leverage over the americans in terms of trying to get a delay to give more time for the -- >> well, the prime minister did get -- the prime minister did get delay. he also got the americans to offset the need to move the second resolution. which i think as you were aware, they thought both was unnecessary. and there was some impatient from the american system. :ush down on that second resolution and then also got additional delay and then you know what happened. then we got the benchmarks and the final ultimatum. >> one of the issues -- obviously we have raised this a number of times -- is this question of whether the inspection process was stopped before you could really be sure it wasn't going anywhere.

now the advice you had from officials in the summer of 2002, was at would take around six months to a stop was themselves and get the inspections regime to a good place. so the point the inspectors return to the end of november, to those in to, what was your inspection about how long they would need to establish themselves and begin work? >> i don't have a particular period of months in place. i certainly felt that will be for four months were up from the passing of 1441 the we would be able to make a judgment about whether iraq was complying with its term which was the test on the iraq, we got 1441 of the

eighth of november the decision to take military action was made on the 18th. beginning after four and a half months. and it is very significant. and if you look at the last meeting of the security council to took place on the seventh of march but nobody, not a single delegate suggested that iraq was complying. the argument was in the context they were not completed they were required to comply. the was the difficulty. the other problem here is that what sir jeremy greene stock described as the straw paradox which is this, but -- secure initially called the straw paradox. >> [inaudible] [laughter] speed anyway, it is a pretty straightforward point and latest had to it, which is that we

wanted to resolve it peacefully. the only way we could resolve the matter peacefully was through compliance. the leeway to get compliance was through the threat of military action, i mean the real threat. and indeed that paradox was actually i think may be inadvertently brought up by the president chirac in that interview he gave on the tenth of march, 2003, where he says before he says we are going to veto -- he says there has been some evidence in compliance, but he thinks it is almost certainly because of the troops sitting outside of saddam hussein's door. that for sure was true. >> you told us last year began to feel more optimistic about the prospect of iraq collaborating with unmovic

inspectors and early 2003. famous odds of 60/40 about avoiding the war. you gave reasons for that in your most recent statement. what mr. blair has told us in his statement and when he saw him a week or so ago is he concluded quite early on in december of 2002, following the iraqi declaration, the there was no prospect of some of hussein comply with the 1441. he almost made up his mind of the basis of the jic assessments of finding their analysis of the iraqi declaration. were you aware that was his view at the time? tenet i was more skeptical than i was, yes. and not surprisingly one can be more optimistic than other. i was aware that that was his view, but the 60/40 was supposed to be a private conversation on

a paper. but i can still remember how i was feeling in the early days of 2003. it was on the instinct. it turned out to be inaccurate, but i felt, taking everything together and not withstanding the fact that the declaration which the iraqi is put in a ninth of december had been inadequate, that as they got the message that if they didn't comply there would be military action. and, you know, for other reasons one could be reasonably optimistic that there was going to be compliance. one of the difficulties faced in the united nations was that the successive reports of the hans blix, accepting that he never said that iraq was in full compliance and accepting that there were many questions still left over the plight of been addressed if there were benchmarks' resolutions. but he was reporting the increased and significance iraqi

cooperation. so that by the seventh of march, you had movement with the inspectors be able to go where they wanted. you had movement on interviews and the area of surveillance. one of the difficulties that you faced is the strong paradoxes were working too well and there was no particular reason to give up on the process according to the members of the security council what that point. >> with respect it had been working very well. of speaking up what i said to the security council on the seventh of march, because there was some improvement. i am not sure -- i can't be certain. i don't recall hans blix seeing improvement had been significant.

what is it -- this is the seventh of march, 2003: mr. .. reported it's not possible to prevent the unrestricted recorded interviews. there have now been 12 private interviews between unmovic and the iaea against the regular and special commission list 3500 people previously associated with the bids of mass destruction and all of those 12th or threatened and intimidated by the regime before had a of a told the exchanges were going to be recorded, so the interviews were not being recorded by tape recorders. they were told that they were going to be recorded in any even to buy the recording calls its most likely to be the most incriminating evidence removed by the security services and there was a lot of evidence from

the iraqi survey group which corroborates what i was saying. so i am afraid i was rather less than sanguine about the progress was being made and spelled out why. >> but dr. blix and his statement that you obviously disagree, dr. blix in his statement said that had these interviews he considers them it has repeated in the evidence to was that he thought that these were not so hindered and that he was even optimistic of getting people, if necessary, out of iraq if there had been more time. i will go over exactly where things were at the moment, but what i am interested in is whether or not this was a different position than you expected to be in with dr. hans blix than with the process began in december/january, where the assumption they have been more that you're looking to dr. blix

to say definitively whether or not there had been an iraqi cooperation. >> that is a matter of some hope and expectation. certainly my hope is it the beginning of the year that dr. blix and el baradei were sitting there were no in compliance and we have not completed our tosk but that was not 4041 required for compliance but that they are in compliance and this is what we need to do to carry on the process. they never, ever said that and even on iraq's this redds rule the city -- the security table. the was the fundamental problem. the requirement of 1441 was not that they should be cooperating a bit with the inspectors. it didn't see that and it

wasn't. it was that there was full and immediate and complete cooperation and there was lawful, immediate and complete operation. there wasn't the day after four to 41 more importantly there was of four and half months later. and they had been told. if they knew what was going on. why saddam took the gamble he did remains a serious unanswered question to me, but he chose to take a gamble and he lost. if i may say so, there are people who say he was edging towards this. the requirements of four to 41 were not requirements which would have humiliated him. yes, losing the gulf war was a humiliation, but, you know, that was a quite a long time before that. they were designed to be a requirement on him that he could meet, and the other members of

the security council who were more friendly towards iraq would not have agreed to those requirements of less -- of less that were the case. >> i don't want to prolong this but the point about the benchmark resolution that did happen was actually a way of trying to resolve some of those issues. >> it was. those benchmarks came from dr. blix himself. >> after had been more time and a way of resolving it. can i just go back in terms of the cabinet was told about the likely sequence of events at the start of 2001? >> 2001? vbied i'm sorry, 2003. the start of 2003. about how these events were likely to unfold in terms of the likelihood of the finding of the smoking gun and it's been called the wmd of the likelihood blix would report on compliance.

seabeck well, you see that quite a very regular reports to the cabinet and i wasn't there every thursday. i was quite often somewhere else, but when i was there i gave reports. i think if i wasn't there, the prime minister would report, mr. hoon, the defense of secretary about where we had to go. i don't believe that members of the cabinet felt that they were under informed on the issue. >> fatta there were extensive military preparations taking place. i mean, this was in the public domain. you can't mobilize 46,000 people. without this being public. it just was. >> absolutely, but the issue was whether there was an expectation that military action, if it came, would or would not follow

a report by unmovic of la compliance. >> this goes to the issue of the relationship between op4 11 and 12. resolution 1441. is it fair to say that not everybody around the table could recite the terms of 1441 in that sleep as could i, so i don't recall it sort of clause i legal text will argument about the interaction between op4 11 and all the cabinet. it would have been slightly of discussion to have taken place. but was their discussion about the circumstances in which we

might move to military action if there were foreshore and what's involved in this? and did i get reports off the four readings of the security council the one intended? >> just fill the ehud of the parliament on november 25th, to those in to that material which means something significant, some behavioral pattern of behavior that is serious. among some breaches could be action by the government of iraq seriously to obstruct or to impede the inspectors, to intimidate with this or a pattern of behavior we're in the selection appears relatively lighter but the actions as a toll at up to something a deliberate and more significant. something that shows iraq's intention not to comply. as you told us last february, the bar had been set high. now on the 15th of march, 2003, the prime minister confirmed to the attorney general his unequivocal view of iraq was a

further material breach of its obligations under resolutions four to 41. were you comfortable with the situation that the prime minister confirm the existence of a further material breach at a time when the head of the iaea had reported that there was the nuclear program he found at the head of the unmovic had reported improved cooperation? >> yes i was and if i hadn't been i was interested in the cabinet. just to emphasize the point about the bar in op4, as i think i mentioned on the previous hearings, in one of the drafts, there were two instincts and saw the full set of revisions in the declaration

