>> from politics and prose bookstore here in washington, this is about 40 minutes. >> politics and prose's timing is, indeed, exquisite for a number of reasons. one is it is almost exactly, now, two years ago from the day in which i finished the first draft of the strategic review for president obama on american policy towards afghanistan and pakistan, and we began the laborious process of vetting it through the united states government. it was almost exactly two years ago that i flew with the president on air force one to los angeles to go over it with him during the spare time he had on a five-hour flight. at this point i'm impelled to give my standard disclaimer.

my views today are solely my views, they're not the views of the obama administration or of the president and, please, do not confuse whatever i have to say with the views of the obama administration. secondly, of course, as you noted in the introduction, we are in the midst of a major crisis between the united states and pakistan. the deadly embrace has become, literally, quite deadly. in the last month. raymond davis who was, apparently, an american diplomat -- i don't know who he works for, don't ask me who he works for, i can't confirm who he works for -- shot to death two pack tanny citizens, a third pakistani citizen was killed by another american driving a vehicle coming to his rescue. and in the weekend after those deaths, the widow of one of the two committed suicide because she believed that her government

would not stand up to the united states of america. the family has subsequently said that if pakistan gives raymond davis back to the united states, they will all commit suicide one at a time. now, that may all be a bluff, but there aren't a lot of governments in the world who are going to call their own citizens' bluff on a threat like that. we have high drama, we have spy versus spy, and it comes after an increasingly difficult relationship over the last several months. in december the cia's chief of station in islamabad, the highest cia officer in the country, was named in the pakistani press, what we refer to he was outed. he had to be pulled out of the country, literally, overnight. if that wasn't bad enough, "the new york times" and "the

washington post" citing cia sources on background said he'd been outed by the pakistani intelligence service, the interservice's intelligence directorate corps, isi. s this not -- this is not normal behavior. we don't usually do this, we don't usually out each other and talk about it in the newspapers. since the arrest of mr. davis, the president has said very clearly he is a diplomat and must be given diplomatic immunity. we have already canceled a trilateral afghan/pakistan meeting to work on cooperation in the war against al-qaeda and the afghan taliban. pakistani president zardari's march visit to the united states is in jeopardy, and president obama's promise to visit pakistan in 2011 is, clearly, in jeopardy.

and if this wasn't bad enough, if you listen carefully to spokesmen on both sides, there's a sense of doom and foreboding behind this relationship. pakistan's chief of army staff, general cayenneny, was here last fall. when he went home to pakistan, he said he was the most bullied man in the world. again, that's not normal in mill to mill relations. and if you read carefully, there's clear concern in our government that there could be a 9/11-type mass casualty attack in the united states datelined pakistan at any time. last may we almost had one in times square. and there's concern there could be another mumbai-style mass casualty attack in india datelined pakistan. and there's concern -- and i

write about it in my book -- that pakistan could actually become a jihadist state. that's thinking the unthinkable in terms of pakistan. it's not the most likely outcome by far, it's not immeant -- imminent, it's not inevitable, but for the first time in pakistani history, i think it's become a real possibility. the stakes here couldn't be larger. pakistan is the sixth most populace country in the world with 180 million people that will soon, within a decade, be the fifth largest country in the world. it is the second largest muslim country, and it will surpass indonesia within a decade. it is the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world. today pakistan is on the cusp of becoming the fifth largest nuclear weapons power in the world. for those of you who don't walk around with a little cheat sheet who are the top five nuclear powers, they are, of course, us, russia, china, france, and the

united kingdom. pakistan is close to surpassing the united kingdom, and it's on a trajectory that will make it the fourth largest nuclear power in the world. and pakistan is the host to more terrorist groups than any other nation in the world. per square kilometer, you can't find more terrorists than in pakistan with the possible exception of the gaza strip. and pakistan has an extraordinarily complex relationship. on the one hand, it has been the patron of many of these terrorist groups. the group that attacked mumbai in 2008 is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the isi. and yet it is at war with others, the pakistan taliban, and it is an extremely violent war. last year there were over 2,000 terrorist attacks in pakistan, somewhere near 10,000 pakistanis died or were wounded. so how did we get here? well, that's the subject that i try to address in "the deadly

