or confused as to who obama was because i did not vote for him. and it is kind of disappointing fact from a lot of black people's perspectives that they did not except -- expect a lot from obama because of who he played to an office and the bus that you wrote on. that kind of thing and taking reverend wright and everybody black under the bust it was clear from anybody who understood the politics what he was about i would suggest you bookmark black and gender report because everything you said

was talked about way back when it is no surprise how he acts because and but either he is smart or he is not smart or a constitutional law professor or he is and. either torture is torture and indefinite detention is indefinite detention. or they are what they are or they are not. >> thank you. >> . .

can be proud of and americans can be proud of and the fact he isn't happen to agree with you and reverend wright and lewis with, embrum, yellow, red as 8-liter and wouldn't be seen as such if she held those views so i have to fundamentally disagree that that's the problem. >> thank you for coming. [applause] >> eric white is an columnist for the nation and the daily beast as well as english and journalism professor of brooklyn college graduate school. he's the author of numerous books including what liberal media. for more information, visit thenation.com and search his name. >> now croswell recalls the life

of whom general smith. general smith, dwight eisenhower chief of staff from 1942 to 1945 served in the military for more than four years and played a significant part in the allied strategy for two. croswell discusses his pocket and you association of the u.s. army meeting held at the washington convention center. >> why would somebody in their right mind -- that might be a stretch -- spent 25 of their life studying grant, sherman, chariton, lee, a staff officer? a man passed middle-age, trinkle, intelligence, eyes like a fish to the same time, and responsive, cool, koln.

without the charm - passions or sense of humor heavily than ever to reproduce and finally go to hell. there is no doubt the template for the description of was walter bedell smith. the quintessential known as the biggest square wheeled some of the bitch in the army known as a hatchet man, an empire builder, known as someone who punched way above his weight. correct. but the point here is that in the book about smith equally at least smith as chief of staff, equally must deal with eisenhower, his personnel and leadership. so this book if it makes a contribution at all beyond selling smith's story, it is the re-evaluation of eisenhower and

his leadership in the second world war. now, as i said, two points. one, the first book was good. it was good to be the was a product of my dissertation. i was 20 something at the time, and i felt prone to a common foot -- that fall and that is received wisdom, receive wisdom of our general marshall. bradley, beavers, colleges, patton, the british, churchill, alexander and of course montgomery and eisenhower. basically what i did is i simply infused smith into the story and the best job i could, but once i dug deeper and deeper into the research i felt there was more to smith and considerably less to general eisenhower. the point being again that

eisenhower was what one might term a passive - commander. passive meaning he live tv can never look for problems to solve, and , the only time he was firm in his decision when he was determined not to do something. but conversely he needed the person in the universe and the aggressive affirmative chief of staff. he couldn't be the backstop. he had to be almost deputy commander. in addition to which eisenhower always hated political commitment and that meant that smith essentially served as his foreign secretary. the other point is that my first book was and military biography. i didn't do a thorough job on the post war period which was an oversight and the was the product of and a member of the ph.d. committee who insisted that i add this chapter, and

frankly i did smith adis service both in terms of not telling the full story the first time around and not dealing with the post war her career which was important. smith was committed to his duty. he couldn't say no. what he wanted after the war is what he thought was just desert and that is a fourth star and follow marshall and eisenhower into the chief of staff of the army. that could never happen. and when secretary of state burns was looking for a hard boiled some of the bitch to dea with the boys in the kremlin he suggested smith and burns. as eisenhower said serves them right for getting smith as their ambassador. he missed stalin twice. once when he presented his credentials, and he told stalin bring the message from truman that we want to cooperate with

the soviet union but do not mistake that for weakness. the next time he met them was during the height of the berlin crisis that eventually sprung into the berlin airlift. here is smith just coming from london obviously talking to a soviet official. interesting thing here is that smith fought as the point man for the west that he had hammered out a deal with uncle joe. but as it turned out, the state department and marshall thought otherwise and that never came to be. smith was suffering from chronic health problems related to ulcers and other complications. he wanted to leave moscow. he returned to command first army which is where old soldiers go to fadeaway. he had half of the stomach and in the major surgery. he found time to write a book

