of your time for a statement read by the douglas family which we'll do. and followed with a few questions regarding them. michael? >> as regards chairwoman giffords she continues to follow those commands as we told you about before. and we're actually confident that she's making some progress now. her eyes that we described as being opened -- that kind of occurrence is more frequent. and she's carrying out more complex sequences of events, more complex sequences of activity in response to our commands or even spontaneously. so we're very encouraged that she's continuing to make all the right moves in the right direction. obviously, we're very cautious

that she makes them at her own pace but again, we couldn't have hoped for any better improvement given the severity of her injury initially. >> with that, if i could have the douglas family come up. we have jenny and sister krissy here who's going to make a brief statement. >> good morning. my name is jenny douglas. and i'm barbara's sister and standing next to me is krissy blake. our dad asked us to read a statement on his behalf as he is being discharged from the hospital today. here's the message from my dad. i want to thank the staff at university medical center for the incredible care and treatment they have given to me since i was brought to the emergency room last saturday. but first i don't believe i would have made it to the emergency room had it not been for the aid rendered to me on the seen by anna who applied pressure to one of my bullet wounds and helped stop the

bleeding. there are so many people at umc who have given me and my family every type of support we've needed over these days and it would be impossible to name them all but every one of them have had a profound impact on my recovery and the well-being of my family. ♪ >> there are a few i would particularly like to acknowledge. dr. ree and his trauma team, dr. hughes and his vascular team, critical care services director jane wilson, the nurses technicians and all the staff in icu, case management and social work staff and my therapy team. two nurses in the icu were largely responsible for my care. i have never met two more compassionate, skilled health care professionals as tracy and buck. they feel like family to us now.

all have contributed greatly to my ability to be discharge today. it has made me possible to attend the funeral services for chief john roll and return home. we are extremely fortunate to have such an outstanding medical facility in our community led by ceo kevin burns and now the whole world knows about the high level of expertise and professionalism that is found here. i also want to thank from the bottom of my heart the people of tucson who brought their words of encouragement to the hospital. i saw their tributes, and photographs for the first time yesterday and was deeply moved and uplifted. my healing process is well underway and so is the healing of this wonderful community we call home. i ask everyone to continue their prayers for chairwoman giffords' full recovery and for all the survivors of the tragic events last saturday. i said my condolences to the families of the good people we

lost. and wish them spiritual solace and emotional recovery. we will take a few questions. [inaudible] >> he has been. he was asked to make a personal statement, and he couldn't physically be in two places at the same time and it was very important that he was at the funeral so he asked my sister and i to make it on his behalf. [inaudible] >> i was with him when he left the hospital. it was both joyous and sad at the same time. we've really created quite a family up on the icu. and we're going to miss them greatly but we're definitely going to come back and visit. it was quite a moment. [inaudible] >> he really wanted to see what was going on. my dad is a hands-on kind of guy. and being in a hospital bed does

not suit him. so he insisted that we take him out there. he wanted to see the entire thing. we walked the entire memorial. what he said in the statement is right. he was both, you know, sad but he was -- it was uplifting for him to see this community that he loved so much come together in that way. >> you said in a hospital bed does not suit him, describe his character and his personality. >> our dad -- he works hard. he works so hard. that's something that he's taught my sister and i. he always worked in the service for his -- for people in his community. he's the first one at work and he's the last one to leave and that's true. that's how we grew up but he plays hard with us too. i mean, he loves his family.

sundays in our sunday -- every sunday, even when we were teenagers and we rolled our eyes every sunday was family day. it's something he insisted on. he holds his family close to him and he works hard, too. >> how it has changed him and how has it changed you. >> people have been asking us that. it's hard to say right now. it's been such an emotional roller coaster for us. >> i think we'll see the changes to come. >> is he walking? >> he's taking a few steps on his own with a walker. >> is he going to be in the office on monday? >> we're going to keep him from doing that. he had a meeting in his room yesterday. my husband took some pictures of him sitting in his bed, you know, all his staff around him. staff and coworkers around him and, you know, that was heart warming to see. it's like dad's back.

[inaudible] >> i believe my husband has given the permission to the star to release a couple of photos this morning. [inaudible] >> he doesn't need any further surgeries. we don't expect any complications 'cause he's healing so well. he will have in-home physical therapy and nursing care provided to him until he feels well enough to do things on his own. >> what's this sunday going to mean to you? >> it's going to be quite a celebration. >> it will be mixed because we will be attending a funeral that day but we will be together. >> thank you very much. i appreciate it. this will be the last time we meet regularly like this. we haven't been picked up for the next season. [laughter] >> so at this time, all other information that we have to give out we'll give out in a routine way both either on our hospital website or our public affairs

office. and if something was to happen, that we need to reconvene, then we'll coordinate that through a public affairs office as well. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> this weekend on c-span2's booktv. on "after words," former advisor to martin luther king, jr., clarence jones with a behind the scenes look with the weeks leading up to the historic march on washington and i have a dream speech. also this weekend a critical assessment of stereotypes. and a new biography of our first president. find the complete schedule at booktv.org and sign up to get our schedules emailed directly to your in box with our booktv alert.

>> this weekend on c-span3's american history tv, historians discuss the importance of their work on pop culture at the american historical association conference in boston. an oral history with walter, washington's first delegate to congress. and to learn about creating currency ? >> the u.s. russia nuclear s.t.a.r.t. treaty would reduce

both countries's arsenals to about a third. the treaty has already been approved by congress and was debated by the russian parliament this week. more now from this event held by the council of foreign relations. this is an hour. >> we'll get started, please my name is cliff. i am director for europe and eurasia at the eurasia group and i would like to welcome everyone to today's council on foreign relations meeting. first, just a few housekeeping items. please completely turn off not just put on vibrate, your cell phones, blackberries, any wireless devices to avoid interference with our sound system here. as a reminder, this meeting is on the record. let me then proceed to introduce our guests, our speakers. first, rose gallimore who is the assistant secretary of state of

the bureau arms control verification and compliance. she recently served as most of you know as the chief negotiator of the new strategic arms reduction treaty. new s.t.a.r.t. prior to her current position she has been with the carnegie endowment for international peace where she worked u.s. russian relations and nuclear stability. steven piper, steve is senior fellows at the brookings center on the united states and europe. and director of the brookings arms control initiative. he focuses on russia and ukraine and arms control more broadly. steve retired foreign service officer. he has more than 25 years with the state department focused on u.s. relations with russia and eurasia and arms control.

and micah is in the center of preventive. and he worked at the harvard university kennedy school of government in a number of positions and capacities and in washington. at brookings, the congressional regional service and policy planning office at the state department. let me then begin our discussion. and let me begin with you, rose. what in your view are the lessons of new s.t.a.r.t. for the future of u.s./russian arms control negotiations? and i really have two angles in mind here. what insights could you offer from what you've experienced on russian views on key issues? and secondly, what lessons does new s.t.a.r.t. offer on how any new administration should handle the congress on an arms control treaty? >> excellent, excellent questions, cliff. may i say how impressed i am

that there's so many people interested in nuclear arms control at this hour of the morning. i think it's absolutely terrific. [laughter] >> but that was actually the first point and i would like to turn to your congressional point because the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty both negotiation and ratification process in my view for the congressional relationship is that it's brought this issue front and center again in our relationship with the u.s. congress and particularly with the senate. i was very impressed as the negotiator, i must say sometimes pressed as the negotiator because the senate was very, very interested through the course of the negotiations. we briefed them repeatedly five times we briefed national security working groups starting back in the spring of 2009 as the negotiations were barely getting started and proceeding then through the summer and the rest of 2009/2010. not only briefing the national

security working group which is chaired by at that time senator kyl, senator kyl and senator byrd but also then chairing -- the chairman of the foreign relations committee and the ranking member, senator kerry, senator lugar, of course we were very involved with them throughout but the armed services committee and the intelligence committee as well so we had this kind of regular dialog going on and then the ratification process came. and you all know what the ratification process was like. it was a very, very lively debate, lively discussions. but the core conclusion i take away from it is that nuclear arms control is back as an issue of interest on the hill. and one where a number of senators -- not all by any means, but a number of senators are willing and ready to engage. so as far as the future is concerned, i would just say, you know, continue what we've been doing, which is to try to stay in very, very close contact as we proceed in new directions.

but also to be aware that the interest level is going to be very high. and indeed you saw that if you looked closely at the resolution of ratification. it calls for briefings, consultations, let's get in there and talk to them before, after and in the middle of any interactions on the nuclear arms control issues. i think that's healthy and i frankly welcome the fact that there is such a big interest on capitol hill but it is a lesson for the future that we also need to continue and that make sure that that due diligence is done. now, as to the lessons learned working with the russians. i would say frankly there were two lessons for me. first -- the first lesson is that the cold war is indeed over. there were many cold war issues that we continue to grapple with. i'll get to that in a moment. but the way the negotiations were conducted was -- it was much different from when i was last at the negotiating table in geneva in 1990 and 1991 working

on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. at that point, we still had a very kind of, you know, set piece way of interacting with the russians. in the intervening periods, 15 years of implementation of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty made a huge difference in how we interact with the russians on these issues and particularly the fact that we had a great cadre of experienced inspectors and weapon systems operators who came and participated in our delegation in geneva and the russians did the same. that meant we had this very experienced team on both sides of the negotiating table who are used to interacting with each other at bases in the inspection process. it just made for a much more, i would say, rich dialog and prepared dialog. we really, i think, knew what we needed to do in the course of these negotiations to get through them and get a treaty that suited the present stage. so that was the first lesson i

would like to underscore. the cold war is really over and we had a lot of experience now particularly on onsite inspection that made a big difference how we interacted with the russians on these issues. but the second point is i would say a realistic point but perhaps one that, you know, is a little more negative. and that is that there are some cold war issues that continue to return to the front of the agenda. and missile defenses and how we interact on missile defenses is i would say at the top of that list. it was a very important part of the ratification debate on capitol hill but it's a long-standing issue and it's an issue that we're now going to try to work very hard with cooperation with the russians, not only in our bilateral context but also in the nato/russia context and that was such an enormous, enormous success of the lisbon summit back before the holidays that in those two context, the bilateral

and the nato/russia context we agreed on a program of missile defense cooperation. again, this is nothing new. ronald reagan back in 1998 when he launched the star wars talked about the russians with missile defenses but we really want to get off the dime on this and i think it's going to be very, very important to scoping the future. so thank you. >> there's sort of next steps in order. steve, what are the prospects for talks on tactical nuclear weapons? and in your view, what might an agreement look like? >> okay. well, first of all, with the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty taking it down to 1500 strategic warheads i think we really are at the point where it's hard to envisage further strategic reductions without doing something about these large number tactical weapons that are not constrained. but we get into another round of negotiation with the russians on

tactical weapons, there are going to be some difficult issues and i just mentioned three. first of all, there's a large numerical disparity in the u.s. u.s. tactical arson cal and the russian tactical. the russians have 3 to 8 times as many tactical nuclear weapons and when you have that kind of numerical disparity it makes negotiation more difficult. a second issue is that over the last 10 to 15 years, the russians have come in their military doctrine much more weight on tactical forces because they see these weapons as necessary to offset what they regard as conventional force disadvantages vis-a-vis nato and more importantly vis-a-vis china and this is nothing new. they have taken a page from nato's book for most of the cold war when nato chose not to match the soviet union in the warsaw pact but instead relied on tactical nuclear weapons. and the third issue which is going to make this, i think, a complicated issue is verification. because when you're talking

about limits on and verification of limits on tactical weapons, you probably will not be talking about the systems because i don't think the american air force or the russian air force is going to want to limit f-16's and their counterparts whose primary missions are conventional. so you're talking about limiting actual warheads and perhaps even designing schemes where inspectors might have to go into storage bunkers and count weapons. that's not an insurmountable problem but it's going to pose a set of verification challenges that the united states and russia have not had to grappled with in previous control agreements. i don't think they are insurmountable. and one way to approach this is, the question is going to be given this large russian advantage, how do you persuade them basically to negotiate a way all or part of that? and i think here the way to do this will be the united states under the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty will end up with a numerical

advantage in nondeployed warheads. the russians will reach their reductions primarily by retiring and taking out of service missiles but most of their remaining missiles are going to have full warhead sets. the united states is going to take a different approach and taking warheads off of missiles and would have the ability in the event that the treaty broke down to put a lot of warheads back on the missiles and the russians won't have any kind of matching capability. so perhaps the way that designed an approach that allowed you to trade an american willingness to accept reductions and limits on nondeployed strategic warheads for russian readiness to address tactical weapons might give whoever is out there some negotiating leverage and it may be done -- i think the time in terms of the next round really to move to an approach that talks about a limit on all nuclear weapons. it would cover strategic, nonstrategic, tactical, deployed and nondeployed and if you put them into a single limit, that might allow some of these

tradeoffs and you could have that kind of approach perhaps much a subceiling that would be akin of 550 limit in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. >> before we move to bmd, would anyone else like to comment on the tactical issue? okay. micah? >> turning to both the missile defense then. i mean, it's several issues. in your view what are the main issues that separate russia and the u.s./nato on bmd? given that the u.s. is very unlikely to accept formal limits on ballistic missile defense and if anything came screaming out of the senate? no formal limits, what types of understandings might moscow accept? and the overall judgment in your view how likely is missile defense to disrupt u.s./russian nuclear cooperation. >> there are a buffet of further steps in u.s./russian nuclear and conventional force

reductions and agreements that could be reached in 2011, 2012 and after the presidential election in both countries. if there's not a formal agreement on missile defense, none of these will likely happen. medvedev say either we come to an agreement on missile defense or there will be an resumption of the arms race and it's a very threatening position but it's a primary concern for a lot of russian officials and strategic thinkers that comes up over and over again. the primary russian concern is not the system which currently protects the united states from limited numbers of ballistic missile launches. the united states has roughly 24 interceptors in alaska, 6 in california. these are intended to cover the entirety of the continent of the united states from north korea or an unauthorized launch from russia but in the summer or in the fall of 2009, the obama administration introduced what's called the european-phased adaptive approach policy which

is a policy to create a missile defense shield over all of europe in four stages, 2011, 2015, 2018 and 2020. there are some russian whose perceive that that system will put at risk it's icbm force so it could not have a reliable second strike against the united states. the administration to be fair has done -- a very good job through the presidential bilateral working group in the council to explain that these systems will not threaten russia's icbm force. technical experts in russia get this but whether the policymakers get it -- get it received that's another question. there's still more the united states can do internally to provide some transparency about what the outphases specifically the 2018 and 2020 stages of missile defense of this missile defense for europe will look like. the missile that would be in place in 2018 and 2020 is still in the design stages. even the earlier missiles which

will be based upon ships in the mediterranean, that has not been tested yet. so we're still at the early stages at this. and the perception that this could threaten its force in the future scares russia and then the final issue as well as hinted at can quote secretary gates and to paraphrase him in june. the russians hate missile defense. they hated it and they hated it in the late '60s and as the secretary said there can be no meeting of the minds in missile defense. i don't think that's the case in light of the nato/russia council meetings in november. president medvedev came out with an early proposal for what joint missile defense would look like which i would call sincere but not serious. it has these three principles. one is russia wants to be a full-fledged partner in missile defense. second, they want to have shared -- the warning data shared early warning data, shared radar, shared sensors with a two-button principle.

one would be covering russia one would be covering nato. and then the third is what they call sector-based defense assigning zones of responsibilities for protection against ballistic missile defense. and you talk to military planners of the united states, it's not going to fly. the poll did not come in to nato to be protected from ballistic missiles from the persian gulf by -- on behalf of the russians there's the issue that russia does not have a missile defense system presently covering its territory. there is a new air defense system called the f-500 which has never been presented or tested which they claim will be operational for missile defense by 2020 but i think there can be an agreement and this is being worked in these groups -- the working groups and the nato/russia council about joint threat assessments what does the threat look like? and that's being done right now. there can also be a shared early warning of all ballistic missile launches. there was this -- for people in history remember the jdec which was this joint data exchange

center in moscow that was going to be a place where russian and u.s. officials sort of watched ballistic missile launches from various parts of the world and then they could both agree they came from these countries and not from each other. so i think there can be cooperation on shared early warning, on threat assessments and on potentially shared radars which includes integrating some of the russia radar capabilities in southern russia into the u.s. phased adaptive approach missile defense system phase in europe. >> i'd like to add on this missile defense cooperation point, some of you may have seen that the minister of foreign affairs gave a press conference in moscow today, a very extensive press conference. and he commented that the pace at which we're getting off the ground on our discussions in the working groups, the presidential commission working group that deals with cooperation on nuclear security and missile defense matters chaired by my

boss, undersecretary tauscher and some military-to-military discussions as well. so there's a very, very fast pace of activity. and i do think that both moscow and washington are really are intent as are our nato allies in getting off the ground quickly and completing these joint threat assessments and then in moving on to looking at joint concepts and really trying to figure out how to put all these pieces together. >> i just -- i think that's actually really good news because i think if you look at the next negotiation, if the russians are insistent on something on missile defense and we've seen the senate react on the missiles defense, there's a trap and there's a way to get out of that box which could be a major obstacle in the next round of strategic offensive arms reductions. >> let me turn to a different type of issue. we now have the one, two, three agreement, the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.

