a carbon tax is likely to have beneficial effects to other areas of the economy and to members of the community? [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> those who wish to debate this issue can do so at the end of question time. . .

some of the committee will come to order. thank everybody for being here as we tackle this important

subject. i would like to begin by stating the oversight commission statement. we exist to secure from the middle principles first americans have the right to know the money washington takes from them is well spent and second, americans deserve an efficient government that works for them and in the oversight government reform committee is to protect these rights. our solemn response of these to hold the government accountable to the taxpayers because they have a right to know what they get from their government. we will work tirelessly in partnership with walked off citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the committee to the american people and bring genuine reform to the federal bureaucracy. this is the mission of the oversight government reform committee. again i want to thank everybody for being here and our witnesses today for today's hearing at the tsa oversight part one whole body imaging. the first in the series that we will have relating to the tsa. in essence one of my fundamental concerns is the need to secure

our airports. we have a true threat in the united states of america. but at the same time, we also need to uphold our freedoms and liberties, civil liberties and oftentimes i think there's a choice that is given that we need to give up our personal privacy in the name of security and that is in part what we are going to talk about today. i'd like to welcome the ranking member of the subcommittee and those of you watching our live webcast oversight dhaka house of god. i want to thank you for joining us. we will seek testimony from private secretary witnesses from the united states security programs and policies and their relationship to the fourth amendment of the constitution. the united states continues to face serious threats from al qaeda and other terrorist groups since line 11 terse six-point to the american airport security checkpoints and by all accounts will continue to try to do so. december 22nd, 20018 her service ordered a flight from paris to

miami where he attempted to detonate explosives active issues. if not for the efforts of passengers and flight attendants and malfunctioning device, he may very well have succeeded. in 2006, british intelligence plots that detonated liquid explosives on different different to the content for the flights that would have undoubtedly caused a tremendous life -- loss of life. december 25th among 2009 another terrorist known as the christmas day, attended a northwest flight over detroit. again passengers aboard the flight along with the faulty device thwarted another tragedy. october 29, 2010 al qaeda operatives pact printer cartridge full of explosives and shipped in the united states aboard a ups air plan. intelligence not affected saved the day each instances, but passengers and mass tragedies this isn't good enough. federal government has reacted to each of these with programs that reforms and

recommendations. the creation of the part of homeland security being the most notable. the opening lines connection between agencies and redirected american efforts to protect the public. the american public is familiar with these reforms enacted in the nation's airports. these changes are what bring us here today. over the past ten years americans sacrifice freedom for greater airport security. you remove shoes, surrender sunscreen, cement to full body scans. the committee has an obligation to ask whether these policies actually truly enhance security. we have an obligation to ask tough questions and when needed to find solutions. we must assess whether the procedures can be done with greater efficiencies and effectiveness. we must examine whether federal government has a common sense lawyer threat based approach to the airport security and is a truly secure in the american public. we must determine whether the part of homeland security is maximizing available resources, strategies and innovative techniques. we need to look into the

behavior detection. intelligence gathering and analysis, explosive traced detection, looking to the vapor weight and how they can be effective in airports. these are the other security techniques that should be included in the discussion. what separates the united states of america from the rest of the world as our ability as a people to ask tough questions of those in the public policy arena and the effectiveness associated with the whole body imaging devices. we will hear from experts and average americans about the naked images that are secured in the whole body imaging machines and talk about candidly the enhanced pat-down now being implemented. with less about the alternative methods and the role in the debate and look at what has been said by the tsa and compare it to what is actually being done. in short i'm proud of the united states of america and the ability to have this type of a vote interaction and open and transparent way.

i appreciate everybody that is here and joining in this discussion and at this time i would like to recognize mr. tierney for his opening statement. thank you mr. chairman and the witnesses for being present today. passengers demonstrate al qaeda and its affiliates are looking for ever more creative ways to attack the united states commercial airline industry and traveling public. as a nation like it falls on us to determine what he meant economic and psychological cost of the terrorist attack on the commercial airline warrant extraordinary defense measures and how costly common interests of and inconvenient we are willing to have those be. none of us like to take off our shoes or throw away our water bottles were empty pockets and change to board a plane. but most would be willing to take the sacrifice that is a reasonable certainty such actions would help prevent other terrorists attack. following the christmas the bomber attack in 2009 funding and some encouragement for some in congress, the tsa procure and deily body scanning machines on