. i wanted to see the bar satire, of my personal view. here again i'm afraid i'm going to be best understood with the attorney general. when he gave evidence he said he and an forest assumptive, never intended to be disjunctive. there were two tennis and both had been met. anyone reading it could see that was the case. but what lb for us talk about full statement in the declaration. the declaration was not complete. failure by iraq at any time to e comply and cooperate fully in the implementation of the resolution.lution as it did. they failed to comply fully.

the obligation on the wasn't to comply a bit. a emphasize this.x s or to say they were just dreadful before, which was what 2003aid in late january 2003 report and now they are bitbettr better obligation on iraq was to comply fully. the obligation on them on the - one not to disregard the whole resolution and they fail to do that to read now you're asking me whether i think that the judgment about whether there was a material breach should have been made by the minister or the attorney-general is a difficult question to answer but it was the attorney who asked the prime minister to make that judgment. >> are you comfortable with the view that the material breach that there was at that time was of such significance it will only be addressed by -- >> yes, i was, and by the time

of the seventh of march security council meeting, my own very strong instinct was that the iraqi sore back in a pattern of behavior they had been before, where they were playing along in the hope of splitting the security council within degrading the consensus that had been in the previous november that they would play along sufficiently at least so we were not involved in the military action, because we were not able to get a parliamentary majority, and maybe that some of the americans with it, but that was the game that they were in. and much of the white vote against hope that they would implement this fully, and i thought they could, and that was, as i say, my hope and believe in the january by large

i just thought these guys have got a different strategy. it is not compliance. it is stringing the inspectors along, splitting the international community and then hoping they can get into a comfort zone where ultimately they could have the sanctions lifted. that required you begin to take a different view from the inspectors and other members of the security council. >> well, with great respect, it didn't. yes, there was a division of the question of military action. that was a palpable. but the inspectors never said iraq was complying it. they didn't. as i have said before, if you go through whole of the record of that march 7th, 2003 security council meeting, whatever side people were on, nobody, not one delegate, said iraq is complying it. that was the test. it was not "have they offered a few more people for interview in

very questionable circumstances circumstances"? the test was worth a complaint. it .. said there were compliant that within the end of it from our point of view. i mean, the end of it in the sense that that would have been the end of any prospect to move the action and know what would have been more pleased than the to the estimate there's other questions we can put on that but i think we better move forward. and it we've got just a few points of the second resolution and i will ask sir martin gilbert to pick them up. >> in our request to you for a statement before this hearing, we asked about your involvement in the formal decision of the u.k. government to pursue a second resolution. if you told us "i was heavily involved in the decisions in respect of the second resolution." and he pointed out towards the documentary record available to us as a committee.

however, we have examined a massive documentation and questioned in the people and we have been unable to find out by the how or wind the decision was made on the resolution. can you explain who was involved in the decision, what the process of the decision was and when it was made? >> i'm sure -- sorry. just on the sort of procedural point, they're must be -- at least i hope they are -- telegrams from london to new york ukmis about a second resolution. anyway, i would be astonished if there were not. i will try to pursue the for the inquiry. the discussion about the second resolution as i recall, got going in the middle of february. i mean, it had always been a possibility, a lawyer can't give you the exact date, but i have

long been clear if we were going to be facing the prospect of military action a second resolution, while not a necessity in legal terms, was highly desirable in terms of managing the international community and the british pilot, but also in raising the prospect of a peaceful solution in the issue. .. so as i say, it got going in there was traffic with the united states about the components of the second resolution. and then, what should be in it. in the draft was certainly down as i recall at the end of february. >> is the decision to go in for a second something you discuss

with the prime minister? >> yeah, i would've discussed it a great deal of the prime minister. there wasn't much discussion because it wasn't an easy decision to make. we wanted to try to get a second resolution. orat's to say it was making thaf effort was desirable for both've reasons i've spelled out. the bigger thing is persuading theit americans it was a good ia and i discussed extensively with a secretary g powell, but heavy lifting on that was done by thea >>ime minister and presidentnd bush that quite difficult? >> i think so because i think you're aware the american view was that the war was contained which we accepted, and they were a bit complexed about why we thought it was desirable from

the point of view of the politics. anyway, they were persuaded that it was. >> and that persuasion was down at the level of the prime minister and president as well? >> partly by me, but colin powell was easier to persuade than president bush. >> i just spoke with the department of foreign office two days ago. he said, "i'm not sure the american administration was ever formally committed to a second resolution. i think they were willing to let us have a go at trying to get it. they certainly didn't see a legal necessity for it, and i think they obviously feared it could only result in more complication of the u.n. security counsel." >> that was because of the downsize that it might expose divisions rather than resolve them. excuse me.

i feel with the benefit of hindsight things it was worth attempting the second resolution, and we were basically close in my judgment to get the magic nine dates, but it didn't happen. it was a concern. that said, the secretary powell were very interested in building support for the second resolution, and there are records you would have seen where you report that. >> thank you. >> i think, robert, over to you now. >> just one very short question, a quick question on the statement. we had a long discussion of this

last year that we don't need to repeat, but since then there's been pieces of evidence. you may or may not wish to comment on them. i'd like to just cite three of them. there were others in this sense. one is that greenstalke confirming what he said in a telegram when asked when was -- whether it was the agreed line to cast a heavy line on the french and rather he was acting on instructions to do this, said he was acting on instructions. secondly, math true ryancroft when asked if there was political presentation to pin the problem on the french when the fact was we failed to get the chillians and mexicans

across on getting the resolution. he replied, "yes." thirdly, sir steven wall, said one can tiptoe around this, but jack straw didn't know what he was doing. by the time he told the cabinet later in the week about the outrageous behavior, he would have known precisely what was said. you have to remember at this point the government was fighting for its life. is there any comment that you want to make on any of those three statements? >> yes, there is. thank you. thank you for the opportunity. i don't agree with their analysis of how we came to a judgment that intervention had

underminded our efforts to get line votes and no vetoes. first of all, on the view about jeremy saying he acted on instructions. well, when i saw that, and thank you for giving me notice of this, i had the record check. no one could fine any tell -- find any telegram or instructions to new york talking about this. >> on the phone -- >> well, yes, i was talking to germmy all -- jeremy all the time on the telephone. there was no one instruction. >> he said on the phone this is what we need to do? >> let's deal with that because -- i certainly was talking to him often all the time about this, and -- as far as i was concerned the

