committee of union and progress. this revolutionary regime had really taken the sultan of the ottoman empire and made them into -- made him into their puppet. the sold by the way was also the caliph of islam which is to say the most important figure in the islamic religion. now, i want to mention also that in 1914 before world war i began, great britain had middle eastern interest, significant middle eastern interest because it controlled the suez canal and dependent upon maintaining control of the suez canal.

>> which today would be considered, i guess, the westernmost portion of saudi arabia was called the grand sharif hussein. this man. the grand sharif hussein was a direct descendant of the prophet, mohamed, and in fact, only direct descendants and there were two branches of the family could occupy this position. the grand sharif hussein was an extremely important figure in the muslim world because it

included within it the two most holy islamic cities, mecca and medina. and then also, of course, he's an important figure in the islamic world because of his heritage as a descendant of the prophet. now, the grand sharif hussein nurtured ambitions in 1914. he was already thinking, probably, about establishing himself as the hereditary ruler of an independent country. certainly, he wanted at the least much more autonomy within the ottoman empire. he was not the only arab nationalist in the world in 1914 by any stretch of theimagination. in fact, various groups situated throughout the middle east were already talking about autonomy or, possibly even independence.

the first arab international congress met in paris in 1914. that same year, 1913, the sharif hussein sent his son, abdullah, his second son but the one he depended upon most at this point, to meet with british officials in egypt. and abdullah did so. he spoke with the british consul general, horatio kitchener, an extraordinary figure, and also with kitchener's oriental secretary, a younger man named sir ronald stores. this figure. and what did abdullah want? and the answer is, he wanted machine guns. he wanted to know if britain would support his father in a rebellion against the ottoman empire, the turks. the british turned him down,

explaining to him that they wanted to maintain friendly relations with the ottoman empire. but then, of course, world war i began. britain feared, quite correctly, that the ottoman empire would side with the germans, and then what would happen? well, they feared that british muslim subjects living in egypt and in the i -- in in the sudan and above all in india, in be present day pakistan, would heed the call of the ottoman sultan who would demand that they wage holy war against turkey's enemies, that they would wage a jihad. and then they recalled their pre-war conversations with abdullah, and they rethought

perhaps they would support a rebellion against the ottomans after all. and what they were thinking was that the grand sharif of hussein of mecca and medina, such an important figure in the islamic world, would blunt the call for jihad of the calif in con assistant nope l. in fact, they thought more than that. they tried to figure out how they could win over the grand sharif hussein, and kitchener had stores inquire, well, will -- we will support you if you rebel. would you like to reconsider? and if you do, we could even think about your replacing the sultan as calif of islam. thus i began a fateful -- thus

began a fateful correspondence. it was carried on between emissaries of the british empire and the grand sharif hussein. now, kitchener when he, when the war broke out happened to be in london, and he was soon appointed secretary of war. he did not go back to egypt. he was replaced by this man, sir henry mcmahon. and mcmahon conducted the correspondence with hussein. this is one of the most infamous correspondences in history. i choose this portrait of mcmahon because i think just possibly it suggests that he was a complex individual and perhaps not easy in his conscious. but i may be reading too much

into the picture. mcmahon, at any rate, in these letters to hussein promised british support for an independent arab kingdom of which hussein would be the leader. what precise form it would take was left unclear. it could be, probably, some federation of arab states of which hussein would be like an emperor or sultan, something like that. but what would be the boundaries of this independent arab entity? well, here much depends upon the translation of certain english words into arabic and then into -- much depends on how hussein understood those words. and it didn't help matters that stores, the man whose picture you just saw, was doing the translations, and stores admits in his memoirs that his

understanding of arabic was, quote, imperfect. [laughter] anyway, historians have parsed these letters with a fine-toothed comb. zionists and supporters of mcmahon have concluded that mcmahon meant to exclude palestine from the proposed arab kingdom, but he didn't say so unambiguously. arabs and critics of mcmahon have claimed that mcmahon included palestine in the envisioned arab independent state. i cannot possibly solve this dispute. but what i can do and what is

beyond dispute is the following, what i can say and what is indisputable is the following: mcmahon was intentionally vague in those letters. as he wrote to his former chief who was called lord harding and who is now a very important official in the foreign office who had been the viceroy of india under whom mcmahon had served, here is what mcmahon wrote to him, and i'm quoting from a letter. what we have to arrive at now is to tempt the arab people into the right path, te tap them -- detach them from the enemy and bring them on to our side. this on our part is at pregnant largely a matter -- at present largely a matter of words, and to succeed we must be use persuasive terms and abstain from academic haggling over conditions. well, mcmahon was successful.

