had accomplished in his days. he looked at me with a twinkle in his eye, took a long set of coffee and shifted his feet. well, he said, i left my farm a better than i found it. when our time has come we will be asked how do we wish to measure our days? ..

>> former british prime minister, tony blair, appeared a second time to talk about discrepancies from his previous -- he suggested mr. blair was aware of warnings concerning the legality of the invasion in iraq and discussions on how to deal with saddam hussein. you'll hear the former prime minister defend his actions leading up to the war.

>> i should like to start by welcoming our witness, and those who joined us at the conference today as well as those who may be watching the hearing either on television or through the internet. we heard some six hours of evident a year ago and many other witnesses and have a mast a many considerable body of evidence. as i made clear in launching this round of hearings, there are a number of areas we have to clarify what happened. we need to find the lessons to be learned, and to do that, we need to construct as reliable and accurate account as possible and reach our own conclusions. this morning, we want to concentrate on a number of issues and decisions, some strategic, others more detailed where mr. blair's own recollections are important. those issues include the way in which the decision to take military action was considered and dated within the government,

our understanding of what happened in iraq after saddam hussein was removed from power, and the u.k.'s preparations for our role in iraq. we shall also look at what happened after 2003 and in particular, the increase in violence which has resulted in the loss of so many lives. we ask mr. blair to provide a statement addressing a number of issues in advance of the hearing. our request and mr. blair's statements are being published now. we are also publishing a number of documents or extracts from documents relevant to this morning's hearing. mr. blair's statement covers a great deal of ground and refers to many documents. we shall not be going through it line by line this morning, but shall, of course, follow up on further points if we wish. there are other matters important for which we do not need to address in the hearings

this morning. we shall not, for example, plan to go over again the intelligence about saddam hussein's armor programs and the government's knowledge and understanding of those nor how that information was put into the public domain. as mr. blare's statement makes clear, he wishes to add a short summary of the lessons he thinks would be valuable for the future prime minister to know, and we should ensure his time at the end of the hearing for him to do so. now, i've said on every single occasion when we've held a hearing that we recognize witnesses give evidence based on their recollection of events, and we, of course, check what we hear against the papers to which we have access some of which are still coming in, and i remind each witness on each occasion sign a transcript of the evidence that the evidence is truthful, fair, and accurate, and if that, i'll ask martin to

starts questions. >> mr. blair, the powerful speech you gave to the house of commons on march 18, 2003 was of critical importance. without parliament's approval our troops could not participate in the invasion. in your speech there was an analogy with the 1930s, the moment you said when czech slow vok ya was swallowed up and that's when we should have acted. this was not the first time. there was a consent to war in the 1930s speaking on the 11th co iraq with nazi germany has enormous force with the public. it also heightens perceptions of the level and imminence of the threat. in your book, "a journey," you say you regretted and almost took out that reference at the

almost universal refusal for long time of people to believe that hitler was a threat. can you tell us why you regretted saying that? >> i think i actually said in the speech in the house of commons on the 18th of march, i don't have it in front of me, but we have to be aware of glitch comparison, but there was one sense in which i think there is still a valid point to be made about how we perceive threats and that is in this sense. my view after september 11th was that our whole analysis of terrorist threat and the extremism had to change, and that point i was most focused on this. the single most important thing to me about september 11th as often said is that 3,000 people died, but if they could have killed 300,000, they would have,

and the single most difficult thing we have to face today, and i think we face it still, i think this is why i permly take it -- personally take a hard line view on iran is the bliss of this new type of terrorism and extremism based on an ideological possession frankly, the faith of islam, combining with technology that allows them to kill people on a large scale. now, where i think the analogy is valid is in saying even though we may look at the world today and say, well, does it really matter? you know, is iran that much of a threat? supposing we just let saddam carry on, would it really have been such a problem? my anxiety is that, yes, we cannot take that risk that after september 11, the risk had to change and change fundamentally, so in that sense in a way i say

there is an analogy, but you have to be careful of bringing it out too broadly otherwise you make a point that suggests the circumstance is not the same and i dmentd mean to suggest that. >> so that's what you regret? >> yes. let me make one thing clear. i don't regret the basic point i'm making which this is a time in which even though many people would say this extremism can be managed. i personally don't think that's true. it has to be confronted and changed. that's the policy reference you see throughout this. stephen and i, i have great respect for him, but disagree with him on the point. there are two views in the world. one view in sense of the iraq was represented by gashing and the other by me. one view is, look, this

extremism is an entrustment on an otherwise manageable situation. don't overworry about it, don't provoke it, don't stimulate it, just manage the situation. the other view which is my view is that this thing is deep. it's potential to reek enormous and devastating damage is huge, and we have to confront it. now, if that doesn't echo of how people deal with fascism in the 1930s it has to be echoed. it doesn't go broader than that. >> you explained for you the decision to house saddam hussein's regime by force was not predetermined and if saddam backed down which you didn't expect him to do so, then invasion would not be necessary. a critical decision was therefore your decision that we should be prepared to join the americans in using force, and we should prepare to use force ourselves. can you tell us at what point you took that decision?

>> i think september 11th i said in the statement in september of 2001 i think this issue of wmd is going to take on a different meaning now, and, of course, the americans had already a policy of regime change. that was a policy in fact articulated by president clinton passed in 1998 following the military action we took against iraq, u.s., and u.k. in 1998. it was only agenda, and i was going to make it clear with the shoulder of america with the threat and how we do with it is an open question. that we were going to deal with was clear from that moment on. the cap innocent paper on conditions for military action which was issued on the 19th of july 2002, a version of which appeared in the press records that you told the president of

crawford in april of 2002, the united kingdom supports military action to bring about regime change provided certain conditions were met. was that a turning point? >> it was not a turning point. it was all the way through saying this issue has to be dealt with. saddam comes back into compliance with u.s. resolutions and actions will follow. if it just might help -- going back to the papers for this -- it gives a shape of how this evolves. pre-september 11, there's a policy of containment. the sanctions are eroding. containment they say is partially successful, but it doesn't mean he's still not developing his programs with his intellect. pro-september 11, the calculus risk changes. america has a policy of regime change, so they could have and some of the american system wanted to say right at that

moment, we're getting after saddam. there was a group of senators writing to president bush at the end of 2001 saying that's what you have. the first thing was in april to say to the americans look, we're going to be with you in tackling this, however, we should do this by way of an ultimatum, in other words, give them a chance to come back into compliance. then in july, we say to the americans, look, you should come back into compliance, but do it through the united nations, build an international coalition. now you got instead of action immediately, we got ut ultimatum first, then ultimatum with the u.n. sanctions, and that's where we came together for resolution 1441, and later we tried to get another resolution with another ultimatum, but that's for another time. >> i'd like to turn now to the involvement of your cabinet in these decisions.

you told us last year that the options paper produced by the cabinet office in march 2002, a version of which again appeared in the press, was seen by you and the parliament defense secretaries and discussed by ministers. we've been unable to identify such meetings, such a discussion, and it's not listed material that you prepared for the butler inquiry in 2004. can you identify when this march 2002 options paper was discussed? >> i know that there was a version of it that certainly went to the chancellor for example, but we have cabinet discussions. i don't know specifically on that paper on what to do about iraq, and so, for example, the cabinet meetings, i think in march before crawford, for example, on the 7th of march, we set up our position on iraq in

the cabinets there. we say it was important the united states didn't appear to be acting unilaterally and important to reinvigorate the peace process and military actions against the regime had to be effective. on the other hand, the regime was in clear breech under many security resolutions, wmd programs posed a threat to peace. that's what we said there and went on to say how to deal with this is a proper way. >> my question is not that the cabinet discussed it, but -- >> i don't know that i saw the paper at the time. >> with that particular cabinet that we can find is the parliamentary labor paper we produced shortly before. how did you expect your cabinet to take an informed view or have a substantive discussion of the

sort you told us did take place without having papers and background information of the sort that were available to you? >> well, the cabinet as i say, the leading members of the cabinet certainly did, but the rest of the cabinet when we were having these discussions about iraq, and i think all in all, there were over 20 different cabinet discussions about it and i heard it say these were not detailed, but they were. when you see all the points being made in the papers so the notion that people were debating and discussing it, i can tell you it was dominant as the issue of discussion in the cabinet, but more than that, outside of cabinet, formal meetings, people talked about this the whole time. i wouldn't go back and have a look whether apart from the key cabinet ministers, others had the option papers, but this was

a perpetual discussion going on in depth and many march and april and may, june, july, all of this was canvassed pretty broadly and deeply. >> without access to these crucial documents, the options paper is very important. this was not something which they were able as it were to add to their contribution to the debate. the options paper and really said two things. it said you can go forth in payment. we can't guarantee that's successful. you will probably continue to develop his programs and be a threat, but nonetheless, that is an option. the other option is regime change. >> right. >> now, there's nothing in those papers as it were that weren't surfaced as part of the discussion. the discussion all the way through was what is the judgment? it's pretty -- the fact of this

is clear in these option papers. if you go back to the one in march 2002, it lays it out pretty clearly; right? that was certainly part of the discussion that was going on in cabinets. now, you can say, and i would be personally happy if you say, look, it's better to disclose those or give everybody a copy of those papers, i certainly didn't say they shouldn't be, but the content of those papers, that is something that was very, very adequately discussed, and the issue was clear in the end. there wasn't a great dispute about what we thought about the facts. the facts were that peace continuing to develop and the intention of doing that, it's crucial to his regime. on the other hand, so far, we've been tamed. >> thank you very much. >> i'll let robert pick up the questions. >> just following through on the last point. say the content of the options

paper was discussed, and now the options paper looked at three possible ways of affecting regime change. does this mean the cabinet has a state in march of 2002 was discussing regime change in ways in which it might have been affected? >> what we were discussing was this, and you can see this set up in the other cabinet members. the cabinet was discussing this -- we're going to have to deal with this issue now, and everybody knew the americans were taking a different and stronger line. the issue was very simple. he either had a change of heart or regime changes on the agenda, and that was clear from the minutes from the discussion, the cabinet, and up deed from the -- indeed, the public discourse. you could have regime happening in a number of ways. the likelihood was that's what would happen. i mean, for example in --