consequence of president sherak's intervention spoke for itself. we didn't need to say we can make -- he was absolutely categorically saying that we would vote no. that's what he said, and it didn't need instructions to say that, and indeed that did undermind the efforts we were making. that is true. i'm just surprised that he and matthew should come to that view. when you are in the loop in any haven't, and i don't recall having sfertions with him, certainly not this because it's not what i was thinking from what understood, but when i saw

this, i was steaming about the approach that the french were taking because they signed up to 40-41, and from late january, they had been in my judgment increasingly unhelpful about getting a peaceful resolution to this. i kept saying if you can't find it, and if you want to avoid military actions which is otherwise likely to take place, the best thing to do is come on side with us and agree to a second resolution that does contain an ultimatum. anyway, they were not willing to do that, and i've read through a whole lot of transcripts. i watched the interview in

french. my french isn't great, but it's good enough, and i didn't hear anybody in watching the totality of that interview come to any other conclusion other than that he was blueprintly, i mean, -- bluntly, i mean, throwing a bomb into the bomb seeking to destruct the negotiations. he knew what he was doing. he did say i'm not a pass vies. that's true. he didn't rule out a second resolution on something. that's also true. he would have been happy to find a second resolution that would have led to a third. or that's correct, and he used the french, but this was not the president popping out of the back door to bump into a journalist and saying something unscripted and then find it recorded in a newspaper. this was the president with all

the people, the president of france in a formal setting, a formal interview deciding that he was going to set out his story. he knew what he was doing, and indeed, he achieved it, and it didn't need me to explain what he was doing. everybody could see what he was doing, and also we could feel it because although we carried on trying for a number of days afterwards, you could feel the support for the position we put together, and i think that steven patterson said to you this kind of thing is of the security counsel. a lot of the nonpermanent members took their lead from the permanent members, and in my judgment, making progress before that. >> we had a great deal of evidence on this including, of course, documentary evidence, and we wanted to make sure that you had an opportunity to comment on some of the evidence

given to us that differs from your interpretation on this. other than, we will review the evidence in due course. >> thank you. i'll turn it to martin gill bert. there's one or two more questions on the cabinet. >> around 2002, you appear to be the only minister who is kept in form of number ten's exchanges with the white house. do you think in view of the sometimes rather substantive exchanges that a large number of seniors could have been involved? >> they could have been, maybe would rather than should. i think it has to be for the prime minister of the day to decide who would have the most confidential communications with another head of state.

i mean, these relationships are of critical importance, and the confidentiality of them needs to be preserved as well, so more question really for mr. blare, and it's not an issue of trust. it's an issue of the fact that the more people who are within a loop about information, the more likelihood it is for this to kind of seep out. as i say, these days people look at bush and blare and see them as simese twins. that's not how it felt at the time. >> you stressed in a way two aspects of the cabinet's involvement. one, that they are essentially

to be briefed and have reports made by you repeatedly, and the other was the problem of leaking. when you answered to sir lawrence earlier, you referred to the importance of mr. blare of cabinet committees that they were preparing the issues and the cabinet would then essentially be briefed. as you know, cabinet committees did not meet to discuss iraq during this whole period. instead as mr. blare told us, -- blair told us, it was a perpetual conversation. did you ever try to persuade mr. blair to take a different approach with regard to substantive discussions? >> i think this is repeated evidence which was given to you last year, but it was well known that my approach to decision making it more formal than mr. blare's, and -- mr. blair's,

and i was more formal in my running of the departments for which i was responsible and maybe some other ministers than mr. blair, and i certainly had conversations with him about the level of formality or lack of it that applied within his government, and if i had been in his seat, would i have had more formal processes? yes, i would have, but that doesn't reppedder, if i -- render, if i may say so, the process in which we're comfortable for members of the cabinet at the time or the outcome any different, and one thing i'm clear about is that if you have had more formal processes, in my view, that would have been better, but it wouldn't have made any

difference to the outcome. >> you didn't think that when -- i'll come to in a moment on a question of your disagreement or with mr. blair at the end. you don't think that these tremendously important decisions which are being made and which you say that i think your phrase was the cabinet was full of people who fought for themselves, so shouldn't they have had the opportunity on quite a number of occasions when important decisions were made of thinking for themselves in cabinet and having an actual debate about it and being able to have their input as it were on that level? >> i mean, there were extensive debates in cabinet as you know from all the basis of briefings from mr. blair or myself which i think is 23 meetings of cabinets in that period from the summer of 02 to march of 2003.

it was the dominant political issues. members of the cabinet were indeed thinking for themselves very extensively. some of the day-to-day, week-by-week deploam simese was not -- diplomacy was not the subjects that would have gone to cabinet. i mean, i -- the cabinet discussed the original approach back in march, and then as mark wilson made clear, this came off the agenda because other things intervened, and there were not that many discussions about iraq until the summer, but they also knew by what we were seeking to do is to get the u.s. down -- the u.n. down the u.s. route. there was the most intense period of discussion, and they were involved in that, and very

content, and i thought of obviously i'd be getting this question, and i was trying to think about the circumstances at the time. i think it's important to divide the periods into sections. you had a period with the u.k.'s own strategy rather uncertain in the first half of 2002 following the state of the union speech, and also with crawford that settled down a little bit. partly settled by this discussion here in march, and then as it became clear that we were seeking a u.n. route, settled down again, and colleagues thought, well, better luck. that's the route that will be

used, and it will be a satisfactory result. there was a decision to be made at that stage, and the colleagues were aware during the course of 2002 military preparations were being made. then you had the period of leading up to 4041. you had bush's statement to the general assembly on the 12th of december, you had that very intense period leading up to 4041. great signs were released by cabinet and the british people that we got 4041 and there was a matter being resolved peacefully. there was not a decision to be made by cabinet because they endorsed the process leading up to 4041. we got it. then you had the declaration, and then it was christmas. that period even if there was a formal cabinet discussion, you

know, what decision points would have been taken that people feel could have been taken if there was formal papers? then, you are familiar with what happened in the runup to the decision on the 17th of march, but there was the third phase. >> i'd like to look back five days before the 17th of march if i could. in your evidence to us, we asked you about the consideration of alternative options on the eve of the conflict. you told us i prepared a paper for mr. blair, i told him about it. if you ask me who was present, i can't exactly answer. mr. blair warns you about the pearls of taking military action in iraq without the military res lyings, and -- resolution, and we heard from a witness who we agreed not to identify says i recall a meeting

with the prime minister where the argument was made in the circumstances which were then heading into the 12th of march for the u.k. military not being involved, and he told us in his evidence, the argument upon which was made was more in terms if you want to avoid your own resignation, you have a opportunity, and here it is. you have a way out, and why don't you take it. he was offering the prime minister a way out if he wanted it. the foreign secretary would have went across the argument in a clear way. the thing i was absolutely struck by is the prime minister's response, the speed of it, and the absolute insistence of it, and the fact that he had got his argument all modeled and all laid out. you mention this meeting in your recent statement to us where you say i made clear to him that he had options other than invasion,

and that these were still open to him would he want to take them. what was your position at that meeting? one of advocating to mr. blair that he should not commit british troops to military action? >> i think that i was advocating, not committing british troops to military action. it's probably putting it too strongly. it was because i had never wanted to give the false impression that that's what it came to is over the weekend of the 15th and 16th, and the decision on the 17th that my position is anything other than to endorse the decision we came to which was in favor of military action, and i was aware, certainly, by the 12th of martha that was a clear prospect. i was -- i mean, i don't think

anyone was keen on military action, and people were going to get killed, so i was anxious that we should explore alternative options. i felt that i owed the prime minister my loyalty and the best advice i could give him, and that was always my approach in dealing with prime ministers, and i, therefore, presented him with a notice that i sent him, and went to see him, and i think that the anonymous witness can give positions. >> what was your view of the alternatives at the time in >> the alternatives were for the u.k. not to take part in the land invasion. that was a straightforward

alternative which we could have followed. i mean, the interesting thing about that, of course, from an early stage it was the defense staff who argued strongly if we were not going to be in military action, the army had to be there because otherwise it would be unhappy and cross if they were not which is -- i don't trivialize that, but that's how it was. afterwards was the most plausible alternative which would mean standing down our troops which is essentially what the spanish and the italians did. >> thank you. we'll take another short break and come back in 10 minutes. thank you very much.

