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>> last night the four major candidates for chicago mayor participated in the final televised debate before next week's election. that debate is next on frakes. c-span2. a look at the war in afghanistan and the political strategy for peace. we will hear from a former afghan government minister. live coverage from the u.s. institute of peace starts at 10:00 eastern. donald rumsfeld was the youngest and oldest person to serve as u.s. defense secretary. >> if you have proximity to a president you have an obligation to tell the truth and what you really believe. because people who don't have

that can only see him occasionally, simply don't want to do it. >> he will discuss his philosophy of presidential staff leadership, process of writing his memoirs, known and unknown and address the critical and positive reviews. four of the candidates trying to replace richard daley of chicago for mayer meat for their final debate. chicago voters go to the polls next tuesday, february 22nd. if no candidate receives a majority of top two will be on the ballot for and april 5th runoff. w l s t. the post this debate from the oriental theater in chicago. >> welcome to tonight's debate for candidates from chicago being hosted at broadway in chicago's oriental theater. the candidates will debate the issues so you will be better informed when you go to the

polls on february 22nd. tonight's the date is produced in cooperation with the league of women voters, lead of chicago theaters, planning kelso, chicago foundation for women, chicago urban league, and univision. candidates for mayor of chicago are carol moseley-braun of the personal miguel, rahm emanuel and gary chico. joining me in questioning abc reporter charles thomas and acre and reporter paula gomez. determined by a drawing held earlier each candidate will have an opening statement of one minute. we begin that. >> we have an election a few days away. this collection should be in the neighborhood of the city of

chicago. you can help chart a different court for the city of chicago. that continues to seek progress downtown and development in the downtown area but also of course to ensure that neighborhoods have been waiting for long time to receive the attention and the neighborhood that needs to remain stable with a stable middle class. get the assistance that they need to ensure that stability. we will be electing a mayor that will chart that course. please cast an informed vote. we need to ignite democracy in the city of chicago in order to in short that course is a course that will benefit all. >> i appreciate univision and abc hosting this. i was born on the south side of chicago. i worked hard for everything on

have earned. i worked in my father's gas station, i went to night school and became chairman of our school board when i was able to lead a nationally recognized benefit for our children. i did defeat and every time i have been asked to serve. i produced 16 balanced budgets with surpluses in each. time to live within its means. our city is at a turning point and i want to take our city in a new direction. that is why i am running for mayor and i look forward to discussing this and other issues critical to the city and our future. >> tonight, the city of chicago, we face common challenges. from the safety of our streets and the strength of our schools to the stability of our economy and the question is whether we will face those challenges for a common purpose. .. challenges with common purpose. in a sense of bringing together the city.

and that starts by being honest and leveling with people about the challenges that we face and the decisions we have to make. and we need a mayor who is strong enough, determined, with a vision and a resilience to see that future and seize that future for this city. so that we can grow as one city, every neighborhood, but also downtown economically, where you can raise a family, start a business, and make sure that the city, as we face these challenges, comes through this period stronger for all its residents and every neighborhood. t forhat's the challenge for the >> we are a great city with apa great future. decisions we make in the comingn comiaysll determine whether chicago stays on the course and continues to be the great city it is. >> thank you.city it is ms. abroad. >> i want to thank channel 7 and the league of women voters for hosting this candidates' forum. i am a woman voter who also knows what it means to be a woman in leadership. born and raised in chicago, i care deeply about the future of all of the children of this city.

i'm a candidate for mayor because i bring experience, gained from elected leadership in local, state and national government, as well as experiences on the international level and as an entrepreneur. i'm uniquely qualified to be mayor at this time in our history, having overcome challenges by making them into opportunities. i bring the leadership capacity to make our city reflect the resourcefulness, productivity and straight forward determination of its people. our city works very well for some. and not at all for others. there are villages of homeless people under the bridges at sawyer and belmont in subzero weather. and yet our downtown is one of the most beautiful in the world. our city's financial deficit is a reflection of its leadership deficit. i have a vision of a great city that includes all and excludes none. a city that respects every person. and i look forward to working with you to get to that point. thank you. >> thank you. first question tonight comes from charles thomas, and charles, it is directed to mr. chico. >> all of you, during this

campaign, have is expressed great optimism about the future of our city. and expect a return eventually to economic prosperity, perhaps, during the next four years. but all of you have also agreed that chicago government must reinvent how it collects and spends our tax money. mr. chico, when prosperity returns, why should the sellers of retail items be the only ones required to charge the sales tax? and why shouldn't those who sell services, including dog groomers, barbers, mechanics and others, add a sales tax? don't they also take advantage of doing business in the city of chicago? >> the issue before us is not whether or not one is right or wrong. it's how to make it work. and the problem that you have right now is mr. emanual has proposed the largest expansion of the sales tax on services that has ever been put to our

city. the problem is this. we don't get any answers about what it would apply to. if you're going to take $45 million out of the budget, tell us how you're going to replace it. you're not going to do it with jet travel and with luxury services that are in his -- in his limited proposal. the problem is this. cranes, chicago sun times and chicago tribune all say it doesn't add up. so the problem is, it's a phony claim to say that somebody is going to get $200 savings when it never adds up. you would have to make $600,000 a year to get $200 in savings. nobody is going to be eligible for that in the city. so it doesn't hold water. it's a very difficult thing to do. and you can't do it on the back of an envelope, as was done here. >> mr. emmanuel? >> first of all, i've proposed three separate tax cuts. one on the employee head tax, that is a disincentive for hiring people. second, a change in the natural gas tax. as you know, people's energy suggested a rate hike.

and it would save middle class families on their energy bill. and third, i've also talked about a sales tax reduction of 20%. i think a single mother buying school applies for her children should not be bearing the full burden of that tax when drivers of corporate jets, limos $85 facials for dogs, grooming, ould nepaha e ail single mother trying to get school supplies for her child is being burdened. chicago residents are being nickeled and diamond on taxes. we have the highest tax rate in the country. it is time to lower it so we are economically competitive, so the retail merchants in one form or another have endorsed this proposal, including gary at one time in a public debate. >> can we respond? >> ms. braun? >> you know, i served -- i am the candidate in this race who said no new taxes. the working people in the city have been taxed enough.

i'm not saying that out of the blue. i am a former member of the united states senate finance committee. i have served also -- i ran the budgets of an embassy, i've run the budgets of the recorded deeds office, so i'm familiar with these taxation issues, and i believe the way we get this budget under balance is that we reform city government, we make it accountable, and then we grow our economy here in chicago. we create jobs, and when we create those jobs, it will grow our revenue base, and that will let us fund essential services in the city without putting a greater tax burden, even a tax swap, on the people of chicago. >> mr. delville. >> we have an antiquated tax structure. and now is not the time to be talking about raising sales taxes. and with all of the confusion that's been created around this proposal, it clearly indicates that we need to do a thorough analysis of this. if rahm goes to the general assembly with a proposal to

raise the sales tax, they're going to turn it down. they just increased the income tax. and so it really is ludicrous at this point to even be talking about changing the sales tax when it's not going to go anywhere. what we should be talking about is how do we protect those businesses that are struggling out there in the neighborhoods that have seen a huge increase in the property taxes and about to close their businesses, because of that. those are the types of things we should be talking about. >> can we stay on this issue? >> one second. we do have a follow-up opportunity. charles can come back. you'll all get another 45 seconds here. charles? >> well, mr. chico, i mean, you've called mr. emmanuel a pathological evader of the truth. >> right. >> is his response to this issue part of that? >> absolutely. i mean, tell us right now what's going to be taxed. i agree with miguel dell ville, this is absolutely the wrong time to be talking about this. i have a daughter who is a single mom. and i have a 2-year-old grabbed

son. she's not going to benefit from this tax. she doesn't make $600,000. it's not possible. secondly, the taxpayers in this city and in this state already have too many bricks on their back. they cannot afford this. one thing is for sure. you make -- i'll tell you one thing, when you go into the barber shop, when you go into the dry cleaner and call the plummer and that new 9% is here, you're going to feel that pinch, trust me. working families around this city are going to feel that pinch. >> mr. emmanuel? >> there are three separate tax cuts i proposed, one, employee head tax, disincentive to hiring people. the second is a change in the natural gas tax. and that would also save hundreds of dollars for middle class families, especially now that people are talking about raising the rates. third is a 20% reduction in the sales tax. because single parents, working middle class parents, have a tax code, and they are bearing the burden. chicago has the highest sales tax in the country. it is time to give working families a cut, which means if

you take a corporate jet, you'll start to pay your share. you hire a limo, you'll pay your share. you want to join salts saddle and cycle club, you pay your share. and we give two tax cuts, one on the energy bill, one on the sales tax. and that is essential to do, given what just happened in the general assembly that, the middle class families have a tax cut, which they need desperately, and we can also balance the budget by changing the reforms you originally talked about, charles. and that makes chicago a place where businesses want to invet vest and create the jobs here. >> did you thank you. mr. del ville. >> we have an antiquated system. the amount that mr. rahm is talking about is a minuscule system. the question is, why are we only proposing this at this time? because it sounds good. we're going to lower your taxes, we're going from 1.25% to 1%. and most of the families aren't going to see the difference. and so why don't we talk about

the property taxes that are choking families and businesses in the city of chicago? that is the issue that we should be debating during this campaign. and that's why this campaign has to go beyond february 22nd and to april 5th so we can have more time to dissect this proposal and educate the voters, so that they understand that it means absolutely nothing to them. and it avoids dealing with the tough issues, which is what's happening to our families out in the neighborhoods that are being nickeled and diamond to death. >> thank you. ms. braun? >> i just think this is such a tricky proposal, because what it does is lowers the tax a little bit, and then expands it a lot. and frankly, i don't think anybody has really crunched the numbers to see exactly what the tax burden will be, and where it will fall. again, we don't need to talk about new taxes. what we need to talk about is going to springfield, and getting our portion of the distributive share in that last income tax they passed, getting that money back for the city of chicago. it was promised to us, we were

supposed to have it, it was eliminated when they passed the bill. so let's get what's owed us, let's move in that direction to bring more revenue in, instead of talking of new ways to put more taxes on the voters and the citizens of the city of chicago. >> thank you. paula gomez, your first question is directed to mr. emmanuel. >> when taxes were going to go to public education, chicago public schools currently have one of the shortest school days in the nation. by the time a high school student graduates, they will have received approximately three years less instructional time compared to students in other major cities. and as you well know, the current graduation rate is only 56%. but the question is, what specifically will you do to improve public education in chicago, and make it available to all students and not just the lucky ones who get into a magnet, gifted or charter school. >> there's two parts to that question. first, if a kid in chicago goes from kindergarten all the way to high school and their cousin is in houston, kindergarten, to high school, the cousin in

houston spends four more years in a classroom than the cousin in chicago. a full high school education. i will seek and go to springfield to raise the minimum both the length of the year and the length of the day, because our kids are being cheated, and they can't compete in the global economy if they get less offen an education. second, invest in making sure we have a performance contract for each school so we can measure the progress of the principal. third, invest in teacher academies, so we have the largest teacher population with a master's degree in education of any school system in the country. and fourth, make sure that parents are involved in their kids' education. because walking through that front door to the house is the most important door where a child learns education. and teachers are going to need the partnership of the parents involved in a child's education. >> thank you. ms. braun? >> the first thing is that we need to have an educate tore in charge of the chicago public schools. instead of trying all these different experiments by people who look at our students as so

many widgets on a spreadsheet, we need to start off with an educator, helping to collaborate around the changes we should make. there are a host of programs that are still being dealt with in the chicago public school system that long ago outlived their usefulness, and that frankly just complicate a system that is already too complicated. i think we need to simplify the system, work with the teachers around what they want to see in the classroom, give them a voice, give the principals a voice, let the principals do what they need to do. and lengthening the school day might well be a proposal. but let's look at things like class size, let's look at things like providing environments suitable for learning. let's look at things like making sure our children aren't fed garbage at lunch time and get better food and better nutrition from the schools. there are a host of things we need to do. >> thank you. >> class size and length of the school day is just one of them. >> mr. del ville? >> well, we have helped develop magnet schools, charter schools, selective enrollment schools,

and those are great. but it's time to focus on the neighborhood schools and the way you lengthen the school days in neighborhood schools is by establishing community learning centers that will engage the entire family in learning activities from 2:00 in the afternoon until 8:00 in the evening. and on saturdays where parents can take ged classes, esl classes, the children can be involved in enrichment classes. its the way i saw last night in talking to a parent who told me, they're looking for a place where they can send their child to get additional support and involvement in an enrichment program, and they can't find one in the neighborhood. in every underperforming neighborhoodel school. >> thank you. mr. chico? >> i've been privileged to serve as president of the chicagoel school board in the mid '90s through the early 2000s. and at that time it was the worst system. and i was pleased president clinton held us up as a model for reform two short years later. how did we do that?

