hot and so on. >> did you receive inebriating yourself on how long the u.k. forces fault that they could last without having to -- me tannin combat readiness? >> i don't think i have a formal writing in briefings. i think i would talk sometimes to the senior military people in the margins of the meetings about that. what was very clear was that they were concerned about the moral of the troops and not just leaving them in limbo. >> were you aware, i think, on the 15th of january briefing that the prime minister got from our chiefs of staff that certainly it was suggested that it would be possible to maintain our forces after the middle of

march could several months after? >> i think i was aware of that. you know, it certainly would have been possible. there is no doubt about that. it was a sort of combination of factors. >> lord boyce, former chief of defense staff, confirmed to us last week that the u.k. had become such a significant component of the front line forces, 30% of the main battle tanks, that the americans would have had significant difficulties, certainly delay in their ability to start military operations if we had pulled out. but obviously raises the question of the degree of leverage we had. again, were you aware of the growing dependence of the americans on the u.k. front line

forces? >> yes, i was. of course, that followed in part from the decisions of the government of turkey not to allow any troop movements through turkey. so that closed of that route which would have made a very different strategy. i was aware of that and and also goes to my point that if there had been compliance of 1441 not only what we have not taken part of the military action but the americans determined to have authority to take military action would delay their action but would you discuss the extent to which this could be used as leverage over the americans in terms of trying to get a delay to get more time -- >> the prime minister did get if delay and the americans to accept the need for us to move a

second resolution, which, as i did you are aware, they fought both was unnecessary and to a degree politically undesirable. there was some in patients from the american system. the prime minister pay and president bush down on that second resolution and then also got additional delay and then you know what happened. then we got the benchmarks and the final ultimatum. >> one of the issues -- obviously we have raised this a number of times -- is this question of whether the inspection process was stopped before you could really be sure it wasn't going anywhere. now the advice you had from officials in the summer of 2002, was at would take around six months to a stop was themselves and get the inspections regime to a good place.

so the point the inspectors return to the end of november, to those in to, what was your inspection about how long they would need to establish themselves and begin work? >> i don't have a particular period of months in place. i certainly felt that will be for four months were up from the passing of 1441 the we would be able to make a judgment about whether iraq was complying with its term which was the test on the iraq, we got 1441 of the eighth of november the decision to take military action was made on the 18th. beginning after four and a half months. and it is very significant. and if you look at the last meeting of the security council to took place on the seventh of march but nobody, not a single

delegate suggested that iraq was complying. the argument was in the context they were not completed they were required to comply. the was the difficulty. the other problem here is that what sir jeremy greene stock described as the straw paradox which is this, but -- secure initially called the straw paradox. >> [inaudible] [laughter] speed anyway, it is a pretty straightforward point and latest had to it, which is that we wanted to resolve it peacefully. the only way we could resolve the matter peacefully was through compliance. the leeway to get compliance was through the threat of military action, i mean the real threat. and indeed that paradox was actually i think may be inadvertently brought up by the

president chirac in that interview he gave on the tenth of march, 2003, where he says before he says we are going to veto -- he says there has been some evidence in compliance, but he thinks it is almost certainly because of the troops sitting outside of saddam hussein's door. that for sure was true. >> you told us last year began to feel more optimistic about the prospect of iraq collaborating with unmovic inspectors and early 2003. famous odds of 60/40 about avoiding the war. you gave reasons for that in your most recent statement. what mr. blair has told us in his statement and when he saw him a week or so ago is he concluded quite early on in december of 2002, following the iraqi declaration, the there was

no prospect of some of hussein comply with the 1441. he almost made up his mind of the basis of the jic assessments of finding their analysis of the iraqi declaration. were you aware that was his view at the time? tenet i was more skeptical than i was, yes. and not surprisingly one can be more optimistic than other. i was aware that that was his view, but the 60/40 was supposed to be a private conversation on a paper. but i can still remember how i was feeling in the early days of 2003. it was on the instinct. it turned out to be inaccurate, but i felt, taking everything together and not withstanding the fact that the declaration which the iraqi is put in a ninth of december had been inadequate, that as they got the message that if they didn't

comply there would be military action. and, you know, for other reasons one could be reasonably optimistic that there was going to be compliance. one of the difficulties faced in the united nations was that the successive reports of the hans blix, accepting that he never said that iraq was in full compliance and accepting that there were many questions still left over the plight of been addressed if there were benchmarks' resolutions. but he was reporting the increased and significance iraqi cooperation. so that by the seventh of march, you had movement with the inspectors be able to go where they wanted. you had movement on interviews and the area of surveillance. one of the difficulties that you

faced is the strong paradoxes were working too well and there was no particular reason to give up on the process according to the members of the security council what that point. >> with respect it had been working very well. of speaking up what i said to the security council on the seventh of march, because there was some improvement. i am not sure -- i can't be certain. i don't recall hans blix seeing improvement had been significant. what is it -- this is the seventh of march, 2003: mr. .. reported it's not possible to prevent the unrestricted recorded interviews. there have now been 12 private interviews between unmovic and

the iaea against the regular and special commission list 3500 people previously associated with the bids of mass destruction and all of those 12th or threatened and intimidated by the regime before had a of a told the exchanges were going to be recorded, so the interviews were not being recorded by tape recorders. they were told that they were going to be recorded in any even to buy the recording calls its most likely to be the most incriminating evidence removed by the security services and there was a lot of evidence from the iraqi survey group which corroborates what i was saying. so i am afraid i was rather less than sanguine about the progress was being made and spelled out why. >> but dr. blix and his statement that you obviously

disagree, dr. blix in his statement said that had these interviews he considers them it has repeated in the evidence to was that he thought that these were not so hindered and that he was even optimistic of getting people, if necessary, out of iraq if there had been more time. i will go over exactly where things were at the moment, but what i am interested in is whether or not this was a different position than you expected to be in with dr. hans blix than with the process began in december/january, where the assumption they have been more that you're looking to dr. blix to say definitively whether or not there had been an iraqi cooperation. >> that is a matter of some hope and expectation. certainly my hope is it the beginning of the year that dr. blix and el baradei were

sitting there were no in compliance and we have not completed our tosk but that was not 4041 required for compliance but that they are in compliance and this is what we need to do to carry on the process. they never, ever said that and even on iraq's this redds rule the city -- the security table. the was the fundamental problem. the requirement of 1441 was not that they should be cooperating a bit with the inspectors. it didn't see that and it wasn't. it was that there was full and immediate and complete cooperation and there was lawful, immediate and complete operation. there wasn't the day after four to 41 more importantly there was of four and half months later. and they had been told. if they knew what was going on. why saddam took the gamble he

did remains a serious unanswered question to me, but he chose to take a gamble and he lost. if i may say so, there are people who say he was edging towards this. the requirements of four to 41 were not requirements which would have humiliated him. yes, losing the gulf war was a humiliation, but, you know, that was a quite a long time before that. they were designed to be a requirement on him that he could meet, and the other members of the security council who were more friendly towards iraq would not have agreed to those requirements of less -- of less that were the case. >> i don't want to prolong this but the point about the benchmark resolution that did happen was actually a way of trying to resolve some of those

issues. >> it was. those benchmarks came from dr. blix himself. >> after had been more time and a way of resolving it. can i just go back in terms of the cabinet was told about the likely sequence of events at the start of 2001? >> 2001? vbied i'm sorry, 2003. the start of 2003. about how these events were likely to unfold in terms of the likelihood of the finding of the smoking gun and it's been called the wmd of the likelihood blix would report on compliance. seabeck well, you see that quite a very regular reports to the cabinet and i wasn't there every thursday. i was quite often somewhere else, but when i was there i gave reports. i think if i wasn't there, the prime minister would report,

mr. hoon, the defense of secretary about where we had to go. i don't believe that members of the cabinet felt that they were under informed on the issue. >> fatta there were extensive military preparations taking place. i mean, this was in the public domain. you can't mobilize 46,000 people. without this being public. it just was. >> absolutely, but the issue was whether there was an expectation that military action, if it came, would or would not follow a report by unmovic of la compliance. >> this goes to the issue of the relationship between op4 11 and 12. resolution 1441. is it fair to say that not

everybody around the table could recite the terms of 1441 in that sleep as could i, so i don't recall it sort of clause i legal text will argument about the interaction between op4 11 and all the cabinet. it would have been slightly of discussion to have taken place. but was their discussion about the circumstances in which we might move to military action if there were foreshore and what's involved in this? and did i get reports off the four readings of the security council the one intended? >> just fill the ehud of the parliament on november 25th, to those in to that material which means something significant,

some behavioral pattern of behavior that is serious. among some breaches could be action by the government of iraq seriously to obstruct or to impede the inspectors, to intimidate with this or a pattern of behavior we're in the selection appears relatively lighter but the actions as a toll at up to something a deliberate and more significant. something that shows iraq's intention not to comply. as you told us last february, the bar had been set high. now on the 15th of march, 2003, the prime minister confirmed to the attorney general his unequivocal view of iraq was a further material breach of its obligations under resolutions four to 41. were you comfortable with the situation that the prime minister confirm the existence of a further material breach at a time when the head of the iaea had reported that there was the nuclear program he found at the head of the unmovic had reported improved cooperation?