[inaudible conversations] >> a question on the aftermath. in your statement, you comment as the evidence is long-standing involvement in the middle east, they had an impressive cadre of diplomats and research analysts, experts in this field and in the language. as has been suggested on several occasions and not least treat others in iraq, this is true, but it seems not to have been drawn on when they came to

debate on iraq. was this drawn on as much as good as dead when iraq policy has been signed and implemented between 2001 and 2006? >> bareness, it actually was drawn on. i mean, what do we could've chaumont at moore was an interesting question. and i think my answer is that the benefit of kind i probably just because the foreign office's rate be very proud of the fact it's got a very deep knowledge and understanding of the middle east. i mean, there is a time and they were very experienced and there were at least two or three occasions when the prime minister got together a group of outsiders to talk about with different viewpoints, to talk about iraq in the past and the

future. >> or why was it not drawn on? credit has been given? >> well, you asked me would i now go for accounts of imperfection, the answer is yes. did i feel the time it wasn't drawing drawing on it? >> no. as i said in my statement, they aware of the three main private secretaries in my office and one of them had been confirmed in fact are in iraq, so it wasn't as though it was not getting daily, hourly, extensive feedback and granularity about iraq. and there were many others in the office who are reporting to me who did have that experience. one of the lessons to be learned is could we have done even

better? i wouldn't for a moment dispute that. but any sense they may not to involve those with experience, not for a second. i came to the iraqis view. from having been home secretary are much more this ending start. so that would've been early june 2001 so i wanted to know about it. >> i mean, you said the prime minister over the last couple of meanings, but was the discussion penetrating the planning, the thinking of number 10? >> sure, there were two or three meetings with the number 10 record that would indicate that on outside experts in iran, which were not to put into a a mission as it were detailed strategy. but it was to get an assessment from them about the possible

options were, how iraq had arrived at the situation and how it went forward. >> i mean, you had mentioned there was a private office, but we talking about the impact might be? >> of course i was. there was a continuing debate going on and i think you have access to my diary. i can't off the top of my head tell you which countries in the region i was going to at that time, but i was in pakistan spending a lot of time in that region. i went in october 2035 times to iran, for example in those around the rest of the region make a deal. >> in this book, in the accounts are taking dr. michael williams to brief mr. blair about the

aftermath of mr. blair been somewhat dismissive of his pessimistic analysis, do you have any comment on that? >> i don't recall. one of the surprises to me and it shouldn't be this may recall of some offense in papers is acute in others is blank and there's no necessary connection between the important of the issue and whether i recall it. but there was continuing traffic across the overturned. >> which he would accept that it could've been drawn on more than it was? that the evidence in the information you hide from the private office in the knowledge within the foreign office could have drawn on more entertaining than it was? >> i couldn't have drawn on my private office more than i did. you know, -- i think we were.

baroness, in retrospect could we have done more? i think you always can do more, but it's not to say we were negligent or lacking in seeking views at the time. >> okay number one to the question of responsibilities because in your previous evidence when we asked you who was responsible for the aftermath planning, you said i could. the officials, most of whom u.s. meant, but in your recent statement, you say the responsibility for post-conflict situation were shared between the defense exoteric and myself. re: understanding from the papers and evidence and stephen patterson on monday was they had a civilian lead to me area, a

questions of the iraq planning of it. for you in development that the secretary every vendor respect the laws? we are having discussions with secretary? >> very different on the application of consistency between what i'm saying now and what i was saying before. i haven't got the transcript in front of me, but i think i've never, ever suggested that ministers are responsible for the work of their officials, not for a second. i also gave evidence on one of the two previous occasions about my relationship with claire short and the foreign office's relationship. i did my best to get alongside claire and i think even she would admit she's not the easiest person to go aside and she was very good of her new department. and there it then -- a pretty

stressful relationship between her and robin cook and institutionally between the two departments, which he came from the eight design originally from what became of it. and i sought to improve, but he was hard going. and the foreign office felt the they have lost control over the age program, which they had. the people felt the same in the foreign office lost control and were enjoying their newfound freedom in this cause difficulties, not so much in respect to iran, but in africa where people have this as an alternative of foreign ministry. and he was tricky. it really was.

and i think most colleagues found claire quite challenging i think is the current cliché. >> you would've had an impact on the planning. i mean, i have to say that when she left and was replaced by barrya mouse at subsequent hilary benn, speaking much better. >> what about the defense secretary? it is clear there are different assumptions made by the military and civilians. and to what extent did you discuss your response to the secretary? >> i had a relationship with a friend of mine and we just got together been at least on a personal site of the businesslike relationship. no difficulty at all there.

>> were the functions discussed in terms of what was the military priority? >> yes. i mean, if you ask me if i was discussing this meaning for that meeting, i can't. it was one of those parts of the discussion in perspective on behalf of the military and opposed to my perspective, a civilian import, that was their analog discussions about that. but in terms of the immediate aftermath, the military would he in control -- complete control and the civilian staff would be acting under their orders. and as we hoped later, when not control was military control was reduced. >> command, by your own admission you said you were focused on the diplomatic

process and it has been suggested so was the rest of the foreign office. there is still contemplating on the diplomatic process to some restraint how it was. suit to saddam. i mean, is that fair? >> it is certainly fair that i was focused on the diplomatic process. i don't get is fair to say that planning for the aftermath wasa in the united kingdom was ignored or not given the priority it should not gi have been. i think any foreign secretary in my position was focused on thed diplomatic process andthat essentially that is what i wasf. paid for.ere was and there was heavy liftinghe required, which ultimately onlym the prime minister and i could do. so as you have heard, a huge amount of my time was with my

opposite numbers in foreign for ministry's. and i make no apologies forplayn that. i'm proud of the rule i giveni'l 1441. i'm just gratefule it didn't led to a peaceful conclusion. but i mean, the foreign officeyi is in my view a great institution. we it was well aware of the need to plan an obviously i was worried. but a great deal of work wasdeaf taking place under the very distinguished senior official, edward chaplin, had completecomt confidence he was getting on with this. i was talking to colin powellutt about it as often as they couldl as it's been spelled out iny previous evidence, in my judgment, the difficulty we ran into did not arise from any

inadequacies in planning the british in.frothi it arose from thiss interagency now in washington in the early part p of 2003 which resulted ih responsibility for the aftermate being moved from the department of state to the department of. defense. and if i were in five to 10 years time plotting what happened, i would say that thath wasat the decision, which led to the aftermath been far less satisfactory than it could'vefat been. >> which are really saying isten that super paying attention that's fair, but from your point of view you are set aside at an work was being done within youre department? esponse been responsible out of that where were you just relying on this issue is?