the letters were convincing. hussein agreed to launch a rebellion against the common enemy, the ottoman empire. and, in fact, it commenced in june, 1916. meanwhile, back in london the british realized that they had better bring their french allies into the picture. and so they deputed an extraordinary individual whose name was sir mark sykes. that man was already an adviser to the government on the middle east. they deputed him to speak for them. sir mark sykes. the french chose as their representative in the discussions that were about to take place this man, francois

george pequot. now, the two men went into the french foreign office and pulled out maps and crayons. they assumed that their countries would defeat the ottoman empire, and they proceeded to redraw the map of the middle east in their own interests or in the interests of great britain and france as they understood those interests to be. very broadly, the french would get control over what today we call syria, and they colored crayons. and the british would gain control of mesopotamia, and they colored that red on the map. now, i should possibly explain in area a and area b, that was where the envisioned independent

arab kingdom would be. but in area a, the independent arabs would have french advisers whose advice they must accept -- [laughter] and in area b the same was true for the british. now, by the way, they also -- you'll see there's another color on the map, and that's because they recognized that palestine was different. palestine was different because jerusalem is located there, jerusalem contains holy sites to the three most important religions of the bid. period. and so they colored it brown, and they agreed that although, actually, the french would get part of what today is northern israel, but as for the rest of it, it would be governed by an international consortium of powers or condominium of powers

they also called it, and they colored it brown. this is, simply, old-fashioned your mean imperialism. there's no other description of it -- european imperial im. at british prompting and with british help, the grand sharif hussein proceeded with a rebellion against you are turke. he may or may not have thought that palestine would be part of his new kingdom. he certainly did not know that in any event the european allies had the boundaries of his future kingdom planned out for him, plus their own roles within it. now, this was deceitful. and certain british officials understood as much, and it drove them crazy. and the most famous example of such a figure is t.e. lawrence,

lawrence of rain ya as we all know him -- arabia as we all know him. and you see i chose this depiction because, again, he looks to me troubled. i may read much too much into these depictions. but in any event, here is what he wrote in a letter. quote, we are getting them -- that is to say the arabs -- we are getting them to fight for us on a lie, and i can't stand it. and he was not the only british official to be so troubled. all right. back in london again there was another group that took a profound interest in palestine. namely, the zionists. zionists are jewish nationalists, and the zionists were saying that palestine, the homeland of jews in ancient

times, should be its homeland again. it was currently part of the ottoman empire. the ottomans, they realized, would not give it back to them. they had tried and tried and tried. it was impossible. in 1897 an austrian journalist named theodore hertzel founded the world zionist federation. the aim of this group was to persuade the great powers of europe to bring pressure to bear upon the ottomans, upon the turks on behalf of zionism. well, by 1914 the zionists had not been successful. zionism had a world presence by then. it had a world organization, in

fact, with headquarters in berlin. in great britain zionism was weak. britain in 1914 had a population of close to 45 million. it had a jewish population of about 900,000 -- 300,000. of those 300,000, 8,000 were zionists, and they were organized in several competing groups. the fact is that about 292,000 british people, british jews thought of the zionists as impractical visionaries and dreamers. it's not that they were unfriendly. in fact, events were to prove that there was much latent support within the jewish community for zionism. but they were too busy we wering livings -- earning livings,

going about their business to pay a lot of attention to impractical dreamers as they deemed them. that's the majority. some jews in great britain objected strongly to zionism. they argued that jews share a culture and a belief system, but that they do not constitute a distinct and separate nation. these jews, anti-zionist jews, argued that jews can practice their beliefs anywhere and that they should assimilate in the countries in which they lived now, 1914 say. they could be jews in england or in france or in the united states. these people, these anti-zionist jews were called assimilationists because they