embrace." and i try to do it by looking at three narratives and see how they interconnect with each other. the first narrative is pakistan's own internal development, the second is the u.s./pakistani bilateral relationship, and the third is the rise of the global jihad. what we think of here in america as al-qaeda, but which is, in fact, a much larger movement of like-minded organizations who share the same goals if not the same leadership as al-qaeda. let me briefly turn to each. pakistan's internal history is a fascinating story, extraordinarily complex. at one level there is a struggle between those who created pakistan, muhammad jinnah who had a vision of pakistan as a modern, democratic, largely secular state that would look a lot like england in the indus

river valley. against him from the start were islamic extremists who, in fact, originally opposed integration of pakistan because they wanted to control the whole subcontinent. then there's a struggle between the civilian government and the military. pakistan has a military which has seized power four times in some 60 years. one of those who seized power rightly deserves the title of the grandfather of the modern global islamic jihad in the 1980s. he was our partner in the war against the soviet union. we'll come back to that. these various struggles interact constantly in pakistan making it a very unpredictable mix. and pakistani history is also littered with murders and assassinations. from the first prime minister who was murdered in 1948 to benazir bhutto who was murdered

only three years ago. to the murder of the governor of punjab just a few weeks ago. in most cases we don't know who did it. it's like we're reading an agatha christie novel, and we keep waiting for poirot to assemble everyone together and tell us who did it, but they never do. they're all mysteries. the u.s. bilateral relationship is a roller coaster. we've gone up and down. we've been best friends, most allied country in the world, and we've been at each other's throats. if this was a soap opera on television, it would get number one ratings because the drama is so high. all the ups are built around great secret projects. the youtube days that flew over the soviet union, nixon's trip to china, the war against the soviets and more recently, the war against al-qaeda. all of these secrets, of course,

don't remain secrets for very long at all. they all come out. one standard, though, is that the united states consistently has always supported and endorsed the military dictators. we love pakistan's generals when they take over. sometimes at the beginning we're initially reluctant, but soon we come around. and it's bipartisan. republicans and democrats alike have fallen in love with pakistani generals. there's also great individuals. charlie wilson, great movie. but also larry pressler, a little-known senator who's the man whose bill cut off military assistance to pakistan. when we cut off assistance, we told the pakistanis we were not going to deliver 30-some-odd f-16 aircraft today had ordered and paid for. we weren't going to give them their money back, and we were

going to charge them rent for taking care of them. larry pressler is not a well known figure in america. every pakistani knows who larry pressler is. [laughter] pakistanis, as a consequence, have come to the conclusion america is a fair-weather friend. pack tannies have numerous jokes about this, and i'll use the cleanest i can. pakistanis think that america sees their country as a tissue; you use it, and you throw it away. i'll leave to your imagination what the ore things that they come up with -- other things that they come up with. lastly, the global jihad. the global jihad was born in pakistan in the war against the mujahideen. i'm sorry, the war against the soviets. don't get me wrong. i think what we did in the 1980s was the right thing. we changed history. we brought down an evil empire, and we freed millions of people. but one of the unintended consequences was to create a

frankenstein which pakistan has nurtured over the years. all americans know who osama bin laden is today. what i try to do in my book is tell you about someone else, abdullah azzam, the intellectual forefather of the global jihad. he wrote the formative pieces about al-qaeda's philosophy and narrative. he is the founder, co-founder with osama bin laden of the services bureau which became al-qaeda. he is a co-founder of lash car atie baa, the group that attacked mumbai, and he is a significant founder of hamas in the gaza strip, so he's the trifecta of international terrorism. it's the combination of these three things together that has produced this uniquely combustible and dangerous pakistan today. so what to do about it.

well, i've learned in book talks that i'm supposed to to leave you with a tease and not tell you the last chapter, otherwise why would you buy the book? so my tease is, my answer to what to do about it is in the last chapter. [laughter] but i'll start with a very simple rule: humility. sixty years of american interaction with pakistan demonstrates we can do a great deal of harm. there's very little evidence we can do a lot of good in pakistan. so take the hippocratic oath to begin with. do not support the generals at the expense of the civilian politicians even though the politicians are as corrupt, despotic as can be. there are no heros in this story. there's no thomas jefferson, there's no be john adams, there's a lot of aaron burrs. but that's what we've got to work with. secondly, there are no magic

bullets. there's no simple solution to this problem. we can't buy off pakistan. we tried to do that in the last decade. we gave them $12 billion in unaccounted funds. that's an estimate. because nobody in the united states government knows how much we actually gave them. we can't invade them. this is a country twice the size of california with the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world. invasion is crazy. but under some circumstances you can envision an american president with very few options orrin the use of military -- other than the use of military force. there are extraordinarily difficult trade-offs in this relationship. and the most difficult ones revolve around the nature of our relationship with the isi. the isi is our most important partner in the war against al-qaeda. the isi has delivered more al-qaeda prisoners and has