>> yes i was and if i hadn't been i was interested in the cabinet. just to emphasize the point about the bar in op4, as i think i mentioned on the previous hearings, in one of the drafts, there were two instincts and saw the full set of revisions in the declaration

failure by any time to comply with to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution as it is it i have to see the complete foley and the plot to fusion was it to comply it like emphasizing this or to have blix say they were grateful before which is effectively what he's doing in late january, 2003, and now they are a bit better. the obligation on iraq was to comply fully. the obligation on them on the -

one not to disregard the whole resolution and they fail to do that to read now you're asking me whether i think that the judgment about whether there was a material breach should have been made by the minister or the attorney-general is a difficult question to answer but it was the attorney who asked the prime minister to make that judgment. >> are you comfortable with the view that the material breach that there was at that time was of such significance it will only be addressed by -- >> yes, i was, and by the time of the seventh of march security council meeting, my own very strong instinct was that the iraqi sore back in a pattern of behavior they had been before, where they were playing along in the hope of splitting the security council within degrading the consensus that had been in the previous november

that they would play along sufficiently at least so we were not involved in the military action, because we were not able to get a parliamentary majority, and maybe that some of the americans with it, but that was the game that they were in. and much of the white vote against hope that they would implement this fully, and i thought they could, and that was, as i say, my hope and believe in the january by large i just thought these guys have got a different strategy. it is not compliance. it is stringing the inspectors along, splitting the international community and then hoping they can get into a comfort zone where ultimately they could have the sanctions lifted. that required you begin to take a different view from the inspectors and other members of

the security council. >> well, with great respect, it didn't. yes, there was a division of the question of military action. that was a palpable. but the inspectors never said iraq was complying it. they didn't. as i have said before, if you go through whole of the record of that march 7th, 2003 security council meeting, whatever side people were on, nobody, not one delegate, said iraq is complying it. that was the test. it was not "have they offered a few more people for interview in very questionable circumstances circumstances"? the test was worth a complaint. it .. said there were compliant that within the end of it from our point of view. i mean, the end of it in the

sense that that would have been the end of any prospect to move the action and know what would have been more pleased than the to the estimate there's other questions we can put on that but i think we better move forward. and it we've got just a few points of the second resolution and i will ask sir martin gilbert to pick them up. >> in our request to you for a statement before this hearing, we asked about your involvement in the formal decision of the u.k. government to pursue a second resolution. if you told us "i was heavily involved in the decisions in respect of the second resolution." and he pointed out towards the documentary record available to us as a committee. however, we have examined a massive documentation and questioned in the people and we have been unable to find out by the how or wind the decision was made on the resolution. can you explain who was involved in the decision, what the process of the decision was and when it was made?

>> i'm sure -- sorry. just on the sort of procedural point, they're must be -- at least i hope they are -- telegrams from london to new york ukmis about a second resolution. anyway, i would be astonished if there were not. i will try to pursue the for the inquiry. the discussion about the second resolution as i recall, got going in the middle of february. i mean, it had always been a possibility, a lawyer can't give you the exact date, but i have long been clear if we were going to be facing the prospect of military action a second resolution, while not a necessity in legal terms, was highly desirable in terms of managing the international community and the british pilot, but also in raising the prospect

of a peaceful solution in the issue. .. >> it was making that effort. making that effort was desirable

for both reasons i've spelled out. it was per -- persuading the americans it was a good idea. i discussed it with mr. powell and president bush. >> was that quite difficult? >> i think so because i think you're aware the american view was that the war was contained which we accepted, and they were a bit complexed about why we thought it was desirable from the point of view of the politics. anyway, they were persuaded that it was. >> and that persuasion was down at the level of the prime minister and president as well? >> partly by me, but colin powell was easier to persuade than president bush.

>> i just spoke with the department of foreign office two days ago. he said, "i'm not sure the american administration was ever formally committed to a second resolution. i think they were willing to let us have a go at trying to get it. they certainly didn't see a legal necessity for it, and i think they obviously feared it could only result in more complication of the u.n. security counsel." >> that was because of the downsize that it might expose divisions rather than resolve them. excuse me. i feel with the benefit of hindsight things it was worth attempting the second resolution, and we were basically close in my judgment to get the magic nine dates, but it didn't happen. it was a concern. that said, the secretary powell

were very interested in building support for the second resolution, and there are records you would have seen where you report that. >> thank you. >> i think, robert, over to you now. >> just one very short question, a quick question on the statement. we had a long discussion of this last year that we don't need to repeat, but since then there's been pieces of evidence. you may or may not wish to comment on them. i'd like to just cite three of them. there were others in this sense. one is that greenstalke

confirming what he said in a telegram when asked when was -- whether it was the agreed line to cast a heavy line on the french and rather he was acting on instructions to do this, said he was acting on instructions. secondly, math true ryancroft when asked if there was political presentation to pin the problem on the french when the fact was we failed to get the chillians and mexicans across on getting the resolution. he replied, "yes." thirdly, sir steven wall, said one can tiptoe around this, but jack straw didn't know what he was doing. by the time he told the cabinet

later in the week about the outrageous behavior, he would have known precisely what was said. you have to remember at this point the government was fighting for its life. is there any comment that you want to make on any of those three statements? >> yes, there is. thank you. thank you for the opportunity. i don't agree with their analysis of how we came to a judgment that intervention had underminded our efforts to get line votes and no vetoes. first of all, on the view about jeremy saying he acted on instructions. well, when i saw that, and thank you for giving me notice of this, i had the record check. no one could fine any tell -- find any telegram or instructions to new york talking

about this. >> on the phone -- >> well, yes, i was talking to germmy all -- jeremy all the time on the telephone. there was no one instruction. >> he said on the phone this is what we need to do? >> let's deal with that because -- i certainly was talking to him often all the time about this, and -- as far as i was concerned the consequence of president sherak's intervention spoke for itself. we didn't need to say we can make -- he was absolutely categorically saying that we

would vote no. that's what he said, and it didn't need instructions to say that, and indeed that did undermind the efforts we were making. that is true. i'm just surprised that he and matthew should come to that view. when you are in the loop in any haven't, and i don't recall having sfertions with him, certainly not this because it's not what i was thinking from what understood, but when i saw this, i was steaming about the approach that the french were taking because they signed up to 40-41, and from late january, they had been in my judgment increasingly unhelpful about getting a peaceful resolution to

this. i kept saying if you can't find it, and if you want to avoid military actions which is otherwise likely to take place, the best thing to do is come on side with us and agree to a second resolution that does contain an ultimatum. anyway, they were not willing to do that, and i've read through a whole lot of transcripts. i watched the interview in french. my french isn't great, but it's good enough, and i didn't hear anybody in watching the totality of that interview come to any other conclusion other than that he was blueprintly, i mean, -- bluntly, i mean, throwing a bomb

into the bomb seeking to destruct the negotiations. he knew what he was doing. he did say i'm not a pass vies. that's true. he didn't rule out a second resolution on something. that's also true. he would have been happy to find a second resolution that would have led to a third. or that's correct, and he used the french, but this was not the president popping out of the back door to bump into a journalist and saying something unscripted and then find it recorded in a newspaper. this was the president with all the people, the president of france in a formal setting, a formal interview deciding that he was going to set out his story. he knew what he was doing, and indeed, he achieved it, and it didn't need me to explain what he was doing. everybody could see what he was doing, and also we could feel it

because although we carried on trying for a number of days afterwards, you could feel the support for the position we put together, and i think that steven patterson said to you this kind of thing is of the security counsel. a lot of the nonpermanent members took their lead from the permanent members, and in my judgment, making progress before that. >> we had a great deal of evidence on this including, of course, documentary evidence, and we wanted to make sure that you had an opportunity to comment on some of the evidence given to us that differs from your interpretation on this. other than, we will review the evidence in due course. >> thank you. i'll turn it to martin gill bert. there's one or two more questions on the cabinet. >> around 2002, you appear to be the only minister who is kept in

form of number ten's exchanges with the white house. do you think in view of the sometimes rather substantive exchanges that a large number of seniors could have been involved? >> they could have been, maybe would rather than should. i think it has to be for the prime minister of the day to decide who would have the most confidential communications with another head of state. i mean, these relationships are of critical importance, and the confidentiality of them needs to be preserved as well, so more question really for mr. blare, and it's not an issue of trust.

it's an issue of the fact that the more people who are within a loop about information, the more likelihood it is for this to kind of seep out. as i say, these days people look at bush and blare and see them as simese twins. that's not how it felt at the time. >> you stressed in a way two aspects of the cabinet's involvement. one, that they are essentially to be briefed and have reports made by you repeatedly, and the other was the problem of leaking. when you answered to sir lawrence earlier, you referred to the importance of mr. blare of cabinet committees that they were preparing the issues and the cabinet would then essentially be briefed.

as you know, cabinet committees did not meet to discuss iraq during this whole period. instead as mr. blare told us, -- blair told us, it was a perpetual conversation. did you ever try to persuade mr. blair to take a different approach with regard to substantive discussions? >> i think this is repeated evidence which was given to you last year, but it was well known that my approach to decision making it more formal than mr. blare's, and -- mr. blair's, and i was more formal in my running of the departments for which i was responsible and maybe some other ministers than mr. blair, and i certainly had conversations with him about the level of formality or lack of it

that applied within his government, and if i had been in his seat, would i have had more formal processes? yes, i would have, but that doesn't reppedder, if i -- render, if i may say so, the process in which we're comfortable for members of the cabinet at the time or the outcome any different, and one thing i'm clear about is that if you have had more formal processes, in my view, that would have been better, but it wouldn't have made any difference to the outcome. >> you didn't think that when -- i'll come to in a moment on a question of your disagreement or with mr. blair at the end. you don't think that these tremendously important decisions which are being made and which you say that i think your phrase was the cabinet was full of

people who fought for themselves, so shouldn't they have had the opportunity on quite a number of occasions when important decisions were made of thinking for themselves in cabinet and having an actual debate about it and being able to have their input as it were on that level? >> i mean, there were extensive debates in cabinet as you know from all the basis of briefings from mr. blair or myself which i think is 23 meetings of cabinets in that period from the summer of 02 to march of 2003. it was the dominant political issues. members of the cabinet were indeed thinking for themselves very extensively. some of the day-to-day, week-by-week deploam simese was not -- diplomacy was not the subjects

that would have gone to cabinet. i mean, i -- the cabinet discussed the original approach back in march, and then as mark wilson made clear, this came off the agenda because other things intervened, and there were not that many discussions about iraq until the summer, but they also knew by what we were seeking to do is to get the u.s. down -- the u.n. down the u.s. route. there was the most intense period of discussion, and they were involved in that, and very content, and i thought of obviously i'd be getting this question, and i was trying to think about the circumstances at the time. i think it's important to divide the periods into sections. you had a period with the u.k.'s

