interesting lead to observe most people that were killed in the region were deliberately killed not because they were sent to camps are ethnic cleansing or deportation but deliberately killed whether by starvation, shootings or buy gas. deliberate killing on the territory is the most significant event in this region. . . to what happened in the second

world war, that these things are somehow necessary because they prepared the soviet union to an award. factually that is not true. but i have a deeper point, which is this. i believe when we try to understand the famine is a historical sense, rather than thinking if you look ahead you can somehow reevaluate them. that is they are historical terms and understanding in their own time and place. you'll also notice there were people who believe that the holocaust is so special, that one should only discuss it in metaphysical terms, that is somehow painted to be discussed. i'm of the opposite view. and if we do not treat the holocaust as a central historical event, subject to a normal kind of historical understanding, that's when it becomes uprooted and open to question. when one situates in history, at the good that most solid and most indisputable.

so while these methods are extraordinarily simple. i combined them with -- again, this'll seem even more simple. i combined them with the use of other languages of territories i was talking about that i knew. i know most of these languages. i wish i knew lithuanian. but most of the rest of them i know. and i mention i got to boast, but to point out that in general it's almost never the case that people who write about the soviet union is german or people who write about germany's aggression. not to speak of polish or ukrainian or yiddish for that matter. so when i'm trying to say is that i used historical fact is, this very historical alimentary method as a way to stay grounded and stay close to the time and place entry in this way to follow policies that brought their lives to an end. so what were these policies? essentially the policies can be divided into three phases. there is a period in the 1930s

or 1933 to 1938 when the soviet union is doing almost all of the telling. the germans are killing hundreds or the thousands, but the soviets are already killing in the millions. then there's a second. between 1939 in 1841 would not see germany and the soviet union are allies entering this. so to speak, germans catch up and kill at about the same pace and also killing about the same kind of people. and then there's a third. come the bloodiest of all between 1841 in 1945, after the germans betray their ally, invade the soviet union and kill millions of people east of the 1939 borders, jewish and non-jewish. these. sprague done it to the following policies. before i talk about the policies, let me say what about the introduction. the introduction is important because it recalls the first world war. the first world war was a strange and destructive episode,

which opened up a whole liter of political possibilities. most of the bizarre auctions that emerge from the first world war have been forgotten because they were never implemented. two of them actually did come to pass. national socialism in 1933 and in bolshevism in the soviet union in 1917. these two options were among dozens of revolutionary possibilities after the first world where appearance appointments at first world war with the situation in which things in which things that otherwise would have been improbable became much more likely. but there's something more particularly noted in the setting of ukraine. and that is as. pitcher mentioned was the the first world war. they won the first world war on the eastern front. they were never defeated. they were defeated on the western front, which meant that for many german, including most of the nazi leadership in eastern europe and especially ukraine was the kind of mystical land of opportunity, a bread

basket, plays her future empire could be one. and this is crucial because this place is eastern europe and the various hortense imagine if geography the nazis have. if it's a particular ukraine between hip and installing in a way which is going to become crucially important. the first chapter is about the same in. the famine in the ukraine in 1932 to 1933. what is striking here is that i felt i was coming to power in germany, who's making a let girls be just about famine ukraine. he has seen the feeling in ukraine joseph arcs of them coming to. of course by marxism he means communist the social democrats and in fact different who disagrees with them come up in the into one bag. but the interesting thing is the famine is going on in the background and is known about in germany as filter comes to power. in the soviet union, the

statement is of course the realities. in the fall of 1932, having already deported, having already enforce collectivization and taken away land for millions of ukraine and other peasants throughout the soviet union, stalin takes a series of particular decisions, which we cannot document rather carefully from which leads anything quite deliberately leaked to the starvation of about 3 million more people in soviet ukraine and had to die. the second chapter concerns the great terror come the second and third chapters contain the great terror. when we thought about the great terror in the past, we've generally had in mind the spectacle intellectual spirit and my and country influences. the old bolsheviks. at best, the military officers is the snow were killed. in fact, the great terror was a masculine action, directed at normal soviet citizen. the largest group of people to die for the so-called kulaks.