>> i think you were advised this wasn't going to happen without military action. it was a question of whether the military action was in support of rebellion or of more direct. >> yeah, yeah. >> but regime change without military action you gobbing back to 1991 when an internal rebellion failed and that was looked at and dismissed, wasn't it? >> exactly. >> this brings the question you referred earlier to the evidence given to us earlier this week by sir steven wahl who was a very experienced official who attended cabinet meetings, and in his evidence session, he was asked at what point he thought from sitting in cabinet, it would have become clear to cabinet members as a whole with the possible exceptions of being short and of course with the

exceptions of defense secretaries but to the rest of the cabinet, at what point were they appreciated they endorsed a policy that was very likely to lead us to war? his answer to that question was probably not before january 2003, so that's about nine months later than the meeting you were just talking about. do you think that's a fair assessment by sir steven? >> i don't frankly. i mean, the whole debate that was going on in and around, for example, the visit to crawford whether we would be with american military action, and go back and look at the press statement. this is not a private thing. it's a public thing. look at the press statement, the speech in texas. i got it here, and i'll just look out in just a moment an interview i did with jeremy paxton in which i make it

absolutely clear that, you know, regime changes is possible. this is in april 2002. okay, this is bbc television. it's not exactly -- >> you made the similar point in your speech that crawford also in april 2002 -- >> give you a flavor of it; right, so paxton: do you agree with bush in iraq? blair: i agree this would be highly desirable and endorse the policy to get rid of hussein at all possible and military means depends and back to the inspectors and i say, if he lets the witness inspectors back in unconditionally anywhere, any time, any place and of course that makes a difference, but there's no sign here's prepared to, and on the 11th april, this is at the cabinet meeting strait after crawford, i say that i

consulted my host in the advance of the speech i delivered in texas in that i made it clear that the iraqi regime is unconditionally -- summing up i said would you reject the clear ultimatum on the return of weapons inspectors and there's widespread understanding of the need to take appropriate action. by the way, daily there were stories that we were lining up and about to launch military action with the united states, so the one thing nobody had any doubt about is either where i stood on the issue or what the policy of the government was. the policy was the fate of saddam, let back in the inspectors unconditionally, allow them to do their job, and the ultimatum is if you don't to that, action will follow. >> another senior official who attended cabinet told us this week that the official policy of the government continued to be

containment at least until september of 2003 previous to the period of 2002 and the period you're talking about the government under your leadership is still leading a drive to get small sanctions resolution to the united nations that was then passed in may, so would an ordinary cabinet member, not one directly handling this issue, in march or april of 2002 that he or she was taking collective responsibility for a policy that was if saddam didn't back down likely to lead us into military action against iraq? sir steven wahl thought not. you were the prime minister. >> yeah, i'll just -- >> i mean, he was sitting in the meetings and listening to the vice president since he was in the position of the cabinet minister not involved, but you

think it was absolutely clear talking about going to the united nations that the implications of this were that they could lead us to military action against iraq. >> there was no doubt of that at all. less people were reading the newspapers or listening to the news which is not by experience with a couple ministers. in fact, what i was doing is constantly saying people we have not taken a final decision on military action. >> perhaps we can move on to the question on the point to which the cabinet was asked to take a decision. first between april the 11th of 2002 and 23 of september 2002, my understanding is that the cabinet had no discussions about iraq, but that was a fairly important period in which the policy was involving and within that period we got fully engaged in military planning both internally and with the united

states and also in that period you reached an agreement with president bush to go to the united nations with the intention of warning or delivering a warning to saddam that if he didn't comply, he would face serious consequences. he would effectively face the use of force. now, in this time in which the policy was developing between 11 april and 23 of september, did you feel that you had cabinet's endorsement for that policy that was taking us closer towards the point in which military action might be necessary? had they taken that sort of a decision? >> well, absolutely. their desire was that if we went down the united nations route. >> yes, but did they understand given saddam in your estimate that he was unlikely to back

down the united nations lay the root of the military action? >> of course. i wasn't saying it privately. >> you have a clear cabinet mandate in effect to carry those negotiations through in this period, and everybody around that take taking collective responsibility understood what was happening? >> i honestly don't think you had a cab nnt minister around the table saying i didn't know he had to comply with the sanctions or we take military action. these questions i was answering. i'll go back over the cabinet minutes between april and september, but -- >> if i'm wrong, correct me. >> i checked them myself, so i will do. however, let me just say this, literally throughout that period, there was a perpetual focus on the question of were we

going to get the americans to go down the u.n. route? the cabinet was behind us. that's what they wanted. the cabinet, i think, were pretty much in of two different minds if you like. one group would have been absolutely with me all the way. the other group was saying, well, look, we understand it's a big problem, but let's avoid military action if we can, and the united nation's route is a good way of doing that. all of us knew at some point there was a moment of truth where you had to decide how you see it through or not see it through, and in the end, for example, robert wasn't with us on that. there's not a single cabinet member -- i can't believe someone would say i didn't believe that was the policy of

the government. it was articulated weekly, daily by me because every prime minister's questions at the time and people were saying to me, so, what's going on here? >> i mean, what isn't clear is what point you made the cabinet take decisions. you said we don't make decisions now, and steven wahl not only in this evidence, but on other occasions said the skill in which you decided the policy and speered it along a course that you determined. he said in evidence that your staff was keep options as open as you could in giving evidence to us, talking utah september cabinet meeting. he said it was a full discussion, but it wasn't one in which the cabinet was discussing options. as we've heard already, the cabinet hasn't had faces in iraq

other than the briefing paper for the parliamentary labor party in september they had copies. they hadn't had the options paper. it only went to the foreign and defense secretaries on the face. you said the chancellor also got a copy. it's not clear that even the deputy prime minister got a copy. if you're not dealing day-to-day with the issue, yes, you're reading the newspapers, but if you're not reading the policy papers, can you make a decision? is the minister making it clear to you we're past the point of briefing and discussing, and at this point, we are looking to the cabinet for a decision, for endorsement of a very serious decision as a point before we get to the final stage and there are not any options left before march 2003? can you identify a point before march 2003 in which you specifically thought a decision from the cabinet rather than

keeping options open? >> i wasn't keeping my option open but stating a policy that was very, very clear. what i'll do after this is go back and talk about the cabinet meetings, but i will go back and give you all the summaries of the discussions that the cabinet and the summing up, but policy was totally clear. the policy was that we are going to deal with this issue. our preference is to deal with this through the united nations, but not dealing with it is not an option. that is there in the cabinet minutes march and april. nevermind september. they had access to the intelligence and by the way, if any member came to me and said, look, i've got issues about intelligence, and i think there were some who asked to be able to see it, i sent them off to see the intelligence people, but also the issue was being

canvassed in the cabinet in the sense that the facts weren't really in dispute. >> okay, but our military preparations were made in great secrecy and indeed -- >> [inaudible] >> they remain secret until the end of the year. now, the cabinet handles secret material and do you think it was clear and understood within the cabinet that we had preparations underway and they were taking collective responsibility for this policy? >> of course they were taking collective speedometer for the policy because it was outlined and they knew you can't simply decide -- >> they didn't know that the military preparations were underway? >> i would be astonished and again i'll go back over -- >> well, within the mod --

>> look, if you are preparing military action, you got to keep it very tight, and there was no way, for example, i mean, i'm sorry, but i would not agree to giving a military planning paper to the journalist -- >> i'm asking for the cabinet. the question of whether they were aware there was the course that they were on. >> i don't think anybody was in any doubt about the course they were on, and, you know, that does not mean to say that there weren't some who said i wish we weren't on this course, but i -- it really does defie common sense and logic let alone discussions to think there were people in the cabinet who didn't know -- that we were on a course where the principles were absolutely clear. go down the u.n. route, get an ultimatum. if they fail to meet that, we're going to be with america on military action. this is not, as i say, if you

will, i will send the committee afterwards my public comments at the time. i set it out with crystal clarity, and that was our position. it was a position i was being under a certain amount of criticism for having, and that cabinet were completely aware of the fact that that's what we were on. >> okay, can i move on to one other aspect of the way the cab innocent process -- cabinet process has happened? comparing your practice with that of previous prime minister's where on major issues of security and defense and possible conflict the habit to have been having cabinet committees including not only the relevant departmental defense and other senior ministers like the deputy prime minister if there was one who didn't have the burden of the

departmental port foe owe -- portfolio but in these meetings and being senior to look for weaknesses and the strategy and challenge it if necessary and challenge the prime minister which he might feel inhibit the about doing. now, as far as i can see, that didn't happen in the way that you would have handled this policy. your meetings as you said in our preavers discussion tend -- previous discussions tended to be ad hoc and it was the foreign and defense secretaries who were there, but not other ministers. do you feel on reflection that having more stress testing of the policy of that kind that i've described might have helped to highlight some of the weaknesses in it such as the weaknesses in aftermath planning that became apparent which you knowledged and president bush

acknowledged? >> look, in one since, i want to say yes because in a way it would be an easy enough concession to make. my frank belief is it would not have made a great deal of difference, no. the committee meetings that we had, small ad hocçit

>> i was frankly concerned about the position that robin would take you, the former secretary knew this very, very well. i had several meetings with him at this time when he was absolutely saying to me at this time is it worth it? in respect to the planning, however, there was a lot of detailed planning going on. the trouble is there was nothing that was putting us on notice about the problem we ended up with. >> we'll come back to that at a later state. >> yeah, i respect had you had people there first of all before the runup of the conflict, first of all they would have tested, but even if they had been there, the questions they would have been asking were the questions we asked humanitarian, environmental -- >> on both accounts, it might have been useful. if they had been stress testing

with military action or with military action now, that's another question, but let's move on -- >> can i make one other point? >> of course. >> when you go through the detailed cabinet discussions, you see the summaries of the points people are making. you can see many points people were making, all right? in the end, they were -- look, one of the things about this that i think in retrospect and hindsight we lose is that everybody found this issue difficult. you know, there was nobody -- not even robin was sitting there saying, look, this is clear. what was happening throughout was that people were saying to me in the sense, look, do your best on this to get the americans down a multilateral route. if you can get them down that, it's going to be easier for all of us. people were actually far more worried about the politics than anything else because, you know,

some papers made clear -- i mean, here we were just reelected, a landslide, suddenly i'm about to go into an alliance with a right wing conservative republican president. that was the thing that worried people the most and the things they stress tested most of all, what are you doing to the government if we are forced to go into an alliance with president bush? that was the most difficult thing in a way politically and the thing was throughout and this is why i go back to september 11th, my view is i was not oblivious to the difficulties, but in the end were we going to stand firm alongside america or not? that is the issue. you can go around this a thousand times, but you come back to the same basic challenge. >> if it wasn't difficult, i don't think we would be sitting here now and spend the last year

and a half being asked to conduct a inquiry. it is a difficult issue. i'd like to move back in discussing the situation in the spring and summer of 2002, but i want to go back a bit to late november and early december 2001 on the 26th of november. president bush said at a press conference if saddam refused to let weapons inspectors back in, he would -- he meaning saddam, he would "find out what happened". that set up media speculation, and this is only about what -- ten weeks after 9/11? the president was shifting towards thoughts of military action against iraq. the days that followed that whether this is coi understand didn'tal or not, i don't know,

the papers don't show. you received a lot of advice on iraq and the focus was very much on afghanistan. you had a note from johnathan powell and he described differently in a note that he said in his evidence about encouraging people in iraq to resist. you asked for and received from the foreign office a note on options over iraq and the foreign office's advice from the former secretary's office was that no one "would know antiterrorist round for stage two military action against iraq." they suggested wratch eting up. the pricings failed for outside support and that military intervention for the purpose of

regime change would be illegal, so that was the foreign office's advice. thirdly, as you mentioned in your statement to us, you received an expert paper from cis, the secret intelligence service, and actually this earlier evidence -- actually in earlier evidence it was established there were three papers from sis in the published evidence of the inquiries with sir david manning, there was a quotation from one of these papers which reads as follows: "we discussed that is to say a discussion is clearly referring to sis and sir david -- "we discussed how to combine an objective of regime change in baghdad with the need to protect important regional interests would be at grave risk."

