i want to say it's good to see susan eisenhower again. i think i saw you at the screening of "why we fight."

i use the cross of iron speech and farewell address as part of the backbone of my seminars on national security decision-making. they are so clear about what the tension is between what michael hogan has called in his book a cross of iron, the national security state which is clearly what we've become and the welfare state which is not a pe score tiff in the sense that we hand out to money for not working. it's the description of a democratic federal republic that takes care of its people with telecommunications and health care and education and good transportation and good energy sources, good jobs and so forth. that's what hogan means by welfare state. that's what eisenhower meant by the american way of life. so this tension between the national security state and the welfare state is with us big time and out of that comes in my experience a unique aspect of this civil military business

that i'd like to talk about because i think i bring somewhat unique credentials to this having spent 31 years in the combat arms and also four years in its diplomatic or foreign policy equivalent on the other side, the state department and i spent them there at the state department at foggy bottom under a man like george schulz before him wanted not only to do foreign policy but wanted to resuscitate the foreign service and those others who work in the trenches in the state department, even including foreign service nationals, those are the people who serve us in our country team, embassies and consulates around the world who come from those countries. so let's look at it from that perspective because it sheds some light and put over here for a moment the other aspect of our foreign policy which is awesome and that's our economic might. and eisenhower certainly understood that too. that's in pretty much disarray

right now. none of us know how that's going to come out. not the greatest nobel prize-winning economist in the world knows how we'll right the ship of state with regard to our economic and financial situation. but let's put that aside for a minute and let's talk about the two other instruments of national power that are daily involved in the pursuit of our foreign policy. that's diplomacy and the military. the unbalance there is so stark that i think if eisenhower were alive today, he'd make a speech about it. it is so stark that as he pointed out in his article in "the atlantic" and was stunned to see that the budget is up to an awesome 48 billion according to andy's article. when i was left it was 28 billion and we had to fight tooth and neal and it was only because of palace bona fides we were able to obtain an additional battalion. that's three-quarters of a

trillion for the defense department and about 40 billion for the state department today. it was joked he lost more money in a year than powell got. he was right. check the records. almost any year the defense department can't find through its audit process somewhere between $20 billion and $40 billion. an incredible imbalance when you understand that money is power. people are also power, resources, 19 bring grades in my army alone, one brigade in the foreign service. our greatest achievement at the state department was to go before our budget committees and appropriators and madeleine can do it. i need $3 billion or $4 billion and i need to hire people. we hired 117 new service officers. they were all consumed in kabul and baghdad. so we're back to zero. you have no educational float.

you have people working around the clock all the time. what are some of the other indications of the imbalance there? the military has in-theater assets. i know. i served in them. they have the world divided up into fiefdoms. if you read dana priest's fine article in "the washington post" about the proconsuls, that's exactly what they are. they are proconsuls. when the four-star navy admiral from st. pak which is my vivid experience, when he goes to japan he is seen by the prime minister because he's trailing in his wake, tactical fighter squad drawns and fighter divisions. when another one goes he's carrying a briefcase and he's lucky if he is lucky to see the head of the american division. that is an imbalance that puts the military out in front of foreign policy, one of the house committee on foreign relations

recently had a title committed is our foreign policy military terrorized? you get it is. >> ease of use is also part of the problem that creates this dichotomy or this imbalance of power. why is it easy to use? it is easy for some of the points pointed out before. it's professional. it's a legionaires. it can go almost anywhere the president wants it to go. the latest attempt to curtail their power was an abdication of the congress to declare war. the congress essentially said, okay, we give up. you can use it but you got to report periodically and every president has although he's protested and, of course, richard nixon vetoed and passed it over his veto. little did he know it was an abdication by the congress, it has certainly proven that way but every president has conformed to its requirements usual by by stealth in the dark of the night delivering the

ports to the congress. no president wants to be seen in any way inhibited in the initiation of hostilities. that ought to tell somebody something. it goes on. the state department does not have a domestic constituency. let's just check what the defense department adds. it has the defense industrial base. it has bases and facilities. it has the reserve component, national guard and reserve and the families of the legions, it has conservatives. it has the american people. it has the congress and it has private security contractors and i could go on and on. what does the state department have? it has no domestic constituency. the state department's constituency is the international public for the american people. but that does not resonate with anybody enough that it could constitute a political or what i would call a domestic

constituency that would fight for the state department. we have a tendency since the 1947 national security act and can you look at the presidents from truman on and see how this egins to build and bu ..and gets to the point of nixon where nixon is calling the people at the state department commie pinko dogs. another institutional creation of the 1947 national security act, the security council so you have ambassadors from other countries. you have ministers of foreign affairs from other countries regardless of who they are, china, japan, whatever, they come to the country. they know who to go see. they don't see their counterpart but the desk officer or director director of the nsc in the white house because that's where foreign policy is run. that's a little different with each president but the tendency and trend to consolidate it there is certainly prevalent and as george marshall said when he was advising truman with regard

to that 26, july, 1947 signing of the 1947 national security act i fear, mr. president, we've militarized the process. the decision-making process is what he referred to. if you get it in the white house and it isn't transparent enough that not just the american people were cut out but the rest of the bureaucracy is cut out, and the pre-eminent institute within that instrument, within that bureaucracy is the dod, guess what? guess whose influence will be prepo prepondant? >> i saw this happen. he knew i was the only member of his policy planning taff that had military experience. good pick, i went over and met general casey at the time j-5 on the time and we set him up. we met three times and then donald rumsfeld ordered them stopped.