.. responsible. there are very good ministers working for me, including michael o'brien, at the time. i was very hands-on on the iraq dossier. i had to be. i think officials expected to have direct access to me on that. >> talking about the actual planning -- >> i understand that. the interaction between ministers and officials in the foreign office is it different one from that in domestic departments, very -- its -- it's true of diplomats >> they are being totally anonymous behind the screen. they are more used to a public

role by definition, halfway between the official and department and the minister, and they knew the region. he knew the beach. i had every confidence in him and in the others. i know you had evidence from steven patterson. they are all very good officials. >> i mean you said when you gave evidence last year, americans were never keen on the u.n. role, and this is just something we had to manage the whole time. >> yeah. >> i ask you about when you realized the united nations would not play a major role, you said the 19th of march. truly, it was clear before that that the u.n. would not play a major role in the aftermath. it was in february when they

went to the states. the americans are not at all keen on the abs vaitions. >> the briefing i referred to on the 19th of march because that was a telegram reporting not on the americans attitude, but on the attitude of other the my view, and i think the prime minister's maybe, but he'd have to speak for himself. although there was this enthusiasm within the u.s. system, if you presented them with the arguments, you could actually sometimes shift them towards this, and that's true in terms of 4041, and it turned out to be true in a significant chunk of 1483. however, what made an extensive role for the u.n. role difficult was the wn reported that he in the circumstances of the

invasion and internationally controversial military action, he didn't think there was a role for the u.n. either. he tried to -- there was great prospects at that state to play a central role. subsequently, of course, president bush talked about a vital role for the u.n. under some instigation from the prime minister to the degree of which he was able to influence president bush. you know, but president bush had other forces at him like john and those who wanted to basically wanted to wind up the u.n.. i think we actually got quite a long way under the circumstances. >> i mean, the fact is that we were aware of the united states not wanting u.n. to have a lead role. u.n. being reluctant to take the lead role, and when i asked

steven patterson, why did we not have a plan b in the circumstances because we came to the assumption that the u.n. would have a lead role. that's what the planning was based on. why did he not have a plan b? he said to me, the plan b was the u.s. sorting it out. if they didn't want the u.n. to have a lead role, the u.s. would have to sort it out. under the circumstances, should we have sought for insight to the planning or concepted with a blueprint? >> well, the only plan b was in the absence of the central role for the u.n. was the role for the occupiers. you were the u.s. and the u.k.. those were the alternatives. there was lots, lots of discussion with the united states system at which we were going to and fro from washington, between myself, and

colin powell. it wasn't a lot of trying that we ended up in the position we did, but this is one of the classics where the american decision making process was opaque, and i know there was some frustration about the informality of the british system under mr. blair, but nothing compared with the long standing lack of arrangements in the american system as robert brilliantly brought out in his biography. it's just there. you put all these things in, and, you know, and it's a sort of floats around, and then one day there is a decision, but the interagency process is very odd

from a point of view of a sort of parliamentary cabinet system. >> you're saying u.s. was not keen on u.n. having any role. the united states was an opaque system. we knew that. yet we continued to work on the assumption that the u.n. would take the lead role and the u.s. would sort it out. it just seems to me if people were not drawing attention to it about the importance of the aftermath that it has to be an essential part of any planning, and why did we not pay enough attention to that? >> well, we paid a huge amount of attention to the aftermath, and you seen the minutes i wrote to the prime minister and others spelling that out, and the prime minister was very well aware too about the problems of the aftermath.

on the terms of we wanted a central role for the u.n.. i mean, we actually got a more central role than i think we had in prospect. after 1483, we had a large u.n. base -- >> i'm going to come to that. >> just to say there was nothing there. what we hoped for -- was it all we hoped for? no. were there prospects not with standing in the u.s. of getting the u.s. to agree on more than we agreed on? yes, there was, there was more they could have done, but mr. blair got the u.s. citizens further down the road than i thought. >> looking at the issue of risk because again in your statement you comment, "strategic objectives of iraq were agreed. they were short and rapid as possible for iraq to become a

state abiding and law law-abiding country. they were not possible to fully predict in advance the end of hostilities. it was therefore not feasible to foresee any specific timetable." mr. blair in his statement wrote, "inevitably, it was impossible to pin down the precise details how and more importantly when each state of transition would occur to which we were in and could judge according to reality. the basic simple transition was agreed and in the event implemented. we always recognized we would be there for some significant time." now, given the clear advice that the aftermath would be critical to strategic success wise? >> was what wise? >> in the statement you make and mr. blair made that, you know, this was significant, but it is

something you would have to wait and see. was it feasible to foresee a timetable? >> we couldn't -- we didn't -- the consequences of war are unpredictable. i mean, because war is a inherently chaotic process. the possibilities of the aftermath of military action are greater than they are from any other human actions so there was obviously a range of possibilities. it was very probably that saddam would no longer be leader, would be a documenting government at the top. we knew that. what was extremely difficult to predict was the exact circumstances on the ground, and as i bring out in my statement, the most recent one, and i think

david manning brought out, you look at the detail documents we produced and say that the state department produced in early 2003, both we and the americans were predicting all the things that then happened. what we weren't able to predict was the exact mix of these things. i mean, that was, and so, no, there was a prediction about the possibility of terrorism. we didn't predict its extent. we were worried about humanitarian disaster and thanks to good planning and as i say in my statement, that was happily absent in the event, so -- and i don't -- i'm sure there are certain lessons for certain about how and where another time

would be we should do this, but i think making guesses about the precise outcome of military action on that scale would be very difficult in any circumstances. i mean, you simply don't know. there's a range of possibilities. >> but lord williams, what was your special adviser, said the campaigns are based on the calculations of risk involved. there's a case of iraq, this is done only in the most narrow sense. he's saying, you know, we did not plan on diversing our view. it was a narrow sense. yfs that? >> well, i mean -- i was surprised that he said that. i don't recall him saying that to me at the time. i mean, i think what -- and i have not talked to him about it, but he probably is another way of talking about his frustration

and my frustration in pinning the americans down. we were doing the planning, and it was and the joint planning with the americans was satisfactory until the shift of responsibility from state department to defense. that could have been satisfactory, but turned out not to be as we know, and we ended up with the result and you know the rest of the story. >> on the 9th of march, and you and -- you and the defense secretary wrote the prime minister saying it will be necessary to sore down our commitment to a third no later than autumn. the draw down was more rapid than that. given the uncertainty and our speedometers for law and order -- responsibility for law and order, were you worried about the rapid withdrawal? >> that was based on all the

military advice on how long you can sustain that many troops in theater. 46,000, it was very significant with the total forces of the u.k. and forces have got to be rested. you're familiar with all of this. you have to have a long tail behind the sources, so i didn't think was unreasonable, and they were there not for peacemaking or peace keeping. this was an aggressive force to invade a country, although for sure in the south there were times in retrospect the command of benefit is for more troops on the ground. >> this is naming the context of the military action itself, not the aftermath? >> yes, i can tell that one, but in that minute i think it was

about what was possible. in the -- given the size of that 46,000 in relation to the totality of the u.s.' armed forces and how people had to be rested. >> can we just look briefly on a question on resources. in your statement request, we asked you, what did you have been the invasion that asked you had the structures, skills, and capabilities for the role it needed to play. your reply is i can only answer the question in the negative. i was not aware of any submission of invasion suggesting that after you let the structures capabilities for the role it was to play, but on the 5th of march 2003, the iraq planning unit were to pay for

you and your colleagues entitled the role in iraq after saddam. i'm quoting, "this is well beyond the financial and implementing capacity of mod, and there is a risk that u.k. could become responsible for the large and expensive commitment potentially in the medium term." you saw this paper. why did this not ring alarm bells in the government's capacity to deal with the aftermath? >> well, there's two different questions. it did. for sure they needed more resources. they got in there on a budget line, and in the end, they got those resources. >> resources is one thing, but@it's about the capability. >> yeah, i was asked about the foreign office.