given us more targets than any other liaison partner in the world and yet is our most difficult partner at the same time. leon panetta in hearings just a few weeks ago summed it up. this is the most complicated thing he has ever seen in government, and leon panetta's been around government for a long time. just one final comment before i take your questions and comments. the research for this book is, obviously, difficult to do. we're talking about secret intelligence organizations, the cia does not like to have it truths revealed even by it own former employees. the isi doesn't like anyone to smoke around the isi, and despite my many requests, al-qaeda and osama bin laden have consistently turned down by requests for interviews. i've always requested an interview by interactive camera so we didn't actually get

together. [laughter] what i have been able to do is over the course of many years both in government and since i left government speak with and interview many of the key figures in this story. including four presidents, including secretaries of state, including every american ambassador to pakistan, including every directer general of the isi since the 1980s. i spent a great deal of time with mrs. bhutto, i've spent time interviewing president musharraf. did they all tell me the truth? of course not. duplicity is at the essence of this relationship on both sides. but i think i've at least done a conscious job of reaching out and trying to get everybody's story. and with that, i look forward to your questions, and if you want to ask me what to do about it as the first question, of course i'm going to tell you. [laughter] [applause]

>> okay, the mic is here. up to the mic, please. >> well, if you can summarize what you're going to do about it. it was a very tempting tease. >> the united states needs to do several things. first of all, we immediate to make sure -- we need to make sure that when we work with pakistan, we do not undermine the civilian government authority. that doesn't mean not dealing with the military, but it means always ranking our priorities and engaging with the civilians first. not because we're in love with president zardari or his likely replacements. but because we should be supportive of a process. one of the things i would emphasize about pakistan today is that when you look back over it history, this is a country that has fought consistently for democracy. not very effectively.

but they've gotten rid of four military dictators. it's not egypt. egypt sat under a military dictator for 30 years. pakistan does not sit still. pakistanis want democracy. there are constituencies in pakistan that are seeking democracy, and we need to help enable them, not undermine them. secondly, and be i'll just mention two, we need to address the issue that obsesses the pakistani army. and that's their with india. when the president set up the afghan/pakistan special envoy office, he he got half right. crow can't deal with -- you can't deal with afghanistan without dealing with pakistan. but the other half is equally as important. you can't deal with pakistan without addressing india. we cannot be a mediator between india and pakistan. the indians will refuse that. but we can be a that till say to have.

facilitator. in an otherwise somewhat grim picture tonight, let me give you one piece of good news. last week pakistan and india agreed to resume their high-level bilateral negotiations process which was suspended after mumbai. not pause either side -- not because either side thinks there's a great chance of success, but because both sides realize there's no viable internship. no viable alternative. and we should encourage that process. there are things we can help do to push india and pakistan towards a resolution of their small differences and, ultimately, their big differences. let me give you one small difference. if you want to fly from islamabad to new delhi, you can't get there from here. you've got to go to dubai. you've got to go to cat kathman. you've got to go to tehran. there are almost no direct flights between these two country. there is less than 1% of the gdp is engaged in trade with each

other. this is not normal, this is not natural. end couraging change in -- encouraging change in south asia big is the big idea the united states should support. >> could you, please, comment on pakistan's dilemma in trying to prevent the forces crossing their borders into afghanistan that continues as such a concern to our forces knowing that the enemy seems to be's escaping -- seems to be escaping into pakistan so frequently. >> the forces we are fighting in afghanistan are primarily the afghan taliban that comes in several different flavors. the pakistani government in the 1990s did not create the afghan taliban, but they were the midwife to it creation.

the pakistani army believes to this day that the afghan taliban is an asset for them. that sooner or later the americans are going to leave afghanistan, and there will be a struggle for influence there, and be their biggest asset is the afghan taliban. up until a year or so ago, they believed victory was in sight. they were going to win at afghanistan. we were going to pull out. hold on to your asset if you think they're about to win. but over the course of the last decade the pakistani taliban has also -- i'm sorry, the afghan taliban has also given birth to a mini-me, the pakistani taliban, which targets the government of pakistan. so the pakistani military has an extraordinarily difficult job of trying to parse the difference. they are still convinced the

best way to deal with this is to fight those who are your enemy and use those who are your asset for the future. united states in a very american way, of course, sayses do more -- sayses do more. you have got to take the entire thing down. pakistanis look at us and say, you're hopelessly naive. first of all, you won't be here when push comes to shove. we'll be on our own. secondly, we need these people. we want to continue to have relationships with them. this conflict over this fundamental issue is what is at the heart of this spy versus spy battle today going on in pakistan. these different points of view. >> i immigrated to the united states 30 years ago.