he didn't want the state department interfering with the defense department's business or having anything to do with what the defense department was formulating. we even had a conversation, the military officer and myself and we decided we'd meet in crystal city off the patch, so to speak then he got selected for brigade command and got fearful whether or not he was caught by the secretary or one of his mignons what he was doing, he would still go to command. i said we understand and we topped the talks so no coordination and defense at the strategic level. the policy planning staff being the only strategic element at the state department. this imbalance is an imbalance of two of the most critical instruments. the one diplomacy should be the leading strumentd. it should be the instrument that's out there all the time. it should be the instrument that is most coveted by your leadership. it should be one that is most exquisite. it should be the instrument that does most of america's heavy

lifting along with its economic power. it doesn't. the defense department does. that is the greatest and starkest imbalance of power within the civil military relationship that i know of. [ applause ] thank you all very much. all right. so we have time for questions and answers. well, definitely question, hopefully answers. we have a very large crowd as you can see. i'd like to entertain as many as possible. we have the jeopardy rule. you must frame your question in the form of a question. no speeches, please, so if you are your question is to a particular panelist please indicate that also. also indicate your name and affiliation. right here. >> my name is jordan.

two brief questions on topics not been raised. one is the virtually every survey shows that the political registration of members of the armed forces is more and more republican than it once was close to an even split between democrats, republicans and independents. so this is my first question i want to raise about how this affects things and also when the draft registration was passed under carter only men were required to register. so i wonder if we face the possibility of going back to the draft, is there any rational reason why young women should not also register, as well? >> good questions, both. >> go ahead, charlie. >> i'd like to take a stab at both. number one, i think there is a statute that is supposed to preclude surveying the military for their political affiliation.

i don't have that on the tip of my tongue but i think that's a good thing. we should not be trying to discern the political affiliations of the armed forces. but you raise another interesting question. my colleague and just for the record i only work for duke university. i'm not a defense contract -- well, god, they probably are a defense contractor somewhere so i probably work for one, but my colleague from unc, dick cone often talks about how officers shouldn't vote and interestingly enough general ordierno and petraeus announced they did not vote. sounds like an apolitical statement, doesn't it? who does -- if people in the armed forces follow that, does that have a partisan effect based on your comment? is that a partisan act by publicly announcing, encouraging people not to vote? and to what extent is it a good thing in a democracy for the

armed forces to alienate -- be alienated from the fundamental act of a democracy which is to vote? and i'd ask you to put that in the context of i guess there's a lot of hate about generals in this room, but, you know, they're not all bad people. i would suggest. but i also think, you know, in a democracy how much do you want them to feel that they are not part of it, that they -- should we fear the silence of the generals? should we have them only in the quiet back rooms? i don't think so. i would rather have them out in the sunshine. i'd rather have them on the talk shows. people are pretty confident to confront generals so i'm not so concerned about the ability of the democracy to deal with it and your second point --

>> draft information for women. >> number one, draft is not going to happen. and will not happy in the country. the military would be profoundly against it simply because it is such a technical force now and having people who don't want to do the things that you need them to do but i'm absolutely astonished for all of the discussion of don't ask, don't tell and all the pontification of how we need to have equality and access and fairness, no one virtually is talking about the inequality that women suffer today in the armed forces. why on earth should every job not be open to them? now let me tell you i'm not a feminist. i'm not talking about gender norming standards and everything else just -- hey, make the test whatever you want it to be but if you can pass that test you

ought to be able to do that so this idea that somehow our military today can't handle h e having women in combat, i would say that they haven't seen what combat is today because we have had women in combat. they've been wounded and killed. one of my young j.a.g.s was severely wounded after she came and briefed me in iraq. by an ied, so that is something i don't think -- if we ever did have a draft certainly, but i think that we need to address the inequality that women suffer today in the armed forces. it sends all the wrong messages to young people. >> let me comment -- it was a court challenge to that when we put draft registration about women not and the courts basically said that, congress had the power to exclude them. i don't think it would hold up anymore because basically women can -- i mean even though there are certain legal things they

can basically do everything. there is a report coming out that congress did set up a group about dropping the final restrictions on women, you know, in combat. i agree with general dunlap, decide what women should do and what the jobs are and just let people compete for them. those surveys -- if you look where the people come from in the volunteer source, it's not surprising, but interestingly enough in the 2008 election, again i don't know how they do these, there was a change because people were so fed up because of what bush had done to the military a lot of them were changing, but i think admiral mullen gave a speech this week telling you where the people come from and, yeah, they would do lead in lean in that direct. i think we ought to encourage them to vote and there are provisions in terms of absentee ballots and things like that.