that paper was also described in this evidence session as setting out a route map for regime change very openly. sir david commented on that that regime change at this stage, of course, is not about invading iraq. that advice came in, and then on the third of december, you spoke with president bush on the telephone, and then you sent him a paper which sir david manning delivered to dr. condolence lisa rice delivered to washington on the 5th december. the paper was dated on the 4th. those records of your phone conversations, sir david's visits and the paper you sent have not been declassified, but i wonder if you could give us the gist of your conversation with the president on the 3rd of

december and of the message which you were then sent to him via sir david? >> yeah. first of all, i mean, i have to go back and study that because it wasn't one of the ones i thought you would ask me about, but i'm happy to go back to 3rd of december 2001 and look at it again, but the first paper i received which is the iraq options paper, i think is worth looking at from the foreign office. you say if concluded there are no military actions against iraq in stage two, we saw no link between iraq and al-qaeda, but before september 11, wmd takes on a different significance. >> yeah, right. >> that letter then goes on to say that there is real reason for concern about iraq's wmd

programs, chemical weapons and long range missiles, and then there's an annex a worth looking for a moment because when it asks -- and this is declassified -- what is iraq doing? this is the answer the foreign office gives me. iraq is concealing information about large quantities of chemical weapons and concealing up to 20 long-range missiles, actively pursuing chemical and by logical missiles, seeking to rebuild a nuclear weapons program, and most importantly borrowing entry from inspectors. that was not a reassuring paper on saddam. >> that was indeed the existing situation? >> see what i think is -- >> okay -- >> when we come to the sis offices and i want to draw attention to that because it's important. in his papers, some of which

warned what if defense said, look, this is going to be very, very difficult if you try regime change in iraq, so watch out. another paper, however, said on the other hand, leaving him there is very, very difficult. when you give evidence to which i think is really, really important in understanding that all the way through, there were these two views. there wasn't ever one view, mainly containments working, what do you focus on with regime change, all the way through the system in a sense like the politicians were saying, look, on the one hand, carry on with containment and hope that works, but on the other hand, i think one of the option papers actually says to me by implication, you cannot stop the wmd program to let you lose saddam. i think it says that. >> these are the views, but my question was what did you say

with president bush? >> i'm leading up to that. when you get to the evidence -- when you then get to my conversations with president bush, i'm in a situation then when i'm saying to him, look, we have to deal with this issue. we accept that. after september 11, the calculus of risk changed fundamentally. he cannot be in breach of u.n. resolutions, so i'm signaling that i'm up for the policy of handling and dealing with this issue, and we're going to be with america in doing that. now, we then, i think, from memory had a discussion about some different aspects of that and how it might be done and so on and so forth, and for me, as i said, again, publicly i was in no doubt it was beneficial for the world to get rid of saddam hussein and his regime. on the other hand, i was saying this is going to be difficult pree sicily -- precisely because of the things listed in the paper from the sis

office. can i just quote from the evidence to you because i think it's important particularly for the public actually to understand what he was saying. he said in evidence to you, "i remember saying to someone at that time the lack of response to the reemergence of iraq is like having tea with proper people in the room and notes there was a pike getting out of a box in the corner. i was aware of the way they were evading it and it had been successful with propaganda since the end of the first gulf war." he goes ton to say, "i want to say something quickly about wmd. people think it's things you look at, tanks, weapons. i thought of it being contained in the brains of the experts who understood them and were able to produce them on short notice. nuclear is different under that heading, but we dealt with the iraqi nuclear threat, but their capability in the wmd field is dramatic. our understanding was iraq

cracked the attacks in which 45,000 iranian people died. this is not something i advocate, but see the desire to do it to be precisive." >> i can see why people agree with that, but when you discussed with the president how to deal with this, what sort of ideas were you discussing? what were you discussing with him -- was this the beginning of the discussions of regime change? >> regime change is that policy. it's always part of the discussion. >> was it your policy? >> not the regime change, but to deal with the wmd issue. >> you with respect proposing at this stage to president bush that we should join in a policy of regime change? it was their policy, not ours? >> if it all the way through, and indeed, this is what i said publicly at that time as well, if it became the only way of dealing with the issue, then we

were up for that, but i think from memory but i'll look at it, i think the americans themselves or condeleeza rice had three options at the time. there was containment and regime change within internal opposition, but the americans from september 11 onwards, this was their agenda. >> yes, the foreign office talked about a stage two military action against iraq. there i think i'm right in saying they are referring to the idea in which in washington this should be a phase two, i think it was called of the war against terror. having started with afghanistan, that wasn't the end of it. now, did you agree with the idea that iraq should be income passed -- encompassed in the war against treasure?

>> absolutely. >> you didn't think we had to deal with afghanistan first? >> i think, again, from memory, i actually was raising off issues to deal with somalia and the middle east peace process. i was raising issue deal with lebanon. my view, and this is the the heart of the foreign policy debate raging on today, this was all part of one issue in the end, and that you had to deal with each and every individual part of it that you couldn't as it were -- although it's good in one way, but you can't say we'll deal with this secretaries qent cially. deal with afghanistan now, and then maybe if there's a problem in yemen, we can tackle that later. that was not my view. >> how did you react to foreign secretary's advice and his office in proposing gearing up containment and steering away from the idea of supporting uprising and let alone military

intervention for the purpose of regime change. did you agree with that? >> they were not quite saying that. they were saying, look, there is a policy of containment. you can see that from the options paper. it says it's been partially successful with certain successes, and then it says, however, it's not actually stopped him doing what he's doing, and i think there's -- this is declassified -- >> a version a peered. >> right. >> i cannot quote from it directly because this appeared it was public doe nan under the cabinet secretary's rule. i think i'm correct. >> well, -- >> i -- >> it gives a good summary and a problem in reading it, but it

says tougher containment, this is the summary, containment would not reintegrate them into the community in removing saddam. he will continue with the wmd programs, destabilize the arab world and impoverish his people. he's -- that was the two sides of the argument. >> yeah. >> and then which side you came down on really depended on whether you thought pro 9/11 we had to be change makers or managers. after 9/11 we've been managing this issue. after 9/11, we decided we had to confront change. even today, that is the issue because as i say we face exactly the same challenge over iran. what do you do -- >> i'd like to come back to iran

if i way. i misled you over quotation. you quote from the version of the pair, not the one in public domain. my apologies for that. let me come back to the paper you sent to president bush. were you at the stage which is pretty early in the post-9/11 process inclining towards a strategy in looking at a strategy that would build up in stages towards a possibility or a probability of military action of some kind or another against iraq to deal with saddam hussein? >> i could see where this was aheading same as everybody else. >> were you looking at this with the president? >> yes, it was obvious. you had to tale bat issue. -- you had to deal with the issue. there were two ways, change much heart or change of regime. that remain throughout. >> were you looking at specific ways in how to deal with it?

>> of course, but in the end, the basic issue was how will we deal with it? when giving the shape of our policy development, a lot of people were saying to president bush, nevermind the u.n. and nermind timatums. it's our policy of the american government laid by president clinton, inherited by you, get him out. >> why did you have the paper instead of conversing on the phone? >> when i was trying to open up the possibility of getting a change in american policy, it helped to set it down in writing. >> your foreign affairs adviser flies to washington with a paper and says this is not a casual conversation. it leads to a follow-up with a -- >> well, then you really have a sort of build up, and i think i got an assessment in march 2002, and we then went to see the

americans in crawford in april, but this was evolving at a quite a fast rate, and the question was could we in a sense -- could we in a sense -- this was going down a track of regime change, but could we put it in a somewhat different track to set ultimatum and then another track through the u.n.. that's where we were going. >> was this effectively the beginning of the track towards regime change? >> well, i think the beginning of the track led towards regime change and it was straight after 9/11. >> in discussions with president bush? >> i think it's absolutely clear from the very outset. testifies going to change the regime if he didn't let the inspectors back in. >> thank you. >> i'll turn it to martin. again. martin? >> can i look at a moment that you're very important and john

johnathan powell and i have a number of questions from that. you wrote to him in all papers, i do not have a proper workout strategy on how we would do it. could you tell us what the "it" in that sentence means? how we would do it? >> yeah. how we get saddam to cease being a threat peacefully or get him out by force. >> this is the clear view you have that somehow there was no third way? >> i don't think there ever was really. after 9/11, and as i say, it's not -- this is not something i said privately. i was saying it publicly, and so by the time you get to april, if you see my press statements with president bush in the speech i made the next day, i was being

very open about it. let the inspectors in any time anywhere, otherwise action would follow. what this paper is about is the politics because i could see politically that, you know, they were going to be extremely concerned. i was obviously going to get a huge political problem out of it. >> i suppose on that political aspect, your next remark in the minute, the immediate wmd problems don't seem obviously worth three years ago. does this mean that you on the one hand didn't believe that saddam was now posing a growing threat or that this would be a difficult case to make? >> well, it was the case that following september the 11th, it wasn't that he was doing anymore than he had been before.

it was that our assessment of relying to do anything changed, but also the latter point as well that you just made. yes, it was also that, the politics of it. >> another point that you make in this minute is sir, we have to reorder our story and message to i think it should be about the nature of the regime. we do intervene after the chicago speech. what story did you have in mind that had to be reordered? >> well, if we were -- look, the context of this the note makes clear. if you're going to build a coalition for this, there -- to put it bluntly, there are people on the right basically supporting this as a security issue very easily. there are people on the left who dent take the same view on the security questions. those people, it is the nature of the regime and therefore the combination of the regime and the security threat where the

argument would be most persuasive and as i think i said in evidence before, one of the problems here is it had grown up a distinction for we gem change on the one hand and wmd on the other. to me, it was linked together in this sense that the regime of the nature of saddam's, thinking of the hundreds of thousands of people he killed, million casualties in the iran-iraq war, the gassing of the curds and clearing of others, a rei gem of that -- regime of that nature is clearly a bigger threat with nuclear capabilities with another regime that's benign. you express that in the minutes. >> we have no inhibitions where we reasonably care about nation building. that does essentially mean that the removal of saddam hussein is an end in itself along the nature of his regime in >> well, i said many, many times on this,

the nature of the regime could not justify in itself the intention. .. >> i would like to turn to in july, 2002, in the context of your exchanges with president

bush and donald from scott. the increase to comment request to you, mr. blair we ask about to specific statements. the one you made to president bush after the meeting of the 23rd july, 2002 and also defense secretary rumsfeld in june, 2002. the cabinet secretary would not agree to the disclosure. in communicating his decision to ask the secretary and i quote, the u.k. prime minister may be less likely to have these exchanges or allow them to be recorded. if he is concerned that this information would be disclosed at a later time against his wishes are you content to tell the inquiry what was in the statements? >> i am very content to discuss the basis of them. but i do believe and i'm not going to hide in the cabin as a country as it is not my way, i think it is extremely important, the british prime minister and the president are able to in

confidence and if something is given in confidence and should be treated like that but i'm happy to tell you the basis on what i said. thank you. >> regarding your comment first to president bush in the note of july, 2002, david manning told us about his concern regarding the opening sentence. he told us and i quote it was too sweeping and that he tried to talk you out of it. he said it seemed to him, and freezing this close of options he didn't think it was a sensible place to be. concluding this quotation it went further than we should have gone. among the less you did retain the opening sentence and can i ask why do you think it was particularly important? >> i did change the opening sentence, but however -- >> i was going to ask whether -- >> i did actually accept one

suggestion frankly he would prefer not to any undertaking at all but what i was singing to president bush is clear and simple. we're going to be with you in tackling this but here are the difficulties. if you see the rest of the note is actually about all the issues and the difficulties. look, in the end you have a very plain and simple decision to take care. america is going to tackle this issue. the first question is we want it to be a collision, and of lying believe is it is extremely important for the international community to hold together at this point. i didn't see it every 11 as an attack on america i saw it as an attack on us, the west, and america could do it unilaterally of course they could but i would prefer them to do it multilaterally.

i said to america look, i'm absolutely sure how george bush took it. whatever the political heat if i think this is the right thing to do i'm going to be with you so i'm not going to back out because the going gets tough. on the header and you're the difficulties and this is why i think it is the right way to go. andrew quote saying it about the end of july, so it must be the same event it was saying having said to president bush quote in new, you know, george, whatever you decide to do i'm with you. is that about right? >> it's not what i said. what i said is what i said the greatest respect i don't think he was present at the meeting. >> no, it was quoted what you said to him. >> what i said to him? >> as i understand it.

