essentially, they missed it by 20 years. they were right in almost everything they predicted. but then equally remarkable is how far c irk a is -- cia is off the mark in 1978. .. unless we did something yesterday, tomorrow there will be a resolution and there won't be any shah. these changes, the changes that came about and recalled the

white revolution essentially prepared for the revolution. in this way. the idea behind this revolution was very much the modernization idea popular in the american social science community. the idea that you need to modernize a society. you need to modernize the infrastructure. you need to educate people. you need to enfranchise women. you need to increase urbanization and if you have a middle-class, if you have a -- woman, if you have a technocrat in charge of a bureaucracy that is confident, then society can have progress and then democracy can come. so essentially a package deal. the shah was going to jettison his traditional social base of power. bashaw's asic power, everybody understood this in 1958. bashaw's basic social power was a hateocracy, the nematic

chieftain, the clergy that have been behind him and continued to support him. the military and some element of iran's industrial middle-class or upper-class. that was to create a larger middle class, the idea was to do away with the feudal system. the idea was to create technocratic, educated middle class that would be the shah's basic support. what happened unfortunately was that in the process of change, the united states and united states and i ran both underwent important changes. 1965, the price of oil begins to change. and from 1966, the shah literally no longer needs american aid. if the 1962, and he comes to the white house and says i want a military of 150,000, kennedy

says no you will have to bring it to 20,000. kennedy won the argument because kennedy was paying for the military. the united states was essentially underwriting iran's military. i ran was the biggest recipient of u.s. foreign aid from 1953 to 1961. it is estimated that the u.s. gave the shot more than $1.5 billion in aid. it is a remarkable sum in that period. but from 65 on, the shah in the longer needed this. in fact, from 74, it was the rest that now needed to shah's money. the shah went on the cia landing bench. he gave away about $1.5 billion to anyone who came begging, from london's mayor asking for money to rebuild the water system in

london to zimbabwe, to pakistan. anybody who came, france, american companies, american companies on the verge of bankruptcy. they came, got their money and they went back. with economic independence came political independence. the shot no longer needed to heat american pressure to democratize. moreover, nixon had come to power in the united states. and nixon had implemented what was called the nixon doctrine and i argue in the look about the development of the doctrine and how shah was influential in the development of the nixon doctrine but the nixon doctrine said basically give the shah what he wants and don't let him about democracy. and bugging shah about democracy

is something that every u.s. administration from roosevelt to carter had done with the exception of nixon. it is precisely during the nixon era where these economic changes of the shah was bringing about, where iranian society turned into a new social fabric, new modern middle-class was coming. the agricultural revolution had completely changed the fabric of the iranian countryside and the iranian cities. the best example, if you want to know what that revolution did to iran is follow the life of ahmadinejad. i have written an article in the boston review called in many biography of ahmadinejad. ahmadinejad captures what i'm talking about. his family was living in a small village.

by early 60 they decided they can't survive in the village because there was a change. feudalism had ended. there was no infrastructure of support. they came to tehran. they became dwellers in these marginal new neighborhoods. and who is there to sing the song of revolution in their ears? the clergy. why is it only the clergy who are there to sing the songs of the revolution? because every other force in iran, from the left to the right was decimated by the shah. the shah believed his authoritarianism was the necessary step to progress and iran made remarkable progress in this period. iran during the early 70s was sometimes registering 20% increase in gmp. 20%. it is a remarkable change. i have seen some statistics on i

ran in 1925, when the dynasty took over and i ran in 1978, when this crisis begins, it's a remarkable time for other countries on the verge of complete collapse. to a country with a burgeoning middle class, a burgeoning capitalist economy, with an industrial base that is competitive with south korea, with an industrial base that is competitive with turkey at the time. look at every social indicator in that period. iran is very much in the same league, in the same ballpark as turkey. this is a remarkable change, but it had come at the price of democracy. at it, the price of no political opposition in the country. the only group allowed to organize and mobilize, the only group allowed to create social clubs for themselves and they didn't call a social clubs. they called call that a mosque.

