012, we're going to have to squeeze every penny we can out of spending because we have reached the point where we're broke. and if we start wars and we are borrowing now, i think were risking some sovereignty that could manifest itself into any foreign policy matters down the pike. they thank you for your service. under very difficult circumstances, rarely have we been imposed in any one country for as long as we have. and we owe so much to you and the troops that you had them they want you to note that we are trying to hope our dear chairman friend in every way we

can to help them on the subcommittee realize what you need. thank you, mr. chairman. >> well, thank you, mr. chairman. , we are anxious to hear your presentation, so we invite you to make the statement as you prefer. your entire statement will be placed in the record and you present it to us in any way you like. >> thank you, mr. chairman. members of the committee, i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the presidents budget request for the next fiscal year. at first like to thank the members of the committee for your support of the men and women in uniform would answer the call in time of war. i know you'll join me in doing everything to ensure they have all they need to accomplish their mission and come home safely. the budget request for the department of defense being presented today includes a base

budget request for fy 12 of $553 billion in an overseas contingency operations request for 117.8 billion. i submitted statements includes the details of this request. i do want to take this opportunity go to address several issues that i know if any subject of debate and can turn in finance the outlines of her budget proposal last january. first they will suffer by operating under continuing revolution resolution for fiscal cover 2011. second the project is so an individual flat over the next five years. third come to plan future reductions in size of the crown forces and for the proposed reforms to the tri-care program for teenage retirees. i want to start by making it clear that the department of defense will face a crisis if we end up with a year-long continuing resolution or a significant funding cut for fy

2011. the president's defense budget for fy 11 with $549 billion. a full-year continuing resolution will fund the department at about 526 alien. that is a cut of $23 billion halfway through the fiscal year. the legislation the house passed a week ago would provide us with about 532 billion, still a kind of 17 billion. let me be clear. operating under a year-long continuous solution or significantly reduce funding with this severe short telephone and tales what do you research programs, cuts and maintenance could force part of our aircraft fleet to be grounded with depleted facility improvements. cousin operations would mean fewer flying hours come if you were steaming days and cutbacks in training for home stations, all of which directly impacts

readiness. mr. chairman, recognized in the current fiscal and political environment, and it's unlikely the department of defense will receive the full but requested for fy 11. based on a number of fact are scum including policy changes that lead to lower personnel costs and reduce the duties by the continuing resolution, i believe the department can have a lower number. although it is my judgment the department of defense needs an appropriation of at least $540 billion for fy 11. for the u.s. military to properly carry out its mission and maintain readiness and prepare for the future. which brings me to the proposed $70 billion reduction in the defense budget toplines over the next five years. to begin with, this cut is to the rate of the predict growth. the size of the defense budget is still protect did and projected to increase in real inflation adjusted dollars before eventually flattening out of this time. or significantly, efficiencies, reforms that we've undertaken over the past year have made it

possible for the department to absorb lower projected growth in the defense budget without sacrificing real military capability. in fact, the savings identified by the services have allowed our military to add some $70 billion to her priority needs a new capabilities. of the $78 billion in proposed reductions to the five-year defense plan, only 10 billion is direct related to military combat capability. for billion of that comes from restructuring the joint strike fighter program. the rest, about 6 billion, results from the proposed increase and decrease in strength of the army and the marine corps, starting in 2015. that decision all addressed now. just over four years ago, one of my first acts as defense secretary was to increase the permanent strength of our ground forces. the army by 65,000, marine corps by 27,000. the army went to 547,000 soldiers in the marine corps to

202,000 marines. at the time the increase was needed to relieve the severe stress of the force in the iraq war is the search is getting underway. to support the latter class up of troops in afghanistan, and subsequently authorized a temporary further increase in the army of some 22,000, and increased always plan to end during fiscal year 23rd team. the objective is to reduce stress on the forest, limit and eventually end apart is its top blogs and increase troops home stations while time. as we and the u.s. troop presence in iraq to share, according to her agreement with the iraqi government, the overall deployment plans honor for his third decreases significantly. that is why we believe beginning in 2015, the u.s. can with minimal risk begin reducing army act of duty strength by 27,000 the marine corps by somewhere between 15 and 20,000.

these projections assume that the number of troops in afghanistan will be significantly reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance with the president and need a strategy. this would still leave the army with nearly 40,000 more soldiers in the marine corps with 12,000 more marines than when i became secretary of defense. if our assumptions prove inaccurate, there's plenty of time to address the size and schedule change. these are supported by both the army and marine corps leadership finally as you know, sharply rising health care costs are consuming a never lurching share of this budget, going from 18 billion in 2001 to $52.5 billion in this request. among other reforms, the fy 12 budget includes modest increases to tri-care enrollment. later index to medicare premium increases for what teenage retirees, most of whom her

employed while receiving full pension. all six members of the joint chiefs of staff have strongly endorsed these and other cost-cutting reforms with congress. just be clear. the current tri-care arrangement, one of which these have not increased for 15 years is simply unsustainable. if allowed to continue, the defense department was the risk of other corporate bureaucracies that were ultimately crippled by personnel costs the department fabians and reform combined with a host of new investment will make it possible to protect the u.s. military combat power, despite the declining rate and eventually flattening of the defense budget over the next five years. i should note, and you refer to this, mr. chairman. this will only be possible if the efficiencies reforms and savings were followed through to completion. in closing, i want to address calls from some quarters for

deeper cuts in defense spending to address the country's fiscal challenges. but her mind them over the last two defense budget submitted by president obama, we have curtailed or canceled troubled or access programs that would've cost more than $300 billion is seen through to completion. additionally total defense program declined further as the u.s. military withdrawals from iraq. we still live in a very dangerous and often unstable world. all you have to do is pick up the morning newspaper. our military must remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse range of threats from nonstate or is attempting to acquire and use weapons of mass distraction to sophisticated missiles, to the more traditional threats of other states, both within a conventional forces in developing new capabilities to target our strength. we shrink friend responsibilities that are imperiled. return trip brought about by shortsighted cuts could well lead to costlier and more transit consequences later.

indeed as they always have in the past. mr. chairman before closing time i want to raise one item of great concern of urgency. exactly a month ago, the department amended a request for the congressional defense committees to reprogram $1.2 billion in fy 11 funds to assess to purchase needed equipment to protect their troops in afghanistan. general petraeus requested this equipment is an urgent matter to better protect our forward operating bases as we continue to push into contested areas. the equipment involved is mostly to improve our protection against ied is by enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, particularly through the very successful use of fixed these sensors. as of last week from all congressional committees except this one have approved this request via mr. chairman, our troops need this protection equipment and they need it now. every day that goes by is a bummer day they will do without.

every day that goes by without this equipment. i urgently want to get these items so i can get these important capabilities into afghanistan in time for operations, prior to the fighting season that begins in a matter of weeks. i understand the committee has a concern over one of the funding sources, the army humvee program. the u.s. military has over 180,000 humvees in the inventory today. 154,000 in the army alone. this vehicle family continues to be a workhorse for network. the army determined over a year ago that we have more than enough, particularly since the act is outside protected areas for several years. with your extraordinary support, we've move to better protect vehicles like the imap, which is saving lives every day. mr. chairman, i wish this were a matter of finding another source

of funding, but the size of the cuts come in the congress is proposing in fy 11 budget and uncertainty over the continuing resolution, we simply do not have the luxury of leaving this undated $900 million on the table. .. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. chairman, representative, dicks, and establishes members, i'm honored to appear before you to discuss the fiscal year 2012

defense budget. before i do, let me echo secretary gates comments about the real dangers inherit in failing to pass the budget. fiscal year 2011 if carried forward would not only reduce our account by $23 billion, it would deprive us of the flexibility that we need to support our troops and their families. the services have already taken disruptive and some cases irreversible steps to live within the confines. steps that make us less effective, certainly less efficient at what we're supposed to do for the nation. it also strikes me that this budget is a budget that we -- the services started working on -- in late 2008. so for the last two and a half years, there's been some planning to execute this budge, which we can't. and also have that kind of affect in 2013 and 2014 as we actually work now to prepare the

next budget. the navy did not procure government furnitured equipment, the army and marine corps have curtailed or frozen civilian hiring. all services prevent for issues contracts for new major military construction projects. some programs may take years if the cr is continued through the end of september. i urge you to pass the fiscal defense bill as soon as possible. it will provide us the tools that we need to accomplish the bulk of the missions we have been assigned. accomplishing those missions into the future demands support of the fiscal year 2012 proposal. this combined with the efficiency effort provides for the well being of our troops and families, current operations in afghanistan and iraq, and helps balance global risk through streamline organizations, smarter accusation, and prudent

modernization. the army, for instance, will cancel procurement of a surface to air missile in the nonline aside launch system. but it will continue production of the joint light tactical vehicle and spearhead the development. it army will give up headquarters and reduce it's man power and increase the use for ships and aircraft, allowing it to continue development of the next generation ballistic missile submarine, purchase combat ships, and another l17. the marines will cancel the fighting vehicle and reduce their strength starting in 201537 -- 2015. they will reinvest to sustain the assault vehicle and light armoured vehicle. even as they advance and restore much of their naval expedition

expeditionary skill. the air force will get a new tanker, bomber, and f-15 fighters. all while finding savings of $33 billion through reorganization, consolidation, and reduced facilities. none of it will come on the backs of our deploys troops. we are ask for more than $84 billion, nearly $5 billion for increased isr, and more than $10 billion to recapitalize our rotary aircraft fleet. these funds plus the partner capacity in places like afghanistan, pakistan, iraq, and yemen all speak to the emphasis we are placing on giving our troops and their partners in the field everything that they need to do the difficult jobs we've asked of them. we must also give them and their families everything they need to cope with the stress and the

strain of ten years at war. that's why i'm pleased with the funds devoted in the proposal, almost 3/4 as much as the $200 billion for operation, maintenance, personnel, housing, and health care issues. as you may know, the chief and i pinned a rare 24 star letter to congress, expressing our unqualified support for the military health care program changes included in this budget. we sought equity across all health care programs with beneficiaries and health care delivery providers having the same benefits and equivalent payment systems regardless of where they live or work. that in turn led us to proposed increases in tricare enrollment fees for working age retirees. these increases are modest and manageable, and leave fees well below the inflation adjusted out-of-pocket cost set in 1995 when the current fees were established.