>> i don't know about that. >> to round on this because it is important committees central how far there was a commitment and the nature of the commitment was thinking also about what you said to donald rumsfeld on the fifth of june. you sit in your statement about that i could not and did not offer some kind of blank check in how we accomplished our objective. but if you use the sort of language that we have seen in the note you sent to president bush. islamic in terms of understanding the american people -- i don't think the americans were in any doubt at all about what was being said and why it was being said. i don't recall the precise conversations i had but by we, this is entirely consistent with what i was saying publicly.

i don't think it was a secret i was right alongside america on september 11th and continued to be tvd and one of the reasons why when we had the meeting there was so much international focus is britain and america were standing together. what i was saying to the americans, i was trying to get them very substantially to amend their position. their position as we are going to do it, then the position okay with an ultimatum, within his system it was going to be we are going to put this back in the lap of the united nations and some of the people in the administration were saying you're crazy, you're going to put back into the bureaucracy of the u.n., swallow them up and be back for all this playing around. in the meantime you got this guy doing what he's doing sitting there and nothing happening. so i was having to persuade him to take a really of you radically different from the

people in his administration so i was saying to him is i'm going to be with you in handling this way and then backing out of it gets too hot political because it is going to get hot politically very much so. i believe in this, that it was the right thing to do. i also think it is perfectly consistent with a public statement and frankly what ever freezing i use i accept entirely. i was saying i'm going to be with america in handling this and however, we should handle it this way and it is in the end what he agreed to do. the single thing that is most important of anything else in this business about the politics and the decision before we went to war is that 1441 represented a huge compromise on his part and the opportunity for the international community to get its act together.

and once it became clear that hadn't changed but was carrying on in the same way it would be profoundly wrong of us to have gone back to the americans and said i know we said that we would be with you in handling this but now we are not. >> i would like to ask sir roger to become resolution 1441. just before i do, i would like to see for the record because i said to the cabinet secretary that we were disappointed it wasn't possible to see the state which of course we have seen and that disappointment continues. >> a question on the attorney general's involvement on advising on the resolution 1441 as you will see were goldsmith said in his statement that he

was not being sufficiently involved in the meetings and discussions about resolution 1441 and the policy behind it that we are taking place at ministerial level. and she says i need this point on a number of occasions. given the importance that you have placed on the lord goldsmith's understanding of the negotiations, where was he about to be more closely involved in the negotiation of 1441 as well as in the discussions which lay behind it? >> well i have to say i have more to do with peter cole smith on this resolution than i could recall on any previous military action that we took. >> resolution 1441? >> yeah, and i read what peter said now and obviously that is something the would be sensible to have the attorney general i

think in retrospect it would have been sensible to have an absolutely in touch with the negotiation of a weaker because i think that we wouldn't have probably gotten into this attrition where he thought provisionally at least we needed another resolution because i think had he known of the negotiated history real time as we were going through it we could have avoided some of the problems leader. >> he would agree with you there obviously he is quoted in his statement a precedent where an earlier attorney general under your government was much more closely involved in 1998 and the negotiation of resolution 1154 and 1205. so their regret is obviously mutual. >> to have to say i don't involve with the attorney in the 1998 thing but obviously i read what peter said.

>> he was involved extensively with the office and a lot of pfizer's in 1998. it was being led from there. i mean, in his statement, he says that he wasn't involved in discussions about 1441 between the time of the meeting with you on the 22nd of october when he told you the draft them and contemplation didn't authorize the use of force until the seventh of november when the text was that he put it all but agreed. but you say you were free much involved with him over the resolution. the two statements fit together. islamic what i'm saying is i was more involved. i remember having more meetings with peter about the look devotee of the issue than i did on many of the other occasions, and i did actually -- there was a meeting i think on the 17th of october which we then minister doubt including two peter where we set the objective for the

resolution and then he and i had the meeting on the 22nd of october and i agree in retrospect because we would have then he would have been sensitized to the evidence that is being given to you by steven patterson and evin mcleod, the head of the u.n. department of the foreign office and mcclellan being the lead advisor for the u.n. legal counsel of the u.n. process and the explain why the resolution 1441 did meet our objectives and significantly changed in the days leading up to its adoption. >> jeremy greene stock in new york the front of his legal but pfizer's working in london so michael and those working to him as from the current respect of evidence took a very different view the to the same view as the attorney general. the attorney general took the view as you know at this time he

took the view that 1441 did not authorize use of force unless there was a further resolution. but you have said in your statement that 1441 achieve our objectives. now how could it have achieved our objectives if you're attorney general or senior legal officer was telling you that it hadn't? >> this is the point i am making that what was happening was -- and this is what frankly with retrospective with have been better if he had been closely involved with the negotiation because what was happening is we had agreed on the 17th of october that there were clear objectives for the resolution and those objectives were and i think we actually say this very plainly that the ultimatum goes into 1441. if he preaches the ultimatum

action follows comes of this was the instruction given. i can't remember exactly what i said after the 27th of october but i imagine i would say we better make sure it does me. steven patterson evident makes clear there were changes the americans put in the finally evolving stages of this negotiation. and the finger was problematic for me throughout is why i wrote on a landreneau from peter i just don't understand this is the the whole point about our instructions to the negotiators were make sure this resolution is sufficient because we can't guarantee we're going to come back into a further resolution or a second resolution on this. and my her view, to go through all of this again, mauney view was the important thing about 1441 is it said the final opportunity and what is more is it specified what constituted a

breach, namely the failure of the unconditionally and immediately to comply with the u.n. inspectors. as we believed that out of this week of a resolution of this balanced and then became a continuing debate the next two or three months. stacks of there was no disagreement between you and him about the objectives that were supposed to be achieved the bid at the end of it he said one specific objective of rising use of force without these to further resolution had not been achieved and that must have been a disappointment to you, but we should probably -- >> more than that. we would have to make sure that they did. as i said, i have no recollection of the specific instructions going out after that meeting but i am sure i would have said you have to make sure it does meet that the objective. >> but he is saying that at the end eight didn't. >> as i just pointed out to do the resolution did evil even

after the 27 of october. i'm not relying on that as it were, but then peter came to me first that on balance it still required a second resolution and once he went through the negotiating history it actually didn't. >> at the time the resolution was adopted and indeed until february the following year he took the position that a further resolution was needed in the objectives precisely because as he set out in his note changes had been made in the word they gave him great difficulty. so that was the position. >> just to take a ten minute break now. >> can i remind you will need to be back within ten minutes so we can resume in a timely manner.

>> [inaudible conversations] >> i think mr. roberts would like to make a short -- >> we have checked or reject the records between april and september of 2002 and the records show there wasn't a substantial in iraq as i had previously set to beat the subject came up twice on the mind of make the former secretary briefed the cabinet security council on the point of endorsing the revised copps system of sanctions against iraq and on the 16th of may he reported the successful conclusions of those negotiations. >> does that conclude the period of the recess by the way? >> the ninth of may and the 16th of may. >> sorry, the period you are

referring to. >> before april and september so that would be the summer recess. i would like to ask general questions about legal led vice because lord goldsmith and his witness' statement states that he felt he was being discouraged from providing his advice and cite his conversation with jonathan powell on the 11th of november and his meeting with jonathan powell, sir david manning and morgan on the 19th of december are examples. were you aware that he felt he was being cut from giving formal not fight? >> i think it was more that we knew obviously when we can to the point of the decision we were going to need formal advice, and the new also this was a very tricky and difficult question, and it was important that he gave his advice. i think the only concern speaking from memory here is the

january paper the entire time on it but it was obviously important that he was involved, and i should say something about my approach to the office of the attorney general. i changed the traditional way attorney generals were appointed. up until about 20, 30 years ago and certainly going back in time there were usually members of parliament who were lawyers at the same time to read with the changing circumstances or people the expecting the understand it to be more full-time it can actually quite rare to have significant practicing barriers so usually the attorney general would be an mp. he was pretty much the last of his kind. i decided really it was best to go and take a person when i

would call the proper lawyer and put them in the house of lords and make them attorney general. they were among the top ten lawyers of their generation. someone like peter was a lawyer through and through a very good one, so if he was giving advice it had to be taken seriously. >> thank you. so, he was not wrong in supposing that he was not being encouraged to put advice in writing from time to time. >> my understanding was once you get to the position of asking advice you get formal advice. i hadn't previously had a search mission. i didn't see or you shouldn't buy the way but i hadn't previously been in the situation i was getting advice of the provisional nature and writing. >> you said in your in a statement lord called smith's at fisa on 1441 was always going to

be influenced by knowledge of the negotiating history of 1441 which was adopted in new york on the eighth of november, 2002, and i wonder then why did it take until the end of shinnery, early february, 2003 because it was arranged for him to

not to have pushed for the second resolution but i wonder in retrospect whether it wouldn't have been better simply to have if we had done it differently and had alongside the lawyers at the beginning he would have kept on that resolution.

>> when you've received lord goldsmith's advice on january, 2003, jonathan suggested and i'm quoting, we should get jeremy greene stock to suggest alternatives to him, and you said and i quote, we need to export whether we can revise self-defense with the united nations security council could have a discussion that makes plain there is a breach with the second resolution, in the of quote. those comments suggest you are focusing not only are mostly on the importance of the negotiating history, but rather that you were keen to find an alternative that might convince lord goldsmith there was a legal base from a better reaction. is that what was? >> i think it was both actually because i think i'm right in saying that peter, himself, mentioned, i think this is in a square bracket, that it had been suggested he talk to jeremy

greenstock and that in fact she should. so, in a sense, he had already raised that issue. i was -- i think i was simply casting about. i was saying look, have a look at this, have a look at

utter to encompass it in that resolution. so i was still in my mind thinking what happens though if one of the permanent members accept, the security council accepts there is a breach and so the resolution 1441 should apply in the fighting six come seven,

eight, and but they then just say we are not going to do it. >> i.t. we would like to pursue that a little bit later on. but just on the point about four goldsmith, the evolution of his advice, what the time he was advising that there was no legal basis for the military action in 1441 alone, the policy, your policy joining with the u.s. and military action didn't change did that mean that he would assume he eventually he would be brought to change his mind? >> no, but, you know, i was in the situation he had given this advice. there was a debate still going on, and remember, i was keeping maximum pressure on them and trying to keep this coalition together but we've got over 40 nations in the coalition, so we actually created a situation

where there isn't just the u.s. or the u.s. or the u.k. australia was in it, we had japan, south korea, we had a majority at that time at the european members. so my desire was to keep maximum pressure on saddam hussein to get an ultimatum and that would mean that we could actually avoid the conflict altogether or than half a clear consensus for removing saddam and continuing to hope that we could overcome its. >> thank you. >> over to you on legal matters. >> just following on this point, you have referred in your statement to professional advice and referred to it again from

the board goldsmith, and there is one specific point i would like to clarify with you this is that on the 30th of january, knowing that you were going to see president bush the following day, ward goldsmith wrote you a specific letter reiterating his advice on whether or not their resolution authorized the use of force. he said you might wish to know where i stand on this. he notes that on the 14th of january he is continuing note setting out his provisional views and said he's preparing a more detailed load of the device. having said that and that he still has got to have further consideration of that he hopes with his american counterparts. but having said all that, he says i'm not convinced this will make any difference to my view. he then says i remain of the view that the correct legal interpretation of resolution

1441 is that it does not authorize the use of military force without a further determination by fisa to counsel and he reiterates that the end of his letter having considered the arguments on both sides, of my view remains that a further decision is required. so on this specific point, he's not expressing himself tentatively. he is saying before you see president bush will you please register this is where i stand? and so david manning minuted to you career advice from the attorney general on the need for further resolution. having had that advice, what you actually said to the president, as you say in your statement, was that you repeated your strong commitment, given publicly and privately, to do what it took to disarm saddam. did you not feel constrained in making that commitment by the

advice the attorney general was continuing to give you? >> no. i was going to take the view, and i did right throughout that period, there might come a point at which i had to say to the president of the united states, to all the other allies i can't be with you. i might have said that on legal grounds if peters advice had not, having seen what the americans told him about the negotiating process, come down on the other side i might have had to do that politically. i mean, i was in a very, very difficult situation politically. it was by no means certain that we would get this thing through the house of commons and so on. so, i was going to continue giving absolute and firm commitment until the point at which definitively i couldn't, because hiring is any doubt at that time, if i had suddenly said well i can't be sure we have got the right legal basis.