own strategy rather uncertain in the first half of 2002 following the state of the union speech, and also with crawford that settled down a little bit. partly settled by this discussion here in march, and then as it became clear that we were seeking a u.n. route, settled down again, and colleagues thought, well, better luck. that's the route that will be used, and it will be a satisfactory result. there was a decision to be made at that stage, and the colleagues were aware during the course of 2002 military preparations were being made. then you had the period of leading up to 4041. you had bush's statement to the

general assembly on the 12th of december, you had that very intense period leading up to 4041. great signs were released by cabinet and the british people that we got 4041 and there was a matter being resolved peacefully. there was not a decision to be made by cabinet because they endorsed the process leading up to 4041. we got it. then you had the declaration, and then it was christmas. that period even if there was a formal cabinet discussion, you know, what decision points would have been taken that people feel could have been taken if there was formal papers? then, you are familiar with what happened in the runup to the decision on the 17th of march, but there was the third phase. >> i'd like to look back five days before the 17th of march if

i could. in your evidence to us, we asked you about the consideration of alternative options on the eve of the conflict. you told us i prepared a paper for mr. blair, i told him about it. if you ask me who was present, i can't exactly answer. mr. blair warns you about the pearls of taking military action in iraq without the military res lyings, and -- resolution, and we heard from a witness who we agreed not to identify says i recall a meeting with the prime minister where the argument was made in the circumstances which were then heading into the 12th of march for the u.k. military not being involved, and he told us in his evidence, the argument upon which was made was more in terms if you want to avoid your own

resignation, you have a opportunity, and here it is. you have a way out, and why don't you take it. he was offering the prime minister a way out if he wanted it. the foreign secretary would have went across the argument in a clear way. the thing i was absolutely struck by is the prime minister's response, the speed of it, and the absolute insistence of it, and the fact that he had got his argument all modeled and all laid out. you mention this meeting in your recent statement to us where you say i made clear to him that he had options other than invasion, and that these were still open to him would he want to take them. what was your position at that meeting? one of advocating to mr. blair that he should not commit british troops to military action? >> i think that i was advocating, not committing

british troops to military action. it's probably putting it too strongly. it was because i had never wanted to give the false impression that that's what it came to is over the weekend of the 15th and 16th, and the decision on the 17th that my position is anything other than to endorse the decision we came to which was in favor of military action, and i was aware, certainly, by the 12th of martha that was a clear prospect. i was -- i mean, i don't think anyone was keen on military action, and people were going to get killed, so i was anxious that we should explore alternative options. i felt that i owed the prime

minister my loyalty and the best advice i could give him, and that was always my approach in dealing with prime ministers, and i, therefore, presented him with a notice that i sent him, and went to see him, and i think that the anonymous witness can give positions. >> what was your view of the alternatives at the time in >> the alternatives were for the u.k. not to take part in the land invasion. that was a straightforward alternative which we could have followed. i mean, the interesting thing about that, of course, from an early stage it was the defense staff who argued strongly if we were not going to be in military action, the army had to be there because otherwise it would be

unhappy and cross if they were not which is -- i don't trivialize that, but that's how it was. afterwards was the most plausible alternative which would mean standing down our troops which is essentially what the spanish and the italians did. >> thank you. we'll take another short break and come back in 10 minutes. thank you very

>> certainly fair on diplomatic process. i don't think it is fair to say planning for the aftermath within united kingdom was a board are not given priority it should have been. i think any foreign secretary in my position would affect the diplomatic process because it essentially that was i -- that's

what i was paid for. there was heavy lifting required, which ultimately only as prime minister i could do. so as you have heard, baroness, future amount of my time was spent either directing issues with the u.n. system or with my opposite numbers in foreign ministries. i make no apologies for that. i'm proud of the role i've played in getting 4041. i'm deeply regretful it didn't lead to a peaceful conclusion. the foreign office in my view a great institution. it was well aware of the need for the aftermath, as well i was worried. a great deal of work taking place under the very distinguished senior official,

edward chaplin, whom i had complete confidence. i was talking to others about it as i could. as has been spelled out in previous evidence, in my judgment the difficulty that we ran into is not a rise from any inadequacy in planning on the british and. it arose from this interagency in washington in the early part of 2003, which was responsible for the aftermath. if i were a historic and five, 10 years time plotting what happened, a lot of evidence which i'm not aware of now, i would say that was the decision which led to the aftermath been far less satisfactory than it

could have been. >> what you really think it is you're paying attention attention to the diplomatic -- from your point of view you were set aside that adequate work was being done within your department. had you made some one particular responsible for that are were you just relying on positions? >> i don't think i had made a specific person responsible. there are very good ministers working for me, including michael o'brien, at the time. i was very hands-on on the iraq dossier. i had to be. i think officials expected to have direct access to me on that. >> talking about the actual planning -- >> i understand that. the interaction between ministers and officials in the foreign office is it different

one from that in domestic departments, very -- its -- it's true of diplomats anyway. they don't feel the classic mold -- they don't fill the classic mold of civil servants. they are being totally anonymo anonymous. they are more vocal, more eastern public role by definition. halfway between big and say, a line official domestic department, and administer. and edward chaplin knew the region. he knew the beat. i had every confidence in him. and any others, i know you have to have evidence from stephen patterson and john buck were also good officials. >> i mean, you said that you are satisfied other planning, but

when you gave evidence just last year you said they were never keen on the u.n. role. this was just something we have to manage the whole time. when i asked you about when you realize united nations would not take a major role, he said 19th of march. i mean, surely it was clear before that at the united nations would not be playing a major role in the aftermath because stephen mattison told us on monday that it was in february when he went to the states he realized or he was told that the americans were not talking on the united nations -- >> the reason, baroness, refer to the 19th of march is there was a telegram reported not on the american strategy but on the attitude of kofi anand. because mike and i think a prime ministers would have to speak for himself was that although there was famously less enthusiasm for the u.n., within

the u.s. system, each presented with the argument you could sometimes ship them towards a. and that's true of course in terms of 4041. it turned out to be true in terms of a significant chunk of 1483. however, what made an extensive role for the u.n. doubly difficult was kofi annan reported as saying that he and the circumstances of the invasion internationally controversial military action, he didn't think it was a role for the u.n. either. there was no prospect at that stage have been of a central role. i mean, subsequently of course i think president bush should talk about a vital role for the u.n. under some instigation from the prime minister, the degree to which he was able to influence

president bush. you know, but president bush had other forces at him like john bolton and those who wanted to wind up the u.n. so i think we actually got quite a long wait in this given circumstances. >> the fact is we were aware of the united states not wanting you into have a lead role. you mean being reluctant to take lead role. and when i asked stephen patterson why did we not have a plan b because of the assumption of the united nations would have a lead role, that's what our planning was based on, why do we not have a plan b? and he said to be that the plan b was the u.s.a. sorting it out. i mean, if they did united nations have role the u.s. would sort itself out. now, in the circumstances, shall we not have actually sought more insight as to what the u.s. was

planning? she would not have represented with a blueprint? >> well, the only plan b was in the absence of the central role for u.n. was a central role for the occupiers were the u.s. and u.k., those were the alternatives. there were lots and lots of discussion with the united states system. edward chaplin as well as the rest of us going to end throw to washington. if i say, baroness, it wasn't for the lack of trying that we end up in a position we did, but this was one of those upset classics with the american decision-making process was okay -- opaque. and i know there's some frustration about the informality of the british system, mr. blair, but nothing compared with the long-standing

lack of arrangements in the american system. it is just there. so you put all these things in, it's sort of flows around, and then one day there is a decision, in the interagency process is very odd from a point of view some sort of a parliamentary cabinet system. >> so which were saying to me is u.n. wasn't keen. u.s.a. in 19 on having the lead role. the united states dysfunction it wasn't opaque system. we knew all of that, and yet we continued to work on the assumption that the u.n. will take the lead role and the u.s.a. would sort it out. i mean, it seems to me that it wasn't for want of people drawing attention to prime

minister and yourself about the importance of the aftermath, because it has to be an essential part of any planning. why do we not pay enough attention to that? >> we did pay a huge amount of attention to the aftermath, and i -- i have seen the minutes that a row to prime minister and many other spelling that out. and the prime minister was very well aware, too, about the problems of the aftermath. we wanted a central role for the u.n. i mean, we actually had a more central role that i think the prospects after 1483, we had a large u.n. base in baghdad. we -- >> i will come to that. >> just to say there was nothing there. it wasn't all that we had hoped for. was there a prospect in the u.s.? at getting the u.s. to agree to

certain more than we got to agree. yes, there was anything they could. and prime minister blair got the americans i should -- further down the road that i had thought. >> and a look at the issues of risk. because again in your statement you comment, and i'm quoting, strategic objectives for iraq were agreed, for example, to ensure as rapidly as possible for iraq to become a staple united and law-abiding country. neither the circumstances nor the timescale for transfer responsibilities and iraqi authority for possible to fully predict in advance of the end of hostilities. it was therefore not feasible for me to see any specific timetable. mr. blair in his statement wrote in evidently it was impossible to pin down the precise details of how and more important when each stage of transition would

occur in could judge a quarterly to the reality. but the basic was agreed and actually in the event implemented. we always recognize we will be there for some significant time. now, given the clear visor that the aftermath would be critical to strategic success, was that wise? >> sorry, was what wise, baroness? >> the statement that you made in the statement that mr. blair made that this was significant, it was something you have to wait to see, not able to specifically see a timetable? >> we couldn't -- we didn't -- the consequences of war are unpredictable. i mean, because war is a violence is an inherently chaotic process. so the possibilities of any aftermath to military action are greater than they are for many

other human actions. so there was obviously a range of possibilities. it was very probable that saddam would no longer be later, it would be a vacuum government at the top. we knew that. what was extremely difficult to predict was the exact circumstances on the ground. and as i bring out in my statement, i think david manning brought out, you look at the planning document, we produced, the state department produced in early 2003 both we and the americans were predicting all the things that happened. what we were not able to predict was the exact mix of these things. i mean, yes, there was a possibility of terrorism. we didn't predict a certain

extent. we are very word about a humanitarian disaster, and thanks, -- that was happily absent in the event. so i don't -- i'm sure there are certain lessons for certain about how, if there were another time, we should do this. but i think making guesses about the precise outcome of military action on that scale would be very difficult in any circumstances. we certainly don't know, there's a range of possibilities. >> belfort williams who was your special adviser in a statement was said, plans or military campaigns are usually based on calculations of the risks involved, that it is apparent in the case of iraq these are only

done in the most narrow sense. so he's basically saying that we did not plan on the worst scenario. is only in the narrow sense. why is that? >> he's a great friend of mine. i'm surprised you said that because i don't recall him saying that to me at the time that i mean, i've not talked to him about it, and it probably is another way of talking about his frustration in my frustration in pinning the americans down essentially. we were doing the planning, and the joint planning with the americans was pretty satisfactory until this shift of responsibility from state department of defense. that could've been satisfactory but turned out not to be as we know. it ended up with -- you know the rest of the story.