a national scale. according to the tsa administrator and the tsa witnesses that were scheduled to be here today, the scanners represent the best available methods to detect the threat items concealed on the passenger such as the christmas a bomber. we should be willing to explore whether or not it is in fact the case. we must also weigh the technology against america's legitimate privacy interest. by now we have all seen copies of body scanning images that show more than any of us would like publicly to reveal. have they taken significant steps to address the concerns understand there is additional technology available and in the testing as we speak that would obviate the concerns altogether. if this is the case i would encourage the tsa to expedite the testing of the technology and deploy it as rapidly as possible if it is effective in identifying anomalies. it is worth noting according to the cbs poll conducted november of 2010 an overwhelming majority of americans, 81% approve of the

use of the whole body scanning devices at the airports. that doesn't take away from the legitimate privacy concerns we share that it's helpful data about how much sacrifice most americans are willing to make to prevent terrorist strikes from happening again. one of our witnesses has also raised serious concerns about the potential health risks associated with weight scale body scanners. i look forward to discussing with the doctor brenner the studies conducted by the national academy of sciences, the food and drug administration, the american college of radiology and the british health protection agency. tsa is a difficult task that one will criticize for not doing enough and stopped the threats for another moment to criticize for doing too much and not doing it in a proper way. our role was to provide constructive oversight that can help them strike the right balance of security, privacy, cost and convenience. i encourage my colleagues and witnesses here today to provide

solutions rather than just keep on criticism. thank you mr. chairman. >> mr. chairman, parliamentary inquiry. i came today with the intent of questioning witnesses from the second panel from the transportation security at a ministration about the subject and i appreciate first of all you and the ranking member conducting this hearing. i have since been informed, and i appreciate the first panel of witnesses that i have since been informed we will not have representatives stay at the transportation security administration. i would like to request of the chair and may be in consultation with the ranking member how we can proceed in the future to have -- and i understand the have submitted to merten testimony, but for the purpose of appearing before the

subcommittee, answering appropriate questions, and some of them will eat all -- will evil from the testimony today. that in person representatives of the tsa either by subpoena or, again, if he would consult with the council on both sides of the nile how we can demand and insure their appearance before the committee in the future that's the nature of my column to the parliamentary inquiry at this time but i think it's really important that this subcommittee hear from those individuals who are involved with again the question forced today and this is the tsa oversight part one of the whole body imaging. for the future either by subpoena or requiring their attendance before the subcommittee. >> ig the gentleman is correct that despite the early

assurances confirmation of their attendance and participation in this hearing by two members of the tsa, senior members of the administration they would attend we are given notice late was night, something that i physically was able to see yesterday that it was their intention now not to attend. i find that to be an embarrassment to the agency. i think it's highly inappropriate, and i assure you that the tsa will appear before this committee. they should appear today and i will give them the benefit of the doubt until we began to swear on the second panel. but at that time should they choose not to attend at their own choice after confirming that they would having to fly from our of the country as early as alaska and others like it is inexcusable and in their dressing that it is their intention not to show up.

>> with the gentleman yield? >> yes. >> the gentleman is well aware. he said he got a letter yesterday stated march 14th, 2011 and the tsa had no problem with testifying before the committee. as a matter of fact they wanted to testify before the committee. the problem is that the majority insisted that they proceeded along side the non-governmental witnesses who represent the electronic privacy information center and the organization is actually engaged in multiple lawsuits against the tsa. now they are -- they have assured us and you they are willing to testify. they want to testify. but to sit at the same table where people are suing you is probably just not appropriate. so i think some flexibility you could have them in here at any

moment, and i think we need to be very careful, and i think mr. darrell issa has been most cooperative with regard to dealing with subpoenas. but when you've got somebody suing you and you are sitting at the same table as a lawyer i can tell you that complicates matters quite a bit down the road. so i think there is a way to resolve this. the majority -- minority will cooperate in working with the majority to accomplish this. we all want them to appear. they want to appear. they have a great story to tell. and so i yield back. >> thank you. in response to the gentleman, if i may, if they want to appear they could, they should come and they would. the problem is they have elected not to appear. as the gentleman knows, the members on the panel take questions from members of congress. they don't take questions from the person seated next to them.

to give members the proper opportunity to question both those that are criticizing the tsa and then allow a timely response i think is most productive for this committee, and therefore i have elected to seat them on the same panel. two weeks ago we had this the department, we headed the department of defense, we had the inspector, special inspector general seated together on the same panel. both kump and all they wanted, special treatment. they wanted to go first. they didn't want to have to wait. we talked to them and explained the situation and as it was complemented i hope this is a fair characterization complement from the ranking member saying there was a swift and efficient hearing, productive use of the member's time coming and we got through that hearing without incident. i think it is a good precedent and it happened two weeks ago from people that had contradictory points of view, and it is the way we will conduct the subcommittee.