if i started to say that to president bush, if i had said that publicly when i was being pressed the whole time do you need a second resolution, is it essentials you get a second resolution coming and i was having to hold that line three uncomfortably by the way, especially in light of what peter had said, but i wasn't going to be in a position where i stepped back until i knew i had to, because i believed that if i started to articulate this, in a sense saying look, i can't be sure, the effect of that both on the americans, on the coalition and most importantly on saddam, would have been dramatic. if the leading ally stood up and said i can't be sure. >> if you had privately warned the president that your attorney general was a advising you than you needed a second resolution, that would have reinforced the argument with him for getting one? >> he knew perfectly well we needed a second resolution and we had been saying that

throughout. if i started raising -- we hadn't had the final advice yet. and we hadn't been through the different retardations, and i think as he explained to you in his evidence one of those things about the way the legal the device is presented is if peter was up so what we definitively one way and can absolutely definitive and the other, what he actually says throughout is it is on balance this. on balance it was this side. he saw jeremy greenstock which moved him somewhat because he was aware of the u.k. side of the negotiation. then when he saw the americans it moved him over to the line to the position where he said on balance it is a lawful. malae was not going to be in a position where i was went put the problem before the president of the united states until i was in a position where i knew definitively i had to. >> all the when the period in question, your senior advisor in his conversations with president

bush's national security adviser presumably was conveying the message that this was pretty difficult for you. >> i mean, that wouldn't have been a revelation. >> you didn't want to say that to the president? >> he knew it was pretty difficult all the politics. if i started reading to the car raising legal issues at that point with the president, i think it would have started to become concerned as to whether we were really going to be there or not and what was really going to happen. i would have had to have done that by the way because in the end whatever i thought about the legal position, whose fox matter most in definitively were peters but i wasn't going to do that until i was sure about that. now, was it difficult for rot that period? very difficult as you rightly say to be in the statement i was answering questions in the house of commons in interviews and so on. i was having to hold the political line in circumstances where there was this unresolved final de debate within the u.k. government about the legal position, but i was aware of the

fact i had not just the united states as our key ally and military alongside their military working on the basis they were going to be there. 40 nations lined up, all of whom had real political difficulties backing this, and obviously the prospect, which is still the prospect i hope that we would find ourselves and with saddam confronted by an international consensus. if i had through that period in january, february, gone out and said anything that indicated there was a breach in the british position, that there was a light that had opened up, it would have been a political catastrophe. >> i think there's a difference between saying it privately to the president and exposing that flank in public. i wonder if i can just seek clarification on another one of these complicated legal point where i am at the disadvantage of not being a lawyer, but you touched on just now.

on the team this jim doherty, 2003, you told the house of commons, and by quote all of this, there are circumstances in which the u.n. resolution is not necessary, because it is necessary to be able to say in circumstances where an unreasonable veto is put down that we would still act. now lord goldsmith, as you know, has said in his statement to us that these words of yours were not compatible with the advice that he had given to you the day before. did you understand that the time that your words about an unreasonable veto were inconsistent with the legal let fisa? >> i was making basically a political point. however, i accept entirely that there was an inconsistency between what he was saying and what i was saying there, but was saying it not in a sense as a lawyer, but politically. one thing i just point out here

is that -- because this was a very, very difficult situation -- i was trying to hold the line, as i say, and my position was a little more elaborate than the two quotes that you taken from either the news -- i think it was a newsnight thing, an interview in the house of commons. i was quoting from the house of commons, but you made a similar point to jeremy paxman on six that the were in. >> back through both the house of commons and the interview. elsewhere in both i expressed in slightly differently. it was worth just letting me say how i expressed it there. i was actually trying to do with this point. i fully accept, and this is really what peter would say, you can cut a situation where there is a veto but i come along and say look there is a veto but i don't agree i'm afraid. i think it is unreasonable that we are acting anyway. my point was, and this is why i

treat it differently than other answers in the house of commons and of their answers and that view. my point was coming and goes back to something else i said in the papers, what happens if it is accepted as a breach but still the veto? now i think peter -- and that's why in the end i didn't pursue this point -- would just say tough. that is just the way it is. my point is this: if the whole point of 1441 was to say this is your final opportunity. you have to comply fully, and it was accepted he is not complying fully, how come the revival argument didn't work? because the laws were precisely the circumstances in which 678 should be revived? so i was making a slightly different point there, and in any event i was making a political point, but, you know, i think peter says it was uncomfortable for him. it was uncomfortable for me, and that is why, by the way, at that time i was saying we have to get him together with the americans

and resolve it once and for all. >> can you really distinguish when you were making to the house of commons is the minister to making a political point and a legal point when you're making a point about the legal interpretation of u.n. resolutions? if you say to the house of commons i am not going to defer to an unreasonable veto, would they not assume that you are speaking with authority as a prime minister, not just making a political .1 of your attorney the day before has told you this is not a valid point? >> by understand that. the fact is what i was being asked about was whether a second resolution -- if you go back to the house of commons, for example, the then leader of the conservative party was singing welcome is essential or is it merely preferable? because i sit was preferable. i take clare short said it was essential. so i was trying to hold that line in circumstances where, as i say, it was very, very difficult, but i wasn't -- i mean, look, in the and i was and left making a legal declaration

because i couldn't do that, but a political point that if there was a breach we had to be able to act, and the thing that i think is worth just pointing out throughout this period of time is that we were going for the second resolution. it was always going to be difficult to get it, but before we might -- the conversations the americans were having with the french really turned bad, i would say, in february as it were. just a bit earlier than that it had been a little bit more hopeful. but president bush and myself were trying to work on the russians and president put him. so i was trying to keep up maximum pressure to get that then. now if i had started saying -- if i had come as it were, really put into their hand the fact that, you know, he is desperate for it and can't do without it

-- you would have put your neck on the block. i think i do now understand this and thank you for that clarification. the central you are in a situation in which you can't be totally confident, rightly as it turns out, that you are going to get a second resolution. you know there is resistance not only from the french but the russians and others. the signal that at the time 1441 was passed in their explanations to vote. therefore, you don't want to put your head in the news by committing to the proposition i have to have it for legal reasons. in order to preserve that plank politically and not cross that line politically, you end up having to cross the line of legal led by strong by the attorney general? >> in the and it is not the basis on which we took that action. >> no, but i am talking about the basis on which you spoke to the house of commons on 15th of january. >> as i say, when you actually -- i tried to choose my words carefully all the way through.

in the two quotes you have, i chose them less carefully, but actually earlier i made it very clear i was talking in circumstances where -- i think i actually say in the newsnight interview where a member accept there is a breach but nonetheless vetoes. i will send you those quotes. >> we have those quotes. thank you. i think that point is clear. >> thank you. will turn now to sir lawrence friedman, who would like to talk about inspections. lawrence. >> thank you. you talked before the break the public demand from november, a 2001 was to get the inspectors back in. when making this demand from that point did you ask for and receive advice about what would happen if the inspectors did get back in? did you ever have grounds for supposing that the return of the inspectors would be able to find proof one way or the other on

wmd? i am talking now before the inspectors did actually go back in. >> look, i think the view of our systems was coming and certainly the intelligence services was the likelihood saddam would play around, but i always thought it was possible he would realize that this was the moment of choice. as i say in my statement to you, like the one very interesting thing is to compare gaddafi in libya with saddam in iraq. gaddafi in libya came to a view and they opened themselves -- this was after the iraq invasion -- libya basically made full disclosure. it operated properly. its experts talked to the inspectors. the disarmed. if you look at south africa, again, it was through the people responsible for the program talking to the inspectors the disarmed. now, saddam -- he would have to say i was pretty doubtful, and so was our system that he would

cooperate, but it was possible he would. >> you received the advice from officials in july that the inspectors would need at least six months. is that the amount of time you had in mind going into 1441 that unmovic would need to do its job? >> for me it was never a matter of time the matter of attitude. you could have given him longer than six months if he was cooperating, but if he wasn't cooperating it wouldn't really matter -- we can come to this leader because i think it is a very, very important point. because i do not accept that if blix carried on doing his inspections we would have found out the truth. >> we will be coming to that very soon. but i just want to get the ground work sort out beforehand. under resolution 1284, which set up unmovic, they're had been a clear timetable that they would operate to, which potentially included the and the suspension

at least of sanctions and you understood that that was the potential time to with all? >> of course. i had absolutely no problem given time once it was clear he had opened up and decided this is it. you know, i know the choice i face and i'm going to choose to cooperate. i think it would have been a completely different situation. >> from what you say in your statement and your book, you appear to have concluded quite early on in december to those to come following the iraqi declaration of december 7th, that there was no prospect of saddam complying with the requirements of 1441; is that basically correct? >> yes, it's basically correct because i think -- you've got the intelligence reports. the intelligence reports were that he didn't intend to cooperate, but the declaration wasn't correct. but there was also very significant piece of intelligence at that time, which was -- and this, by the way,

remains valid as far as i know, that saddam had said that anybody who cooperated with overseas interviews would be treated as a spy, in other words, executed. the, i mean, the information as such that was coming to me not looking very optimistic. >> but the inspectors on the land and on november 27? >> sure. absolutely. >> so they had not really a chance to find out for themselves it? >> no and that is why it was important to wait until blix started to come back and report. >> to drop the inspectors back in but are already anxious about whether having this demand is going to really change the game having the inspectors back in but how well they do.

we talked up the timetable you didn't care how long it took. but you're also talking your statement and college president bush expect them to launch a military attack that change brought by a week. did that ever leave enough time to see whether unmovic could do its job? >> welcome of the time line was pressing. it's true. and that was again a very complicated situation because, the americans took the view that a was a absurdity think that saddam was going to change his mind because he wasn't and therefore -- and also come by the way, day and our own military work buy then fully ramping up. and indeed, as the prospects of know what reaction got closer, saddam began to cooperate a little bit more. so, no, the reason i sought yet a further postponement with

another ultimatum at the end was in order to give more time, but i have to say to be very frank about it, more time would not have bought us anything unless it had an absolutely clear that came with an ultimatum. >> we will explore that a bit more in a moment. sir jeremy greenstock told us, quote, we were on a timetable of american making which we couldn't escapes from. so is it fair to say that we were caught between the american desire for early action with an international desire for inspectors just to get on with their job? >> is, of course, it was a pressure that we were under to be and my way out of this ultimately, because this is what i decided to do -- the whole reason i came out with this idea at the end which was to say okay, we will get blix to settle benchmarks of what saddam has to

do and the americans are saying let's go for it. so i try to find a way through at that point so here are the benchmarks. we will take them from blix himself, but it's got to have an ultimatum. >> de think it would have benchmarks set right from the start? because one of the problems with this process was on top of that plank there wasn't a clear sense of what constitutes a resolution to beat islamic exit, you might have done that except in 1441i think it actually specifies the things he's supposed to do. now, when you then get during the course of the initial inspections is some practical sense of where there is a problem, and really, this all came to interviews for me in the end. the was the critical thing because, you know, i had -- i don't know exactly when i did this, but i had studied -- we hadn't gotten to libya by that stage but i had studied some of the disarmament frameworks that had been successful up to then,

and it all depended on your technical experts sitting down with the inspectors and saying look, this is what happened. here is the genesis of our program. this is what we have been doing. when you come at a later time, as i say, it is actually very instructive to look at how the libyans disarmed. it wasn't the political leaders that gave the instruction. the actual work was done by the technical experts. now the problem all the way through, and we can go through this about blix, and hans blix was -- will, we had a profound disagreement about iraq but he is a very decent and honorable man and i am sorry we ended up having this disagreement, but in the and i think it is clear from his statement that time that that cooperation specifically on the interviews wasn't forthcoming. >> i am not sure that's the case. can i quote to you directly from his march 7th report, which was the last one he made? he explains in his march 7th report that there had been

improvement on this issue. the iraqi side seems to have been encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of iraqi officials, the so-called minders, or the taping of the interviews. he talks about the possibility of taking the mound site iraq. nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked to private interviews, of which can accept our terms, seven of these during the last week. so it is not the case that there was a complete blank on interviews. they were happening and they were happening -- and he again told us in evidence to us under the conditions that unmovic wished for. >> well, by march 7th it is absolutely correct the iraqi is working more forthcoming than they had ever been earlier, not surprising since we had approximately 300,000 troops down there, but if you actually