>> on the 19th of march, you in the defense secretary wrote to the prime minister, said it will be necessary to draw down our current commitment to in nearly a third by no later than autumn. any event the the drawdown was much more rapid than that, given the considerable uncertainty and responsibilities for law and order, were you concerned about suggesting such a rapid drawdown? >> not -- that was based on military advice, about how long you could sustain that many troops in theater. i mean, 46,000, it was very significant, total armed forces of the u.k., forces have got to be rested. i think you're familiar with all of this. you have to have a long tail behind these forces. i didn't think that was unreasonable. and they were there not for peacemaking, peacekeeping.

this was an aggressive force to invade a country. although for sure in the south south, there were times in retrospect the commanders could have benefited from more troops on the ground. sticks of this was men in the context of the military action itself, not the aftermath? >> yes. i can turn up the minute, but that meant i think was about what was possible. given the size of that 46,000 in relation to the totality of the u.s.'s arm forces, have to be rested. >> can we just look briefly at the question on resources. in your statement, in your statement request, we asked you what assurance do you have before the invasion that the

u.k. government were widely have the structures and skills and capabilities for the role it would need to play? and your reply is, i can only really answer the question in the negative. i was not aware of any submissiosubmission before invasion suggesting that they lack the structures, skills for the role it was to play. but on the fifth of march 2003, the iraq planning unit would pay for you and your colleagues entitled uk's role in iraq after saddam. edifies, and i'm quoting, this is well beyond the financial and implement capacity of dfid and m.o.d., and there is a risk that you could end up becoming responsible for a large and expensive commitment potentially in the medium term. you would have seen this paper. why did this not ring any alarm bells in the governments

capacity to deal with the aftermath? >> well, the answer is two different questions. it did. as i recall. and for sure they needed more resources than their normal budget line and in the end they got the resources. >> resources is one thing but capability of you can have money but not capability. >> i was asked about the foreign office. i wasn't asked about dfid capability, nor about the m.o.d.'s, and it wasn't for me to offer a judgment about that. on the foreign offices -- baroness, ask a question like that you rack your brain. you can check all the documents that are available. you talk to the officials who are helping you with your evidence. you come, you can come if had been a piece of paper, which is foreign office lacks the capacity to deal with this, why would not have acknowledged it?

i say, what i said though is entirely accurate. i don't recall getting advisers saying that the foreign office had the capacity. and, indeed, foreign office officials i think performed brilliantly in the situation. and i was pleasantly surprised about the number of people from the foreign office who are willing to volunteer to go and serve in iraq, and the way in which they did it. >> you took it to mean specifically the f. use capability and resources, not the u.k. government why responsibly? >> well, what assurances do have? i talked about the sco. perhaps i should've said this answer giving you a bit more

detail and done more research about the u.k. government. i was supposed 68 written questions and i try to answer them all. but i think what to say exactly what will be, that was true. >> now, i just have a few questions on the security council resolution 1483. now, it was clear from the legal advice you had received at the beginning of 2003 that the u.k. would be treated as an occupying power in that area of iraq for which it exercise authority. on eighth of may, 2003, mr. jeremy greenstock and john negroponte wrote the president of the city council on behalf of of the u.s., u.k., and coalition

partners, confirming that the states participating in coalition with strickler abide by the obligation under international law. now we have seen advice from legal advisers dated eighth of may, 2003 stating that wording is important to be consistent with our position that u.k. is not an occupying power throughout iraq. through the coalition but only in the areas where u.k. forces have established authority. now, was at the uk's position as of eighth of may that u.k. was only an occupying power in the area of iraq, on which it exercise fiscal authority, i.e., the south? >> i was taking on the eighth of may, baroness, but more specific notice about that. what was my starting point of all this was a was -- authority

over that content area which we controlled and not more widely. in the event, you will be aware, be aware, we legal advice and the attorney general. he said you occupied for the whole of iraq. so that was the end of it. he was the government's legal advisor, not me. i will come back to a moment. i just also want to look at that on the seventh of april, you wrote to the prime minister suggesting that the u.k. should agree a formal understanding with the united states specifies a need for consultation and joint decision-making and advanced policy decisions about all activities. was one of the main objectives of the proposed, that can from the u.k. was only responsible as an occupying power of the areas of iraq that it physically

occupied? >> i haven't got the track in front of the. i think so. but in any event what we're trying to do is bend down, whether legally -- ultimately, baroness, this issue whether we were formally and legally responsible for the whole of iraq or just for our area came down to a decision by the attorney general. and that was going to be his advice, not based on mime. >> i'm going to come to that. >> so that was -- spending a lot of time on that issue. it wasn't a high profile and sensitivity, my interpretation of 1441. he made up his own mind. and we have to get on with it. what, however, we were concerned about as we had been before the invasion, but certainly after, was trying to pin down the arrangements for cooperation, coordination with the americans, which is were the president came

from. in the event as i recorded my answers to your questions, they refuse to sign up to the m.o.u. it was frustrating. >> because they refused to sign the m.o.u., why did it follow from the refusal of the u.s. agreed to the m.o.u. that the u.k. should each name a joint occupying power? i mean, for example, hostility decided not to. so why did the failure to sign an m.o.u. meant that we had to become a joint occupying power? >> you have to ask -- i don't think the to absolutely link linked that you have to ask lord goldsmith that question. but my understanding from his decision that followed was that took the view that because not only of the number of troops that we had on the ground in the

south and the area that we were literally occupying, but also our involvement in baghdad and elsewhere, that we had a joint responsibility. and then i think it was more making a kind of virtue of necessity, we judged that there might be some advantage from that, from whoever was sitting alongside the corner and then the grammar in terms of having sort of joint power as well. that was the way we were. it would've been desirable if we had a clear area for which we were responsible without the americans, and got on with it. but it wasn't to be. you can pin responsibility on pages on the m.o.u. on the americans. i don't think you can in responsibility for the legal advice that we were responsible, and they were not directly related. >> but just come back to the fact that it was the attorney general who recommended that,

but the security council resolution 1483 must have been drafted on the basis of instructions provided by those negotiating it, and that you can begin an occupying power. when was the decision taken -- i mean, who made that decision? >> which decision? sorry. >> to become a joint occupying power. instructions must have been given. to the negotiators. >> it was made by the attorney general spent if i can interject that i think the attorneys advised that we've seen states in 1483. >> i was not appraised of that, i'm sorry. >> what i'm trying to establish is when was the position taken to become a joint occupying power? >> i can be certain when was taken. my guess is it was part of a process which would've included conversations with the attorney.

in advance of this. i can't be actually certain about that. >> we've not been able to find any record either. >> at one stage i recall briefly reading a record of the minutes which i think i sent to the prime minister saying in all circumstances it may be better if we end up as a joint occupying power, and here are the reasons. but what i can't say for certain as to what extent, as they say, that was me making a virtue of necessity when the attorney general would end up. >> so you can recall when the formal decision was made. and can you recall if any discussion was had by the implications of becoming a joint occupying power? >> we were sorely discussing that. sorry. i can't recall precisely when that was made. i'm happy to go back to the

records to get further information, if you want, but of course, we were considering the implications of our relationship with the u.s., which is where the m.o.u. started from. and -- >> that's one aspect but what are the implications of becoming an occupying power. >> we knew what they were because they were set out in the treaties underpinning, the legal basis of being an occupying power. we knew what the current legal basis was. and as i say, i can go back and check the record, we were seeing a virtue of necessity about the fact that we are going to be a joint occupying power anyway. so a lot of discussion about a patch of consequences. and the overarching discussion was about how we best

coordinated with the americans and other positive collaboration. not only in what we were doing in the south but across iraq. that was difficult. >> from a slightly different point, stephen patterson told us -- stephen patterson told us yesterday that in the late stages of the negotiation of 1483, a decision was taken to exclude david frum enrollment because of the difference of opinion between members of the cabinet and the increasingly uncomfortable position of clare short. he told us that the decision was yours. do you agree with that account? >> yes. i don't have a recall of it but i'm pretty certain. i'm sure he is telling the truth, number one. and i have no reason to challenge its accuracy. >> why did you take that

decision and what was the impact of that decision on the engagement of dfid? >> after i saw his evidence i was trying to remember why i had taken that decision. i've not talked to my officials at the time about this, but this was fairly close to the time in which clare short in the and in the event they decide to resign. ..