they didn't call it a social club. they called it -- they didn't call it training seminars. they called at summer camp for the pious. the clergy created from 1941 to 1979, a remarkably subtle, complicated, multifaceted network of organizations that went everywhere from the mosque. the terrorist organization led by a young man to the most benign classes teaching the study of the koran. this network encouraged by the shah was the only force ready, capable of holding the country together in late 1978, when the u.s. and britain both, about the same time, october 78 is when

both countries decide that the shah cannot any longer stay in power. and he can't stay in power primarily because he is given in times of crisis. the shah had shown he cannot withstand pressure in 1953. the shah had shown he was not the man to stay in the ring and fight it out. he was not saddam hussein. he was much more likely to flee the scene of the crisis if they crisis arose. he almost left the country five times before 1953. and in 1978, when the british and the americans began to see the rise of the movement and iran and began to see the shah incapable of making decisions, they began to look for what the british prime minister called a way to reinsurer. they wanted to look for somebody who they could form a pact with,

they could allow the country. who emerges on the scene? the clergy. this network that they have created. and to place his hand brilliantly, a man by the name of khomeini who had risen to national prominence by opposing the right of a woman's vote, by opposing land reform. by opposing the status of forces agreement with the united states by using legally anti-semitic rhetoric against israel in 1962. he was exiled in 1964. he lived from 64 to 77 -- 78 in exile, and he wrote some of the most remarkably antidemocratic, anti-modern credence is ever penned in modern version of language. nobody and iran was allowed to read them, because he was a band

person. his works were banned. and no iranian, except the very few radicals, headed for redwood khomeini really intended to do. he had said very clearly what he was going to do. but in late 78, the astute politician that he was, he recognized that that is not going to win him the day. iranians wanted democracy. every indication in the 1978 revolution was not about economics. as i told you, iran's progress was remarkable. it wasn't about anything else other than political freedom. there was more cultural freedom in iran in 1978, 77, than any other month -- muslim country in the middle east.

iranians were essentially free to live their private lives anyway they wanted. for the first and last time in the history of iran, jewish, christian and even members of the religion persecuted by the current regime were persecuted before, achieved more or less legal equality with everyone else. some of iran's greatest industrialists in this period were members of the bakhtiyar jewish community of iran. iran had 150,000 jewish living and iran. today still iran has more jewish than all of the other muslim countries put together, 20,000 to 25,000 people living in iran but in 1975 there was 150,000 people. they had more or less religious qualities. women were beginning to get equal rights under the law.

they were beginning to get the right to vote. countries through islamic prescription, but these were not with the people were interested in. people wanted political freedom. they wanted a share and the political decision-making. the shah had made a bet, and i don't say this metaphorically. he almost literally made the bet. by giving the iranians and economically prosperous life, he is going to quiet them from demanding. he is going to release them from demanding the political right. he was trying to do in iran in 1975 what we today call the china model. what china is doing today, the shah did in 75 and failed, which is give people a great deal of economic freedom. give them some modicum of

prosperity and then, as a return, demand that they do not engage in the equal power sharing and the political domain. people got the economic welfare that was created as a result of the heightening price of oil, the heightening price of oil that the shah had a lot to do with but nevertheless they were not interested in any of these things. they were not interested even in the rise of women. the left's chastise these as mere decoration. they wanted political rights. khomeini appears on the horizon, and says to everybody, including to the americans, which he volunteers to contact. i have found some remarkable documents about the extent of the regime, the current regime's leaders, contact with the american officials in the month

before the revolution. the same regime that today is putting people in prison because they simply cope an american official who was actively seeking and establishing contact with the americans. both khomeini in paris and his allies in tehran. they realized, khomeini realize, that what the americans were looking for was a force that could hold the country together, keep the consonants out of iran so the union was the soviet union in those days and keep the oil running. in a letter that khomeini rights to carter, he more or less is exactly what i told you. he says what do you want? do you want the oil to flow? do you want the country to be held together? we will do all of these things. tell the till the military to stop supporting bakhtiyar and

that is exactly what the american government did. the american government interceded on behalf of khomeini, with the military. the general was very much involved in telling the iranian leadership that the u.s. will not support a coup in favor of the shah, that the future belongs to the regime. and, i must say, it was the ignorance, not the ambitiousness solomon was the american ambassador to iran at the time. i didn't really believe that khomeini was going to create a democratic regime. because, like the rest of the iranian society, he had not read khomeini's work. he had been talking to some of the iranian democrats and some of the iranian intellectuals and they had all told them what khomeini was saying to everybody publicly. khomeini promised more than oncs