track the development of this -- by the way, the three-point your meeting, sir lawrence is the reason i have tried to come to the benchmarks. so i will come to that in a moment. if we actually go through it from interviews without minders is turned down on a january 17th. on the 536, blix comes to see me and again says he is worried about the interviews. by the way, one of the things he is saying to me throughout is i am very worried about this idea that you ask for interviews abroad, because their families may be killed. well, you know, as i used to say to him, hans, if he is going to kill the family, it doesn't exactly constitute full cooperation with the -- >> ben -- >> if i just say that should erase text meeting it is worth quoting what el baradei, who was

also there admitted not in charge of that part of the inspection, but is the head of the atomic energy agency. el baradei made the following points it says. the next that deficit will be crucial. the security council was clear. not all members agree with the u.s. timing but all recognize it. iraq was not cooperating unless there were clear signs of an iraqi change of heart on cooperation, both process and putting interviews and substance , a u.n. resolution four to 41 half to be implemented. not alarming interviews was a lack of a full cooperation. now, by then, we were several -- >> the message was now also getting through and the suggestion that nothing was changing clearly is in incorrect. things are changing. you mentioned the designer to get people to come out of the country, which come as you say, blix was very worried about and

had been worried about right from the start of the resolution 1441 being passed. in that same statement i cited earlier, the march 71: interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. it is our intention to request such interviews shortly. then he told us in evidence i never thought he would get very much out of it. not only would it have been troubled, but it would have been driven to it in the end. i think the push was so hard so we would have persuaded the iraqi and said this is what we need to do, if you pick up someone you should order them to come along with us. the point is that you were getting progressively more cooperation at this time? >> let me make two points in relation to this. the first is we were going to get some more cooperation progressively because he knew he was about to be invaded if he didn't cooperate. if you track this through -- i think even hans blix admits this -- the pressure on him was the

threat of military action. that wasn't going to be what would remove this issue. what he needed was not a tactical believed by him, that he would string of samore corporation as the advent of the better reaction came closer. we needed a genuine change of heart on this part that meant that the past was going to be changed and he would adopt a different perspective, and the importance of the iraq survey group report, which is the authoritative report as to what the faster they actually could conduct interviews, is that he never changed his heart on this issue at all. the second point i would make, however, is this: you are right in this way. one of the puzzles to me all the way through was how do i get out of a situation where the french are saying what reading. okay. it is not what 1441 says but he is doing some cooperation. so give it more time, with the

americans saying look, we made a deal with everyone. one final chance. for unconditional immediate operation or else. so he is not fully cooperating so why are we still debating this? so for the very reason you get, sir lawrence, what i was trying to devotee and then they say okay. how'd we find a way through those two polar positions? it is to say to you, the americans, must agree to this attrition where there is a specific agreed to set benchmarks and she knows he has to do, of which interviews is actually the critical one, and you, the french, have got to agree that if he preaches the ultimatum, then action follows. the trouble was i couldn't get it to bits together i am afraid. >> we will talk about the difficulty in a moment. can i just go through quickly the points you have just made there? first of intent, and obviously anybody who has read the isg

report those they stressed that the intent was there, also in the short term the intent is to develop tactical chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and the ballistic missile part of that was being dealt with by the unmovic. they were part of that being dealt with by unmovic. they were destroying engines and missiles. however, under resolution 12841 of the things that unmovic was supposed to do was to set up and ongoing monitoring and verification system so that even if the sanctions were lifted, and they might only have been suspended, there was still a way of monitoring what was going on. there would still have been an arms embargo. there would still have been a safeguards agreement and iea inspectors could go back in. it wasn't as if he would suddenly be unleashed and be free of the inspections had been able to run its course? >> yes. here is the situation and here is the judgment you have to make

about it. saddam hussein had known for many years that he should be letting inspectors back in. the demand to put back in the inspectors was not a new demand. he had been in breach of u.n. resolutions going back over ten years. the inspectors had effectively left in 1998 as a result of the non-cooperation. there was a history of concealment and deception. i fink we can agree on that. he finally under threat of military action agrees to let the inspectors back in. now, let's suppose in march, 2003, and this is why ultimately on and on the american side of the argument, let's suppose in

march 2003 we said okay. he's to be enough. we will stand down the trips. will let unmovic carry on its task and we will try to set up this new institution. we will have a new smart sanctions rather than the broader sanctions than before. my point is very simple. i don't doubt that there are all sorts of things we could have persuaded him to do with 300,000 troops down there. the question is, though, because at some point the mouse troops would have to go back home, if he had not changed his mind about these essential belief in the importance of these weapons, and the evidence is -- i mean, i know it is never describe, because no one describes it -- but it is not just the isg, robin butler's report also, that he continued to pour were both nuclear and chemical ambitions. what we have to pose is not a

question of in march, 2003 blood he had carried on cooperating what he had carried on cooperating when all that military pressure was off him, when he would then have had no tough sanctions, unlimited amount of oil money? as we know from the speakers, he retained the technical know-how, the scientists and the intent. is that the risk that even knowing what we know now we should run? >> the difficulty was that you set in motion a process -- you got to the international community to every under resolution 1441. you had been demanding the inspectors to return. the inspectors had returned. the initial cooperation had not been good. now the initial cooperation was much better. hans blix was saying this progressively. wasn't just military force as you mentioned in your statement. getting sanctions lifted was obviously a major incentive for him as well.

the problem with the argument you have just put is why bother with the inspections process at all, because the cooperation was coming. there was more of it. if you still didn't think this was going to do the job, why set the process in motion at all? >> because here is the situation you declare 1441. you have given him a final chance for full immediate unconditional cooperation. now, at that point, he can make a big decision, which is to say i am going to put aside my concealment, my lack of cooperation, all the things i have done in the past and i am going to cooperate fully. he doesn't. so he is in breach of 1441 and part of the problem is frankly that those who supported 1441 who were not on the american

side of the argument got a bye in the end and they agreed he would be given a final opportunity than they wanted another final opportunity. the point about his change of heart and the point -- the important point about the iraq survey group and the rest of the evidence is that if he had not taken that decision really to put the past behind him and turn over a new leaf, yes, it's true, one of the military pressure was there he might cooperate but when it wasn't there he was going to be back and he was going to be back with far more money with the international community having built this great consensus it would have then disintegrated. ..

which was rather abruptly discontinued. finish asking about this cluster of proposal you're putting forward and wyeth have difficulty. according to jonathan powell come he did try to extend the timetable and then you'd asked the americans for nine more weeks because president bush said he wouldn't agree to it dirty-minded creek little time, but nine more weeks. do you recall that? >> yeah, we were asking -- i don't know that's exactly what the timeline was come up but yes, we were asking for more

time. and the americans at it actually our own. i'm not sure about this, but our military would be anxious about a time not long. but you know, we could have probably compromised somewhere i guess. but that's not the probably cut into at the end. the problem was, and this is where whole business to do in the second resolution, which i would like to do with the might of things being said to you. the problem was there was no consent form ultimatum. and whether it was nine weeks or one week, without an ultimatum that would be pointless. >> just for one second, can i check on the position, the military position. we understand you were briefed by the chiefs on the 15th of january. reifies that would be possible to maintain combat readiness for a number of months beyond march? >> well, can't recall exactly.

i'm very happy if that was the case. in a pinch we could have done it. and by the way, that wouldn't have stopped. you know, if we manage to get the ultimatum and the debate had been put in about time, i think that would have been a very interesting discussion with the americans that would've been quite difficult a thing. >> just am not in terms of relationship that the americans at the time, in march, jeff koons private secretary wrote for a variety of reasons, one division is now likely to represent a higher and more significant proportion of the overall combat power available in your distortions of the korean campaign. for example, current assumptions it contains nearly 30% of the tax. so this doesn't make it sound like a little extra.

>> no come over absolute essential to accomplish is the cutest leverage in the situation. >> so you did have lunch and asking for more time? >> when i went to president bush and the book, i want to put a new resolution down with benchmarks in an ultimatum, it was a very typical conversation because he was same look, we've gone through this. we first of all agreed to you having an ultimatum and not just doing it. and we agreed to the u.n. route for doing the ultimatum. and we agreed the inspectors should go and we can try and resolve it peacefully. and now you're telling me six months from now or five months when actually it's clear he's not cooperating fully, that you want another ultimatum. so it was a difficult conversation but we did have leverage in that situation and i was prepared to use it. the problem was we couldn't of an ultimatum because i was not in favor of another resolution,

never my intent which didn't have a clear -- >> bar ms prashar has a question. >> i want to ask a couple questions about what finally brought the u.n. tbn. a statement, you did deal with your attempt to secure the support of mexico and chile in order to get at least a majority vote in the nations guilty council. you say in your statement and on the ninth of march, president bush said he thought they were denying what should be enough. >> may be a period he said in the house of commons last monday you are getting very close with it. we nearly had the majority agreement. johnny crane stock told us that he never felt that we got close to having nine votes in the bag.

how close did she believe you were to a majority vote? >> at that we've come pretty close to it actually. i mean, i have somewhere a list of the calls i was making at that time and i was literally going virtually around the clock trying to hurt a members of the security council. the americans, you know, and can be pretty emphatic in the circumstances with their allies, were pretty major pressure on. i simply said to me in a call if i said nine days spent in any event we were there to get a majority. i think we could have cut chile and mexico actually if the french position had been less emphatic. but it wasn't in the end and they felt unhappy. so jeremy is right. it's always going to be difficult. on the other hand i thought it was possible.

>> was a different position or was it that president bush was losing patience with the united states process? >> no, it was really more to do with the fact that she was the situation. you see, we've been carrying on, discussing with the french and germans as well although they didn't have a veto, they were an important player because of their relationship with her and. we're quite close conversations with the german. can you know, we thought a certain time that the french with a little bit of german pressure actually make the name rather than veto. and you never knew what might happen with the russians because they were calculated on a pretty tough assessments of their interest in the end. it was possible that the russians could be persuaded not to veto. so no, he had lost patience. but with then started to happen,

going into february thing, the french position hardened and then it and it became very obvious to me that the old traditional divide was back, you know, the british abuse americans. french would be the people who market themselves as not being with the americans. you know, we can talk about how this is affecting our relationships around the world, the countries are also looking at how they look in the situation for their allies. and i think in the end, russia and france to set up a, i'm sure they were sincerely against it, but they also decided we're going to make a point of being against it. sometimes people are against things that they don't push it too far. the other traditional allies are going to be within america. so i don't think it that president bush lost patience. i think it became apparent then that we were going to get a second resolution passed the security council. >> obama standing you touch really about benchmarks. chile and mexico wanted three

weeks and president bush would not agree to a week. you think that was the fact that? >> yeah, but i am back to him and said that the ultimatum, the agreement to ultimatum, i think we would've got the extra time. i mean, the problem was -- he kept saying to me perfectly understandably, look, i hear what you're saying, but you can't even that the french on board? and was they couldn't. >> you're saying you could go back because he thought the french were hardened. >> picked up by them, the french position had heard and what they would've veto without at the ultimatum. >> can we just stay on this for a moment because it's quite an important moment. he said in a statement that the french statement of opposition in chile and internal politics

made president lagos said he could not support what was going to be battled a resolution doomed to a veto, but one strongly kept by searching p5 members. particularly the french statement of opposition at the press conference. >> well, more generally, it was being made -- the position for the non-p5 members on the security council, particularly countries like chile and mexico -- when a situation like this happens, they are caught on one level of america as a major ally in one sense. on the other hand, they've got public opinion. the most important, they've got permanent members of the security council taken a hard line against this. and in those circumstances, i mean, my experience the non-permanent members of the council saying i don't want to get into this really. whereas i think president lagos was quite sympathetic and very

smart, intelligent capable leader and he was looking for a way to deconstruct the, when france came out with such a heavy position, then i thank you decided, look, this is going to be too difficult. also because one said we're going to veto anything with an ultimatum minute. and he was going to be pointless anyway. >> they think -- leslie put the french asheville aside for a second. we just talked about the points that set up to raise about the impact of the tents of the americans to extend that deadline because he missed the importance of that. can i talk to about president bush's memoir, decision points, where he describes his conversation with president lagos. he talked about giving saddam an additional two or three weeks. i told them a few more weeks would make no difference and he