we sincerely hope you will see fit to pass it. please know we will continue to invest wisely to include research, diagnosis and treatment of mental issues, and brain injury, in health services and new battlefield technologies. we understand that changes to health care benefits cause concern among the people we serve in the communities in which we receive care. but we also understand and hold sacred our obligation to care completely for those who have bourn the brunt of those wars as well as those for whom the war never ends. i remain convinced we haven't begun to understand the toll in dollars and in dreams that war extracts from our people. as the grandsons and granddaughters of the world war ii vets still struggle to comprehend the full scope of the horror those men yet concealed. so too will our grandchildren have to come to grips with the wounds unseen and the grief

unspoken. unless, of course, we get it right. i believe the investment we are making in wounded care and family readiness will pay off. but it will take time, patient, and money, three things we seem rarely to possess in this town. that brings me back to this particular budget request. with limited resources and two wars in process, we should be prudent in defining our priorities, in controls cost, and in our thirst for more and better systems. we should also be clear about the joint force can and cannot do. just as we should be clear about what we expect from our interact si, and international partners. our global commitments have not shrunk. if anything, they continue to grow. in the world is a lot less predictable now than we could have ever imagined. you need to look no further past the events in middle east and north africa to see the truth. i just returned from a tour, visiting seven countries in

seven days. at each stop i was struck by the degree to which civilian and military leaders alike desired to keep our military partnerships strong. this desire isn't rooted in the fear, but rather a shared understanding of the external threats to their security and ours which still plague the region. changes to these relationships in either aid or assistance ought to be considered with cautious, and thorough appreciation for the long view, rather than the flesh of public passion and the urgency to save a buck. the support we provide many of the militaries has helped them become the capable, professional forces they are. in that regard has been of incalculable value. of equal or greater value is increased appropriate the for the state department. our request for something called the global security contingency fund.

a three yeared pooled fund between the pentagon and state that will be used to build partner capacity, prevent conflicts, and prepare for emerging threats. the request is modest and initial $50 million appropriation along with a request for authority to reprogram an additional $450 million if needed. but that -- what it will buy us is an agile and cost effective way to better respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of emerging opportunities, for partners to secure their own territories and regions. we must get more efficient, absolutely. but we must get more pragmatic about the world that we live in. we can no longer afford bloat the programs or unnecessary organizations without sacrificing fighting power. we can no longer afford to put off investments of future cames across the spectrum of conflict.

i have long sense we must not be exempt from belt tightening in defense. there's little discretionary about the security that we provide the fellow citizens. cuts can reasonably only go so far without hollowing the force. in my view then, this proposed budget built on the balance that we started to achieve last year, and represents the best of fiscal responsibility and sound national security. i would be remised if i did not close by praising the incredible effort of our troops overseas and their families as they finish one war in iraq and begin to turn corners in afghanistan. i know you share my pride in them, and you will keep them foremost in mind as you consider the elements of this proposal. thank you for your continued and long-standing support. and i look forward to your questions. >> admiral, thank you very much. you know we do share your very, very strong support and admiration for our warfighters,

our troops who have kept this nation free. secretary hill, do you have a statement? well, then -- mr. secretary, in responding quickly, we agree with you. cr is not the way to fund the nation's national defense. we have tried everything that we could to get that bill passed last year. we did pass it basically in the form that i think you supported. the defense part of hr1. at least you indicated that last year. we support that. we don't want to fund the defense budget on a cr. so we continue to work that issue and try to get that bill passed. now on the reprogramming, you and i have discussed this before. but my strong concern about how much money we waste in the defense department by starting a program, stopping a program, paying termination fees,

investing billions of dollars, canceling the program, and we get nothing for it. taxpayer gets nothing for it. what we -- when we support from general petraeus is asking for. we strongly support that, and we strongly support your position. we would like to analyze with you in some detail another source of that funding. or how we might work out an issue. on the efv, for example, we had quite a discussion early on about the efv. last year this committee wanted to cancel the efv. the defense department says you can't do that. the requirements are too strong and too powerful. we funded it. this year the story was you got to cancel the program because we can't afford it. we had already spent $3 billion. my question is what did we get from the $3 billion. the responses were basically nothing. we provided language we think in

hr1 that would allow oo way -- allow a way to eliminate the $145 million termination cost and get something for that money. and we just think that there's a way to work out this issue with the humvee reprogramming as well. so we would like to just in the next day or so talk to you more specifically about that. and what we think might be a helpful way to approach this. but anyway, we stand to be supportive as usual. and we want to be what's right for our nation's defense. mr. dicks has agreed, mr. bonner at our brief hearing at our threat briefing, mr. bonner was the only one that didn't get any time. so i offered to give mr. bonner, and he has a very important mission in his chairmanship, and he has to perform that this morning. so mr. bonner, we're going to recognize you now for five

minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary gates, welcome back to the committee. i think the fact that there are so many members here, in fact, it's almost full, speaks volumes of the importance of your testimony today and the many important issues that are facing our country and, in fact, the world. and in fact, your own comments in recent days have raised questions here in congress and around the country as we are currently engaged in two wars in iraq and afghanistan. so i'm sure some of my colleagues will like to focus your attention to some of the other pressing matters that come before us today with your testimony. forgive me for being a little get parochial in my questions and my concerns. notwithstanding a friendly disagreement with the ranking member and the gentleman that i have a lot of respect for.

the people along america's gulf coast, not the people of france, suffered a great setback last week with the decision that the department made with regard to the case ex tanker. in 2008 while you were secretary under the previous administration as you will recall, we won this contract. at that time, the eads aircraft was judged to be by your own officials the best value at the best price. it was protested to the gao. gao ruled that on eight process issues, out of someone 150, the department should have amend rfv, seek revised offers, and make an award decision. you chose not to follow the gao

recommendation. the contract was canceled. and then you created a new acquisition strategy on the lowest price technically acceptable basis. and the result was that last week the loser of the 2008 competition won the contract today. you know first hand how the debate regarding government spending, which has been discussed by the chairman and the ranking member and the chairman of the full committee has evolved over the last two years. we have focused now, more than ever, out of necessity to find every savings that we can out of the federal budget. when i joined capitol hill as a young staffer in 1985 with then congressman sunny callahan as his press secretary, the debt of our country was $1.8 trillion. it's now over $14 trillion.

so i understand. i think probably every member of this subcommittee understands that the attitude on major defense procurement, such as tanker, has to focus on the bottom line. but i think we all are also concerned about any affect that this could negatively have on our warfighters as well as on the taxpayers. i trust that we could also agree that the first serious price -- fixed-price development contractor awarded since you and dr. carter initiated this to control the cost of procurement came out this year would be the tanker contract. certainly one of the size of a $35 billion award for 179 planes. as you know, dr. carter recently

said the defense department must not start programs that it cannot see through. i think many of us agree with that. and feel it is important that we continue forward in this direction to avoid future debacles like the presidential helicopter and the medium extended air defense system, both of which were canceled for running over budget and behind schedule. also recently, president obama scratched the virtual fence, otherwise known as the secure border initiative network. the high-tech fence along the mexican border that ended up costing the taxpayers of this country $1 billion that we got nothing for. i realize that's not a d.o.d. project, it was department of homeland security. but it raises the point that money and time were both wasted nonetheless. i personally feel that any unforeseen changes to the kc46a,

of which will certainly will be, will leave taxpayers footing the bill, our warfighters at greater risk, and i at least for one feel that the most capable tanker which won the competition the first time will be sitting on some allies tarmac while we are waiting for the delivery of these tankers. so i want to say without said in the six questions that i have, there's no animosity whatsoever for when you were president of texas a & m and you stole our football coach from the university of alabama. these questions are not about that. these questions win think, do deserved to be asked, and i'm going to ask them in their entirety, if you can't answer them with respect to the other questions, if you could get back in touch with us, i would

appreciate it. the first one, in this contest, can you commit to this committee and to the american people that the loser has been and will be afforded the same information this time around as was provided in 2008 which led the winner -- excuse me, which led boeing, at that time, a loser, to make a well informed protest of the northrop eads contract? number two, historically contractors in development programs such as this have run into major program delays and cost over runs that forced the military to buy fewer models, or even cancel a program. recently, the air force chief of staff, general schwartz said he would have no patient for the graduated sales prices and contractors don't blow smoke up my ass about what a platform can do and when it will be ready. mr. secretary, what assurance

can you give congress adding cost in the uncompetitive environment, via change orders, will be strictly prohibited. number three, given the contract, can you tell us what we will be buying with the kc46a. will it be -- mr. chairman can i submit the other questions for the record? i'll be happy to. but the last question was which tanker will we be get the kc6200, kc72400, and i will get the other questions to you. >> could we hear the other two questions? i'd like to hear the other two questions. >> if there's no objections. >> that's okay, sure. go ahead. you are on mr. dick's time now. so it's okay. [laughter] >> while the loser is assessing their decision whether to protest, it is a beginning to