about his observation about the soviet union which in hindsight proved to be very pressing. he asked him to take over the direction of the cia which is the founding after the failure to anticipate the north korean invasion of the south. power to restructure the cia which he achieved. he created a vertically integrated structure based upon functional alliance and that structure served as the basic foundation for the cia throughout the cold war. quote eisenhower's person action election as president, thought that finally he would get the big prize, chief of staff. he was disappointed. again, some of the highlights

during the truman period. but obviously they didn't get along very well. he was also responsible than that period for the engineering, regime changes and the elected government in iran and in guatemala. the job that eisenhower asked to fill was number two to john foster dulles. playing behind john foster dulles was like playing behind lou gehrig. the relationship was very testing. dulles mostly wanted smith to trouble for an administration. he handed over what hemisphere affairs, but basically the relationship as we said was not very friendly. the united states didn't want to be associated with another, the

conference in geneva that resulted finally in the partition. he commented on the premier and i was had. she was a lobbying some of the bitch. the family loaded with communists or corrupt communists and the edify users [inaudible] that is in telling it the way it is. he recommended the united states signed the agreement, but again, going to the domestic consideration primarily that never came to pass and we all know what cayman. when he died in 61 days at the wonder was all that smith died he lived as long as he did. by 1954 he was virtually a cadaver. interestingly, before he passed away he had a meeting with vice

president nixon and they were piling a few scotches back and he began to cry out of character and said you know what he's always had to have his frat boys and we've been his frat boys. obviously that he never fulfilled his ambition, and that was to succeed not necessarily eisenhower but he's also a marshall man and buried across the river very close proximity to the general marshall. again, marshall man. the important role that he played as the secretary general marshall in the war department general staff as the chief troubleshooter but more importantly perhaps is the role he played fundamental as the architect of the structures of the combined joint chiefs of

staff to read this as a colonel and brigadier-general. he also had a major voice in considerations of and whether the allies should attack across the channel or operations which smith supported among the senior. they live in north africa and the ante to become a model from let cooperation. however not only the british and the americans but also in terms of the problem of north africa and others. the most famous episode was an smith brokered the decision on the invasion of sicily in the

algerian laboratory with montgomery. but more importantly, he led the negotiations actually the extortion forced the frattali inns into surrender. now this picture tells of all. smith, nothing to play, also two -- disheveled after the as stallions, he blows in the uniform.'? most famously of course he is her chief of staff. again, still very useful, 48-years-old in that period of time. usual suspect, eisenhower commander, montgomery, ground commander, ramsey and mallory,

smith's chief of staff, interestingly bradley had no combined role, but i guess for americans in the photograph. so it plays an important role in organizing the sheiks, preparing the multitude of problems of both political and military preparations and it's interesting that in that meeting where eisenhower decides not to delay, he turns to smith last, not to montgomery. now after the war, eisenhower, rather smith writes a book called eisenhower's decision. more about that in a second. now what transpires immediately after the war of course the cold war. and folks want to blame the

allies, primarily general eisenhower for failing to take berlin and the division. shortly thereafter, a number of books appeared and a book loosely based on the diaries. what eisenhower calls crackpot history. unless a person like churchill goes to misery for his famous lawyer and curtain speech told smith that he was the perfect guy to write a definitive insight history of world war ii at the higher level. but smith still have the designs to become the chief of staff, said he did write a series of articles for the post and later became his book eisenhower's 63 decision. eisenhower was also writing his version of the war called crusade in europe and that's the get feist smith gave eisenhower

your own estimate of the tools with which you were working. and by that i mean your commanders like patton, montgomery and bradley. we all know about patent and montgomery. i feel so strongly that the do-it-yourself and associates of history the symbol unfurnished truth. of course they never got the symbol unvarnished truth. he sat for an account all about eisenhower even though he didn't much appear in it. now if we use smith as our modus operandi in terms of the decisions again, the day, the normandy breakout, the broad front advance to the rhine, the battle of the bulge, the crossing of the rhine and the completion of the ruhr pocket and berlin. what smith argues is eisenhower always had a right. he was an affirmative commander and he stayed true to the plan