believed that jews should assimilate many their countries. in their countries. they argued that the zionists who claimed that the true homeland for jewish people was palestine were opening up all jews to the charge of dual allegiance and that this would only encourage anti-semites. palestine will become the world's ghetto, one of them said. the leader of the anti-zionist jews in england was louis yen wolf -- lucien wolf. this man. now, world war i began. the zionists in great britain were appalled as was everybody else. but on the other hand, they quickly realized that the war presented a great opportunity to

zionism. if british won the war, that would mean they had defeated the ottomans. the ottomans they considered to be the main obstacle to the realization of their dream for palestine. what they hoped was that british victory would lead to a british protectorate over palestine and the british would then allow massive jewish immigration into that country. now, the zionists in great britain who understood this best and quickest and who acted most decisively -- hmmm. there we go. l chaim weizmann. he was russian by birth, he had

left russia and become a chemist. he had earned his degree in switzerland. he practiced -- well, he became a professor at the university of manchester. in england. in 1914weizmann was a relatively obscure figure in the british zionist movement. and no one would have predicted at that point that he would emerge as the leading advocate of zionism in great britain. in fact, this man became not only that, but as i'm sure many of you, probably most of you know he became the first president of israel. why should he have catapulted into the front rank? i see a number of reasons. he was, it turns out, probably uniquely able to charm the

british governing elite. teach to them the principles of his movement, zion itch. zionism. moreover, he somehow managed to persuade them something that we know simply was not true, namely that the vast majority of jews were zionist. and then there was something else about weizmann, he was one of a very small number who were able -- it's a form of political jiu-jitsu. he could turn anti-semitic prejudices to his own advantage and to the advantage of his movement. how? well, many people among the british leadership accepted stereotypes about jews, that they represented somehow a vast

subterranean influence upon the world. that they were important in world finance, that they were it looked as though bolsheviks would soon take that country out of the war. at weizmamn's subtle prompting, the british governing elite drew what seemed to them to be the logical conclusion. in order to win the war, they needed the support of this powerful if subterranean group. in order to get their support, they must win over the zionists. and to do that they must offer them palestine. hence, the balfour declaration. this was weizmann's extraordinary achievement, and it was based on an absolutely colossal bluff because we all

know the jews did not represent a vast, powerful, subterranean influence. and certainly all jews were not zionists. so let's see where we've got to now. through the mcmahon/hussein correspondence, great britain had won arab support. they had allowed the leader of the arab rebellion, the grand sharif hussein, to believe that britain would support the establishment of an independent arab kingdom. now, historians and partisans argue over whether or not the arabs believed from the outset that palestine would be part of that kingdom. we can leave that alone. it's indisputable that mcmahon was intentionally vague about that and about much else.

simultaneously, britain was wooing the zionists and, in fact, won zionist support by promising to support the establishment of a home for the jews in palestine. and this they did unambiguously in the famous balfour dem la ration. declaration. so jews after november 1917 believed that they would inherit palestine in one way or another. they had it in writing. the arabs believed, quite likely, that palestine would form part of an independent arab kingdom that the british supported. but they had only mcmahon's intentionally vague letters on this matter. now, there is yet another dimension to this story which further complicates it and which constitutes my original contribution.

from the moment that turkey entered the war, there were british people who wanted to arrange a separate peace with the ottomans. now, understand the zionists believed that turkish control over palestine was their greatest obstacle. they wanted total victory over turkey. the institution of a british protectorate there and then integration into palestine for jewish people. the arab people believed, right, that they would have to help defeat the ottoman empire and that they would have their own independent kingdom. so they, too, like the zionists were unambiguously, unalterably

opposed to britain negotiating a separate peace during the war with the ottoman empire. who in great britain favored the separate peace? well, there were a small number of british miss rims -- muslims in the country. they lacked political influence, they lacked connections. but they i felt deeply -- they felt deeply that it was a tragedy for great britain whose empire included 100 million muslim subjects to be at war with the greatest muslim empire, the ottoman empire. and so they were in favor of a separate peace. then there were what i call in the book british turkophiles. these were british people who believed that their country should return to britain's traditional policy, one that had