appear that the winner simply bought this contract through the low price bid. that maybe to the benefit of the american taxpayer and war fighter, time will tell. but on the fixed price basis, what enforcement mechanisms will you institute on this contract to ensure that congress and the company and air force will simply not use change orders in the future to add capability in currently making the contractor whole on the price? my last two questions are that a company official from boeing last week said after the announcement that they would fly their airplane for the first time in 2015. this contest calls for 18 aircraft will be delivered by 2017. so my question is, mr. secretary, have you ever seen a program that will executed that quickly from first flight to delivery of 18 aircraft in your history? and then lastly, i would ask you to provide the committee with the specifics of what we're

buying under the kcx contest award, what specific price, and what specific schedule? mr. dicks, thank you for allowing me to get the answers in. >> my answer will be short. given the technical nature of our questions, i will take them for answering for the record after our lawyers and acquisition officials have thoroughly examined them. >> i figured that's what mr. bonner wanted anyways. thank you for cooperative. you are recognized. >> right. well, i wasn't planning on getting into this. but since the gentleman from alabama who has been a gentleman throughout this entire process raises this issue, i want to make a couple of comments. one, i have been involved in this thing for ten years. i think this time the work of the air force was much better

than last time. i would remind the gentleman that the gao said there was seven or eight major violations, any one of which could have turned this in boeing's favor. also when the -- when the gao added up the price, boeing had the low bid as well. and yet we still lost. there's a question here of fairness. and i think secretary gates made the right decision in turning this over and making him do it again. because of the multitude of problems. and this time i got to tell you, i really believe that the low bid was buy over 1%, and that's why boeing won. that's the clear cut reason. i also want to clarify one thing. there's been some press stories that talked about life cycle

cost. i really believe that we have to do a better job of evaluating and bringing in all of the factors in life cycle cost. you know, when we got the john young changed the life cycle from 25 to 40 years, not because of political pressure, but because it was in the joint requirements document that was done by the jay rock. they said the life cycle should be 40 years. i frankly thought it should be 50 years, because the kc135 which we are trying to replace here were -- have flown for over 50 years. they were all built between 1957 and 1963. so on that point, i just want to make that clear as well. and also bigger isn't better. you know, what -- many of the secretaries had said up to the

point of that second go around was that they wanted a smaller airplane because it's more energy efficient. and the life cycle cost. you don't need the military construction. so there are reasons why we wanted a smaller aircraft. in fact, the secretary of the air force and pete aldridge says the season they didn't let air bus bid the first time was that air bus didn't have a plane that we wanted. that's why the first time when boeing got it, which was approved by everybody in congress, it was because airbus didn't have a plane. their planes are bigger. i know the secretary is going to give you forthright answers. i believe this thing was done totally on the merits. i don't think there was any pressure from anywhere that made any difference. everybody tried to do a lot of different things. i think it was decided by the

air force on the merit. and i hope this is a decision that is sustained. >> okay. mr. jerry lewis, former chairman of the committee and subcommittee. notice his portrait is behind him. mr. lewis, you are recognized. [inaudible comments] >> thank you. i'm concerned about your comments, admiral mullen, as well as secretary gates, regarding the year-long cr, the implication it has in terms of readiness, flexibility that we need to move some of those dollars around. can either of you describe for us what we experienced with a year-long cr last year? what actually was the fallout?

you've been through that there. give us some kind of day-to-day blows from what you saw from that cr? >> well, actually, i tried in my opening statement, sir, to capture certainly what we see this year. and there are, you know, there are as -- and we've done this certainly more than once over time. what isn't captured too often when we talk about -- we are talking about the malta projects we can't start, and the projects that we can't start, what we have to pay for it, goes to the $23 billion piece of this. but you see particularly inside the services they really start to constrict in terms of what they will spend their money on, and what they won't spend their money on. currently, there are costs that we have to pay. we have to pay salaries, we have to pay health care increases. they are given.

they really pile up where almost as the chairman said six months halfway through this year without a budget yet. and what's hard to describe are the inefficiencies that it generates that are almost expotential other time. we get to a point where we say we finally get a budget and we'll have to execute contracts in a short period of time. which are incredibly expensive and inefficient as well. some of the specifics, i mean the major pieces that i talked about, where we have major systems that we are not buying equipment for, we can't buy equipment because we don't have the money. it cascades into the major program. i'll use the submarine program in connecticut. where we cash flow to keep programs going. but at some point in the time the navy is going to stop cash flowing. there are potentially, you know, workers that will get laid off up there. we see that. we talked about freezing, one the first things we always do is

freeze hiring. and i mean from one, you know, literally from the major stuff to the kinds of capabilities we execute on a daily basis. it's incredibly inefficient. and services. they can't spend money they don't have in the end. they really contract and hold back. we get into a point in time, typically as i'm sure you know, summer time, where secondary loses flexibility in being able to pay salaries at some point in time. because the services run out of money to do that. and being able to reprogram that in a way that we must in order to pay salaries which we get from programs, et cetera. so it's -- it is the inefficiency, it's the program piece, meaning we can't start new things. we don't buy things as well as just the almost expotential inefficiency over time.

>> let me just add a couple of things. first of all, on a continuing resolution, we're $23 billion below what the president's request. that means there's no funds for the pay raise, for any increase in fuel prices, no money to pay for increases in health care costs, has a severe impact as the admiral has described on our acquisition program. he mentioned the potential. we've worked for the last several years to get ourselves to the point where we could build two virginia-class attract submarines. fy11 was to be the first year. that's at risk. the air force, that will be -- we'll have to reduce our buy by probably 24 airplanes, we'll have to reduce the buy of ch47 helicopters. all of the services will cut, sustainment, repair, and maintenance. there will be an impact as i indicated in my opening

statement on training. we have just gotten back to the point that we have enough army troops to begin doing full spectrum training. now in fy 11 if there's a continuing resolution. there's no money for it. there'll be no new military construction, no milcon, a whole year out any new milcon. that would describe the troops among other things of a full year of needed construction of new facilities. you know, it'll have impact on special operations, particularly in terms of training and support. but it'll have -- we will probably be in a situation where we will have to dramatically ramp down the work of the army dee poas at red river and letter kenny. then it goes down to the things that affect our military men and women in a personal way.

just to conclude with one example. the navy has done, usually -- correct me if i get the dates wrong -- the navy has a practice of notifying families six months before the pcs move. that moteification is now down to two months because of cash flow problems. this has an impact across the entire defense budget, top to bottom. >> mr. chairman, a lot of discussion is taking place within the department of defense, but also within other agencies relative to our effective use of space in terms of our national defense. yesterday we spent a lot of time in the interior committee talking about the difficulties of that department just to get their agencies to communicate with one another and thereby use dollars reasonably efficiently to carry forward their missions. some of our future capabilities, in terms of really securing our

country as well as i think the rest of the world relate to our effectiveness in the way we use space assets, the way we use satellites, and indeed even the way we used unmanned aerial vehicles. i'm interested in having you describe for us, mr. secretary, what the department is thinking about and talking about relative to our responsibilities in the application of the space assets to our future security. and i really want to know if there are effective communications vehicles between the various agencies involved, and the black world and otherwise, that allow you to be absolutely certain that we are affectively communicating with each other rather than just -- rather than just continuing to secure stove pipes and those standards in the federal government operation. >> well, i will get a detailed statement or response back to

you, mr. lewis. but i would just say one the examples of acquisition recore that is in the fy 12 budget is for the first timed, blacked buys of satellites that will meet the need of multiple customers, and allows us instead of contracting one and two satellites a year to the builders, instead, to give them a predict -- a higher number and a predictable number over a several year period that allows us to bring the cost down. it also forces us to communicate better among the different customers of the satellite builders to do that job. the other is, i worked very closely with the deputy under -- with the under secretary of defense for intelligence a couple of years ago. and he with the director of national intelligence in terms of putting together a joint architecture of what we would buy, both in the white and black

world and where we can complicate, i'm sorry, where we can compliment what is often very expensive in the black world with often commercially available satellites in the white world. that allow us, and that would be used by both the department of defense and the intelligence community. so i think we've made white a bit -- i had more than a little bit of experience with this when i was dci. but i would tell you i think we've made considerable headway over the last two or three years in getting our arms around this and doing it more as a -- looking at it more whole -- holistically. we will get it to you. >> really, sir, i want to make a couple of points. i will strongly echo what the secretary said in terms of focus on this from an interagency standard point.