of times. he gave more than 110 interviews in paris in the three months that he was in paris. he gave more than 110 interviews to foreign correspondents. not once does he mention the word -- which is the rule or the guardianship of the jurist council, the guardianship of the clergy which is the iranian regime today. not once. in fact, repeatedly, when he was asked whether the government of iran was going to be a government of the clergy, he said absolutely not. he said, i myself will go to the city, a seminary school not far from tehran and will leave all the power to the people. the same constitution that was

drafted for iran welcome any was now back in iran, the shah had already fled the country. the regime had already fallen. the first constitution that was developed was profoundly democratic constitution. but then the war with iraq, the occupation of the american embassies, was used by khomeini to gradually but brutally and efficiently sidelined and marginalize the democratic forces, one by one. and the constitution that was written at the period now had at its center the concept of the rising rule of the guardian. one of the first decisions he made was to stop the shah's nuclear program. in the same period where iran's rise in income have given the shah the grandiose ideas of some

of you might remember from those days when he talks about how democracy of the blue-eyed world is about to collapse. during that period the shah also decided iran was going to have a nuclear program. within a short span of time, they developed a program that stipulated iran to have 20 reactors. now, countries claimed this regime and i have again documented this with some detail. the united states was not in full agreement with the shah on the major nuclear program. in fact, there was much diplomatic tussle behind the scenes between the shah and the u.s. about the nuclear program. the u.s. believed than that the shah might be going towards a potentially military nuclear program. and they did everything they could behind the scenes to try

to get assurances from the subsidy that this would not happen. the shah would not give categorical assurances. he would repeatedly say, we do not want to bomb yet. only by 77, late 77, early 78 was the carter administration willing to allow u.s. companies to sell iran's nuclear reactors. in the meantime, the europeans had jumped and and like they have done in the last few years, they jumped in and cornered the market essentially. and, they signed an agreement with iran to start a reactor in the city. that reactor was supposed to start in 1981. khomeini unilaterally decided that iran's nuclear program was guarded, that the shah was a lucky of the u.s. and that is

why he decided to have a nuclear program and he stopped the nuclear program on which iran spent billions. saddam hussein bombed the place several times but i 1984, khomeini changed his mind. by 1984, khomeini changed his mind because in that war, saddam hussein used chemical weapons against iranian soldiers. and to their shame i think, the international community and the raj -- reagan administration did nothing, essentially nothing to punish saddam for his egregious crimes. the regime decided that if the international community was going to allow saddam to use weapons of mass destruction against iran, then the regime must develop its own weapons of mass destruction. and they started their nuclear program, but they did it this time secretly.

they kept it from the international community. they kept it from everybody because they were worried that israel would do to the iran's nuclear program what it had done to iraq. and recently syria. and by the time the international community learned of the nuclear program, it was already a fairly developed program. we can talk much more detail about this. we don't have time. i need to stop. but the short version of it is that many of the same problems that have existed between this regime and the international community existed between the shah man the international community. one big difference is the shah was trying to solve them within the context of the npt, within the context of the existing international law, not into

science of international laws. it is a remarkable sign of incompetence i think, something that hasn't been much discussed in any media, that the program that iran could have had in 198e after billions of dollars, after economic losses that are remarkably more than the mind can easily configure. because this regime is incompetent. first, the wrong decision to start the program without any discussion and then the decision to restart it secretly, and then the decision to lie and cheat every way, every step of the way, creating the current impasse where there were their word is not taken by the international community and the international community is worried that with iran, you will

have with iran going nuclear or developing the mutual capacity for the bomb, which i think is what they are trying to do. another worst they are trying to do what the shah was trying to do, to have everything in place, to be able to go nuclear at very short order. almost verbatim what the shah told officials in iran and western officials. he said we don't want to bomb now but if any of the neighbors become a nuclear state we are not going to be far behind. the shah was particularly worried from 1959 about the possibility of an attack by iraq it was really fascinating to see how things changed after the changes in iraq after the new regime. let me stop here and try to answer some of your questions.

