what is the problem, how long has it been, why hasn't it been rectified? give me some details, please. >> i can't tell you how long the problem's been going on. i'd assume it's been going on the whole time we've been in this contingency environment. example would be if you're sitting on fob fenty and you don't have a good signal to connect, and you're trying to put in the data, you're not going to put it in. and in some cases if you're sitting in kabul, it is easy, and we are doing it. but i can't tell you that i -- my organization can do it 100 president of the time -- 100 % of the time because of issues like that. >> would you say when it has been easy you've done it 100 president of the time? >> i can tell you since january we've done it 100% of the time period in afghanistan and 50% of the time in iraq. >> and when can we expect to see it 100% of the time in iraq, sir? >> i don't have an exact answer, but as soon as humanly possible,

i can tell you that. >> okay. mr. amey, i'd like your comments on my minor outburst here. >> i think it boils down to this type of work has been considered red tape. i think this is the kind of, you know, it's been a procedural burden, and that's kind of the reputation it has, and at that point this is the kind of work that's being gutted out of the system. both from a preawards side of thing, a contract administration and oversight side of things that has been gutted from the system that makes it a lot more difficult to hold contractors accountable. and also agencies accountable. >> okay, thank you. mr. carroll, i have a very special sympathy for igs. they worked very closely with me when i was in government. you mentioned in your testimony that there were four entities omitted from the excluded parties' list. who were they? and let me ask you since your team is checking on this, who

were they, did they get new contracts, are they still contractors, and what was done as follow-up? and maybe if you don't have that now, perhaps you can get back to me on the second round on that one. whatever's easier for you. >> probably on the second round. >> okay. then one last question. you say that there have been 28 suspensions and debarment l actions over the past year with aid. now, aid in particular strikes me given that it's been an organization that's relied heavily on contracting for at least a decade, the improvement is late, o put it mildly. -- to put it mildly. but just as here you see up there how many actions are we talking about? 28 suspensions, debarment out of how many cases? could you tell me that, please? >> out of how many cases as in -- >> as in number of contractors. is the number there, the 81

that's up on that chart or what? what's the base when you say 28? 28 out of how many? >> i couldn't say specifically. i'll get back -- i'll get you the information, but the point i was trying to make was the improvement and just because there's a contract, a number of contracts doesn't mean ha they're poorly performing or there's fraud or criminality. >> oh, absolutely, i couldn't agree more, but there's no way of knowing that if you don't complete a report as commissioner henke said. you know, you've got to start at stage one, and it just seems to me to say we're doing better or that we're doing anything at all is very difficult when you don't have reports completed. and i think part of the difficulty that at least i find with so much of the testimony i'm hearing and that i've read is that everything's about process and very little is about outcome. and government is great at process. in fact, government is best at defending whatever it does or

doesn't do as opposed to actually dealing with what the outcomes ought to be. thank you. >> thank you, dr. zakheim. sometimes when something is so outrageous, it has less impact. because it's hard to get your, your mind around it. so admittedly, it's just a sampling, but in our statement, our joint statement -- and, by the way, republicans and democrats up here, we hardly remember who's who, and sometimes our biggest disagreements are with staff and not among ourselves. and it's a healthy disagreement. we have a lot of practitioners who sometimes say, yes, but, you know, we're in the system, we know how it works. the whole reason why it's good we're not in the system is we can look at it from the outside. so if you were the general public and you are aware that samplings of contingency contracting data in the federal procurement system suggests that

more than 90% of contracts have not had required past performance data entered and then you're in the general public and say, well, if 90% haven't been entered, how in the heck can you judge them on past performance? and then, admittedly, it's a different sample base, but the office of federal procurement policy has found more than 75% of past performance reports that were made still lack adequate narratives on contractor cost-control efforts. so is it because you're in the system and you all make excuses and you understand, well, the people are overworked? what is it that's going on in government that accepts this for, literally, decades? and, and doesn't do anything about it? admiral, explain to me why, why this is happening. because to the outside and to us it's really outrageous.

>> yes, sir. and i can see where especially given some of the testimony given here it could seem outrageous. one of the problems that i think we are well on our way to fixing is, again, in my environment as dcma i provide that past performance data, and i do this routinely, not just the cpars piece, to the procurement contracting officers, to the pcos and to the program offices. the way our policy that i was discussing currently lays out the pcos are the ones that are responsible to put in that performance data. in some instances i'm probably the closest, my organization is the closest to observing and surveying the contract performance, and that's why we've changed recently to have us put directly into cpars. so i think some of it is the way the system was developed, and i believe the people that developed the system previous to us did a good job putting