what in your view is in for both sites and what can the u.s. government and the u.s. private sector best pursue avenues on this really major agreement? >> uh-huh, yes. if you haven't heard about it, a lot of people have been focused on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and the missile defense cooperation and those aspects. but there was really a major, major step forward in moscow this week when the ambassador brought in the so-called one two three agreement, the agreement for nuclear cooperation. this happened on tuesday, the 11th. the day before yesterday. it's a really great step forward. you know, when i was an assistant secretary of energy back in the late 1990s, we were working on a one, two, three agreement and we were trying to move that forward so it's really been a long-standing initiative, one that both sides have been very intent on bringing to forth and it has finally happened. and there are really, i think, three areas of enormous benefits

for both countries. first of all, the area i am most familiar with is the nonproliferation cooperation. having in a place the agreement of nuclear cooperation of this kind really helps us to advance our nuclear nonproliferation cooperation. it helps for our technical cooperation when our scientists get together and work on very detailed technical projects, for example, on new sensor systems and that type of thing. there's been a history of very, very successful u.s./russian agreement but it will ease that in the future. also we'll help with some very, very nitty-gritty counter-nuclear terrorism issue like nuclear forensics. .. fissile material that is acquired and we're concerned about it, you know, being part of a possible terrorist not or something like that, the nuclear forensic process will be facilitated through the one, two, three agreement.

so it's very, very significant. second area is civil nuclear cooperation. again, that's on a government of-to-government basis where our two countries are working together and cooperating, and deputy secretary of energy is the chairman of the commission, bilateral commission with the head on the other side. there's a bilateral commission looking at ways to advance civil nuclear cooperation, that means advanced reactors, advanced fuel cycles, a number of arenas of that kind. so that's very, very important. and then the third area is on the commercial front. it will facilitate cooperation between u.s. companies and russian companies that are engaged in nuclear energy projects. again, for the development of new reactors, new fuel cycles, new fuels. and, overall, does address the issue of rights. that is when the united states has a deal with another country for nuclear fuel, purchase the united

states has consent rights over the final disposition of that fuel. so having a one, two, three, agreement in place addresses that issue and facilitates commercial cooperation as well. so three very, very important areas where this 1-2-3 agreement will make a big difference and allow us to advance nuclear energy cooperation on the u.s.-russia front overall. but you i welcome it as i said because the advantages i see forth come in our nonproliferation cooperation. i want to underscore in this audience. i didn't really know it but i was looking at dan's materials from his recent trip to moscow this year. the united states and russia have looked to repatriate 706 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from other countries to be disposed there. 760 kilograms is a few

nuclear bombs of highly-enriched uranium. that has not required the 1-2-3 agreement. that is pursuant to this international partnership that president obama lawn launched last april at the nuclear security summit in washington to get healy enriched-uranium, plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons to dispose of them or better protect them. and so russia has been a great partner this regard and i think it is really worthwhile underscoring the way the partnership can now be enhanced and further developed because of the 1-2-3 agreement being in place. >> one final question from me, for micah. a political economic one, moving the space a bit. as we all know russia faces presidential elections in 2012, and worrisome tightening fiscal landscape involving large deficits. how could these political

economic factors, go to the big picture here, affect russian policy on the nuclear front? >> well, if you want, a very interesting perspective on russian policy making look at the president's speech to the nation, state. union address that the russian president gives november 30th of last year. he goes through all the litany of problems russia faces familial, societal, government, environment, and a long list of problems that russia face and political tension and money. throw money at these problems similar to the united states. the final issue president medvedev discusses is foreign affairs and national security and i lays out this agenda over next 10 years spend $700 billion on improving defense systems including conventional weapons, missile defense and nuclear weapons. it ain't all going to happen. they just don't have the money to do it. if oil stays $100 a barrel they get closer but they don't have the capability to do the modernization they

want. based upon the need to both restructure its conventional weapons forces, to bring some sort of rationalization, for example, russia recently created what the united states version of darpa is, which is how to do better research. they consolidate all their air defense and missile defense into one sort of strategic command. they're trying to rationalize the process on the conventional side while making incremental improvements on nuclear weapons modernization. based on the need to come down to the levels steve mentioned by retiring old systems and not building nuclear weapons. russia wants for great power purposes and respect the nuclear weapons gotten them over the last 50 to 60 years, they want an additional agreement that provides transparency and predictability on u.s. and russian nuclear weapons at lower levels. for both those reasons. >> thanks all of you. we now invite audience members to join in the discussion.

and again, a few procedural comments. please wait for the microphones. speak directly into it. please stand, state your name and affiliation and please, maybe most importantly, keep questions and comments really on point and concise to allow as many members as possible to speak. so the floor is now open. yes, sir, please. >> i'm hank gaffney from cna. and i worked 13 years on nato nuclear weapons and i carefully read all the russian statements of doctrine as they have been coming out. i never see the word tactical. this notion that relying on tactical, they're relying on strategic which is what nato relied on. i think a lot of you know the syop was involved in nato responses very early on after about two days of

conventional battle but that is a concept of deterrents. they're advancing, not war fighting and it includes strategic weapons. we shouldn't forget that. and i just wondered does anybody up there know of their statements where they use the word tactical? >> that is a good point. i would just note two things. first of all, we've tried to be very careful and precise. indeed, again, if you look at the resolution of ratification that came out of the senate, it refers to nonstrategic nuclear weapons and i think it is a good point to be considering you know, because the use of the word tactical does have a number of imprecise aspects to it and so that's a very important point. i do see the russians refer to tactical nuclear weapons but it is in comments on what we have to say. it is not in their own

doctrinal writing so i would agree with your comment in that regard. >> might i suggest perhaps one thing that could be done between now and next round of negotiations in the working groups beginning to talk to the russians, what would be a common scheme way we talk about nuclear weapons? i suspect when we stalk about strategic, non-strategic, tactical we may have a different way classifying than the russians do. having a common language on that would i think facilitate another round of negotiations. >> the nato russia council years ago before the sort of warmer feelings that sprung out of lisbon summit they do have these joint definitions with you the russians presented their definitions what tactical means and u.s. presented its definition what tactical means. you can find those on the nato website. that could be a starting point on what both sides setac call nuclear weapons are. >> yes, ma'am, please. you, yes. the microphone here. thanks. >> hi, sally horn,

independent consultant. i have a question for all of the panelists. i was struck by what you said, cliff, about what are the lessons that could be learned from the debate on the hill and the actual negotiations. i'd like to ask you if could take that a little bit further in terms of what are the lessons that could be learned in terms of the perceptions, for example, some recent russian public writings have suggested one of their key concerns is not today but what might happen in the future. which is suggestive of a policy concern about what direction might we go and how might that impact their concept of their deterrents? when you look at some of the writings of the senators on the hill what you also take away from that is some concern about policy concerns. not the numbers, not, not even, you know, their tactical or questions about

the technical aspects of verification but underpinning it all is a broader policy concern about direction. i'm wondering if you might speak to the question of what lessons might be learned about what you perceive as this underpinning, underpinning of perceptions and views and how do we deal with that moving forward in the era of further cooperation with the russians and related to that, the question of at what time and when and how do we bring in the other nuclear powers? both the other so-called p-5 and the other states who happen to have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilitis? thank you. >> who wants to take the first bite? >> i'll try the first bite. it seems, if the russians are looking at the discussion that took place during the course of the ratification debate in the u.s. senate what they're going to see is a very strong policy attachment and

it is reflected throughout the resolution and ratification to missile defense. that may have something of the opposite but unintended impact of making the russians press even harder in the next round of negotiation for some kind of limits on u.s. missile defense. my guess in the end was that the russians finally accepted during the new s.t.a.r.t. negotiations there would not be meaninglyful lessons on missile defense, but not that roosevelt was successful telling them know but they look in the new s.t.a.r.t. period 10 years 2020 and 2021, when you look at face adaptive approach you have a pretty good understanding what the american missile defense will be in 2020. okay that will not pose a threat to russian strategic defensive forces. if you're talking about a follow on agreement which could go 2025 or 2030 or 2035, the russians will have a lot less clarity about where american missile defense is going to be. and there is a concern on the russian side that

missile defense could have an impact on russian strategic forces. and one way they might choose to counter that would be to expand their off fence sieve foss -- offensive forces. one of the issues that will come up in the next round the russians perhaps even harder for even some kind of constraints on missile defense. that's why i hope this possible path of nate at that russia path on missile defense could be developed because that may be a way to get out of that. >> could i just add? i mean part of sally's question gets to how robust are u.s.-russian relations overall? and indeed over the last several decades there have been many, many peaks and valleys in the relationship. that's no secret to anybody. we go through difficult times in any bilateral relationship. seems often we've been on quite a roller-coaster ride with regard to our relationship with russia. one of the, i think occur reasons that the obama administration has been so

intent on this reset policy has been to try to insure that we have a kind of robust relationship across a number of areas of policy that can support us through the peaks, inevitable peaks and valleys in the relationship. and you know, clearly we're here this morning to talk about the new s.t.a.r.t. treatly and where we go from here on strategic and other nuclear arms control, but, i would just like to underscore that it is little noticed but in fact our relationship with russia has undergone some great strengthening in the last, in the last couple of years. the 1-2-3 agreement, i've already mentioned that. but little-noticed is something like the afghanistan transport agreement. that was reached at the same time that we were doing our first joint understanding with the russians in support of the new s.t.a.r.t. negotiations in july of 2009, when president obama went to moscow.

little-known at the time, little-recognized but in fact now we are transporting an enormous amount of materiel for our combat operations in afghanistan through russia and that is a great change in how we did business in the past. it is saving our armed force as great amount of money because it is really shortening up the transport lines and so, i think, it is those kinds of very robust cooperative projects that will in the end i think help to get us through the tough times. so i do, i do really want to bring that to your attention, and say that i believe that we have come a long way in strengthening and adding some robust elements to our bilateral relationship. >> i just want to point out the issue when you get to the other countries. i believe there is another agreement between the united states and russia on strategic and tactical that can be reached before you address the other countries. the specific country that you need to talk about is

china. we know china, based upon, they don't have much transparency in what their nuclear systems are. secretary gates was invited and visited the second artillery corps just two days ago, which was unprecedented visit for someone who leads the pentagon but there is so much little transparency on behalf of china and what their nuclear systems look like and whether or not, and what their conceptions of the nuclear doctrine is and what they think about nuclear weapons control yet and that is years and years for that to happen. while this discussion and dialogue continues to build momentum, united states and russia can reach another agreement. >> in the back, please, ma'am. >> hi, thank you, mary beth sheridan from the "washington post." i have a question for rose, which is there any timetable or even tentative timetable of when follow-on negotiations on a follow-on treaty might begin or is it all just going to

depend on other factors like progress on missile defense? thank you. >> we have already got underway some, you know, i would say, first of all, i wanted to give an advertisement for the papers that these two gentlemen have done. i'm not endorsing them but both mike and -- >> go ahead. go ahead. >> have done very interesting papers on the future of where we go from here. i'm not endorsing anything specifically, believe me, but there is a lot of good discussion going on in the nongovernmental community both here and by the way in moskow. i found it enormously interesting, the kinds of writing that is being, being done in moskow right now by people like dorkin and others. there has been official discussion of this when the chairman of the duma defense committee came to warsaw back in november for

interparliamentary meeting. in his remarks to that conference he said, there is a lot of work going on in moskow right now to study what the options may be for future nonstrategic negotiations. so i would say, in and out of government in moskow and in and out of government here in washington a lot of work is already going on but it is the homework phase at the present time and we're not ready to go to the point of setting any, any schedule in place for out right negotiations. but we're also talking to the russians through the this period. there will be lots of consultations. lots of back and forth about where we go from here. >> toby. >> toby --. rose, congratulations on the treaty. >> thank you. >> i have two questions. the dual ma is now talking about amendments. what significance will they have in reality and on the political debate?

the second is looking towards the future, not about the negotiations but do you really believe that anytime soon another arms control agreement could make it through the senate? >> first of all you may have noticed, all of you back in december we had a very lively debate in the u.s. senate about, about the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and the resolution of ratification and during that period our russian colleagues did us the courtesy not comment on that debate. so now i'm doing the same courtesy not commenting on their debate. obviously the duma and federation council well have their own lively process going on the next couple weeks so i'm simply not going to speak about it. but the second thing, i would say is that, i take a different lesson away from our ratification debate, and

i reremark on it at the outset. i really think nuclear arms control is back as a topic of interest and discussion in the senate and the new s.t.a.r.t. debate in the senate proved it to me. and it is not only debate around the ratification per se but as i said this long series of discussions that we had throughout the negotiations process as well. i really do think that we sparked a new interest there and so i'm looking forward to continuing that debate and discussion. and frankly i think it has laid the foundations for the next ratification debate, whatever it may be. i can't predict what will be next up at this point. i think we now have a good both store of substantive tiff knowledge that has been laid down but also a store of interest which i welcome very, very much. sometimes i feel pretty, kind of beat about the head and shoulders.

that is again natural. it is part of the process and i think it is part of a healthy debate as well. i think we've got in place good conditions for future work on these topics with the u.s. senate and congress overall. >> is that not, in the government, let me comment briefly on the russian resolution of rat if i case. i think when it comes out there will be a number of russian understanding that will be probably a little bit irksome here. i think if you go through the u.s. senate's ratification and read from a russian perspective there is sort of implications russians are cheaters on the arms control agreement, et cetera. you will probably see some of that language. but the most important thing do the russians in the end and i suspect the duma will not require any amendment to the treaty. we ought not to be hyperventilating in the language or perspective ratifications and resolution uhgs. at the end of the day can the treaty be brought into force and can we move on?

>> yes, sir, please. s. >> ciss. to what degree does the complexity, dismantling, destroying and inspecting warheads slow down the whole process of reducing numbers a little faster? >> that's a very good question and for those of you who have tackled these issues over the years you realize of course up to this point arms control treaties have dealt with dwlifrry vehicles and launchers, large items, missiles, bombers we can see with our national technical means, our satellites and there is therefore count more easily. future negotiations and the president, president obama, has already clearly laid out this task when he signed the treaty, the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty in prague in april 2010. he said next we will be

tackling nonstrategic nuclear warheads and also non-deployed nuclear warheads. this is part and parcel of the nuclear posture review. this is all part of a consistent policy development that has gone on in this administration. so you're quite right. the next phase is going to be a complicated one because we will be grappling with the smaller objects that are more difficult to address in terms of monitoring and verification, elimination, the entire range of activities. i will say that in my view the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty puts in place some important innovations with regard to reentry vehicle on-site inspection. we're pursuing more intrusive reentry vehicle on-site inspections in this, in implementing this treaty that will essentially push open the door, in my view, to more intrusive measures that involve warheads. so i do think we're

beginning to take some steps in that direction. and certainly in terms of the research, the study work that has to be done, that is again all part of this activity inside and outside of government i referred to a moment ago. >> please. first row. >> tom from the national defense university. rose, congratulations. i want to go back to the nonstrategic tactical question for a minute and put it in european context a little bit more. two questions. first there is still an issue in europe what we do with the remaining small number of u.s. nuclear bombs deployed in five european countries. and the question is, is it important in your view to keep that small number still in europe as a sort of bargaining chip for the future. the nato strategic concept really didn't settle the

issue. then the second question is, given the fact that steve said you are looking forward to a a negotiation which we might lump together nonstrategic and nondeployed systems and have a number let me take a long time. is there interim step with regard to europe you might take that might contain a zone, atlantic to the urals which you remove nonstrategic system as interim step to that broader negotiation? >> my colleagues may want to comment on this question as well. i would just refer you, hans, and i would refer everybody who hasn't had a chance to look at it to the remarks that secretary clinton made in holland last april when she spoke about these very issues with the nato foreign ministers and that remarks is that the core of our

policy with regard to this very issue and she does take note of the fact that further reductions involving nonstrategic nuclear weapons must take into account overall negotiating necessity. in other words, you know, that these are the kinds of things that we would, we would involve in a negotiation rather than in unilateral action. and so i think that's a very important set of remarks to look at and i really refer all of you to them if you're not familiar with them. it lays out the policy very, very succinctly in my view. on the second that is a very interesting proposal. there are a number of proposals out there. again in and out of government. i'm not at the stage in my own deliberations nor with my inneragency colleagues that i'm ready to endorse any particular suggestion but my colleagues may have some other things to say on that. >> i'd say i think when you look at just the political trends in europe now,

there's a lot of pressure building up in european countries basically to say we don't knee american nuclear weapons in europe anymore. that the american extended deterrent can be provided by u.s.-based strategic forces just as u.s. base strategic forces extend deterrent to japan south korea, australia. as you look forward i see three ways american nuclear weapons can come out of europe. one would be the is the result of individual country decisions. and right now i think there is a trend in that direction. the german air force plans to retire its tornado which is their designated aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons between 2015 and 2020. the successor aircraft not at this point programmed to have a nuclear capability. so if the german air force goes out of the nuclear business, i think that put as lot of pressure on holland and belgium. that's one way. according decisions. another way, to unilateral

policy, as nate topolsy, nato is withdrawing and removing all nuclear weapons. the third way, which is preferable. put them into negotiating pitch. i don't know how large a bargain they could be but hopefully get russians in terms of their none strategic weapons. i think probably the third way is more preferable. >> [inaudible]. >> that is also a good point. i fear unless nato really figures it out, the first way may be the default mode. the point that you made been a interim step on doing something about atlantic to the your rals, certainly there might be some value in terms of a negotiation. for example, withdrawing nuclear weapons away from borders consolidated and centralized storage locations in the interior. i would be a little bit nervous i think though about going down the, says we'll

get all non-strategic weapons out of europe because i think you're going to have a lot of concerns on part of the chinese, japanese, south koreans, what we're pushing all of this junk east of the urals where it is opposite them. i think that has a host of problems. i think the fact that these weapons are fairly transportable i'm not sure regional limit buys you all that much. >> to echo steve's third point the idea that these weapons can come out of europe i believe but only should be done with consultive way with the u.s. allies. if you look at the decision in the nuclear posture review last april which retired the tomahawk land attack missile which provided at the time tactical weapon nuclear deterrent to u.s. allies in east asia, that was only retired on the basis of many, many consultations with the u.s. allies and south korea and japan to make sure they were still comfortable with u.s. deterrent support through conventional systems and through offshore strategic weapon system. if you look at trends within europe of u.s. weapons that are there based upon in

class size estimates in 1990 there were 4,000 u.s. nuclear weapons in europe. now there are 200. they were in hundreds of sites and probably now five sites. at some there were eight types of bombs and now there is one bomb. it has sort of been a steady stream down and what you're left with is, a small number which could be potentially bargained away if the russians make reciprocal cuts in their tactical nuclear weapons forces which are primarily based in operational status on bases near nato allies. i also mention there is a split within europe as you know between basically history and geography from russia. the countries closest to russia least comfortable with use nuclear weapons leaving europe the country he is furtherest are most comfortable. nato should make decisions on entire alliance based upon article 5 commitments the united states makes and only collectively should that be done.