from the very beginning. this is ironic because montgomery suffered under 50 years of abuse because his claim in normandy everything went according to plan. yet with eisenhower and smith argue that indeed the whole operation in northwest europe went according to the plan. it also would give the opinion that smith always agreed with eisenhower and that's not the case to read in terms of the normandy breakout, the whole plan was basically presented on the taking and seizing the peninsula. the invasion was the it would be staged -- used as a staging area for manpower and the material to flow along the lines of communication and flow to and from britain to paris and

beyond. and of course the decision was not to simply the operation in britain as envisioned, but instead of the attempt to encircle the germans. if you did he suffered from the factory disease including smith, but smith was always more aware of the logistical requirements than eisenhower so there was a difference of opinion of that. the whole notion of the broad front, smith argued that they should either cancel hannibal, the operation, and that those troops and certainly agreed should be moved now and staged in to britain to complete the operation. it didn't take place. again, smith agreed with the british against eisenhower. of course eisenhower got his way.

and the whole issue about why the u.s. army and the british were unable to complete the destruction of the german army. everyone always wants to pray blamed the logistician because the eight and legislation. it's easy to blame jesus christ himself but the structure problem and from the moment that eisenhower became the chief of staff, september 1942, he was pressuring eisenhower to restructure and to give priority is to the separate manpower, and has centralizing of logistics. there's a lot of reasons for the breakout. but it's overly simplistic to simply blame it upon him logisticians. the other issue of course is the bridge too far.

smith was livid because eisenhower would never issued definitive command of montgomery. montgomery was right. he was never ordered to open up. it was always the priority and the order was written by smith. marshall happened to be in the theater at that point in time. again, how that dynamic worked between smith and eisenhower. the bulge we needn't go into it and the crossing of the broad front, smith is a very important role because he is the lead man at the conference and eisenhower's approach. at the bitter of all conferences and finally, the decision not to go to berlin again. so smith goes in front of the press and argues we are not taking berlin because we need to deal with the idea that the

germans would pull back the operations, the guerrilla warfare and mountain depths of the all-time peak of course that didn't exist and there were sharp differences of opinion. it wasn't all that smooth. and again, you might argue that it wasn't allied general. pretty mediocre. it was so puny it can't be called a counter attacked sealed the fief of the german army and french. his decision to launch the battle of the bulge and unleash in the new submarines meant they cut away all of their offensive capability and hitler's decision to not yield an inch west of the rhine and the germans couldn't defend the rhine to the anyway.

just to throw that out there. and finally, smith as in the case of italy, eisenhower distances himself from a hold of the negotiations in the final surrender so smith has the honor of signing the german surrender. mouse mat's place in history. truman said his contributions were of immeasurable value in the real. winston churchill. he always found the finest field. he thought highly than he did it any other american. after smith's death "the new york times" opinion only president eisenhower and the late general of the army george c. marshall said to have matched the range of bedell smith more

than four decades in the military of the government. it's key that he's talking about marshall and eisenhower and smith. now marshall said right after the war spoke of his admiration for the manner in which you have discharged your vast responsibilities assuring that he carved out a place in the history of the great and terrible ethics. if they hadn't taken place for general marshall either. he had lost their great organizer of victory, the greatest soldier of world war ii lost in the popular mind. he had the misfortune of being the chief of staff. final word a very great soldier once assured me my place in military history was secure since the only requisite was the enduring battle was of the chief

of staff. he went on to say that no one was ever quite as vice were as fortunate as i was in this regard. and finally, no single man in europe contributed more to the allied victory bedell. the bottom line is mabey smith was with that 25 years and may be worth 40 bucks in the book. [applause] >> what's the some of the equation of eisenhower - smith? >> that's a good question. the reason marshall sent smith to a wind in preparation for what was going on initially

marshall wanted to cross channel invasion and it was a buildup and was a fiasco. nothing happened because eisenhower will send cracking it. smith was still valuable general marshall he didn't want to surrender. so weeks went by, months went by and marshall said i just can't give up smith. what finally cut it was the decision was made for torch and was very clear that if things didn't happen and happen fast in terms of the mounting and logistical problems that it wasn't going to happen. for the immense consequences, and so the reason that marshall since smith is to bolster eisenhower. it is a good question. he could have failed miserably and no one would have known his name, or maybe not.