something out there, but we need to make it better. >> well, what it describes, the fact that you used the word seem is distressing was -- because it doesn't seem outrageous, it is outrageous. that's the bottom line, that's the whole point. mr. carroll? the question is, this is so outrageous, what do you hear within the system that kind of justifies the fact that this can exist as outrageous as it is? >> well, from are our point of view, chairman shays, we don't accept it, and while we did the audit and we're going to continue -- >> what kind of excuses do you hear? give me one or two of the top two excuses why this didn't happensome. >> it's going to be staff. >> yeah. captain? >> sir, in my environment i provide the data, and we provide that user training. >> when you provide the data, the data, do you begin to think, like, what's the point? because you've been providing the data, and nothing's been

happening. >> where well, the programs -- well, the programs, cpars has been a program, federal program since october. i don't do any analysis of it, no. >> okay. mr. amey? >> i think this is why your 23rd recommendation in your report you released last week that talks about a written rationale for not pursuing proposed suspension and debarment is vital. we've seen multiple instances in just using contingency operations, kbr had over a billion dollars of unsupported costs. i'm not claiming that was all waste, fraud or abuse, but we couldn't support them, so we're not sure how money was spent. well, you know, the dca wanted to take some moves, wanted to initiate a withhold, and they backed down from the department of defense. we have seen it with bp as a contractor. everybody, obviously, knows their record in the gulf coast, but they, obviously, supply a lot of petroleum to the air force.

>> yeah. one of the challenges we have is since so many people have their finger on it, nobody's ultimately held accountable, so no one gets blamed. ibm has this wonderful system that even once someone's retired, they look at a successful program, and if it's successful, they go back to the retiree and give them a bonus of hundreds of thousands of dollars for a decision they made. there's this sense of accountability even that follows you once you retire. recommendation one allows contractor to respond but not appeal agency performance assessment. do you gentlemen understand why we made this recommendation? can one of the four of you explain what the logic is behind this? it's pretty logical. i'm just curious if you think about it. it's one of the things that we encountered. allow contractors to respond to but not appeal agency performance. assessments. what's the problem with the appeal? >> well, i'll jump in. >> sure.

>> did response alter -- you know, the decision should come from a government agent, not from discussion with the government or with a contractor. >> and the appeal can take months, maybe a year, and you're held in limbo, and yet you're in a contingency environment? we relate this to contingency environment. you have to have a decision made soon enough. align past assessment with contractor proposals. we want to make sure that a contractor isn't claiming that they did something well when, in fact, they didn't, and be there's no counterrecord to contradict it. what's the sense of this? why would we want to suggest this? could any of you tell us why? do you think about it? admiral? >> yes, sir. i just think it makes common sense, and i agree with that recommendation. >> and if -- thank you. and it holds people accountable. just let me go through the few others. require a written ration male for not pursuing a proposed

suggestion or debarment. this was a question that i wanted hanging for you, mr. carroll. i don't understand how we could see an agency -- we don't, the commission -- without a justification for not agreeing to a recommendation of being disbarred or suspended. >> well, we, we present the evidence to the agency to make a suspension and debarment decision. sometimes that's in parallel with the referral to -- >> and dcaa sometimes does the same, and -- >> yeah. >> and then they still get the award, and there's nothing written that explains why the recommendation notwithstanding was still decided. >> true. >> do you agree with that recommendation? >> whole heartedly. >> captain harrington, can you, can you speak to this recommendation and whether you agree to it or not or think it makes sense? >> if i could ask you to repeat

the question, sir. >> our recommendation 23 is require a written rationale for not pursuing a proposed suspension or debarment when it's been recommended by an inspector general or recommended by dcaa. or -- >> or senior employee of that organization. >> or a senior employee of that organization. >> sir, in my capacity i think that if there are programming changes or inputs or things that need to be changed to the system, i will be able to provide that. our -- >> i hear you, captain. admiral, could you speak to that recommendation? whether there should be some kind of written -- not some kind, a written rationale for not pursuing a proposed suspension or debarment when it's recommended. >> yes, sir. my interaction with suspension and debarment is extremely limited. from what i do know, personally, my own opinion is i think it's a good recommendation. i think it's something that should be taken forward. but, again, i am not in the

suspension or debarment officer realm. >> okay. well, let me just say i'll read the other two, and my time is up -- >> chairman. >> but we want an increased use in suspension and debarments. we think if you're not going to be suspended or debarred, there's no accountability. it's what's the point of even recording past performance if you don't, don't act on it? and revise regulations to lower procedural barriers to contingency suspensions and debarment. we just think that the process in a wartime environment is absurd if process can take literally years. then what's the point? and, you know, we waste money, we get bad performance, and we put our men and women who are on the front line in danger. so we really want you all to go back and look at these recommendations because we think this is an important, essential part of what needs to take place in the reforms.