i think if countries go up front and call for u.s. nuclear pores forces off their soils it is a bad starting point for the solidarity of nato. >> we go back to the back somewhere. anyone? okay, sir, please. yes, please. >> bruce mcdonald, u.s. institute of peace. i wanted to thank you, rose, for mentioning several possibilities of additional technical cooperation between the united states and russia and i hope you'll be able to elaborate on that more next week when you're speaking to this conference that the institute of peace and the national academy of sciences is holding on future technical cooperation of science diplomacy, small plug there for all interested. going beyond that there have been several comments bringing down the road, bringing in additional nuclear powers as you go to lower levels and, i wanted to ask, you know, in addition, certainly from a quantitative point of view

that makes sense. the numbers that u.s. and russia have are a lot higher than the others but another dimension of arms control is qualitative limits. there are qualitative limits in the new s.t.a.r.t. having to do with verification of that sort. given how sticky a multilateral nuclear arms negotiation might be, might there be some merit in establishing a separate, completely separate because you wouldn't want to muck up a follow on s.t.a.r.t. agreement but a sepulveda rat negotiated form where a nonquantitative issues could be discussed for two reasons. one for whatever value that might have and secondly to get our feet wet, if you will, what evently will be a multilateral negotiation? and i throw that out to all three of youtilateral negotiation and i throw that out to all three of you. >> perhaps >> perhaps i will start because there is already

activity underway. this is the npt treaty review conference took place in may 2010 of new york. out of that came an action plan agreed to by consensus, very, very important. and one of the items in that action plan was for the p-5 to get together and show some progress on disarmiment, the three pillars of the npt, disarmament, nonproliferation and civil nuclear energy cooperation, civil nuclear energy issues. so again, it is not well-known but in london, in september of 2009, there was a very interesting piece on a conference where all members of the p-5 got together and started to talk about verification and transparent technologies just the kind of things you're talking about, bruce, and the p-5 has now agreed to continue that process pursuant to the npt review conference, action plan and tasking on disarmament and the french, announced in september that they will host the second of these p-5

conferences to talk about verification and transparency cooperation. and i think that is a very, very, welcome step. . . cooperation. that is a very welcome step. we are planning to hold this conference in the first half of this year and it will get together and continue basically along the same trajectory that was lost by the london conference. i welcome this very much. basically setting up a process that will be very beneficial. the next review conference already on the horizons of thinking about showing results in that context. just in terms of beginning to shape dialogue and discussion allow all members of the p 5, important issues of this kind.

it is not been advertised a lot but it is out there for all to see. you are interested, a very worthy project that we will be continuing now. sometime -- i think it will be later in the spring. it will be in the first half of 2011. >> these consultations can be important. there is room for one more negotiation. the numbers between the united states and russia and everything else. having consultations that allow you to get measured transparency with regard to britain and france and nuclear china plans to do. one concern you mentioned from time to time is the united states and russia come down. chinese will make a huge investment. i am not sure i buy into that. the chinese talk about their nuclear forces, where they plan to go and weather doctrine is.

that makes people more suspicious. if you have these consultations with greater understanding about chinese forces in particular, that make the united states and russia more comfortable in terms of the reductions we might negotiate in their bilateral challenge. >> we are out of time. i would like to remind everyone that this meeting has been on the record, i like to thank our panelists and all of you for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] 

>> monday marks the 50th anniversary of president dwight eisenhower's farewell address where he talks about the military-industrial complex. the cato institute hosted a forum about the speech and whether the president's warnings has been heated. this panel scholars look at the military-industrial complex today, how it is change since president eisenhower's time. this is just over an hour and a half. >> good morning and welcome to

the second session of our conference on the 50th anniversary of president eisenhower's farewell address. my name is ted galen carpenter. i'm vice president for defense of foreign policy studies here at cato. a friendly reminder since we've just come off a break, please check and be certain that you have turned off your cell phones. when president eisenhower gave his farewell address, he was worried about the early indications of the development of the military-industrial complex. and what he regard i think quite of a legitimately as disturbing, ifgk unintentional for the most part, consequences of always having this country prepared to confront the soviet union and waged the cold war. it is a very important aspect

that his view, and that was a many policymakers at that time, at the cold war would be anas mn aberration in american foreign policy, that once this rather foreig brittle and confrontational bipolar structure in the international system would an change for the better, would return to something more resembling normality, then there was a chance to at least undo many aspects of this emerging military industrial complex what we have discovered, of leao course any intervening half-century, is that then th dynmics that gave rise to the military-industrial complex turned out to be not just aintef temporary emergency response to. at an unusual internationaldustria. development d in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise toh industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that industrial complex. what we have discovered in the intervening half century is that the dynamics that gave rise to the industrial military complex

turned out to be not just a temporary emergency response to an unusual international development but it became institutionalized and it has persisted indeed intensified in the post-cold war period. one wonders what president eisenhower would say about our current situation where the united states spends almost as much on the military as the rest of the world combined. and when one sees the many tentacles of influence when the political system, indeed within the social system of the united states, exercised by what he identified quite correctly as a military industrial complex. we have an extremely able panel this morning to address these and other issues. i'm going to introduce them as a group and since you to have their bios in your packet of material, i'm not going to spend the time reading that.dto have their bios in your packet of material, i'm not going to spend the time reading that.o have their bios in your packet of material, i'm not going to spend

the time reading that. i'll just highlight a couple major features. our first speaker is eugene gholz. he is considered a rising star within the u.s. foreign policy community. at the present time he is on leave working in the u.s. department of defenses office of industrial policy and i want to stress, therefore, that the views he expresseses this morning are completely his own, they do not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense.are completely his o not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense.morning are completely they do not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense.are completely his o not represent the views of the office of the secretary of defense. he is also involved in producing a lot of very interesting writings. i want to mention two books that he has written. one by military transformation, technological innovation and the

defense industry, and another, u.s. defense politics, the origins of security policy. both of these books have considerable relevance to the topic that we're discussing at this conference. our second speaker is john holsman, who is the president of a consulting narm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.f geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.mnarm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. narm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.thnarm does lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.tanarm does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers.at does a lot of geopolitical risk analysis if a variety of corporate customers. i first met him about 15 years ago when he was a very young scholar at the heritage foundation. and we found that even though he was a self-described conservative it and i was an a vowed libertarian, we agreed on probably 70%, 75% of defense and foreign policy issue, a percentage that i suspect has

actually grown quite a bit over the last 15 years. since then, highway has had a very impressive career both in the think tank community and with a very successful consulting firm. and i want to highlight two books that wrote that really deserve a lot of attention. one is ethical realism, which i originally thought was a rather redundant title since realism properly understood is ethical. but i understood the need for that given the tendency of some purported realists, including a secretary of state in the 1970s, to rather i go more ethical considerations in american foreign policy. and i think that book is a very useful corrective. he also wrote an extremely worth quhil biography of lawrence of arabia, but that book is much

more than a biography. takes bo it is a book that provide as lot of lessons for the follies of nation building. our third speaker is professor richard bet richard betts from columbia university. again, one of the most distinguished scholars in the american academic and foreign policy communities. author of several books including two very, very important volumes. one soldier states man and the cold war and the second one enemies of intelligence.man and cold war and the second one enemies of intelligence. he is as i said -- he has a tremendous reputation and we're extremely pleased to have him here today.

the final speaker on the panel this morning is my colleague, christopher preble, who is the director of foreign policy studies here at the cato institute. a book that he published last year i think deserves a tremendous amount of attention. the book is the power problem, how american military dominance makes us less safe, less prosperous and less free. and he documents in great detail how the united states, assuming that by amassing great power and utilizing it around the world has produced a lot of counterproductive results. very much like a golfer who assumes that if he just swings harder at the ball, he'll end up having a good golf game. those of us who play that sport know that it's exactly the opposite. before that, he wrote a very interesting book, john f. kennedy and the missile gap, which of course deals with a

number of issues at the end of the eisenhower administration. and most recently, he coe- editd the book terrorizing ourselves. chris is another one of the rising young stars in the american foreign policy community. so i think we'll have a very interesting discussion here this morning and i'm going to ask eugene gholz to kick it off. >> i want to thank you for the very kind into dukes and thank cc ochco a it to for orpging will s event. i think it's a great opportunity to reflect on extremely important issues for national security policy and the future of the united states and this

wonderful speech from 50 years ago, which i think really can guide us in a lot of ways. so i should follow-up on what ted said in the introduction, that i'm speaking here as a scholar and as myself, none of this is official and i'm not only obligated to say that, but it's clearly true. i guess the only other thing i'll say about my job is it sounds from the title lie i really am now in the bows of the military industrial complex. the fact that there is an office with this name, the office of industrial policy, probably suggests there's something to the concept. what we try to do is balance the positive aspects and avoid the negative aspects of the military industrial complex. and you'll hear through my

remark, should you interpret for yourself what it might mean what someone who thinks the way i do can actually show up in that office. and i can't go further than that, but there you go. so i'm actually going to wear this quite relatively scholarly hat for this talk in the sense that i'm going to deal with history and then try to bring its implications of that history into the present or draw some contrasts. and i'm going to talk about the economic issues in the military industrial complex. i'm going to talk about it actual companies a fair amount, industrial itself. and i know that some other people on the panel may talk about kind of the lobbying and interest group politics and i'm very eager to hear their remarks and i think that's -- it should offer an integrated panel to get the full picture of how of

military industrial complex works and what's dysfunctional about it. so i'll try to focus on the economic issues. and what i want to pick up on is from the farewell address spooef speech itself, president eisenhower expressed a number of concerns about the military industrial complex, but one of to me the core concerns was the fear of or a warning against crowding out civilian, commercial dynamic economic activity by a focus on military spending, military dominating industry, dominating in some ways taking the best and the brightest of technology and focusing it on military continukiconcerns as opposed to social concerns and realizing that that rock of the way of american life depends on now crowding out too much of

the commercial industry through our necessary military efforts. it's not that the military was bad, we had to defend ourselves against the soviet, but we had to be cautious not to let it get out of control. and so there's a key line and i'll paraphrase because i didn't write it down, but where he talks about the fear that people will decide what to do based on the hope of getting a government contract as opposed to deciding where to invest and where to spend their time and their energy and their efforts trying to make products that keep a want and would buy willingly in the marketplace and would make people's lives better. so that's the fear that i think on the industry side we need to understand, does that come on pass or how do we guard against that. and i guess i would say that after -- there's a

counterveiling view that's important to weigh against that which really came to prominence mostly in years after president eisenhower's speech, maybe in the 1970s kind of hit its first pay day, i think, which is the story about spinoff technologies and how military effort can actually help the commercial economy and increase our dynamism by investing great products. there are all sorts of examples people point to. maybe the funniest one is tang. the idea that we'd be much worse off if we hadn't had all the investment because in the commercial market, we wouldn't have tang. but there are many other example, zippers and microwaves and people talk about lots of different things. so there is this counter

didveiling view that might actually say there's not so much a problem of crowding out.count might actually say there's not so much a problem of crowding out.idveiling view that might actually say there's not so much a problem of crowding out.view there's not so much a problem of crowding out. what i'm going to do is offer a few vignettes and kind of a logical explanation of why i think president eisenhower was right and the spinoff story is exaggerated significantly and we should be cautious, but in fact president eisenhower also had the answer and we've actually done a good job. the reason why defense spending in absolute terms is much higher today than it has been in the past but in relative terms of chance of it crowding out and taking over the whole american economy is much faded is that we've had statesmanship and leadership of certainly people like president eisenhower and a few others, maybe not enough,

but just enough that we kept it in check, that there has been some amount of balance. and so i guess the punch line of the history that i'm going to tell you in a minute is that there is actually a defense industry, there is a real military industrial complex, where their focus is exactly on what president eisenhower warned about, it's on getting another contract. they're completely responsive. in fact, this is how you get to be a good defense company, a good defense contractor, is through ghn straigdemonstrating responsiveness to any little wing, nudge, chance that there be a contract on the government. they're watching and they changed their investment behavior and they do whatever it takes to get that contract. they act very differently from commercial companies. and that's a good thing because it means there are a lot of commercial companies out there

not paying attention and watching the goecht livernment hawk. they're watching consumers and other companies that might buy their products and they're still a very dynamic economy parallel to this enclave of the defense economy. so i'll give a couple examples to i also straigllustrate this . i thought it would be useful to look at the time frame eisenhower was looking at when he first observed that there was this will arriving. people were excited about jet aircraft. seemed to be related to the military. we're entering the era of commercial jet travel. and, in fact, these stories, or at least one them, the story of the bowing 707, is the hero

story for the spinoff people. they say thank goodness for military investment, we got jet travel, look at the boeing 707. and i'll talk a little bit about that and then a contrasting story of the 880. which was not such a success. and i'll do that in the next five minutes. why it's easy in the next five minutes, some of you may have seen, i have a new article in the enterprise society, and they did a special issue on the 50th anniversary of the speech. so this is drawn from that. so if you want gory detail, there are copies i think upstairs. any anyway, the key thing i'm going to investigation, and there are

many bits of the story you can pull out, i'm going for focus on the power of customers and the need t to focus on customer relationships to make your sales. so on the 707, i don't think there's any doubt that some of the basic technology that went into the 707 and many other airports like swept wings came from military research. and that's what we would all expect, basic research that the government does, private companies by themselves do applied research, they don't do a lot of basic research, and so you want to look to the government to do those basic things like figuring out the core technology of swept wing, but then when you actually make a product that people want to buy, swept wings isn't enough. you've got to decide how far does the plane go and how past does it go and how many passengers and will it be quiet or noisy and how much fuel it uses. so when you get for that next level of making a product, the

question for boeing is was boeing better off competing in the commercial aircraft market selling their 707 because they also had military aircraft contracts like the b-52 and especially the kc-135 at the same time. were the actual products helping them in parallel. and the answer is not really. and it's because the military was such a powerful customer that when boeing was offering them products like the kc-135, they had to really tailer to military requirements and they had to pay attention to the military first. from the military's perspective as a customer, if a company wants to go sell products to commercial airlines, that's a distraction. the military's not going to reward you if as a company you say, yes, i'd really like to make your product, that's great, i'll make you a fighter plane or bo er or whatever, but first i'm

going to take care of this thing for american airlines and i'll get around to the military when it's convenient.thing for ameri i'll get around to the military when it's convenient. that's not how it works. if on the side you have a little free time to do something for commercial people, that's fine, but actually we don't believe you have free time because we think every second of every day, in fact, when you're sleeping, you should be working for the military contract, right? pay attention to us. and so boeing when they were trying to sell commercial airplanes had actually a problem that the airlines didn't trust them. they thought, well, our order is going to get delayeded because the military is going ask them for a hurried up production on the tankers. or something else is going to divert them so they can't pay attention to our needs as an airline. boeing it manage to sell commercial planes. the 707 was a success because they did manage to separate the production activities, separate

the development activities, and make products that were customized for the airlines and for the military, and it was a near run thing because a number of airlines said we don't trust you and they went to douglas. the dc-8 almost sold as many airplanes as the 707. the 707 you remember because boeing is still doing great things today, but there were other planes at the time. and then my quick second story is about convair. it used to be an independent company, but by that time it was a part general dynamics. they were branded in congressional hearings of trying to become the general motors of defense. in a way they embodied the military industrial complex because they were a big and powerful company involved in a

lot of lobbying. they tried to make a commercial aircraft, the 880. and it failed substantially. when it got canceled in the early 1960s, convair took the biggest corporate loss at that time of any company that didn't delay bankruptcy. they lost more money in an ford lot on the edsel. it was a complete blood bath for convair. and the problem was they were a military company and they didn't understand how different commercial markets worked. so they tried treat it like a commercial market. how do you succeed in the military? you promise to be very responsive. whatever you say, even if the task is impossible, you want a plane that can fly 10,000 mile do, a round trip in ten minutes, we're on it, right? so convair took that to american airlines and twa and especially howard hughes who some of you may know was an eccentric ceo of

twa and tried to follow his every twist and turn. and in the military when it drives up the costs, the military pays because they really needs the product. in commercial markets when the cost goes up because you're doing all kinds of crazy stuff, you should pay me twice as much as you offered, there's a contract. twa and american airlines said what are you talking about. and convair lost all their money. but they said it will be really fast, but twa and american said it burns fuel like -- i don't know. whatever burns a lot of fuel. it was terrible. they couldn't fly this airplane and make any money. it would have been great for the military, but the fact that convair walk seeking military market, it crowded them out of commercial market.