like it was meant a peasant who had somehow survived other forms of soviet repression and might thereby -- therefore oppose the regime. the second largest of the victims in the great care for members of law national minorities and this is the subject of chapter three. the bloodiest national action was the polish action, which took place largely in soviet ukraine and deliveries in which more than 100,000 people were individually shot on this various charges of being spies for poland. that concludes the first period in which the soviets are killing and germans are killing on a much smaller scale. the second. it appeared between 39 and 1941, when the germans and the soviets join together as military allies. germans use the cover of this alliance to invade countries and france as well as some of scandinavia and of britain feared the soviets invading

finland. he occupied the baltic states and along with germany, they jointly occupied poland. the main subject of this chapter is the joint occupation of poland in which hundreds of thousands of people are deported in 200,000 people are killed. the striking thing about this. is that this is a time when the germans catch up to the soviets. this is the moment when the einsatzgruppen begin to kill people and large numbers. this is also the time interestingly when the germans and the soviets are in the closest agreement about what sorts of people should be killed. the demographic profiling implies that very often the germans and the killing of one sibling and the soviets and the killings and other sibling. and the reason this is so is that both groups are after the intelligentsia, which is a word used in russian and german and

polish. it comes out of the 19th century. for poland has the significance of ukrainians as well in the significance of a group, which is supposed to embody both natural culture and politics. interestingly the germans and soviets agreed away to destroy the polish nation from the server and view or master from the soviet new ways to destroy this intelligentsia and both of them tried to do this. the third period is appeared in the germans betray the soviet allies, invade the soviet union in 1941. i begin this. with a long discussion of political economy. now that might not seem the most semantic way to proceed. it is much more dramatic to describe a million men in arms crashing across this order, to describe stalin and all of that is of course true and i get to that. but here in the middle of the book, i wanted to emphasize just how important and political economy was. what do i mean by political

economy? i mean the imagined vision of how colonization could take place. i try to remind readers that what the soviet vision was. as stalin's all things without the possibility for territorial and large, the soviet union itself had to be internally colonized their collectivization had used to create c. the soviet union could itself be modernized. then there is a german vision, which in many ways is contrary to the soviet vision, all the unpaid borrows from it. in the nazi idea, soviet union will beat the modernized. it cities will be destroyed and industry for the most part will be removed. 30 million people starved to death in the first winter after the war. after the war from the several tens of millions of more people will be supported, a simulated, killed or enslaved. and all of this, it is also planned that all of the are going to disappear, although

just how it is going to happen hasn't been decided before the war. the germans go into the soviet union with these explicit plans. these planes are now know as the hunger plan. they don't achieve these things, but what has to understand this vision of political economy, to see what the moral premises of the german invasion and occupation were. it's in this chapter two of the german policies which most closely resemble these plans, namely starvation of prisons or, some 2.6 million prisoners of war restart to death. another half a million were shy. this is a huge figure, often overlooked. for example, as late as december 1941, the largest group of the thames of the german occupation were soviet prisoners of war. in occupied poland allowed the germans starved soviet prisoners before they brought in camps in

occupied and starved them. the largest victim group in december 1941 was not jews, the soviet victims of war. this is a major school which the polish resistance observed and reported on. poor surroundings can stretch out the men were killed for doing so. for the most part it goes completely overlooked. and for that reason among others i've pay attention to it. the other place where the germans come close to applying policies and the starvation so crowd with some 1 million people are starved to death. because the germans explicitly planned to take over population, the story of the city and hand over the ruins to finland, the starvation can be seen as continent but the earlier planning. i've been in the close of the book, and three long chapters commit deal with the event which i think defines the blood landslide than any other, the depths of these policies is likely than the other and that

is the holocaust. i divide into three chapters although they are overlapped. the first of these concerns ukraine. a vision for german initial policies of killing jewish men, how that rapidly escalated to the murder of women and children and then whole communities. in ukraine you can see the rapid escalation and a transition from a policy of the murder of some to its very quickly in my opinion by december 1941, although opinions vary on this destroying all sub 10. in the second chapter on belarus, i concentrate on the relationship between the holocaust, the jews and belarus. belarus was the center of soviet partisan act committees. he was here more than anywhere else, where the germans killed civilians and reprisals at reprisals have to be in quotation marks for partisan activities because some of the so-called reprisals involves doing things that taking whole

communities, putting them in barns, taking whole communities and putting them up for teaches. or by the end of the work, just taking the women and children, killing all the women and children and back as slave laborers to germany. that is not a reprisal in any traditional sense of the word. hundreds of thousands of people died in this way. more than 300,000 and non-jews were shot by the german civilians and talking about during the war. if you put into that direction pows and the soviet citizens who died in other german policies, belarus becomes the territory in the world most touched by the second world war. and the final chapter on the holocaust, i.t. with the death facilities in occupied poland, starting with belgian because the germans were initially going to be carried out government who