we lengthened the school day by two hours a day, and had the nation's largest summer school program. the reason those are both important is because the more time we spend teaching, the more time our children spend learning. and when we do that, we will begin to eat into the dropout problem, because we will be more effective, the children, the students will have more positive reinforcement and see that it's in their best interest to go to school, pay attention, and succeed. i think these are the most critical elements that we can effect, and i've proposed those both in my education reform plan. >> thank you. paula, you have a follow-up question. >> we can go in the same order. which will be your top two priorities when negotiating the new teacher plan of 2012? >> first will be the length of the day and the year. because we are literally cheating our kids. you cannot ask them to learn and compete when we have one of the shortest years and shortest days of any major city in the country. and second is raising the

quality of the teachers in the classroom. which is why i want to double the size of the teaching academies here in the city of chicago. we have a model program that people come and actually study. seven schools. i started the first high school teaching academy in my old congressional district. i want to take that to 15, so we have the equivalent of two high schools and six elementary schools of teachers graduating with a master's degree in education. and those teachers move on to the neighborhood schools. and we improve them, school by school. that to me is the priority, doubling the size of the teaching academies and making sure the length of the school year matches the requirements of a 21st century economy, so all kids in every part of the city can compete and win in the future. >> ms. braun. >> i think the first thing we need to look at is engaging the teachers and the principals in working toward reform of the system. frankly, since some of the changes that happened under mr. chico's leadership, our system has moved more in the direction of private advertised education, and less in the direction of the public schools and public

education in the neighborhoods that we need to see. and i believe that teachers want very much to be a part of that. nobody goes into teaching to make a fortune. they go into it, because they care with children. and so i want to engage the teachers in seeing to it that we provide environments for the school, in terms of their contract specifically, i would like to work with them on resolving issues having to do with assignments and eligibility for the academies and eligibility for working in the neighborhood schools. if you have a good teacher who is right now in one of the academy or has been spun off into one of these selective enrollment schools, those teachers ought to be encouraged, i think. >> thank you. >> to come back. >> thank you. mr. del ville. >> i want to establish a good working relationship with teachers. they have been criticized, they have been blamed for everything that's wrong, with public education, not just in chicago, but throughout the state, and throughout the country.

teachers have received criticism. i think teachers want a strong evaluation system in place that ensures that they get the kind of feedback that will help them grow and develop on the jobs. you know, you really learn about teaching when you get into that classroom. the colleges of education don't prepare you for that first day when you go in that classroom. and so we need a strong evaluation system, and teachers more than anyone else want to weed out incompetent teachers. because they're the ones who have to deal with the students who then come to them after being in it a classroom where the teacher didn't do their job. so i will work closely with the chicago teachers' union, and i will also challenge them and work with them to take on the underperforming schools that need to be turned around as quickly as possible. thank you. >> and i think that partnership can be put together with the mayor in a board of education, working with teachers throughout the entire city of chicago. >> thank you. >> in a way that's constructive. >> thank you. mr. chico. >> my mother-in-law, my wife, my

son and my daughter are teachers. i internalize how important this is to our society. it's not just rhetoric for me. i was the lead negotiator with the chicago teachers' union twice back in 1995 and four years later where i led successfully two contract negotiations for the longest school contracts that we have had, probably yet to date in the chicago public schools. and they were effective. that stability gave us six years of test score i am professorments. we need to do that again. i would have as my number one item longer school kay, longer school year. i'll work that out with the teachers, and they will be compensated for the time. we're not just going to say come work for nothing. and then secondly, we will arrive at a meaning -- together, a meaningful performance evaluation system. so that we can truly monitor the performance of our teachers, compensate accordingly, and make sure that we absolutely have the best teachers in our classroom for our children. i think that's an incredibly

important set of goals. >> thank you. the next question goes to ms. braun. let me combine a couple things here, because i think they may be relatively simple answers for you. the head tax. we have had some brief discussion of the head tax. you in favor or not, and why? and the residency requirement for city workers. are you in favor or not, and why? head tax, residency. ms. braun. >> okay. in that order, the head tax. no, of course, i'm not in favor of it. and frankly, fewer employers -- it applies to fewer employers than is suggested in some of the plans that have been floated for raising our city taxes. the second thing, though, is very important. if we don't keep residency requirements, what we will have is an incentive for people who are paid out of the city revenue stream to leave the city so they're no longer contributing to it. the police and fire and teachers, residency requirements are very important to maintaining a stable revenue base for chicago when it no

longer applies, we can begin to have to figure out how we're going to fill the revenue hole that creates. >> the head tax, to me, is a nonissue. do you know that we collect more in red light tickets from residents in the city and people who visit the city than we do from employers who are paying the head tax? we collected last year $64 million for red light tickets, and we're talking about $20 million for the head tax. let's put this into perspective. the people who are really getting hit hard are the ones in the neighborhoods. and so let's not use this as an example of how we are discouraging employers from setting up shop. after all, when we talk about the head tax, we're talking about the large employers. and they can certainly afford paying $20 million a year, given that they're making huge profits in the city of chicago. let's start protecting the residents who have to pay those red light tickets. >> mr. chico.

[ applause ] please -- i will again caution the audience, no applause, no reaction of any kind. please. thank you. mr. chico. >> i think the head tax is a horrible signal to business that we will tax you for bringing jobs to our city. that's why i've called for its entire elimination in one year. the only candidate to do so. i'm the only candidate that has already taken the dollar off the head tax back in 1993. it went from 5 to 4. i think it should be eliminated, eliminated quickly, because it's a horrible signal to people who would like to bring paychecks to our residents. as far as residency goes, i think rahm and i share an opinion on this. i think i said i would merely put it on the table, take a look at it, but i have reservations about it. there is a lot of cons to this. but many groups sent us questionnaires and asked us to talk about it. i said i would merely talk about it. >> mr. emmanuel. >> i was the first to call for

eliminating the head tax, because it is a disincentive for creating jobs here. when i visited the ford plant on the south side, the number one reason they stated they're not getting possibly a third shift was because the head tax made them uncompetitive to other ford plants. and we can afford to eliminate a $20 million because -- of revenue source, because it cost us more in lost revenue from employers. second on residency. as i said before, i understand from the police and firefighters and the teachers, it's an important issue. but those folks are more than just police and firefighters. they're the anchor in our neighborhood, they are the little league coaches, they are the people that volunteer at their churches and before we give up those anchors in our community, and i appreciate the other side's recognition of the importance from their side, but they play an important function in our city, not just in the police station, not just in the fire engine, but also what they do for the communities and neighborhoods and also for the little volunteers that they do as little league coaches, hockey coaches and in their churches. >> thank you very much. for a follow-up, let's move to

another neighborhood issue. citywide issue. given recent court rulings, is there anything anyone can do about guns in chicago, ms. braun? >> oh, i think so. in the first place, if we start -- if we focus in on not trying to shut down people who collect, who hunt, who want to have guns for their own safety, which is what this -- focusing on in the decision, if we focus in on shutting down the illegal gun sales, as well as tracking the theft of guns from some of our transit facilities here in chicago, a lot of the guns are stolen from the trains, they're stolen out of the airport. we need to make sure that we have real prosecution of gun use, of gun crimes, and of the gun thefts. i come out of a law enforcement background, and it's the illegal guns that are the biggest problem in the city of chicago. not homeowners trying to protect their homes or hunters or collectors. so i think going after legal

guns would be the way to go, and that's not happening right now. >> thank you. mr. del ville? >> i think date is going to come in the makeup of the supreme court, we'll end up with some common sense gun laws in this country. because certainly, we have to continue to advocate to ensure that our police officers, by the way, we want living in our neighborhoods, not in the suburbs, should be protected from the flow of guns in our streets. and our residents need to be protected. and so we must do everything possible to limit the flow of weapons, firearms, in our streets in the city of chicago, including adopting local ordinances that are able to withstand supreme court testing. >> thank you, mr. chico. >> along this campaign trail, a met a woman who lost her 13-year-old son anthony to gang fire. he was killed. there's no doubt about it, there is an imperative here to try to limit the proliferation of guns in our city. right after the mcdonald case was decided, the one you

referred to, ron, the city of chicago produced another ordinance, which, again, attempts to limit the amount of handguns that a person can own in our city, and put some other restrictions on it. no sooner was the ink dry on that order that it was promptly attacked in federal court. i as mayor will continue to do everything in our power to limit the amount of guns in our city. >> mr. emmanuel. >> as a point person for president clinton, i helped pass the brady bill, and the assault weapon ban in this country. and i introduced as a member of congress the juvenile brady bill extending the brady law to juveniles, violent criminals. second, i and my 50 site visit visited roseland, a memorial to juveniles and young kids who have been killed by gun violence. 126 names yet to be put on plaques. i believe that the u.s. attorney should back up the state's attorney here and help us prosecute these gun crimes. i'm not waiting for springfield or washington to pass new laws.

let's prosecute the laws we have on the books today so any gun crimes we can stop and put those individuals behind bars. >> thank you. charles, your question goes to mr. del ville. >> i would like each of you, of course, to answer the question, but beginning with you, mr. del valle, i want you to use your 60 seconds to name and describe three people that you, if elected mayor, will include in what might be called your kitchen cabinet. these are people who are not necessarily working in your administration, but from whom you would expect to take advice and counsel. >> well, i am not going to name my cabinet here. >> not your cabinet. people that you depend on. >> but i will turn to people out in the neighborhoods in the communities. we need folks who are common folk, who are in the neighborhoods, who are business leaders, small business owners -- >> can you name some? >> specific leaders, individuals who can come and partake in the decisions that get made.

for too long in the city of chicago, the mayor has been surrounded by a very small, close-knit circle, and that's why gentlemen like gary chicko got appointed to everything, because the circle is so small. and so we need to widen that and we need to widen that with individuals who come from different walks of life who can advise the mayor on a lot of different issues. >> thank you very much. we do need to move on. i'm going to caution the audience for the last time, there will be no more reactions or we'll empty the room and finish this without you. thank you very much. mr. chico. >> three people had come to mind that i think would be celebrity advisers. one, paul valas, one of the better minds i've seen on municipalel pal finance. bee herbert martin, a dear friend of mine during the course of the campaign. a minister on the south side. because there is a role for the faith community to play in making sure that our city sees things through a different lens. and then another person who i

have become very close to is luis gutierrez. he is path-breaking, and i think having these kinds of points of view in a kitchen cabinet would enable me to make the best policy possible. >> mr. emmanuel. >> well, it depends, truly, on the subject. on education, i would look to somebody like mike holedike. in the area of education, we worked together in creating the chicago teaching academy. as it relates to building, i think our communities from the ground up, dr. brasher, taking over the church on the south side. as it relates to i think our arts and culture, which i think are very important to our sense of our city, dave mu seeno over in the museum, head of planning. so it depends on the topic. there will be a number of individuals whom i call, and that's limited. there's a great series of a number of people organizing and sponsoring the debate today.

who are involved in our foundations and our think tanks, and academia, who i would want to get involved in their area of specialty. so depending on the issue, charles, i would actually pick people on their areas of specialty, and bring them in, both as outside advisers, and willingly, i think other people should now see city government as a chance to join and do public service. i'm going to call people from private sector and the academia to participate by joining city government and opening it up. >> thank you. >> as miguel said, to others. >> ms. braun? >> you know, i'm kind of torn and i started to write a list here, and i had too many names and so i started striking people's names out. it's not working. the point that miguel made is a very good one. you can't just answer this in terms of three people, because the media is going to run and say, oh, what are you going to do? and it's supposed to signal something, and it really doesn't. but i will give it a shot anyway. i rely on my family. my family for advice. my sister is a states attorney, my brother is a chicago plam.