a number of these activities were done in coordination with the united nations of the attorney-general's advice on the ninth of june. we asked whether you were satisfied if the mechanisms were in place. and you replied that it was evident that the cpa was not in 2003 operating to its optimum and action was required. were you satisfied that the requirements set out in the letter from the attorney general's office would be met? >> i can state with the legal

requirements were there before being told the legal requirements of 1483 and international law to which the u.s. and u.k. were working. what is certain is it was practical. was working very well and there are others about that. >> but you didn't have a mechanism to keep you satisfied the requirement was being met or did you like the people on the ground? >> the legal requirement being met, and there was -- the

occupying powers -- to act as police. there were legal requirement with respect to those people and british forces. to ensure we were meeting those obligations and that was our responsibility. on the water end of this if you are talking about the extent of the cpa working with cooperation with the u.s. of the obligation under 1486ed my perception is that up until the terrorist attack on the u.n. on the nineteenth of august, 2003, cooperation between the cp and the un was -- i went to baghdad in early july of 1993 and i saw

a fellow there and talked to him. they had a hundred people at least in the compound. but for that attack, couldn't be ignored. by that stage you had brennan posted was an interesting character who wanted to achieve some success. but the u.s./uk cooperation would have continued to enhance. >> when he was killed, he was not replaced by a special representative but in early 2004, regime was named a special adviser and special representative.

what were the implications of that? did that impact the ability to work with him? >> given the very distinguished circumstances, extraordinarily impressive international public service, very highly respected. but a sad fact of life that the attack on the nineteenth of august lead to a withdrawal by the u.s. and many other -- they just pull down. took a long time to get any current of representation effectively back there. >> review concerned about broad implications of responsibility of international law and security council resolution that

-- >> not directly. i think was indicating the decision. the un had been traumatized by that attack. they were in a state of shock. i was very pleased and managed to persuade birdie me to go in there. we give a lot of help in terms of security as one of the problems as it turned out for security. the you and was not responsible for the sort of hard end on the ground asun was not responsible the sort of hard end on the ground as prepared for the

occupation. >> was the end of this session of invite your reflection. i have two questions un policeing. i am grateful for the response in your reinstatement to these questions and we have taken quite a lot of that on this topic. the first thing, in october of 2003, your private office was assuring that we judged the coalition has a deliverable strategy for these things, trading 30,000 but we get around different accounts and a date from the field. brown says really not until december that a comprehensive plan was developed. but paul can enhance that he doesn't really see a comprehensive plan had really existed and the wonder how confident you are in the basis of the judgment that was being

offered in october? >> there were anticipated in one of your questions. you know about british policeing. and of the individuals who were in the lead. i took a fairly great interest in this at the time, i thought that was a reasonable judgment and that meant it would have come with advice behind it. wasn't intending to exaggerate the situation with hindsight which was your question. was it accurate? i don't think it was.

i visited the training compound in better. an extraordinary kodak figure in baghdad as well. there was a lot going on. part of the difficulty was getting those police on the ground and translating into effective policeing against the background in which the iraqi police had a poor reputation. >> there is a standing question as to how long it actually takes from the base that was there, the effective working police system but the other question is about our own contribution. is built up like this. the uk has had and has still an

expeditionary military capability. it can do that. it certainly doesn't have an expeditionary police capability which says something about the relative balance between what the military needs to be able to provide and the police side of civilian can provide from the u.k. to except that there's a tension. >> more than tension if i may say so. it is a big gap in terms of our capability and it goes back to the very unusual structure and culture of the british police and other police services. if you're going into a country you're going to occupy, you need a certain style of police and make sure the only police service within the united kingdom that has anything like that experience and training expertise is the police service

from northern ireland. with in great britain the expertise is very different. a different number of officers and specialists who are good at public order. they know about obtaining consent to keep us all safer as well as the areas we are patrolling the better safe in the ninth. but can they deal in that hinterland between the accused end of an army's activity and tranquillity? not very well. should we try to developed a u.k. capability? we should.

i think. although -- and try to get our police service better experienced on it. it is a natural thing to do >> i could spend a lot of time on this topic. any final questions? may i invite your own reflections on this experience? >> the iran dimension? >> and not leaving with wm ds. >> a subject for another. >> let me deal with the iran

dimension first and offer reflections which i had thought about on the subject of your inquiry. i have taken a very close interest in iran since i became foreign secretary and my predecessor, robin cook was ready to go to iran and two occasions to fry to improve relations with the then government but on both occasions he was put off from going to i think under pressure from the israelis. i was very anxious to develop relations in tehran.

that was in hand before 9/11. but whether that would have happened the prime minister asked me to do that priority and immediately after 9/11, a really quite extraordinary statement reaching out to the west and the iranians had no love at all, offering cooperation as well. so i went to iran and also went straight after to is real and given the usual is really welcome for anybody who had been on a trip of which they didn't approve. he saw me at midnight. that is par for the course because the israelis always like to rough up any british foreign secretary and it didn't work,

let me say. we then -- i was very conscious of the vulnerable position the president of iran is in. it is not a dictatorship. it is not a democracy. it is a very complex mix of theocracy and semi democracy. much more opaque than the american system. my judgment and our judgment was this was the best hope we had of improving relations. we're trying to get iran in from the cold.

you had the decision by president bush to include iran in the axis of the full speech. when i read president bush's speech there was no reflection on what it did for iran and all and there should have been because this was a major foreign policy blunder by the united states. president hurt me significantly was embittered by that and lead to people saying that is what you get for trying to reach out to the americans. it is a long-term consequence. during late 2002 we got wind from the ncr i, which is a

terrorist organization disclosing details about iran's nuclear program. and that led to the negotiations which we got going and so i finca said to you in the early stage that one of the unexpected consequences of divisions over iraq was to lead to a determination in london that we shouldn't be over there again if we could avoid it. so we really set about the will to seek common positions on iran which lead to a letter to the iranians in 2003 and tense

negotiations. they in the end coded and i will write about this, funded with moat heart of the regime. they needed response from the americans including elementary stuff, parts from the uk or european supplies for their civilian aircraft. no way these would be used in fighters. to export those parts, the european suppliers require the permission of the u.s. or they would lose markets under the iranian live in sections. and at the time the personal without influence like john bolton, wasn't possible to get the americans to agreed to those

changes. there was a last effort made at negotiations between the americans and the iranians in early june of 2005, shortly before the elections but they weren't successful and the iranians were incredibly different. they never closed the sale. ultimately it will be possible as has happened in the past, face of the earth nothing in it for them and you had mahmoud ahmadinejad elected in summer of 2005 and you are familiar with the rest. in terms of the future nobody knows for certain if iran has a nuclear weapons program. there is a high-level

circumstantial evidence suggesting that they do. my own judgment is they are trying to build up a capability for nuclear-weapons program. whether they are -- have an intention of building a kick -- this is all supposition. how do we handle it? we handle it by negotiations. simon different position than others but i am more carrot and stick with the iranians. there are a powerful country in the middle east. the handling of the west of iran shows lack of understanding of their history and also as part

of that shows lack of understanding of their national fighting because it is a self-evident truth that this regime is not supported by the majority of iranians. it is supported by quite a lot but not by the majority. but the desire for international respect. the desire to show to bear persians was a very fine history that are very distinctive, they have a religion which is really interesting that they developed their own version of islam as we developed an inversion of christianity for the same reason, nationalism at the same time. these things need to be factored into this.

and if they are event over period it will be possible -- they are very torn. united states is the great satan. we are a medium-sized city in for them. there is a did joking diplomacy that will leave the iranians think the united kingdom is still a superpower and they do. they think we are much more skillful than the u.s.. on the one hand it as an important part of the rhetoric internally but on the other hand they want normality. they know they will be stuck in sanctions which i support for a long time and sort of have never land and they want to break away from that. but the short story is we need to have a reassessment of the

overall strategy. a sort of impromptu essay on the subject. let me just turn to the more formal part of this. the first thing a wanted to do was express again my deep sorrow and regret for loss of life and injuries of our coalition forces and among many civilians, iraqi and every other nationality who lost their lives in the conflict. also for the reasons i explain to believe in the event military action was justified. and i am conscious of two historians here. i took this to be an obvious point.

as i put it together, i was reminded of the phrase about what is history in which he says the events which are long in the past were once in the future. looking at iraq there is a conventional wisdom that everything which did happen was preplanned, was inevitable and occurred to 8 sinister design of president bush and prime minister blair. having been in the middle of all this, i can say that wasn't the case all, least of all for prime minister blair. the related point that is inevitable, that must be about details of the written record

ridges available. they're very important and i know you are frustrated by the fact that there ought to have been records available when in practice there not. an official and governmental point of view. there is a dimension more difficult to capture and convey but equally if not more important, the atmosphere, environment of the time and nature of the political relationships one has experienced before 9/11 as well as after. i tried to reflect that but sometimes it is much easier to get down to the detail of his said what according to a particular minute. prime minister blair's relationship with his cabinet and party can only be fluidly understood by his success as a

labor leader. and his success in rescuing the labor party from the wilderness in which it had been stuck for a whole generation, the first eighteen years in opposition. that is why he had this influence. he was much more collaborative and is often given credit for but he was also the dominant figure for a very good reason. he lead us out of the wilderness into government and won not one but two elections by a landslide. the fact that he used soft furnishings rather than hard chairs does not make him a bad question, to make a more serious point and nor do i believe that

a more formal process would have altered the respect in which he was held by colleagues nor the outcome of the decisions but equally affect the process was frustrating for some, as for oil and the should have been, the foolish range of opinions in the input. treason of the last points i want to make. i have served under a tree to prime minister is good and the operations leader of history and biography and my perception is each prime minister is different but i don't subscribe to the view that -- there was a golden age of cabinet government which came abruptly to an end un the second of may of 1997.

i don't believe that was correct to. there are different levels of formality. i will give two examples where they didn't follow the manual un cabinet government. i read a biography of he's in the summer and he recalls what we all remember which is in the end, at the end of the self-service ran the government by parting the cabinet. the other example i give which is well chartered in two volumes, about britain's atomic bonds, he was regarded as chairman of the cabinet, a collaboration, brought everybody in. in made an explicit decision to

develop the atomic bomb in complete secrecy. he didn't involve the cabinet, wasn't even aware there was a committee sitting on this department assessing your opposition of parliament. it is an interesting story. i mention this because mr. blair's approach was less formal than others, he operated as prime minister not dead differently than others except he was one of the best and he made a decision the of the final decision on any military action would not be taken by him or the cabinet but by the house of

commons and it completely changed the dynamics of the decisions. what it meant goes back to my point about -- there are not records of this. the argument was taking place in public. the cabinet -- we weren't just briefing them--members of the cabinet had to be satisfied about the arguments we were presenting, prime minister blair and myself. because they had to make their own constituency parties and to make two other members of the parliamentary party. ultimately there wasn't military action recommended to carry through. high understand the frustration

of some people in the system that it is a different way of working. unlike to emphasize the balances and ultimately the decision was made. there wasn't much debate about this. during 2002, british national newspapers on iraq, more than -- not just a hundred day but that brought us up and shows the intensity of the debate in which cabinet ministers knew that in all sorts of forms being challenged that we had the right on top of this collectively. thank you.