but boeing stopped making military airplanes. the b-52 was the last that boeing delivered until now when they're back in the -- well, now they're -- well, when they took over mcdonnell douglas in the late 1990s, they got some mcdonnell military aircraft. but for many, many years, boeing made commercial airplanes. they knew their market, they understood it. and so the companies that tried to make military aircraft and get in the commercial markets, general dynamic, lockheed martin, they struggled. it was the dedicated companies that did it. and so that's the distinction. it is in fact an enclave economy. as long as you have people who are willing to -- you have political leaders who understand the enclave can't grow too big because it would crowd out and you hold a check on that, then

you actually can have the benefit of a highly responsive defense industry to protect america without crushing the commercial of the united states and that's the important legacy. it's what i want to focus on in the economic side of the farewell address. eisenhower demonstrated the ability to do what he said we needed in handling the american military industrial complex. thank you. >> well, it's good to be home. for those of you who know me, i left washington this 2006 and i'd like to thank ted and chris and cato for a good reason to come home and see many of you, a little bit older and hopefully a little bit wirz. but i'm going to focus on

something different from the last speaker. i'm going to talk about mind sets which is something that i know a little bit about. when i left washington, i was a made man, a member of the -- life member of the council on foreign relations, senior research fellow at the heritage foundation, a rather young guy, and i fell out with the kind of foreign policy establishment over nation building and the iraq war. so that's where i'm coming from. returning to talk to you about this lovely topic. we talked about eisenhower in-sain incein in-says auntly. he said the thing that's different has to do with mind set. we can talk all we want about the things that i hope the other panel lists talk about, the lobby i go and the nuts and bolt, with ybolt

but there's a mind set that underlies this.lists talk abouty i go and the nuts and bolt but there's a mind set that underlies this.ists talk about, i go and the nuts and bolt but there's a mind set that underlies this.s but there's a mind set that underlies this. well meaning people make mistakes, but they're based on things that might make sense in the council but not necessarily the medical hand process. well intentioned people do dire things and are often wrong. one of the things that i loved about eisenhower and that we talked about was a very different mind set that you see in either party and that's a totally nonpartisan comment. and that in fact is my lament, that both parties grow only a couple things, one is a way overly expansive foreign poll that i has absolutely nothing to do with geopolitical realities of the world that we live in today.

and they wonder like charlie brown when lucy moves the football away what went wrong and let's just do it again. and if we do it enough time, we're bound to hit something. as i live in europe, it's very odd to watch. but i like to start by talking about another eisenhower moment that implies the mind set. i see the farewell address which i agree is fantastic as really just a culmination of the way the man ran the presidency au. and i think it's sad that it sounds rather odd now because i think he was right. and the story i'm going to tell is in 1954, the french are in agony and there's tremendous pressure on eisenhower to intervene including from some of the joint chiefs. so eisenhower realizes that general ridgeway is against intervening and he says cost what it would -- cost it, what

would it cost to go in and intervene in in-dough china. i was in the room when he said it will be a neutral cost. i thought i misheard. and i hasn't. that's not a small mistake. and now i say do you want your trillion dollars back. and there's no doubt we do. we simply don't know what will happen and we might need the trillion down the road and these a totally different way to look at the world. anyway, the number comes back from ridgeway $3.5 billion. i don't know what a that is now, but it's a large number. i'm confident it's a big number and so then what does he do? does he daulhe call in a knee o

conservative? no, he calls in the secretary of the treasury. he says i made three campaign promises in 1952. what would it mean for the promises and he says it will mean a deficit, mr. president. and eisenhower says, well, that's the end of it. boy, do i miss this. when i'm reading this, i'm getting teary. i remember at the time. what happened? and indeed what did happen. because the thing that eisenhower got right in terms of mind set beyond keeping his promises, which is great, is the notion that economic strength really is the load star of national power. that's what's missing. and he did this institutionally, the national security council at the time included the treasury secretary and the budget director at every meeting so

they would say it costs too much, it costs too little, that was intricately done in the bureaucracy because he did not divorce the two things. as the '50s went on, particularly after "sputnik," he was asked why he was not raising defense spending and he said without fiscal soundsoundness, is no defense. again, words that i don't hear at my council meetings very often. i'm coming in to give you three numbers that i repeat all the time to my clients. to give you an idea when they say how bad are things in america economically, and these numbers are kept simple for me. one-third of americans today have no retirement. private retirement of any kind before zero. one-quarter of americans live in houses where their mortgages are underwater. and one-fifth of all wealth has been wiped off with the great crash because of the value of

houses going down. one-third of americans have no retirement of any kind and a quarter of the houses are under water. we're not going through a little difficulty as both main parties continue to say. and part of the problem is that there has been a decline for a long time. the end of the story is the wolf does show up and eats the boy, but nobody believes him. and i feel for that boy as you can tell. because that's it, you could always say we thought the japanese were going to take us over and that didn't happen. this is almost unimaginable suffering in the last few years. and, yes, the spending continues. let me give you one more number. according to president obama's own ridiculously optimistic numbers assuming growth of 4% a year until 2020, which is true it if you're brazil, but

probably less true if you're an established power like the united states, assuming these numbers are correct, # 0% of the budget about be for a i have things in 2020, medicare, medicaid, social security, interest on the debt and defense spending. will in the words of the great coal porter, something's got to give. you can't cut the interest on the debt. you have to pay the bankers. we've seen the efforts of medicaid and medicare. social security we'll have to deal with, but nobody wants to. and the reality is that means whatever do you, you are going on have to cut defense spending on have to cut defense spending. frankly, we're fiddling while rome burns. that's not a discussion that i hear from either party, okay? i hear it from democrats who i've known since my think tank day, it's all george w. bush's

fault. i'm not a big fan of george w. bush as you can guess, however, to blame the hapless ex-president is a bit much. and our secretary of state says once we get over these little local difficulties, it will go back to the way things were in the 19 '90s. that's a curiously reactionary comment for a supposedly progressive person. are we supposed to get in our time machine and go back? think about what it means. it's before 9/11. it's before iraq. it's before afghanistan. it's before the great crash p. its be of course they wants to go back. could you you could do any of. you had give. you lose vietnam in the by pl lar world, doesn't matter.amount of room for makes mistakes was

huge. in a multipolar world, the margin of error is very, very small. and you can't do everything that you want to do. and that's the world that nobody in washington seems to be able to fathom. of course she wants to go back. utterly understandable and poisonous to think that you can, that these things will go away, that the rise of the rest -- it's not just china. this is shorthand for india, south africa, gulf states, turkey grew at 11% year on year. this is a change of 500 year change in power in the world. and staring us in the face and nobody's doing anything here. republicans, it's take taking the american view of the power of positive thinking it a ridiculous extreme. john, if you talk about decline, we're in decline. so it's me talking about decline that's the problem. well, if we don't talk about decline, won't our decline speed along? isn't that what happens to people this will decline?

no, no, it's positive thinking that we need. no, what we immediate mee need thinking. and we need to say -- i said to mr. kay again, what's the bitter tears. the british were in decline and london was the best place in the world.he british were in declin london was the best place in the world.ears. the british were in decline and london was the best place in the world. but you can't manage it if you don't go back and say there are limits to what we can do and prior size. the prioritize. the foreign policy of both parties is impossible. in the end knee owe conservative will fail n. you we're out of money.

if you consult the micut the mi, which you're going to have to do, we have to set up a foreign policy that is tailered to that limited military spending. those two go together or we will continue to wonder why things aren't working.military spendin. those two go together or we will continue to wonder why things aren't working. he's arrogant, he's corrupt, but that's not the problem. the problem is the american mind set and the problem is the spending and we simply don't have the give that we used to have. so to conclude, what should we do? take our ball and go home sf how would the new world work? first, we have to live within our means. the dos are the indian ocean rim in china is where it's at. it's where all the future growth

of the world is. look at the ten year numbers. it's compelling that this is where it's coming from. but almost every problem in the world emanates from this region, too. what shouldn't we do? asian building. it's eloquently silent about darfur from the left because there's simply no money. who is going to do what on what terms. they will tack with the wind not because they like it, because they is no options. this is a change. no, it's a distraction. i think the war on terror, which isn't the key to the 500 year change, has gone from a second order problem that was incredibly understudied to a second order problem that's incredibly overstudied.

this will not destroy our way of life and i lived here on september 11th and i'm acutely aware of my friends who are not with me. but when i come home to america and i see the chance if militarization here and i stand in an endless line and i hear please bring alone someone to check my pass port and bring him to the command center, this is not a place i necessarily want to do much business with and the other people in line tended to agree with me. let's not give terrorists what they want, which is our overreaction. nobody wants to live in a cave like them. the reason that people still admire us around the world has to do with freedom. has to do with what we're trying to defend. and i think that's what knowing the distraction is. the last thing is to get our house if order economically. we have until 2020. if you look at the cbo numbers,

we're looking at 90% debt to gdp, but that's an enron number. that doesn't include state and local government debt. and we know they are not doing real well. we're greece in 2020 if things go along as they are and trust me, markets in europe are moi g i noticing this even if we don't talk about it here. so i would end by saying let's look at what we're trying to protect, let's use the genius, let's look this thing square in the face as eisenhower did so often and realize the wonderful things about the country, but for goodness sake, let's realize that we live in a different time.

>> i appreciate the invitation from cato to speak today. politics makes strange bedfellows. i'm not a libertarian in the normal sense and although eisenhower does look a lot better to me today than many who followed him, i vividly remember being one of only three kids in my fourth grade class who voted for stevenson in our 1956 straw poll. and in the cold cold war, i was usually considered a moderate hawk. back then i probably seemed part of the problem, not the solution. yet when the cold war ended, i naively thought that total victory over the only great power and ideology that could compete on the world scale meant that the united states could stand down. so today on matters of national security policy, i don't have any trouble identifying as much with cato types as with the mainstreams of either major party.

a dwight eisenhower, too, is something of a strange bed fellow. he came to power as the international alternative to senator robert taft and while he may have been a states man, he wasn't really a dove. he simply believed that the cold war would be long and best won by endurance running rather than exhausting sprint. in his farewell address remembered by so many in the sense of even general eisenhower warned us about the military spril c industrial complex was an argument about thousand maintain military power over the long haul. and this was in the context of his assumption forgot ten in later years that as nato allies regained their footing, u.s. forces could be withdrawn from europe. eisenhower's cautionary pair well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.fpair well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.apair

well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.repair well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.air well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.ir well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.r well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today. well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today.well address seems a beacon to the forces of frugality and restraint today. the united states remains intensely engaged militarily around the world fighting twice as many wars, though smaller one, in the two decades since the berlin wall fell than it did in more than four decades of cold war. the wave of ambition to reshape the world has crested since set backs in iraq and afghanistan, but the sources have a been resilient and i think are in constant need of the reminder about costs that was so well emphasized in eisenhower's farewell address and in the an effect dote just mentioned. u.s. policy has gone beyond what eisenhower expected, but i think not so much because of the warning about the military industrial complex that's most remember remembered, true corporate interests and to a smaller degree the direct influence of the professional military has something to do with it, but i

think the more important reasons have been a perverse convergence of pail i don't liberals and knee owe conservatives promoting intervention abroad, the evap igs of con statistic encities, victory disease after the surprisingly liberation of gate kuwait, and the institutionalization of empire and government organizations and habits of operation which have become second nature over the course of the half century since eisenhower reflected on what was then the new permanence of peace time mobilization. first point, the paradox cal consensus. the main reason for ambitious american behavior lies less in

the mill area complex than political developments beyond it. at the time eisenhower said good-bye, huntington pointed out that military contractors then competed and lobbied over which programs would be funded within a set defense budget ceiling. they couldn't compel an increase in the aggregate level of spending. what changed after it eisenhower was it that presidents stopped imposing formal and, frankly, arbitrary limits on the defense budget. truman and eisenhower had forced the services to bargain and log roll rather than simply ratchet up programs. p what changed as well was the further evolution of what eisenhower had wanted to call the complex in the original draft of his speech that was changed before delivery and that was the military industrial congressional complex. eisenhower could get away with setting an arbitrary cap on military spending because his credentials as a warrior were

bulletproof. subsequent presidents had to claim that they'd spend whatever security required and the formula for trying to measure that became a hopeless political football. and the decade of retrenchment after the tet offensive, it took a dive. but after reagan took ownership of the national security issue, the constituencies in both parties evaporated. 1950s, fiscally conservative republicans had restrained democrats who aimed to spend more on defense and this in the 1970s, it was the only way around. but 1990s, however, no check remained on either side of the aisle on capitol hill or even constitution avenue. this happened for two reasons. republicans abandoned fiscal conservatism in practice while

pretending to honor it in principal, and democrats an ban conned skepticism about the use of high defense spending in reaction to repeated punishment for wimpiness on national security. reagan wanted balanced budget, but he never once submitted a budget that asked for a deficit. lower than what resulted. the bushes were no less hypocritical. since the financial crisis of 2008, republican legislators are once again talking the talk, proceed claiming the wisdom of milton friedman, but for decades after eisenhower, in action, they validated richard nixon's famt famous line that all containians now. there is no evidence that

they're pi more willing to start walking the walk. today we hear plans to slash the deficit, but exempt not only domestic entitlement programs where most of the money is, but defense spending as if that, too, has become an entitlement. the democrats presided over the only significant budget surpluses since eisenhower left office, but they didn't match that success with restraint abroad. as a morally impaired draft evader, clinton dared not challenge military needs. and in fact he wound up with defense budgets higher than his republican predecessor had proce provide jekted. desperate for popular credit ability, the democrats nominated a war hero for president in 2004 and john kerry's criticism of the bush policy in iraq ended

feebbly. now, critics remained but only on the fringes rather than the mainstreams of either party. but it's taken a decade of bleeding in this iraq and afghanistan to make argument for restraint beginning to being politically potent again. while american politics became more polarizeded on domestic issue, elite attitudes on foreign policy did not. for all the sound and fury during the years after the cold war, i think there was much less difference between mainstream republican and democratic foreign policy positions than met the eye. neocoms have been liberals in wolf's clothing. liberals decried bush the younger's un lat alism, yet

wanted as much as he did to exert american power to set the world right. clinton's aim was multilateral about we can, unilaterally if we must and the junior bush's was the reversion but they both wanted to come out in the same place. using american power and leadership to force the world into proper shape. second point. nothing pail fails like sus sc. saddam hussein was cut down to size quickly and as wars go, cleanly. in victory, the coalition did not overreach. operation desert storm was truly a model for take steestrategic. as a war, it was just right. the problem was that it was too easy. and subsequent leaders applied

the model where it didn't belong. american military seemed invincible. americans tend to like using force when it works effectively, quickly and cheaply. all too many forgot what the old soldier eisenhower knew well, force is rarely more than a blunt instrument. kosovo initially opposed a reminder, but it ended if a victory at low cost. not a single casualty on the american side. the first venture into afghanistan after september 11th also appeared to end in decisive victory. from the korld wworld war cold states was on a roll p about unlike eisenhower who had ended the korean war as bush the elder did without demanding unconditional surrender and destruction of the enemy regime

and on destruction of the energy regime, and it would hold back industry in indochina, they wound up with bloody noses. third point: public detachment. the second war in iraq became very unpopular before u.s. forces disengaged and the war in afghanistan is becoming so. but have you noticed, there is no real anti-war movement? at least for anyone who remembers the turmoil, bitterness, general asianal conflict, shrillness, sometimes violent disorder in the vietnam era, the public silence today is deafening. in part this is because the wars now are smaller, but it's also because part of what worried eisenhower in his farewell address has ghana wone away, an that's the extent of the peace

in society. as eisenhower said goodbye, the united states had been operating with a decade and a half of conscription unprecedented in peace time and the draft continued for little more than a dozen years and was in no small part a reason for the anti-war movement in the 1960s when graduate school defermentes were ended. in korea and vietnam, they had to pay the piper not just with treasure but with their own blood. it has cost most citizens nothing extra in neither blood or treasure. combat is taken care of by volunteers, and funding isn't demanded of taxpayers. passing the tin cup to allies paid for virtually all of the war over kuwait. no tax increase was asked for the fight over kosovo, and taxes

were even cut, probably a first in wartime history, as american forces have fought harder and harder in iraq. as fewer civilians share the sacrifices of war making, they naturally become more grateful and differential to the soldiers who do the dirty work. at the same time, they lose the skepticism that comes with war and often military service. veterans used to be overrepresented in congress compared to their percentage of the population at large, but since the cold war, they are underrepresented, and data indicate that legislators without military experience tend to be more faisvorable toward t use of force than are veterans. fourth point, finally the habit of empire. the national mobilization of our

era has ghana wonuantanamone aw military movement has not. the cold war has been down sized but it's been pursued by w warmongers but secured for global formism. it is reflected in how government came to organize defense capabilities and plans almost completely in terms of operation far from home rather than at our own borders. the national security council and department of defense, which were created in the 1947 national security act, have come to concern themselves exclusively with defense lines far forward. on other continents and the protection of allies, not direct defense of u.s. territory. military forces were organized for combat in terms of a

worldwide set of unified commands, each one with a huge headquarters and bureaucracy overseeing a bitter region. scent .come for the middle ooels and now for africa. each with a pro-star military council overshadoweing attacks since the soil since the war of 1812, brand new organizations were created to handle the threat. homeland security council. as if the security of the the united states for the nec. and a new department of homeland security, as if protection of the homeland wasn't the responsibility of the department of defense. no other country in the world

that i know of, not even the former european imperial powers, have military structures organized so thoroughly in terms of functions so far from home. in sponsoring the system of worldwide military command organizations that was legisl e legislated in 1958, eisenhower is in large part responsible for spawning the institutionization of the american empire in that sense, maybe some uneasiness about everything associated with that had something to do with the farewell address, but there is no indication that he saw this as anything but a temporary necessity, however long it might be, for waging the cold war. the changes in society and the are pretty much beyond the rimplt of that struggle was not

unamerican optimism to control war at low cost, to make modest conceptio conceptions, pretty viable options, again, but at least we shouldn't let policymakers of the. and costs that eisenhower saw so long ago. [ applause ] >> at risk of going forth on a panel with three other eloquent speakers, fearing that they would steal my thunder, which they did, i'll go on as best i can. during the first 150 or so years of our existence, the united states maintained a small standing army, mobilized additional personnel to fight the few wars declared by

congress and then sent most of the men home when the war was won. in the latter half of the 20th century, however, they went through a new interventionist foreign policy. critics charged that state of affairs had made a permanent imbalance between the branches of government and many believed it threatened individual liberty. no leader worried more about this fundamental shift in the nation's character than dwight david eisenhower. as has been repeated many times this morning, the departed president warned its country to be on guard against a military complex with unwarranted influence in the halls of power. thus, one of the most important lines in the speech also become the most famous. snerds, it is easier to contribute to that it.