>> chris, two ink thing, jason dempsey just back from afghanistan, west point faculty, the state of our army, amazon.com, he gives you the stats for his surveys and his analysis and it's pretty balanced. people forget that the officer corps is one thing, enlisted and nco is something else and they make up the bulk of the army. so it's pretty balanced. on the second point, casey, general casey, chief of staff of the army, is opening serious suggests about women serving in all positions. >> in the back, david aisenberg. >> david aisenberg, and three points. first, the most important line in president eisenhower's speech was always the part about the necessity of an informed and alert citizenry to restrain the influence of the -- how you

define it and the citizenry is capable of being knowledgeable due to the myriad of information freely available to everybody out there who is interested in looking. they don't seem particularly alert. they seem to have largely bought into the idea that the military is the most trusted institution and therefore they know what they're doing and we should just trust them to continue doing what they're doing and it's basically good which i think is radically wrong. how do the panelists think that could be changed if at all and secondly, what do you think president eisenhower would think of the rise of the private military and security treaty contracting we've seen in recent years. >> two very different questions. who wants to take it? either one. >> well, i think, david, on the private contractors, you would have been appalled. remember, that basically started when we went to the volunteer military because we started

contracting out kp as they used to call it back then and of course we went over the line. if you look at the first gulf war one out of ten people in theater was a contractor and iraq and afghanistan is about 50/50. i would argue one of the reasons it is is because they didn't activate the selective service people to call people up and have more active military people so that's why they relied on it. >> private contractors very simply stated allow the president of the united states to get around constitutional mandated in strength limitations on the armed forces, they allow them to go to war. >> yeah, on the first one, i think that the military is the most trusted institution because quite honestly and i'm not talking about people like myself, when you see thus young kids they really are our best and brightest and it saddens me in a way that so much of our talent has to be bled off into the military because if you

think about president eisenhower's speech about every dollar spent is a theft, so forth and we can talk about intellectual capital, as well. getting back to your central issue i for one very much believe that a civilian who has never served can educate him or herself to the point where they can confront, if you will, the military on more or less an equal plain and we're talking about on the strategic level and defense policy level. you're not going to get down to the point where you know as much as a corporal about how to drive a tank but you don't need to. that's not the big policy issue. you can and you educate yourself. part is self-education but seeing more and more universities and i would like to see it even greater have national security study, not just for people going into the

foreign service and i'd be happy to comment about the foreign service if anybody asks a que question, but who will be citizens and business leaders and so forth. and not to plug duke but duke and the law school, that's why we have a center there and you see when they first started years ago, you wouldn't see that at all. now there's i think 160 universities that have some sort of national security studies. it's a hot topic and it is possible and necessary for a democracy to educate itself. >> down here. >> i'm christine with p. sax in montgomery. i want to thank you, mr. wilkerson, for your interesting analysis. i read that there are more people in army bands than there

are diplomats. and but my question for you is you talk about the lack of a constituency for the state department and the lack of a constituency for diplomacy. how can we change that? how would you see -- i thought your analysis was very profound and i don't know how we go about making that change. >> a good question, one we deal with in seminar because i ask my students how would you change it and i've had interesting responses to that. including i'm going to help change that and they go and -- i'd say probably a third of my students will take the foreign service exam. they will probably -- about 50% of that will go on to the oral exams and maybe 50% of that will get into the foreign service. others are going into other instrumentalities of the government not the least of which is the peace corps which doesn't get much want anymore

but i get the most interesting e-mails from my students who have gone into the peace corps, el salvador, mexico, incredible eye-openers for them and come back and hopefully be policymakers so one way is through education, a long-term solution but through education. another way is to recognize, i think, this division of power, that imbalance of power. secretary clinton and gates have made headway in recognizing it and trying to do something bit but now the physical situation of this country is such that no one is going to give up a single dollar because they know they'll give up billions across the board as this physical situation gets worse and worse, which it's going to. so i'm into the sure how you do it in a fast way, given the physical situation that we have today and the fact there's not enough money to go around for everybody. the long-term solution, i think,

for the american people and for those who will go into policymaking positions is education. it's opening their eyes to the fact that diplomacy is still an instrumentality that ought to be used. interestingly, if you studied the demise of empire and history, you will see that one of the things that becomes atrophied as the power becomes more arrogant and more dependent on its force as its principal instrument, you get this frittering away of that power on the fringes of power, think afghanistan and iraq today for example and then you get a -- if you're smart like the british were, you get this reaction that says, wow. we do need a civil service and a foreign service that can do things for us because our power is no longer that way can do everything. and so you get a resurgence of the diplomatic instrument. i'm hoping that that will be an