the last point -- all of the pans in public is if i may in regard to pertinent to thank you for your neighbors on behalf of witnesses. >> can i think our witness, mr jack straw for your long session of the evidence and not the first one. i do have a few concluding remarks that won't take long but today is the last session in this round of public hearings. my colleagues and i find these hearings extremely useful in clarifying a number of points and in coming weeks an inquiry will publish further transcripts of private hearings and associated documents. we have no plans for further public hearings but we will need to continue to secret evidence as issues arise and we may hold some further private hearings. in bringing our analysis of the evidence to a conclusion we will also have other individuals or

groups for instance parliamentarians to lee which to talk. in the task of writing a report we said we would provide a reliable account of almost nine years of united kingdom involvement in iraq. it is a significant task. we believe it is important we do justice to the huge amount of written evidence we have received a. my colleagues and i are aware but completely not surprised that different people have different perspectives on the same event which will also reflect on the many submissions we received. we will reach our conclusions and recommendations on the basis of our analysis of the evidence and in the interest of transparency and public understanding, we will seek the declassification of additional documentary evidence to support and explain our report. it will take some months to

deliver the report itself. i don't want to set an artificial deadline at this stage. what i can say is my colleagues and i want to finish our report as quickly as possible and i would like to finish by thanking those who have assisted us in holding these public hearings. the q e 2 center itself and particularly the event operations manager and his team for hosting us. i would like to thank both thai television for ensuring our proceedings can be broadcast and related over the internet. and our stenographer of legal solutions and tirelessly recorded our proceedings. thank you very much. i would like to thank all those members of the public who have attended these hearings and especially if i may say, a few who have been very regular and consistent attendants.

we are grateful for that. finally, i would like to say a particularly warm word of thanks to all members of our secretariat. they have put in an immense amount of prolonged hard work both in arranging these public hearings and supporting the committee more generally. with those words i will bring this session to a close. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations] >> sunday on booktv in depth, the founder of the american spectator magazine has written half a dozen books including boy clinton, the conservative crackup and hillary and the latest after they hang over:the conservative road to recovery.

join our three our conversation with e-mails, phone calls and tweets on noon eastern on booktv on c-span2. >> this weekend on booktv on c-span2, afterwards on booktv, 100th anniversary of ronald reagan's birth. ron reagan's account of his father's life and emily lambert on the history and future of the market. the complete schedule at booktv.org including in depth. and get our scheduled e-mails. sign up for booktv alert. >> the heads of ibm and dell have recommendations on how the federal government can reduce the deficit and improve the economy. this event was posted by the center for strategic and international studies.

>> both of these gentlemen had important meetings on the hill and they have to leave fairly quickly. we will dive into this very quickly and i am going to therefore not waste our time with introducing them to you. that is why you are here. you know who they are. i don't need to do that. i do want to say i am glad to see a little gray on michael bell's hair. that is a good thing for a guy like me. >> i painted it on to look more distinguished. >> i do appreciate that. let me start if i could wish you guys. yesterday you spend a fair amount of time with the president. he gave his state of the union speech and emphasized the need for a more efficient government or effective government. these are private conversations but what can you share with us about this conversation? what is it that he told you?

[inaudible] >> he usually has people that do this. >> where do i handle this when i made these? seriously, we are part of a group that holds the government several times a year. they just frame it because it sets the tone for the meeting and as well as the president was phenomenally gracious with his time. his key staff members were there on the treasury and other folks. it was a good group. we basically if i could frame at the highest level. we talked about competitiveness like what you heard in the state of the union and what is necessary from the

competitiveness perspective. we found it was a very good dialogue with a lot of interaction. we have a lot of different points of view. we expressed our. he and his staff were very responsive. three big points as you might expect. competitive corporate tax structure, trade, more than 70% of our industry by the united states and most growth outside the united states and we need to participate in global economy to be successful and we got into the president was supportive of adjusting corporate tax rates as long as it was deficit neutral. this was in the state of the union. and michael articulated the proposal whereby they could address a trillion dollars of productivity or inefficiency that exists in the government which is using what we have all done the last ten years and applying it. it wasn't any rocket science.

it was basic business practice that we do to improve our own company to supply the government. if i could leave you with a thought, most of us have been in here a lot the last couple years and there was a sincere and keen interest in addressing why the u.s. is not more competitive and we might disagree on the details but at least from the importance of the country's agenda, observation would lay up to where it was two years ago. >> i agree with that. it was great to see competitiveness on the agenda and as sam said a genuine interest in addressing some of the short-term and long-term issues standing in the way and we have a frank discussion about what that really means in terms

of the other countries out there, what it means for tax and trade the people government efficiency and productivity and certainly education. there's a lot to be done. the world is changing very quickly. partisan activities, other nations are advancing rapidly doesn't really help our cause as americans. we are global companies. we do things all over the world. we are still americans. we want our country to succeed. we are interested in seeing real action taken against how does america stay competitive and stay relevant and maintain or grow the standard of living we have in this country? >> i was in government and

several times was called over to meetings with big guys like you in a white house. there is a warm glow. the world is different now and all that. two days later you don't remember the meeting. why is this going to be different? what are you prepared to do to make this different? >> i think the magnitude of the challenge made it onto the agenda. you have this enormous debt we accumulated as a country. the competitive pressures that are showing up for competing nations are much more obvious. there's a real crisis in a number of states and various geographies where there are particular challenges. we can't afford to ignore these

issues. we also don't believe it is too late. we think if we take decisive action, lot of progress can be made. . we have to jump into action quickly. >> we have all been to a lot of these for many years. what came out of the meeting different from others was we agreed in certain areas to work together and work with timothy geithner on establishing a set of principles. they are back again. tax cuts are coming in. there is a schedule. there is a work plan in. the people on the hill agreed we should get principal the established and there will be a negotiation but you have to start someplace. this is the first time in the last two years when it comes to

corporate taxes, being competitive, there is a i would argue real work underway. teams at the table negotiating and putting something together. that is a sign of progress. we have lots of statistics on why we are not competitive. the other thing that came up on trade, they asked us to help them make the case. they get it. every time you look at where we have an existing fda, service is better, manufacturing is better, that is the data. these are the facts. we are just saying, make the argument that let us compete. we are fine. the data says the u.s. is better off based on these facts.

clearly it is not the perception of the average american. very difficult in a high unemployment environment. it is a complicated task. on ways to save money or make government smarter, fundamentally he told us in the cabinet meeting that morning, i don't think this is confidential. he instructed the cabinet to look and these elements to drive a smarter government. he got a whole long list of to dos, why it wasn't going faster. which is appropriate for all of us. that is okay. it is the nature of getting things done. so i am kind of where you are. we both have a little more gray hair than michael. we went to the same school year

apart so we are close in age. having been to this so many times, there is real work underway. people doing work or making recommendations, negotiating, that doesn't deal with the political environment. it is hard for us as business people to underestimate what is necessary politically to get anything done and that is an area where we don't have a lot of expertise. we can only help people with the analysis, the fact, of things we do for a the things we do for a living. >> you heard washington -- what i know is return on investment. our customers return on investment and the kinds of things when we talk about this trillion dollars of savings,

these are things that have 30%, 40% return on investment. i don't understand it. i do understand very high are i. those the things that the company or government ought to be done and the way you drive it is $100 million. you get $150 million out of your budget in a future period. and accountability to make it happen. >> everybody knows the patron saint of all controllers -- it makes it really hard. i am going to take money out as long as you do the right thing now but you are right. let's get into the report. you really ought to read it. it is a good piece.

the audience needs to get a little familiarity. one of the things that is concretely saying, consolidating information, technology. you have had experience with this. a share of that, good things like that. >> fundamentally, if you think of what we are talking about. very complicated technical projects in this discussion. putting things together and sharing them. this is just taking what exists, putting it together and sharing. we had 84 data centers that went down to 14. you get 40% return plus reduce energy consumption. it is months of work, not years

of work. planning and literally putting things together and so it is extremely straightforward. reports the government has 2,000 data centers. we will go with the public data. it different view of it. does the government need 2,000 data centers? let's go to 100. as you can see, just share them. the concept of how to use them together. a share a electricity and water and phone systems. the real life which we have done. the first way, eighty-four-14,

and for our case of 40% return, back to 14 months. it is very doable. >> in the size of this stage, each computer note, and virtual servers. and put 14 pet of bytes of storage. and better than exists in historical commercial environments. and we heard about cloud computing, and supply the infrastructure for 21 of 25.

the government can do it as well. and was five 46 years when the rate of improvement is of fast, incredibly expensive. when you do these consolidations, with new efficient technologies, and incredible savings. we need these small outposts. >> during yankee's we move car box readers. thank you for being such a loyal customer. >> how watson sr. would be proud of you. [talking over each other]

>> the ibm centennial, 1916 or something like that. >> one of the major recommendations, you have written the book on this. what can be done with supplies? >> what we see is there are enormous number of different supply chains and collapsing consolidating those, to replace physical assets and all things, the world's best companies with best practices for that. with hundreds of supply chains it could be simplified and

streamlined tremendously. >> the government spends $550 billion a year. it is a ten your case. when we went to one supply chain and globalized $25 million on smaller spend base, it is very conservative. we have hundreds of supply chains to the government, it is running 170 around the world. the estimates in this report are quite conservative. >> how do you get --