[applause] >> thank you, abbas. we have a number of questions that deal with the relationship with the shah and mossadegh. they are sort of asking for a little bit more clarification of what the relationship was with the shah and mossadegh and why were the clergy anxious to see mossadegh overturned? >> okay, this will take about three minute response. i hope you can bear with me. mossadegh, for those of you who might not remember him, was a member of the parliament. he was a nationalist leader, and 1951, he becomes the prime minister through a democratic cross this.

one of his -- is to nationalize iran's oil industry. it was until then under monopoly control of britain. now, even before mossadegh comes to power, the united states begins to worry that there will be a nationalist uprising in iran under the oil issue because the agreement was so unfair to iran. i have found really remarkable documents and exchange between the u.s. and britain with the u.s. administration telling the british, give them a little bit for something more serious happens. but the british were arrogant. they thought the americans were stupid. they didn't understand how to deal with these natives, literally. they are naïve idealists, and then mossadegh comes to power and the british's first instinct

was to try to attack iran. the truman administration said no. then they try to organize a coup against mossadegh. they pushed the shah to use extra power and the military to overthrow mossadegh and the shah said no i won't do this. we need to find a democratic process. we need to find a legal process. not a democratic process. we need to find a legal process to get rid of it. i'm not going to do anything illegal. and when the british attacked mossadegh, and when the communists originally attacked mossadegh he became the head of this very powerful nationalist movement. everybody lined up behind him. the iranian middle class was squarely behind him. the merchant class became completely in support of him, and the clergy came supportive

of him because they thought he had caused fighting. the clergy was divided into two camps. one was a very political clergy and became eventually the speaker of iran's parliament in mossadegh. much of the clergy were of a school that would call the school of shiism. was a school school of shiism today that is practiced. they don't believe in seizing power. abol hassan ebtehaj did not want to seize power but he was clearly supporting mossadegh in this fight. the shah had apparently closed relations with mossadegh but behind the scenes they were at each other's throats. they dislike one another and they were trying to limit one another's powers. the shah would not oppose him

publicly. by august the 53, something had happened. the united states had by november of 52 reached the conclusion that there is no deal that mossadegh would take her go mossadegh was uncompromising and there was no deal that was going to satisfy him. he wants 100% in nothing less than 100% in the british were not going to give him 100%. so the united states against to change its position. until november essentially september of 52, they were against the idea of overturning mossadegh. after 52, they began to get convinced that maybe we should get rid of mossadegh. one of the reasons, one of the other reasons that they decide they need to go against mossadegh is the increasing rise to the communist party and iran.

some historians have said the turning point came in june, june 1953 when the tudeh party organized a demonstration that brought on 100,000 people in tehran. that scared that the jesus out of mossadegh. mossadegh was becoming increasingly isolated because of the economic hardship and was becoming weekend because of again economic hardship. the clergy began to worry that mossadegh was depending too much on the communist. and they were worried that iran might go communist. now, the british and the cia we know in this period, period, had a very sophisticated program where they would send a -- 2% -- pretend they were like communist

and they wanted to frighten the clergy even more. and it worked. the clergy with themselves were worried and they further contributed. further adding to the risk other than the fear of communism, other than the economic isolation, was that he was extremely arrogant, aggressive leader, and he felt that mossadegh had stayed in power basically because of the support. so he began to demand essentially veto rights on legislation. he began to demand the right to appoint ministers. he began to demand the implementation of islamic law. he began to demand mossadegh implement laws against the baha'i's in iran and mossadegh basically said no to all of

them. he decided to now work with the critics. all of these factors worked hand-in-hand and made mossadegh a much more isolated figure. so, in the election that he himself had organized, the results of the election were not very much to his liking. so he stopped at the elections halfway and decided to have a referendum to dismiss the parliament. many of his staunchest allies told him that first of all, there is no constitutional basis for this. second of all and more importantly, if you dismiss the parliament, the shah has established rights to make recess appointments. he has made many appointments. people make another one, dismissing you and another one

appointing someone in your place. mossadegh literally said he does not have the guts. well, the shah believe that dissolving the parliament as mossadegh had done gave him the constitutional right to make the appointment. so he wrote two orders, one appointing mossadegh as his replacement and the other one dismissing -- mossadegh had by then learned of these moves. instead of abiding by the shah's order he arrested him. the shah believe mossadegh is seriously engaged in a regime change essentially. he fled the country. he fled the country, went to iraq and from iraqi went around and in rome began to plan for a life as a gentleman farmer in connecticut. but then on august 19, the tide changed. on august 19, crowds began to

gather and the attack mossadegh's house. they attacked the radio and took over. were these crowds rented crowds by the cia as the cia claimed? or were they genuinely angry and worried anti-communist iranian members of the middle class as the shah supporters claimed? or is it a combination? my research, everything i have done, and i wrote the chapter on the coup, the last because it was the most difficult for me to write. my conclusion is that it is really a combination of all of these factors. the cia was involved that it had much less of a role than its later claimed and later claimed that it was the only force that play this role because it had had a series of defeats. this was really the only major success they had in a series of

difficulties. it is remarkable to read the legacy of ashes and you will see how many difficulties they had it for this. that was more than three minutes. [laughter] >> i noted that but it was interesting anyway. so there are a number of questions you are also, just to leave forward a little bit in time, regarding iran's nuclear program, the weapons development and the so-called peaceful development activity. and did you come across documentation that may have given proof one way or the other of what they were really planning to do, and you brought this question a little bit, is what should the united states be doing? are we handling this correctly? should we leave all these options on the table to use a popular phrase, or not? >> well, let me begin with the easiest which is the last one.