and we're going to start the next order o, and we'll go to you for five minutes, commissioner thibau lurk t. >> thank you, commissioner shays. i want to explore something that commissioner shays read very briefly and just get a yes or a no. there's a recommendation, i think, we're popping numbers, number 22 that says agencies certify, require agencies to certify the use of past performance database. require agencies to certify the use. does anyone on, up there think that that's without merit? all right. well, it seems to me then that the next part of that is the accountability that commissioner shays brought up which is if you do that, right now it's a whole lot of -- and we're doing it, it's in the testimony, well, we're doing this to improve it -- but there's none of this, here's where the failure occurred or senior management

accountability. well, if you require the agencies to certify that they're effectively using it consistent with the requirements and the regulations, then at least you can evaluate the process that they're using. but if as you see in the chart there you get all those zeros or less than so %, you've -- 10%, you've got nothing to evaluate. so it would seem to me if you implemented that, you could turn to the head of agencies in forums like this and say, what's going on? and it seems to me then there would be a scrambling on the side of the government to get this done the way we all would like to. is anybody up there disagreeing with what i've said so far? okay, now let me get to a point that's sort of near and dear to me that i wanted to bring up which is the cost of these corrective action plans and the suspension and debarment work too. many of these contractors that have that we bring up, i like professor tiefer's flagrant five. i found that a good way to reinforce it, but many of them

that we bring up are valued providers of certain goods and services. so people in a government make a decision, you know, and we can criticize it in some cases, and we are. we need to continue their support. but it seems to me that the question that hasn't been asked is, so, who's going to pay for this? in the example of -- or who should pay for this? i'm going to start with mr. amey and work my way down, but in a most egregious example, clearest understood example where there was life lost in this electrical problem where we were wiring living quarters and other quarters inappropriately. well, in that particular case we, the government, devised all sorts of project safety-type situations where it was all fixed. it's a cost-type contract. it's not. if it was a fixed-price contract and a contractor agreed to perform against a certain standard and didn't and you put

a cost improvement program, corrective action plan together and they had to do it, guess who pays for it? the company pays for it if government's been doing their job and documenting. in a cost type, we have been out in the field and gone through a lot of these in the semi-remote, the shanks and airbornes of the world, you know, we've been to them. there they want a plan and a responsible contractor will fix it. but if it's egregious and they didn't build a building so it couldn't be inhabited, the real question is why in that environment do we continue, you know, should we be changing the regulation that if it's worthy of a level three corrective action plan or however we're referring to it, who should pay there are this? and we're changing the regulation on business systems saying you take a withholding until they get it done. and i'd go a step further and say ask the question, you take this withholding, it's that important on a corrective action plan also, and then the question

is, who pays for it, mr. amey? who should -- you know, when you get right down to the business world that we're try to be like, who should pay for that? >> obviously, it should be the contractors to either provide the goods or services that were promised to an adequate level based on the requirements of the contract, but, unfortunately, i think most of the time the taxpayer pays for it. >> okay. captain harrington? do you have anything different? >> from where i sit for funding, i look at the system, and i am funded -- >> so you're a user of the system, and it's not really down your lane. mr. carroll? you've got a usaid contractor that's failed. you've got a bunch of money being spent. it's an irreversible contract. right now we're paying for it. should we be considering a change in either the regulation or the law that requires that where it's egregious, you know, they're going to continue to do business. they've made all these fixes, but who's going to pay for the fix? >> i agree with you 100% on what

you're proposing, and i would just say two things. for the agency, for example, to fix that they're going to put eight fte into a new unit, so you've got to give them credit for that. secondly, i know mr. tiefer is a fan of lbg, but they are paying for their corrective actions, you know, civil settlement -- >> part of their justice settlement all of the corrective action plans? >> we, exactly. >> and justice can do that, and they've done it. kind of rare, but they've done it. all of my history which makes me older than all of you, justice effectively does that sometimes. they don't always do it in this case. >> right. and in addition to that where we find egregious instances where contractors didn't perform, we'll make a recommendation to the agency that they can't sustain that cost and to recover the cost. so it's the contractor, clearly. >> yes, sir. admiral? >> i would always say contractors have equitable

adjustment capability against the government, i would love to see a law that would allow us to have equitable adjustment. >> well, i think that would maybe -- my instant reaction is to agree, but i would say that would be contradictory and very difficult. but the concept of simply saying in the regulation that if a corrective action plan at a certain level, the contracting have the authority with the advice of his or her advisers to say to the company, that's one you're paying for. because i think then the company will be more attentive, and i think the government will be more attentive as long as you have agencies certifying the proper use of past performance database. because then the head of the agency is going to have to put his reputation or her reputation on the line. mr. amey, you have a quick comment? >> and then we need to move on. >> yes, sir. this kind of gets into the weeds, but it may also be on the competition side is that you need a competitive multi-award idiq so if that contractor isn't