executed in poland and was also in charge of concrete planning in the soviet union. one can see how the germans fell back from their more ambitious plans of killing tens of millions and became much more resized against a more specific group, namely the jews by focusing on the lint in 1940, 41, 42, which is what i do. i described what happened, where some 2.8 million jews were cast. if we take together numbers of jews who were shot and gas, the total number by the germans or something like 5.4 million, another 300,000 were killed by romanians. the final chapter of the book deals with uprising. during the warsaw uprising and actions unrelated to combat, germans killed at least 120,000

civilians in the early days of august 1944, they were shooting several thousand civilians a day and actions which were totally unrelated to combat. to conclude the book with two chapters not about deliberate killing, but which i think are necessary to bring us from the second world war today. the ethnic cleansing from 1933 to 1948 carried out first and the caucuses and crimea and among ukrainians, poles and from the soviet union and also within poland itself against ukrainians. and of course the largest total action is the mass fight the deportation from eastern europe to a becomes the federal republic of germany and the democratic republic. these are china's population movements involve huge numbers of deaths and i try to describe them very carefully. in my view, these events, as horrible as they are, are a

transition from the age of mass killing to the age of the cold war, which i discuss in the final dirt under stalinist anti-semitism from a wish of the holocaust is an event in eastern europe and as an event in the soviet union was very difficult soviet ideology to handle and the end of his life he developed a new kind of anti-semitism, which i argue has been harder for us to understand the holocaust eastern geography. so is there an explanation for all of this? is there anyway to bring these events together? let me try to do so very, very briefly. we've seen two ideas, two ideologies of global transformation. one focused on race. one focused on class. for different reasons, most of these ideas have a territorial focus. the territorial focus is the land between berlin and moscow.

what i mean by this is that in this world shared by the not tease and bolsheviks come in to find in some sense for the first world war, also defended the great depression in which the only possibility for expansion and development seemed to be on land, seem to involve controlling fertile soil. ukraine, belarus and poland for different reasons, economic and political were the focus of both regimes. and this is not just an abstract matter. first the soviets and then the germans strive to control the stream and in the middle. if the book, to jointly destroy the independent political unit, poland, which is a barrier to both of them. after that the germans go forward. it is important to see the time factor here. this is one of the ways the disappointing to not compared the soviets and germans abstractly. the revolution had run its course and stalin was in a

series of retreats. the very idea of modernizing within the soviet union rather than going further by way of world revolution is the kind of retreat. collectivization and punishing people for its failure was the kind of retreat. the great terror was the kind of retreat. in the german breakdancing is the soviets are retreating. they have their own ambitious idea of your ration revolution which will be there for the benefit of their own race. when that fails, they to retreat. but they carry out is absolutely horrible. but the policy they carry out, the holocaust does not exhaust, sadly, all of the plane they went into on the war of the eastern front with. they retreat to a particular policy which defines one enemy, an enemy which can be destroyed family, choose the main enemy of war. that's not a full explanation of the holocaust, but it gives a sense of how the timing in all of this is different. so when the boat come i try to stress that ideas matter a great

deal, but that ideas cannot be separated from economics. it makes no sense to try to understand on this ideas of development, simply in terms of an ideology without a notion of how the soviet union will become moderate. the same holds for nazi germany. the vision of destruction of the soviet union was a vision of colonization, a vision of racial colonization, and therefore highly ideological, but also a vision of colonization, a new frontier empire and ideology is not about economics and economics to work with yellow. likewise emphasize ideology cannot be understood without politics. politics one can only set if i get i beauteous retreat and talking about. politics than in crude encounters between a teacher in me and the soviet union through the politics which is evident when groups resist the germans resist the soviets and help us

all and have to decide what to do. all about his politics. and the tenderness and, the most controversial kind of politics of the politics of the interaction between the soviet union and nazi germany. this interaction could involve competition. it could involve military alliance or it could involve war. but i would stress that even when it involves were, the two regimes made each other worse. so for example, why did domine soviet prisoners of war died in the german starvation camps? because stalin wouldn't allow generals to retreat. why have so many sub one died in 1933 to 1944? soviet partisans revoked those proposals among other things. and the like in 1941 and 1942 in 1943, with the worst records of death of 500,000 people registered as having died in this year's. those people die because they