>> yes. you take a big barack receipt, the tools the government doesn't have. >> we have management. i am not being flip. michael would have the same thing. we have a person dedicated to globalization. senior executives work for me, and we say to linda beyond 2006 to 2010 we have -- by 2015, and engineer who goes to work. that can't happen in government, they are states. we are assigning somebody we call an operations person. we have these huge issues.

we are signing individuals to work these cases. they start sharing things like data center's -- when you put the sector analogy that can apply, my only point was they can apply. the state level can apply. they can apply at the federal level. >> we are seeing this with the large university system. it forced them to do things they previously would not have done. we see that the state level. every single year how we do that

with collaboration, we can invest, that will allow us to invest and grow and continued to provide value for customers so they grow and thrive. >> we raise -- every cio is watching for the secretary. that is a little dangerous and fiber securities. tell us what it is we should be telling washington. >> there are multiple ways to implement a clout and secure way is to do it but they're different from the consumer clout. if i was running national defence, all that good stuff, i

would have to look at it differently. if you are looking at a civilian agency, not all clouds are the same. it was a virtual environment so everybody says fine. when i was trained at ibm charity years ago it was a virtual machines. we still have keypunches too. it hasn't changed all that much. it has been moved from mainframe to large servers. fundamentally it is sharing resources. these issues can be designed with software that can secure the environment.

they can write it themselves. on the other side of the house i argue that a lot of civilian work that lends itself naturally like the office environment, very productive environment and civilian agencies, i don't think there's that same level as protection of passports or the same level of concern. another one is very simple where we have 50% productivity, development and test. the way it works in development and test, you take capacity and set it aside. it could run in this environment. we can share the production environment to do it and instead of two four provisions, we are doing it for hours at 50% less expensive so developers get it

done faster. there is no security risk to do those things. it is the secure environment. what i would tell them is stand back from it. to make everything sort of national security, it is certain areas that need to be extremely -- not everyone lend itself, 40% of what they do. we are running in this environment. things can't go unchallenged. if life was moving non.

we are not in this set of circumstances but productivity. it was not sustainable. only in a political environment can that be the case, with factual questions about solving problems, i think is not appropriate for any organization. i don't want to pontificated so much about others but it is not appropriate. we are in a crisis. let's wake up and act like it. >> we are often talking about secure private clouds just to be clear to draw the extension from the public file. ..

>> you have remarkable experience as business leaders. michael, you invented a new model. obviously, you've had to convince an industry of something profoundly different, but you did that, you led the way. sam, you reengineered ibm, took it from an old, stodgy company to a dynamic new company. both of you are proven leaders. look at washington. with the average political appointee in office for 26 months, and, you know, when you have to change an organization, you have got to, people have got

to think you're going to be there a long time, and you're going to be on them like ugly on an ape, you know? [laughter] and yet we've got political appointees that disappear. what, how do we get that sense of leadership mandate and direction and urgency in a government environment that has this turbulence with senior leaders? you've undoubtedly thought about this. i realize, you haven't been in this environment. >> one is we're actually elected every year by our shareholders. >> we made that point a lot the last two days. [laughter] some have two-year cycles, some have six, we the months. -- we e 12 months. [laughter] >> we're sort of reaching the point where this is a national crisis where the planning horizon of the competitive landscape is much, much longer and proving itself to be far more effective. so china is in it 12th

fifth-year plan. twelfth, you know, five-year plan. and they have it for each industry sector. meanwhile, we have the partisan discussions how do we deal with this, how do we deal with that. that's a formula for disaster. so we need to get real serious about addressing the systemic issues in productivity and education, in competitiveness and, you know, how we as a nation -- let's remember, we have % of the world -- 4% of the world's population, we have roughly half the wealth. and that's a great thing, but, you know, the world's changing out this pretty quickly, and we have -- out there pretty quickly, ask we have to get in gear the things that worked, you know, two to three decades ago don't nearly work as well with this competitive landscape really shifted. >> let me come at it a different way. michael's given me the benefit of some time to think about it a

little, so thank you, michael. what we would do in a business which -- is we would actually go establish the process that is, you know, i mean, we're talking about 2015 for the next eight billion. a process and the metrics for the next five years, right? and that is, now, hard wired into the business. so, you know, and every year, every quarter or every month -- >> 10% productivity. >> you know, whatever it is adds up to eight billion. so all the projects are identified, so short-term yield, some long-term yield. i do believe that if you actually would look at the thingsing we're talking about, let's say the trillion dollars, you know, let's take that and just, basically, establish the process, put the metrics in place, put somebody in charge, make them a civil servant, maybe not necessarily a political appointee. give it some permanence, right? and then we would have a reward system, so you reward poem for

doing -- people for doing well. but i guess there's more risk in the private sector because the system also adjusts to the negative. but fundamentally, you know, i would think about a way how do you establish the metrics, define the process and have someone responsible to kind of drive this initiative over a multiyear period of time. >> john, i'd like to nominate sam. >> no, no, no. [laughter] no, no, no. us guys, we've got to get back to baltimore sometime. [laughter] >> both of you have referred to competitive landscape. i think most americans don't realize how far or high we're falling. you know, you, if you leave beijing international airport and fly into lax, it's embarrassing. it's like going back 30 years in time when you get here. and yet we have this vision we're ahead. share with us a little more you're an international

business, you've got operations globally, you interact with people on a global basis. how do we make this tangible and real to americans to understand what's happening? >> well, i think the thing -- gosh, tangible and real. i think the thing that comes to mind to me that people can relate to and what's happening is measure the emergence of the middle class, john. this is what i don't think people get in the unite. they assume that chi -- united states. they assume that china, india or brazil is, everything is correlated because they're export oriented, natural resources in some countries, manufacturing in others, there's a mix of these things. theretherefore, it's all tied te u.s. and maybe germany, right? that's the -- you go around this room, you poll people, that is the model. you've lost track of a little statistic i'll share with you, like 500 million people entering

the middle class in the next three years. those 500 million people want cars, houses, cell phones, banking accounts, air conditioners, all those things. they expect transportation to work, they expect secure, safe cities, they want quality health care. guess what? all those things. so the point of it is you say, okay, so how do those countries that are emerging so, therefore, they're like the third world, right? the third world, how to they address it? they get everything that we have -- skip everything that we've done. >> go right to the future. >> all wireless. we talk about 3g, 4g, forget it. they've been doing music and entertainment in india for ten cents. we wrote the software three or four years ago. so a simple thing, you know? you go through these things, you look at the highway systems in shanghai, you go to all these places, right? they built a loop around shanghai in a year. a year. the spire city in a year. --

entire city in a year. incredible. at one point in time the largest crane pass any the world -- capacity in the world was with in shanghai. 70% of the crane capacity was in shanghai. one other example, rail. we talk about rail and innovation for the country, china has decided they're going to build the largest high-speed rail network in the world, appropriates $2 billion and off you go. so, i mean, i think to michael's point -- and you can take the education statistics which you know the engineers, scientists and math, china's here, we're here. a number of graduates, etc., etc. so a lot of these fields. but i think the thing is that, i think the first thing that needs to be understood is these are not developing countries. these countries have a huge amount of well-educated middle class people that are entering into their societies, right,

that are going to drive massive economic transformation. now, that sounds a little bit intimidating, i understand, but it makes the point. go to the other side. so what are our inherent advantages? oh, my gosh, you know, right? and they don't have a lot of debt. there's not 15 trillion they're trying to get authorization for, they're just writing checks. two billion here -- >> their the lender. >> they're the lender of last resort. >> fortunately, the lender has a long-term horizon for the time being. they pulled their line of credit. so not to make it too negative, but i think the other way to look at it you say, okay, so what are the inherent advantages? what are the inherent advantages? is if you did this in the old, tradition competitive advantage economics point of view, which you would have studied, what are the inherent or advantages of the united states that we have? well, we have an incredible

university system, right? incredible university system. we have the ability to innovate, create, research intellectual property. we have rule of law, therefore, there's a right for the individual to create and invent and be protected which drives innovation into the future. we have, we had had and will have again a very transparent capital market system so you can become a michael dell, right? total transparency. we have had and we will have again, this period will pass, right? so, so basically you say we have this inherent advantage, right? yes, we have education problems and, yes, we would like our railroad or systems to work, i'd like to get to the airport on time, we have all those things, and then we have other things. so what is missing? what is missing is somebody saying, you know what? just like they do in india, brazil, china, michael and i sit in these meetings, we say we're going to take this country from

here to there. i'm not talking about sputnik, right? you know, we're going to go from here to there. we're going to set up an innovation agenda, we're going to drive innovation, these are the elements that create that society, here's our inherent advantage and go out and sell the case. go out and sell the case. and if you can't sell it and people say that's not what they want, then, you know, we have what we have today. >> and it has to be national priority. you know, if you take things people are familiar with as a proxy for this, there are about five billion people in the world with cell phones out of, let's say, seven billion. about a billion and a half people connected, you know, on the internet. so, you know, much, much larger, obviously, than u.s. population and the fastest growth is in these emerging nations. 1.3 billion of those cell phone users are in china, sorry, china and india together. adding about 15 million new subscribers a month between the two of them.