>> i would like to place it in a conference. why this industry has persisted so he much longer than the soviet union, the establishment it was temporarily connected to, has ceased to exist. and i'll close with a few helpful suggestions for what we can do about it. so scholars have studied this connection, the workings of this loose alliance between industry and military. and they on trace it to back to world war i. as well as billions of dollars for the war effort. the image of the wib is a band of well-meaning industrialists who sacrificed for the country and was shattered by the interim

engineer old pete. he commented with a frujt assaultly olt. wilson claims that u.s. intervention advanced waynedog security. critics such as nye said it will sit in the merchant of death vpt -- wasted countless lives on a pointless and unnecessary war. but his critique was far more so fist cade than nye's, and he approached it from a very different philosophical position. the title of the book is "unwarranted influence" and eisenhower was deeply concerned about prebting private property

rights. he treds this notion in eisenhower's thinking back in tt 1930s, he had worked for a commission created by congress to explore the relationship profit and war. nye, senator nye, proposed to solve the problem of the industrial complex from moving the positive motive to the military industry. i recognized this would be a horrible idea, first from perspective of efficiency, but also inconsistent with american traditions and values. the. it is the forced expiration of the material assets and label by the government was an anatha. it was un. in short, eisenhower's critique,

bt r not just in the final speech. -- when we return, conservative. he wanted the needs, especially the trade-offs inherent from private government to the federal government. he also worried, correctly in my view, that educational institutions and even individual researchers were becoming too dependent upon the largesse of the federal government, and this would discourage them from scrutinizing growing state power too closely. to put it most crudely, you don't bite the hand that feeds you. and the end result, in part, is where we are today. lots of push on the part of people who benefit from massive federal spending and relatively

little push-back from all the rest of us who pay. political scientists and public choice economists call this the problem of concentrated benefits and diffused costs. this is yet another theme that typically resonates with right of center audiences. but the problem, and one of the great tragedies, i would argue, of the speech, of the farewell address, is that the fundamental conservatism of eisenhower's critique was lost almost immediately after the speech was delivered because the concept of industrial military complex was picked up, and the anti vietnam war was left and turned into an assault on are the paft of the. the effects are far more subtle, i would argue, and perhaps more insidious than this leftish

critique would have you believe. it's an outspoken. they were liberal economies. men such as paul toeb in, paul samuelson. hence the concept not always of mill temporarily. the pentagon's budget has become just another pot of money and a lae vrnl as well, from when kohl tigsz could flow uneasily to september gee grachblg money to their and punish those who do not. these political realities would persist even if the government somehow managed to remove the

profit motive from the process, the process. you can call it business if you like, but i think eugene makes a pretty good case for why it's not business. it's a process whereby material and equipment and food and everything else that the military needs is provided to the military. you can call that business if you like, but i think it's a fundamental misconception. so combatting this alliance, this very loose alliance tweens t between the military and the business community, either directly or indirectly by the military is, as we have seen, resistance to reform. and it is likely to be as resistant to reform in the next two, thee, four decades as it has been in the past fooi. defense spending servings as a thinly veiled job

this is easier now to capitalize on public beers and a new round and here is where professor betz stole my thunder.it's think about and it is worth repeating, think about this for a minute everyone. after 9/11 washington didn't merely spend more money to fight terrorism, created an entirely new department, sensibly dedicated to the defense of the homeland ignoring the inconvenient truth that the department of defense is supposed to do the same thing. sentenostens

ostense mindset is particularly prominent i would argue among foreign-policy elite who vie increases as synonymous with increases in national strength and national security. ignoring things. they put the increase in the budget synonymous with strength and national security. eisenhower saw things differently. i could quote you from many, many different places in the course of his life. my personal favorite is from the state of the union address in february 1953, his first day of the union address. our problem, he explained, is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of the endurable strain upon our economy. to a mass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another. such sentiments may strike many

of you today as timeless principles that need not be dusted off during momentous anniversaries, but i would argue that they seem especially significant in the state of affairs that was documented so eloquently a few minutes ago. and yeah, we must not forget that 50 years ago, liberal democrats, men like henry jackson, missouri stewart simonton, and a young senator from massachusetts, john f. kennedy, knocked eisenhower for con straining the military's budget and allowing fiscal considerations to shape the nation's strategic objections. the charge that eisenhower was forcing the nation to fight the war with one hand tied behind its back. especially limited the nation's flexibility to engage in land wars in asia. again, we didn't organize this. how appropriate he references the food decision in 1954.

he said he had no desire to recreate the nuclear war and he thought there was enough to make descend ants. they are equally dismiss sieve of deter rents, but i would also say they are dismissive of american geography. the democracy in north america depends on democracy in southeast and south central asia. they call for us to drain the swamp where terrorists could poke out in their heads, seems poized. there is a continuum here. an intellectual continuum, and

there are people who are fighting just as hard as they were 50 years ago. let me conclude. i'm not crude. neither was eisenhower. he said the institute over politics would be difficult to break. he hoped that the engaged and the knowledgeable citizenry are noted. but, as i can see, americans do hope to benefit handsomely. but that might be changing. the depths of our physical crisis have created warner such -- in inflation dollars since 1998 is one of the few administrations in the future, but as more americans come to understand the high cost and dubious benefits, a bad clash is all but inevitable. at this point in time, we wish we had another eisenhower or

someone like him. articulate, knowledgeable, whose credentials on national security would be unasailable, for mass security that does not depend on a. struggles to bring the costs of our enormous military under control, washington, the city of washington, should embrace strategic restraint and characterized by the minimum use of force skpen gaugement around the world. that is a foreign policy befitting of a. it is consistent with the model set 50 years ago by dwight eisenhower. thank you very much. [ applause ] >> thank you very much. we now have time for about 20

minutes of questions from the audience. let me outline a few ground rules. first of all, would you raise your hand if you have a question. wait for me to call on you. also wait for the microphone so that we can hear your question, and then there is the jeopardy rule. please make sure that it is in the form of a question, not a speech. and we try to gep this as brief as possible. and also please indicate if your question is directed to just one panel member, or if it is a general question for the entire panel. so with those ruined lu-- fine words, we're ready to begin. >> there we go. this is only a sentence, so i hope i don't get sent out to the

hall for one sentence. what a fabulous set of presentations today, period. now, here's my question. chris, you raised a very interesting notion that the concept of military industrial complex, and actually maybe even the speech itself, became hijacked, if that's a fair word, by forces other than -- by unexpected forces, the liberal forces in america. to what extent do you think the change in the republican party might have had something to do with this, too? in other words, the republican party of 1964 no longer had many eisenhower republicans at the forefront. >> well, that's a good question. i mean -- i'm going to answer a different question, but hoselly

we'll get to your choice. in fact, i think we're -- we would much rather quote thomas jefferson and they don't want conservatives to even know anything about this man. they failed, not just because of this meeting, but a lot of people are talking about the speech now. i understand there is something like 14 books about eisenhower due out in 2011? something like that. so, anyway, they failed. but the budget keeps going up and the debate between -- you know, the natural string does have a troubling pournt part from them rkt the other things that john noted in others, the

entitlement over hahang and is true breaking point. i don't think that makes or breaks the defense, but they do have a point, and it makes it hard to argue what eisenhower did, and yes, it's a major achievement and we wish we could come back to something even close to that. we're a long ways from that. yes, in the back on the left side. ashley. >> for the panel, if you have your way and there was this significant change, how, then, would you set up or address the question that confronted us at the start of world war ii when we were completely unprepared? >> who wants to start?

richard? >> i think the solution is not to go back to 1939 when we spent, i believe, 1.4% of gnp on defense. we learned our lesson. that was too low. i think the solution is to have a robust mobilization strategy whereby defense policy aims to maintain the critical ingredients from which a much stronger, all-out effort can be generated quickly if the need arises. and this would mean at the margins more emphasis on cadre's training, professional development, more organization on faces and being. it would be essentially a strategy that rested on willingness to get ready. i, frankly, have said this over recent years and have detected

no interest or like-minded thinking among anybody who count. i don't see this as yet a politically salable alternative. but that's the weigh station between the unpreparedness before world war ii and the excessive preparedness after the cold war. >> can i just briefly add to that the level of imbalance or outside spending now is so great, you could cut the american defense budget and effort in half and still be far more prepared than 1939. so, you know, realistic scale of cuts, i think dick is right, this is not how people talk if you talk to people in the building in which i work, and i'm not representing, it's all about delivering things to the

warfighter today. the way they talk is all about, we're right on the brink, we need to focus on the current fight. there is no discussion of, gee, shouldn't we think about balancing that with a mobilization strategy? this would be a very productive discussion to have. >> yeah, just briefly, i think in terms of the shift, we're so far from there that i don't worry about it. i think mobilization strategy would be great but i do think there is room for opty mission to hear me say that word. we're in the era which most of us were in before the cold war came upon us. this has this very odd point of view of a pick-up and that's how

you have to pay different for defense and have it mobilized and lift and have a navy and have it go together, but you certainly don't have to spend what you do. then there's the disconnect between policy people and the real. one of those things i learned in washingt washington, it's almost impossible to lose your job in a think tank. i worked hard at it on a policy difference. but it's really hard to lose your job. in the real world, it's really easy to lose your job. if you look at the few pun opposites in year and what avrnl people do. it the second more popular ways to cut the budget. 73% says cut defense spending. the 36 ers, and i think that's

really, really healthy. >> one thing i would point out, in 1939, the united states had an army that was smaller than that. today we spend five times as much as the country with the next large military investments on that, so that does, as jane suggests, leave a lot of room for potential cuts. >> in the left on the front section. >> hi, pat span representing myself. i wonder if the panel could maybe explain what happened after the '50s and '60s that

both parties became interventionalists? what happened? >> the explanation that i think works best is the structural explanation. it's not so much the '60s and '70s, it's the '90s. so someone here, even in the previous panel, pointed out there were more interventions in the 15 years after the end of the cold war than in the 45 years of the cold war. why? because even a small-scale -- a brush fire war could result in a, you know, confrontation between the two superpowers, so they danced around, trying to, you know, not be directly confronting one another. and there is a structural explanation, or to put it even more crudely, we, the united states, did more stuff, invaded more countries because we could. and, again, the selective reading of the histories of the war, the first gulf war, the war in kuwait, allowed for, i think, a fairly pro mimiscuous use of

force that is only recently beginning to be corrected by our wars in afghanistan and iraq. >> one of the things that happened positiliticallpolitica disappointed. they saw the serious hippy movement around mcgovern, hence writing him out of history. suddenly you have the chastening among one state, and the government is saying, me, too, me, too. well, we have to be tough on this, because this is an issue that the country owns. you have truly, you have

kennedy. and that really changes the balance, but both parties from. it no longer scoop jackson who challenged carter. you go from that to supporting reagan as part of the very broad tent that supported reagan being one of the elements that did that. in the '9 ons, as chris said, you get open warfare. all of us eisenhowers. i'm against that in america and i think that's where that battle comes from. >> i think it had a locality to do with the end of the vietnam war and the end of a cold war. there was no, and the perception that the left had let the country down. any enter p ventalists, were not

present, especially after the cold war, and eventually the democrats felt chastened with identification and about foreign policy and became more meat on it. but also at the end of the cold war, liberated kohl sake yann war with informants personally. so there was a con jungz of hoom thought that the military. >> yes, the woman on the far left there. >> i would add to that last discussion is the brilliant lobbying that the defense industry has done, so when you

see robert gates today trying to make very modest kulcuts in the military, you immediately see congresspeople, both republican and democrat, coming back and saying, we can't cut that weapon stm. given the public media wants to attack the military. how can we work together from different sides of the idealogical spectrum, and what would be the thing to focus on? that that's not a very consistent smds for? is it the wafds the american public no longer wants to fight. >> i do think it going to be a menu of those option so they don't have local constituencies. it's easier to cut weapons,

alternative bases. they can do something besides build a chip. that's a difficult thing. but i also think, somewhat naively, that strategy should drive for structure, not the other way around. as it is today, we have a four-year structure and every four years the defense department comes up with a rationale why sef. leet start with a strategy first and then build the floor structure to meet the, but thaet the way it supposed to work. it doesn't work that noi. mack the case for a smaller, well restrained ground strategy on purely strategic ground.

then show the that would go to down with that that's what i think is an opportunity given the other things we've talked about today for fundamental shift. >> i would just jump in and says, i'm the last bun tie that were in terrible trouble force cally which is what we should do, anyway, about nrg. but if he with do, you're playing with my children and grandchildren's patry money. as i said, the new pugh numbers are compelling, that people want this change. as chris pointed out, they're not represented. i think paskagula has a big naval base, so guess what in

they were funded whether it needed to be funded or not. that's the way it works. so there's always going to be this broad constituency that would agree with us that the consistent people who do well at it are far more motivated than broadly. the key to that is talking about the money because it affects everyone, their children, their grand business. they'll come bang and say, you don't care about the country. absolutely the reverse. i care intensely about the country, and the reason is because if we take our fiscal help out of the equation, we're not doing our chin children on the berchl made. >> i think a lot of the other things were, unfortunately from my sper tech active americans

don't to want knowing as how many dollars do we need for the bare minimum to protect ourselves from being captured by the enslaved martians? think of the opportunity and they want a vision of the world. i think chris wants us to have a strategy-derived defense budget and spending, and that's good. that kind of analysis sounds good to me, but there is actually a whole raft of people who have strategies on the shelf and offer them to the administration and they think they have -- it's transformational diplomacy. there are all these words that come in. they think there is a strategy, it's just not the one that we prefer, there is the one that says, there is a tremendous balance on the world, let's go, and it's hard to tell people just in the abstract strategic

sense, well, there are some costs to that, and actually your. it's very hard to control this without --. t this is the appeal we might have made earlier, but part of what allowed president eisenhower to have that appeal was, oh, we need to keep powder dry for the long haul, we need to have an endurance race. there is a real threat out there, and unless people perceive -- well, there is money gns the feature. i just think the intellectual argument responding to that is it pessimistic. since that happening by, jat gee

is not to be the rescue. >> unfortunately, i think we have come to the end of our allotted time. >> on that? >> i would ask all of you, i think, to focus on the last question that was asked, because i think that is the most pertinent one. is dwight eisenhower a prophet and one that is a guide to a much better policy, or is he cassan dra, someone who gets a warning that no one lichbsz to. i tried to remainty mystic. concentrated benefits diffuse costs. to change the system that has

developed and return to eisenhower's vision of a society with far more balanced priorities. but that is the task awaiting all of us, and i think people across the political spectrum have an interest in seeing some constructive fundamental changes. please join me in thanking the members of our panel for their excellent participation. [ applause ] >> you're all invited to a reception up surely we will be going live to the kennedy center here in washington for a memorial for the late diplomat, richard holbrooke.