attribute of what's happening in the world today, that is the defusion of power, not just our power that is being diminished but others coming up in terms of our relative power, so it's a mess if you want my real appreciation of it but it has ways it can be ameliorated and one ways i'm work on myself is education. >> let me give you a more specific 30 seconds. you need a unified national security budget age look at all the instruments together and goes up as one then the president can make the trade-off as head of time, missile defense or diplomats or whatever it might do and that will do it quickly. now, congress may or may not go along with it completely but if you send it up there you at least started the battle and gates talked a good game and said we ought to spend more on diplomacy. well, where are you going to get it from? the sky so that's what you need to do. >> and you also need to go after the congress because my party,

i'm a republican. my party in some of its more right wing members takes great pride in not even owning a passport or never set foot out of the united states and doesn't want to. takes great pride in the fact it doesn't speak any language but english. you've got to change that mind-set too. >> if i -- i've often heard that thing about the bands and foreign service and i assumed it was just a flippant remark and wasn't serious because my flip apartment remark serious back would be when they become effective at representing the united states as our military bands do maybe we'll increase the size of the foreign service. but let me say this, nobody in the military would prefer to take the lead in foreign appears. we all would rather have things resolved through diplomacy but i think it's a mistake and i do

agree, we need to have a larger diplomatic core and it needs to be opened up to more than graduates of georgetown and princeton, i might add and duke, yeah, seriously, more than just the graduates of the elite universities. but we have to understand that what gives our diplomats leverage is our military power. so the idea that we could be militarily insignificant particularly in a particular theater, for example, and have the same kind of leverage that we would hope to have i think is not very realistic. there's interconnection. >> right there and then i'll come down here. right there. >> paul sloan, retired military served both in the draft era and the volunteer. is it a possibility that the military of the all volunteer today with the civilian

contractors equaling as much as they are could morph into truly a mercenary army? s>> well, that's why i think if you go to war, we kept draft registration and that's one way to prevent it. if you just say, you know, forever we'll never draft again i think you do, you know, run that -- run that risk. particularly with your private contractors because you have virtually no control, you know and we've seen all of the stories. even the military doesn't like the private contractors i mean because if you go back and you look at what happened in fallujah where the marines had to go and fight when they really were not ready for that particular engagement. >> let's distinguish between security contractors and the vast, vast majority of contractors which are not performing security duties, the

vast majority of contractors are leaning latrine, serving food, doing logistics and things like that. i totally agree that when you have contractors guarding the u.s. embassy, i remember going into the green zone. it just shocked me that we had contractors guarding that compound. in the interperimeter. that shouldn't be. i don't think that they'll -- and a lot of them, most of them are not americans. most of the contractors we hire get subcontractors from all over the world so i don't think this is a good thing but do the american people want to pay the incremental cost to hiree ssentially security guards? what we're paying for now, what we're buy something a highly trained sophisticated infantryman that the decision has been made it's better to use that sophisticated infantryman

in other tasks other than standing the important much simpler task of guarding point defense. but the rise of military contractors is troubling especially since more and more are being employed by nongovernmental organization and media and so forth so even if we got out of the business of security contractors, i think that there would still be a market for them. >> down here. >> boday aberdeen. i have a question for the three panelists about the imbalance of power within the defense establishment which we heard about, the imbalance of power between state and defense but is there any balance of power in the pentagon between the civilian leadership and the military leadership? >> okay. good question. >> in terms of what is the proper balance. >> is there? is there an imbalance?

>> well, i think it changes depending upon the personalities. i think you can -- you have secretaries of defense who are not afraid to confront the military. you have some people who don't want to confront the military. i do worry, you know, in terms of somebody, you know -- i mean in secretary gates was in the service and he's also, you know, an ncia. he dot not seem to be afraid to confront the military. you may disagree with him but he's not afraid to confront them. it's important and doesn't necessarily have to be military service but understand the background. i see it even now, you got people there -- they want to be popular with the military and don't want to take them -- you know, take them on. and, you know, for example, we all talk about military health care and the cost for retirees.