i rely on close personal friends, like rene ferguson, who has joined our campaign as a press spokesman, because that was my price when she agreed -- when i agreed to run for this office. john rogers is a friend from corporate sector who i rely on who has been very helpful. i could go on. and i would go on, but i'm sure now -- >> we're out of time. >> they're all mad at me. >> charles, you have a follow-up question. >> interesting that none of you mention mentioned richard m. daly, but i'll go on. i would like to ask mr. emmanuel something. could you tell us the kinds of things that you did between the time you left the clinton administration until you ran for congress to make what some say $18 million? what were you doing for people to make that kind of money? >> sure. i worked in the private sector. and i worked in investment banking. on a transaction. here creating exelon and keeping

the corporate headquarters here. in a period of time in which many corporate headquarters were leaving the city, i worked on a major transaction that kept a corporate headquarters here. with thousands of jobs attached to it. in addition to that, a company that pays many of the taxes that helps us fund the things that we build here. and i worked on other transactions, as well. i did that. i also served, charles, as vice chair of the chicago housing authority and helped on the plan for transformation. and i also taught at northwestern, a class on the press and the presidency. so i worked in the private sector, continue to do stuff in academia and also gave my time for the city in the -- as a vice chair of the chicago housing authority. >> any of you have a reaction to that? mr. chico? >> i do. i think you did some other things too, ron. i think you served -- i think you served on the board of freddie mac, i would like to talk about that, if it i could. because we have just a few days left in the campaign, and i have yet heard an answer about what happened during your time on the

board of freddie mac with the accounting scandal that cost working men and women in this city, taxpayers, $585 million. you say that because you were a vice chair of the chicago housing authority, and because you were not on the audit committee, that's your answer. but what happened there? what responsibility do you take for that accounting scandal that cost all of us as taxpayers so much money? >> mr. del valle? >> well, i'd like to say that both gary chico and rahm emanuel have done very well. they're both individuals that have reported millions of dollars in income. and i certainly don't begrudge that. but the fact of the matter is that they've been able to do that, because they have taken full advantage of their contacts in the federal government, or in city government. and so i think this city is ready for a leader that takes money out of politics. and that's why i advocate stopping pay to play in the city of chicago. once and for all. >> thank you. ms. braun? >> well, again, i think the

issue here is whether or not they disclose conflicts, potential conflicts of interest, whether or not mr. emmanuel registered as a lobbyist to let us know who he was representing and who he was calling, and relationship management. he's neither a cpa nor an mpa, nor a lawyer. and yet was able to go into a field that traditionally requires that set of credentials. so i think we need to know more, charles. but i also would ask the question, even about records in congress, mr. emmanuel voted against the congressional black caucus 128 times. who voted against issues having to do with poverty and sending water to drought-starved africa. voted to allow people to sell down meat from downed animals. those are the kinds of questions in terms of the record that i'd like to have asked tonight. >> thank you. paula, your question goes to mr. chico. >> 2013, the federal government wants to increase collaboration with local authorities to deport undocumented immigrants. what will be your stance as mayor of chicago? >> i wouldn't allow it.

i was proud of my assistants in authoring the executive order, calling us a sanctuary city, which means we will not allow our police officers, firefighters or city personnel to help enforce the immigration laws of this country. frankly, i think it's a red herring. i'll tell you why. we ought to, as a nation, once and for all, figure out federal immigration reform. it didn't happen on mr. emmanuel's watch as chief of staff. but i was so proud to see president obama during the state of the union just recently put it right back on the agenda, and i believe he will push, and we will get this done. and i will work side by side with congressman luis gutierrez to make that happen, because it's the right and moral thing to do in our country. >> mr. emanual -- [ applause ] >> please! mr. emmanuel. >> i'm the grandson of an immigrant who came from eastern europe here to chicago. the son of an immigrant who came in 1959. i worked tirelessly in congress,

in making sure that we every year -- i co sponsored and voted for comprehensive reform. and also opposed republican efforts to politic size the issue. and my office worked many times, there is not a week that goes by that somebody doesn't come up to me and thank me for helping them get naturalization and citizenship here in the country. third in the city. third, i would also keep our policy as a sanctuary city. and i've also introduced a chicago version of the dream act. so individuals here who came here with their parents have the opportunity to go to college, which is a dream of every immigrant parent when they come to america, is that their kids get a better future. that is a policy that we need, maintaining our sanctuary policy here as a city. i've done it both as a member of congress, but i also have made a proposal here on how to make chicago stand out and have a new policy that is consistent with our values, as it relates to education and the dream act. >> thank you. ms. braun? >> you know, sometimes you have to have a sense of unreality about this whole thing. you have been, mr. emmanuel, shown that you directly involved

with killing the dream act when it came through. so to listen to you tonight is really kind of surprising. and, again, whether chicago should continue to be a sanctuary city, we shouldn't allow families to get ripped apart because of the ill logic of our immigration system. among the things that are illogical is the federal government mandating activity by i.c.e. that they don't pay for. that comes out of the city. i think that we need to -- i still have floor privileges in the united states senate. i'm prepared to go back to washington, to press for a reform of the way that immigration laws are enforced, reform the way the state department treats people, because there's no reason why people are standing out in the rain, waiting for somebody to talk to them. we need to make certain that we press to make -- to press for fairness in the -- in the area of immigration. >> thank you. mr. del valle? >> this question wouldn't even be an issue tonight if we had

had comprehensive immigration reform. and the fact of the matter is that rahm emanuel referred to immigration as the third rail of politics when he advised his colleagues in congress not to pursue immigration reform, and then as chief of staff to the president of the united states, he also advised the president not to pursue immigration reform in the first year of his administration. but in chicago, we need to do more than just continue to protect the rights of immigrants in our city. we also have to advocate the mayor of the city of chicago has to also look at what's happening at the county level. and also has to advocate at the state level so that we can make sure that we're doing what is right with immigrants in the city of chicago. >> what would you tell a chicago police officer who is having the dilemma of not knowing whether to adhere to the city ordinance, the sanctuary city ordinance or to follow the rules of the program implemented by customs

enforcement? >> mr. chico? >> i think it's pretty clear. the executive order is what that police officer operates under. i think it's also a problem that what the federal government has done, again, perhaps under your leadership, has really an awful dragnet program right now for the most minor offenses to tear families apart, and deport people for minor traffic violations and other ordinance violations. this is wrong. this is only going to get straightened out when we once and for all have federal immigration reform. i am the grandson of a mexican immigrant from mexico who came here. i live this every day. and frankly, this is way, way past the time that it should have beened settled, and i'm looking forward to working with luis gutierrez to once and for all settle this issue. >> mr. emmanuel? >> obviously, a police officer has to follow the police sanctuary policy we have here. number one. number two, i think it's very important to also know that under president obama,

naturalization of individuals who have come to the country has dramatically increased during the period of time of time also since my time has been in question. also an appointment to the supreme court. sonja sew son sonia sotomayor as a supreme court member. third, the last time it was under ronald reagan back in 1986. this is a complicated issue, but we needed policy that reflects our values and also reflects our laws. and that means working together across party lines to get it done. >> thank you. ms. braun? >> the fact of the matter is that our immigration policy is broken, and we need to fix it. we need to fix it in ways that respect people, that provide for fairness, that is fair to the city of chicago and the people who live here. whether they are documented or not. and that is -- and what i would do specifically, again, is to

try to work with the administration on behalf of comprehensive immigration reform in the first place. but in the meantime, lobby to get the money back that we are right now having to pay as taxpayers here in chicago for what is basically an unfunded mandate by the federal government. it is not right for the federal government to insist that we do a thing, and then not send the money to let us do it. >> thank you. mr. del valle? >> i just talked to someone yesterday who said someone they know has been deported, and children have been left behind. this is happening quite often in the city of chicago. i think it's important that the mayor of the city of chicago ensure that all city departments, including the police department, are monitoring the activity within city limits. and that we then establish a line of communication with the

federal government regarding the status of people here and ensuring that the federal government is respecting our local laws. we have an ordinance in place. it's not an executive order. it's an ordinance. and if the federal government is not respecting that, then we need to take action, and certainly now is the time. >> thank you, mr. del valle. mr. emmanuel, the next mayor is going to face a huge, unfunded pension liability in the city. has to be paid. somehow. some have suggested if we get a casino license in chicago, send that right straight to the pension fund. is that a good idea, or what would you do? >> first of all, i believe in preserving the pension. my uncle, former police officer here in the city of chicago, 25 years, retired, is living on that pension. i believe that -- i also know that if we don't do anything within the decade, the pensions are going to run out of money to pay the retirement.

i also fully reject raising property taxes 90% to pay for it. that's the other option. those extremes are not acceptable. when i first got to congress, i worked with united airline flight attendants who had their pension eliminated. i never want to see that again. that means being honest, how to preserve it, make changes so you preserve it, so that people that are putting into it know that it's going to be a retirement system for them, since workers, police and firefighters do not get social security. that is their retirement system and their disability insurance. make sure that's done. you can look at the casino as a revenue source, but it has to be changed so that revenue source is part and parcel of a whole program to preserve the pension. >> thank you. ms. braun? >> you know, we have to protect retirement for city workers. while i was on the president's commission on pensions and retirement security, we took a deep look at this. and the first thing i would say to people is don't panic. we do have to fix this problem,

but we're right now at the top of a demographic bubble, where there is the most pressure on the pension system. that will change, as we change -- as the generation moves forward. the second thing we have to do, obviously, is fully fund our pensions and we have four systems in the city. we have to fund them and do better than we're doing now. that means getting away from the kind of spending -- the spending that didn't pay attention to this. when i talk about a leadership deficit, this is one of the areas where you see it. the most. because the attention was not being paid to what was happening with our pension system as they were spending going on in other arenas. there was not enough planning and foresight to make the contribution sufficient. i refuse, refuse to increase property taxes, certainly. but we can address this, i think, if we grow the economy in the city and create more jobs. >> thank you. mr. del valle? >> the pension problem is a problem created by government, created by the city, created by the state. because of our failure to contribute the employer share at an adequate level. and so now, what's the

discussion? the discussion is, taking away benefits from current employees, which i think would be unconstitutional. we've contracted with those individuals, and now we're going to take away either prospectively or current benefits. that is wrong. we have to find a revenue source to support our pensions. and so license is one of those possibilities. if that's not what goes, then we have to find another source so that we can make sure that we make these pension funds whole. they have to be helped. no doubt about it. and it has to happen real soon. >> mr. chico. >> ron, i've led the way on collective bargaining. that has included matters like pensions, pension contributions bch. it's not something i haven't seen. i will not tell our police officers and firefighters who protect us that i am going to cut their benefits. what we will do, however, and i

think this is a proper role of leadership, is sit down in the room. i have said that i would lead the negotiations personally, to sit down with labor, and work out an affordable solution for everyone. but we should honor the principle that a pension benefit level earned is one, a promise that we need to keep. and i will do that. as far as the casino license goes, i was the first candidate here to say that i would support a casino for chicago, because we need the revenue. if could be as much as 200 to $250 million annually for our city. a portion of which could be dedicated to something like this, where you wouldn't have to look at that 90% property tax increase. so i think it's absolutely in order to look at that kind of revenue. >> brief follow-up. of if we can. you have all talked about we're going to have to cut, find new revenue. can you each assure us that your first budget as mayor will be smaller than the current budget,

and that it is a simple fact there will be higher taxes and fees of some kind? mr. emmanuel. >> first of all, i've laid out a specific budget, line by line, that is balanced. it's one of the reasons, also, the "chicago sun times" "chicago tribune" and "chicago cranes business" have supported my candida candidacy, straight forward -- their editorial page -- honest and straight forward with the voters and fundamental reforms. ron, such as health care, we paid $500 million. consolidating procurement across the board saves $40 million. doing garbage collection different saves money. we'll have to make reforms through city government. i have a specific line by line plan of how you to do that. >> thank you. ms. brown? >> number one, again, no few

taxes. a balanced budget, absolutely. i cosponsored the balanced budget constitutional amendment. i think it's important. number three, in terms of the budget, it has to be fair and transparent. i believe we should put every dime online. put the budget online so the citizens of chicago can see where the money is going. that's a very important step. right now, our city government operates like the creme plkreml. in addition to that, making certain that we have the kind of budget transparency that respects and supports every community is very important. when you say a smaller budget, will it be smaller? probably. but will it be new taxes in it? absolutely not. >> the budget will be much smaller. but the question is, what will be the priorities? where are we going to start? we have to start in the mayor's office and reduce the cost of

the mayor's office. we have to reduce the cost of the city council and eliminate committees. we have to lead by example and look at the upper layer of management and start getting rid of some of the deputies who report to deputies. we need to cut personnel at that level. and i anticipate 50 to $100 million in cuts. then we in these to use surplus dollars and change how we collect garbage and collect overdue water bills. we need to look at who's paying water and who's not paying water in terms of not for profit organizations. we need to refinance debt. >> thank you. mr. chico. >> you're not going to balance the city budget with line item measure. the city budget will be smaller next year then this year.