and my question is in the even tougher peace between kashmir, between pakistan and india, there were reports, there were reports even musharraf wants them to have a cease fire on an agreement on the line of factual control now between pakistan over kashmir. so my question is, if army could control after this peace in pakistan, would there be ever a solution, would there be a time there that pakistan could be like india because thomas friedman wrote two years ago concerning pakistan/india that a democracy gave rise to what india is today whereas a military dictatorship and islamization of pakistan led to all those madrassas, and my

question is it will be because the people have the same culture and language, so your comment for question and answer. >> this is a very important question. let me just for the benefit of the rest of the audience put a little bit of perspective here. general musharraf, after he first tried nuclear intimidation, a small war, several high profile terrorist attacks and be threats came around to diplomacy. he was a slow learner, but he got to the right outcome. the outcome that he negotiated with the indians, and i've talked to him about it, and i've talked to the indians and everyone agrees on what it was, was a deal in which the cease fire line in kashmir would be recognized as an international border so that india eastertorial integrity -- india 's territorial integrity would be respected so kashmiris could go back and forth. a little bit -- this was an exaggeration -- like maryland

and virginia. a lot like in europe where there's not a lot of border stoppages. unfortunately, musharraf's sell-by date with the pakistani people expired at this critical moment. he says his partner in this negotiations was general cayenneny. now chief of army staff. and if that's true, then there's some glimmer of hope here. this is a good deal for india. indians who think about it may feel some level of satisfaction in watching their rival in trouble, but if they think about it at all, they know that their vision of a bright, shining india -- one of the great leaders of the 21st century -- is impossible if you are connected to the a failed state -- to a failed state or worse, a jihadist state next

door which has hundreds of nuclear bombs targeted on you. and i am convinced the prime minister in particular understands this. it's a good deal for the kashmiris more than anyone else. they have lived in a nightmare for many, many years. the hard part is selling it to pakistan. the good news here is president zardari wants to do it. that's why he embarked on a new peace process when he came into office, that's why mumbai happened. the dark forces in pakistan deliberately wanted to prevent it from going through, and they carried out an operation to do so and succeeded. we cannot make this happen. but we can help indians and pakistanis make this happen. we can be cheerleaders, we can go to the u.n. security council for reaffirmation and support, we can give them ideas. but we have to do it in a way that is very uncharacteristic. we cannot talk about it all the

time. we cannot have a special envoy for kashmir. we cannot give constant press reports on how we're doing. we've got to be sophisticated, subtle and under the radar screen. now, many of my colleagues who have worked in the u.s. government say i'm dreaming. we can't do it. but pakistan is a country that it's easy to be pessimistic about, and it'll take you nowhere. so we have to try to raise our game and raise our sights and see if we can help them do it. >> hi. one question and two points. your counterpart at langley said there are only 50 al-qaeda, so why do we spend $10 trillion chasing them? the other point is i urge you to not to talk pakistan or

afghanistan. this is a collection of nations. the punjabi army is misruling the country. the pashtuns, the pashtuns especially trouble. and sunni-shia agendas. and these countries -- [inaudible] by three brits and one german. and that's a terrible thing to happen. and -- [inaudible] as far as a combination of mormons and -- [inaudible] okay? >> i've never heard of it characterized -- [laughter] [inaudible conversations] >> i'm going to steal that line. >> [inaudible] you know how the massacres have occurred by the sunni taliban. we have been assaulted by is

sunnis the last many years. this community is paranoid. the country is collapsing, the taliban are murdering people, and everybody who was well connected in the diaspora to help pull these people out. so my view, and i've been there for 40 years is that pakistan is a conceit, so is afghanistan. collapsing, and just like other places, like sudan, new nations, new states are being created, and very few people are prepared for that chaos. >> you and i, i think, are in close to violent agreement about pakistan's problems today. >> [inaudible] >> you brought up more of the