were sentenced to the gulag by the soviet union, but they also die because in this years come and germany had invaded and disrupted supplies. are they victims of hitler or stalin? that many other people, the blame is shared. this brings me to the last point i want to make that has to do with precisely the comparison. as i said, i did not write the book as i wanted to compare nazi germany and the soviet union. it was my view and is still my vehicle and into the both of these comparisons are to abstract into theoretical and to the ground and what we now know about history. that said, i think comparison is something which had to be done and i put it at the very end of the book and am going to give you a glimpse of what i think about it in three points. the first of this. logically, i don't think any taboo on comparison is that all sustainable. so if i were to stand here and say to you, you cannot compare

the soviet union and nazi germany, the only logical content of that desire authority made harrison and i would very much like for you not to do so. it has no other meaning. the word and comparable is a comparative judgment. you cannot say two things are incomparable messy part elected oath and made some kind of comparison. so the comparison taboo is essentially a power play. it just means i have the microphone. it does not have any stronger meaning than that. the second thing about comparison is that if we really want to know -- if we want to defend the differences between the soviet union and nazi germany and i think the difference is a very significant, by the way. but if one wants to defend the differences, one has to make a comparison first. if you want to say nazi germany

was special, as i say it was coming to have to the comparison. and if you do make the comparison on the basis for killing policies, which is what i do in my book to me find some interesting things. define for example that although almost everybody, including historians of the holocaust believed that the soviets killed more civilians than germans. in fact, that's just not true. germans killed more civilians than soviets did hear a lot of things we just think are true because we been told that order. them for decades actually don't stand up to an actual comparison the third thing i think about comparison is this. setting the taboo on on comparison as the luxury of the present day. given that the germans killed on the same territories that the soviets killed, people who live there and were talking about tens, in fact hundreds of millions of people with themselves condemned to compare. comparison with the part of their life experience.

if i give you some examples, this will hopefully become clear. peasants in soviet ukraine in 1933, many of them hope for a foreign invasion to rescue them from their misery. in 19 or be one, foreign invasion came and then they compared. there were people that survived hungary 1933 who are then served in german camps in 1941. actually they compared. once you see this, the list goes on and on. but they were talking about in 1939, trying to decide when the soviet union and nazi germany invaded poland, which way they should flee, whether talking about belarusians in 1943, when they had to decide whether they would join the partisans or german police, whether we're talking about the polls in 1944, trying to decide whether they should be given up raising a soviet power was about to replace germans. all these people were condemned to compare. so if we placed comparison

beyond our own historical investigation, where not being aired to the people who lived in these times and places them were denuding our own historical world of an important element. so many people were killed and this is my final word. so many people were killed that it's hard to grasp. once we have carried out a comparison, once we have analyzed the policies, once we've try to understand individual ways in which all of these things,, ukrainians and others were killed, were left with this overwhelming figure, which is 14 million. now i think that figures matter. i think it's very important to try to get the numbers right. but i also think even as we try to get numbers right, we should be careful with them among other reasons because the difference between zero and one is so

great. the difference between zero and one is an infinity. the difference between life and death is itself an affinity. each increment is another infinity. the difference between zero and one as we cannot remember if we think of the last person we cared about is so enormous. the difference between zero and one is the same difference between 72,031,720,032. the number 10 is just as important. we have to be very, very important with the numbers. and we have to do this partly for the reason i said, to human reason, but also for historical reasons, which is history assigned about death. history is about life in a flight account such as this one brings us to the borders of what history can do. because history is about life, i try to portray individuals who died while they were alive.

very often when writing about the famine or holocaust, people appeared just at the moment when they die essentially. so i try to introduce in this book people -- the little boy in ukraine who saw food where there was no food and died in the famine and the rest either died in the family or the terror for the polish officer just before he was shot. he was keeping a diary -- a final entire entry about his wedding ring that was being taken from him for the young woman in the synagogue who knew she was about to be shut and scratching at her mother in the wall wall of the synagogue. i think without these kinds of materials, without trying to re-create people, indians don't have history. we don't have a history which can rescue these events from the people who perpetrated them, from hitler and stalin, which is why i and the book was an

attempt, having seen how hitler and stalin turned the start of the world which we all care about, trying to turn the numbers into human beings because it seems to me if we can't do that in the end, then they have one. thank you frame much. [applause] >> there is a kind of adamant and logic to the way he structured the book and i'm not going to quarrel with it, but you chose also not to discuss certain issues. one of them is the collateral civilian death of the war and i'm just wondering, our statistics unreliable?