had years to comply except to have condemned today face had one last time i would vote. he said no, it is not reasonablt clear that president lagos was the amount of time he thought ir reasonable to put forward new ultimatum was not there.e. >> yeah, but i don't think -- i mean, it's a difficult time tott judge, but that wasn't his basic concern. the basic concern of presidentin lagos was you're asking me -- this is me, asking him, you're y asking me to put myself in a position where i'm going to wind up with you guys inance or th circumstances with the french and russians will attack this very heavily in hishey will circumstances were because they're going to veto you won't get the resolution anyway. >> as you know, president chirac's statement and there is

a very strong statement and itt. may not have made a difference to him. ne ruling outessarily a deadline. so, there were two such are so perkier. a certain strong french view and the strong american view.trong a you describe to us in our erl conversationi that they wereu we caught in a sense between these two views. >> yes, that's true. to but i have to emphasize this. ts particularly in the light of als the things being said aboutwe whether we were misrepresenting the french view or not, we never misrepresented the french view.s the french view is absolutelycl. clear. it wasn't that they were against any second resolution. they were perfectly happilyhap agreed to a secondp resolutionen provided at the third resolution. theyut would agree if that meanp the fourth one. what they were preparead to do n any set of circumstances,to nevermind the swallow is thatumc

they were prepared to agreees t. situasolution with an ultimatum. we were caught were quited singo rightly americans were saying to us, what they are prepared to thate is basically a rerun of 1441 except possibly weaker. well, that's useless. so in the end and i'm very happy that i've got the french president interview here to goou through it. he had come to the view thatspes inspections were working and that should be the root that wee dealt with and we should not do with them by force whatever the circumstances. anything with an ultimatum -- his point was not timed. it was not the time for this oesolution to operate.itg his pointless if it's got an ultimatum i don't want it. thef >> to the french have earlier talks about the possibility oftn time?h i think we've been to the

question of what frenchi actuals said.phen >> i insist on reading whatwe hv steven said to you because we did not misrepresented thethinta position. position is absolutely clear. anything with an ultimatum they were going to veto. >> just come through this on this point as well.the afternoof 12th of march a conversation with president bush. again, we have to rely on you to tell us what he said. you discuss whether chile and mexico were coming along and how to accept that they were. did you discuss the fine that you should take about the role of france to get a second resolution? >> i can't recall. i've gone back and refreshed my

mind on the know, but it would have mattered much frankly. the line we're going to take on france is the line. i mean, that's the language. and that was as much for our own -- the french-american relationship by then had become very scratchy and very difficult. i was always very keen to remain on good personal terms with jacques chirac. i both liked him, admired him come and have a great deal of time for them as an individual and as a leader. we disagreed on the fundamental question of extremism and what to do about it. but, you know, we wouldn't have wanted frankly to take the same position as america who were after france anymore rather aggressive way. >> you alluded to it already, we have been told it was a conscious decision, when you

fail to get chile and mexico to start up. stephen told us it was his you -- that you knew that and you knew which were claiming was not what chirac headset. would you like to comment? >> i would like to comment on it because it's simply not correct. i've got great admiration for steven and he was a fantastic colleague to work with but he wasn't handling this particular issue. and the fact is that the french were of course going to various people and saying no, no, no. the british are quite wrong about this. we are not opposed to a second resolution. that was absolutely correct, with one writer which was an added comp which is as long as it's not got an ultimatum in it. and so when you go to the french

presidents actual interviews -- i have it somewhere here. in that interview what president chirac said was there is this proposal of a new resolution setting an ultimatum. goes on to start with the talk of 17 march, then a busload of the british amendment to postpone the date of the ultimatum. it's of little consequence. in other words, he said we move from a course of action in order to disarm iraq to a different one consisting of so many days go to war. question, you don't want that? france won't accept it and so we will refuse that solution. and that's in the context of which he then goes on to say regardless of the circumstances, i didn't say when i'm asked at the house of commons, i'm asked

what is the french objection, and i said the problem with the diplomacy, this is on the 18th of march, the debate authorizing conflict, the problem with the diplomacy, when it came to an end, it came to an end after the position of france was made public, repeated in a private conversation between myself and president chirac, and he said it would blocked by veto any resolution that that contained an ultimatum. so i wasn't alleging they would say no to any resolution or they of course they would agree to resolution that didn't have an ultimatum and because that would mean a further resolution afterwards. and so the position was really very clear on both sides. >> i think chirac -- >> the very point is making here, jacques chirac come is the

time isn't the issue for him. it's the ultimatum that is the issue. >> just won a slightly separate but similar point on that same episode. i mean, what is clear is that the americans had deadlines of military action as you yourself have said. and go for they must have wanted very much to wrap up the process of negotiations that united nations on the possible second resolution, bring it to an end. what is not clear is why we continued those negotiations for nearly a week after president chirac had made a statement which the government, on the 18th of march, described as making it is not possible to secure a second resolution in the united nations. in your book you say that you have decided that we should

table the five tests anyway. we did so in the early hours of first day, 13, march. they were immediately rejected by writes. jacques chirac gave a very strong statement he would not support military action whatever the circumstances. but he had made a statement on the 10th of march which was four days before you table for the five tests. why did you go ahead and continue those negotiations and they continued be on the 13th, effectively i think the following monday that jeremy greenstock finally withdrew a draft resolution? was it because you didn't really believe that chirac is statement signaled the end of the process? or were we continuing negotiations at this point that a particular good faith? >> no. it was effectively this, that obviously this was the second best thing now because france

had made clear, you're right, on the 10th of march, i think it was dominic that with a statement out on the 13th of march, but what we decided was look, even if you can't get the resolution because they said they will would veto, nonetheless you'd have some greater, if you like, political authority if you could at least get the majority numbers on the security council to say they would agree such a resolution if they don't. so in other words, it wasn't -- >> you mean by voting for? >> yes by voting for it. you would have a veto that resolution. >> that would undermine the authority of in 1441? >> no, it would have undermined that because we believe we have authority anyway in 1441 but it would have allowed us to have said politically we had a majority security council. so had we ended up in a situation where chile and mexico have said okay, we are with you. we probably would have put this

resolution down had -- >> but you had gotten? >> it became clear during that period. >> it was circa clear by wednesday, and on thursday the negotiations went for another four days. >> we are still time to do everything we could to build the majority. i'm not sure exactly the time when it became clear we were not going to get anywhere. >> did you agree with president bush when he spoke on the 12 the game was up? >> it looked like that, yes, because it is clear we were not going to get a resolution. this was the second best, okay? our preference would have gotten a resolution passed the security council. but as i recall what it took place, i thought that i had that you at least, i think this is denied also in conversatconversations with cabinet colleagues as well, and i was very conscious i had cabinet members who were unhappy about this and so on, that it

might give us some political weight, not much frankly, but some if we detail these we had a majority on our site, even though we knew we were not going to get the resolution. >> i'm not sure i'm entirely clear this point, but i spent too much time because i know we have a lot more. >> it's simply a political point. i mean, if you say we didn't get the resolution, it was vetoed. but nontheless, we got a majority security council in our favor, it would allow us to say that. at that point you're right that the political, you know, you're at a point of political decision. you know you have a vote in house of commons because we give the house of commons a vote on this. it would have helped me. i would definitely use this in terms of the presentation of? if i'd been able to stand up and say well, we didn't get the resolution but nonetheless we had a majority at the security council. >> i can see would help the presentation of the case.

and i note that by wednesday we had effectively concluded that we were not going to get nine votes, and i think that's probably where we left a point of tactical detail. back to you, lawrence. >> time is beginning to press. jack straw told parliament on the 20th of november, 2002, and ago, material, material breach means something significant, some behavioral patterns of behavior that is serious. among such features could be action by the government of iraq deserved to obstruct or to be the inspectors to intimidate witnesses what any single action appears relatively minor, the actions as a whole add up to something deliberately and more significant. something that shows iraq's intention not to comply. would you agree with that as a

definition of material breach? >> absolutely. >> it has a low bar i guess? >> no, look, you could have made an argument that said the declaration in december was a breach. i think some of the american system at the time trying to claim that actually. but my attitude was, look, and this was the advice given to me, this is not a proper declaration, so on and so forth, but you can't just say okay, we are going to action now. >> so the previous time you're taking military action against iraq, in december 98, richard butler reported that saddam was not cooperating with inspectors. was your expectation that hans would be able to do the same? we are talking of december, january the. he was obviously coming back to the security council, indeed he did, regularly to report.

i mean, it would be a matter of decided how often he do that. given the history of this, we were going to expect very early and significant signs that saddam had genuinely changed the position of his regime. >> but hans clinton wasn't giving you a statement that iraq was not comply. he was saying conditions were improving. the attorney general's office wrote you on the 14th of march asking you to confer that it was your view that iraq admitted material further breaches, they reply the next day confirming to that. when you replied were you working with the definition i stated earlier from jack straw

in my -- >> yes, absolutely. >> can you tell me the process she followed be forgetting that determination? >> we went back over the blix report, and it was very obvious to me, particularly on the subject of images that they were not cooperating. they will cooperate more agile is a. they start to get out a little more. but there was absolutely nothing to suggest that this cooperation was for immediate and unconditional. it was actually not a media. in fact, lex himself said it was an immediate even on the seventh of march. and not unconditional. and in addition to that, i had i think other things as well, which i think are still outstanding, where it was clear that saddam is putting heavy pressure on people not to

cooperate. although i didn't know this at the time, but we know now, that he actually said -- said the vice president long to address a whole group of the iraqi scientists and experts to say you better not be found with any material, it is a problem for inspectors what his actual obligation is they should have been offering any material. >> it is interpretation of that, which is simply that he was nervous there had been freelancing, and that the point of that was to make sure nobody did anything because they shouldn't. >> i think freelancing -- >> can i just clarify, when you said we looked, who was the we involved with this? in your office? did you consult more widely? >> i'm sure jack particularly at the time, i don't recollect this, but in any event this was literally the whole time this

was going on. i mean, our view was that he was not cooperating in the terms of 1441. and that by the way remains my view today that he wasn't, and, indeed, he never had any intention of doing that. that is correct as you rightly say, we have been over this once before that he was offering up more but he was not offering up more, you know can't even figure he wasn't offering up what they were asking him. >> finally on the issue, you mentioned something from hans blix that you quote in your book, you quote this on page 427 of your book and it's obvious by the new initiatives which were taken by the iraqi side with the future result of some long-standing open disarmament issues were active or even proactive, these initiatives three to four months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute immediate cooperation. nor can cover all areas of

relevance. but a paragraph been continues, they are nevertheless welcomed and i don't think there respond to them and responding currently unresolved issues. that brings us back to the crux of the issue that you stop the process at a time when it was given more results ,-comcome when the iraqis need aerial surveillance that would agree to interviews, and when it was already starred to destroy ballistic missiles. when the iaea was able to say that there is no nuclear program. >> what we've got to do is make a judgment here. was the reason why -- first of all, 1441 didn't say over the coming period of time you should increase your levels of cooperation. it said there has to be full, immediate and unconditional cooperation, and a plane he wasn't. now, the judgment you've got to make about this is does that

patent behavior very reminiscent of his previous behavior, does that indicate that actually this is what you withdrew, because you have to get rid of the troops at some point, you can keep them forever. does that behavior indicate that this is somebody who wants the threat of that military action with withdrawal was then going to be carrying on with this, you know, eking out of bits of cooperation? or issue a judgment that any end once the threat of military action was withdrawn, he would be back to his old games ?-que?-quex and look, we don't know the answer to the question but a to point to the survey group and that it is at least as argy-bargy would be back to his old games as is argued what he would become a different saddam. >> the basic problem was that you had to make that