been shaped by the great british conservative leader benjamin israeli who, by the way, had been born jewish although he was baptized at age, i think, 12 or something, 11 or something. anyway, his policy had been that britain should maintain the ottoman empire because it would act as a bulwark, it would keep the russians from ever coming through the straits of the dardanelles and down into the mediterranean sea which the british didn't want. so there were british turkophiles who wanted great britain to return to the old policy. there were, also, more liberal british turkophiles who believed that the ottoman government for all its faults and drawbacks was a more progressive and liberal government and a more suitable ally for great britain than

tsarist russia which, of course, was the most tyrannical and backward of all the great powers. so british muslims, british turkophiles. the turkophiles did have some influence. they organized pressure groups, they recruited important members of parliament from all the parties and members of both houses, commons and lord, also men of letters, businessmen who had interests throughout the ottoman empire. they formed a not insignificant pressure group called the anglo ottoman society. and then, more important, were the so-called easterners. now, the easterners were men in the british government. they had come to the conclusion that britain and france would never defeat germany on the western front. that was a killing field. there was no way to victory by

just blasting through the western front. and so a back door must be found. well, that door was located in turkey. it could either be kicked open, or it could be opened by turks themselves. well, they couldn't kick it open. they tried in the famous campaign at gallipoli. the man most associated in the early stages of the war with this group of easterners was none other than winston churchill, and he was one of the architects of the ill-fated campaign at gallipoli, and he paid the political price. but there were many others, and the easterners now concluded that they couldn't batter down the door, and so they must find a way to open it by agreement. and so we come -- i, i show you

marmaduke pickfall mainly because i love his name. [laughter] i have to say he does not play a hugely important role. [laughter] he is the first to try seriously to persuade the british government to open a back door to turkey. he was the son of an anglican vicka -- vicar, and he converted to islam. he is famous, actually, for having written the first translation of the koran into english. he was the author of many novels about life in the ottoman empire. but his effort was stymied by a friend of his, actually, none other than sir mark sykes. and so sykes made sure that he was denied a passport to travel to switzerland to meet with dissident turks there about maybe a separate peace.

the second man who made a concerted effort to persuade the government and the turks to come together to talk matters over was a businessman who is so obscure that i could not find a photograph of him. his name was j.r. pilling. pilling turned out to be totally unreliable, a rogue, irresponsible. he had private reasons for wanting a separate peace with turkey which was to get rich again. and so we won't spend much time on him either. but now be we get to the important men. henry morgenthau had been the american ambassador to turkey. he knew woodrow wilson. he had been an important fundraiser for the democratic party. he and wilson talked about

getting turkey out of the war. and wilson sent morganthau on a mission, ostensibly to palestine, to check on the condition of jews in palestine during the war. but really morganthau was supposed to meet with turks and talk to them secretly about getting out of the war. and the reason why an american could to this particularly well was because the united states and turkey were not at war. they had not declared war upon each other. the united states was at war with germany and us a try. >> ya and so on -- austria and so on, but not with turkey. well, weizmann back in london learned about this expedition. he stormed into the foreign office to protest, by now -- and we're talking about june 1917 --

he had entre to the foreign office. the foreign office calmed him down. it had come to oppose morganthau's mission. why? it had at first been favorable, favorably disposed. but it had to be kept secret. if people learned about it, then they might begin to think that britain wasn't confident it could win the war. and, unfortunately, this mission was not kept secret. it turned out that morganthau couldn't keep a secret to save his life which is why someone like weizmann could learn about it in london never having spoken with morganth automobileau at a. weismann said, send me to stop morganthau. the british foreign office agreed and sent him to gibraltar.