it's much better than it was. the stove pipes are still there. i think we all have to continue to focus on that. secondly, it is a boundaryless domain that impacts our national security and the national security of others. i think there's recently issued a space strategy which i think is a significant step forward here specifically. which guides us, and the last thing i'll say which i've been concerned about for years in space is the industrial base. so how do we make sure we have a robust enough industrial base, secretary talked a little bit about, you know, this combination of using commercial as well as obviously defense contractors here. how do we make all of that work together? i think we do have to focus on that in both the white and the black world to make all of this work. it's a vital domain, vital requirements that deserves the

focus, sustained focus, over a long period of time. >> okay, mr. chairman. >> mr. moran. >> thank you, thank you very much, mr. chairman. mr. secretary, mr. chairman, i strongly believe that you are as fine of a team as has ever led our national security. but i fear that as history has shown with so many outstanding leaders, that while they were the right people at the right r- in the rights place, they were there at the wrong time. and i worry that your legacy is going to be crowded by our engagement in the afghan war. and i think more and more people are coming to that conclusion. the -- and the reason that i say

that, while we've spent $450 billion, you are ask for more than $100 billion again this year. we have seen 1500 soldiers killed, it's gone up each year since 2003. the afghan government is the most corrupt government in the world. and unfortunately, we've contributed to that $14 billion economy pouring in that kind of money, perhaps, it was inevitable. at one point, we were told that the kabul bank was the most successful postinvasion institution that we had created. and yet we now find, and there was just a saving investigation by the international monetary fund just this month, that about $900 billion has been taken from that bank. much of it went to president

karzai and his associated. he has -- president karzai has undermined our mission there deliberately. he has said the teams led by the u.s. and it's allies were designed to bolster governments were, in fact, undermining his government in kabul. he's now authorized the establishment of a separate police force. the more we look at this, the less justifiable this mission seems to be. and i think you may have noticed the review of bing west's book, front cover of the "new york times" book review sunday. here's an assistant secretary of defense from the reagan administration, former infantry

offer. counterinsurgency isn't working because the afghan people will turn on the american troops on a dime. they don't want us there. no matter how already guess that we bring. i think the question that we really have to ask you again is, is the government that we are backing in afghanistan, the karzai government, worthy of the resources, the sacrifice of lives that the american people, and particularly of the dedication of our soldiers who are fighting over there. secretary gates? >> well, first of all, let me just say i realized full well when i took this job in december 2006 under president bush that i was inheriting two unpopular wars.

and that that was -- and i took this job knowing full well that the chances of ending one or both in terms honorable to united states and those who served our national security interest were pretty grim. i think in the first instance of iraq, we are ending it on terms that are honorable to the united states and serve our national security interest, leaving aside how it began. i think we have to understand the nature of the conflict in afghanistan. we are in afghanistan for our own national security reasons. we are in afghanistan because we were attacked out of afghanistan and the pakistani/afghan border remains an epicenter of terrorism that has the potential

not only to destabilize the entire northeast and southeast asia, but still launch attacks against the united states. so our strategy is not focused on the government of afghanistan. our strategy is how do we defeat al qaeda, how do we prevent insurgent groups from overthrowing the government of afghanistan, and how do we degrade the capabilities of the taliban to the point where the afghan national security forces can sustain them? can sustain their security? now you asked me a very serious question. i'm going to try to give you an answer. it's not one i'm going to do in a sound bite. this has been a very tough fight. as of this morning, we've lost -- since 2001, 1,045 american soldiers, marines, airmen, and

sailors. we have at the same time, the afghan national security forces have lost five times that. they are in this fight. and so they believe what they are fighting for is worthwhile. and i think that the consequences of our leaving precipitously, of leaving this job unfinished is that we will confront exactly what we did when we did exactly the same thing in 1989 and turned our backs on afghanistan. and 12 years later, we're attacked from there. we can't leave this place alone, and i think that those who are in the fight and the closest to the fight in some respects are the most committed to the fight. >> chairman mullen? we know there are 50 to 100 al qaeda in afghanistan on any given day. we know that pakistan serves as

the safe haven for the taliban and other anti-american elements. every day it serves as a safe haven. is it possible to achieve any form of military victory in afghanistan as long as there is a safe haven in pakistan for our enemy? >> sir, for a long time, i have not focused on -- >> excuse me. after the admiral responses, your time is expired. >> yes, i understand. thank you, mr. chairman. >> as i have focused on this area, it has not been afghanistan alone. it has been the region. and i think that's important for all of us. as we move forward here and underpin the strategy and the reason and i believe the same relationship with pakistan that i have spent time on has

improved remarkably over the past two or three years. that doesn't mean we don't have our significant challenges. but specifically, for instance, yet again it's been widely reported last week with general on the trip to the middle east region. what i say between general petraeus and general was a level of cooperation that no one could have imagined across the border in the last couple of years. that's been a lot of hard work to improve the relationship and trust. we are not there. but we broke that in 1989, 1990. we have the gap. and just like the secretary, i believe that we have to sustain that for the long term that downside consequences of a pack -- a nuclear capable pakistan that -- who's government collapses and is there in the

hands of violent extremist or thee cattic individuals is a huge, huge danger, globally and certainly for us. i believe we have to tonight to work that. we have to continue to invest in it. it's not going to happen fast enough for any of us. and our ability to work that has is significant impact on what's going to happen in afghanistan as well. so it is, in fact, working both sides, and, in fact, al qaeda is in much tougher shape than it was a year or two ago. some of the taliban organizations are certainly much more concerned about their future than they were as recently as a year ago. because we finally got the resources right, we finally got the people right, we have the strategy right, and we are starting to turn. no one is more aware of who we've lost and the people that we've lost.

but as the secretary said, if you want to talk to someone that thinks we have this right, get out on the front lines with them. all of that said, we can't do it without having some level of legitimate government to pass this off to. at the local level as well as at the national level. so the challenge you lay out is certainly there. we see that much more clearly than we did in the past, including where the -- where's the money going? how we are audits contracts, et cetera. i think we know what we have to do, and the question is, you know, execution as we move ahead. >> if you'd -- mr. chairman, if you'd just yield. i would like to hear secretary gates address the question that we raised about the government itself. the karzai government, and it's -- the problems there. and what can we -- are we trying to get them to cooperate and to be -- i mean they make comments all the time that make you

wonder. here we are making this enormous sacrifice. karzai says things like we're the big problem. give me your take on that. >> first of all, i would say that the competition for the most corrupt government in the world is a tough competition. and i don't think actually the afghans are in the top five or ten. >> mr. secretary, they are. they are tied with burma. >> not in terms of dollars. >> no, but those are our dollars >> the honest answer to your question is it's a mixed picture. some of the ministries, the ministries that i deal with, that we deal with, the ministry of defense, the ministry of interior we think is pretty good. they are competently led. they are feeding people, they are recruiting people, putting them into the pipeline. they are ahead of their schedule in terms of recruitment, in terms of training, in terms of

literacy training and everything else, partnering with us. but they are delivering the young men to us ahead of the schedules that we laid out. which is terribly important to the end of our strategy. but i would say that, you know, let me just say a word about president karzai. i think we have done a lousy job of listening to president karzai. because every issue that has become a public explosion from president karzai has been an issue that he has talked to american officials out repeatedly in private. he like the iraqis before him, complained a long time about the private security companies and how they were out of control. nobody had oversight over them. he told us that repeatedly. he didn't go public until he'd reached the end of his teeter. civilian casualties, it wasn't

until general mckiernan and mcchrystal got there until we started taking the civilian casualties seriously. it was something that he raised every single time. these issues that ended up with him having the explosions, the critical comments that he has in my view in most instants, there is a basis for that. maybe he over does it, maybe he carries it too far, but that's a reality. and, you know, the truth of the matter is, again, this is one the things that the administration has looked at and has spent a lot of time other the last several months on. where do we -- where do we set the standards in terms of our goals? we are not there to build a 21st century afghanistan. what do we need to do in terms of development, both in terms of governance, and also in terms of

their capabilities and so on that frankly gives us a path out? having accomplished our objectives. so the idea, there isn't a developing country and particularly one anywhere near as poor as afghanistan in the world that delivers services outside the capitol. there isn't a government like that that isn't corrupt. so how do we -- how do we establish objectives that allow us to accomplish our national security objectives within the framework of the reality of the history and culture of afghanistan. and at the same time, help begin to build the relationship with them that we have with dozens of other developing countries that will last long after 2014 in terms of having -- helping them modernize and develop some of these capabilities. but figuring out how to balance what our objectives are and what

we actually need to do in afghanistan is one the things that i frankly think this administration has done a better job of than i've seen during the entirety of the afghan war. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentleman, good morning. "the new york times" reported last week and talked about a secret report ordered by the president back in august what fell under the rue bream of presidential study, relative to identifying potential arab uprising. >> actually, i saw that story. i asked the question about the report. it was a draft, never went anywhere. so it never happened. >> fair to say whether it was ordered by the president i assume the joint chiefs and the secretary of defense have ready

for justified every contingency. >> every crisis. is that fair to say? >> yes. that affects -- let's say the mediterranean, what's happening in libya. we look very hard. >> each and every day. >> at the future as best as we can. we as the secretaries point out more than once our ability to predict historically has been pretty lousy. certainly we have been concerned about what has been, i guess, building in the middle east over time. specifically, but i don't think anybody predicted the the -- wht would cause it and when it would happen and the speed. >> you know, some people attribute it, i don't know whether you it call it an intelligence failure, that we didn't know the depth of what was going on in egypt and libya. i have to say when i run back into my constituents, they say, well, it's just about every

other nation was able to evacuate the citizens on a relative timely basis. where were our -- why weren't we able to upload american citizens? on a more timely basis? >> i think we got them out pretty fast. >> yeah, but other countries were there, the chinese were there, koreans were there, there were a lot of evacuations. >> judgment of when to evacuate is a decision in the united states that is made by the ambassador when the time -- when they believe the situation has reached a point where they want american -- they believe that there should be ordered departures of americans. that's the timing of that is up to the ambassador. so the chinese and the others may have just made that decision locally earlier. >> did we have assets in the area to evacuate citizens on a more expeditious basis? >> well, the statement department. >> apparently we did. >> the state department's view

was that the most expeditious and least provocative way was to lease the ferry that took most of the americans out. we also took a number of british citizens on that ferry as the british flew out some americans on one of their flights. >> relative to libya, a lot of pressure building here for establishing a no-fly zone. i mean i often tell my constituents we're fighting two wars in the middle east and we are fully occupied there. what do you think is the likely scenario in that regard? >> well, if it's ordered, we can do it. but the reality is -- and people -- there's a lot of, frankly, lose talk about some of these military options. let's just call a spade a spade. a no-fly zone beginning with an attack on libya to destroy the air defenses.