so, you know, enormous, you know, industrialization, modernization and, as sam said, sort of skipping past all the legacy kind of problems -- kinds of problems and saying, okay, what should this thing look like in five years, ten years and let's, you know, leap ahead to that. >> okay. let me ask, you know, a washington question. you know, we're snotty people here, so we're going to ask a snotty question. [laughter] you guys say that we need to improve productivity, increase productivity and, of course, that's getting the tax code down, yet industry's sitting on the biggest pile of cash in history. so what, why, why would we think this is a problem? this is a washington question, okay? is i happen to agree with you, but what do we say to the broader public on this? what is the problem? >> well, the problem is -- i don't think it's the fact that business has over the past couple of years shored up their balance sheets because of the economic uncertainty. i mean, most house i holds have

tried to do the same thing. so to sit there and say that's inappropriate behavior in a difficult environment is sort of sill hi. ibm's been around a hundred years, i don't want to be the guy who took it down, you know? [laughter] i got it, but 100 years -- sam crashed it because he got drunk one night at a party and spent the ten billion they didn't have. but it was a wonderful event, you should have been there. it was unbelievable. [laughter] a little bit of sober up, guys, let's go on a diet, let's act like adults. it's not the balance sheet, it's why aren't you investing more? that gets back to competitiveness. because we do invest where there's opportunity for growth. every case gets invested where there's opportunity for growth. and we spent two days, and michael laughs when i do this, trying to explain to people it never work -- who never worked in the private sector that the

only thing we have to invest is what's left over. now, you all know this at home because you take home your paychecks, some portion goes to government depending on where you are, somewhere between 30-50%, and you spend what you have left over. we do the same things. numbers are bigger. right, john? numbers are bigger, but we take whatever's left oaf, and we -- over, and we reinvest in growth opportunities. so very simple, straightforward approach. so if you take more from us, there is less to invest. and, oh, by the way, you say, well, that's okay, but if you compare the u.s. to the rest of the world, we're taking dramatically more on the effective tax rate -- 10% above the average d than the rest of the oecd nations. so we are taking out 10% more. so there's 10% less to invest. now, on the other side of it you go back, and not to turn this into an ibm commercial, but, you know, last year we opened centers all across the u.s.

we spent six billion in r and n, six or seven in acquisitions, gave, what, $15 billion back to the shareholders, something like that. i could be off by 500 million or so in round numbers. and, oh, by the way, we opened centers in d.c. and new york and data centers in charlotte and boulder, columbus, east lansing, dubuque, probably some more. throw a couple on the west coast too, right? so, you know, it's not a question of that. i think the question becomes, you know, what you need to do if you're in washington and you're the people that make these statements and obviously you don't, you went to johns hopkins, you never would say things like this. [laughter] you have to ask yourself this, and i turn it around, and i say, look, people can go anywhere in the world. they can. people can go to any city in the world. businesses can go anywhere in the world. work flows anywhere in the world and so does capital. so the question is, why would

they come here? that's the question. not, you're not spending enough. why would they come here? why would you come and invest in the united states of america when you can invest elsewhere instead of giving 30% to the government 10? why would you invest here instead of competing with 3100,000 -- 100,000 math and scientists, why would you come here when you could go to environments that are very green-oriented but don't have requirements that force us to close facilities because i have a plant that has the same admissions as a church? as a church. so my manufacturing facility, the benchmark is a church. are you going to close your churches too? so ask, seriously, john, ask this question of ourselves.

and i think if you asked yourself the question when people have ultimate choice -- money can flow, people invest, they all need fair returns, we're not acting like greedy business guys, why would they come to ibm? if you're a government, do they stay city or federal government? you need to have a value proposition that attracts the smartest people in the world and that slow capital so you can continue to be competitive. and if you do not do that, if you do not do that, there's too much choice today, michael's point, and it moves too fast, and it doesn't have a happy ending. >> it just goes right back to competitiveness. and so, you know, we have to address the competitiveness issues or else the capital doesn't get invested, you know? whether it's foreign companies or domestic companies or new businesses forming, you know,

they'll go where the talent is, they'll go where the infrastructure is and where the environment is a friendly one towards, you know, growth and business formation. >> let me ask you, i'll admit this is a pet rock of mind, but i can't figure out why the most prosperous and successful country in the world wants to limit the number of talented people that want to come here. we have half as many h-1b visas that we had 10, 15 years ago. it doesn't make any sense. i would think we'd be craving to get talent. tell me how you look at this talent issue, international. michael, you go first. >> yeah. i mean, i think, i think, you know, both of us have a lot of open positions in the united states that we're trying to hire for. >> [inaudible] >> exactly. unfortunately, we can't find all those folks for the pretty highly-skilled jobs, software

programmers, engineers. and, you know, totally agree with you, john. we ought to be, you know, stamping green cards to the ph.d. certificates. we want those folks to come here and stay here, and, you know, certainly if you look at the history in the tech sector, that talented, you know, group of immigrants have continued to contribute for many, many years to the not only the growth of many great companies, but the creation of many great companies. >> i mean, michael bloomberg -- another plug for johns hopkins university, thank you very much -- michael bloomberg has a proposal -- >> you running for president? >> no, no, no davids is doing a great job. i heard all this yesterday because i was there yesterday giving a centennial speech. mayor mike has a proposal which is, basically, give them all green cards and let them come to new york because they're all

taxpayers. >> imagine if you were a mayor of any city in america and you said, hey, you know, how'd you like to have a bunch of smart, with well-educated, reasonably well-financed people come to your city and develop businesses? i don't think you'd find a lot of mayors that would say, well, that's a really bad idea, we don't want -- you know? these are job create, you know? -- creators, you know? to have people employed, you need employers. >> john, the other side of the argument, i think there's a statistic here that we really need to focus on a bit because you can understand, and i am sensitive to the fact, that politically you say, look, unemployment's 9.4%, obviously, if you measure real unemployment, we all know it's higher, but let's use the public data. therefore, how can you encourage all these other people? the let's look at the unemployment, again, let's peel it back a little bit. college graduates and advanced degrees it's between -- i think two months ago i did this with

bernanke. even close to full employment people with high school education, 15.6%. so do we have an unemployment problem or do we have an education problem? is what is it? because if you have a college degree or an advanced degree, you know, statistically 95-96% of the time you're probably going to get a pretty good job. we all have openings, you know? so you probably will. so what is the real problem? so when they talk about you can't bring in ph.d.s, we can't bring in masters in electrical engineers, ee in if my world too, right? i mean, those people have plenty of jobs here, right? and we need those skills to go build these businesses. >> and, you know, the story that sam and i can tell over and over again are, you know, teams of engineers that we have, we walking -- bought a little company in new hampshire had 200 engineers, now it has 650 engineers. the fastest growth for the product and technology that that

group of edge nears is creating is in china. and it's in india. it's in brazil, it's all over the world. and, you know, fortunately, we're able to find enough talent there. but, you know, if we want to go to a thousand engineers, we can't quite find 'em, what do you think -- we'll go wherever they are. >> well, and as you said, it's an education issue here. >> and i think the administration is doing, i think, a very, very good job of trying to tackle a very, very tough problem. but, and that's at the federal level. so, i mean, arne deserves a lot of credit. >> these are tough problems. there have been a lot of forward progress in the right direction, and i think back to the reception we had at the white house. it was a very constructive meeting and, you know, i think -- >> we're down to the wire here, and your handlers have been giving me the, you know, we've got to get out of here. >> questions from the audience? >> we have several of the most influential audience you could

possibly want. [laughter] >> yeah. i don't recognize any employees out there, so actually it's a real audience. [laughter] they might all be dell people, i don't know. [laughter] >> with him -- [inaudible] so the thing here is we've got to -- what is it that you need them to do with this mission? you came to town, you talk -- what do you need them to be doing to help with us? and we'll wrap up with that. >> you know, what i would say is, you know, go take that report and take a good look at that and familiarize yourself with this whole competitiveness agenda. i think it really has to get on the consciousness of the, the, you know, planners and the intelligentsia here in washington because this is a national priority, and it's got to be addressed, you know, in a big, comprehensive way. >> and i think i would just complement what michael is saying because -- and it's the same thing we've said in all the meetings. i mean, when everyone asks us what are the two or three biggest inhibitors to

competitiveness, it's tax, trade and education. it is. and, you know, you'd like to make it more complicated than that, but it really isn't. because what that is a bet on if you have a level playing field -- tax and trade -- and you create, informs in human capital -- invest in human capital, that we have great faith that the best system in the world, the best system in the world, and, look, we're investing in 170 countries, so i have a benchmark for those of you who haven't been to 170 countries. you might follow me around this year, at least you'd get to 60 but anyway -- because it's our centennial. but seriously if you look at that, right? and you say you have this inherent strength, right? then why wouldn't we capitalize that and deal with these issues and move to the future? deal with the issues and move into the future. a business -- there is a correlation here. a business can never survive by dwelling on the past, and people ask -- michael's done it for 26 years, ibm's done it for 100

years. you say how could ibm exist in tech for 100 years? tom watson jr. in 1962 gave a speech at a prestigious university. he said of the people who were mt. top 25 industrial companies, there are only two left. and if i look back to 1962 to now when i gave a speech yesterday, there are four. four. that's it. because you've got to go to the future. whether you're a business or whether you're a society, you've got to go to the future. and, yes, we have a responsibility to transition from the past. very, very fair and balanced. which you can't trade off and dwell in the past. you've got to transition from the past. and you don't solve the problem by creating a housing boom so you can give people hammers and nails and say that's a wonderful aspirational state. thank you very much. >> you know, one of the real problems we've had in washington in the last 30 years is most

ceos have stopped coming to washington to help with systemic problems. they come to town to deal, really, with transactional company issues. so it's rare to see two ceos that are willing to devote their time and energy to broad national purposes. so all of us here should thank these two gentlemen for this remarkable service. [applause] >> thank you, john. [inaudible conversations] >> live pictures this morning

from the national prayer breakfast here in washington. it began a short time ago, and coming up we expect remarks from president obama. this is live coverage on c-span2. >> there is many ways to deal with the ultimate questions of god as there are people on the planet earth. but every one of us must stand alone before all that made us and all that we have been and all that we might be. and dying in your bed many years from now would you not trade all the days from that day to this for one chance, just one chance to come back here and open your heart before god almighty and say, i will lose my life, and i will win it in loving in all the

ways you lead my heart to love? you have a prayer. pray it. amen. [applause] [applause] >> thank you, randall. thank you for inspiring us. all of us.

and now it's my honor to introduce my president, our president, the president of the united states of america. we have an expression in florida that you can walk shoulder to shoulder with someone even if you don't see eye to eye. that's the prayerful spirit in which we gather today. it is the genius of our founders that we have one president at a time. and it is the higher genius of the scriptures that we are to pray for our leaders, that we may all lead quiet and peaceable lives. mr. president, first, we thank you for your attendance. and the strong support that you've given this event.