mr. hobart passed away in mid-december at the age of 69. we will have coverage, including remarks from president obama, hillary and bill clinton and as well as kofi anon. we will have that starting live at 3:00 p.m. eastern right here on c-span. [inaudible conversations] again live coverage of the memorial service for richard holbrooke will start in 15 minutes. we will have live coverage on c-span2. while we may -- wait here is remarks from pakistan on october of last year. >> let me say first of all that we don't do this extensive effort with pakistan excess echoes of the war raging on the western border of pakistan and across the border into

afghanistan. to be sure we are all aware of the connection between the war in afghanistan and the situation in western pakistan, and that is a very important focal point of the discussions we had. he we met with president obama prior to the president's meeting with minister qureshi. we met at raj shah and i and our colleagues met with the president earlier in the day to discuss these issues, but we don't work with pakistan because of afghanistan. we work on pakistan because of pakistan itself, because of pakistan's importance to the world, to stability in south asia one of the most dangerous and explosive parts of the world, and in an effort to help the pakistanis with the massive set of internal problems in which they legitimately should get the support of many other countries. all of this i would have said

before, but the floods are simply unimaginable to those of you who have seen it only on television. we have all seen floods on television and at first the world under reacted. floods in asia was an old headline, but this was not just another flood. an area larger than italy went underwater, imposed on an american map that would stretch from the canadian border to florida. although death were far less than the tsunami and in haiti as foreign minister said, the total affected area and the people affected far exceeded that, and we have just come back from brussels with a damage needs assessment from the world bank and the asian development bank that simply to replace what has been lost will cost almost $10 billion. that is over and above the recovery, early recovery efforts rajiv shah is going to talk in

more detail about the floods but i want to stress that in the midst of everything else, pakistan was visited by an epic tragedy. there has been much criticism of how the pakistanis responded that i would ask all of you to bear in mind that just over five years ago we and our great nation with their best communications and all of our capabilities, a much smaller disaster became a huge domestic issue, and even to this day, the damage has not yet been fully redone. so let's acknowledge the fact that pakistan overburdened to begin with, has done as well as it could possibly have done and that the leaders of that effort, including prime ministers colleague general ned dean, former general new team led the emergency efforts with us in this effort. so, it again, we support pakistan not because of afghanistan, but he cuts of pakistan itself.

we supported because it matters, put simply, to all of this, it's stability, it's reemerging democratic institutions which has been under constant pressure and are as we speak, its ability to deal with its own internal threats which matter to all of us for reasons you all understand, it it's immensely complicated relations with india, which go back to the origins of both countries 63 years ago. all of this matters to us. the foreign minister has mentioned kerry-lugar-berman. that is an indication that the congress shares our concern, and multiyear aid authorization $7.5 billion with the leaders having given us permission to redirect, to reprogram money as necessary for flood relief and i would hope in the future we will be able to back fill backfill

what we divert. but for the time being we are going with pakistan's priorities on the floods and other things. kerry-lugar-berman is an indication of how deeply the congress and the administration are united in supporting democratic, civilian -- civilian government in pakistan. we inherited a policy that did not see these things and while i recognize that our very attention to pakistan has increased press attention and has left an impression of the situation that you all understand, it is our view that the relationship between the two governments has improved dramatically. my first trip of the 18 i have made to pakistan, foreign minister and i had a joint press conference. in fact we have done about i think about 30 of these shows in various capitals in the world by

now. but in the very first one the foreign minister used a phrase that i had not read easily hurt. he said, our two countries suffer from a trust deficit. and i am glad to say that we no longer talk about that. to be sure, we have differences. to be sure, if you are a pakistani your view of the strategic interest of your country is not going to be identical to our view of the strategic interests in the region. that is inevitable. but, we have found a way to have an extensive dialogue at the strategic level, back it up with practical policies like the 7.5 lien dollars. when the floods hit, the united states was first in with the most. it is hard to give a clear dollar estimate for what we have done, but direct aid is in the

350 million range, but that does not count the cost of the helicopters that we sent over from afghanistan and an entire ship load of helicopters off the uss valeo who went and. nor does it include our percentage of the funds for world food program, unicef and other u.n. agencies. but when we leave, and this is something that all americans should be proud of, when we lead other countries follow. we leverage our efforts and that is what we have been doing, working very closely with the pakistani government. on the larger strategic issues i am sure we will get an to them in a minute but just let me say that we have worked very closely with pakistan in regard to the terrorist threat. as the foreign minister and i both have said many times, we face a common enemy, a common threat, a common challenge and a

common task and while there is much more that can be done and the press often focuses on that and i don't question their right to do so, we believe that we have made a great deal of progress and we believe that progress has reduced the threat to our homeland while not eliminating it, and while as i said a moment ago and they need to stress this, we all recognize how much more has to be done. i want to be clear to you that as we talk about water and energy and women's empowerment and communication in agriculture, we also talked intensively and extensively about how to improve our mutual efforts against the terrorist threat which the foreign minister so eloquently denounced a moment ago. thank you very much. >> the late richard holbrooke speaking at the brookings institute last year. he passed away suddenly last december.

he was 69 years old. live pictures now from the kennedy center here in washington where friends and family are gathering for a memorial service for former ambassador holbrooke. speaking this afternoon will be immediate family and friends, president obama, former president clinton, secretary of state hillary clinton, former u.n. secretary kofi annan and admiral mike mullen chairing the joint chiefs of staff. this is set to begin at 3:00 p.m. eastern. live coverage here on c-span2. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] >> the kennedy center opera house, the site of the memorial service for richard holbrook, gathering of dignitaries, congressman, and celebrities, making remarks and remembering the special representative to pakistan and afghanistan. this is from "the washington post." surgeons at washington university tried to repair a torn aorta, and they couldn't. he passed away on december 16th at the age of 69. opponents of the war in afghanistan were delighted to hear that he remarked to a surgeon that the war should end. later the state department needed to clarify that comment as. family and friends, expected to

hear from president obama, president clinton, and secretary of state hillary clinton, copi, and mike mullen. it's expected to get under way soon here on c-span2. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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>> well, i'm david rubinstein, the chairman of the kennedy center. on behalf of the kennedy center, i'd like to welcome everybody here for a memorial service for a extraordinary man who was often against so many odds. some of you maybe wonders why at a memorial service we have a palm tree. the answer is that south pacific is playing here now. we were going to move the palm tree, but kofi said "south pacific" was his favorite show. he was the asia and pacific affairs. let's keep it here. i wanted to say thank you.

behind me president obama, secondary clinton, president clinton, and a couple of foreign visitors who have come quite a way to be here. including president of georgia, the president of pakistan, president somewhere -- zardari, i'd like to recognize minister that's come here to acknowledge the president of afghanistan, and the chief of diplomatic corps that's here as well as all of the ambassadors that are here. thank you much for coming. dick was a friend of mine for 35 years. i first met him in a political campaign. it was clear to me then he is extraordinary different than anybody else that i'd met. in this campaign, nobody had their own office, telephone,

secretary, until dick came. when dick came, all of the sudden he managed to get a secretary, several secretaries of staff to staff him, he managed to get the office, he has the office with windows. after a while, became apparent that the campaign revolved around him. [laughter] >> that's the way it should be. he did extraordinary things. sometimes dick might have been thought by others to have a large ego. but in truth as the famous american baseball pitcher, dizzy dean said, if you can really do it, it's not bragging. in dick's case, he really could do it. the intelligence, perseverance, patriotism, and commitment to make the world a better place. a service like this could be held on dozens of cities around the world and attracted a similarly impressive group of people, a dozen venues in this city or new york, and attracted a similar group of people. i think the kennedy center is

appropriate place for a number of reasons. it was president kennedy's who's inaugural address seven 50 years ago inspired dick to go into public service. @ president kennedy that created the peace corps, and that was where dick spent so many of the early years. it was president kennedy that had the diplomatic achievement, the cuban missile crisis, and during his period of government that dick had his time and dates and accords. president kennedy and nick had another combination, that's true as well. both of them were taken from us much too soon. while dick did live about 25 years longer on this earth than president kennedy, and it's not therefore fair to say, dick, we hardly knew you. we did know dick. we knew him well, admired him, respected him, loved him, feared him at times, we always knew he

had the interest of the american people and the interest the humanity at heart. therefore, everybody really respected what he had done and his commitment to public service. as with president kennedy, as with all of us, you never know when god is going to take you back. you never can know what the reason is. we'll never know why dick left us so suddenly. my own theory, somewhere in the heavens, there's a need for a negotiator, and intergalactic dispute only dick would solve. right now he's like you can make a better speech, how come so and so didn't come, but nobody would be more appreciative than dick. dick said i can negotiate up here even better than down there if you gave me certain powers. for example, if only i had the power of thunder and lightning. [laughter] >> just think what i could do.

think what i could do on earth, and now solving the disputes. no doubt, god is saying, dick, i don't need to hear anymore. i agree with you. you got what you want. the bible tells us blessed are the peacemakers, they are the children of god. on the 69 years, i don't think there were very many children of god that were better than dick. he devoted his life to peace and making the world a better place. all of us who knew him, we know that. those of you who didn't know him, i wish you would have. he was a unique individual. i was proud to call him a friend. i'm sad he's not here. i'm sad the missions in which he worked are not yet completed. when the missions are completed, people remember that he started the efforts and some of what his great legacy will be will be finished in a few years. his legacy will include things that he already did with some of the things they are now being

worked on when they are resolved with no doubt bear dick's fingerprints as well. dick, godspeed, i'm glad to have known you and called you a friend. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, david, for hosting the remarkable memorial for richard. mr. president, mr. president, mr. secretary general, admiral mullen, vice president biden, beloved friends of richard, good afternoon to you. here's one fact about my husband that none of the thousands of remarkable tributes from the corners of the world have mentioned, richard was a very good husband. from the time we came together 17 years ago, we were full partners. with richard, that moment no boundaries between our personal and public lives. we gave each other courage, great courage, knowing that the

other was always there. not a single day passed wherefore he was without a phone call. we married during the fateful year of 1995. the deadiest year of the balkan wars. on route to our wedding, he was on the phone urging strobe talbot to start the bombing. that was my initiation into life with richard would be like. on the way to our honeymoon in france, he addressed the council of europe. from the podium, he produced me, his new bride, a local girl. as we were making our escape, a group of very determined bulgarian ladies came up to him. am bad door, they called to richard, we did not know you were looking for a bride in the region. we have so many beautiful ladies in bull -- bulgaria.

but it was too late. a few weeks later, he returned to washington with the coffins of his three comrades. following their funeral, richard headed back to the balkans and did not quit until he brought the warring parties to the air force in dayton. his breath-taking performance, corralling, outmaneuvering, and finally breaking the murderous will of some of europe's to havest autocrats was something to behold. if i wouldn't have been in love with him before, i would have then. when necessary, he deployed me. on the night of the peace conference, he seated me between two foes. make them talk to each other, richard instructed me. thrilled to play my small part for richard and for history, i succeeded. by evening's end they were talking to each other. at the u.n., too, we were full

partners, traveling to 11 african countries which opened both of our eyes to the full ravages of aids. those trips led richard to persuade the security council to aids on it's agenda for the first time. richard made me feel whatever i was working on, book, ngo, was as important as he was working on. i think he did that for a lot of people. in recent days, i've had thousands of letters from people's who's lives he touched, who's problems he tried to solve, from cyprus to tibet and better known places, i've heard from people he helped in some ways the small private acts of kindness that did not make headlines. i tried to domesticate him. good luck with that as the kids would say. instead, he thought me the most valuable lessons.

those who hold grudges are diminished by them. richard thought me that elegance is not about dressing well. lord knowing it was a rare day when his socks matched. elegance was about the spirit and the mind. oh he was an elegant man. always first to call a friend who's stumbled or been brought low by rumors. he taught me about patriotism. there was no job he would turn down if the president of the united states called. the toughest job, of course, was the final one. i have never admired richard more than observing him during the final two years, facing

layers of breath-taking adversity, he just kept on moving. in the depths of the night, when we were at our most open and vulnerable, i could see just how deep and genuine his passion to do good and make use of his god given talent ran. so he ignored his friends who told him his final mission was mission impossible. i never urged him to come home, because i knew him too well. from richard, i learned that a life of meaning is worth more than a life of ease. and perhaps even more than a long life. we had many plans for our next chapter. none of those plans involved anything other than a life of full engagement. here's a consoling thought for all of us. richard was not looking to the last mission for his place in

history. as something of a historian himself, he knew he had earned that place already. he was just going to give this last task as he had the others everything that he had. i look around this beautiful hall at the hundreds of young people that he mentored and inspired, including my own daughter, and in their eyes, i see my husband. richard is right here with us, very much alive. i will miss him forever. [applause] [applause] >> dear dad, i'm writing this

letter now because you are so far away. i imagine that you are busy enjoying the company of governor harriman and other v.i.p.s in great beyond, probably guzzling diet soda around the snack bowl. we had so many times and trips together. like when i was just 10 when you took me to china. i remember how the people all rode bikes, wore mouth suits, and stared at the foreigners in the square. when you are ambassador to germany, and you brought david and me to see the official departures to see the russian troops, we watch you had in disbelieve as mr. nelson jumped on stage and did a impromptu dance. or where he stayed with the

nomads until you ate almost all of their yogurt. reflecting on the trips also forces me to realize that you were not presence at any key moments in my life. when you gave me that brand new baseball glove, it was my mom that i learned to play catch with. or the day that i scored three touchdowns against our rivals. i wish you could have been there. i may not have realized it then, but i did come to understand that you weren't there because you were working. working hard to find safety and shelter for tens of thousands of refugees fleeing cambodia or laos, or finding a way in the balkans to end the blood baths. you were saving thousands of lives. the day when my son cyrus

holbrook was born just six months ago, you were off in the mountains in afghanistan and pakistan. but the day i'll remember most is the magical day at the state department just a short while ago. it was our last day together. watching you race down the hallway, holding cyrus like a football. with cyrus' mother agap, me and 20 staff members following in your wake as you carried cyrus right into the press briefing room. dad, while you didn't always have a perfect attendance record, what pride, deep pride, i take in being your son. i wouldn't want any other father in the entire world. afterall, how many sons can say their father saved lives and made the world a better place? the pride i take in being your son will have no end. i love you, dad. and, yes, it is your suit.

[applause] [applause] >> this past summer, a friend came to our home in brooklyn for the first time. after looking around the living room and seeing family photos with his holiness, the dalai lama, bill and hillary clinton, president obama, my friend said this is not a normal home. [laughter] >> it's not a normal home because i did not have a normal father. my father was an extraordinary man. but as anthony mentioned, he was not a natural parent. internal and external pressures prevented him from being there as much as he wanted to be. but when he was, i saw the world from a remarkable vantage point. he went to game on the subway series, he sat in george steinbrenner's box.

when we went to dinner in new york, we ate with hillary clinton, joe dinero, pleasing my wife greatly. we stood with my father in the white house after president clinton named him ambassador to the u.n.. it was the only time i ever remember seeing him get choked up. my favorite place to be with him was in telluride, where he loved to ski with his grandchildren. of course, i always had to make sure they skied behind him. because he had an unfortunate history of barreling into people. [laughter] >> but it was even more fun, and a lot safer, simply hanging out with him at our home there. his shirt untucked, lose and relaxed, playing ping-pong and explaining to the kids why "blazing saddles" was such an

essential film. i wanted so much more for my children. their grandfather was not a normal grandfather. now tragically we have all lost him. but as painful as this loss may be, my family is enormously proud of his legacy, and i know it will inspire each of us and each of you to contribute to the world in our own way. his way -- now that was something. my father was described as a human title wave. diane sawyer said being with him was like being in the eye of the hurricane. this week, i encountered another extreme type of weather. on monday, four days ago win think, on monday we were in the heart of the floods in australia. when it seems certained we'd be stranded in queensland and miss this occasion, i thought about my father. what would he do? how would he get out of here? i decided that he would call

anyone, i mean anyone, who might be able to find a helicopter. which is exactly what sara and i did. here we are. by the way if anyone from hertz is watching us on c-span, we're really sorry about your toyota. it is on high ground on a town called gimpy in queensland. judy has the keys. thank you. as screwy as it was, i'm certain my father would have relished our australian adventure. he would have brought as much relief to the people suffering there as he could. like i said, he was not a normal father. the kids and i recently read the book, "danny champion of the world." which ends with this epilogue. when you grow up and have children of your own, remember something important. a stood dwi parent is no fun at

all. what a child wants and deserves is a child that is sparky. my brother and i certainly got that. we miss you so much, pops. [applause] [applause] >> richard and i had a rocky start. when he first came into my life, i did everything in my 14-year-old power to ignore him. i thought i didn't need him. i was wrong and completely outmatched. richard barged through the wall that i set up and planted himself in my life. our relationship became one of support and complicity, shared interest, movies, food, any kind of food, a passion for texting, the u.n., traveled to places most people can't locate on a map, and a mutual love for really bad tv and all nighters. over the years together, we plotted my future, looking for

ways that i can make a difference. we talked boys as many of the women here can attest, he had a knack for relationship wisdom, and the advise often in a form of a text came at all hours and usually when he was in the middle of a meeting. [laughter] >> he became my greatest advocate, both personally and professionally. we don't get to choose our family, but richard and i chose each other. at the center of all of this was the implied but never stated recognition that we gave each other another chance. for him to be a father one more time, and for me to have one again. within of the last times that we were together walking on the beach at thanksgiving, he insisted that we talk about the parallels between his work in afghanistan, and mine in haiti, no matter how new i was to the country or to the issues and how much i had to learn about a world that he had been