tuitions within pack -- divisions within pakistan between the punjab majority which dominates the officer corps which sees the country as basically a punjabi estate in which everyone else is a second or third class citizen. that's absolutely true. you raised, rightly, the growing strength of extremism. highlighted by the murder of the governor of punjab. extraordinary thing. his own bodyguard shoot him to death, and the bodyguard gets all the favorable attention. >> [inaudible] >> a thousand lawyers go to protect him. the battle for the soul of pakistan is underway today. how it will turn out, no one knows. there are a lot of very dangerous possibilities. i'll just make one comment about 50 al-qaeda. with all due respect to the directer of central intelligence, i've been engaged

in the business of counting insurgents and terrorists for some 35 years. we don't have a clue. and anyone who says they know how many there are is either bluffing or something worse. al-qaeda is a lot more complex problem than 50 individuals, and i wish that the united states government would get out of the business of body counts. we learned in vietnam that's not very helpful. and get into the business of thinking about our enemy in a more flexible way. >> two questions. first, picking up on your theme with regard to the global jihadist movement and broadening the scope of the discussion a little bit, how do you see the global jihadist forces interacting, dealing with and coping with the pan-arab change that is as yet undefined but,

clearly, in play? in because this is a very interesting struggle and, i think, could have serious implications for a lot of things here. a lot of people are talking about it but probably don't know a whole lot. your opinion would be very interesting. and the second, just recalling some figures from the past. i wonder what you think about the future of colonel ghadafi. [laughter] >> i think colonel ghadafi's shelf life can now be measured in days. i certainly hope that's the case. he has demonstrated what he's been for the last 40 years dramatically to the world. all the myths have fallen. he's a murdering terrorist. he killed several hundred americans, pan-am 103. he's been engaged in one act of terror after another, and i hope this is the end game. i don't see a negotiation between the opposition and

colonel ghadafi like between hosni mubarak. the egyptian revolution, i think, is much more significant. al-qaeda's been caught on the back foot, really taken off guard. al-qaeda's philosophy was the only way to bring about change in the arab world was jihad, violence, terrorism. and that violence and terrorism should be directed against the crusaders and the zionists. that's you in this room. what's happened in egypt is regime change through a largely peaceful -- not 100 president peaceful -- 100% peaceful but a largely peaceful mass-based movement. this doesn't fit the model. the al-qaeda leadership, in particular al-zawahiri, number two, who's fought hosni mubarak his entire life, who

participated in the assassination of anwar sadat 30 years ago, was urn able to put out -- unable to put out a statement for almost a month. he finally put a statement out last weekend, and guess who's to blame? napoleon bonaparte. [laughter] whoa! yep, napoleon bonaparte invaded egypt 200-some years ago, he set upon the decline of the islamic world, and it's all his fault. now, promised additional statements to bring us up a little bit quicker to the current day. and while this is very consistent with al-qaeda's narrative and history, it shows you a little bit of how off put they've been. but there are several scenarios in which they can come back. if the promise of democracy now turns into something much less, then there will be a radicalism. in libya we don't know who those

kids are. we don't know what they're -- who they're fighting for, who they're listening to. in yemen we know part of the opposition is al-qaeda, not all of the opposition. so for now they've suffered a setback, a certain humiliation. good news for us -- it's good news for us, but this game is just beginning. you know, the easy part of the revolution is toppling the dictator. the hard part is building a democratic, stable country that provide jobs for 85 million egyptians. that's a really hard thing to do. >> how many people have we got -- [inaudible] okay. >> a quick question on the general political scene in pakistan. china has a border with pakistan and india, iran has a border with afghanistan, and they have their own agendas, and they have

their own strategic imperatives, but the chinese actually have a lot more influence in pakistan than the u.s -- they take our money, but the influence is really coming on china. today call them the all-weather friends. >> that's right. >> and china has, does look at the u.s. as a quasi-- [inaudible] city, and i'm wondering if they have interest in actually creating some instability? today in "the new york times" they funded and gave the technology for a nuclear reactor to make bombs to pakistan, just now in this world of non-proliferation and all this other stuff, they're encouraging the pakistanis to build nuclear bomb materials. what's your take on the iranian and the chinese, and do you discuss it in the book or focus on it? this thanks. >> briefly, you characterize

china quite rightly. they are taller than the himalayas and deeper than the indian ocean. in if -- in practice, while they've given pakistan a lot of weapons and nuclear reactors, in the every clutch situation the chinese haven't done anything more than we have. china's short answer is china is in a quasirivalry with us and with india, but it's also in a relationship with us and with india which is an economic cornucopia, and china's trying to figure out how to balance all of this together. so for me the high road here is to try to get the chinese to row with us in in this. they don't want a jihad state in pakistan. they're investing in the indian economy now. tricky, hard to do, but something that we can do. iran is a more difficult

partner. the short version is in afghanistan since 2001 iran has largely been a supporter of of what we want to do because they hate the taliban. the trick here is to somehow segway off their relatively positive pursuits in afghanistan from the so many other things where we have very serious disagreements with them. that's a very tricky diplomatic problem to pursue. >> do no harm, does that suggest that the drone attacks aredown productive? are counterproductive? >> i'm glad you brought this up. if i were to teach -- i teach at johns hopkins. if i were to teach a course in decision making, i would use the drones as a classic example.