that's the way you do a no-fly zone. then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down. but that's the way it starts. >> i'm not endorsing it. >> no, i understand. and it also requires more airplanes than you would find on a single aircraft carrier. so it is a big operation, and in a big country. >> where we have those aircrafts, obviously, are committed to other missions. we would have to redirect them from wherefore they are to participate? >> yes. >> libyans have liabilities themselves? >> if you are going to do that, we have to assume it's very capable. we know something about their readiness. you have to assume it's capable unless proven otherwise. we have also seen and not been able to confirm that any of the libyan aircraft have fired on

their own people. there has been reports of that. we have been unable through this morning to confirm that's actually happened. >> i'm not endorsing it. i'm just saying there is sort of a preacception here that we are the only ones that can do it. we would have to take out the libyan assets? >> yes. >> it would be what some on the ground would suggest an action, somewhat, you know, a war. aggressive action on our part. >> well, at this point, the u.n. security council resolution of last week provides no authorization for the use of force. >> okay. thank you very much. >> thank you. i will address my first question to admiral mullen. before i start, i want to thank all of our panel today for your

wonderful service and deep caring about our military and it's equipment and resources. admiral mullen, you have mentioned previously that diplomatic and foreign aide are just as vital as the military role in our overall success wordwide, in particular in afghanistan and pakistan. can you help and comment more specifically on the importance of diplomacy and foreign assistance in addressing the channels -- challenges worldwide? :

the shoulder to shoulder commute and to work the use issues together. and it really is a piece of this that has huge not just near-term but long-term implications. in the end, it's relatively inexpensive if you get it right and you don't end up in any kind of conflict. i mean, wages compared the kind of resources we've extended in these wars, the investments that we've made on the military side,

for instance, in egypt. $1.3 billion a year is not a small amount of money. when you look over 30 years from what the egyptian military was very specifically has done, it's been pretty extraordinary. were i've seen it -- i'll use another example that i'm extremely concerned about is in iraq. the budget we need the transition is we need to make sure that the state department budget here, in order to transition its supporting, for example. so there are near-term iraq, afghanistan, pakistan issue specifically, but also long-term, which these investments become preventative in establishing strong relationships. we have over the course of the last 20 years that would argue devastated the state department

budget overtime. so i have for a long time called for increasing not in order to not have it then, quite frankly, a lot of money were i've been in force these relationships. pakistan is a great example. they're waiting for us to cut them off. the dominant question when a go to pakistan afghanistan is we have been in past. we have to be very, very cautious about making sure we have this right to make these investments in the way, which sustained the relationships. >> thank you very much. secretary gates, i commend the priority you find done these inefficiencies and saving the department of defense and even very eloquent today about

talking for the need of funding and how we'll need to work together. i do know of course that china and russia have recently demonstrated their development of a fifth-generation tactical aircraft. this underscores the need for an affordable fifth-generation aircraft or her services and allies. so i returned to the joint strike fighter that you mention your opening statement. the dod says the impact of moving 124 f. 35 aircraft from the defense program will have little impact to unit cost over the life of the program. while this may be true for the life of the program, i'm concerned about the impact unit cost of the aircraft being produced in the next five years. this poses an immediate problem to her services in international partners. would you comment on the immediate or near-term impact of this decision? we just have or are in the

process of concluding or have concluded the next five joint strike fighters. and through sharp pencil is on the part of both the contractor and the u.s. government, i give special credit to dr. ash carter. this by the joint site strikers will be cheaper and we are in a condition to bring concept of this in a way that'll keep the cost under control without growing. >> again, i appreciate that and working to the time i've been in congress, i've just seen where we slow down the purchase and then it raises the cost. the theory is later the cost is too high when often times we've done it and that is my concern. >> one of our new initiatives is

a long-range penetrating bomber. and the criterion can be done when we began to discuss this as i don't want to have this in a situation where we end up with egg on their that cost $2 billion apiece and we can only buy 20 of them. and what if you lose one evilest 5% of your force. so we are looking to build in this new bomber program each 100 of these bombers, but not make mistakes in terms of the previous programs were good, having contracted using unproven technology so one of the benefits in one of the reasons we think we can afford a new penetrating bomber is for the most part we will use existing improving technologies. >> thank you mr. secretary. >> gentlemen come attainment for exceptional service to our country and those under your command.

let me say that i'm influenced to my question this morning by the recent arrest in pakistan of an american by the name of raymond davis. and beyond the resolve nature of what he was doing and who he worked for her. and i have had a long-time interest in the relationship of the rising cost of an all volunteer force as a percentage of her manpower account in the rising costs of the contractors to the u.s. department of defense. mr. secretary, you were quoted in the july 20 issue of the "washington post" in a major story about contractors and he said they quoted you correctly. this is a terrible compression. i can't get a number on how many contractors work for the office of the secretary of defense. it has been my assumption based on much as nation and congress passed that there will be an effort made by the u.s. department of defense to in source more service at rather

than outsource and miracles that were sad. according to the budget that was submitted in terms of contract support services, it appears as though rather than reducing costs by 10% a year, your budget reflects the growth of over 26.6 billion for fiscal year 2012 over 20 amount in. and i guess my question really is in terms of contract, it's my understanding now have over 200,000 in the field, supporting our operations in iraq and afghanistan. but how do you look at this contracting ratio? and when do you believe the department will be in full compliance with the law that requires reporting of the number of full-time contractor employees in bringing those costs down as a part of the budget you submit? >> will first of all, the one thing i found out is that one of

the reasons i couldn't find out how many individual contractors work for the pentagon is that the way a lot of these contracts are written is for a job to be done and the contractor will be paid x number of dollars for that job. in the contract your will be in the framework of that contract. the money is the same. we computed the contractor in terms of what needs to be done and what we'll pay for it. so i think we are getting in making significant headway in this area. i will say in terms of services contracts and acquisition of her outcome of the one area where i have allowed an exception in terms of the freeze on civilian hierarchy is to continue to in source acquisition and contracting experts said we

don't have contractors supervising contractors at the will and the acquisition process. in the overall a lot of the focus on the cuts in contract being an inner efficiencies in the fy 2012 budget is on service contract. as providing management support and professional services. in terms of specifics, let me answer. >> we are trying to do a better job of getting a handle on contractors here in a fixed price have no information generally about how many people are involved. >> mr. hill, can you provide is some sort of timeline in terms of dod's overall expenditures on contract team from the time the volunteer force was initiated? >> i don't know about 1973. >> also with the budget, the cost of the all volunteer force

compared to the draft. that has significantly increased a percentage of your manpower. it's very interesting to look at the relationship between those two. the first for security reasons, but also because it costs less. and i don't see that happening with your budget. what percentage of your budget right now dollars even the overall contracted services to the department of defense click >> if you're simply saying what we pay our people versus everything else, probably 40% dollars spent on contractors. >> be significant. >> if you could provide data for the record, we both appreciated. i want to turn to one of their subject and that is broad support among the american people for soldiers and military, the less so for the wars in which they are currently engaged. on the domestic front, major complicating factor is returning

veterans, particularly currently serves return to places such as ohio to know basis and to unemployment in limited health services. it's not a secret that suicide rates are up among our guard and reserve. am i the bill. every member as those i call the civilian conservation back to us in the 1930s to the army corps of engineers which was brought up less than six months in this country, that would target employment to areas that are in during innermost levels of unemployment in the country including returning veterans who are lined up at my food bank in my district. do not distribute on tuesday and thursday. my question would be, i would like to have your considered judgment about finding a way to employ returning veterans coming

using underutilized card and reserve, leading civilian products to replant and rebuild our country in d.c. if if you can find dollars in your contracting accounts to shift for that kind of activity. if franklin roosevelt could figure it out, certainly could figure out how to do it. by the way for ohio, which is that the cancellation of the dual sourcing on the past 35 engine and the expeditionary fighting vehicle. but the loss of thousands of jobs in a state that is now 6 billion in debt. so even though it isn't technically your job to be concerned about this, i think there really is a relationship between what going on to nothing of what we could do looking back at the history of her department. >> i think, ma'am, you'll find the secretary and i are very much in agreement with what you say and i really do appreciate your focus in that regard.

too often it's been three entities. the dod, the va and communities. we sort of move people from one door to another. we have to figure out a way to work together. my attack to those that are leaving, they go home and they want education, employment and health. they focus on those kinds of things. i've tried to inject a national voice with respect to this and families, not just the vets, but their families. i think the initiative that president obama and the first lady initiated nationally about a month or two ago is that every single cabinet secretary signature unless given a government white focus. we've got to connect to local communities to the needs of these young men and women who are the most extraordinary group of ever seen. >> they are being delivered.