i don't think iran coss nuclear program -- problem has a military solution. i think that it is too far developed. it is too far disbursed. the innocent lives that -- the collateral damage is simply too great, and without a u.n. mandate, without the u.n. decision for the united states or israel to once again attack a third muslim country, particularly for the united states unilaterally, i think is a fiasco and i don't think it will be militarily successful in its attempts to delay this program. the iranians now have learned how to build centrifuges. they have learned how to enrich uranium. they have built these facilities

at the tone for example. it is under 25 feet of cement and dirt. it has been heavily fortified. there are three centers for enriching uranium, each the size of 6-foot oldfields. they have the capacity to have centrifuge cascade of 50,000. nobody in their right mind believes a country wants a peaceful nuclear program when it builds a cascade of 50,000. you just don't need 50,000 cascades if you are going to enrich uranium 2%. for enriching uranium 3%, 5000 cascades is enough. 50,000 give you 90% enriched uranium which has only one use, for a bomb. i think the regime clearly in my view, unambiguously has been

trying to become what is a ritual nuclear state. that is to have the capacity established known capacity to build it tom in short order and have the world consider it as a layton's nuclear state. in other words, they want the world to know that they can be a short while away from a bomb. and they are working on ways to deliver it. they are working on designs. they are working on every aspect of this except i think the decision to take that last final step, which is to weaponize this enriched uranium. now, the united states i think made several very strategically important errors. in 2003, when the u.s. had just

defeated saddam hussein, the u.s. had just defeated him in a daze and army iran had not been able to defeat in eight years. the clerical regime in iran was very worried that the united states might attack. the neocons in washington were singing the song that boys go to bed dad, men go to tehran. this song had reached tehran as well. iran at that time was very much willing to negotiate. it had suspended its enrichment, although it had suspended it temporarily. and it felt like it was in a very weakened position, that the united states now had almost -- this was before whatever you want to call it, the uprising, the civil war, the disturbance,

whatever you want to call what happened in iraq. bad before it began. the united states had almost 250,000 forces on iran's borders. they had easily defeated two of iran's biggest challenges and the regime was worried. they were willing to make a deal and the bush administration decided that they were not going to negotiate this time. and i think that was a very important opportunity. now, the bush administration i think has been overly criticize. some people claimed the regime was willing to give up everything in this period. it was willing to recognize israel. it was willing to give up the nuclear program altogether. it was willing to give up the support for hezbollah or for the promise that they would be treated well. why think that is a bogus argument. i don't think that argument was really ever -- the deal was ever

on the table, but they were much more in a negotiating mood then. now, they feel like they have achieved the upper hand. it used to be the idea not to negotiate with iran. there are now 8000 centrifuges and the united states and the international community is willing to negotiate. so tactically, the regime has one. strategically they have braley bungled it up because as i said something iran could have had in 1981, iran still does not have and even if it gets it started, with all the virus business and all the buying of material on the black market, nobody knows whether it is going to be safe. >> well, i hate to do this but

we have run out of time and perhaps abbas would be willing to stay around a little longer while he is signing books to answer some additional questions. i am just going to ask one final one. as you know, i was in iran last year for a very short tourists visit. found the people to be very friendly on the streets. we didn't really interact with any government people, so that was a characteristic that i would give. one of the questions here has to do with -- actually there are two pieces of it, but how did the iranian people react on 9/11 the short answer to that and also are you able to return to the country again? >> i can return it if i accept it will be a one-way trip. [laughter] the ideas for a two-way trip, then i can. they have in fact named me a