navigating mastfully long before i was born. he treated me in a partner in understanding and making our work count. richard supported and taught so many of us, pushing, dragging, leading, or standing beside us, allowing us to shine when the time came. but nemertea -- no matter our proximity, both of us never came close to catching up to him. we are forever transformed by, in his wake. on the night the richard died, i came back to the arena. it's not the critic that caughts, the credit belongs to the man who was actually in the arena who's face is marred by dust and sweat and blood. reading this today, i hope seals a pact between nerve -- between everyone in this room to continue to challenge and elevate, to fight our for appeals and people who do not

have a voice. it will take all of us. richard expects it. thank you. [applause] [applause] >> to kofi, anthony, david, and elizabeth. to all of the friends and admirers of richard, we come together to celebrate an stood life. in 1999, at the height of the crisis in kosovo, richard gave an interview in which he addressed the question of why the united states was engaged in

bringing peace to that war-torn corner of the world. why bother? his answer was simple. because we could make a difference. because we could make a difference. that is the story of american leadership in the world. and that is also the story of richard holbrook. he made a difference. in 1962, when he was just 22 years old, he set out from vietnam as a foreign service officer. he could not have known the twists and turns that lay ahead of him and his country in that war. or the road that he would travel

over nearly five decades of service to his country. but it's no consequence that his life story so closely parallelled the major events of his times. the list of places that he served, the things he did reads as a chronicle of american foreign policy. speaking truth to power from the delta to the paris peace talks. paving the way to our normalization of relations with china, serving as ambassador in a newly unified germany, bringing peace to the balkans, strengthening our relationship with the united nations, and working to advance peace and progress in afghanistan and pakistan. richard came of an age looking

up to the men who had helped shape the post world war. dean atkin atkinson, mr. harold, clark gifford, and in many ways he was the leading light of a generation of american diplomats who came of age in vietnam. there's a generation that came to know both the tragic limits and awesome possibilities of american power. born of a time of triumph and world war ii, steeped in the painful lessons of southeast asia, participates in the twilight struggle that led ultimately to freedom's triumph during the cold war. after the shadow of communism,

richard understand the we could not retreat from the world. he recognized our prosperity is tied to that of others. that our security is endangered by instability abroad. most importantly that our moral leadership is at stake when innocent men, women, and children are slaughtered through senseless violence, whether it's islamabad. richard possessed a hard-headed, clear-eyed realism about how the world works. he was not naive. he also believed that america has a unique responsibility in the course of human events. he understood american power and all of it's complexities and believed that when it is applied with purpose and principal it

can tip the scales of history. and that coupling of realism and idealism which is always represented what is best in american foreign policy, that was at the heart of his work in bosnia where he negotiated and congealed and threatened all at once, until peace was the only outcome possible. by the time i came to know richard, his place in history was assured. his options in the private sector were so many of his peers had settled were too numerous to mention. but for my first conversation with him in chicago, in my transition office, a conversation in which he teared up when he began to talk about the importance of restoring america's place in the world.

it was clear that richard was not comfortable on the sidelines. he belonged in the arena. to his wonderful family, i am personally grateful. i know that every hour he spend with me in the situation room or spent traveling to southeast asia, south asia, was time spent away from you. you shared in the sacrifice. and that sacrifice was made greater because he loved you so. he served this country until the final moments. those who take the measure of his last mission will see his foresight. he understood that the future of afghanistan and pakistan are tied together and afghanistan he cultivated areas like

agriculture and governance to feed stability. with pakistan, he created new habits of cooperation to over come decades of mistrust. and globally, he helped align the approaches of 49 nations. were he here with us, i know richard would credit the extraordinary team that he assembled. today i'd like to make a personal appeal to the s-wrap team. particularly the young people, stay in public service. serve your country. seek the peace that your mentor so hardly sought. i also know that richard would want us to lift up the next generation of public service, particularly our diplomats who so rarely receive credit. i'm proud to announce the

creation of an annual richard c. holbrook award to honor excellence in american diplomacy as we look to the next generation, it is fitting as david mentioned that this memorial will take place at the kennedy center. named for the president who called richard's generation to serve. it's also fitting that this memorial takes place at a time when our nation is recently received a tragic reminder that we must never take our public servants for granted. we must always honor their work. america's not defined by ethnicity, it's not defined by geography, we are a nation born of an idea. a commitment to human freedom. over the last five decades, there have been countless times

when people made the mistake of counting on america's decline or disengagement. time and again, those voices have been proven wrong. but only because of the service and sacrifice of exceptional men and women. those who answered the call of history and made america's cause their own. like the country served, richard contained complexities, so full of life, he was a man both confident in himself, and curious about others. alive to the world around him. with a character that is captured in the words of matthew arnold poem that he admired. but often in the den of strike,

their arises an unspeakable desire. after the knowledge of the buried life. the thirst to spend our fire and restless force in tracking our true original course. belonging to inquire into the mystery of this heart which beats so wild, so deep in us, to know once our lives come and where they go. richard is gone now, but we carry with him -- with us, his thirst to know, to grasp, and to heal the world around him. his legacy is seen in the children of bosnia who lived to raise families of their own. and a europe that's peaceful and united and free. and young boys and girls from the tribal region of pakistan to

whom he pledged our country's friendship, and in the role that america continues to play. there's a light to all who inspire to live in freedom, and in dignity. five decades after a young president called him to serve, we can confidently say that richard bore the burden to ensure the survival and success of liberty. he made a difference. we must now carry that work forward in our time. may god bless the memory of richard holbrook and may god bless the united states of america. [applause] [applause]

>> exactly five weeks ago, as the news spread, many of us gathered here today and found ourselves trading phone calls and e-mails, we were activating the intercontinental holbrook network. during the three day vigil that followed, a lot of us gathered in the lobby of the george washington university hospital just four blocks from here. we spent sometime grasping at straws on a subject that few of us knew much about: cardiology. but there was much more talk about richard's heart in another sense.

it was a big heart. and it was a young heart. and it was young throughout his life. what a life it was. it wasn't just a career. it was a saga. and it had a plot that underscored his sheer talent, his energy, his versatility, what's been called his audacity of determination. there he is at 24, in the white house, helping wage the vietnam war. at 27, in paris, helping forge the vietnam peace. at 29 in morocco, directing the peace corps.

at 36, presiding over the state department bureau responsible for east asia and as david reminded us, the south pacific. and that job, his office was on the sixth floor of the department of state which on those premises is considered close to heaven since it's just below the office of the secretary of state. so flash ahead 30 years. there he is again. back in foggy bottom. but this time on the first floor. close to the cafeteria. he took pleasure in showing off what he called his huddle. it gave him a chance to laugh at the ironies that attended the drama and occasionally the melodrama of his life. so richard had a playful heart

too. but it was still a proud heart. and there was plenty of room in it for pride in his colleagues. especially as coti and president obama have stressed, his younger colleagues. mentoring often meant pushing proteges to higher positions, on higher floors. his was a generous heart as well, but most of all, his was a brave heart. he showed current of many kinds, intellectual, political, diplomatic, moral courage, but physical courage too. most recently during the past two years in the bad lands along

the doran line where he was a prize target on al qaeda's hit list, but where he was also revered by the destitute, the displace, and the disenfranchised. starting sometime around last summer, richard began thinking seriously about writing a book. reflecting what he had experienced and what he had learned going back over a half a century to vietnam. he joked that the title of that book might be to end all those wars. but that project would have to wait. because he still had a job to do. helping president obama and secretary clinton find the right way to end the war at hand. that brings us back to friday

five weeks ago. there he is, in the secretary of state's office on the 7th floor, close to heaven, doing his life's work, the life that he loved, doing it bravely and proudly to the end. [applause] [applause] >> for 41 years, richard holbrook and i were collaborators, protectors, allies, business partners, and most importantly friends. we met in 1969 at princeton university when he was a mid career fellow and i was a graduate student. he arrived that fall with his distinctive sound and furry and a rare degree of wisdom having

already done some heavy lifting in saigon and paris and the state department and white house. richard was just 29 years old. from day one, it was apparent that he was a person of stunning intelligence, a laser focus, and a profound sense of history. he was a geyser of energy who was 24/7 before the phrase was even minted. he rarely slept, his appetite for books, the media, people dead or alive, sports, movies, theater, travel, work, and yes, friendship was almost unlimited. i had the privilege of working shoulder to shoulder with him in the carter administration of spending 18 years as a business partner in three different firms, sharing endless personal and family experiences, talking

and talking and talking as he would say sometimes after a month and sometimes after just a few days, we really need to get caught up. to put it mildly, richard wasn't always easy. i toll him -- i told him many times how much i valued his friendship. i told him when i signed up to be his friend, i didn't anticipate it was a full-time job. [laughter] >> over four decades, i watch's richard compassion deepen, and capacity for the significant contribution expand. he was relentless, and occasionally exhausting. he was enduring, larger than life, amusing, and easily amused, and indisputably committed to the cause of peace. he was a true patriot. richard holbrook was one of a kind.

if you ever hear someone say that guy is just like holbrook, it's not true. his loyalty and dedication to his friends was never in doubt. he always knew what it meant to stand up and bare witness. there was no fair weather dimension to him. finally, our family so appreciated richard's turn to washington. the late afternoon calls asking where's dinner. the great conversations, the memories and walks and endless review of the challenges that we face. the only downside of these last two years is that i know now 200 times more about the power grid of kandahar than i want to know. [laughter] >> in closing, i want to pay tribute to kofi. plain and simply, richard adore

ed you and everything about you. to david and anthony, your father treasured you beyond your imagination. and to lizy and christopher, richard was so proud of who you are. and i can see why. all of you so enriched his life. richard loved history, and he made it. he loved his country, and he made it proud. he loved his family and friends, and he made us all better. richard holbrook was irresistible, ire repressible, and irreplaceable. [applause] [applause]

>> picture our friend, at a donkey kong arcade game throwing in quarters and splashing all over the place. hour after hour. failing each time to achieve the bonus of that game, the epic win. cursing at the machine, banging it, accusing the donkey kong company of war crimes, never stopping, never giving up. dick holbrook was like the rest of us. only much more so.

we mourn him today because we expected even more of him. and he expected more of himself. he finally got that epic win at dayton. but we wanted more and he wanted more. and we mourn him today for the next dayton to promise lost. others here today have remembered him well, his accomplishments formidable, him formidable. i want to give you -- i want to remember the dick holbrook that i knew. and miss so very much.

what a -- what a handful of a guy. [laughter] >> what a gem. what a character. what a whole friend. whatever job i had, he took whatever time was necessary to tell me how to do it. [laughter] >> in the middle of one of his knockdowns with melosvich, he said i got the son of a b here to promise you a box of cuban cigars. but this guy, he lies all the time. don't you, slobo?

don't count on those cigars. [laughter] >> consistency was not a goblin of the holbrook mind. [laughter] >> you know, but it was just too high of a price to pay for pointing it out. [laughter] >> whatever i did, he could come back and point out all of my inconsistencies. and then each of us would proclaim we never contradicted ourselves. ever. we started yelling at each other, and it was great fun. life was easier when he was

around. you know, you didn't have to read a book. you didn't have to go to a movie. you didn't have to see a play. he would tell you all about it in the greatest detail with full analysis, and if you were lucky, he did not add the historical context. [laughter] >> depressingly, really depressingly, he actually knew what he was talking about. never, never forget dick's fragility, his vulnerability. he was talking to one of his dearest friends from vietnam days, peter turnoff not so long ago. dick blurted out to him, you know, everything was easy for you and for the others. for me i had to fight for

everything. : bobby deniro knows everything about the united nations. he studied the charter. he could tell you anything about it.

and dickens pulled away and i embarrassed in a manner, deniro looking down at his shoes and he finally raises its head, into my eyes and says, what's all this u.n. shit? [laughter] he said it. dick was a leader of men and women and interns. [laughter] widely prone to endless troubles, never paralyzed by self-doubt [laughter] endlessly searching for

legendary feat, seemingly immortal. you know, i think everybody in this room felt it was a feat to get through any meal without talking about dick hol rooke. we talked to him all the time. for many years to come, we'll still be talking about him. because it was like the rest of us, dick was, only much, much more. [applause]

>> .holbrooke, that holbrooke was the way my mother referred to richard. she was a discerning women. she recognized early in the 1960s his pores, his intelligence and his charm. that whole holbrooke she declared is my fifth child and so in a stroke, my friend from saigon days he came my brother. polly fritchey did another thing. she helped introduce richard to the washington he aspired to enter, the city of statesmanship of power, of ambition and he took to it with enthusiasm and confidence, meeting those he admired, dean acheson, russ cabot lodge, and david bruce, chip folland, george cannon am

appalled that the, april herriman, clerk clippard, those great men of our past who shaped america's international role in soccer fortunes to the coldwater richard studied their style and their record and one time he parted company with their consensus over vietnam he had set his sights on joining their ranks. and so, over time he did. richard also concentrated in those theaters on the great figures that for press and broadcast, journalism, forging friendships with them, earning their admiration and later even practicing their trade, recognizing the huge power of media in shaping national policy and in realizing his own ambition.

from the beginning, richard was a determined man. he saw his star and he followed it. i was privileged to be with him on his journey, sharing friends, adventures, ideas, his love of history and almost intimate secrets. through his intermec at times and are bad ones, through moments of triumph and those of disappointment, he was at constant in his attention to me as he was predict the bullet in his demands on our friendship. for our richard did nothing but half measure. richard was a man of many dimensions in contradiction. his passion for work, new ideas, experiences, excitement for

legendary, just as was his appetite for competition, cool and confrontation. he was restless, insatiable, ever questing. but his will to succeed in his will to leave his mark, they were driven by more than simple ambition. at first i felt close to him, did not recognize to richard's humanitarian humanity in his determination to act on it. only over time did i come to realize that as much as he believed in himself and his ideas, he believed passionately in this country and in america's power and obligation to help those in need. no site moved richard more than the spectacle of injustice and suffering.

i thought richard time and again set-aside calculation, reject caution and engage himself in this country to find haven for indochina both people come to those utilized in bosnia, distribute relief goods to flood the dems in pakistan, drive humanitarian intervention in sudan and congo and plead the cause of victims of hiv/aids. all of us, all of us will remember richard service, his service in shaping this nation's policies towards china, vietnam, korea, the united nations, the balkans, afghanistan and pakistan. but i will treasure particularly my memories of richard's humanity and, those virtues of his pitch and above and his

compassion, which i witnessed at the same time i experienced the intensity of his friendship. the holbrooke occupied a huge space in my life. i admit to being devastated by his passing, but then, i share that loss with all of you, especially to you, connie, david and nate, chris and lizzie. [applause] >> early on, not long after the administration started, i spotted richard talking to somebody just inside the west wing of the white house. forgetting where i was for a minute, i charged up to him very spontaneously to embrace him

shouting, dick! i was like a catcher embracing the! in the world series. no longer had a pin myself to his chest that i realized he wasn't returning the hug. indeed he seemed to be pretending as though you'd never seen me before. as i peeled myself off of his torso and trudged away, i noticed that the person he was talking to was dick. i learned this is the first substantive conversation about afghanistan they've ever had. yamaichi relegation pass quickly because minutes later richard came charging out of the west wing, chase me down, give me a mighty hug and twirl and exclaimed, i bet that it's never happened before in the history of the white house. people don't hug in washington, samantha. [laughter] just another holbrooke tutorial.

holbrooke mentees had been teased, interrogated, lectured, exaggerated about and above all taught. we were each completely incredulous when he soon gained, why the is richard holbrooke making time for me? he taught us back sanitized history, but he also taught us that play in mischief for the saving grace of serious work. although he had infinite time for us, we didn't have infinite time to get to the point. what do you think this is you'd ask? the council on foreign relations? [laughter] as an editor, he decimated our prose, saying if it takes you this many words, you don't know what you're saying. when i complained that he was repeating himself, he'd say there is no indication you've retained what i told you, so i'm trying again. [laughter]

for all of the historical and bureaucratic wisdom that he doled out and for all of the stories in which he figured, we actually never appreciated the scope of richard's achievement for a very simple and counterintuitive reason. he was not in fact the hero of a known stories. richard titus when you build a personal authority in the world of you should sprinkle it like dust on others. you just said something truly significant event expectedly. he would try to remain the tapes in his head to figure what it would have been. not since the long telegram have a seen a more important memo he would tally stunned number of this aspect team. he was holbrooke, r., h. he had built the branding from scratch. he knew it came to mean something and he doled out his anointing liberally, knowing the attention he could generate further people. when i wrote about, he ordered

65 hardcover copies and send them to friends insisting they read all 600 pages about genocide before their next meeting. bragging about his aspect teamcoming was like a 10-year-old running to the glories of each yankee in its lineup. he especially admired those on his team up with qualities that he knew were recessive in him. finally, richard taught us that love and loyalty are the foundation of all else. love and loyalty to america, his president, his principal, his team and above all his family. as he wrote to the hospital, he kept saying over and over again, there's so many people i love. there's so many people i love. all of you, david, anthony, sir, lizzie, christopher and katie.

you are perfect under his arm. you are a bulldozer and untrammeled pull. on our last double date, i asked him if he had taken off his bluetooth long enough to notice how hot you look. he got that goofy grin, looked over at you again and i'm pretty sure blushed. [applause] [inaudible] [inaudible]

>> -- and for the powerful man who also showed basic compassion. pray for him the injustice and beneath equal destiny for us pray for us always at the hour of our death. ♪ ♪ ♪

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♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ [applause] [applause] >> kb, mr. president, my memories of richard do not stress as far back as those of so many of you and yet i feel

i've known him all my life. every hour with him was crowded. every outing and adventure. every conversation turned into a debate the more you fight back, the deeper you god. richard was the quintessential washington know it all. or was he? for what i loved most about him was his natural curiosity the man was monumentally, if not exasperatingly, interested in everything. art, music, culture, religion, politics, how he'd love to talk politics. i'm happy to say that i've never challenged him in that either.

i just nodded till he was finished and then slid him the check. [laughter] but the sheer breadth of his knowledge and his thirst for more with staggering. some people's minds were like steel traps. richards was like electronic -- a lint trap. our first meeting to discuss a trip you're taking together had the feel of an interview or more accurately a final exam. with me playing the part of pupil. it made my confirmation hearing look like in appearance and are you smarter than a fifth grader? [laughter] frankly at the end he declared me fit to travel. after all, i had the airplane.