the drones, which is an operation president obama inherited from president bush; president bush created the infrastructure, obama very skillfully has exploited it, but it started under bush, are our only real way of putting pressure on al-qaeda in pakistan today. and it works. it has put a lot of pressure on them. al-zawahiri u.s.ed to put -- used to put out a new message every other week. last year he put out four messages, two of them less than 50 seconds in length, and it's not because he got laryngitis. it's because he fears the drone. on the other hand, the drone is incredibly counterproductive. even though the isi provides a lot of the targeting information for it and is a be beneficiary when it kills the pakistani taliban. this is a classic example of what's really hard in making decisions in government.

there's not a naturally easy solution. i, i'll be 100 president candid and -- 100% candid and up front. i am a supporter of drone operations, i recommended increasing them two years ago, but i think we also need to be very careful not to become drone-addicted. the drones are a platform and a weapons system. tear not a strategy. they're a means of putting pressure on al-qaeda. they are never destroy al-qaeda. we cannot destroy al-qaeda from 30,000 feet in the air. pakistani cooperation is essential to doing that in the end. but this is, this is real world problem. if we don't keep the drones up, the danger of a mass casualty attack in the united states will increase very significantly. if we keep doing them, we drive away a significant part of the pakistani people. there's no simple answer to this problem. in the long term, the best

answer is to get the pakistanis to take ownership of the drone operations. the pakistani government doesn't want to take ownership of it. it much prefers to let barack obama and leon panetta take all the flak. it demonstrates the contradictions that are at the heart of our relationship with pakistan and which make it such a difficult partner to work with these days. thank you. [applause] >> you're watching 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books on c-span2's booktv. >> in about an hour, we're going to cover several thousand years of world history and touch every part of the planet. are you ready to roll? you ready to go on the journey? and this is a journey that as we touch all these places did

actually start from a family -- two family stories. and so if we can look at the world map, marina and i were in jerusalem, in israel, visiting with my family, and i learned -- i asked about the story of one of my aunts, a mysterious aunt of mine a nonjewish woman who had married into our jewish family, and i wondered, what's the story about her? it turned out that her grandfather had been a serf in russia. do any of you remember what a serf is? hold on, you in the back row. could you hand this to him and -- >> i think it was a slave. >> a serf was very much like a slave. he was a person or a woman who could be bought and sold with

the land. so my aunt's grandfather was a is serf, but he had invented a process for working with beet sugar that was so useful, he became so rich, he bought his freedom. when we learned about that, we suddenly learned about a connection to marina's family. >> so i had always known about my family's connection to sugar because my great grandparents traveled from india across to guyana which is in south america, but it's considered part of the caribbean, and they came to cut, to work on sugar plantation. so part of what fascinated us was what is this substance where someone in his family all the way in russia, a serf, and

someone in my family looking to get a better life over here in india and then over to the caribbean, why what is this substance that could effect people from such different parts of the world? >> and before we trace that out, we want to ask you a question. how many of you think you might have sugar somewhere in your family background? some so that's one, two, three -- oh, man, yes! yes! >> all right. what i'm going to do, is i'm going to bring it on, i just want to hear from a couple of you where your family might have been from, okay? >> well, i think my family might have been in the caribbean. >> caribbean, okay, very good. >> absolutely. >> okay? >> i feel my, i feel my family was either in the caribbean or in europe. >> very good, both. >> okay, okay. >> i think my family was either in the caribbean or europe.