if you don't take that on -- they finally made a little bit of change this year but we haven't changed it since 1995, okay. and nobody wants to take that on because you don't want to be seen as unpopular. people forget and bill would remember when stockman was in there, we froze military pay one year, no raise like civilians. would you try that today? let me tell you nobody would do because the men and women and all this. if you look at the military pay it's higher than it's supposed to be right now because you have an index and it's been going over it all year but, again, i think, you know, that is very, very difficult than -- i do worry about that, you know. i used to tell people working for me, if you leave here after a couple you have years and the military loves you, you haven't done your job, okay, because you've got to take the bomb. >> so quick question to all three of you. will congress pass an increase

in the co-pays and fees for care? for the first time in its history every time it's been floated up congress has shot it down. >> i'm afraid so, but it's wrong. it's wrong because we're in the middle of two wars and you're going to balance the budget on the back of 19-year-olds and 20-year-olds and 25-year-olds? if you want to cut charlie dunlap -- if you want to increase my co-pay and co-pay of every general officer, if that is somehow going to solve the budgetary problem, have at it. but don't do it on the backs of -- >> so that's the distinction, charlie. it's between active duty personnel and retirees because otherwise they don't affect the rates much the retirees either. >> i can tell you in the great keep of themes this is not a lot of money. let's start with entitlements to people who have never served. >> there is a -- >> because if -- if -- yeah,

if -- if we are -- if we have to -- if we have to make a decision, i think we can do both. i don't think it is -- we may have to increase taxes or whatever, i think we can do both but we should not try to balance the budget on the backs of that small portion of this country that served -- is either serving or has served in uniform. chiefs, we ought to look someplace else than to take away the health care for them and their family or make it more expensive or more difficult to obtain. we're the united states of america. we don't do that to people we have set in harm's way and so many have come back very different than how we sent them. >> we don't. we've done it since the revolutionary war and i will tell you something going on right now i'm following very closely as are many of my retired colleagues. if you belong to a military

associations, used to be retired association, they're the lobby group for retired people, you guys know about them, i'm sure. there is actually very sophisticated orchestrated i think from the pentagon who's oshth straighting, i can't say campaign going on to divide the veteran committee and steal from the old veterans to give to the new veterans and the rhetoric accompanying it is being put out by varous and sundry congressmen who come down on either side of the fight but that's very dangerous in my view. you divide and conquer in this way and of course the most acute ve veterans group is the ones who have the athengs are those veterans from afghanistan and iraq particularly because some of them have some really horrendous wounds due to the fact that we can now save pretty much almost anybody on the battlefield so this is a dangerous thing to be doing to

start the fight within the community as to who should be the bill payer? i agree the sums are so small this shouldn't be necessary but it is necessarily apparently because it is so difficult to get into cutting any of these. >> let me disagree here and i can't emphasize this too much. first of all, what is happened -- we were not at war from 1995 on so number two we've increased the benefit, okay, if terms of you didn't have dry care for life in until 1999 so this idea that you can't touch them is nonsense. and nobody is saying you're going to balance the budget on the -- with the defense budget but it has to be part of it, okay? and the fact of the matter is, you get -- you have the same thing with police and firemen. well, how much can you, you know, pray somebody to put their life on the line? look, i'm going to give away --

when i went into the navy i got 220 a month. why did i go in? because my father said you deserve to serve your country. we didn't go in for money and say how dare -- i took a cut from being a new york city high school to go in, okay and we never said, oh, you owe us this, no. we love this country. we owe them -- owe the country so you can't -- mullen says health costs are eating us alive. what are you going to do about it? and that's the key thing. if you were paying right now, admiral allen when he retired, head of the coast guard says i pay $19 a month, okay, for, you know, coverage? you have military people what retired have a health care plan. they don't take it because they stay on their own. that was never intended. nobody to talking about wounded veterans and the bill that gates proposed is for retirees under 65, okay? that's what he's talking aboutle

now, you ask me how to do it i'd means test it and we've made changes, for example, it used to be if you served, you know, you could only get 75% of your pay regardless of how long you save. now it's 100%, we changed that. that wasn't part of the agreement. who came in after 1986 said you'll get 46% then 50 perhaps we changed it before the war stated. you can do it. you've got to take it on because if you don't, you're not going to be able to buy some things that you may like to defend -- to defend the country but this argument -- nobody is trying to bat the budget on the backs of people but has to be part of overall. don't give me this, we're helping people who haven'tered it. you haven't earned it? you paid your social security. we use the social service surplus to go to war. that's what we did. we took that surplus, we didn't

raise taxes on people. that's the big mistake. this is the first wars we have's ever gone into which we haven't raised taxes so who do we expect? this again and i'm not demeaning it. i know what it is, okay. i went and the reason i went is because my family told me, i could have had deferments ras a teacher and all that. that's what killed the draft. we got all these politicians the last two vice presidents and the president they didn't serve, okay? that's what killed it and we let them get away with it. so this idea that somehow, you know, and i among to -- you should see the stuff they write about me. i love it when i get my thing every month with all these horrible things that these people write about, this type of thing, no, okay, so i think, you know, in terms of pay, we have a standard. employment cost index. we're way over it. that's the standard. that's the law and nobody ever