and there weizmann did it. every historian, every historian writes that this was a bra view rah performance. and, of course, it was. it was. he dominated henry morgan thaw. and he simply persuaded him to turn around and not continue with this mission. and morganthau really crept back to the united states with his tail between his legs. and then the foreign office sent weizmann to paris where the prime minister, lloyd george, and the foreign secretary -- none other than arthur balfour -- were at a meeting with other allied leaders. and lloyd george and balfour were fulsome in their praise of chaim weizmann. however, simultaneously the foreign office was arranging for an extraordinary figure, my new favorite historical figure,

aubrey herbert. this man. to go to switzerland and talk to the turks about a separate peace. exactly -- or, i mean, within days of having sent weizmann to gibraltar to stop morganthau o to talk to the turks about a separate peace, they sent aubrey herbert to switzerland that talk to the turks about a separate peace. i should just take a minute to explain to you about aubrey herbert. he was the son of an early, he was the half brother of the man who discovered the tomb of tutankhamun. he was the model for sandy who is the hero of the great thriller by john bucken, "green mantle." this man was the model for that figure.

before the war he explored the ottoman empire. he was a great expert which is why they could send him to talk to turks. he rode with bandits in albania, he also spent time, clearly, with more respectable elements in albania because he was twice offered the banal yang throne -- the albanian throne which he wanted to accept, and the foreign office would never let him. [laughter] now, let me just say again, just as the foreign office was dispatching weizmann to checkmate morganthau, they were sending herbert to discuss the possibility of a separate peace with the turks. weizmann never knew about this, and no other historian of the balfour declaration has written about it either. so herbert headed for

switzerland, and it is like reading about a thriller. by john bucken. i have his diary. he traveled to switzerland ostensibly to recover from war wounds. really, of course, to meet turks which he did in safehouses. he picked up messages on railway platforms, and he returned from switzerland to paris where lloyd george and balfour were at that meeting. the proposals said, basically, that a group of disdepartment turks -- dissident turks were prepared to overthrow the c -- c.u.p. government if they received certain guarantees. lloyd george and balfour received aubrey herbert two days after receiving weizmann.

they had congratulated weizmann on stopping the separate peace initiative of morganthau, now lloyd george, a confirmed easterner. he could not get the idea of a separate peace out of his head. he didn't know about marmaduke pickthal. he understood very early that pilling was a rogue who who coud not be trusted. he opposed loose lips morganthau, and he feared -- correctly -- that herbert was talking only to the term he uses as second raters in switzerland. and so he chose someone else. he had another instrument for pursuing a separate peace with turkey. none to of the men i've mentiond so far, but rather basil sa

zaharoff who was the most infamous be arms dealer of the generation. and some of you may remember the television, the english television production sydney reilly, ace of spies. and in that production they have a figure who portrays basil zaharoff. now, zaharoff early in the war received word from a former turkish minister to greece and austria whose name was abdul karim. zaharoff knew him. how? he had bribed him many a time, he writes in his letters, during the prewar years. and now, i think, to cut short a

long, complicated and absolutely riveting story for full details of which, please, read the book -- [laughter] abdul karim and zaharoff -- well, karim told zaharoff that he represented one of the triumvirate of turkey. and that he was willing to make a deal with the british about a separate peace. zaharoff got this message to lloyd george. lloyd george understood immediately, of course, that pasha was at the top, and he empowered zaharoff to meet karim in switzerland to find out what would be turkey's terms for a separate peace. now, please, understand the foreign office, the war office knew about j.r. pilling.

the foreign office and the cabinet knew about aubrey i herbert -- aubrey herbert. only lloyd george and the chancellor of the ec check corps who was the conservative leader, ann -- andrew law knew about zaharoff, and you may ask why law? and the answer is because he was the chancellor, and he would be responsible for arranging a multimillion dollar bribe. that would go, first of all, to abdul karim and then a huge sum for enjer -- enver to bribe the necessary officials and then to go with about a dozen other turkish leaders and live happily ever after in new york city. [laughter] notice, arthur balfour, the head

of the foreign office, did not know about this. so let me try here just to explain the layers of intrigue. number one, surely is zionists would have been outraged to learn about the various missions i've just described to you. because a separate peace would have allowed turkey to maintain control of palestine. they knew about morganthau, but they believed that he had been defeated and that the movement for a separate peace with turkey had been defeated. they were wrong, and the british did not enlighten them. this then, obviously, the arabs would likewise have been outraged to learn that the british were secretly negotiating with the arabs since they were involved in a rebellion against the arabs at british behest. against the ottomans, i beg your pardon.