i wasn't asked about the capability nor about the mod's and that's for me to offer a judgment about that. on the foreign offices, i mean, look, ask a question like that, you rack your brain, you then check all the documents variable, you talk to the officials helping you with evidence, and come to a judgment if you can. the foreign office is lacking the capacity to deal with this, why wouldn't i have acknowledged it? i don't -- what i said though is i don't recall getting advice saying that the foreign office lacked the capacity, and indeed, foreign officer officials, i think, performed brilliantly in the situation, and i was pleasantly surprised from the number of people volunteering in iraq and in the way they did

that. >> you took it to mean a specific view of the capability and resources, not of the u.k.'s responsibilities. >> well, what choice did you have the invasion? well, yeah, i said -- i talkedded about the fco lacked structure, but they should have said, this answer, give me a bit more detail about, could have done more research about the u.k. government, but i was answering 68 questions and frankly couldn't answer them all, but i think exactly what was wrong with me, well that's just proof if i can explain that. >> just a few questions on the security counsel resolution 1483.

now, it was clear from the legal advice you were deceived at the beginning of 2003. the u.k. would be treated as an occupying power in that area of iraq in that society. on 8th of may 2003, sir jeremy greenstalk wrote to the president of the security counsel on behalf of the u.s., u.k. coalition partners confirming that the state's participating in coalition was strictly abided by their obligation under international law. we have seen advice from advisers dated 8th of may 2003 stating that it is important to be consistent with opposition that u.k. is not an occupying power throughout iraq through the coalition, but only in the areas where u.k. forces have established authority.

now, was it the u.k.'s position as the 8th of may that u.k. was only an occupying power in that area of iraq of which it exercised fiscal policy? >> well -- >> i want to know the position of the 8th of may. >> well, on the 8th of may there was more specific notice about that, but what was my starting point was that it was desirable, merely possible, for us to have authority over that area which we controlled and not more widely. in the vermont, there was legal advice and the attorney general. he said you occupy over iraq, and that was the end of it. i'm not -- he was the most legal adviser, not me. i have subviews but what was desirable. >> i'll come back in a moment,

but i just also want to look at on the 7th of april, you wrote to the prime minister suggesting the u.k. should consider a formal memorandum on standing with the united states specifying the need for consultation and policymaking on the activities. was it one of the main objectives of the proposals of the areas of iraq that it physically occupied? >> i don't have the draft, but i think so. we were trying to pin down whether -- ultimately, at least you whether we were formally and legally responsible for how iraq would operate our area came down to a decision by the attorney general, and that was his advice, not mine. spending a lot of time on that

issue. it wasn't a high profile festivity. he would make up his own mind, and we'd have to get on with it. what, however, we were concerned about before the invasion and certainly afterwards was trying to pin down the arrangement for cooperation and coordination with the americans which is where the proposal for mau came from in the event as i record in my answers to your questions. they refuse to do it that way. it was frustrating. >> because there's a few signs on the mau, what did it follow on the refusal that the u.k. should be named the joint occupying power? i mean, for example, australia decided not to be an occupying power. why did the failure to sign an

mou meant that we had to become a joint power? >> i don't think that the two were absolutely linked. you'd have to ask lord goldsmith that question, but my understanding from his decisions and the lessons that followed was that took the view that because not only of the number of troops on the ground in the south and the area that we were literally occupying, but also our involvement in baghdad and elsewhere that we had to have joint forces, and then i think it was more making a virtue of necessity. we judged that there might be some advantage from that from whoever was sitting alongside the bremmer in terms of having the joint power as well, so that was the way we were. it would have been desirable if

we had a clear area for which we were responsible without the americans and got on with it, but it wasn't to be. you can pin responsibility for failure to sign the mou on the americans. you can pin responsibility for the legal advice that we were responsible for in iraq on americans, and the two were not directly related. >> just to come back to the fact it was the attorney general who recommended that, that the security counsel resolution 1483 must been drafted on the basis of instructions provided by those negotiating it, and that you were an occupying power. when was the decision taken? i mean, who made that decision? >> which decision, sorry. >> to become a joint occupying power. instructions must have been given to the negotiators.

>> it was made by the attorney general. >> if i can interject, i think the advice we've seen post dates 1483. >> i would was to think about that. >> when was the decision taken to become a joint occupying power? >> i can't be certain when it was taken. my guess is it was part of a process which would have included conversations with the attorney. i can't be absolutely certain about that. >> we have not been able to find any record either. >> okay. i mean, at one stage i record recently reading a record of the minutes for which i sent to the prime minister saying in all circumstances it may be better if we end up as joint opening power, and here are the reasons,

but what i can't tell you for certain is to what extent that was me making a virtue of necessity naming where the attorney general will end up. >> you can't recall when the former decision was made, and can you recall if any decision was had by the implications of becoming a joint power? >> well, accept accepting that. sorry -- that i can't recall precisely when that was made. i'm happy to go back to the records and get further information if you want, but the, of course, we were considering the implications of our relationship with the u.s. which is where the mou started from. there was -- >> that's one aspect, but what are the implications of becoming an occupying power? >> we knew what they were because they were set out in the

relevant treaties which underpin the legal basis of being an occupying power. we knew what the legal position was, and as i say, i think i can get back and check the record. we were seeking to make it a virtue of necessity, but the fact we were going to be joint occupying power anyway, so a lot of discussion about the practical consequences and the overarching discussion was about how we best coordinated with the americans and got their positive collaboration, not only what we did in the south, but across iraq, and that was, as you know, difficult. >> on a slightly different point. >> thank you very much. >> steven patterson told us yesterday that in the late stages of the negotiation of