>> with the gentleman yield? that is a reasonable characterization of what i would have said. i certainly would have said that and indicated to you i thought the hearing went well. and i think we've had is the past when i was the chair we would go back and forth with the administration's, bush administration and subsequent administration obama administration about them wanting to be first and i believe strongly in the house we control it and we go. i think what is unique about this and we're on a separate on you on that is the litigation and i think mr. cummings is right. when you are advising a client not only do not want them to be on the same panel last people suing you, you don't want to have to say i'm not going to answer that question and that is an inappropriate question given the circumstances. is it fair to put it into the position. i think in this case where there is litigation on the panel and the other leg and is a step too far. and we can reach an accommodation of the products of the house or retained and getting witnesses to take what panels we want them on to make an exception in a matter of

litigation and separate opportunity and if the were the case today i think they would comment and testify we would have gotten the information we want and what have been better. so i would ask if in the future you would consider that aspect of it and we try to find a way to cooperate and move forward and give the agency the chance yelled back. >> the gentleman from iowa for a. >> thank you pittard i will be brief as the others have. this committee has a long history of doing it right and doing it wrong. under the two chairmen ago, the fallujah force litigation subjects were brought in here and quite frankly they were brought in to promote a lawsuit that the chairman was very well aware of. the pat tallman case, the same thing happened. it's not our intention is the chairman knows and i know he worked hard to facilitate any confrontation about litigation. this will not happen on my watch or the chairman's watch.

what we will do is insist on the right to seek people on a panel we believe is appropriate. we make exceptions. current members of the house and senate and cabinet officers and certainly any persons directly from the executive branch would be seated separately out of deference to their current status. we will continue to work with a ranking member and mr. cummings has been reasonable in supporting us when he thought we were right in asking for changes. the gentle lady from alaska has come a long way and i want to hear what she has to say. i would have had a we had the tsa sitting next to her. my understanding is there is no lawsuit is a legitimate claim that the tsa isn't living up to the promises they made for all scanners can be used and how they would do their job. so i look forward to that and the ranking member. the testimony would be placed on

the record since it does not appear it won't be any unanimous consent to place it in the record he would have the opportunity to read at and we look forward to that testimony and a rebuttal when the tsa comes. chairman, i think for holding this hearing. certainly with 57,000 counting tsa employees, countless people including the gentle lady from alaska who comes from the city in which you can only leave the city in the winter i guess by dog sled but mostly by ship or aircraft its essentials for those travelers have an opportunity to efficiently and effectively and privately be able to go through the screenings and get on to the aircraft to bring them to the rest of alaska and the low were 48. so mr. chairman, this is important as we all heard today this is a bipartisan issue we get right after nearly a decade what we haven't gotten right, and i think you for your attention, you're continued attention and the title says this is number one.

we will be back here as long as it takes an hour over cycle to get it right and i yield back. >> at this time i'd like to ask unanimous consent sheila jackson lee and russia be allowed to participate in the hearing and ask questions of the witnesses. without objection so ordered. >> the chair will entertain any additional opening statements members would like to make. if any of the member wishes to make an opening statement. mr. cummings, the gentleman is recognized, ranking member of the full committee. >> thank you mr. chairman for the discussion we just had and to you and our ranking member mr. tierney. on the surface of today's hearing, we share the same goal. let me emphasize that. we share the same goal. keeping airline passengers safe and secure with as little

inconvenience for invasion of privacy as possible. the whole body imaging technology we are examining was introduced following the terrorists attempt to blow up in northwest airlines' flight in december, 2009 using nonmetallic explosives. let that sink in. in response to the threat posed by the so-called christmas the bomber and others, the tsa interest in number of new security measures including whole body imaging. by the way, congress fully supported this effort by funding the procurement of hundreds of these machines. because the tsa witnesses are not here to speak for themselves what me read from their written testimony which i will -- which i hope we will hear. it is based upon our analysis of