>> a recent book argues that when andrew was commensurate like six weeks after d-day that the general had a clear shot to get into germany, and eisenhower stopped them because he didn't like them on a personal level. is there any truth to that? >> there's absolute truth that eisenhower detested. his record is extremely good and it's an injustice. we are talking about the command structures the sixth army group had a british structure, and even though they were facing some of the same problems that the 12th army group in france was experiencing, nonetheless, they were able to maintain momentum of that and of course all the way, but the problem was by that time juan, the ammunition shortage was beginning to bite and the

manpower problem and continually what happens of course is the move forces from the army group. so he simply didn't have the horses to do it. but the fact that he got that far that quickly as a testament to his leadership and the kind of staff and the come board of cmdr. -- commander. >> any other questions? [applause] >> this event was part of the annual us association of the u.s. army meeting. for more information, visit ausa.org.

coming up next former secretary of defense donald rumsfeld discusses his memoir known and

unknown. during this event the first stop on his book tour is interviewed by history and michael beschloss and takes questions from the audience, the national constitution center in philadelphia. >> we thought that we would have this little gathering because secretary rumsfeld's book has not been getting much attention, so we thought that we would make up for that by at least having won the event. i know that you're not doing anything else to make sure the book gets the attention it deserves. it's appropriate that we are doing this year in the national constitution center because one of the things the founders were serious about was unlike the regimes in europe they were starting a the country to be unlike they wanted to make sure we had a record of our leaders, what they thought about what they did an office, and also they hoped their record would be open as soon as possible, and --

>> [inaudible] >> can everyone here? >> there's so much noise over to the right. >> [inaudible] >> is that what it is? >> it's a big a crowd of people trying to get upstairs for in author who's news you'd like to hear. [laughter] in any case, the hope that we, americans, but have access to what our leaders thought and with the data as soon as possible so we can learn from their success and shortcomings. and as i was saying, donald rumsfeld's book is a very much in the tradition and i'm glad it's published. i think you are, too. the book is on mr. rumsfeld's entire life, but i thought we would begin by talking about iraq and then work backwards to be a great deal of the book is about iraq. and i guess maybe the way to get into this is here we are in the constitution center. we just passed by the statute of

james madison and the others. as you know, madison gave a lot of thought to the war and what presidents should do and how often americans should get into war. if he came back and ask you to tell him why do we go to war and iraq would you say? >> the answer would be that the converse and the united states passed a resolution overwhelmingly favor the regime change in iraq in the 1990's by an overwhelming vote, and it was signed by president clinton. the united nations issued some 17 different resolutions advising iraq but to say should conform to the resolutions, the request for the united nations security council to allow the inspectors into their country to provide the inspectors the

information on their weapons of mass destruction and the united nations had been repeatedly rebuffed. president george w. bush made a decision when he first came into office that he was concerned about the fact that iraq was firing a regularly at the united states and united kingdom aircraft that were supporting the united nations no-fly zone and patrolling in the northern and southern portion of iraq. those planes are being shot at almost every day. the only country shooting at american and british aircraft. over 2,000 times they were fired on to read the joint chiefs of staff at feisty and the president that they were concerned about the fact that essentially one of our planes, british planes or our plan would be shot down and the crew would be killed or taken hostage.

sir, the united states department of state have listed iraq as one of the country's on the terrorist list. so there were a series of things like background. next, the united states intelligence agency spent a good deal of time and were determined that they were convinced that the iraqi government had weapons of mass destruction, had the competence to continue developing weapons of mass destruction and had the capability to rapidly expand those capabilities in the event the decided to do so. you had a country in iraq that had used chemical weapons on its own people, the country that had used chemical weapons against its neighbor in iran, and a behavior pattern that persuaded people that they not only had

them but would use them, and we were at a point in our country's history where the lethality of weapons had arrived at the point that once you mix them with someone who was willing to proliferate those weapons, and once you give them and allow them with somebody that has demonstrated a willingness to use them as well as proliferate, the danger, the lethality was so great that president bush went to the concourse and told the congress what they believed. >> was there ever part of a war declaration instead of just going for resolution? >> nope. i don't know. that would have been something of the department of state would have done. estimate we haven't had a declaration of war. >> not the korean war, the imam, the incursions' of president clinton involved.