but you understood what i was trying to say. okay. three, aubrey herbert would have been astonished to learn about basil zaharoff. he thought that he was representing the british government in its exploration of the separate peace with turkey. but, of course, lloyd george to whom he reported never said a word. and then again let me underline lloyd george never told balfour about zaharoff's mission. this just as lloyd george was about to put his name on the famous declaration promising british support for the establishment of a national home for the jewish people in palestine. so lloyd george was willing to double cross the zionists, the arabs and his own foreign secretary in order to at least explore a separate peace with turkey. when i realized that this was

the case, that the two were at cross purposes, i asked diplomatic historian friends of mine if it this was possible, ad they said, okay. it happens all the time. [laughter] so -- now, meanwhile, i'm not an historian of turkey and of the ottoman empire, but from the british documents i understand that there was a darker picture of intrigue and we trail on that side -- betrayal on that side. aside from enver, the other great turkish leader during this period was a man called telat. at one point zaharoff asked abdul karim what enver was planning for telat because telat was not being mentioned in these discussions. and abdul karim said, and i quote from the letters that zaharoff was writing for lord george, i myself will give him

in other words, he would poison him. now, unknown to abdul karim, unknown to enver, telat had simultaneously begun exploring a separate peace and, in fact, he had been behind the overtures to pickthal, pilling and most important of all, to aubrey herbert. all right. now, zaharoff met abdul karim several times in switzerland during the summer and fall of 1917. but the climax came on the 7th of january -- 27th of january, 1918. enver's wife was living out the war on the swiss border with -- maybe swiss/austrian border, i'm not sure. in any event, enver was able to sneak into switzerland.

zaharoff traveled to switzerland. he did not meet face to face with enver. rather, abdul karim shuttled between the two men. he was, zaharoff explained to lloyd george, a human telephone. lloyd george had provided zaharoff with his negotiating position. for our purposes the most important part of it includes the following words, and i'm quoting: palestine will not be a next or incorporated in the british empire. note, this is nearly three months after publication of the balfour declaration. had enver accepted zaharoff's offer, no one would think a great deal about the balfour declaration today. it would have been sidelined by

history. it would be merely another of the many beautiful promises made during the war by politicians of all partieses and in all countries to persuade men to go on fighting and dying. and it would count, as i say, about as much as the other promises that we do know were made and with which, of course, were later ignored. no annexations and no indemnities for open covenants openly arrived at or war to end all wars. however, enver did not accept. why did he not accept? because this is january 1918. russia has just been defeated and is coming out of the war, and enver now thought that turkey and germany could prevail after all.

let me be clear, though, the main reason why britain and turkey never concluded a separate peace is that whenever one party was really and truly interested in it because it could see no other way to prevail, the other party was not so interested because at that particular moment the war was going well for it. before britain was willing to zig, turkey was about to zag. and, thus, it p continued -- it continued right through to the end of the war. let me conclude. too often historians have deemed the declaration which pears the -- bears the name of this man, arthur balfour, to have been the inevitable product of chaim weizmann's brilliant

campaign to educate and win over the british governing elite to the zionist program. well, weizmann conducted a brilliant campaign to win them over. nevertheless, the ball fort declaration was the highly contingent result of a torturous process that might have turned out very, very differently. and that process was characterized as much by deceit and betrayal as by adherence to principles and liberal values. and today we have only touched the tip of the iceberg so far as deceit and betrayal go. during world world war i then, n sowed -- that is to say planted -- dragon's teeth in the middle east. their fruit; suspicion, resentment, recrimination, hatred and eventually following the greek myth about the sowing

of dragon's teeth, new soldiers rose up from the ground. and sad to say, tragically, theorizing still. they are rising still. that's the talk. thank you. [applause] [audio difficulty]

>> first of all, the last issue of christian -- [inaudible] there were three reviews of the book dealing primarily with the balfour declaration. and -- premillennial christianity having a major emphasis towards the adapted declaration. you didn't discuss that at all. i was wondering if you discussed that at all for your book. >> i assume everyone could hear the question? >> yes. i don't discuss it enough in the book as several reviewers have pointed out to me. [laughter] here is my understanding, okay?