band named stanford as co-conspirators against the regime and the indictment. i have written an article in the new republic. but, on the other one, iranians as far as i know are the only muslim country where the people spontaneously took to the streets, lighted candles and organized a vigil in memory up and support of the americans. the united states is very much much -- indeed wikileaks is a very interesting document. the u.s. badminton team was supposed to visit iran and the u.s. -- at the last minute, khomeini pulled the plug on it. the explanation was that the united states was not supposed to announce that the team was traveling to iran. and when the united states announced it, khomeini pulled the plug because he said there

would be such a strong show of support for the american team that it would be a propaganda bonanza. when the u.s. wrestling team went to iran and played in an international tournament, the iranians showed more support for the u.s. team then for their home team. and that became an incredibly embarrassing thing for the regime. khomeini said we don't want another wrestling fiasco. that is how popular the u.s. is. >> okay. thank you. before we thank abbas finally i would like to remind you that his book, "the shah," is available for sale to my left and courtesy of books inc. and that he will be available here to sign copies for you. and i might just add a little note.

i could mention that introducing come in introducing dr. milani that i could have mentioned he is a shakespeare buff. as you read his book, you will see quotes from shakespeare's richard the second that lead into each chapter. and that highlights the parallels or analogies between the two tragedies. in other words, if you read him by his book, you will get two-for-one, little shakespeare education is learn a little bit about iran. so thank you very much. [applause] >> this event was hosted by the world affairs council of northern california. to get information about upcoming events in the council, visit it's your world.org.

c-span's local content vehicles are traveling the country, visiting cities and towns as we explore a nation's history. some of the authors who have touched upon it through their work. this weekend on booktv, we take you to downtown indianapolis or a look at the new kurt vonnegut memorial library. >> kurt vonnegut was perhaps the greatest american writer. he was a world war ii veteran. he was a hoosier. he was a satirist. he was a political activist. he was a husband. he was the father. he was a friend. he was a friend to his fans. he would write back to his fans. he wrote more than 30 pieces of work, including plays, novels, short stories, some of his more familiar books are slaughterhouse five, which is perhaps his most famous. breakfast of champions, cats

cradle and many other books. vonnegut always brought in his midwestern roots and often wrote about indiana and indianapolis specifically and if i may read a quote, many people ask me why did -- should the vonnegut library be here in indianapolis and i have many different answers but then i found this great quote. it says, all my jokes are indianapolis. all my attitudes are indianapolis. my adenoids are indianapolis. if i ever severed myself from indianapolis i would be out of business. what people like about me is indianapolis. so, we took that as a green light to go ahead and establish the vonnegut library here in indianapolis. we have an art gallery, a museum room, a reading room, a gift shop and i would like to share details about these with you today.

this is a vonnegut, kurt vonnegut timeline. if you would allow me i would like to read the quote at the top of this beautiful painting, which was created by the artist chris king and by a vonnegut scholar named rodney allen. both of these individuals live in louisiana. and the quote reads, all moments pass, present and future always have existed, always will exist. we can look at all the different moments just the way we can look at a stretch of the rocky mountains for instance. they can see how permanent all the moments are. it is just an illusion we have here on earth that once a moment is gone, it is gone forever. and something that is unique about our timeline is we actually start on the right side and read to the left rather than the left side and read to the right. one thing we wanted to mention

about this quote, we hope that vonnegut would know that, while he may think that -- may have thought that once a moment is gone it is gone forever, we like to think that the moment of kurt vonnegut will live on forever here at the vonnegut library. he went to cornell university. he was studying chemistry. he did not plan to go into architecture like his father. but he did think he would move into a science career and discovered at cornell that he was not very much interested in doing that. so, he enlisted in the army during world war ii and i would like to point out a moment here on the timeline that is very important in the life of kurt vonnegut and that is 1944. vonnegut is dying from an overdose probably intentional, but alcohol and sleeping pills.

vonnegut enters combat in europe. he is captured by germans in belgium during the battle of the bulge. soon he is writing in a boxcar with other american p.o.w.s to dresden, a supposedly safe german city, unlikely to be bombs. so dresden was this beautiful cultural city that was not a military target. as vonnegut rode in on a train, he was able to view this beautiful city and then he was placed in a slaughterhouse where the rest of the prisoners of war were held. has slaughterhouse was slaughterhouse five. we have an exhibit we call the dresden exhibit that is really his world war ii experience that became so important in his writing and his worldview later in his life. i will start with a photo that was taken right after he was released as a prisoner of war.