said when you come into the -- you know what you promise military people when you came in, read the contract. you will be entitled to health care at a base on an availableability basis. that's what you're promised. there was no tri care. >> we got the one thing that could get the panel ifs to disagree and get larry fired up. >> if we talk about means testing why limit it to only those who served in the armed forces. i'm not into it but if we're getting into means testing and go down that route. that takes us in a whole different direction and we immediate a new panel. >> two more questions, 10:40. go. right there. >> alex dirk with national legislation. i wanted to go back to the idea of the unified national security budget. we've heard secretary clinton and others argue that could

increase the state department's stature as the budget goes through the congressional appropriations process but do you think it's also possible given the imbalance of power that already exists that could actually exacerbate the balance of power between dod and state? thank you. >> go ahead. >> in brian stek, captain u.s. army national guard. my question is back to the all-volunteer versus draft. it seems me the reality of it regardless of the political imbalance is a socioeconomic imbalance. you do not have members of all walks of society continuing to serve in the united states military. as a result, the policies that are being put out by the politicians are now being carried on the backs of 1% and mainly a. >> reporter: affected by it. isn't, in fact, the question is, is that really good for democracy for the fact that everything that we're doing

everything, everything that we're imposing is in fact not in any way shape or form whether through taxes or mutually service good for the democracy. >> you brought up the unified security budget. are you putting the kitten in the cage with the lion? okay. so that's number one because you raised that, as well, colonel wilkerson and unified security budget? >> well, basically what you would decide can how much you want to spend on defense, diplomacy, development, okay? the decision based upon, all right, then you would be able to make trade-offs and you'd have to say do i want to buy another submarine this year or do i want to spend more -- we're not just hiring foreign service people but talking about development. you know, development of foreign aid an you would make that trade-off so that basically you could say, well, for this dollar in foreign aid i can deal with what the military says is a big

claimant change. i can deal with that or deal with the scarcity or something like that. then when you send it up, yes, congress can change it but you've already made those changes and congress accepts about 90% of what you do and what i want is get the executive branch to sit back, the president and his team and look after you make that decision and, bart, the other question, basically that's why volunteer military is a peace-time military. go back and read it, 1981 the military wrote that to president reagan. it's ray peacetime because then in war you would get, you know, to deal with the problem you want. >> senator? >> i think it's a reality -- it's a reality, and we're going to have it. we have to make military service attractive enough so that the best and brightest will continue to solve to do the things that need to be done. in terms of putting the lion with the cage that is always going to be a problem because of

this factor. at the end of the day we can have battalion after battalion after battalion of diplomats but they're not going to be hunting al qaeda in the hindu kush so there's things the military has to do which requires a much bigger infrastructure so i do think there will be imbalance but i do think it's a good idea. i support the idea but -- >> last word. you do have the problem for some of the reasons i pointed out and others that you may be letting the fox into the henhouse, but i think if you reorganize the congressional committee structure to provide better oversight of the process you would be a long way down the road to trying to stop the head or prevent that. you'd need probably a joint national security committee sat on by both members of the house who have the power by the constitution of the purse and by members of the senate who by historical precedence or a little more shall we say sagacious when it comes to long-term thought but a joint

oversight committee and eliminate all the committees that have their own fief domenici fiefdoms could go a long way in preventing that. >> thank our panelists. we'll take a quick break. [ applause ] we'll take a quick break to allow the panelists to leave and our second panelists to come up on the stage and reconvene just before 11:00 so pay attention to we'll flash the lights or i'll make an announcement. thank you very much.

defense and foreign policy studies here at cato. a friendly reminder since we have just come off break please check and be certain that you have to indulge yourself phones. when president eisenhower gave his farewell address, he was worried about the proper limitations of the development of the military-industrial complex, and what he regarded quite legitimately as disturbing if unintentional for the most part consequences of always having this country prepared to confront the soviet union and wage the cold war. but there was a very important aspect of his view, and that wao as many policy makers at than tt time, that the cold war would be an aberration in american foreign policy. thathe wants this ratherforeign.

that once that rather brittle and confrontational by poll hip structure would change for the better, would return to something more resembling normality, hen there wthen ther chance to at least undo many aspects much the emerging industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise too industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise tou industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise toc industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise toh industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise to the industrial military complex turned out to be not just a temporary emergency response to an unusual international development but it became institutionalized and it has persisted indeed intensified in the post-cold war period. one wonders what president eisenhower would say about our current situation where the united states spends almost as

much on the military as the rest of the world combined. and when one sees the many tentacles of influence when the political system, indeed within the social system of the united states, exercised by what he identified quite correctly as a military industrial complex. we have an extremely able panel this morning to address these and other issues. i'm going to introduce them as a group and since you to have their bios in your packet of material, i'm not going to spend the time reading that.dto have their bios in your packet of material, i'm not going to spend the time reading that.o have their bios in your packet of material, i'm not going to spend the time reading that. i'll just highlight a couple major features. our first speaker is eugene gholz. he is considered a rising star