>> as the declaration make any difference and what it has brought america more into this? >> i doubt it. you never know. that is eroding the didn't travel and i can't say. but i think the resolution passed by congress and then the resolutions by the united nations provided an underpinning. of the other thing i would add to the former president is that president bush and colin powell and condoleezza rice and george tend to the content and the others discussed this hope that the hope there wouldn't be a conflict and saddam hussein could be persuaded to leave the country and not require an invasion of the country and their message to the to messages passed and requests made yet they were rebuffed. i think that some who seem very

likely was purposely trying to make the world believe he had large stockpiles. i think that he felt he had friends in the united nations who might be evil to stop the united kingdom, the united states and other countries supporting the coalition and prevent them from going in. and i also think that because president george w. bush's father had going into iraq after iraq invaded kuwait and cause them to be removed from kuwait but didn't change the regime there is good evidence that saddam hussein believed that america wouldn't change the regime, that he would survive the and in both the united states might come in. so, there were a combination of things taking place that argued for it and there were -- was a behavior pattern on the part of

iraq, misguided as it turned out, and he refused to leave with his family which was offered and urged as war is the failure of diplomacy. >> else you quote in the book. one thing - people will be surprised to read about is that president bush never asked you for your advice on what to the country should go to war against iraq and with of violate one of rumsfeld's rules? >> i don't think so. i think president bush -- i don't know that he asked colin how will or condoleezza rice or the vice president. he was elected by the american people, he had frequent meetings and discuss various aspects of the situation. the work very hard with of the united nations to put pressure on saddam hussein that he wouldn't continue to resist, and the president did with the president has to do. he made the decision and i

assume he assumed everyone in that group would have argued vehemently if they disagreed which no one did. >> how do you think they will look back on that position in iraq? >> it's hard to know. the road not traveled is always moved, and one looks at it and thinks what if. i think a little-known fact is that khaddafi, the head of libya, at that point had a very aggressive nuclear program under way. and when the united states went in and changed the regime in iraq, khaddafi who had been working hard on the nuclear program very high on the terrorist list designed he would forgo his nuclear program and he contacted some western leaders and indicated look, i do have

this nuclear program. i am willing to stop it. i am willing to have it inspected that i stopped it because i do not want to suffer the same state as saddam hussein. so if you look at the region, there's some disadvantages that linder from the conflict, by the same token you have a country of iraq that no longer has a truly vicious and brutal regime that had used chemical weapons against its own people and its neighbors. it's gone. the iraqi people have fashioned a constitution, have elections under the constitution, and they are finding their way towards -- away from the system towards a free, political and free economic system. and other countries in the region such as libya are engaged in a behavior pattern that is vastly better for the world and

for the region. so there are minuses, - this and there are some pluses and i think you are an outstanding historian and i think you will be people like you who over time will weigh all of those things and with the benefit of some distance make some judgments based >> lets go back to the beginning. you're born chicago, grew up in illinois which wasn't quite as prosperous town as it is now based beat ausa.org eda a little village. >> sleepy little village. and went to high school and on to princeton. was that a culture shock coming from the u.s.? >> my goodness, it was in deep. i was told by the dean of the school i was going to go to the big ten school and russell and the dean said know you've got to go to princeton and i said why?

he said that's where you belong. i said i can't go there i don't have the money. he said there will get you a scholarship, which he did, and so i went, and of course most of the people they're going to private schools take freshman courses before, and i got there and i worked my head off. i spent all the time in the library or playing football or rustling and never did much other than that. there were no women of the school, it rained a lot. [laughter] not my first choice. and my wife was at the university of colorado skiing through college, and it was a totally different experience for me. >> you also heard a little talk by the princeton ne who had run for president and had been nominated once. it's not in the book but i am told that you know some of those words almost by heart. >> i do.

>> telco it was first of all. >> my senior banquet in 1954, and the former governor of illinois named at least even some have lost to dwight eisenhower already in 52 and he later lost and 56, and it was the senior banquet in college and he came to speak at princeton, he was a princeton graduate, and he gave the most eloquent and persuasive speech about public service that i had ever heard or will ever hear. it was an evening event, and all of us just sat they're listening to this brilliant -- he called himself an egghead and as a joke used to say what was it, something about -- >> you have nothing to lose but