1483, a decision was taken to exclude visit because of a difference of opinion from members of the cabinet and increasingly uncomfortable position. he told us that the decision was yours. do you agree with that account? >> yes, i don't have a recall of it, but i'm pretty certain. i mean, i'm certain he's telling the truth number one, and i have no reason to challenge its accuracy. >> what did you think that decision, and what was the impact of that decision on the engagement? >> after i saw the evidence, i was trying to remember why i had taken that decision, and i'm being his -- fairly unprecise, i have not talked to my officials at the time about this, but the -- this was fairly close to the time in which claire short

in the event did decide to resign, i think. i think that i got wind of this, and i think the reason was that i had decided we'd settle of policy and knew what the parameters were, and we just had to get on with it. that was the reason. if i -- if any flash of recollection comes back to me on why i made that decision, i will of course report it. >> thank you. the 1483 authorized u.s. and the u.k. to the cpa to carry out a number of activities that went beyond what would have been permitted under the international humanitarian law, and a number of these activities were expressed to be done in coordination between the cpa and united nations as tone general's office advised on the 9th of

june. we asked in our statement and addressed whether you were satisfied that the appropriate mechanisms were in place and this consultation happened, and you replied it was evident that the cpa was not operating to its optimum and that action was required. now, were you satisfied that the legal requirements set out in the letter from attorney general eats office were being met. >> i can't say at this stage about the requirements being met. i don't recall being told there were legal requirements of 1483 and international law to which the u.s. and u.k. were working that had been broken. i mean, what is certainly the case is that it's kind of

practical that it wasn't working well, and you've had evidence from jeremy and john about that: >> but you didn't have a mechanism within the foreign office to keep you satisfied about the legal requirements being met, or were you relying on people on the ground as to what happened? >> well, was the legal requirement being met? there was the occupying powers had power including on the list to act as effectively as police. there were legal requirements to respect of those people and the british military forces had lawyers attached to them very greatly to ensure we were meeting those obligations, and that was our responsibility. on the wider end of this if you're talking about the extent to which the cpa were working in

cooperation with the u.n., it was absolutely a requirement and an obligation under 1483. my perception is that up until the terrorist attack on the u.n. on the 19th of august 2003, cooperation between the cpa and the u.n. was increasing, and i went to baghdad in early july, and i saw him there and talked with him. it was gradually building up. there was 100 people at least in the compound, but for that attack, i think, because of the reputation among other things, the fact he couldn't be ignored, and by that stage, you had bremmer imposed who was an

interesting character, but wanted to achieve some success that the u.n., u.s.-u.k. cooperation would have continued to enhance, but the attack of the 19th of august was before we discovered that. >> when the matter was killed, he was not replaced by a special representative, but in early 2004, he was named as a special adviser opposed to a special representative. what were the implications of that? >> well, i mean, also there was service in afghanistan as well. it's impressive international public servant, very highly respected, but he was just a sad fact of life that the attack on the 19th of august led to a

withdrawal by the u.n., and they then lost -- [inaudible] they lost many, many other staff they lost. they just pulled out. they took a long time to get any kind of representation. >> were you concerned with implications, international law, and the resolution that he was replaced by a special adviser? >> not directly. we wanted to -- with a sense i think it was a decision. the u.n. had been traumatized by that attack, and some very senior people as well as developers were killed or badly injured, and they were in a state of shock, so i was very

pleased that they managed to persuade him to go in there, and we gave him quite a lot of security because one of the problems of the compound as it turned out is it couldn't have security. ung, of course, was not responsible for -- ung, of course, was not responsible for the sort of hard end law enforcement on the ground during this period of occupation. that was a matter of the u.s. and u.k.. we didn't have any direct speedometer. >> okay. thank you. >> coming towards the end of the session, and in a few moments, i'll invite your reflections, mr. straw. there's two questions on policing i'd like to put. i'm grateful for the response in your written statement for these questions, and we've taken quite a lot of evidence on this topic. the first thing to ask is in october 2003, your private office was assuring nigel that

we have a political strategy for policing, training 30,000 iraqi police over the year. we get different accounts from people in the field. brown says really not until december that a comprehensive plan was developed, well, october or december, but looking back on it, he didn't think such a thing as a comprehensive plan had ever really existed, and i wonder how with hindsight how confident you are on the basis of the judgment made in december? >> i remember this because they were anticipated in one of your questions. you said this about british policing i mean, about being home secretary, and knew a lot of the individuals that were going on in the league.

i took a fairly close interest in this. at the time, i thought that was a reasonable judgment. that meant it would have come to me with advice behind it. i wasn't intended to exaggerate the situation. with hindsight, your question, sir john, was it accurate? i don't think it was with the benefit of hindsight, and i visited the training compound, and i visited one in mumbai, and another extraordinary figure in baghdad as well. there was a lot going on, but part of the difficulty was then getting the police on the ground and then translating into really

effective policing against the background in which the iraqi police had a poor reputation. >> thank you. i think that's a standing question as to how long it takes to create from a low port base that was there to get an effective working police system. the other question is about our own contribution. it sums itself up like this. the u.k. has had and has still an expedition military capability. they can do that, and is certainly doesn't have that kind of police capability that says something about a relative balance in the aftermath of what the military needs to provide and what the police side of the jiflian front can provide. do you accept there is a tension there? >> more than a tension if i may

say so. it's a big gap in terms of our capability, and it goes back to the very unusual structure creating a culture of the british police compared to most other police services. if you were going into a country, you are going to occupy it, you need a police style that are armed. the only police service within the united kingdom which is anything like the training expertise is the police service from northern ireland. as you well know, it's broken. from within great britain, the expertise is different. there's a limited number of armed offices. there are specialists, and offices are good at public order. they know about obtaining

consent because after all, they have to keep themselves safe as well as the area they are patrolling safe in the name. can they deal in that land between the acute end of an army's activity and tranquility? not very well. should we try to develop a u.k. capability? yes, we should i think, although , it -- and try to get some of our police service better experienced on it. it's not a natural thing to do in the way it is safe for the france or all the police service in italy. >> i could spend a lot of time on this very interesting topic. >> it is, it is. >> i'll turn to my colleagues to

see if they have any final questions to raise? can i invite your reflections on the whole iraq experience? >> one thing that would be interesting to hear if you wish to is the iran dimension. >> right. >> wmd's. >> that's a subject for another time, four hours. well, let me just if i way deal with the iran dimension first and then also some reflections which i had thought about on the subject of your inquiry. i have taken a very close interest in iran. well, really since i've become foreign secretary, and my

predecessor, robin cook, had been ready to go to iran on two occasions to try to improve relations with the then government, but on both occasions, he was put off from going i think on pressure from the israelis. prime minister i was an, to hear develop relations, and so as was our post in thai ron. immediately after 9/11, the president made this really extraordinary statement reaching out to the west and the iranians have no loss for al-qaeda at all.

they were offering cooperation as well. i went to iran. i also went straight after it to israel given the usual israeli welcome for anybody who had been on the trip of which they didn't approve. he was planning to see me, and he finally saw me at midnight. israelis seek to rough up any new foreign secretary. that's how they are, and it didn't work let me say, but we then, and i was very conscious everywhere in iran of the vulnerable position that the president of iran is in because if it's not a dictatorship, it's not a dplok. it's a very, very complex mix of

theocracy and semidemocracy. i mean, it's more opaque than the american's system. my judgment and our judgment was this was the best hope we had of improving relations on trying to get iran in from the cold, and part of me was ready to do business. you then had the decision by, which i think is almost inadvertent by president bush to include iran in the axis of evil speech. when i read president bush's speech, there's no reflections on what he did for iran at all, and there should have been because this is a major policy blunder by the united states in my view. that undermind, he very, very

significantly led to a great deal of bitterness by the reform, and it led to people elsewhere in the system saying to me and the reformists, that's what you get to reaching out to the americans. there was long term consequences with repore. during late 2002, we got wind from the ncri who is the wing of the muk terrorist organization disclosing details about iran's nuclear program, nuclear weapon's program as they claimed, and that then led to the detail negotiations that we got going. one of those, i think i said to you, sir john, in and early statement, one of the unexpected

consequences of the divisions over iraq was to lead to a determination in paris, berlin, and london, that we should not be there again if we can avoid it. the heads of government and i really set about with a will with a common position on iran which led to a letter to the iranians early in 2003 in terms of negotiations. they, in the end, found it, and i shall write about this in longer time, but they found it with the regime because they wanted sort of a grand bargain, and they needed some response from the americans including elementary stuff like parts of their -- not parts from the united states, but parts from a u.k. or european supplies for

their civilian aircraft. to export their parts, the european spliers required the permission of the u.s. otherwise they lose their u.s. markets under the act, so at the time, and not least with the influence of people like john bolten, despite the best effort that the u.k. power was not possible to get the americans to agree to those changes. there was a last effort made at negotiations between the americans and the iranians under the heart of the regime in rearl june or late may in 2005 shortly before the elections, but they were not successful, and, of course, iranians -- they are incredibly difficult to negotiate with.