and he also chose not to discuss the implications of this massive wave of killing for the society. it seems to me that in the contemporary development of these countries, the legacies that these are poorly disguised defense are haunting legacy and political problem. is this something you hope to turn to? or why was it simply you couldn't discuss everything in the order of the book? it seems to me that if you take civilian collateral casualties and division of the death and the military casualties of rank-and-file soldiers, there is this vast destruction of the society. what does it do to their view of the outside world to create some hostility of a more harsh and separate distinct so i just

wanted to sort of put this on the agenda. and again, ask why he didn't specifically talk about the additional numbers. i mean, i don't know what those numbers are compare probably another 10 million soldiers that fight in that war and also civilian casualties apart from those which you have circumscribed but i do not. >> every book has a certain form and form allows us to do the things we do in formosa prevents us from doing other things. i think the thing that i like most about your questions is the way it takes the form of my book to be self-evident, which is strong indeed. someone works very hard to make the self-evident. you know, no one had remotely done before but i didn't miss the. no one had made the observation

that the killing was concentrated in this region and then try to explain it. and that was my goal. and if i'd done that much, then i'm very happy with the results. and if they made that statement that the self-evident approach, then i succeeded beyond my wildest dreams. to answer the question in more specific terms, it's not that i don't discuss. but the little too strong. i do discuss civilian death. they also discuss the war. the worse going on from (193)019-1945 and there's many places where he talked about how many soldiers fell at such and such a doll. i don't include them in my definition of the number of people who died. i do that for two reasons. the first is that i want to try to understand policies and deliberate killing. it's so easy for those things to believe analytically into ethnic cleansing and deportation and battlefield action. i realize there's a natural reason, which is these are often

related. but i had a sense that not only had we not concentrated on the time and the place, but that we had in quite extracted this sort of hard -- terribly hard kernel of reality from the other very dark conundrums surrounding it. i wanted to make sure we had a good record of the deliberate killing. but i think part of your question about collateral attached so-called collateral damage has to do with your question about memory. and there of course you are right. at the end of the book i make sure the reader knows roughly how many people died in the second world war total. and mention this in the introduction as well. of course the lessons are catastrophic. our grasp of them is actually poorer than qwest would civilian death, especially in the soviet side. the number of soviet soldiers who dies just not known. we don't know how much of the demography was covering for the loss of the 1930s. there was a period when stalin wanted numbers to be too low and 90. later in the 70s for the

numbers were wanted to be too high. and the people who actually worked on this on the record keeping was incredibly anything. but in general, that the only reason i didn't include it. but you're right. if you put a military vestige of this as well, by my calculation, about half of the deaths in the entire second world war, including the specific theater happened in the blood plans as well. so we are looking at a catastrophic loss of life. but on the talk about memory. i don't talk about memory because i thought for a couple of reasons i thought it dilutes the overall project. i thought if any of my entries about memory of the unknown, then people would read the history in terms of what i have to say about memory, which is the very last thing i wanted among other reasons because they care about memory discussions. as of the greatest contribution to memory discussions would be to try to write a history, which was as unbiased and professional

and solidly grounded in objective as possible. this may be pie-in-the-sky, but different kinds of polls and jews and ukrainians and russians and the long. not to mention americans and others could see this book is the starting point, then they would have a starting point, which we really don't have. the one thing i do say about memory has to do with numbers. and the general concern that we be very cautious with numbers and not inflate them. for all cases it's a bad thing when we release the spirits of people who never lived in to the discussion. the real numbers are about enough. >> professor snider, in "bloodlands," you tension that approximately 3 million people died during the ukrainian famine

of 32 and 33. can you please give some clarity as to how you derive that number? this contradicts the number of others who have been on their topics. >> so, i want to say that robert conquest was an incredibly important -- is an incredibly important historian. provided the interpretations, which very often turn out to be right and some of the other ways that the terror and famine culture highly controversial and rejected at the time are now part of the consensus. one of the elements in both cases, which is not one of the consensus numbers and not the simple reason that when conquest

is writing those folks, we just didn't have any idea. and the figures he was relying on for both famine and terror were sort of second hand from people the soviet union for his favorite demographic projections of the kind which we would probably not reject. since conquest incredibly important book was published on a couple important things that happened. the soviet union came to an end in hundreds of researchers have started working on this issue. some of them trained demographers. in general, what they have found is something on a range between -- at the low end, 2.4 million or maybe it's 2.5, on the high-end, maybe as many as 1 million ukrainians died. there is a controversy among historians within that range. but whether you are looking a australian or americans or ukrainians in ukraine, working