we're telling the working families, tighten your belt. give us more money. we're not doing anything. i'm not going to see that happen. i think it is about leadership. i've offered to cut my own pay as mayor, 20% just to start. after i did that, the city council talked about reducing the number of committees. the bottom line is that the entire chicago government will have to be cut back in size. we can't afford to go along any more like this. >> that brings us to our closing statements. we begin with mr. del valle. >> chicago is ready for reform. we'll have to make a decision, voters. we're going to decide are we going to take full advantage of this historic opportunity in this election? i've heard when we reach that turning point, we're turning in the right direction. in a direction that says we're going to have balanced growth and balanced development. that we're finally going to engage our neighborhoods in a

process that will ensure we will live up to that process as a world class city that we don't have right now. because we don't have world class neighborhoods. do we do it by electing an individual who has made millions of dollars and profited from their associations with government or do we start anew with a reform government that is going to once and for all put the people first before special interests in the city of chicago? this is the opportunity. take advantage of it. it's time, chicago. >> ms. brown. >> as we grow our economy, we have to remain focused on fairness. chicago's 3% minority contract participation is a travesty in a city that has a 47% minority population and a sad commentary on race and diversity in this city. by stream lining city government and making it more responsive, government can become an ally of the people who create businesses

in this town who create the jobs that this town so badly needs. by protecting retirement security, we preserve the standard of living for our work face by holding the line on taxes. we have to -- in egypt two weeks ago -- the people demanded democracy and got. we should do no less for chicago and choose reform, open government and accountability. here in this city, they're trying to tell you this election is over. that the money has won it. but i want to tell you something. it's not over until you, the voters speak. and i think that if the voters on the 22nd vote for themselves, we will fight the power. we will have democracy in chicago. >> thank you. mr. chico. >> thank you, ron. we need to go in a new direction in our city. that's the reason i'm running for mayor. the city that we love has lost its momentum. i'd like to offer my experience to get us back on track. i've delivered genuine change

each and every time i've been asked to serve. i know how this city works. and right now it's to the working for you. our streets are not safe enough. we don't have enough jobs. our schools are not performing at the level we'd like. i grew up on 33rd and ashlynn and watched my mom and dad strug toll pay the bills. i'm not going to let the city rifle through your pockets. i'll force the city to live within its means. i humbly ask for your support to be your next mayor. >> this has been a very good debate. these are very good public servants that i consider friends. denial is not a long-term strategy. for too long on the issue of facing crime on your steereets

our economy and stability of our economy, we have been operating as if denial is a long-term strategy. when you get to a fork in the road, take it. chicago's at that fork. we need a mayor who has the strength, confidence and resi resilience to make those decisions. i want this city to be the great city it is. the decisions we make as a city in the next two years, three years, will determine the course we're on. i want it to be a city my children can call home. >> thank you very much. that concludes the debate between the leading candidates for mayor of chicago. i want to thank carl mosley brown, ron del valle, ron chico and rahm emanuel. thank you to our partners in the production of this event, the league of women voters, chicago loop alliance, the league of chicago theatres, the planning council, the chicago urban league, the national conference

of la rosa and univision. we thank the voters of chicago. it will meaning in unless you come out to vote on february ♪ >> live pictures this morning from the u.s. institute of

peace. they are releasing a report dealing with the war in afghanistan this morning. in addition there will be a panel discussion and speakers will include the former interior minister of afghanistan as well as former members of the united nations assistance mission in afghanistan. the u.s. institute of peace here in washington is the host of this event. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> again, standing by for the start of this discussion from the u.s. institute of peace on a report they are releasing today dealing with the war in afghanistan. the report is called "making peace in afghanistan". the u.s. house today continues debate in the federal budget for this year. members thursday slashed funds for the u.s. institute of peace. this is from the hill yesterday. the house agree to an amendment to cut $42 million of funding for the u.s. institute apiece. early thursday morning debate congressman wiener said democrats must the old to find it something. >> i think we should get going. for the topic at hand on making peace in afghanistan, i think it is a sufficiently important one that we need as much time as

possible to be talking on the substance of those issues. thank you all very much for coming and thanks to our panelists for coming. i personally see this issue of the critical strategy in afghanistan as one of the most critical issues facing, certainly the u.s., but also afghanistan. a critical issue to which i think we have a lot of gaining recognition of importance, but we are still lacking a lot of answers and clarity about how to go forward. i was last in afghanistan in november, and every time i go i come back even more confused about the situation. in particular confused about what is our overarching critical strategy in afghanistan that we are spending roughly $100 billion per year today, at present in afghanistan on military and development in particular. still, a lot of questions about

to what end in terms of our political objective there. i am hoping that today's discussion and touch on those issues. at think this is a particularly important issue, especially now as we are heading into this transition time of transitioning to afghanistan security lead by the end of 2014. i think that it highlights the need for political process, i think, because if we currently with 140,000 or so international troops in afghanistan are really struggling in terms of defeating the insurgency it is hard to see how they're guides the able to be defeated militarily as we start testing this troop levels out. the urgent need to focus on that. i think we are seeing more attention to this end afghanistan and out, the appointment by president karzai of the eyepiece counsel with the symbolic gesture of the importance of this issue.

however, their is a lot of question about the substance of the high peace council progress of rumors and discussions of contacts, especially last fall with taliban and fake taliban. talks and talks about talks to not strategy make. i'm hoping some of those issues will come out in today's discussion. given the importance of this topic it is my honor to introduce the esteemed group of panelists today who bring a lot of expertise on these issues. we are going to each panelist have approximately 15 minutes to speak and start with unama team who is the author of this excellent new report that has just been put out that i hope you all get a chance to read on "making peace in afghanistan: the missing political strategy," which is the topic of today's conversation. at book tv was formerly the head of analysis and planning. she is currently working out of

oxford for the european stability initiative on projects and intervention and state building. prior to working in afghanistan after one had extensive experience working on peacemaking including as a senior adviser to the nobel peace laureate, the former finnish president supporting his work in northern ireland and throughout the balkans. minna järvanpaä has worked extensively in the balkans including two years with the u.s. mission in kosovo and holds a degree from the london school of economics from harvard university. a second speaker is minister at 17. we are privileged to have them. currently it distinguished professor at the national defense university and formerly served as the interior minister and afghanistan from 2002-2005. prior to that he has lots of experience in counterinsurgency. quite active as a military

planner for the afghan resistance following the soviet invasion of afghanistan and prior to that served as a colonel in the afghan army. graduated from high command and staff colleges in afghanistan, the united kingdom, and the u.s. and is the author of numerous books and articles on the political, military, and security situation in afghanistan to be our third panelist is dr. nixon, currently coordinating a product -- process. basically he is doing research on the whole issue of how do we -- issues around the durable peace in afghanistan and in particular trying to map out the interest that various afghan parties. the connection will speak briefly about some of the preliminary findings from his research. spend five years in kabul prior to this working most recently

for the world bank's national governance program. prior to that the honor of being a colleague of hamish when i was the director of the afghanistan research and evaluation units in afghanistan. hamish has extensive experience with issues of conflict governments and transitional elections. he holds a ph.d. in peace process seas and post conflict political developments from oxford. last but not least i am honored to welcome dr. christian barnard who is the director of the piece research altitude of oslo. his research interest includes the dynamics of civil war, migration and transnational communities and methodology and difficult context. extensive experience working in afghanistan and on afghanistan and is the author of the social networks and migration and wartime afghanistan and has a ph.d. in sociology. an excellent group of panelists.

i'm looking for to what you have to say on this very important topic. over to you. >> thanks for coming today. just as a preface i would say i started and afghanistan in 2005 and had felt that there was a lot of hope. a lot of things that seemed could go right. working down in helmand at the time. since then i have had to personally revise a lot of my views on what we, the international community, can do in afghanistan. i would just like to start by saying, i find it harder and harder to see how the current strategy could be made to work. we have a military surge. but the insurgency has been

spreading from the south and east to provinces. they used not to be the ground for insurgency. this continued centurion pakistan, a tenfold increase of taliban fighters since 2005. what my staff estimated was about to a 3,000 fighters. the recent estimates have been up to 35,000. some analysts was suggesting a much higher number than 35,000. also a vast amount of money has been spent, and the pressure to spend that money quickly has resulted in a war that in itself, i think, is stealing some of the rivalry and conflict on the ground. the massive conflict is becoming much more messy, not just about taliban government, but all kinds of localized conflict that

are unclear in the bigger picture. the whole industry that has grown up around our foreign aid, extortion, corruption that plagues the construction, private security contracts, and many reports that have been written about these things. is networks of powerful local strongmen. karzai in kandahar who are dominating the economy, the new war economy. and this massive spending comes at the same time as international has named afghanistan the most corrupt country in the world after somalia. so what we are seeing at the most physical level is the merging of politics and economy and things like the troubled bank scandal which has become the most visible symbol

of this kind of corruption. out of this management, the influence that has been given to politically connected individuals there is a risk that 579 million at least is in jeopardy. the entire financial sector including now the withdrawal, a potential withdrawal of the imf deal. politically we are hobbled by a president who is being increasingly the legitimate by the pop -- population to register for into the 2009-2010 election. this last parliamentary election is not yet over. he is also prone to lashing out at the international community for what we are trying to do. fundamental disagreements on aspects of the strategy and a lack of trust that goes both ways. there is a transition time line

that was set in lisbon, and that is the transition for 2014, which is obviously by any standard too short a time for a modern democratic state to emerge. and even if there was a very enlightened and reformed line of afghan, it would not be possible in that time line to create a strong central state which provides security and justice for all the people. so what is the answer? i would say in 2005i would have argued it is strategic patience. we just have to stay longer, stay the course. think about our decades-long commitment and afghanistan which may still be correct. i think the question now is to do what? said in a i would not advocate during the same as what we are doing now for the next 30 or 40 years. if we are doing the wrong thing, then we just had in that same

wrong direction for a very long time. but i would argue that it is a political strategy. this suggestion that there needs to be talks to end this war had started to become more respectable in recent months. the press reports of preliminary talks with the taliban, the high peace council which has been appointed by karzai. these are not a political strategy, i'd like to emphasize, but they do show that debate may be shifting. last year when i covered around washington and around this time of year pushing the idea of the peace process, most people seem very skeptical. they were feeling that there was a winning strategy that obama had launched. smart people were working on it. substantial resources finally. the military have the troops needed and one so-called expert who had been advising and

creating and crafting this letter counterinsurgency effort told me that after those everything would be different. there was a humorous tic sense that the military victory was still possible. and, yes, i think the town has fundamentally shifted since then. there is a recognition that some type of political process is needed, although policy has yet to catch up. i think that is clear in a number of key areas, and i would like to touch a little bit on the current military strategy. now, a key metric that isaf is using to point to success is a number of mid-level commanders to have been killed. a lot of particles coming out about the tempo of night raids, special forces operations, and they clearly have intensified since summer. in the first half of 2010 there

were 100 insurgent figures capture or killed. in the second half of the year there were three times that many. so targeting those mid-level commanders is certainly fragmenting the insurgency, as isaf argues, but i've just put a question mark on what else it might be doing. i think there is some evidence that it is also generating a new generation of commanders who are younger, more radicalized, and more locally autonomous. so there are no longer responsive to the traditional authorities in their area. one example is the network where the generational transfer of power is happening. the sun is much less respectful of local, travel, and traditional authorities. this may make it a lot harder for the taliban to enforce an eventual peace deal.