along with fellow prisoners. we also have his purple heart that was donated by his son, mark vonnegut, to us. he received the purple heart. kurt vonnegut was embarrassed to have received a purple heart for frostbite. so many of his friends had suffered from other types of physical problems and disease. we have a signed first edition of the book slaughterhouse five. this is important because slaughterhouse five is probably the most well-known book written by kurt vonnegut. of the 30 some pieces of writing that he completed, this was possibly the most famous -- excuse me, famous. >> wide? >> why was slaughterhouse five famous? so vonnegut, but they give you a

little history about what happened to him in germany and my impressions of why it affected people so much. vonnegut as i read, he was taken to the slaughterhouse. while he was in dresden, the allies bombed dresden and so his own countrymen as well as allies bombed the city. it was a horrible bombing. it was literally a firestorm and tens of thousands of people were killed. these were noncombatants. these were women and children and old people. vonnegut, one of his tasks as a prisoner was to go out and remove the bodies you know, from these burning buildings and he also was required to bury the bodies of women and children. that affected his life tremendously. he came back from his world war ii experience being completely against war.

he was searching for a peaceful resolution to conflict and supported diplomacy and other approaches to solving problems. i will also point out a photo that was taken after he came back from the war. he got married to jane cox vonnegut who was from indianapolis as well. this photo was taken on their honeymoon and as you can see, he is in uniform. vonnegut and jane had three children, march, ed and annette, nanny. and then, many years later, his sister alice died, just a day or two after her husband had died in a freak train accident. alice had four children and three of them came to live with the vonnegut family, so they had quite a large household, seven

children and vonnegut at that time was writing books that at that time were less familiar, but he had published several books and articles for magazines as well as working a job as a car salesman for sob. the experience of writing about dresden and what happened to him was tremendously difficult for vonnegut. it took him about 20 years to be able to publish the book, slaughterhouse five. jane, his wife, had encouraged him to write it. she worked as his editor on the book. she asked questions and got clarity on issues and helped him to retrieve a lot of those memories that he had repressed. because of the family situation with the addition of more

children, and the success that was coming with the publishing of slaughterhouse five, his marriage was jane was rocky. his daughter, ed, had mentioned about a month ago that experience and the publishing of the book and all the fame brought to vonnegut contributed to their marriage dissolving. and at that time, vonnegut had met the photographer, jill cremins and eventually married jill cremins. she was his second wife and was the only other person he was married to during his lifetime. i will move you over here to what we call the political activity exhibit, and vonnegut continued to talk about his

interest in finding peaceful solutions to conflict. i think that is another thing that made him very popular during the vietnam years and after. this photo, which was given to us by "the new york times," was taken during the first gulf war and there is vonnegut out there at 28 university. i am sure that was a large crowd, because even to his boat dying day, vonnegut would attract a large crowd. i have been told he was like a rockstar coming into his different speeches and large auditoriums, always filling the auditorium. so here we are in the art gallery portion of our library. i would like to take you over here and show you a vonnegut

quote that assigned that was given to us by his artistic collaborator, joe petro. it says, don't know what it is about hoosiers, but wherever you go, there is always a hoosier doing something very important there. this quote was in the book, cat's cradle, and it is a very funny exchange that the main character has with a fellow traveler on a plane and that fellow traveler gives this quote next we have possibly his most famous piece of artwork, the. vonnegut, in his humor, he associated the asterisk with this anatomical feature and we actually have used this asterisk and other pieces of art exhibits, including our timeline which you may have thought had

stars in the sky but they are actually vonnegut's asterisk in the sky. we also have life is no way to treat an animal. this is the tombstone for his famous character, kilgore trout, who appeared in many many of his books. it is understood that kilgore trout is based on vonnegut himself. interestingly, the character kilgore trout died at the age of 84 and vonnegut also happened to die at the age of 84. >> what did kurt vonnegut died from? >> he collapsed. he fell down the steps of his new york city home. and he went into a coma and never came out of that.

he often joked that cigarettes would kill him and he would sue the makers of palm out because the warning label on the cigarette package said that pall mall would kill him and they had not yet done so but they actually happen to be smoking a pell-mell while standing on the steps. next we have here two are two pieces of artwork created by morley safer of 60 minutes theme morley is one of our honorary board members. he was a close friend of kurt vonnegut. they actually both shared a close friend, sidney offutt, who wrote the introduction for the last vonnegut but they came out. but these two pieces of art, the first on vacation is kurt vonnegut's birthday was created in 2003 as a gift to vonnegut and then the second was created when morley found out that vonnegut had