performing well, then you can turn somewhere else, someone has already been preapproved, so at that point you could bring them in, and there's that threat you could lose that contract. that may be a remedy. >> good point. good point. >> thank you, my co-chair. we'll now go to mr. green. >> thank you. not, not really the focus specifically of this hearing, but my closing comment in the first round now that you've all had time to think about it, and i'd like to take advantage whenever we get some smart folks up here to sort of pick their brain. you know, commissions like ours just come and go. and some do good work, some don't do terribly useful work. i hope that some of the things that we have done over the past couple years before we close out will prove to be useful. unfortunately, many of the recommendations just die a slow

death. so back to my earlier comment. the war's over, the troops come home, they're focusing on training, they're focusing on maintenance, they're focusing on exercises. senior osb leadership goes away. joint staff turns over. senior service leadership goes away. cigar goes away, we go away, you guys maybe all go away except igs survive forever. what would you do if you were king to insure that the progress that i think we've made -- and i think you all agree there's been progress made -- what do we do to insure that that lives? anybody? >> sir, i'll take it first. >> i want to ask all of you. >> yes, sir. i think i would say that you'd have to insure that we institutionalize the

operationallization of these sorts of things, and we need to drive it just into our culture, and we also need to make sure there's a proper metric that is agreed to and corinne into the -- driven into the process. it's, it will be difficult to keep track of these things. i'm sure that there were same instances of this in the vietnam era, and we're looking at it again now. so the key is how do we institutionalize it, and that's something that we have to take a focus on. >> in your area do you see it being institutionalized, whatever that means? >> yes, sir. i do. i see -- we are writing sops, we are measuring, we are insuring that it gets into our culture. >> mr. carroll? >> well, i would say it's incumbent upon the igs, as you stated, to maintain the momentum and to continue holding the agencies accountable for contractor performance. and i think that's, you know, even when the special igs go

away you still have the statutory igs for defense department, state and aid to be able to carry the torch forward. so i would say from my point of view we're fully prepared to continue doing what we do to make sure the agency holds contractors accountable. >> well, i think the pressure will come on the igs, and i hope that when the special igs go away, if they do, and whatever, whatever form follows them, if any, they will also have certain responsibilities. but short of that and short of really taking that seriously, i'm skeptical as all of you have seen recommendations, studies just collect dust. and i think that some important work has been done here, and i think we're moving in the right direction. but we've got to, we've gotta

stick with it. captain harrington. .. >> unfortunately, or fortunately, administradministration and policy policymakers go a >> unfortunately, or fortunately, administradministration and policy policymakers go away as well so i think you need to codify this, get congress to pass legislation that will

enhance what's currently in the federal acquisition regulation as well as the dfar. i wouldn't expect it just to come from the management side of things with policy memos. >> thank you. my time is up. >> thank you, commissioner green. mr. tiefer. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'm going to go back to a couple of my favorites among the flagrant five, and ask admiral gilbeau, i know that you carefully said in your statement that as far as logcap iii and logcap iv, enormous logistical contracts in iraq and afghanistan, there had not been entries made by dcma. i'm not talking about currently, i'm going back and kill the

reason ask made by dcma, i want to take it one step further and ask about that. our staff look to see whether somebody else made entries and found that there had been no entry for kbr in logcap iii or logcap iv, which means the expenses history described that you could describe on the pogo database doesn't have anything corresponding in a government database. and i want to ask, how could this have been true, or why would this have been true in the most what i think is the most famous incident of kbr wrongdoing, which was at the electrocutions in iraq, the electrocutions of soldiers and others because of faulty work on the wiring. and i think you at dcma did yeoman's work, you establish a thing called a level three core active action which is a very serious sanction. why didn't get -- why didn't i

get into the database? >> this would just be speculation but my guess is because of that handoff from the dcma activity to the procuring contracting organization, to give all that information in seven volumes, seven big volumes of information, and then the oversight trail from my perspective is suffered once i hand it over to the pco. >> thank you. i have a question about what i believe is a major game that the contract with bad performance have succeeded at, and that we have a recommendation at, and that is, number one comic isn't it the case now that even if there is no for a contract in the database, there's no past performance entry, that a contractor may cite that work on

the contract as past experience in seeking to be evaluated favorably for new contract where best value, 30% is often what they have done before. and if we recommended that that should not be the case, that contractors could only take credit for performance that has been rated, would that lead to a better rating system? >> i'm not sure. at the onset i think it sounds like a positive idea. however, i would have to look at what kind of experience was being built, what kind expense did they have, when would they ask execute a contract and then be competing for another contract. >> but is the case now that contractor who does not have past performance leads into therefore may hae