the latest intelligence and after studying available technologies and the prophecies, the tsa has concluded an advanced imaging technology is an effective method to detect threat items concealed on passengers while maintaining checkpoint screening operations. the tsa continually evaluates this technology, software and seceded screening procedures to ensure they are effective against the anticipated threats while continuing to protect passenger privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. now, you know, i think it was our ranking member of the subcommittee who said he didn't say it like i'm about to see it but he said, tsa is damned if they do and damned if they don't. if you have a incident particularly coming after the christmas day bomber incident, and if they did not try to address that issue in the most effective and efficient way and

in the most mauney evasive way as possible, then if somebody was harmed and god forbid killed then people would be screaming. so as the conduct or oversight it's important to understand that he is a professional storch with protecting the traveling public have determined this technology is necessary to protect the real threats posed by al qaeda and other affiliate's. it should be to provide instructed oversight to help tsa strike the right balance between the need for security and concerns about the convenience, costs, health and privacy and i want to make it clear as our ranking member has come every member on this side of the nile and ensure the other side of the dial our number-one concern is the safety of our traveling public and at the same time striking a balance so we have

procedures that protect them which doesn't go too far with regard to invading their privacy and making sure they can have a wonderful experience, and we understand and i want to thank our witness for being here today. sar reva you've gone through when you've gone through but we need to strike the balance and get it right. and with that, mr. chairman, again, i look forward to working with you and our cranky member to make sure we get them here so they can testify appropriately. with that, i yield back. >> i would like to ask unanimous consent statement of robert kane for the technology and the assistant administrator operations transportation security administration coming u.s. department of homeland security be admitted to the record.

>> i don't have the chair, but i do think that since i have chosen not to appear today today when they get here that we would submit that to the record and we would also add that time have the opportunity to examine and question the witnesses based on the submission of the testimony so i will continue to object to the submission of their testimony at this time. >> mr. chairman, i, too would reserve the intention is that to be placed at a time in which the witnesses can be made available, and i look forward to that opportunity and yelled back. >> if i may speak to the objection. i think that we all understand we want them to come back and

testify. that is a given and i don't think anybody objects they will be back and testify. it was one of the unique circumstances the ended up not being here and the circulated by e-mail to all the members. i think it's helpful for us in questioning it today we are going to ask a question to refer to something on the record and keep the record intact. we must have a full account of the different positions that might be available here and reserve the right to bring them back but i do know that they wouldn't testify it was the fact they have a circumstances with confronting litigants on the same panel we may or may not disagree on. i think it's extraordinary in this case and i think for the plo itself -- panel that selzer would be inappropriate to have those on the record. >> the chair would disagree with the characterization and that's fair enough there has been an objective to the unanimous consent request therefore it is denied as there is an objective

we do not have unanimous consent the statements will not be entered into the record. >> mr. chairman? >> yes? >> i would move to the statements on the record and ask for a vote. >> semidey point of parliamentary inquiry is a vote to be in order during a hearing in don't believe it is. >> i don't believe it is. we have not yet got into the second panel. we have not yet confirm whether or not they are going to indeed show up. there was a unanimous consent request, there was an objection that has been denied. consequently the chair is the and to recognize we are still in the opening statement mode. the chair is going to recognize the gentleman from florida of the transportation committee mr. mica of florida. as a member of 18 years' standing of the government

reform and oversight committee,. i thank both of the ranking member and the chair for conducting this oversight hearing. and this is a very important responsibility i think of this committee. transportation security -- and i started some of this as the chair of the aviation subcommittee you never know what the good lord has in store for us, but. i made the trip in 2001 later than usual in the appointment of the chair but then we were confronted with the attacks of september 11th and had to put in place the security system for transportation for our country. probably one of the most important things we can do particularly for aviation is seeing that the threat still exists. i think that these folks have

seen the damage they can do to our economy to our society to our way of life and they are still determined to come after us and i think therefore it's very important that we have a place in systems that work. i helped initiate an error of -- number of the programs and ask them to look it advanced imaging technology and i'm supportive of using advanced technology for determining threats in this. my concern is that while first the manner in which, and i don't have the opportunity to question of the tsa representatives, the matter in which these pieces the very expensive equipment were acquired in light of the committee and staff are listening than they would in fact review very carefully the acquisition. this is in the neighborhood of