yes, lloyd george, for example, was a -- lloyd george was brought up in the welsh chapels. he hue the bible -- knew the bible very, very well. he once said something like the geography of palestine is more familiar to me than the geography of britain. was he then at some level a christian zionist? the answer is, yes, at some level. let me also say about balfour. balfour, i know because i've read weizmann's letter, was moved to tears when we disirks disirks -- weismann told him the story of jewish suffering over the centuries.

however, lloyd george was capable of making anti-semitic remarks which i do document in the book, actually. balfour told weizmann that he shared some of the antisemitick postulates -- anti-semitic postulates, that was the phrase, of the daughter of the great composer. what are we to think? these men held opposing notionses about the jews in their own heads. did they at some level take satisfaction in thinking that their policies would lead to the fulfillment m of biblical prophesy? perhaps. did that shape and form -- shape let alone determine british foreign policy during the war towards the zionists, towards the arabs, towards the turks?

i don't believe it for a minute. i, i think the book will show that there were many other hard, more hard-headed reasons for the policies that they followed. >> question. >> how did you get interested in the subject, and what steps did you take to do the research? and now that you did all this research, did you say, has it led you to anything else that you want to further explore? >> i got interested in the subject for several reasons. the first reason was not determinative, but was -- it played a small role, and it was this: i promised my father that i would go through the family

papers which were in a mess. and i did so and went through my grandfather's papers and discovered that he had saved a menu from a dinner at the waldorf-astoria in the 1920s to honor chaim weizmann. and i didn't know anything about this or about my grandfather's ideas, and so that just sort of lodged in my head. then i read a book by margaret mcmill lin called paris 1919 which is about the framing of the treaty of versailles and which is a quite brilliant book and which brilliantly succeeds at anticipating, but also -- anticipating, but also at teaching an audience not composed of family members and graduate students. and i thought i would like to do something like that someday. and trying to think about what i could write with my ec per tease -- expertise as a british

historian, i came up with the balfour declaration which coincided nicely with this discovery of mine in family papers. now, what was the second part of that question? how did -- >> [inaudible] [laughter] >> uh, that's -- >> [inaudible] >> i'll probably totally shift, but i'm waiting to see. that's not -- it will not be connected with the middle east. [laughter] so -- yes. >> as i recall -- [inaudible] >> yes. >> churchill -- [inaudible] what is today palestine and what is today jordan -- [inaudible] due to british promises, that just never occurred. >> well, as you say, it's a

long, complicated process. the very short outline is this. i could go back to that map, i suppose, but essentially, let's see, the grand sharif hussein wound up only as the king of the is ask hejaz -- as the king of the hejaz, and then he was booted out in 1924, and he went and lived with one of his sons forever after. faisal had thought he would become king of an independent syria. and, in fact, for a very short period of time he was. but this conflicted with the french interests in the middle east. and so they kicked him out, and he was given a consolation prize which was to be really the puppet ruler of iraq under the

british. and then the other brother, abdullah, and, you see, this goes past my period, so i'm not an expert. but he does become eventually, of course, the king of what they called transjordan which is now jordan. and his family is still the hereditary ruling family in that country. >> [inaudible] the british wanted abdullah to go to damascus. he kind of stopped in -- i'm sorry -- [inaudible] he said, no, i like it here, and that was one of the problems that, again, that became jordan. >> well, you're going beyond my period of expertise. they certainly did not -- here, you see, the british, the british are juggling so many different balls in the air at once, so they're juggling the arabs, but also the french. the french were determined to have damascus. so i do not believe that in the early 1920s the british were

saying to abdullah, you can have damascus. the french had it. so i don't think that. i could be mistaken. but at any -- >> it's been a while. >> yeah. i don't think so. i don't think so. and during, i mean, in the book i do speculate if, you see, faisal who was with another son of the grand sharif hussein and his army are trying to move, to press north from above the gulf of act baa up to damascus. if they could have gotten there and taken it before november 2, 1917, in other words, if an arab army had been in possession with guns and weapons and so forth, i'm not sure that the balfour declaration would ever have been written. but they didn't get there until the end of 1918. >> let's do one last question here. what became of mr. balfour, and what was -- [inaudible] afterwards