on this, you will not find people who are actually looking at the numbers in a serious way. you will deny this ukrainian events and many people, but she also will find people who go above 4 million. and if you do, just by a little bit. i am not a demographer. i relied upon the demographic studies that have been done. i also relied upon the very long monograph 10 base done by stephen wheatcroft was a demographer of roughly 3.5. i emphasize this. i ukrainians in ukraine who believe when the famine was a distinct event, which in general gives you gives you a three and 3.5. that's what ukrainians in ukraine are arguing for. the best based on that was about

3.3. the difference between the famine and other events or even important elements of the holocaust is that we don't have killed records. we don't have quotas. we don't have the figures which williford to solve this dispute. so when i see 3.3, that's an estimate in the sense that my numbers for parts of the holocaust or terror are not elements. those are calculations based upon perpetrators that are out there local and reliable and important sources. 3.3 million is always going to be an estimate. it's within the range of a few hundred thousand. and be very surprised if that turned out not to be a case. what i'm saying here by the way is entirely uncontroversial among people who look at the subjects, whatever their commitment made the. >> i'm wondering why he did not use the term holiday mind, which

seems to be an accurate representation rather than famine which is the natural event. and second, do you in fact leave that it was a genocide against the ukrainian people? >> cannot, in the book at the very end, there's so many -- there's so many terminological questions they let myself to write at the end of the book, a guide to where you certain words and don't use of the words. so for example, and make a distinction the boat -- and getting to your question. it doesn't sound like it, but i am. between final solution the holocaust because people use those in the same meaning. the final solution was the idea of getting rid of the sub 10 finally. and most of the draft version describes deportation, a murderous deportation, but not physical murder on site. the physical murder on site is

the holocaust, the final version of the final solution. to understand that, when asked to make a distinction. i say something different, which is that the reason i don't use it as they think he will be in for english-language audiences. i mean, in this room, one can say hello and it will be clear what everyone's talking about. i don't use it for the simple reason that 90% or 99% of my readership does not have a d. is about the famine one way or another. and introducing the worst of them in a foreign language is not going to be the best way for them to grasp what is going on. so behind your question though about language is a question about the liberation. and from this i can tell you haven't read the book because i make a very strong case in the first chat or that this wasn't a deliberate policy, but after decompensation and it tens of thousands of killings and deportations, after click to the

station, at a time when stalin knew there was a famine. that was his word in ukraine come he deliberately escalated policy in very concrete ways, then this the block was on individual communities so we could make requisitions targets come you couldn't trade with the rest of the world. they within the quotas. if you did make requisitions targets come he then had to turn in whatever animal or livestock you still have, which for us doesn't sound like much. but for people over the countryside, they know that livestock is the last thing you have before starvation. he can get milk, fodder for me. when you give up your livestock that so i've been keeping you alive. in that world, everyone knew what a requisition of life stockman. for not letting peasants by rail tickets for the city had a policy. there was a policy about that, but above all, the simple enforcement of acquisition target in january 32, figure 33,

guaranteed millions of people with type one on the hundreds of thousands probably would've died otherwise. they make that very clear that chapter. for there was a genocide or not is another question. and not section at the end of my book, which are referred, explain why don't use the word genocide for any event. the word i don't use genocide for any event is that i think precisely when you talk about these things, you end up in discussions, with a genocide in the woods at night, which are not particularly enlightened. people mean different things at the word and it's beyond my power in one book or lecture to change that and you have to recognize your limits. people think when they hear genocide to deliberate extinction of a whole people what they mean the convention definition of 1948, which is much broader emissary and would include things like taking children to school in them in a different language. it's a tremendous range.