now, i can't go into a lot of data for that, but there is a book coming up by felix and alex in april or may, to analysts who have been tracking the issue of the insurgency developing. they have lots of data to support conclusions. in fact there is fragmentation and potentially quite a dangerous new local autonomy developing. now, general patraeus predictably disagreed with this view of the military campaign and speaks of impressive progress. he also highlights cases where taliban fighters have been coming over to the government side as part of the reintegration program. there were said to be 900 x combatants who have enrolled so far in the reintegration program. the vast majority come from

provinces in the central, western, and god and parts of afghanistan, away from the heavy fighting. this is something that is developing and it is hard to say where it is going, but i would say that the hard core is not yet being tantalized by this offer. in fact, this may not be a productive debate to engage in. the military have asserted that negotiations should be on the convective from a position of strength. if they now also planned to be making impressive progress at think we should be asking the question of them, does that not mean that it's time to start negotiating? the reality is, of course, that the fighting and talking will go on for a long time and parallel. i think everyone always recalls northern ireland in making this case with the first chance for peace were established in 1972, for peace talks.

very careful, low level, an official channels. the good fighter agreement was signed 25 years later in 1997. so that would be my first proposition, that talks need to start now and preparations for talks need to start in center. and there are channels, but from what i can see they don't talk. so what should a political strategy look like? i think we should be careful about talking about solutions. i'm not sure that there are solutions, as such, that we're going to get to. talks in themselves can have value in building the trust, confidence, creating stability. and i think there are several layers on which those talks need to be happening and several different groups, circles the people, who need to be involved and then to make them create that potential stabilizing

effect. a peace agreement that results in a state that afghans are willing to live in and regional neighbors are willing to endorse, i think, is alternately where we need to be heading. so the agenda needs to be somehow tailored to that, understanding the grievances of afghans, trying to understand what the taliban wish list might be, and then, of course, understanding the core principles that can't be negotiated away, things like what makes an afghan state acceptable to neighbors, sovereignty, that it lives up to international obligations, that it will allow with their power to use it as a base to attack its neighbors. now, so far there has been very little of -- we talk about the different circles, consultations of the afghans themselves, the broader population. a lot of afghans are very nervous about talks, and rightly

so. they are being kept in the family. karzai has been reaching out. involved in various initiatives. there is a high peace council, which is many think, and the taliban seem to think is a fixed process. seems to be mainly designed to keep the north of lance warlords on board. the taliban have explicitly renounced this aptitude and talk about the reintegration process as another way for the government to cash in on the foreigners. there is also opposition from northerners, women's rights groups, human rights activist, and a faction of the army which we need to be very careful of in this context, a lot of generals who probably if there is a deal that creates fractiousness, would walk away with their troops. and so that is why i think it is

absolutely crucial to open up the political space to broader consultation. there should be debate within afghan society about what kind of conditions are acceptable. now, some of the popular grievances that are generating support for the day before, two main issues, the presence of foreign troops and secondly the lack of justice and the corruption of government. some indication, also, that the taliban think, although we don't really know, there are people who have written about it, matt waldman, michael and others, last week in london at an event held there. he is not -- he does not represent the taliban. he is the former taliban ambassador to pakistan. maybe some of these things would give an indication, and i would just like to run through some of the taliban which list.

now, the taliban would probably want to be a recognized as a political movement. secondly, there is an interest in the release of prisoners at guantanamo and others. thirdly they're looking for a cease-fire by all sides. fourthly, they're looking for the withdrawal of foreign troops. fifthly, there is an interest and a more islamic state. and on the other hand what we could imagine asking them would be be more explicit about pronouncing al qaeda, which they do it privately disassociate themselves from the de hottest agenda. secondly a commitment to reforming rather than controlling the afghan state. thirdly, a commitment about sovereignty of afghanistan rather than some kind of merger with pakistan. fourthly, a commitment to

different ethnic groups and political parties. and so some of the things that the taliban are about, which is not totally clear. i could imagine a formula for the way ahead. and so the in the state that i could imagine would be the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and that means al qaeda, any activists operating. getting there would be through some kind of series of confidence-building measures, cease-fires, localized cease-fires, changes in the rules of engagement that are agreed to by the warring parties. that would require some kind of office for the taliban somewhere so that they can actually be a party to talking about what the next stages are. no preconditions for talking. so far we have talked about redlines. redlines aren't particularly

helpful if we are talking about talks. the redlines are probably things that in the and become the outcomes of the conversation. so, al qaeda is not a precondition for the taliban, but it should be a precondition of a final peace agreement. similarly the constitutional issues that might be there, it may not be something that we want to insist on, but there needs to be an agreed constitution at the end of the process. and so, just to come to my final points about who should be at the table, i'd think we need to make sure that everyone who is currently engaged in the conflict is at the table. the afghans can negotiate a peace agreement without the united states. there are issues that they simply can't represent in relation to the taliban or anyone else. there needs to be a preparation of the various parties.

no internal clarity that i can see in the u.s., although i'm sure there are a lot of conservation is happening. the afghan government has too much interest in continuation of the conflict, and the knees to be a preparation on their side of what is it, what is their negotiating platform. afghan civil society needs to be a real representation in this process, rather than a token representation. the taliban, and it is unclear how much discussion there is, is there a position already forming or is it just a few different forces coming out? pakistan, which is -- well, the internal destabilization continues, economic crisis, how much real effort is going into defining a platform is unclear. and then who mediates? i think there is a confusion on

going where we talk about the afghan as efficient of the process. the afghan government is a party to the conflict, and i have never seen a conflict where the successful negotiated resolution or one party of the conflict is the one that sets up the peace process. i do think there is going to have to be a third party mediation. and here is where the international community ought to take etched a much stronger and clearer row. it could be the u. n, it probably could not be unama which is on the ground and has a mandate to support the government. the u.n. might be the right body. there might be some other body. and so starting to set up the process, i think, is crucial. also an understanding that a peaceful settlement is not so much about working through technicality, but creating a narrative that allows all the different parties, u.s., taliban, and others, to save

face and come out of this with no one defeated and no one winning, but with something that is lasting and durable as peace for afghanistan. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much and good morning. i'm taking this opportunity to thank usip for organizing this discussion on a very important issue. i agree that the situation in afghanistan looks confusing.

this last year i made several visits to afghanistan. i spent two or three weeks. every time i came back with a different picture of the country because things are changing. on the one hand you see improvements, progress. on the one hand the situation is deteriorating. so the battles sheet is very complex. now this next year is a key to the future of afghanistan, whether the progress and achievements are going to reduce the negative impact of setbacks or setbacks will actually reduce the impact of whatever progress you see today in afghanistan. as i was reading the report, "making peace in afghanistan," i was struck by the emphasis of the author on the need for

political strategy that goes beyond talking to the taliban, but must define the kind of state that the afghans are willing to live in and neighbors can endorse. i fully agree with that and have written and spoken in support of this idea over the last year. in fact, i agree with most of the arguments presented in the study and its recommendations. however, i have some reservations about how to proceed toward creating a social, political, and security environment that is conducive to the success of the political strategy that she is supporting. we should also recognize that regional actors can be both obstacles and solutions to the problem, including politics. our structured might briefly.

the role of military strategy in shaping that kind of environment , the second proctors of the comprehensive political strategy and finally the role of regional actors. although there is no military solution to the conflict, one can, a political strategy is not an alternative approach, but they complimenting effort. there is an ongoing debate whether negotiating with taliban should be adopted as a political strategy of round which military strategy is defined. preferred by some european countries. the military effort should be the strategy of choice to produce gains on the battlefield and force the taliban to the

negotiating table supported. in the first case, the pace of troop withdrawal will be determined by the progress in talks with the taliban. in the latter case the pace of progress in talks will be determined by the progress on the battlefield. these two strategies are not mutually exclusive. there is a close link between them as long as the withdrawal is the centerpiece of strategic approach. the taliban and their supporters are not going to have any instance to negotiate if they see that they can gain more by continuing the fighting. meanwhile, without taking advantage of military gains to when conditions for talks the peace will continue to be elusive.

historically negotiated insurgencies have all taken an extended amount of time. they were conducted parallel with combat. so in either strategy talks and fighting are likely to go on simultaneously for some time until an environment conducive to a settlement is created. next, the march 21st, afghanistan tries to begin taking over security responsibilities for important population centers and the shared nato afghan plan. most likely it will start in the northeast. the plan envisions that afghanistan security forces will assume full responsibility for security across the country by 2014. now, there are three major

questions. first, what are the chances of success? this is the tenth year of u.s.-led military involvement in afghanistan in a security situation that has continued to deteriorate. second, what is the basis of expectation that the country will stabilize by 2014 to the point that will allow irresponsible withdrawal of foreign troops from the country? third, what is the vision and what are the ways and means to achieve it? but when we, war in afghanistan, we started or and have continued for ten years. during the past nine years were more than nine years, but resources stabilization effort to check the security environment that peak this year

at the highest level since the removal of taliban from power in 2001. actually, taliban were defeated. bush so, what we call a victory in 2001 was not a victory. the ever increasing complexity of the strategic and operational environment is perplexed the afghan government and contributing nations. the government of any unified vision for the nation and its people. all parties have approached the emerging issues in divergent and coordinated ways with operations on every front being fragmented to events rather than strategic undertakings designed to support long-term goals. aware of the vietnam war famously once said that america had not been fighting the war in vietnam for 12 years, but for

one year. the same can be said in afghanistan today. the international forces have fought nine years. if you multiply it by the number of actors and afghanistan then it is 400 in the past nine years, uncoordinated. now, 2009. look. the first time in the post taliban time that sufficient resources are available and that there is a sound strategy adopted by nato forces to not only still the insurgency or reverse the momentum, but also to build capacity in afghanistan before stabilization operations. counterinsurgency.

what i think there ought to be, that strategy started to employment. there were calls for a change of strategy. the surge that took place, 35 or more troops, actually, they were deployed only at the end of summer of last year. it has not been even a year since the strategy actually started implementation perrysburg changing the strategy into something else. if you look at the transition adopted by london and continued through the process it is based on two major things. on the one hand try something to reduce the level of threat and on the one hand do something to create the capacity to respond. that should be done at the same

time. so building capacity, a conservation but the effort of insurgents, at the same time trying to get support of the regional actors. these data parameters of a military strategy. it is it time to think about a different strategy? well, maybe. but at the same time the actions of comprehensive political strategy golan with this military strategy. there are, however, confusions inside afghanistan and the region about the parameters of political strategy. the scope of political strategy by an overemphasis on talking to the insurgents as the key to

peace. negotiation with the insurgents. the end is a peace settlement that is supported by all parties. a settlement which is sustainable and does not so the seeds of conflict. it should address grievances that fuel corruption, and justice, political exclusion. such a settlement is not just about a deal with taliban or even the supporters within pakistan. the settlement should clearly define and in date. the afghans are willing to support and the original actors and others who are involved too comfortable with. behind there is a potential with

the country's leaders and could be very divisive. during the past years there were talks going on that only a few people knew about. we are talking about the debates. okay. the karzai government and his family was reaching out to some taliban people. your talks at different levels in afghanistan are going on for the past nine years at different levels. local levels for different purposes. afghan talk with each other. so therefore it is not talked with individuals or local issues. talks for the in the state is not happening in afghanistan, not at the afghan level, not with the political parties, not with even the international community, the reports about un officials

talking with taliban or you in officials and other countries. these are not talks. i think if you are looking for talks that will end and peaceful the solution i will come back. the public trust with the kabul government is deepening suspicions among the afghan forces and require a multilevel negotiation be part of any strategy. there are many people that the karzai government is not looking at. what does legitimacy in afghanistan? it does not come from the ballot box. the election. legitimacy is derived. if the karzai government becomes

effective nobody will talk. otherwise an environment like afghanistan, you cannot hold elections. at think in 2003 to people were against elections in 2004. elections, first to have to build the institutions, the rule of law. election because the playground. the affair. we are talking about the corruption. without the rule of law the free-market economy becomes a playground for mafia. so when i was covering central asia in the 1990's and 2000's after the breakup of the soviet union, when we talk about corruption we have to realize that most of this corruption was caused by the way the

international community deals with afghanistan. so in 1980's when seven factions are fighting the soviet occupation and it was supported by countries with no accountability at all, the same way. in 2001 but by the most corrupt people who were the reason that the taliban came and listed as partners. so if you have to change that environment. corruption after lotus risk activity in a high-risk environment. you need to reverse it. so this is how you have to create that environment. in afghanistan it will eventually be conflict resolution process.