>> they have huge potential for the future of america. if we can bridge them in this transition, though make a difference for the next 50 or 60 years. >> time has expired. mr. crenshaw is recognized. >> since this is my first meaning is a member of this prestigious subcommittee, i want to maybe just say to secretary gates that i look forward to working with you and a thank you for your leadership and commitment into admiral mullen, we've met before or have worked together from time to time in a thank you for the guidance is given, not only for the navy but all military services. and i know we've had conversations from time to time about a place called naval station mayport and i didn't want you to be disappointed of me at least not mentioning not. i would just simply say in that

regard to thank you in the secretary and i applaud your approval of the strong language in the quadrennial defense review in supporting the navy's decisions to make it more capable of a nuclear carrier and to give you a brief update, the first couple of projects that come in under budget with substantial savings and i look forward to working with the cml and secretary made this to make sure the remaining projects are complete and on a timely basis so we can continue to capitalize on this environment of lower construction costs. i just wanted to say that. i wanted to ask a question about afghanistan. we talked a little bit about it before. my last trip there was about a year ago and a delegation headed by mr. dicks. one of the things i found interesting when we talked about

counterinsurgency was we went with our military leaders in talked about the fact that the talladega and can often use the fact that these foreign invaders were coming in and they would recruit people for their cost. and one of the aspects we were trying to develop was the security force to police force and national army take away one of those recruiting tools to the taliban couldn't argue these were foreign invaders. and we met with the ask any leaders and found it was not that easy to develop that kind of security forces. in fact, marjah had just taken place in the national army and those problems are being worked through. so i'd really focused on that over the last year, but i just read about two weeks ago an op-ed piece by general caldwell, where he taught about one of the

untold stories has been the development, the coming forward at the asking these two joined the national army indicated a real sense of hope, where there was not much hope some 15 months ago. and so i wanted to ask you while a couple of questions about that. number one, do you agree with that assessment that is made. number two, do you see some continued success is coming out of that building of the ask any national security? and three, in light of the fact that in this 012 budget there's $12 billion of money. in these difficult times, what is your expectation as we go forward in terms of money that will be sent to continue to build that ask any security force, recognizing there will be

a day with a need to be alert to support themselves. could you comment on those three aspects? >> will both take a crack at them. first of all, the progress that has been made in both recruiting and training the afghan national security forces over the past year has really been quite extraordinary. just as one example, the percentage of trainees who qualify with marksmanship is confident about 35% a year or so ago to about 95% now. and we see the results of that, going to your other points, we see the result of having campaign such as the one going around kandahar right now, where in fact about 60% of the forces are engaged in that enterprise to the west and to the south of kandahar are afghans. we are in the minority in the

ice that force is there in the minority in that respect and they are being very fact give in showing the ability to increasingly done around. they need our mentoring for quite some time to come. they like the iraqis have real problems when it comes to logistics and maintenance and things like that. combined arms, intelligence fusion. we'll have to give them help in that kind of training i think for quite a while. but they really are stepping up and getting more and more people out into the field as i mentioned in responding to mr. marantz question. the afghan security forces have lost over 5000 of their own members and they were willing to put their lives on the line for their country. so i think that this is a real

success story over the last year. i would say there's been one of the areas that has been most successful has been our experience with developing the nss. in terms of the cost, i had a very frank conversation last week. a boat the afghan defense minister and interior minister can make quite clear to them the united states would not and could not sustain the level of support at the level that you describe $12 billion plus for very long. maybe for two or three years, but not beyond that. and hopefully by 2014 there will be some kind of a political settlement that will allow them to scale back the size of their forces, so they won't be the much. alternatively, they need to figure a way to structure them differently, perhaps with a much smaller force any national collared for us when there's a

problem. in the third channel is obviously as countries begin -- as the 49 plus countries that are engaged in a military effort with us began over the next three years to draw down military forces, to have them contribute more to sustaining the afghan security forces. it is a burden we largely carry alone at this point. so i think we have given them the message pretty explicitly. don't count on this indefinitely. we'll have to think about what this looks like after 2014. >> just a couple quick comments. i think there are 24,000 afghans in training right now in a training structure that a year ago didn't exist. anything to your very direct question, general caldwell and the op-ed pieces a story of

success. there is great criticism very early as to whether or not we could do this and they are actually leading in places now that we could've imagined. and it also strikes me that roughly a year ago we initiated marjah. they have local elections there yesterday. so the improvement there has been pretty extraordinary. that doesn't mean we don't have significant challenges. the secretary talked about the marksmanship. we've also initiated a very comprehensive literacy program. because a literacy is a big problem. a large number of the afghan security forces are now reading at the first grade level. there's actually a significant accelerate to get readers that the third-grade level. looking at that from the american, you might say not so good. but this is afghanistan were talking about.

it's been an extraordinary accomplishment that allows them the level of confidence that they just didn't have before. i think as we look at it right now, as their forces up, mind, the school of 2014 in transitioning to them is a very realistic goal. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks to all of our witnesses for their service. secretary gates, admiral mullen, we can all agree that the procurement system is flawed and i'd like to share a few examples. while most of us were pleased that the kc x contract has been awarded, the process, as you know, started over 10 years ago. the new contract was just announced last week. the army future combat system started in 2000 masher. the ses is restructuring is now

comprised of a request for the new ground combat vehicle, a total that i believe is close to $20 billion without any real tangible benefits to the united states army. the ddg 1000 program was announced in 2001 with the original intent was 32 ships and i think we are down now to seven and this was announced that the program will be terminated after $9.3 billion in cost will yield three ships. the ft for the marine corps development since the mid-1990s after 3 billion the program was canceled last month. how can dod and congress hope change the trend of the multiyear multibillion dollars acquisition that in some cases end up with very little project can certainly very serious cost

overruns? >> sir, i think that is an extraordinarily legitimate question and something about the congress and we have spent a lot of time i'm over the past four years. sn mentioned in my opening statement in april 2009 i proposed program changes in 33 different programs that if built to completion would cost the taxpayers about $300 billion. and i think that there are several elements associated with correct in this problem. the first broad category is what are. and i would start with discipline with respect to reclaim and in being more realistic. when the dollars were flowing as quickly and as much as they were in the past decade, i think there was a temptation to go

after the most exquisite possible, most technologically advanced possible kinds of capabilities, often using unproven technologies. and we would get into those. and i think with respect to requirements, we also were not disciplined enough in terms of the operational use of some thing even if it were completed. and i give you an example. the reason why i recommended cutting and the congress recommended cutting most of the airport labor defense. this is a 7047 with the laser capability to go after missiles. the trouble is nobody stopped to think about the fact it was going after missiles on launch pads and had to be within 62 miles of the launch site for it to work. so if you're looking at an arena so, the idea of finding 740

event and cannot set up around but have not been shot down is pretty remote. so we went to a technology only program. we are going to be out to salvage some technology engineering test and design out of the ef 80 and so we will have -- that would not have been for nothing. but discipline in the requirements i would say also discipline and management, and being willing to hold program managers accountable. i fired the head of the joint strike fighter program last year. there needs to be accountability when things are out of control. we have put in some procedures that among other things the first one is affordability to gauge every program on the basis of affordability and every

milestone decision point, judging can we continue to afford this? and we have done that. and i would use that as an example, the affordability criteria and as we began to design and requirements accountability as we begin to design the next generation of nuclear ballistic missile submarines. the original cost estimate to the submarine was at or about $7 billion. by changing -- by scaling back some requirements, we are able to get the cost of the summary now to just below $5 billion. it's still very expensive. but by exercising some discipline, we made some pretty significant advances. the final piece of discipline i would say is discipline not only to fire somebody who is not doing a good job, but discipline

to kill a program. part of the problem frankly has been in our department, primarily the department of defense, but i would also fit fit the congress has some responsibility here as well as when a program has gone wrong or is so far off the path that it's clear it's going to take many more years to complete and many more dollars to complete than was originally anticipated. there has to be willingness to kill the program. on those rare occasions where the department has often come up here and has to have a program killed, the congress has not let the department to that. so i think -- i guess the final thing i'd say and it goes back to his captors questioned. a part of this also is professionalizing our acquisition workforce

contracting is an example had almost disappeared as an army career for men and women in uniform and that's been the revived in the last couple years. given contention in priority to professionals along with all these other things that about i think are really essential to getting control of these programs. the truth of the matter is budget stringency itself will be an important element of acquisition disciplines and procurement discipline. too many of these programs were allowed to go forward because frankly the money was there to allow it. i do know a few want to anything. >> this just goes to what mr. kaptur said when we outsource everything because it was going to be less. so as we can source everything everything -- >> those caught acquisition reform. >> and so, as we outsource every day and, if we don't show the

disciplined the secretary is talking about, it will not save us money. and i agree that the construction of the budget, if you will, will cause us to prioritize, analyze and make tough decisions that for the last decade in many cases he didn't have to make. these programs just cannot grow out of control. they've got to be terminated very early. one of the things i learned as it's very difficult to start a program in washington. once he started it's much more difficult to kill it although the steps have been taken in the last couple of years in my experience have been extraordinary compared to what i watched historically. >> with the gentleman yield for five seconds? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i just want to thank you, secretary and admirable in. i think history will report you

were to extraordinary americans, probably the finest were among the finest with agriculture respective positions. i thank you for your personal and professional courage in so many areas as well as your thoughtfulness in so many areas in your caring about forces and their families, which does not need your overly touchy-feely because i also believe you have created the most robust and lethal military on the face of the earth in american history. let me go quickly to two questions if i can get the name. last week the director of national intelligence mr. testified a brand of the scientific technical industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. is it the policy of the united states still to prevent iran from becoming a nuclear weapons capable nation?

it so or if not please advice me. if it's our policy to prevent iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, i asked this two years ago and got a yes answer from each of you gentlemen. is the u.s. military is given the military by the commander-in-chief capable of executing necessary other range becoming nuclear weapons capable? >> iran is unacceptable to the united states. if the president should order, we have capability to take action. >> admiral mullen, do you feel the same way? >> i do. >> denote the policy prevents iran from becoming nuclear weapons capable, gentlemen? >> a way i have framed and maybe the ad was the battery memory, but the brief i always heard it

is both in the bush and obama the administration says that iran's acquiring a nuclear capability is unacceptable. >> and i would agree with that. >> admiral mullen, i believe he said the secretary shares these views. i think the admiral said he paramilitary partnership strong was essential and that was along the lines of my chairwoman of the foreign operations and state committee, ms. granger's comments about the 1% of our budget goes to state department diplomacy, which each gentleman's comments have been of great importance to you and your work and in saving lives, especially where offenders as well as cleaning our missions. admiral, you mentioned egypt to pakistan and afghanistan as members of the military partnerships. can you comment about our military partnership with

israel? and a reach as they at all in the value to the u.s.'s national security about our military and intelligence partnership with the state of israel. >> is of extraordinary value. i've invested a lot of my time with the idf as well and the partnership which is long standing is critical and will continue to be in the future. i mean, i'm not directly involved in the intelligence aspect of that, but certainly we enjoy a deep relationship that i think is absolutely critical to the near-term and long-term stability in the middle east and windows -- >> u.s. national security. >> yes, sir.