half a billion dollars. furthermore i'm very concerned about the testing and the past when we looked at see mr. cummings there. we were always consulted by the tsa and the major acquisition and deployment of the screening technologies. i don't think that there was adequately done in this purchase. i'm concerned about testing results and every member of the panel should have the classified briefing. i have the equipment tested by the gao in december of this past year and then i had the pat-down tested in january. everyone should be required. every member of congress to see the extensive failure rate i can't disclose. it really concerns me when you spend half a billion dollars and then another half a billion dollars for additional

personnel, and it doesn't work as it should. even the initial deployment of the portals is a joke. even a seventh grader i think could come up with a better plan for deploying and utilizing this equipment and it doesn't have to be used for everyone like we have seen it deployed and then we have great concern about the failure of its use and the implications of its use. people in this country are protected by the fourth amendment. they should be subject to the illegal search and seizure. and the embarrassment and assumed guilty. we can and must do better especially for aviation security, and i am disappointed they are more fundamental

problems with the tsa and i ask the members of the panel to work with me for a period we didn't come a long period we didn't have an administrator. we've had five administrators in five years. this administration chose not to appoint someone. they named several who were cast aside. the first appointment didn't come until eight or nine months into the president's term and that needs to be changed. denney to be more than 200 personnel and tsa making more than the administrator. the lead minister has an army of 3,770 personnel in washington, d.c. making an average of $105,000 per person. he said he worked in the department where ten secretaries made more than $100,000.

this is an agency kronman out for reform and i think it's very sad that they would choose not to show up today. i hope we can get in the future hearing and i would be glad to participate in the questioning of them at that time. thank you again for convening this hearing and i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back and now recognizes the gentleman from iowa. >> thank you. it challenges facing the tsa are not a democratic problem or a republican problem. the year fusing every american who truffles and those of us who travel frequently know that this is one of the difficult balancing act we face in a country that treasures privacy, treasures its citizens and that is the challenge we face in the subcommittee today. with each a terrorist attempt against the airports and airplanes that the sas responded with new and usually more

inconvenient technology to address the threats removing shoes of the x-ray machines to limiting liquids and shells to add to its imaging technologies that are able to screen whole bodies for suspect material. i don't deny there's a clear need for security for the attempt by the terrorist richard reid and umar farouk abdulmutallab show but i have serious concerns over protecting the rights of our citizens and ensuring the technology we use our fully effective and safe. recent studies suggest the whole body imaging technology currently in use may be ineffective at detecting and concealed explosives such as those used in the christmas bombing attempt in 2009 as well as suggesting the backscatter x-ray technology in the devices could be higher risk than indicated. we should work together to find effective screening mechanisms to the greater deployment and use of explosive trace detection

technologies. they get a better detect explosives and preserve the modesty and personal rights of american citizens. that's why i was proud to introduce the protect the lives of americans screening or the plane sacked last congress. this calls for more intelligent use of the screen technology to ensure safety and airports. i look for what the testimony of the witnesses today and i hope this hearing sheds light on why technology has to be the best answer to terrorist threats from the tsa and how we work together to protect the rights and health of our own citizens and i yield back. >> we recognize the gentleman from arizona for his opening. >> thank you for holding this hearing on the transportation security is that ministers and use of the whole body imaging at the airport and security. the series of hearings starting today to analyze the tsa efforts

to increase airport security since the christmas day, incident is at a hearing this shettle to ensure the government is working on the best interest of the constituents. in light of the constituent concerns an alarming press accounts we have heard it is critical this committee revisit airport security policies. the tsa must develop effective policies and process these that keep the traveling public safe and maintain our nation's security while keeping in mind passenger safety. the air transportation is one of the nation's most the central infrastructures and the policies and activities of the transportation security administration have a direct impact on more of our constituents than almost any other federal agency. in my home state of arizona, been at the international airport as a primary airport on of the ten busiest in the nation and not the 1020 busiest in the world, the sky harbor airport has a 90 million-dollar deal the

economic impact. last year they sold 38,000,550 for those of 530 passengers come through the airport and 276,338 tons of cargo in and out. over 440,000 aircraft passenger were true. with a heavy volume of the passenger cargo and aircraft the phoenix airport was one of the first test sites for the whole body imaging scanners in 2007. today there are nearly 500 imaging technology units at 78 airports. the implementation of the whole bloody imaging scanners of the phoenix sky airport has not been without controversy. there's been numerous press accounts, documented passengers and the new scanners, and i've heard concern from many constituents directly. there's been very his local press reports mentioning that passengers are concerned that the lack of privacy and may be viewing the 70's. as we can all agree we need to effectively protect air passengers while at the same time respectably passenger right