by the legal definition of genocide, i agree with russ olympians made up a word. i think the ukrainian famine was a genocide. was it an attempt to murder an entire people? know it wasn't. as a popular definition of the word genocide. i avoid using the word entirely because with start use the word, i'm afraid all you do is confuse people. >> despite their passionate pledge, don't do what i do, do what i tell you to do, don't compare, i would like you to elaborate on two processes related to the killing policies. that is the decision-making processes and communication of these policies as done by not these in by the regime. not these seem to me another

history, but the policies were clearly described, communicated, kill, kill, kill. i'm curious if you have an opportunity to look at the source materials in both native languages. is this the case? and how does that compare between these two regimes? >> you are not violating my rule. i do compare. my sense is that we have, just to try to be clear, my senses we have too much comparison and not enough basis for comparison. i would rather give people a basis for comparison, knowing naturally people compare. there's no point because naturally all of you and mr. and compare and so do lots of other people and so do people the times. my point is rather i see the book above all as an attempt to inventory and explain killing policies, which then might help people make larger comparisons. but at these particular levels,

like the one you describe, there's all sorts of comparative judgments. what you say is interesting because it reflects what the common view is, that the germans were precise, they were officials in the one and so forth, where the soviets were sloppy and it was all carelessness. it turns out it must be true. the germans had with the soviets didn't. they had explicit large-scale plans to kill millions of people. the two major ones are the hunger plan. there is nothing on paper were soviets say we expect 30 million people to die. there's nothing like that. however, the germans do not carry out those plans the way they are written down. the plans give you a sense of what they wanted to do, what they were willing to do, what ideology sanctioned in the not the case, but you can see the germans follow those plants that letter because they didn't. the same is true with the holocaust, which is one of the

reasons why it such a difficult subject. people think they're hot to be a plan with proper paragraphs come with hitler's signature at the bottom. and of course there is no such thing. they talked about this themselves. there's thousands and thousands of indications of what they talked about and how the holocaust happened, for one woman within the plant that says this is where the holocaust is going to happen. the exist. no one will ever find it. it doesn't mean we wanted it to have been. but i'm trying to emphasize his face. the germans had big ambitious land and practice in the killing policies of back-and-forth, with the center gives a general idea of what is going to have been in the people at the bottom, the einsatzgruppen reports with dave dunn of whether you should go forward or back and it's usually go forward, but not the kind of careful memorandum you expect about. whereas, on the soviet side,

though as i said there is no master plan to kill millions of people. when there is the intention to kill millions or tens of thousands, it's extremely well documented that the soviets wrote things down. they thought the revolution is on their side. i thought history was on their side. you have these practices were he to order some executions in the file came back, it's still in the archive. so for the famine, there was no plan to kill such touched millions of people, but we have conversations between, no when he says we must export as much as possible and stalin says yes and that is documented. for the terror, we have the numbers, the quoting up-and-down from the center, local branches coming for full court assembled like a higher number with the center saying it's a can of the higher number, but that is all recorded in excruciating detail,

much greater detail than we have on the german side, which i didn't expect either, but that is the way it actually looks. it's excruciatingly clear. the documents given precise detail what they're going to do. >> it wasn't quite clear to me from your presentation much about the relationship between the famine, terror and subsequent holocaust. in other words, did the stalinist policies that took place in the early 1930s or even starting in the smaller famine in 1920 as, do you feel that those events aided and abetted the subsequent not the policies as they moved across eastern europe?

>> well, there are relationships and i try to document them in the book. i wouldn't say there is a relationship which is a straight forward as that. it's surely the case that the famine was known about at the time. it was known about in a time in which it was an after the war or during the cold war, but there's been new research by ukrainian historians, which make it very clear. it was a known revenue is happening. it was known about in the spring and 33. in the spring of 33 when the organizations -- ukrainians appalling, but also across europe are trying to draw attention to the famine. they are writing letters to president roosevelt and so on who is at the time of course about to begin official democratization for the soviet union. the feminists on about a nice stress and other places in germany. and the fact that the famine happens is one of the reasons --

i would face a second-tier reason, but one of the reasons why european politics become polarized. for people or anti-communist, there is one more argument for being anti-communist. as they say, it is an intellectual speeches. it is a second-tier argument. it's in there somewhere in the mix. it's one of the reason my politics are polarized some of the not the main reason. the famine is one of the reasons why west ukrainian nationalists or anti-communist, of course. it's one of the reasons why romanians or anti-communist because famine victims fleeing to poland and fleeing to romania as well. and people in those countries have experience with famine but in spirit is a real possible event, which contributes to anti-communist than and to that extent, it's one of the reasons why people are willing to believe that german world might be better, but there's lots of other reasons why people have the view as well, then historically back to the first