>> and i would just add, i think in terms of concrete stubs to improve the security relationship between the two countries, moore has been done in the last two years than any comparable period in my entire career. further -- it's nighttime upcoming up, chairman? [inaudible] i just wanted to follow up on so on the aid to the lebanese army forces. i understand the lab's army forces is a delicate situation that we don't want those weapons to fall in the hands of hezbollah and hezbollah has practical control over the country although maybe not complete political control. how did you strike the right balance of which weapons in which aid to provide to the lebanese armed forces and by and

with the tipping point come when you would say that it would no longer be appropriate given u.s. national security interests? >> well, i would say that i am very concerned about the lebanese government bert even if hezbollah does not -- is not represented as the prime minister or hold significant cabinet positions nonetheless exercises a relatively effective control over the government. and since the development to place, i would just say without getting into too much detail, that i have become much more cautious in terms of the kind of cooperation that i prove. >> i would add to that it is something the secretary and i and others discuss all the time. you talk about allen's because it is something obviously but i

certainly discuss with my counterpart and our counterparts in the idf also. so we share the concern and understand completely, but it is something we work her way throughout the time. >> mr. kohl. >> thank you, mr. chairman. to thank you gentlemen for your service. mr. secretary, i hope honestly this is the last time you doing this. heaven knows you've given the country a lifetime of service, but under two different presidents you have done the country and repair service in the last couple years teared thank you for all you've done. it's been remarkable. i agreed with a lot of the tough decisions he started to make and no have our disagreements and still you represent median and you new canyon sunday. but i would like for you to talk a little bit about one of the recommendations you are making and the longer-term.

i'm very concerned about the long-term reductions and manpower that you see in both the army and marines. as on the armed services committee and we all worked very hard to get those numbers up. i don't want to slip back to a situation particularly where we are using the guard and reserve as much as we used to put them under enormous strain. it was so hard to get those numbers. thank you for your leadership on what they needed to be. it is a dangerous road as you pointed out. it is your right at the reductions you envision in 2015. >> in the case of the right corner, the numbers emanated from the marine corps as part of their overall -- the commandant's overwrought review of marine corps structure moving forward. this is an area for general conway and amos were in agreement that after the drawdowns anticipated in

afghanistan after 2014 at the marine corps needed to get smaller and lighter. and so what they are thinking about is a reduction of about 12,000, which would lead them from -- i'm sorry, about 15,000, which would leave them with 12,000 more marines than when i became secretary. in the case of the army, it is partly budget driven. i would say primarily budget driven at this point. and i just ask people to bear in mind all the caveats that we've surrounded this with in terms of conditions based, drawdowns take place in afghanistan as anticipated and presumably no new major commitments. as i indicated in my opening statement, with those caveats in under the current plan at the end of 2016, the army would still have 40,000 more troops

than when i became secretary. i would tell you about the planning for the next five years, this is the one guy and the the most tentative about them feel that it is almost entirely dependent on the conditions that we find ourselves in the 23rd 222, but we are in, but we are in a budget-cutting. were doing things a year ago we were telling you we were knocking to do. you will find support for tough decisions you're making and weapon systems a matter of a few months ago. the manpower thing if you get started coming your caveats may not listen to very much. i would just urge extraordinary

caution. another question i have, you pointed out about how important the relationship we've built up over 30 years has been for this country at a moment of enormous crisis. could you run through some of the other relationships on a military to military bases that we have in the region that are also yielding those kind of results? i think of that time and other places. back to the point that ms. granger made about how important relationships are so we don't find ourselves in contingencies are we have no assets, no relationships and very little knowledge. >> i was just in seven countries in seven days in starting in djibouti which is an emerging relationship in terms of support. but oman, which is fairly long-standing, the uae, which

has been significant for a long period of time. you've mentioned saudi arabia, which is another when we've got extraordinarily strong relationship with historically, bahrain, which is the headquarters for faithfully. we've had a relationship on the navy side the late 40s. as well as qatar and inchoate. i was literally in kuwait for the 20th anniversary of their liberation and intro to the streets with an american flag flying. the smiles on the young children who had been told by their parents. it was extraordinary. so those relationships. i mean, they are not all exactly the same, but we work to invest over a long period of time. in this moment of crisis, they

certainly will help see everybody through to what is an uncertain future. >> i know my time is about to hear just to make one more point in reinforcing symphony both said. we did what out and we paid them horrific price for doing that. we've had two different presidents with very different gives. i would just hope we are in this budget challenging time for the country that we not make some short-term financial decisions that are very dangerous for us long-term. i continue matter what you've all done to reestablish our relationships and our credibility throughout the area and a very difficult time. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. and thank you. i just want to express my deep

appreciation to you for the work that you do. absolutely necessary essential work that you do. in the context of the conversations we've had here, it comes back again very clearly all the things you are doing, how you're dealing with it and complexities of the operations you have to be involved and and how those complexities can be very challenging in the context of the situation as it has developed over the last number of years. for dangerous -- more difficult to deal with in many ways. so thank you. thanks very much for everything you've done and thanks for the candid conversations that we've had, particularly about the situation in afghanistan and complexities between afghanistan and pakistan. and you can't help but think that all of the operations that continue there now perhaps may

be unnecessary if they had been dealt with more honestly and effectively after the attack of september 11. but of course that's all gone. upon the past and it just requires you to be focused on this as clearly and effectively as you are. so again, thanks very much. we know how difficult the circumstances are and we deeply appreciate all the things you're doing on it. i have just a very simple question that i wanted to initiate. first of all, how can you do with the presidential helicopter program? as you remember back in the last congress, the house of representatives passed resolutions on the presidential helicopter program that provided the white house with a full fleet of others within the regional budget requirements of the program. and while scrapping the more

costly version, ticking off a lot of the costs. so now, after $4 billion has already been spent by the department is working towards awarding new program at the navy estimates will cost somewhere between 10 and $17 billion. i think this is something that is absolutely necessary, something that has to be done and is overdue. there recently, "the wall street journal" reported that the state brands china aviation corporation offered at 313 helicopter for use in the next marine one fleet. the helicopter transportation for the president for the president of the united states obviously as one of the most -- one of the most sensitive national security requirement is something that has to be done in a very good, open way. so i'm just wondering what you were thinking is likely to happen with this. how is this operation going to

come to fulfill completely? hopefully it will end soon. how is it going to be done? is china involved in this? is there a possibility or likelihood that some of his corporate aunt t. could go over to china for the construction of this process? >> first of all, i haven't received an update on where we are at the new presidential helicopter. end of the navy has been working very closely with actually the deputy secretary of defense is the working closely with the white house in terms of requirements and getting to a point where we could put out a request for proposals. that would just make two observations. the first is the cost that you just cited stagger me because one of the things that i made

quite clear we made that decision last year is that any success or program would have to come in less expensive than the program we killed, including money that a dirty been spent, but projected money as well. i will get you the latest report on where we stand on that in terms of the relationship. i frankly doubt -- based on the last information i had, i don't think were far enough in the process for anybody to have had another. it estimates on what the program would cost at this point. this is also the first i've heard that there might be a chinese company engaged in this competition without getting into any specifics that the acquisition would send me to

jail. i'd be interested in in the secret service on that subject. >> well, it's very much. this is something i'm very interested in an opinion that is necessary because the level of security for the president as one of the most important things, probably the most important thing we have to focus our attention on. and so this is a major part of it. it's long overdue and i am hopeful that it's going to come through in a very positive and effective way. >> will get you an update on it. >> i have three unrelated questions and i'll ask them in a row. the first two you might want to dispatch somebody to talk about. the first one is that at 18 years old you can enter into contract and buy a house, go to jail, get married, go to afghanistan and iraq. but when you come back you can't

have a drink in a bar. it greatly disturbs me when i stand at the tarmac at under army airfield with the third of the tree deployed in a suit is 19 back that there'll obviously be in harms way and then they come back and cannot have a beer at the nco club. last year introduced with congressman taylor a piece of legislation that had that 18-year-old soldiers could have a beer on the coast, the idea being that if that responsibility to do that. so your reaction to that if you want to have somebody talk about why that's a good idea or how that could be a good idea, that would be good. number two, i'm interested in your public comment the other day about the secretary of