to read as a medical professional practice in per for over 25 years, i'm also concerned about the potential health risks posed by the machines. the tsa reports of the radiation exposure has been challenged by a variety of independent studies. i look forward to hearing the witnesses testimony on the scientific data as it is critical that the health of constituents are currently considered when analyzing the tsa security efforts. it's important to note the whole body imaging technology is not cheap. it's estimated the total cost for the program will be about 50 million for 2013. in the time when everyone is forced to cut back i think it is only fair to ensure if the federal government is when to spend the money on this initiative it better be very effective. finally we must ensure we have a consistent fair and uniform policy across the board. no airport shuttle three different when it comes to the security or how to handle passengers to read my constituents are telling me that simply is not the case.

the federal government must strike the proper balance between the security and privacy. i'd like to think the witnesses for appearing today and contributing to the committee's work to examine the tsa travel security policies. i look forward to hearing your testimony and discussing what it is and isn't regarding the airport security. thank you. alladi yield back. >> the gentleman from massachusetts for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the members of the panel for appearing before the committee monday eventually to appear. just a point on that. it has, as the former subcommittee chair, it has been the practice that we've taken agencies single week to allow them to avoid, you know, conflict with other parties, and also just to give them a basic courtesy. so, but i respect the chair's

decision on how to handle that. it is not -- not necessarily what has been handled in the past. for the substance of today's committee hearing, i do want to amplify the concern about the health risks and not only for the traveling public but also we have tsa workers, so transportation security officers who may indeed screen anywhere from 200 to 400 or 500 people on a shift. we have some very, very busy airports that handle huge volumes of people and so one of the areas of interest i have is on their behalf, on behalf of those to make sure that this repetitive exposure even though it is alleged to be low-level

exposure to low-level radiation given off by the scanners i'm concerned about their safety. i've heard from a couple of the employer groups i guess it's not their officials union yet but the american federation of government employees who have asked some of the workers just to alleviate your be allowed to wear a december which is a device which will record the levels of exposure to the creation which the where encounters and i think that is a reasonable approach however it hasn't been increased by the tsa and that resistance is similar to the resistance that we had a couple of years ago when we had the swine flu epidemic.

in mexico city we started there and yet we would not allow tsl embrum skill and a number of airports along the mexican border we wouldn't allow them to wear masks, we wouldn't allow them to use purell on their hands between screenings and putdowns of people coming across the border. so we allow those officers to be exposed to a hazard i think they shouldn't have been exposed to. and when i say that we would not allow, the department of homeland security and the tsa leadership wouldn't allow them to protect themselves and yet they have gone home every day to their families and so you see the lunacy in that policy. so that experience does not encourage me -- does not, you

know, lead me to believe that responsibility has been taken and the privacy issue. this is a serious issue and there's got to be a way that we can protect the public during these imaging screenings. and i hope the most profound a deterrent with the screening process and the images that can be stored on the systems is to provide a cause of action for the public. if the tsa knows that they can be sued and serious damage can result to them as a result of their laps handling of privacy issues than they will be

diligent about protecting the public privacy. if i can do it, if i can mishandle and these images, then there is no consequence that they will do exactly that experience in reason to agree on that point. so health risks and privacy issues i hope we will get some helpful direction and instruction from our witnesses. i yield back. >> with any other members wish to make an opening statement? >> members may have seven days to submit written the acoustic as for the opening. we are honored to have sharon cissna of the alaska state legislator who represents the 22nd district in alaska. she's a democrat and i appreciate the link and short notice that she's taken to travel great distance to be here today. thank you for your presence.

pursuant to the rules all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. please rise and raise your right hand to read you from the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? let the record reflect the witness is answered in the affirmative. thank you. thank you again for being here. we will now recognize you for five minutes. >> push the -- there you go. thank you. >> chairman davis and ranking member tierney, also fellow members of the subcommittee so i want to first of all introduce myself, and my name is sharon cissna, and yes, i in a state representative of state house and have been with the

legislature now for seven terms. i'm in my seventh and represent a district 22 which is in fact the district in the state that has been universities and medical systems that actually serve the whole state. so my focus really is health and education. those are the two focuses on a half. i have another thing that actually brings me here, and that is life in profile of the people that are harmed by the present, the tsa, and that is initials i haven't actively used very often before. but suddenly i found myself actually starting in november of this last year in a situation