the diverse or diffuse fighting for different reasons. i share the concern of some colleagues. okay. the taliban commanders is : to create a new generation. afghanistan society, the old generation and the young generation. it is all mixed. they fight for different reasons. the taliban commanders, they will come. maybe they are more radical are not. it was to atomized to disintegrate. it was ethically to intertwined to compartmentalize. so it does not have the kind of

potential to disintegrate. now, let me talk briefly since i am running out of time about the rule of regional actors. the regional powers can be both obstacle and solution to the country's problem. progress requires stability in afghanistan as an extension of other nations. what are the main things that can be the policies of neighbors. there are two things. the so-called legitimate security concerns, opportunistic and the strategy. the two other things, the

opportunistic and hedging strategies can be addressed if you achieve a certain level of stability unless there is a certain level of stability in afghanistan neighboring countries will continue to try to influence the situation in afghanistan. the strategies will be the strategy of choice. and then security concerns. these are things that should be. what is the lowest common denominator? we have discussed it. talks within afghanistan and pakistan on a bilateral basis.

there are several meetings about this. one is the university. that is a kind of the consolation, reintegration and construction. this brings together the strategic studies centers of afghanistan, pakistan, iran, china, russia, central asian countries, turkey, the u.s., and others. there have been several meetings in the past one year. then there is the meeting about the process within afghanistan, but all these discussions cannot

achieve the in better understanding. it was also complemented by two other things, bilateral and official diplomacy. at the same time a kind of a change of perception that afghanistan eventually will be able to stabilize itself. i will stop here and i will be happy to take questions. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> good morning. thank you for coming, and i want to thank minna järvanpaä for her hard work and writing the paper, but also recognize all the work that went behind the paper to advance the concept that a discussion with a wide range of stakeholders of many different options is needed to move as and

afghanistan toward a peaceful and durable political settlement. thank you, professor at ali jalali, for your insights both written and spoken over the years that have motivated me and to usip for holding this event. the way the three partners i am working with on this project are trying to take forward this agenda about a political process has focused on a limited area which is the drivers of conflict within afghanistan understanding better the interests involved with in the country and exploring the parameters of potential durable solutions to those issues. it is always important to stress that there are a host of international, regional, and transborder issues that are very important, in some ways may be determinant. but the internal elements

increase the vulnerability of afghan state and society to these factors. these need to be addressed if any settlement is calling to be durable and therefore provide a longer-term solution for the national security interest of the united states, other involved countries, and one that does not simply the ground for future crises. in order to learn a bit more about these issues we have been carrying out interviews with a wide range of afghan stakeholders. one of the things we have learned is it is not necessarily the most forceful approach to divide afghanistans actors into predetermined interest groups. the influence of the old wood had been leaders is waning and changing to new figures, new economic actors that are emerging and combining with the political elite, tribal leaders are becoming security actors. civil society and women's rights activists can also be combined with ethnic politics and

patronage as well. there are broad contours to the discussion about the possibilities of a negotiated peace within afghanistan that i want to describe in a very preliminary way. just to give you a sense, we have been working with a pool of 110 interviews which conclude around 35 or 40 mps who are incoming or outgoing, sometimes we don't know which. the ten members of the executive, mostly ministers, but also other officials involved in the national-security apparatus and government of afghanistan, ten members of the high peace council, half a dozen or so former or current governors of provinces in afghanistan, several, about sex, former taliban leaders. another five or six former commanders. a small number of current taliban commanders including active commanders in the

insurgency. representatives of civil society and human rights organizations. these categories, as i say, overlap. at least 15 afghan academics, policy analysts and media figures, and also business figures. there are a few areas where we need to go further and get further representation of melody institutions. so that is a sense of what we are doing. we have been doing that a lot ourselves with a group of very capable yang analysts. one is here today, and he may be able to shed light on some of that as well. of want to just touch on five things that come from this discussion as well as the of the conclusions from the frequent research trips i have been making to afghanistan. the first is that the drivers of the conflict are widely perceived to be changing and becoming more and more centered on domestic issues.

again, this is not to say that people don't speak about pakistan. they speak a great deal about pakistan, but also increasingly about iran. this has elements of current events that are driving the discourse. many afghan leaders are increasingly asking why we are so vulnerable to these factors. there are really to drivers of the conflict domestically within afghanistan. both of these have very localized manifestations. again, one is the presence and the behavior of foreign forces and the role of the u.s. within that. the other is the weakness and abuse or corruption of the government and various forms. i will build on that point by expanding on what we are hearing about both of those. first, and terms of the military effort and the u.s. role and the presence of foreign forces it is

pretty much unanimous. out of 65 interviews that i have looked at, only one suggests that the u.s. should not be directly involved in the negotiated solution to the conflict. one out of 65. it is a very, very broad theme that as a man player to this conflict, one which is paying the huge costs and of blood and treasure of supporting the afghan government and fighting the war the u.s. obviously has interests that want to preserve or pursue in afghanistan. there is also a recognition among a lot of afghan leaders and stakeholders that those interests are not necessarily centered on bringing peace to afghanistan or upholding the rights of afghans or bringing democracy to afghanistan but a centered on other issues. those goals and what they really are remain very opaque to almost everyone at all levels of afghan society that we and spoken to.

this feeds the well-known speculations and conspiracies that all of us to work on afghanistan are aware of. these create realities on the ground, not just rumors, but the fabric of politics. there is a huge communication gap regardless of what the strategy is. many speak of the need for the u.s. to communicate more directly to the people of afghanistan themselves as well as potentially to the taliban. beyond polls there is the actions. the actions of the u.s. and the strategy which has been discussed by both speakers and creating a gap between the reality on the ground and the rhetoric of the government about its pursuit of peace through reconciliation and the use of the high peace council or whatever other aspects they're trying to put in place. there are a range of views,

predictably, about that. there are many who support the escalation of the military strategy right along the spectrum to those who call for an immediate the escalation and with the -- withdrawal. the point here is the ambiguity over both the long term strategic partnership between the u.s. and afghanistan and the terms of the shorter-term drawdown is creating a situation where not knowing the framework the u.s. applies to this conflict these people very uncertain as to the likely course of events. this is feeding a range of conflict reducing behavior's deepening the political discourse, more looting forms of corruption, reliance on local defense imperatives and all kinds of other actions that the parties domestically are taking to the conflict. so that is on the foreign forces u.s. side.

in terms of government weakness there are a huge range of issues that come up here. there is an interesting focus that for me was quite different from the way i had thought about corruption and government weakness previously. there is a general sense that the concentration of power in the afghan system currently is related to the problem of nepotism and unfair appointments. people focus on that much more than necessarily the theft of money for different kinds of problems in getting predictable institutions and speak a lot about the representation of various groups in state structure. this is not a new issue, but i think it is deepening and linking up with a more emphasized interpretation of the conflict by a lot of groups. obviously that is of deep concern and potentially is an issue where some expressed concern that the taliban come to

be seen as representing passed in interests which would be a dangerous turn. there is an interesting side note here and which many people also talk about the deepening underrepresentation, and people talk about this from all sides. i can tell you, it is not that one group feels this all leaders in all groups who use an ethnic discourse talk about this problem. they talk about it also in terms of their current leaders not been able to represent those interests. they talk about it with this concern i just mentioned of not making the taliban the representatives. so it is more about the groups and about the rights of those groups being preserved than it is about returning to the old leaders who claim to represent the scripts but, in fact, have much reduced legitimacy among them, it would seem.

there is also a kind of interesting range of how people talk about whether the problem is the institutions of the state or the individuals. this is interesting because it relates to the issue of the constitution as a sensitive issue that has to be negotiated. .. >> it may be that it's less about the shape, the final shape

of the constitution than it is about to make sure the mechanism can be found to preserve the core issues within the constitution that the different groups are concerned about. let's go beyond human society and civil groups i would add. as an example, the phrase that quickly comes up among a wide range of stakeholders is the constitution is not the koran. and that issues about the nature of the institutions of the state are already aligned debate within the particle system in afghanistan a month political opposition groups and the government. finally, on the government's peace plans, the high peace council and its role, there is a pretty white perception that this high peace council will have a lot of trouble playing a constructive role. the members of the high peace council themselves most

frequently viewed themselves as playing a role of mediators and somehow bridging the gap between the insurgent opposition and the government. nobody was not on the high peace council really shares the view that they can effectively play that role. at the same time, a wide range of stakeholders don't really see that they can viably play the role of a negotiator on behalf of the government, an agent of the government, because of the perception that the real discussion about the terms and guarantees peace process would have to bring forward isn't really house in the high peace council. what the council and maybe interaction with it might do would be to do more to promote a conversation between the various interest groups that are currently within the political system in afghanistan, and it seems they are not doing that very much yet but this is a potential avenue or role that they could play. probably alongside other actors. so what does this maybe point to in terms of the shape of a

political process? building on those better than already made, the first from our point of view of the research that comes to very clear is the u.s. has to get seriously stuck into this, come to the forefront, and to be very clear about its positions and goals. as a participant in the conflict as well as a concerned party or supporter. and that instead of pursuing perhaps an independent or d-link policy of fighting and then transitioning and withdrawing from we perhaps need to seek a framework with a drawdown of foreign troops can be interlinked with the steps both by the taliban to the escalating violence, to remove the influence of foreign enforcers on the insurgent side as has been going to come and to facilitate taliban legitimate representation within the

system. but a key issue here seems to be the definition of future security arrangements. the current policy i think in professor jalali's framework i would argue is led by part of the strategy or in primacy, is that any peace negotiation will likely involve a discussion about how the national security forces are structured. and one early point of evidence for that is that those eight or 900 activity around reintegration at the moment, one of the key concerns of all of the commanders are stepping forward, even in the limited areas where they are is very much to retain their arms and retain security responsibilities in their areas. so there seems to be a tendency were a framework for securing, for security of all of the parties has to be part of a peace agreement here and next

week on friday, there is an interesting group your usip with the ministers of interior and defense of afghanistan will both participate and i'm sure talk about aspects of transition. this framework about withdrawal and de-escalation also needs to be linked to a reform agenda. of the institutions of state and of the individuals of state, and this linkage may be needs to be motivated by emphasis also on defining the terms of that longer-term strategic partnership between the international community, the u.s. and afghanistan. i think we learned that preempting spoilers will require knowing more about the economics of the actors in the conflict which are causing changes in interest to emerge. so i would just conclude by saying that maybe in addition to minna's arguments about the need to open a process and with the

shape that might look like, the u.s. is involved in has to be underpinned by a clear and strong commitment to that process. to my mind this means we need to articulate within unisys a couple of things. one is a durable political summit among active actors within afghanistan is possible. and secondly that such an uncommon is essential to sustain the meeting the president's core aim to prevent the recurrence of al qaeda and other groups to the region. if those two realizations can be made it becomes more obvious that using diplomatic means to seek a diplomatic process that is durable within afghanistan will be the most effective way

to do much, much more with much less both in terms of blood and treasure than a policy that only emphasizes the escalation followed by hand over to a very shaky regime at this overtime will much better secure the long-term national security interest of the united states as well as the interests of the parties within afghanistan. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, and thank you to all the three speakers for very, very rich presentations, which both teachers quite a few lessons but also holds quite a few new questions. my policy is to offer some reflection before we start, and hopefully to those reflections will further stimulate the debate.