defense and i can only roughly paraphrased, but who entered were into the middle east should have his head examined. actually, if it was a very good comment because they think we need to have that discussion. it has been described that we've been in afghanistan when you're at a time for 10 years. one of the things that try to do in my office unsuccessfully in largely because we couldn't get the support from the pentagon that we wanted, was to put a metrics together that had three acres to it. political progress, economic progress and military progress. for example, economic progress either in iraq or afghanistan, the number of businesses opens on the stock exchange with activities in iraq for example, unemployment rate is in the governmental process of elections rule of law, local councils being developed and

then military, ied attacks, provinces, training missions. provinces conquered are stabilized and metrics like that some members of congress and the public weather for the word origins to work it's a-ok, i admit in these categories and various metrics there is progress. you can get the information that is so scattered. it would just be excellent if we could have one document was issued monthly that said okay, here's what's going on. and then my third question is the bureaucracy at the pentagon. and i'm not sure what number or who is in the bureaucracy and who is that so to speak, but in 2002, the budget request was $329 billion. this year's 553 billion or 41% increase. i have had friends of mine who

are in the military who come through the pentagon and save the bureaucracy they are, maybe 25% of the people work their tails off and then if that maybe 75% who aren't. a very dangerous place to stand us in the pentagon parking lot at 3:00 every day. and you know, stories of when you walk by, the computer switches to home screen. again, a lot of people working their tails off come the blood of others who are maybe more nine to five and the government aircraft wheel kind of fear is not contributing enough to the bottom line that would like to see if taxpayers in these type of budgets. those are my three questions. mr. chairman, i don't know how many time i drank much time i have this something we can follow-up on or whatever. >> we have the extent that eyewitnesses want to respond.

>> first, i would say we will get somebody to come talk to you about the 18-year-old drinking age. will make this observation. one of the things we are seeing as a result of repeated tours is not just an increase in suicide, but an increase in risky behavior, particularly by young men. and so, that would be a concern of mine in risky behavior on post in terms of motorcycles in the vehicles and so on. so that would be a concern and the decree first of all of the foreign president of the huge public university, this isn't just confined to army post or military post either. >> and fair, i say as a native of texas and somebody who is

reared in storage, i believe any college town as an industry of fake ids and absolute degree of hypocrisy and a society do we think 18 and 19-year-olds are drinking. to me maybe control it. >> and everybody has a 21-year-old friend. second, with respect to what i've said at west point was in the context of spending a large land army into asia that were into the middle east. and by that, i meant the kind of land army we have in germany during the cold war with heavy mechanized divisions and so on come i think some of our folks in the army world were brave enough come to think that we need to get rid of them and that's not the case. it goes back to this question of balance. how many heavy brigade to need and so on? a matter allen's and they are

absolutely essential. and we'll get back to you on the report, the idea of the report and so on. but let me address one question because i think there is value and in addressing your comment that we thought when you -- every year for 10 years the same order. i actually think of it very differently. i think there've been three phases of this war. the first afghan war was 2001, 2002. and we won that outright. they were expelled from afghanistan, the constitution was created. elections were held, clinics railfan, gross went to school and i was 2001, 2002.

keep your eye off the ball in 2003. in the 2003 until roughly toward the end of 2008, we really didn't pay as much attention as they should have to afghanistan. we didn't pay attention to creating an afghan national security for us. we didn't pay attention to governments. we didn't pay attention to the fact that the taliban, beginning during that period were beginning to reconstitute themselves, recruiting, training coming to a new arms comer infiltrating back into afghanistan. the level of violence began to grow again in 2006 -- and the spring of 2006. when i came to the job in december of 06, i made the decision in january of 07 to extend the battalion commander

brigade and may to do with the new fighting season that was supposed to have heavier fighting. that's all we have to put into afghanistan at that point. we didn't have anything more to put in until the end of 2008, when president bush made the decision to add 20,000 more troops, none of them would get there until 2009. so when my view, we have really only begun, apart from 2001, 2002, we have only begun to take were seriously and get the inputs and strategy and great people it took place in the last 18 and 20 months. and as the admiral said earlier in this hearing, we now have all the right resource is, all the right people and the right strategy in place and all the signs we have are that it is

working. it though, painful. we take great bosses in our young men and women, but it does seem to be working. i think it's too simple to talk about afghanistan and the tenure were. this is a war that had a front end in 2001, a period of relative neglect and then a full and conflict. i'll just give you one statistic that illustrates my point and it's a it's tragic statistic. when i took this job, 194 americans had been killed in afghanistan. so in five years of war, 194. since then, now the total as of today is 1045. so you can tell when the real fight begins in afghanistan. most of that additional, almost 1000 have come in the last couple of years.

>> we have a few minutes left. >> i'm going to be sustained in asking my questions. >> i don't want to steal your foot tall, coach. >> thank goodness. so calm. he said the fabric is strong. it's not unraveling, but showing signs of wear. what is your view of how it is doing? by the way, i see you've named admiral nick raven who was an outstanding pick. i could not be more pleased at the you've chosen. he's done a great job. >> there is no question that our special forces are tired and will both speak to this.

.. >> for a long time after we are out of afghanistan. so one the things that we've done over the last two or three years is move a significant portion of the special operations budget out of the supplements and ocos and into the base budget so that we will have those capabilities when these wars end. >> i actually believe that when, you know, the history is written in iraq that, you know, that force will have been, you know,

decisive in terms of turning in. their first in, they are lost out. and that has -- that is the case, that will be the case i think in iraq and certainly in afghanistan as well. they can't do it alone. because we've had exceptional performance in our entire military that i'm very, very proud of. they have been extraordinary, they have evolved, and i am concerned about the number of deployments. i think admiral nelson had it right. mindful to the leaders, we have to payation. we cannot over use them as we call on them time and time again. and will in the future. the investment, the expansion, the marine corps which is now very much a part of the special operations world. i run into marines that are so excited about that, they don't want to go back to the fleet from which they came.

there's been such a tremendous evolution there. they are truly extraordinary. their families have also sacrificed equally. so we have to pay a lot of attention to that. >> okay. good. now other question that i wanted to get briefly into the cyber command. do you believe you have the appropriate authorities to conduct military cyber activities? if not, what additional authorities do you think are required? and if you want to just talk generally about the budget, but the threat, the cyber threat, i think, is the most serious threat to the united states right now. i mean the numbers that we see now there's $1 trillion been lost because of cyberattacks against companies all over the world on their intellectual property. this is a serious matter. >> this is an area where i think the executive and the congress need to work very closely together. i think there are probably some narrow areas where we could use some additional authorities.

in general, i would say we pretty much got what we need. i suspect that there are some specific areas where we would use some additional legislative authority. i would just say that -- i think the hardest thing that we're dealing with in the government is figuring out the bridge between the military and the civilian world. i think that we have the dot-mil world covered pretty well. but i worry a lot about the dot-gov and the dot-com world. and partly it's -- partly it's legal, and or legislative, partly it's capabilities, partly it's the scale of the problem. janet napolitano and i, secretary of dhs, and i signed a memorandum of understanding last year, last summer that put dhs

executives in the leadership of nsa, and with their own general council and own firewalls to protect against -- with respect to privacy and civil liberties and so on. but so dhs could task directly into nsa in the event of a threat to the dot-com or dot-gov worlds for which they are principal responsible. it's a start. but i would say it's only a start. >> does that document public or? >> i think so. >> or is it classified? >> i don't think so. i think it is not classified. >> so we could get a copy. >> i think so, sure. >> either way. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. dicks. mr. secretary, admiral mullen thank you very much for providing this subcommittee a very, very excellent and interesting hearing this morning. and for providing us as the top leaders, the best military in the world, you've kept the nation secure, and all we can say is thank you very much for

-- i can't imagine what's on your mind when you settle down just to think with all of the tremendous responsibilities that you have. having to worry about congress picking at you from time to time. you guys do a really good job. and i -- as one that's been here in the congress a long time and been working in national defense issues for more than -- more than half of my life, i really appreciate and i understand what you do. >> y'all have said some very nice things to us, mr. chairman. let me say something in return. this committee in particular, has been very supportive of the department of defense and men and women in uniform since forever. and i just want to point out one specific example where y'all played a critical role in saving lives. and this committee took the lead on it. and that was in funding my request to build these mraps,

and you voted billions and billions and billions of dollars and you have saved countless lives and limbs. and we appreciate that. >> mr. secretary, on that point, why can't we do that more often? why can't we do the 18-month approach, rather than six or seven years in the -- as we go through development and then finally go into procurement? >> i'll give you my two-minute speech which i have down pat. it's because the department of defense is structured and organized to plan for war, not to wage war. and everything that we have done to try to get capabilities to the field fast has to be done outside the bureaucracy. we did it with the mraps and the medevac in afghanistan and we did it with walter reed, and giato, and isr. it's had to be out the regular defense department and needed

the direct involvement of the secretary of defense. >> why don't we do that more often? >> because i only have as much time during the time. >> hire a couple of more -- i mean. really the notion of us going ten, fifteen, twenty years on some of these things. you talk about the bomber. i went through the bomber thing. it cost $25 billion to develop. i told you at the end of the day it was $700,000 per copy, the fly away cost. if the development cost, and that's what -- boy, when you talk about this bomber, you better have that understand control. how much money we are going to spend in development. >> mr. secretary, i remember the first meeting on the mrap up the senate intelligence room. you made the pitch, seems like we had them in the field two weeks later. you moved quickly. it proved that the defense

department and congress can move quickly when they get together and work things out and just do it. thanks a lot for a great hearing. we're adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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