your yolks. >> i think all of us who were getting ready to go into the military, all of us came away with a sense of responsibility, and one of the things he said is that young people in our country have been the responsibility to help guide the country into the power of the american political system is virtually without measurement, and if america were to stumble the world would fall. it had the impact on me. they had hundreds of memos that i believe support the book that we've got here and you can go to an end note and go to the web site and actually see the entire memo, but i'm almost positive we have got at least begins in's

speech and we highly recommended , it is a wonderfully inspiring speech. >> although he didn't attempt to become a democrat obviously. was there any point in your life you would have been anything but a republican? >> my goodness, yes. during world war ii by father was a navy in the pacific on a carrier, and franklin roosevelt was about the only president in my lifetime between 1932 and i guess he was sworn in 33, and i was in july of 32 but i never knew herbert hoover personally. but franklin roosevelt was the president. he represented the united states of america asked for time. and my parents, i and everyone i knew looked to him as the leader of the country into was

enormously important figure for an jongh man. >> you were taken from stevenson and what he said and i assume that his influence over the fact that he ran for congress of the age of 29, very dark horse, 1952. most people don't run for congress that early or at least they did in those days. it was younger than it is nowadays. what moved you to get in so soon? >> i was the longest of long shots. i had been away from my home district for a decade. on for years to college, three and a half and the needy and the am i worked in washington for the congressman, one from ohio and one from michigan. i never met a congressman in my life, and then i had gone back to chicago, home and suddenly out of the blue, a woman who was the congressman who succeeded her husband and a that congressional district from 32

until 1960 she announced she wasn't going to run for reelection and i felt my goodness, that same family owned that district my entire lifetime. >> you may not have the chance -- >> you may not get another chance. so i talked to the ways and she was a game sweep of friends from high school and college and got less than they went out there and formed i think we had something like 1,500 volunteers helping and people running around with cartop saying rumsfeld for congress and earrings and buttons and bumper stickers and sure enough i was fortunate. one of the things that might have helped is president kennedy had got him elected two years before coming and he was so young. >> he ran for congress at 29. >> and he served in the cementer part of the term then he ran for president. but he was a young president and

he had been elected and was so attractive and charming and humorous. and get the first president -- the second president you pose detector with eisenhower during the campaign and as a new president within the couple of months went to the white house and met kennedy. >> i did indeed. but the fact that he had such an attractive young president have an appeal in the district that made a kid 29-years-old running for congress look like maybe he could actually be a congressman. >> and so that proved to be. you came to washington, and among the things you did in washington, and you write about this in the book, is that you attended the briefing by lyndon johnson on the vietnam. tell a little bit about that because you actually spoke up in that briefing in a way that i think very few people did. >> well, this wonderful hubert humphrey was called the hefty warrior and just a wonderfully energetic and appealing person,

he was vice president and had just come back from vietnam, and vietnam was increasingly becoming a major political factor in the country. it had not then when i first ran in 62 but by then i suppose it was 64, 66 -- 65. >> mabey 66. >> so president johnson was getting complaints that members of congress didn't feel they were being informed about the war. >> however the hid said such a thing. >> he invited the members of congress to the white house and we all went down, at least a large number, 150 of us coming and it was winter as i recall. the invitation came late and we went in and it is nothing for young congressman to be sitting in the white house getting briefed by the president and vice president just back from vietnam, and he would humphrey started to give the briefing and

lyndon johnson was commander in chief and he was bigger than life. he would pop up every time someone would say something and the answer the question and hubert would just about be ready to answer and stop and lyndon johnson would take over. >> that's pretty much the way it usually works. >> johnson was talking about the things he was doing to with the war and you piped up and said like bombing halts? >> as a congressman listening to him i was probably more critical than i would have been as a member of the executive branch being asked questions by members of congress. so where you stand kind of depends on where you set. but he was going through a period she was trying to figure out what to do in the war in vietnam and he would go to a

heavy bombing period and then there be a bombing pause and he would hope of cause a positive reaction from the north vietnamese or vietcong and it didn't. and in explaining what he was doing, he was asked a question by a democratic congressman from texas about why it wasn't working. and his answer was in effect that it would work, and of course the fact was if you do something for a period and then stop completely it's confusing. it's confusing to the enemy, and i did ask a question and tried to get some response as to how that combination of off and on was going to work. he said the way it's going to work is more the same.