i was reminded this morning about the engagement in afghanistan. the guest house where we were living tended to discuss issues, but we also had -- before written? in discussion with other guests at the guesthouse. and, of course, that also is telling not only because engagement but because that engagement is also one key resource in reducing the ideas. softly we will find pure reflections and resolve this even more tangible ideas from you and the audience. not that i will deprive you the opportunity to ask questions, it is your privilege and you're right. let me limit myself to three brief reflections. the first one is on what is potentially a strategic gap between the military and the

public part of the strategy? as andrew reminded us, what we have at the moment is really all we talk about his talks. it's easy to mistake this talk about talks. they are are not really anything that it must do concrete things work as far as, at least as far as we know. there are a number things have been point out the past few years which could possibly inside the scene. that is also all. i haven't spent -- i've been visiting regularly but only for short visits. one of the things i was struck with was here perhaps at least a little bit, i think you're absolutely right, minna. over the past two years there's more and more interest, more and more support for the idea that the political process will be necessary. my sense from his last visit was

really bad there has been a setback in terms of support for a political solution. perhaps not so much with international community, but more so within, particularly the afghan political elite i would say. i actually wonder if the conference -- the lisbon conference and the relaxation of 2011 deadline, the 2014 deadline really contributes to that more lukewarm attitude to need for clinical process. -- for political process. we've heard a lot in these presentations about military strategy and the possible political impact of the military strategy. i think many of us, many of the people we talked to in our

research are really skeptical about the ability of the military surge to produce a conducive, starting point for a conducive political process. and here again, this is perhaps a different aspect of the gap. at the moment we have a military certainty which is very much driven by the international community and the international community i think increasingly means u.s. where as the very responsibility for the politics is supposed to be going with the afghan government. and there is a cat. that is potentially quite problematic. another aspect that strikes me as problematic when i discuss this many, amongst the afghan political elite, political association seems very much perceived as a zero-sum game. and without criticizing you for

what you did, trying to come because i think the way you laid out your positions is accurate and also flexible your but once we lay out the position, there is also the risk we can't -- not only those positions but the perception that it is a zero-sum game where the party said that at the table, show their cards. because as you rightly said, a political process is like if something goes wrong, in that long drawn process of course positions, perspectives are transformed and compromises are being worked out. and what initially made look like a need for a compromise may actually have, may end up being a comparability between positions that looks very, very different. so i guess what this brings me to is really a rather general

and overarching but nonetheless terribly important question, which is really what are the possibilities in the current climate given the skepticism within much of the afghan ,-comgovernment by and large part of the international community to develop a politically, they truly politically driven strategy for afghanistan. the second issue i want to pick up on is the issue or consultation with the afghan people. and you may forgive you for being a bit selective but i'm trying to push some of the issues which i think have not received the necessary attention in the debate. there is certainly a widespread concern amongst many afghans in afghanistan in the diaspora are what the political process result in terms of hitting up over the past 10 years, giving up on rights. there is certainly very little dialogue between anybody who has

an influence on the very strategy and those who express those, larger civilian population. as we heard hamish say, in many other consultation, people are not necessarily so concerned about constitution itself. this may be a bit of a surprise since from the international community we say the constitution is not up for negotiation. that's not necessary such a concern. we also talk about red lines again. most afghans seem not to think that entering negotiations with a finite set of red lines is very constructive. but there are deeper concerns about rights, about justice, about what sort of afghan state, what sort, with what sort of protective mechanisms for its citizens, or what welfare for its citizens that would come out of negotiations.

so there is definitely a need here for some type of society consultations. hamish use the term inclusive, inclusive peace process. what the peace process should really look like is something i don't think we have a sufficient attention to. there is no doubt that given the experience we have from peace process that the durability of peace hinges on such rather consultations. existing mechanisms doesn't really seem to contribute to this. of course, back in the beginning of the decade was the electoral mechanisms, the representative mechanisms could really be the mechanisms through which the sort of consultations should come about. but that doesn't seem to effectively be the case. the peace council is a new

invention that is possibly also fostered such a dialogue. at the peace council itself doesn't necessarily see this as a central part of their mandate. so i think a key question here really is what could be the shape of a peace process which is inclusive, transparent or perhaps even what exactly is the type of consultative mechanism that should run throughout the possible peace process that could really make the voice of the innocent or the non-armed or the civilian population heard. and then finally, and again i allow myself to ask a rather overarching question, what should be the contours of the negotiation process? we've heard here, and i think with a good substantial to his argument, that there is no way one can think about the peace process in which there is not a

commitment by the united states. it is a critical party. what exactly the form of that commitment should be is a different question. we also heard, and again i think very convincingly argued, the engagements from afghanistan's neighbors is critical. and we also heard, again i think, the current escalating needs of the afghan presidency and the afghan government is a liability. and i certainly got very concerned about that because it seems to me that at least we are now at a stage where there could be reasons to ask whether, not only the government, the tensions within the government are of such a scope is not fully good to lead a political process, but, in fact, whether burdening this rather, this

rather tender alliance that we call the afghan government within the peace process could be held the very nature that tips the balance. and one thing that was emphasized by several other speakers which i also think is terribly important, the whole question of readiness of the taliban. at one point, it struck me as i listen to you, what is the impact of the current driven military strategy in terms of helping the taliban are encouraging the taliban to develop that readiness? we don't know much about what sort of reflections go on within taliban leadership's, leadership about a political process. but it wouldn't be surprising if the fact that there is inherently a rather intense military surge that is taken away from the energy that could

otherwise be put into discussing what a political situation could look like. so somehow is there a way in which one can actually create a more conducive space for bringing about a political reflection within the movement itself, because that is certainly a rather important element of readiness for talks. basic question accepting some sort of representation for insurgents, numerous countries have been suggested as the host of a new taliban office. nobody has been wholeheartedly enthusiastic so far. i think but again that may also have to do with the fact that there is no clear signal from the international community that this is something that is really wanted. and, finally, and i think minna said this very clearly, who is it that can be critical third

party in this situation. there are certainly at the moment many tracks, teaching tracks perhaps, not that there are any tracks but there are many tracks and nine of them are terribly strong. none of them have the support that it takes to become strong. but most importantly, i think we need to ask at this very moment what are the contours are constructive political process in afghanistan, and what would be the first elements? because i'm not sure at the moment we're really making progress in terms of converting the past 10 years of the international strategy into what is first and foremost, a political strategy. thank you. [applause] >> i'd like to thank the four panelists are very interesting

and rich presentation. now, over to all of you for questions and comments. although preferably brief questions and comments, but we have two microphones on either side if you want to come up and ask your questions from there. we will probably take two or three at a time and then get the pin was an opportunity to respond. please. spee if you could also introduce yourself first. >> i work at the department of state. minna spoke of the war economy in afghanistan and professor jalali i think suggested that the war economy is also a large part of the explanation for the increase in corruption. if a political strategy succeeded, what is the economic

future, postwar, post-withdrawal of foreign troops? we hear that afghanistan also is the world's largest producer of opium. nobody has mentioned that in the course of this discussion, but it is an important element of the economy. so where does -- what's the future of the economic future of afghanistan and the afghan people? >> scott? >> i work on rule of law issues. my question relates to parliament, and i realized and asking it we still don't know what department will look like. and it could take a shape that this question becomes irrelevant, but if we assume that this crisis over the parliament gets resolved and you have established body, i wonder what role, if any, do you see them playing in talks as you mentioned the need for more

inclusive process and accommodating different groups? because as flawed as the election was is still a body that has leaders from around the country representing different parties and the only formal institution in high peace council i would say which gathers those leaders in a peaceful setting. and so, both in terms of i guess hamish, your interviews with a lot of parliamentarians, they see themselves, their institution playing a leading role, and even if not, for others is that a potential mechanism for introducing this inclusiveness or not? >> one last question. >> a couple of strategies proposed, which were interesting, one was a semi-peacekeeping role essentially between the afghan government and the taliban as two warring parties.

a fact that came out was there should be de-escalation with insurgent and leading up to a cease-fire. [inaudible] >> secondly, in both the strategies we are not really talking about disarmament perhaps, in which case can we really imagine a sustainable peace after a cease-fire or after some kind of peace accord? thank you. >> okay, whoever wants to take on some of those questions. >> on the issue of the economy, i think one thing that is not always there is that there has been economic growth for the last 10 years. it's unclear exactly how we

measure it, but there does seem to be at times double digit growth. and i think a great deal of potential with peace for capitalizing on that and on the sort of, it's very energetic face of afghans. if it's coupled with regional infrastructure initiatives and with trade agreements across the region and so on. people of course speak a lot about the mineral wealth, which i think has a potential of course to become a foundation for afghanistan, but it will take an awful lot of time and investment. and it will take security. to be able to really harvest. i think, scott, you're absolutely right that the

parliament passed to be somehow involved. it is a body that could potentially provide some kind of inclusiveness and a sense of different regions being represented. i don't quite know what form that might take, but i do think that as soon as the parliament is accepted as not being -- as excepted as legitimacy, there needs to be thinking about how to work that into. on the questions about de-escalation, disarmament, yes, it's very hard to see afghanistan really going through a full disarmament process. this is a country that has a great history of weapons being held in homes. i think it's not so much about the arms. it's about the question of how the various groups are integrated into this, the

political process and have their integrated also into security forces, and those questions. there's a lot of details that would need to be worked out. >> yes, about the economy, economics in afghanistan future depends on the stability of the nation. talking about opium. there's not a long history of opium production. it started as part of the war economy in the 1980s during the soviet occupation. and then would be breakdown of state control or, and also the droughts and others and some of the war, it actually became their regional problem. i think mainstream, this counter narcotics strategy, in all aspects of development, that

security, governance and economy, there's no simple solution for that. today, i think the most, you know, the part of the opium is produced in the south which is unstable. in the north and west, it is easier to control but in the south is very difficult. on the other hand, as long as the insurgency continues in the south come it will be very difficult to control production of opium. with regard to the peace console, peace council is something which is created by the government. people who are on the peace council, those were hit by the government and, therefore, it is actually the voice of the government. but parliament is not.

all these peace jirga and other things are not going to a. i think parliament is the real state of institutions that can play a role because they represent the people across the country. i think this problem, i'm not talking about the secular parliament because for the past one year they were not able to elect their speaker. but generally speaking, parliament i think yes, it is a very good institution to be involved in the peace process. with a peacekeeping role, i think first we have to the peace in order to keep. there is the peace in afghanistan. and when you have peace, peacekeeping. in 2006, when many internation international, nato countries came to afghanistan, there was

no peace to keep. and, therefore, i think first we have to some kind of peace. you have to keep the peace first and then probably that will work. >> a couple more questions. marvin. >> marvin weinbaum, middle east institute. you made reference to the fact that we really don't know much about what's going on in the thinking of the taliban. should we be talking about, however, about whether in fact we can treat them as interlocutors here in the sense that we would have some common sense that they in fact understand compromise and what that means?

it was suggested, and i don't think there's much to indicate that it has changed, and i say that even with -- they never represented -- they never represented the connor hart shura. what we found was that they we were, they had a true believer notion hear about the righteousness of what they were doing. and the sense here of there being part of a compromise of power-sharing, taking cabinet positions. it seems to great many of us, i think, is antithetical to their thinking. so in our effort here to find the way out, have we perhaps projected onto the taliban the way we would like for them to

respond if they were, you know come even like other afghans? because you can make it argument that their ideas, the traditions they acquired in pakistan gave him a different mindset than most afghans, for whom the idea of compromise is very easily relied on. thank you. >> brian marshall. i've been serving in a series of areas of the state department. one thought and relates to a previous question, actually i'm struck by the fact that always the reference to the taliban is not doing individual come just to the taliban. and i wonder about do we have a good idea as to who has the

authority to speak for the taliban interests in at least political discussions? for example, there was an awkward situation a few months back in which someone claimed to be speaking for taliban interests, and was found to be a fraud. >> colin cookman. doctor nixon sort of tucked on this -- touched on this. i was wondering if you would discuss the role of the militia programs which delays incarnation of which i think the afghan local police, the role to which these actors tie-in to the karzai government network and the degree to which they, assuming this negotiations were conducted with the karzai government in the lead, the degree to which it would lead to smaller local groups would be a

part of that process, or would be pursuing their own sort of local economic or otherwise, other interests. >> take two more questions and go back to the panelists. >> good morning. i work as an afghan analyst. i have been involved with the peace process in nepal and sudan and iraq. i have a number of questions. first of all it was a wonderful work carried out by you. i appreciate that. a number of things that come to, and i would like to share with you, one of the major demand of taliban or other insurgent is basically withdrawal of foreign troops from afghanistan. in many cases they demand that. and you have coded that even the afghan army and police can not ensure peace in afghanistan. and you have chief of

afghanistan speaking out day before yesterday saying afghan army is lacking the moral leadership. now, if the capacity of afghans on military police is a condition we have to provide -- why it's not elaborate more on that side than how we can bring the more leadership because we have people who are leaving their duties because of the lack of transparency and so forth, in the country, the nationalism. and again, you talked about the political sentiment in afghanistan. no peace -- [inaudible] afghanistan, in fact when the peace process came to afghanistan it was very much

urban-based, you know, development, services. and the taliban during their time when i have been through the country during that time, it was very much seen in two different fronts. in the rural afghanistan was a much seen as security, the fact for stability. rural afghans, when it comes to the urban population there same then as an occupier who have given the basic right of freedom. when the problem started forecasting very much on the urban population, therefore they don't see any change. with all the development, all the millions of dollars spent in afghanistan, they don't see that change and that contributes to the volume, that from 3000 taliban it has moved to 5000 taliban. [inaudible] >> that's an important. one of the things which is

probably could have been incorporated is that the taliban rule,. [inaudible] now, i wonder if north country still not heavily supported the taliban. now, the pressure on these countries if you take the example of pakistan is limited to drone rocket in pakistan. but there is no other pressure in term of policies, strategy. and as you know these are very strategic allies in the war against terror. so why strategic effort is not taken by all the nato countries and united states to pressure is pakistan? you talk about the haqqani network. they are all in pakistan. so why not put pressure on that? that is very important element that i see about that. i would fully argue with professor jalali that there are