within the u.s. foreign policy community. at the present time he is on leave working in the u.s. department of defenses office of industrial policy and i want to stress, therefore, that the views he expresseses this morning are completely his own, they do not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense.are completely his o not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense.morning are completely they do not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense.are completely his o not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense. he is also involved in producing a lot of very interesting writings. i want to mention two books that he has written. one by military transformation, technological innovation and the defense industry, and another, u.s. defense politics, the origins of security policy. both of these books have considerable relevance to the topic that we're discussing at this conference. our second speaker is john

holsman, who is the president of a consulting narm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.f geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.mnarm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. narm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.thnarm does lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.tanarm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.at does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. i first met him about 15 years ago when he was a very young scholar at the heritage foundation. and we found that even though he was a self-described conservative it and i was an a vowed libertarian, we agreed on probably 70%, 75% of defense and foreign policy issue, a percentage that i suspect has actually grown quite a bit over the last 15 years. since then, highway has had a very impressive career both in the think tank community and with a very successful consulting firm. and i want to highlight two

books that wrote that really deserve a lot of attention. one is ethical realism, which i originally thought was a rather redundant title since realism properly understood is ethical. but i understood the need for that given the tendency of some purported realists, including a secretary of state in the 1970s, to rather i go more ethical considerations in american foreign policy. and i think that book is a very useful corrective. he also wrote an extremely worth quhil biography of lawrence of arabia, but that book is much more than a biography. takes bo it is a book that provide as lot of lessons for the follies of nation building.

our third speaker is professor richard bet richard betts from columbia university. again, one of the most distinguished scholars in the american academic and foreign policy communities. author of several books including two very, very important volumes. one soldier states man and the cold war and the second one enemies of intelligence.man and cold war and the second one enemies of intelligence. he is as i said -- he has a tremendous reputation and we're extremely pleased to have him here today. the final speaker on the panel this morning is my colleague, christopher preble, who is the director of foreign policy studies here at the cato institute. a book that he published last year i think deserves a

tremendous amount of attention. the book is the power problem, how american military dominance makes us less safe, less prosperous and less free. and he documents in great detail how the united states, assuming that by amassing great power and utilizing it around the world has produced a lot of counterproductive results. very much like a golfer who assumes that if he just swings harder at the ball, he'll end up having a good golf game. those of us who play that sport know that it's exactly the opposite. before that, he wrote a very interesting book, john f. kennedy and the missile gap, which of course deals with a number of issues at the end of the eisenhower administration. and most recently, he coe- editd

the book terrorizing ourselves. chris is another one of the rising young stars in the american foreign policy community. so i think we'll have a very interesting discussion here this morning and i'm going to ask eugene gholz to kick it off. >> i want to thank you for the very kind into dukes and thank cc ochco a it to for orpging will s event. i think it's a great opportunity to reflect on extremely important issues for national security policy and the future of the united states and this wonderful speech from 50 years ago, which i think really can guide us in a lot of ways. so i should follow-up on what ted said in the introduction, that i'm speaking here as a scholar and as myself, none of

this is official and i'm not only obligated to say that, but it's clearly true. i guess the only other thing i'll say about my job is it sounds from the title lie i really am now in the bows of the military industrial complex. the fact that there is an office with this name, the office of industrial policy, probably suggests there's something to the concept. what we try to do is balance the positive aspects and avoid the negative aspects of the military industrial complex. and you'll hear through my remark, should you interpret for yourself what it might mean what someone who thinks the way i do can actually show up in that office. and i can't go further than that, but there you go. so i'm actually going to wear

this quite relatively scholarly hat for this talk in the sense that i'm going to deal with history and then try to bring its implications of that history into the present or draw some contrasts. and i'm going to talk about the economic issues in the military industrial complex. i'm going to talk about it actual companies a fair amount, industrial itself. and i know that some other people on the panel may talk about kind of the lobbying and interest group politics and i'm very eager to hear their remarks and i think that's -- it should offer an integrated panel to get the full picture of how of military industrial complex works and what's dysfunctional about it. so i'll try to focus on the economic issues. and what i want to pick up on is from the farewell address spooef speech itself, president

eisenhower expressed a number of concerns about the military industrial complex, but one of to me the core concerns was the fear of or a warning against crowding out civilian, commercial dynamic economic activity by a focus on military spending, military dominating industry, dominating in some ways taking the best and the brightest of technology and focusing it on military continukiconcerns as opposed to social concerns and realizing that that rock of the way of american life depends on now crowding out too much of the commercial industry through our necessary military efforts. it's not that the military was bad, we had to defend ourselves against the soviet, but we had to be cautious not to let it get out of control.