[laughter] the trip proved to be wonderful, classic holbrooke trip. he ranged with us to meet for people across afghan and pakistani society, parliamentarians and farmers, students and scholars. the most intriguing was the hellenic council we attended in kabul, a gathering of clerics. it came out in the discussion of one of their number had been a taliban leader in his former life. that was all richard needed to hear. he latched onto that part i like like a terrier on a t-bone. [laughter] assailing him with questions about taliban life until the man probably wish he had stayed a part of the insurgency. [laughter] i like about that time was which one of them i would be more afraid that if, the taliban or

richard. not an easy color. but richard has always had a rate. these were questions that need answering. and far better for those questions to come from a statesman than from a sailor. we were there together in that room, but he was rightly and delete. richard and i were seared by her experiences in the vietnam war. we no doubt learned different lessons from that war, but the one we know shared with about the need for strong, civil, military relations, with the emphasis on civilian leadership. he even asked me to co-author a book with him about it. i can just see the chapter titles. how to win friends and ticked off everybody else. [laughter] everything i know i learned by listening, now shut up, it is my

turn. [laughter] and media relations for dummies, how to write their headlines for them. i think it would've been a bestseller no doubt with his mouth on the cover. but it was just like richard to want to search himself that way, just like him to want to explore a new subject and challenge his own. he understood better than i do very wisdom of seeking wisdom. as one poet put it, each and every man is a discoverer. he begins by discovering bitterness, saltiness, the seven colors of the rainbow in the 20 some letters of the alphabet. he goes on to visages, masks, animals and stars. he ends with out or with faith and the almost certainty of his own ignorance. richard was never afraid of that

ignorance and yet he was never so arrogant as to think he had mastered. he was the ultimate discoverer. and now falls to us to keep asking the questions he posed, to keep discovering the things he wanted to know and to keep making the difference he so clearly made. because i guarantee you when we meet up with them again, there's going to be a pop quiz. [laughter] [applause] >> dear kati, dear friends, i begin today by extending my very deepest sympathies to you, kati,

to the people of the united states on the loss of a great american. richard is remembered for his historic contributions to america's national security of nearly 50 years. but richard was in the truest how most general sense of the term a citizen of the world. and so a deep loss has been felt far from this city and this country. it is perhaps difficult for many of his fellow americans to appreciate just how much richard met two people beyond the shores, to foreign diplomats, aid workers, presidents, prime

ministers and u.n. officers. even more to the terms of distant war-torn countries. for him, as we've had the suffering of innocents be in bosnia, the democratic public of congo, sudan, all of afghanistan and the suffering of his own fellow citizens for a martyr as equal. i never knew another diplomat or a statesman that i could say this about. richard was the american who came in peace, however well disguised. to him to reunite and to rebuild and though the sounds of water. he said his country was skilled and passionate and by serving

his country he served the world. at the united nations where he had the privilege of working closely with richard, this translated into a fierce commitment to my continent of africa into the struggle against one of his greatest enemies, hiv/aids. almost exactly 10 years ago today on the 19th of january, 2001, richard attended his last meeting of the united nations security council as ambassador for his country. it was a transformative meeting, convened to discuss the threat of hiv/aids to international security and role of the security council and conference, something richard quite literally invented from scratch.

i have told them it's not going to work. he said we will have to discuss it. it's killing people, decimated security policies. it is of course an issue of international security for richard, the personal and professional were never equally divided. he simply cared too much about people to think of foreign-policy as mere distractions about great power ships were grand strategy. and so during richard's tenure as ambassador at the u.n., the security council became merely another center for richard's dinner parties and the person he set about was improving the guest list.

for richard said the security council meeting of the millennium on hiv/aids. vice president gore was quartered into coming to newark to preside over the counselor. for a meeting on peacemaking and central africa, nothing on the president of nelson mandela and see the plane would do. and so richard convinced him to make a trip from south africa and preside over the meeting. and then, he invited jesse helme to the security council. he was determined to get the u.s. to take over a billion dollars. but i did not realize that was part of the deal or that i should go to speak at jesse helme on the monitor with

colleagues. [laughter] he invited me after the event. he said my step pio is looking at it is extremely portend. so anyway, we went in to my amazement at one point i thought i saw the senator and they shook my head and i said i don't think man and i did that. as part of the job, richard did argue. but the beauty and the power of richard's unique brand of diplomacy was that if a course was important to him, it had to be the most important cause for anyone anywhere and then of course how could one say no? over the years of our

professional relationship, richard and i developed a keen friendship that had both kati and i just called. a strong and special bond was made even more so by kati's book. by the way, venus sisters sends you her deepest sympathies. but over the years i came to admire about richard, perhaps more than anything else was the sheer courage and drive, physical, intellectual, political, even though i often found myself biting him richard, pace yourself. my friend, wherever you may be and whatever you're doing, and i offered that advice once again.

pace yourself, knowing full well that if there is a war in need of mending or suffering in need of healing, you'll dressed only when the work is done. [applause] >> i know this program has been somewhat lengthy, but honestly, it takes this many talkers to do train to justice, to keep up with holbrooke. he hasn't said a word here and i think were still behind. i will say that hillary and i were asked to end the program

and we are. according to holbrooke protocol, the one with the real power speaks last. mr. president, kati, all of you, it might real relationship with richard began almost 20 years ago when sandy berger got and i together one night for a drink so that he could interview me to determine whether i could suitably run for the democratic nomination for president. and somehow or another i passed the test. by the end of the night, he was so aggressive i thought he was going to finish with his hands on my throw. but i like that. a lot of people haven't talked about this tonight, but if you're a professional relationship with holbrooke as i

was, as was being friendly, they're basically were three kinds of meetings you could have with other people looking. they were the meetings where you were arguing about policies. those are the ones were e-mailed to enemies. people don't talk here tonight, this afternoon, where he would scream and claw and scratch and make you feel like you had a double-digit i.q. if you didn't agree with him. but he did that because he knew the purpose of diplomacy with japan's wars or avoid them or minimize conflict or save lives. it's worth wrestling a few feathers for diplomacy to save lives. then there were the meetings where the policy had been adopted and he didn't exactly agree with all of it, but there was any either had to leave our wave the flag. he was good at that. you would've thought it was his

idea. [laughter] then there were the policies that he was charged with implementing that he keep he agreed with. then he was a hurricane of eloquence and energy and force. he was a great diplomat because he was smart and he could learn and he could think, he could write, he could speak and most importantly, he could do. he never was any meeting in his life when he wasn't taking about okay, what are we going to do? and he loved the doers. one of the saddest days of my presidency was august 19, 1995, when we have begun negotiations

to end the bosnian war, or at least to end the siege about the need for and the shelling in sarajevo. and dick called me with wes clark to tell me that they had a terrible accident on one of my road. we have lost the vehicle and bob frazier, joe crusoe and nelson had all been killed, three of the best public servants we've ever worked with, part of our team. because melissa would not let them fly, knowing that those were unsafe. so we had a memorial service. we tried to promise to remember them. i still have three christmas ornaments that hillary and i put my treat for those three men.

but holbrooke was determined to honor them by ending the violence. by the end of august, the seeds have been listed, the talks began at detained in november. three weeks later we had an agreement. dick holbrooke did many things in his life and he would be the first to say he did not do that allowed. attending the worst killing in europe since world war ii and giving you the chance to be united and free was a very big deal. he could do. and he could do in matters big and small now. some people will say that president obama and hillary gave him a much harder job working in afghanistan and pakistan.

i agree with that. but i give them a harder one still. i made in the united states ambassador to the united nations when kobe was secretary-general and need to talk jesse helme and he did that, too. how would a living daylight he got jesse helme to do that i'll never know. but he did. there's a lot lot to laugh about, a lot to be grateful for. after i left the white house, i learned that holbrooke's an airing shows for protocol had begun and he realized he no longer worked for me and maybe on occasion i would work for him. and the one thing he was no good at. there was only one thing he was no good at. he would over to all this

flattery when you knew he basically didn't mean a word of it. [laughter] so, i remember two things in particular. he called me one time and wanted me to give a speech to the asian society. and he kept saying what a great thing would be for them and what he was really also saying is you know, you want to do this. you need to keep your hand in the game where people will think you don't know anything anymore. when i said i do what he proceeded to tell me exactly what i should talk about and how i should say it. [laughter] to many had of this business group to fight aids around the world, which was a really noble thing. and when we started there was nowhere near as much money going into it is now. and we still have them torso have no 8% of the people in the world who are hiv-positive who didn't know their status. within a month. i've been working on for years. when the month he knew as much about all this stuff as i did. and he relentlessly,

relentlessly drove this agenda. and he got me to appear at all these things, always sandisk or for that business person or the other would help me, but it was always basically a work for you. i did all this stuff. now you work for me, to go do this. so i did it. i loved the guy because he could do. doing a diplomacy saves lives. everything everybody said about him here is true. then the end, what matters is there are a lot of people walking around on the face of the earth for their children or grandchildren because of the way he lived his life. and i never did understand how people would buy it a little rough edges, which to me was so obvious what he was doing.

it was so obvious why he felt the way he did. i could never understand people who didn't appreciate him. most of the people who didn't were not nearly as good at doing. sometime in my second term, kati and dick started hosting a holiday dinner in hillary's honor. and they asked me to come, which made me know i was kind of a lame duck. and what holbrooke and i would talk about all the stuff we've done together when we were having a drink and is interviewing me for my suitability to become president. and it was after hillary was running for the senate. i don't know she'd been elected or not. he said you know, she's better than you are.

[laughter] and i said yeah, i knew that before you did. and i said, i know one other thing. you're still my ambassador and you have to keep that a secret for one more year. [laughter] if you knew him, you have to love him. and if you understand the business of diplomacy is saving lives. you have to appreciate every single strategy he deployed to try to do it, including when he said or did things that exhausted the rest of us. the great thing about 10 was even when he lost his last battle, he was fighting in the fight kept him forever young. and for that, i will be forever

grateful. [applause] [applause] >> well, i am last because my office is on the seventh floor, which is as close to heaven as you can get. so i end the program by beating and bringing you with me to be as close to richard as we can be. i'm very, very moved by the outpouring of love and admiration and respect that has been sent to me on behalf of our country, from so many places across the world. and in this audience this

afternoon are so many who have worked with richard in the past and are working with him today. if we had time, each and every one of you would have your own story. i want to start with richard on an airplane. those of us who flew with richard never forgot the experience. imagine being confined in a small space for many hours with richard determined to make his point and convince you to agree with it. it was a combination of a big personality and a small space that led everyone who traveled with him to be able to say, at the end of our flight, i too now have a story about richard

holbrooke. richard would begin by assessing every seat, to find the one key deemed most comfortable. and then he would use every one of his diplomatic skills to persuade a person who had the seat to give it up to him. he would roam the cabin and search himself in to conversations, tell stories and provoke arguments. sometimes those arguments snowballed. on one flight years ago, when richard was a younger diplomat, he and a staffer from the white house ended up in a mutual headlock over who got to see transcripts of a conversation with deng xiaoping.

that presaged the kind of headlock experiences richard would have with white house is through the years. and so, even more people have their story. but what was most memorable is that on many flights he would disappear into the restroom and then emerged, having changed out of his sober business suit into what he called his sleeping suit. it was bright yellow. he would brief the press and it and the rest of us would shrug and say, that's richard dean richard. there was simply no one like him anywhere else in the world. for 20 years, i had a front row

seat to richard dean richard. he was my trusted colleague. occasionally he was my biggest headache. often he was an inspiration and always he was my friend. and richard was a genius for friendship. as bill has said, we were so delighted to attend annual holiday parties that richard and kati would throw. and apparently one year, some months before i had said something complementary about the work done by the salvation army. it was a completely offhand comment. anyone else would have forgotten it. not richard. so in the middle of dinner, he gave a signal, the doors swung

open and in march the salvation army band. [laughter] trumpets blaring, carols being sung and richard beaming from ear to ear. once again, richard being richard. richard was brilliant, blunt and he did site until the final bells for what he believed in. not richard upon hearing winston churchill's famous motto never, never, never, never give up, said that churchill was halfhearted. [laughter] there are many of us in this audience who've had the experience of richard calling 10 times a day if he had to say something urgent. and of course he believes everything he had to say was

urgent. and if he couldn't reach you, he would call your staff. he prayed outside your office. he'd walk into meetings to which he was not invited, act like he was meant to be there and just start talking. i personally received the richard holbrooke treatment many times. he would give me homework. he would declare that i had to take one more meeting, make one more stop. there was no escaping him. he would follow me onto a stage as i was about to give a speech or into my hotel room or on at least one occasion into a ladies room. [laughter] in pakistan. [laughter]

when he had an idea, he would pitch it to me. if i said now, richard, no. he would wait a few days and then try again. finally, i would say richard, i've said no. why do you keep asking me? and he would look at me so innocently and he would reply, i just assumed at some point you would recognize that you were wrong and i was right. [laughter] and you know, sometimes that could have been. richard and i were 18. starting in bosnia, when i was first lady, through his years at the u.n., his work on aids and global health and our work together on afghanistan and pakistan. it was not always deemed easy on

richard's team. we went through a lot of tough times in those years. but we went through them together. he stood by me through my battles and i stood by him through his. so i feel his absence keenly and i know so many people here do as well. this is a loss personally and it is a loss for our country. we face huge tasks ahead of us and it would be better if richard were here, driving us all crazy about what we needed to be doing. he had, as we've heard from others, secured his place in history. i am confident that the work he has done and was doing in afghanistan and pakistan will also stand the test of time.

and i greatly appreciate president zardari coming all the way to be with us today. [applause] he was -- [applause] he was, as mike mullen said, passionate about restoring the balance between our military and civilian operations. he was determined to bring that balance back through sheer force of will if necessary. shortly after richard was named to be the special envoy for afghanistan and pakistan, i decided that i needed to bring richard and general petraeus together. so i invited them both over to our home here in washington. and i set up two chairs, with a

third and i just watched them interact. and those are two men with a lot of energy. i was exhausted by the time they had finished going through every thing that they were thinking and what needed to be done in the years ahead. and as they were leaving, the post said let's do this again tomorrow night. [laughter] per richard got results. the high peace council that he helped launch in afghanistan is working and just sent a delegation to pakistan. his work on water, energy, agriculture and trade is paying off in significant improvements to people's lives. he had a vision where we needed to be going and despite all the challenges, which he knew very well, he remained optimistic and

positive about what we could do together. richard did this work with the help of a phenomenal team that he assembled with great gusto and pride over the past two years. they represent some of the best minds in biggest talents from inside and outside government and many of them are here today. so let me say to richard's team, you meant the world to richard and all of us at the state department are proud of your work. he also created an international contact group, with now more than 40 countries represented and increasing numbers of majority countries as part of that international contact group. i met with some of them who traveled so far to come here for

this celebration of richard's life and u2 spent a great deal to richard because he thought that we must have a political solution and that we must work to build regional and international support. many of richard staffers are young. then he was young when he started. and he wanted to give young people a chance to learn and serve and work on behalf of the country that he felt such a commitment to. there are few people in any time, but certainly our time who can say, i stopped a war. i made peace. i saved lives. i helped country heal.

richard holbrooke did these things. he believed that great men and women could change history and he did. she wanted to be a great man so he could change history. he was and he did. his time with us ended far too soon. and yet, he lived enough for timelines. so while we mourn, we have reason for joy, joy for the life that richard lived, joy that we were able to be part of it, that we went along for the ride. and his partners in that endeavor where his family. his son, david anthony and their families. lizzie and chris, his grandchildren and most of all,

kati, a friend to us all and someone who understood and loved richard so well. the families they built together cast light on so many people. there is a book of early jewish wisdom, the book against iran, which includes this passage. with three things i am delighted, for they are pleasing to the lord and two men. harmony among brethren, friendship among neighbors and the mutual love of husband and wife. with his life and legacy, richard holbrooke was three for three. god bless you, my friends.

[applause] [applause] ♪ america, america, god shed his grace on me.

♪ for beautiful, for spacious skies, for amber waves of great, for purple mountains majesty, above the return land. america, america, ♪ god shed his grace on it the. ♪ and crown thy good with brotherhood