they never, ever close the sale, but that said, ultimately it was going to be possible to do a deal as had happened in the past if they saw there was nothing in it for them, and then you had ahmadinejad elected in the summer of 2005, and you're familiar with the rest. now, in terms of the future, nobody was for certain whether iran does have a nuclear weapons program. there is high level of circumstantial evidence suggesting that they do. my own judgment is that they were certainly trying to build up a capability for a nuclear weapons program, and they also have a missile system. it's leery whether they have an intention of building the kit which i think is much less likely, but this is all

supposition. how do we handle it? we handle it by negotiations, by -- here i am in a different position from others, but by rather more a carrot than a stick in dealing with the iranians. they are a very important and powerful country in the middle east. they are not arab. they -- i think the handling of the west of iran shows a lack of understanding of the history, and it also as part of that shows a lack of understanding of their national psyche because only self-evident truth that this regime is not supported by a majority of iranians. they would not had to have fiddled elections. it's not supported by the majority.

the desire with international respect, the desire to show these are persons with a very fine history that they are very distinctive, they have a religion that is distinctive, and it's really interesting that they develop their own devotion of islam as we develop our version of christianity for the same reason, as an expression of nationalism in my view at the same time. this needs to be factored into this, and i think if they are, then over a period it would be possible to reach an agreement with them because they are very torn. united states is the great state, and we are a medium state for them, and there's a joke in diplomacy that if only the iranians think the u.k. is still a superpower.

they do. they think we are much more skillful than the u.s., but on the one hand, they think those things, and it's important in rhetoric. on the other hand, they want normality. they know they can be stuck in sanctions for a long time and then they sort of half never land, and they want to break away from that, but my own judgment, the short story is i think we need to have a reassessment of the oval strategy. there's an impromptu essay on the subject. now turning to the more formal part of this. the first thing i wanted to do is to express again my deep sorrow and regret for the loss of life and injuries on our coalition forces, and among many civilians of iranians and other

nationality to lost their lives in this conflict, and i hope i can say that not with standing on behalf of the reasons i explained that in the event the military action we took was justified. the only thing if i may want to say by way of conclusion is this. i hope that what i say doesn't appear to be an obvious point or impertinent. as i put together sort of what i wanted to say in conclusion today, i was reminded of a very telling phrase in a book about histories in which it says events which are now long in the past were once in the future, and looking at iraq, there is a sort of conventional wisdom, not to say semiindustry which

everything that did happen was preplanned, was inevitable, and occurred to a sinister design of president bush and prime minister blair. i have to tell you having been in the middle of all this, that that wasn't the case at all. at least at the fault of prime minister blair. there is a related point that it's inevitable as we've seen from the session is that much of the questions is bound to be about details of the written record. that's the most reliable record which is available and they are very important and i know you're frustrated by the fact that there ought to have been records available in practice, but they are not, but they're bound to be from official and governmental points of view. there is a dimension, a more difficult one to capture and convey, but equally if not more

important i suggest, and that is the atmosphere, the environment at the time and the political relationships one's experienced over quite a period before 9/11 and as well as after. i've been trying to reflect that, but it's easier to get down to the detail of who said what according to a particular minute. prime minister's blair relationship with his cabinets and party can only fully be understood by reference to his labor leaders. his success in rescuing the labor party from the wilderness which it had been stuck in for a whole generation. i spent the first 18 years of my experience in parliament in opposition, and his style, so that was why he had this influence. he wasn't -- he was much more

collaborative than he's often given credit for, but he was the dominant figure for a reason that he led a out of the wilderness of government and won two elections by this stage by a landslide. his start was less formal than others and the fact you sit in hard chairs doesn't make you a bad person nor, if i may say to so, to make a more formal process would have ordered the respect in which you saw my colleagues, the influence he had, more the outcome of the decisions, but equally, the fact of the process was frustrating for some, less formal than it should have been. i don't mean the decisions were of poor quality, but lacked the

full range of opinions in the input. to other last points i wanted to make. one is that i only served under two prime ministers, but i've been a vivacious reader of political biographies, and my perception other than post war is that each prime minister is different, but i don't subscribe to the view that sort of it's in the either that there was a golden age of cabinet government which came abruptly to an end on the 2nd of may. i don't believe that was correct, and there's different levels of formality, but i could, i wont, but two examples, could go through every prime minister after war where they didn't follow the manual of the cabinet government. i read biographies in the summer, and they record what we remember from the period is that in the end the head of the civil

service were seeking to run the government by parting the cabinet. the other example i give which is well charted in more great's -- margaret's development on the atomic bomb is atley who is chair of the cabinet, the collaborator brought everybody in, made a decision to develop the atomic bomb in complete secrecy. he didn't involve the cabinet or knew where there was a committee sitting on this with the senior opposition. it's an interesting story and it was not very much. i mention this because yes, as i

say, mr. blair's approach was less formal than others, less than if i had been in his seat, but it -- he operated as prime minister in my reading, not that differently than others except in one respect, and that is that he made a decision, advice from robin cook and myself, but he made it, that the final decision on any military action would not be taken by him, but the house of commons. it had not happened in that way ever. third, it completely changed the dynamics of the decisions, and what it meant, and this is going back to the point about capturing. much more difficult to capture because there are not records of this is that the argument about this military action was taking place in public. the cabinet had to -- we were

not just briefing them because it was a second order issue, but members of the cabinet had to be satisfied about the arguments we were presenting because they had to then make them. they had to make them to their on constituency parties, to other members of the parliamentary party because if the argument didn't stand up, ultimately if military action was recommended, it wouldn't carry through. that, i understand the frustration of some people in the system about say this different way of working, but that is another side which is a difficult side to capture, but i want to say if i may that it balances the way that ultimately the decision was made, and i mean, i people say wasn't much

debate about this. we checked. during 2002, there were 35,000 articles in british national newspapers on iraq. that's more than 100 a day. that's not a substitute for cabinet discussion, # but it shows the intensity of the debate in which the way cabinet members knew in all sorts of forms being challenged about the forms. last point if i may because it's what i gather to be the last. in all evidence in public is if i may, and this is in regard to thank you for your labors on behalf of the witnesses. >> well, a moment for thanks all around. can i thank our witness, mr. jack straw for your long session of evidence today, and not the first one. i have a few concluding remarks. t