at that point he was in a bombing plot which suggested that it might not work, and of course it didn't. he had a tough job as president and he did his best. >> in retrospect what you think the mistakes were on vietnam and making the decision the way that the was fought? >> well, i wasn't in his shoes and it's hard to say for sure. in the last analysis that country was going to have to find its way itself. the task we had was not to try to go after the north vietnamese for the viet cong alone because of the had to do was to sit here. they didn't have to fight a single battle they could just disappear, and a week later show back up and go harvest and come right back and you could have lost u.s. forces from one end of the country to the other and they would have just disappeared into the countryside.

and then when you pass a would come right back. in retrospect with the benefits hindsight the taft was to try to get the south vietnamese government capable of organizing and training and equipping their own forces and providing something for the vietnam but offered a promise for them for the future. i think ho chi minh was more successful in suggesting to the vietnamese people that the future would be brighter for those people, and there was an argument made that the south vietnamese government was corrupt and out of touch with people. it is not unusual for the governments to be labeled corrupt. i don't know that the north vietnamese government under ho chi minh was not correct.

that was an argument, and the combination of those things i think created a very difficult circumstance for lyndon johnson and the united states of america. >> in 1968 richard nixon was elected. he comes to you and asks you to take on the office of the economic opportunity, one of the crown jewels of the society. not very popular with republicans or nixon who basically wanted. not a great career move for you but you did it. what was your rationale? >> i voted against the legislation when it passed. sargent shriver recently passed away had been the person who headed up the office of economic opportunity, and it started under president kennedy, he and his brother bobby kennedy and the justice department had fashioned a program to try to assist the poor and the country and then president johnson came

with his big texas approach and enlarged it and it became the war to eradicate poverty and if you define poverty has a certain percentage of the population, and then you try to eradicate it, it's not possible because there's always going to be a certain percentage in that category, and they immediately started a host of programs. there was the job corps, head start, migrant programs, health care programs, drug programs, community action programs, just their must have been 12 or 15 different programs under this umbrella on the war on poverty. the these naim was the dewitt bypass the governors and mayors, elected officials, and of course that had the effect of in during republicans and democrats and

public officials because the money would come straight from the federal government to the organizations, community organizations the were described as having maximum feasible participation and the poor was the concept and bypassing and of course what they started to do was opposed local government reeves of the local city council and local state governments were constantly being harassed by the legal service program as well, so the federal government supplying money to the office of economic opportunity which then filed lawsuits against the mayors and governors and city council, all of the people regardless of the political party. they had nothing to do with politics. it was against the structure. so by the time i went in, it was widely disliked. >> but i'm talking here you are promising the republican people and talking about the future president is in this sort of a

graveyard for that? >> well, joyce has an unusual sense of humor and one night i got home and i went to the icebox and there was little sign that said he tackled the job that couldn't be done he tackled the job that couldn't be done and didn't do it. [laughter] >> you laugh. at 10:00 at night when i was reaching for a pop that slows you down i will tell you. [laughter] >> so you did that and went on to the nixon white house and you write in the book he wanted to leave washington after the election of 72. did you see watergate coming >> no, i didn't at all. i ended up going to nato as the ambassador right after the 1972 deflection and the pundits in

washington couldn't couldn't believe i would leave the power. i was a member of cabinet in the white house and suddenly i'm going off to brussels belgium. it looked like syria. proximity to power is considered in washington what one would want and i did the opposite. thousands of miles and the other direction. someone wrote in a magazine in washington after watergate broke who is the smartest man in washington? answer, donald rumsfeld. but he's not in washington. that's right. [laughter] and i got a reputation for being smart instead of lucky. i had no idea what was going on. i mean, richard nixon had just been reelected by one of the biggest margins in the country. he won every state in the union except massachusetts and the district of columbia. and no one could imagine that i

would want to get -- excuse me -- the i would want to be away from that as opposed to write in the middle of it. but we did, we took our family had moved to belgium and had a truly wonderful experience representing the country overseas. >> and gerald ford becomes president after the knicks and inauguration. your friend and colleague in the 1960's. he came in saying he wanted the spokes of the wheel everyone would report directed to the president. to were brought in after a month when he thought that wasn't working very well. was that he time -- it has been said a lot people who worked for president ford were a very much impressed with the fact that presidential power was, did you see signs of that? ..