determination about time because that's when the americans wished to go to war. we're not talking a eking it out indefinitely, a few more weeks might have made a lot of difference. >> the question is, this is the whole hub of this comp the question is would it have made a difference? i mean, yes, it's absolutely true that he may have carried on getting more concessions. that wouldn't have removed the problem of saddam, unless those concessions were made in good faith, good heart, because he decided to change. now you're right, the american metric timer april under timetable, that is clear ad notice, but the whole, the last gasp as it were was to give a way of resolving, particularly this issue of interviews to the ultimatum. that you know this is a debate that even now people still have. you know, would this have been a situation where saddam would

have changed continually? or would it have been a situation where he would outfox the international committee and come back to his old games? look, we can't answer that question now, but i say to look back on the record of the man, the things he did, you know, not as if he never developed these weapons. he developed them and use them. and we know now that he saw their use as essential to having defeated the iranians, and that he saw having nuclear and chemical capability as a central part of the stability and maintenance of his regime. now, all i say to you is we can't tell at this point in time whether he would've changed or not. but i say it is at least surely, surely arguable that he would have not changed, been there with a lot of money, and still

with the same intent. in which case it was a risk and it which case we would being in my view responsible about it is not a risk we should be running. >> that process at and at that point. >> it doesn't seem that actually. it seems he had a change of heart, but anyway, i think we have -- >> and just a few minutes we will take a very short break, but before you i'll ask monty to open up a new question. >> if i could stay with the pre-march 20th period, look at the question of how the decision was made for united kingdom to take the responsibility for southern iraq. and your previous evidence to us, you said i think from january onwards it was clear that we're going to have responsibility in the south. but on the sixth of march, 2003, you are recorded in saying, document we released today, the

issue of secularization would need to be addressed. it should be covered in the plan. in your statement to us, you said we took the decision to take on responsibility from the south sector following jack straw note to me of the 19th of march, that that note said that it would be premature to take it you on the sectors at a time when iraq still wasn't in a stabilize the situation under our control. can you tell us exactly when the decision was made for united kingdom to take responsibility for the south? and who was involved in that decision? >> right. i mean, because you have indicated, i've gone back through the papers again. i mean, look, from january 2003 it was obvious, rather not obvious, sorry, it would be a great we do in the south, so we

would be, as it were, we have responsibility for that area. and i think mikey jackson gave evidence to you which said really in a sense our responsibility for the aftermath in that sector grew out of the fact is was our area of operations in the conflict. we think, it's correct, we had a meeting in the sixth of march which i got a briefing note for on sectors nation. i resolved to find of income it was then a cabinet office note of the 19th of march 2 matthew rycroft for the ministerial meeting saying we should decide on sectors, and a joint foreign ministry is coming to you, that's the one in the 19th and then david manning thinks it should have gone on the agenda for tomorrow, chance to comment

on her return on the 21st of march. so we put it on tomorrow's agenda. so we didn't take a final view them, but then the note to me was the expectations is the u.k. forces would be responsible, and i didn't -- i then had that meeting on them, they note out to the foreign office minister of defense, office from the foreign the street secretary. he agrees with proposals provided with the satisfaction of the resolution, and i list certain issues. and then again the foreign office rights to matthew rycroft, and then what happens is that we established at some point that the ad hoc committee capital h. this time with jack straw in charge come and out of that comes to the view that we should be responsible for that sector, and they should be part

of a joint occupying power responsibility i have to say then that was obvious. that is where we would end up. >> this was a specific decision during the time when a lot of -- >> i think the decision ultimately could take what we think of resolution 1483. most of the discussion here was not really about whether we should be responsible for the south or not. it was about the u.n. role, and then what happened was that these ad hoc committee meetings that jack was chairing were happening day in and day out. they're going through a lot of details, legal advice. and then we got 1483 reported at the cabinet and agreed it. >> in your statement you say to us i was also keen of this area of operation in the south, because it seemed to me the south would be more manageable. but in the joint intelligence committee assessment of the 19th of february, which has

been declassified and which is now published, it concludes we have limited intelligence on the particular conditions in the south. and also the posts of them security situation in the south will be unpredictable your how is this caveat factored into this? >> it was obviously going to be -- sorry, i have the paper here now. it was obviously going to be unpredictable. these situations -- but, you know, my calculation about this was really very to the brit. one of the things that we're all very concerned about was sunni-shia divisions, the difficulties, and then with the kurds, potential problem there, too. so the one thing the was a lot of thought of was we had to make

sure that we dealt with this issue. the benefit of the south is that the shia, absolutely predominately. and so i felt we were going to be in an area of operation where it was frankly going to be easier for us. and actually if you look at the overall levels of violence, i think i am right in saying that overall i think the figure, it may even be -- i think overall i think about, only about 1% or 2% of the violent overall in iraq following the invasion was centered around basra. and so that was the reasons why -- i mean, you know, what they were warning of obviously right and important, but we felt that we had a better chance of managing this. i mean, i would just draw attention also to what they say

about iran, too, because basically they conclude, and this is what obvious we changed very dramatically. their basic view is that it is unlikely that iran would be aggressive. .. they start coming back as soon as you can. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations] >> well, let's resume and a turn to baroness prashar to start some questions. >> we are now moving on to the question of the aftermath and so

on.on in your book come you comments. i'm going to quote, we are going to be in a position of patient building. we must accept the responsibility and the knowledge that is planned for the upset that there was clearly a feeling and respect of iraq. p you obviously except theaccept feeling. why do you think the planning didn't take place early on? because we've declassified a fa. we declassified what was sent to you on the nineteenth of the july when he said we need to plan for the day after. had just worked and had to scramble to get them ready in time. obviously a number of people -- what doesn't the planning take

this on? >> planning did take place. the question now in spite of what we know with hindsight should we be focusing on different things? we have meetings ourselves. the department of international -- the trouble is we were getting an assumption that iraq had a functioning bureaucracy but it didn't. and our focus was on humanitarian, environmental and use of chemical and biological weapons. a significant amount of planning went on directed at the wrong thing. >> humanitarian planning with the invasion.

what we want to know is what is the longer-term planning? things were considered in the planning. what happens? in 2003, you can take out saddam hussein but what do you do with iraq? -- who is going to run the place? you decide the responsibility is down to the americans. in early march with an interview, there was no clear plan and you reportedly applied, don't worry, that is in hand. it would be done by u.s. over 90% of the essence of the

operation. >> this would be the primary responsibility. what should be left to the americans. the reason we have done a lot of planning ourselves, we knew we would be part of the aftermath and planning that fitted in to three categories. in the department of international development and for an office and the reason for all the erasion before the invasion of what would be the structure of government because -- how would we transit from saddam hussein to the coalition and health through a legitimate authority. if it is true and real issue to be very blunt about, what we referred to in lessons learned,

where the americans are going to be providing 90% of the assets, you are not going to be in a position where there is the driving party. it was precisely -- we would have an interaction with a the americans, in a position where the americans -- the one thing -- when we look back on this now particularly in light of the experience in iraq and afghanistan, there are things we didn't believe would be problems than, we need a far deeper

analysis of the type of nation building and state building capacity that you require. all of that i would agree. what i wouldn't say is we were not focusing on these things because we were. >> i would suggest to you that the grandstanding and planning could have taken place. earlier this morning when you were talking, you talked about how you did not adjust the policy because the policy -- what implications of the policy understood because lord williams who as you know with a special adviser to jack straw, made a statement that planned facility campaigns are usually based on risks involved. in the case of iraq this was only done in the most narrow sense that we were focusing on the campaign but didn't already test out what the implications

were. >> i think that is far too starck a comment made with the benefit of hindsight. you hear from many people who were engaged in this process. karen miller was talking about officials with a hole for an office infrastructure on things like how would we work out the right form of iraqi government and so on. if not simply looking at humanitarian but reconstruction issues and so on, the letters to me in october of 2002 which we can go to describe in detail all the things they are doing about various issues. in the immediate aftermath, the ministry of defense and military were going to be in charge but one of the things i want to say

is in retrospect, the failings of the american system being set out in the report we have done and they have accepted them. if we knew then what we know now of course we would be looking at different things. i do make this point. it is true that when we got in there we found a very different situation. but you got evidence that 10% of the original plan survived with contact from the reality on the ground and that is true in bosnia and kosovo and everywhere. these problems that we had were resolvedable very fast. that was not the problem we got into. if we carried on with the same security situation in 2003 into 2005/6 we would not have had a problem we ended up with. >> to the pre planning stage. we were aware of how this system

was. the conversation was taking place. do you think we had sufficient visibility of making enough to influence them or were you interested in this area? >> i was. i was raising this with president bush. you had evidence about it. this switch from the state department in january of 2003 to the department of defense. that is one of the things the americans themselves have gone back over. i didn't see this at a time but i went back and looked at the state department plans which were very detailed. i have only looked at them as they are now but they were published -- brought into being in january of 2003. the things i would emphasize, when you read their plans they were on the same assumption as i which is there is a functioning

infrastructure of government and your basic problem, you may get security issues but your basic problem is humanitarian and go as planned are very detailed and very good. they don't address the problem we ended up with. >> would it be true to say there was so much concentration on this second resolution on the diplomatic course or campaign plan itself that attention wasn't paid to a clear strategy of the aftermath? >> you are read to the be right in saying there was a huge amount -- a absorb enormously by the politics. however i think virtually every meeting, i continually say the aftermath is of vital and sometimes i even say the aftermath is the issue. insofar as we were getting

information about what we thought would happen we were trying to draw this in from all sorts of sources including iraqis who recently left the country and so on. when i look at what actually happened after march of 2003, i don't minimize the problems because when i went to iraq i came back in a high state of anxiety. but none of these were insurmountable. if we were to plan something like this again we would do differently. not just in the light of knowledge that we have now about security but there are far better government mechanisms like the stabilization unit in 2004. all of that is very sensible. one other point by the way.

there is not just a need for us to have that capacity. it is a vital thing for the eu and possibly native land you and to have that capacity. i am not sure since leaving office that that capacity is there. >> in terms of planning pre invasion. you accept we could have done better than we did. >> i do accept that, yes. i made it clear all the way through that i don't believe it would have resolved any changes of our basic problems that are far more fundamental than anything to do with bureaucracy or structure of government and so on but of course. if we were sitting down today, if we are in a situation of nation-building again, there are changes in our approach that certainly should be done. are have thought on those i

could give you later. the single most important thing i could say is the real issue is what you focus on less than the structure. you could say we should have had one minister focusing on the preplanned and. i would debate that. >> seems to be the focus of the problem is you didn't actually tried to work with the americans but we will move on. i want to get the question now. >> we did try. >> the question is the occupation. your statement implies that you were not aware concerns about the issues, on the fifth of

march, discussion on the sixth, our planning unit advised ministers including yourself that a likely area might contain 20% of the iraqi population and somewhere between $400 million, and $2.4 million might be needed. this is well beyond the financial capacity and there is a risk you could end of becoming responsible for a large and expensive commitment in the medium term. if you become responsible for funding, in the british sector, we judge this would be very likely to be beyond the resources of a u.k. alone. in the face of this, do you seek to limit the ability in iraq?

>> no. i was absolutely sure that if we required more resources we would find them. i have gone back through these papers and i can recall a time when someone said to me we need this resource to make sure the iraqi effort succeeds and i would say no. gordon brown made it very clear throughout the meetings we had and to be fair, he on it this commitment which is necessary but what i did do as a result of that, reduce our commitment at all. what i did do is, this is part of the discussion with the americans, we had to get international support so we put the debt relief for the iraqis. there was an international

pledging conference. money wasn't the problem. it really wasn't a problem. one of the things i am frustrated by when i read the evidence and this is possibly a lesson here is obviously further down the chain there were people saying there are resources and problems that we have, to the people we send out, if you have a problem, tell me. i want to know. i think there was a time in may or june of 2003, i have a vague recollection of hillary bend asking for $30 billion or something. he got it. if it had been a resource problem, we would have paid the bill. >> there was never any suggestion of too clever or