>> okay. very good. anybody else here? >> actually, i know that my family was from the caribbean, and that's where i get it from. >> get sugar. >> excellent. >> so if you have the caribbean in your background, you definitely have sugar in your background. but we believed that many more people have sugar in their background than they know. and we're about to take you, as i say, spinning around the world, and the subtitle of our book is, "a story of magic, spice, slavery, freedom and science." and let's start out with magic. why might we relate sugar to magic? well, sugarcane -- if we go back to the world map -- originally was very first, you know, off at the edge on the far edge. we know that the first grown in new guinea. and it was -- they grew

sugarcane. have any of you seen sugarcane before? >> okay, good. >> have any of crow ever tasted sugar -- you ever tasted sugarcane? all right, all right. we know that we -- we do know that sugarcane was first grown in new guinea, and then it was brought up to india. and the reason we know that is there are prayers to the goddess durga where you would burn various offerings to the goddess. and one of the offerings that you burned was sugarcane. and we know that the original word in the ancient indian language of sanskrit for sugar was that which brings sweetness to the people. but at a certain point the name for this substance changed, and the new name for it was sharkara

which means "gravel." can anybody guess why you might use a word that means gravel for sugarcane? or for sugar? this gentleman. >> you might use gravel because it, when you put it in your hand, it kind of, like, it came out like sand, and sand is like gravel. >> you're exactly right. originally, they had cane, but they had learned how to make cane into sugar. and this is one of the crucial things. sugar granules do not key in nature. do not exist in nature. what exists in nature is the cane. we had to learn how to turn the cane into those little pieces of sugar. and we'll get to that, but before we get to that, the question is how did knowledge of sugarcane can spread? how did people learn about this plant growing in new guinea,

this substance used in religion in india? does anyone remember who might have brought knowledge of sugar across -- that back row there is great. i think the second guy there hasn't spoken yet. >> christopher columbus? >> no, no, you're ahead of us. you're ahead of us, buddy. you're ahead. we're way back. >> um, i think it spread because it went across the world, and i think china had it? >> yeah, but before china gets it, there's someone who brings -- there's a woman here on the end, marina. >> i think it was, i think it was the slaves. >> that's later. we're way back. we're in b.c., guys. we're way, way back. >> the australians? >> nope, no australians. >> ah. >> with the greeks? >> yes. alexander the great. if any of you remember the

stories, alexander the great is conquering across from greece. he's conquering across iran. he's conquering -- he gets to the edge of india, and his troops say i won't go any further, i've gone as far as i'm going to go. but alexander is conquering, he has this hunger to know. alexander can never know enough. so he sends his friend in a boat saying go explore india, find out stuff for me. and the friend comes back and talk about the reed that gives honey though there are no bees. now, why would you describe sugarcane as the reed that give withs honey -- that give honey though there are no bees? >> because it was sweet? many. >> yes, and why else?

you'll get a chance. >> because the honey, bees usually produce the honey, and with sugarcane they didn't need the bees. >> right. because what they knew -- before people knew about sugarcane, how might they have sweetened their food? what, what ways might people have used to sweeten their foods? >> they would use mashed fruits and honey and sap from a maple tree? >> very good. you all may remember that in north america there were no bees, north and south america. they didn't have honey. so what they had is main be l syrup, they had the a gaf i have cactus, and in the rest of the world they had honey. so we've had sugar used in magical ceremonies, we've had sugar now is spreading, people are starting to learn about it. >> but one thing we want to mention, when you say that they

used, let's say, honey or fruit is sugar or sweetness at this time is not the way we think about it where you're going to have a chocolate bar or a cookie. it is just a taste. it is a spice. it is something you use in your meal to give it one with of the flavors. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> here are a few upcoming book fairs and festivals from around the country. this weekend book tv is live from the tucson festival of books. visit booktv.org for a complete schedule of events. the virginia festival of the book will be taking place from march 16-20th. booktv will be airing several events live online on thursday the 17th and friday the 18th. simply visit booktv.org at the semid time of any live online program and click the watch icon to view the event. for the schedule of programs

that'll be live on booktv.org, check the upcoming program section of the page. also in march, the 16th annual patchwork story telling festival happens in rockville, south carolina. is there a book festival happening near you? e-mail the name, date and web site of the event. you can also visit booktv.org for more upcoming 2011 fairs and festivals. >> about five year ago i got a letter from a teacher that i had in eighth grade in chicago. she had saved one of my papers that i had written about thanksgiving -- >> host: she must have really liked this paper. >> guest: she really liked this paper, and she mailed it to me, and she said, i've kept this all these years because it was one of the best papers i had gotten from a student, and i read that paper, and i was going, hey!