-- [inaudible] not really doing so good in afghanistan. during the 30 years of work, not a single movement emerge in against a. despite the fact of all the war but nobody wanted to north afghanistan or south afghans do. they fought among themselves but they maintained the afghan national id. so this is really not a big thing on the table as an alternative afghan i can assure you of that. and again, let's be hopeful about it. there are lots of hope for things happening in afghanistan. we have fundament. actually take it has signed democracy we're talking for two months to select the chairperson of the parliament, but they are not developing. i would say it is good which they are talking. you have the professor as a leader, and you have got a female activist coming from the west. they are talking in the public

and talk. so i see a sign of improvement and progress your thank you. >> my name is debbie smith. i run a nonprofit organization for building a school in kids with disabilities afghanistan. my question is, you addressed talks that should happen between the taliban and i believe it was isaf nato forces. and you listed some conditions that each party could bring to the table. however, nowhere did you discuss the role of the future of women and girls. and i just wonder how we can build a durable peace in afghanistan without addressing the rights of women and girls in the future of afghanistan? >> let's start at that end of the table now, kristian and hamish. >> i don't know my question.

>> in the interest of time i won't touch on all of those many interesting questions. i think maybe what i would touch on was the question about parliament very briefly in which many parliament members are also members of high peace council, and those particular respondents do have a view of the role which is much more focused on reaching out to different kinds of disgruntled groups in their own regions of the country, et cetera. so there may be grounds for the. a lot of the respondents outside either the high peace council or the parliament felt that i think more because of sort of ineffectiveness or division of the parliament rather than an argument against it is intrinsic or theoretical role in this regard mentioned frequently mechanisms like those, like the

emergency constitutional jerk is as kind of way to get views from across the country represented. certainly your characterization that most felt because it's an appointed body, the high peace council is limited in its ability to play that role. i think another thing that was interesting is that my own work in the past is on local governance. we have quite a formalized debate among western specialists about whether decentralization is part of the solution in afghanistan. a lot of the way of this issue is interpreted through afghan stakeholders i would say is about diffusion of power centers generally. there's too much power concentrated in the presidency, anything you can do to defuse that outwards on an institutional basis is a good thing. not necessary downward, but to other parts of the government. slightly different issue than your core question, scott.

they don't take up the question about peacekeeping. i mean, i think we have to be realistic. the likelihood of a robust international interest in the scale of disarmament and peace keeping effort that would be needed to do a traditional post-conflict peacekeeping effort in afghanistan i would say has zero chance of manifesting itself, even after a political solution to this conflict. and so, the nature of the political solution in how it deals with armed men in armed groups is going to have to take into account the structure of the national security forces or the national security framework, shall we say. and i think the current direction that the national security force framework is being played out raises some questions about how adjustments could be made to make it led by a political process, if one was to emerge. and those two directions are

obviously a great deal of interest and effort. and i was in some ways more effective effort than in the past, and increasing the size and as well the quality of the national security forces. there are a wide range of opinions on whether any of that is sustainable about attrition rates and other things, which others can speak more effectively than i can. but the second direction is also the afghan local police which was mentioned by colin and generally the localization of the duty which has been a kind of recurring theme, serving in the entire time i have worked in afghanistan. and those two trends are not necessarily the same, compatible or in the same direction. if you mobilize an armed local group and if you try to increase the size of the national army and have a more formal framework of security forces, and i think it's clear funny which is coming

through among the commanders which currently expressed interest outside basically the core kind of areas that the taliban has a stronger structure, but nevertheless their strong interest in retaining their ability to basically manage their own security speaks to the need for a framework where mutually reinforcing our mutually checking security arrangements between the armed groups would have to form part of the political process. and just very briefly on marvin's very interesting question. in terms of the leadership level, this discussion that we don't know enough about what the talibans leadership position is, i think it's an important one but i wonder whether we ever know that much about an insurgent organizations true political position, or viable outcomes and to enter into a process. that doesn't necessarily mean committing to it in state or in negotiations, but by putting forward a clear position on the

part of one side, you may elicit a response which tells you more about what the position of the others is. secondly, i would just finally say that while we may not know much about the position of the leadership, i would argue that we ask you know quite a lot about what motivates and mobilizes a large large portion of the fighters were fighting in the insurgency. and they are the two things with all pointed to. their poor government performance and a sense of injustice. and they are the presence of foreign forces. so by putting for scenarios in which we don't agree to withdraw foreign troops as a precondition but we say no, we don't agree to that. here are the conditionconditions under which that might happen. we think that process and possibly elicit a response. possibly not. the future is uncertain. but in addition, that process could be even better linked to

certain amounts of certain element of a reform agenda that is underpinned by a long-term strategic partnership. that in turn might elicit a response. again, it might not. and so there's a political means to undercut a huge amount of the non-core ideological taliban as well as what's currently what is being pursued which is a military and the offer of surrender. >> about this, who speaks for the taliban, i think it depends on the situation. different groups speak -- i do think taliban has a position yet other than their rhetoric's and some statements that were made by individuals. in fact, we should not ignore the role of pakistan here. pakistan is shaping and trying to control any kind of negotiation with the taliban. therefore, there are groups in

pakistan who are getting their cues from pakistan. the only group that so far has offered a position was -- actually they sent their delegation to kabul. but, unfortunately, neither the government or the taliban, they do not have a clear position that is clergy find. so, therefore, since there's no clear position it would be difficult to start that process. afghanistan and the international community lost missed opportunities in the past. one was in 2001 where the majority of talibans, 90%, wanted to join the political process. but they were excluded from that because all taliban were

considered to be part of al qaeda. in the next time that they offered, came up in 2003-2004 when he had a meeting in -- they contacted me. at that time the position was clear, very simple. very acceptable. they wanted protection. at the same time they had to be allowed to continue their political and peaceful means. but they wanted this to mean guaranteed by all stakeholders, at that time not only afghan government, all ministries, ministry of interior, ministry of defense, ministry of intelligence, coalition forces, isaf, and all countries. and they wanted us if we can

create a mechanism that altogether can guarantee this protection and a lack of political activity, they will actually join the process. but, unfortunately, neither the afghan government came up with an agreement, noted international community was so enthusiastic to support this idea. so then after 2003, after that today the position is not as easy as in 2003-2004. today, you have the pakistan influence. at the same time the international community. it is very difficult now to realize what is the real position. yes, maybe that position can be clarified when you start talking. however, talk for talks is not

happening. the rule of the militia, you know, in the past we have had experience with malicious. and although you call it afghanistan national please are afghan local please come you can give it any name but it depends on the situation on the ground. they help the afghan government in order to help, local security, and even fighting outside the invasion. however, that worked only when they believed in the viability of the government. [inaudible] >> that works with each other when that system is there. that system is no longer intact. so at the local level, if they

believe that they can be supported, they can believe in the viability of the afghan government, they will cooperate. however, the afghan government is no not in a position to suppt them, then they find their own ways to reach out to other groups internally or externally. i think -- it might work. at least they can create a situation where all local strongman will not create their own militias. something that is happening today. because in the north under the name of local police, the warlords, strong local warlords are arming their own people under the name of the local police. which is a very dangerous thing happening. i think some of the insurgencies in the north was not ideological. most of them was because they were mistreated by some people in the north.

today, when you see that people are coming to the site of the government or not, these are the same people who, for one reason or another, joined the taliban. not the taliban that actually were known to be -- or haqqani group. thank you. >> if i might just collect some of those questions under the framework of what i sing at the very end of my presentation, which is about repairing the parties for talks because i think a lot of the falls into that idea. and i think there's a lot of work to be done by the international community. to try to help these parties and try to help them make coherent. and if we start from the taliban and marvin's questions, i think there are elements in what the

guesswork by various peoples, there is panels is saying might be the taliban's position. that might be quite compatible in fact with western physicians. we don't know what the taliban -- its guesswork. it's based on a series of interviews by different analysts of mid-level and senior of taliban commanders but it's based on others who speak about these things. it's based on the talibans own pronouncements and what they put out on the website. but i say that one way we would start getting closer to what the taliban would be to support this idea of some kind of office for them, to give them a space or they can articulate their position. but on those issues where we might find actually a surprising amount of compromise are things like the question on al qaeda. there's a very clear readiness to start drawing some

distinctions. i mean, one of the things that the taliban, at least people will say about them is that al qaeda is a religious issue, which is always created some differences. there's also, the history of how al qaeda and the taliban came to interact is not so clear-cut. al qaeda was actually -- other groups originally. and then jalalabad mixed up with the taliban, and i think is always quite a lot of mutual suspicion. omar became -- osama bin laden. among the other movements does not ever a close connection. and so those are the things that i think any work done and can be a basis for change in their position. the constitution, i'm not sure

that the taliban are really looking for government ministries. and maybe looking for influence in the south, and so again there might be some space there. there's clearly a mutual interest in westerners leaving afghanistan. that can probably be exploited in talks. so while i agree, and kristian, hereby. it's not that helpful to articulate positions because those will not be the final positions. talks will change all the positions. but it might just be a way to start analytically thinking about how does one see a way forward and what issues need to be discussed and where the positions might start off at. and part of making, creating that coherent with the taliban is giving them, finding a way of giving them a platform. on the government side, i think there's quite a few things that have been mentioned, kristian

also mentioned earlier, as to the afghan government leadership and support for the poker process, a question, and i would agree with the. i think there are many interests among the senior members of the government that point to perpetuation of conflicts, not the least of which is the money that comes through and the ability to partake in that, and those inflows of money. but also things like the militias. i think we should be, rather than encouraging for the initiatives for localized and fragmentation, i think we should be asking the government to cohere as much as possible on also who are the players on the government side of the conflict. then on the question of civil society i think was important to bring up the women and children.

i think the reason i haven't emphasized too much is i don't think this is something that the international committee should take on and make demands. it is something where we should be very actively building up the capacity of afghan civil society to articulate what kind of afghanistan people want to live in. and building up the capacity to put pressure on the parties, put pressure on the government, the pressure on the taliban about women's rights, human rights, children's rights. and i think from my own testimony -- my past expense, the days in boston where we were pushing very hard for returns, and there was such a strong constituency among the bosnians who were insisting on those returns happening. we could come behind them and support them. so i think there must be a role for us to help galvanize both society and an articulate their position. and, finally, on pakistan and

some of the regional questions. yes, i think more pressure would probably be needed. at the moment pakistan -- pakistan's situation is one that will probably not be very -- it will be hard to put the pressure on because i think that such a sense of fragility in pakistan itself. but i do think that pakistan is starting to see the stable afghanistan is, in fact, in its interest. and i think that there's some potential there to also have, start having bilateral talks with india about afghanistan, separate from some of the other issues like kashmir. so i think is probably scope for engaging pakistan, maybe not talking so much about pressure on afghanistan. >> okay. i see we don't have anymore questions, and we are running out of time. i have one or two last comments, or questions. just to throw out there, but i

do think for me, my perspective, the militia issue is just a very good example of i think the contradiction between what we currently have -- or the lack of a political strategy and a military strategy. there can be some short-term stabilization gained at a very local level, possibly with some of these initiatives. at its very striking to me in 2002-2003, when i get a lot of research, the very number one demand was disarmament. it's very hard to find any example in recent afghan history of where in certain weapons at the local level our creating militias. so just to me, i think that's a critical issue that we might be getting some shot-