world war. and the book i try to press the kind of more subtle or more far-reaching claim, which is that especially ukraine was at the center of attention to both the soviets and the maxis. for both of them was a key region for the transformation of the symptoms. you had to be able to master ukraine in order to export, d. l., industrialized system. was a bread basket for that reason. from the nazi point of view and i wish i talked about this more, it's also a bread basket. and what nazis need to do is to use the collective farm in key to collect a fine, the user to divert food to western europe rather than to russia and belarus and for that matter ukrainians starved. that is their plan. so ukraine that the center of things. in ukraine is at the center of hitler's vision of an eastern empire generally coming if he

wants to master second-tier caucasian oil. and it is part of his view of how this is going to happen and destroy the soviet day by killing lots of leading jews. in his view it as the soviets date. the plan of conquest and control ukraine involves this terror and mass murder from the nazi point of view. and in that sense, the two events and the underlying sense for both regimes in ukraine as an economic transformation and an economic transformation, which by its nature will cost many millions of lives. but that the kind of structural arguments, which i have to develop slowly, chapter by chapter by chapter. >> we want to thank you for a very interesting analysis.

>> thank you. [applause] >> timothy snyder as a history professor at yale university and the author of several books including the reconstruction of the nation and the red prints. to watch other programs about this topic, visit both tp.org and enter world war ii in the search bar in the upper left-hand side of the page. >> we are here talking with brigitte gabrielle. >> islamic militants therein by the islamic minority and bringing back their islamic counterfeit. so that's what the book talks about. it talks about the history of logical islam code is doing a summary now, what is happening in the united dates as well and

why we need to be more idealized to understand what radical islam is coming from. >> what are some of the findings you have. >> well, we are finding out that the radical islamic terrorist are organized by the year for the united states or in australia. they are not working together. they are linked together through the internet. we are finding out that al qaeda, which means the base in arabic is nothing more than an umbrella organization with many other radical organizations that come and share similar goals. lately we've been hearing a lot about the muslim brotherhood than considering what is happening in egypt. the muslim brotherhood is a mothership basically that i stole these terrorists are today's at the muslim brotherhood was founded in 1928 and has islamic organizations, including al qaeda and hamas. so chapter in the book is dedicated to the muslim brotherhood and in particular the muslim brotherhood project

in north america. >> tell us about your background. how do you become an expert in terrorism in the middle east click >> i was born and raised in lebanon and my 9/11 happened to me personally in 1975 when the radical is on this blew up my home, bringing me down during the rebel. i ended up in the hospital for two and half months and later ended up living in a bomb shelter underground for seven years of my life, hiding to survive. i became very concerned about national security, even as a child. i grew up and i went and became news anchor and wanted to understand what was happening around the world. in what contributes to certain things around the world, certain movements. i worked as a news anchor for world news from the 94 until 1989 and that the reported prodefense back in the 80s i was connect in the datsun realizing that the name of the perpetrators were always the

same. the names were always the same. oxide, mohammed hussein, the names of the victims were westerners, christians and jews. colonel higgins, twa, finance life. and i can go on and on. i started realizing that what i used to think was a regional problem between the majority of muslims middle east trying to kill or expel the minority christians and jews had become a worldwide problem, but the world was not connecting the dots. when i came to the united states, i thought i left everything behind me. radicalism is left behind. december 11 changed everything for almost all of us in the united states in the world. the way we travel, the way we live. you can't turn on the television without hearing that some radical terrorist activity around the world. and so that's what drives me to do what i do. >> quickly, commute time in which her next project is?

>> i'm working on another book and it's going to be discussing grassroots events around the world, not only in the united states, but how the internet gave power to the people to rise up and mobilize in their own government. we are witnessing a resolution around the world that the internet is empowering. i can tell you my organization started out of my bedroom on the internet we were nothing but a website. today we are the largest national security movement in the united states. 160,000 members, 510 chapters nationwide. it all started on the internet. so my next book is going to be about power to the people. >> c-span's book, abraham lincoln: great american historians is a unique contemporary perspective on mr. lincoln from 56 colors, journalists and writers from his early years as a springfield lawyer to his presidency during one of our nation's most troubled time in this relevance today. and now for president and while

supplies last, publishers are offering c-span viewers the hardcover edition of abraham lincoln for the special price of $5 for shipping and handling. go to c-span.org/books and click on the abraham lincoln book and use the promo code again and check out. >> inside the outbreak i did take over five and a half years to break this as my wife reminded me repeatedly. and it was really a labor of love. it's about an organization called the epidemic intelligence service. and a friend of mine went through this and told me about it. and first he sent me an e-mail n