and so there's a key line and i'll paraphrase because i didn't write it down, but where he talks about the fear that people will decide what to do based on the hope of getting a government contract as opposed to deciding where to invest and where to spend their time and their energy and their efforts trying to make products that keep a want and would buy willingly in the marketplace and would make people's lives better. so that's the fear that i think on the industry side we need to understand, does that come on pass or how do we guard against that. and i guess i would say that after -- there's a counterveiling view that's important to weigh against that which really came to prominence mostly in years after president eisenhower's speech, maybe in the 1970s kind of hit its first pay day, i think, which is the story about spinoff technologies

and how military effort can actually help the commercial economy and increase our dynamism by investing great products. there are all sorts of examples people point to. maybe the funniest one is tang. the idea that we'd be much worse off if we hadn't had all the investment because in the commercial market, we wouldn't have tang. but there are many other example, zippers and microwaves and people talk about lots of different things. so there is this counter didveiling view that might actually say there's not so much a problem of crowding out.count might actually say there's not so much a problem of crowding out.idveiling view that might actually say there's not so much a problem of crowding out.view there's not so much a problem of crowding out. what i'm going to do is offer a few vignettes and kind of a

logical explanation of why i think president eisenhower was right and the spinoff story is exaggerated significantly and we should be cautious, but in fact president eisenhower also had the answer and we've actually done a good job. the reason why defense spending in absolute terms is much higher today than it has been in the past but in relative terms of chance of it crowding out and taking over the whole american economy is much faded is that we've had statesmanship and leadership of certainly people like president eisenhower and a few others, maybe not enough, but just enough that we kept it in check, that there has been some amount of balance. and so i guess the punch line of the history that i'm going to tell you in a minute is that there is actually a defense

industry, there is a real military industrial complex, where their focus is exactly on what president eisenhower warned about, it's on getting another contract. they're completely responsive. in fact, this is how you get to be a good defense company, a good defense contractor, is through ghn straigdemonstrating responsiveness to any little wing, nudge, chance that there be a contract on the government. they're watching and they changed their investment behavior and they do whatever it takes to get that contract. they act very differently from commercial companies. and that's a good thing because it means there are a lot of commercial companies out there not paying attention and watching the goecht livernment hawk. they're watching consumers and other companies that might buy their products and they're still a very dynamic economy parallel to this enclave of the defense

economy. so i'll give a couple examples to i also straigllustrate this . i thought it would be useful to look at the time frame eisenhower was looking at when he first observed that there was this will arriving. people were excited about jet aircraft. seemed to be related to the military. we're entering the era of commercial jet travel. and, in fact, these stories, or at least one them, the story of the bowing 707, is the hero story for the spinoff people. they say thank goodness for military investment, we got jet travel, look at the boeing 707. and i'll talk a little bit about that and then a contrasting story of the 880.

which was not such a success. and i'll do that in the next five minutes. why it's easy in the next five minutes, some of you may have seen, i have a new article in the enterprise society, and they did a special issue on the 50th anniversary of the speech. so this is drawn from that. so if you want gory detail, there are copies i think upstairs. any anyway, the key thing i'm going to investigation, and there are many bits of the story you can pull out, i'm going for focus on the power of customers and the need t to focus on customer relationships to make your sales. so on the 707, i don't think

there's any doubt that some of the basic technology that went into the 707 and many other airports like swept wings came from military research. and that's what we would all expect, basic research that the government does, private companies by themselves do applied research, they don't do a lot of basic research, and so you want to look to the government to do those basic things like figuring out the core technology of swept wing, but then when you actually make a product that people want to buy, swept wings isn't enough. you've got to decide how far does the plane go and how past does it go and how many passengers and will it be quiet or noisy and how much fuel it uses. so when you get for that next level of making a product, the question for boeing is was boeing better off competing in the commercial aircraft market selling their 707 because they also had military aircraft contracts like the b-52 and especially the kc-135 at the

same time. were the actual products helping them in parallel. and the answer is not really. and it's because the military was such a powerful customer that when boeing was offering them products like the kc-135, they had to really tailer to military requirements and they had to pay attention to the military first. from the military's perspective as a customer, if a company wants to go sell products to commercial airlines, that's a distraction. the military's not going to reward you if as a company you say, yes, i'd really like to make your product, that's great, i'll make you a fighter plane or bo er or whatever, but first i'm going to take care of this thing for american airlines and i'll get around to the military when it's convenient.thing for ameri i'll get around to the military when it's convenient. that's not how it works. if on the side you have a little free time to do something for commercial people, that's fine, but actually we don't believe

you have free time because we think every second of every day, in fact, when you're sleeping, you should be working for the military contract, right? pay attention to us. and so boeing when they were trying to sell commercial airplanes had actually a problem that the airlines didn't trust them. they thought, well, our order is going to get delayeded because the military is going ask them for a hurried up production on the tankers. or something else is going to divert them so they can't pay attention to our needs as an airline. boeing it manage to sell commercial planes. the 707 was a success because they did manage to separate the production activities, separate the development activities, and make products that were customized for the airlines and for the military, and it was a near run thing because a number