[laughter] i was really good. [laughter] >> host: what was the paper about? >> guest: thanksgiving. >> host: the blessings of thanksgiving. >> guest: kind of what it meant to me, i don't know, but it was good. >> host: is it on your refrigerator now at your house? >> guest: it's in some box with all my memorabilia, but it was remarkable that she had saved that. anyhow, apparently, i did write pretty well, and i had an english teacher that said you need to join the high school newspaper. and i had never thought of writing. i actually liked acting. i was in a lot of plays and things like that which i'm very grateful i was now because that helped me as a television broadcaster. >> host: with your voice -- >> guest: learning how to use and project your voice and not being afraid to get in front of people and speak. so i joined the newspaper, and they gave me a column called "division news." they weren't home rooms there,

they were called divisions, and my job was to go around to all the home rooms and interview people about what was going on with the people in that home room. [laughter] >> host: great. fascinating. >> guest: it was actually kind of a gossip column or something, who won the spelling bee and who won the science fair. >> host: yeah. >> guest: but i enjoyed so much having access that me, carole, could go around to these rooms and talk to the teachers and talk to the students and know things before anybody else knew them, and then write them up and see my byline? oh, my goodness. well, you must feel the same way. [laughter] >> host: it's a -- >> guest: suspect it a heady -- isn't it a heady, it's kind of a heady experience. >> host: yes, indeed. so you make the decision this is going to be your life's work. >> guest: i loved it. i'm, like, i love this. >> host: the attention, the

access -- >> guest: people coming up to me wanting to tell me information. >> host: right, right. >> guest: and i was a curious child who read a lot. i guess i was pretty nerdy. but it all worked; the reading, the writing, the access and being able to ask questions and get answers. it was just wonderful, and i said, this is what i want to do. but did i know anybody black who was a reporter? did i know anybody white woman that was a reporter or any woman? all i knew was lois lane from superman. [laughter] >> host: right. >> guest: and brenda starr from the comic books. but the idea i i knew there was a chicago tribune and a "chicago sun-times" and a chicago daily news, there were all kinds of great newspapers in chicago at the time. my parents were avid newspaper readers, and so seeing the bylines in the newspaper there

and that people were covering things about murders and fires and politics, i just, i just decided that's -- i had to do that. >> host: and you go, and you tell your parents this is what you've decided, you want a career as a journalist. what do they say? >> guest: ha, ha, ha, ha, silly girl. silly little girl. [laughter] you can't be a journalist. women don't do that. and, certainly, black women don't do that. you need to go become a teacher, so you can take care of yourself. you can always get a teaching job. but we don't want to spend tuition, and it was a struggle for them to get my tuition together for me. and it was like, you need to be a teacher or a nurse or a social worker. that's just about all the thing young women in the early '60s would aspire to. and i was just, no, i don't want

to do that. i really want to do this. so there were a lot of fights in my household and a lot of slamming of my door and putting my foot down. and, again, this was the first no, no, you can't do this. and i was just determined. and finally, they saw i was, i was not going to be happy, i was not going to be a good person to live with unless i got this opportunity. so they supported me, and i thank god for having supportive parents who didn't go to college but made sure me and my sister did. >> host: and then at some point you hear a second no, the second of many noeses when you apply to school, northwestern. >> northwestern university in evan son, illinois, was right outside chicago, and that's where i wanted to go because at the time it was one of the best journalism schools in the country. and i had great grades.

as i told you, i was in all kinds of activities and things. and i had a b+/a-average from high school, and i applied to northwestern. and little did i know, there was a quo that system going on. -- quota system going on. they've acknowledged it now that there was a quota of the number of jews and the number of blacks that they took into the college. so i go to this admissions counselor, and he tells me i was wasting my time. that i needed to go become a nice english teacher that i could get a job. but i'd never get a job working for the or chicago tribune. so i knew what was going to happen, and i got the rejection notice a few weeks later. we regret to inform you that -- i remember those first words. >> host: thin envelope -- >> guest: thin envelope. no forms to fill out, no housing -- [laughter]

little, tiny letter. and i was, like -- and my parents, thank god, didn't say we told you so, but i said, well, i'm applying some place else. >> host: and you do just that, and you end up eventually graduating from where and what year? >> guest: university of michigan, and why do you want the year so everybody will know how old i am? [laughter] >> host: well, never mind. >> guest: 1962. gltion 196 the, and you did well in school. >> guest: i did well in school again, and there were 60 graduates in my class from journalism, and everyone had a job at graduation time except me. >> host: the little red hen did not have a job. >> guest: and so i went to work at the chicago public library where i had worked every summer from the time i was 15 years old. here i am with a degree, and i'm going back to my high school myb.