where like so many other alaskans i went down for a second opinion to seattle and got that medical procedure done, went to the airport not having a clue that there had been any changes in the screening devices, and ctac just put it in. this was early november. and because in fact i am like to consider a veteran of breast cancer, i fit that profile that incidently is going to have both the full very invasive and search, and this is not something i talked to many people about what i'm going to talk to you now about it and it's really important and i

think the sexually as i listened to your conversation. bring something that we really don't oftentimes get when we are talking about the total world or country. we don't often -- we look at the economy and statistics and that kind of thing. but oftentimes we don't look at the individual life of the people that we are serving. and what actually is affecting them and how. it's often times in the research that we see, and we see this especially in alaska because we don't have enough numbers to really make it work and that is the research that shows what kind of harm is being done and when. if you've got a very few numbers it doesn't fit into the research

yet people are being harmed. in my case it was because of a teenager i experienced that touch and have experienced my adult life working on making sure that an assault doesn't happen to the kids come in contact with which having worked in the mental health field for a number of years starting in actually in 1962, which of course shows i'm not new at all of this really has been something that is larger than we ever talk about or think about or even test. i'm fairly sure of that. so when in fact i went through the screening device, i was in front of the woman who tried to tell me that i simultaneously

was going to go through the new hand pat on consider it feeling that and i'm sorry but i'm going to refer to it that way. we accept that. i went through this, and that's the way i feel about that. she was also telling me very rude as a matter of fact i had to be simultaneous to whatever she was going to do to me and she wasn't really explaining that because i think she was trying to remember. she had just been trained. she was learning. it showed. but simultaneously i was supposed to be watching my baggage, and at that point i look over at my baggage and other people's bags are now piling on top of mind and someone is going through my head bags trying to figure out i am sure that if a was fares. i start moving towards it and she yanks me back and very rudely tells me stand still,

keep your eye on your bags, yet i suppose to now stand and put my hands a certain way to have her ctac, and was very intensive that happened. for several weeks after that, and i would love to know if there was someone i could build for the time i lost because of my emotional state, that actually was i think the emotional state that happened after that was very similar to what happens with probably anyone who has been through assault and i wonder -- am i running away past the time here? i'm sorry. >> we would like to ask unanimous consent to allow her to continue another two minutes. without objection. >> thank you. what happens is i went through

two weeks of very disruptive time over the response to that. all right. moving forward again very quickly to fit you're 20s, not very long ago, i suddenly find myself having gone back to the doctor and finding myself at the airport again and thinking something had changed at the airport. the full body scanner which i haven't worried about. i've heard many people worry about that, but what happened after that was a feast of the woman and my husband and i talked about it. i felt i was never going to go through that again. i said no. ..

>> every time every day i have stories of how they are harmed. i sent in my statement that i e-mailed to you folks, many of the comments that were made, but i've also witnessed exactly how alaska does deal with this, and the minute i got back to alaska, the thing that was amazing to me is my legislature passed this into the house on how i had done the right thing, that it was the right thing for me to have done, and they have put out a

resolution that is to come to you, and it goes through all of the different things that -- and the most important is how important air travel is to us, but how alaskans have been harmed. we are four times -- we travel four times what the rest of the united states does. all the other members of the citizens that travel, and i think i'm supposed to be ending here. i hope you'll read the rest of my comments and any other questions, please ask. >> thank you, and thank you for that testimony. we'll bet the balance of your testimony into the record. i'd also like to ask unanimous consent that the resolution from the state of alaska be entered into the record. without objection, so ordered. i'd like to recognize myself for five minutes, and then each member. one of the hallmarks of the

united states of america is the commitment to the fourth commitment, unreasonable search and seasuire. how do we find that balance and what was your personal experience and there's many who argue if you choose to go on an airplane, then you choose to give up those rights. can you sure with us your perspective? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. mr. chair, it's absolutely true for alaskans that we don't choose. we don't have a choice. i did make my way back to alaska after that event at the airport on the 20th of february, but it took four days. it took four days, and i was really lucky because i was able to find in canada someone to fly me and so then i was able to take the marine highway and get

to alaska that way. for people in remote parts of the state, what happens is that they oftentimes it's their first time away from those remote places, because of operations, have to fly out of the state, and there are patient at that time and i hope they get consideration at that time when they go out. we don't have the level of screening because it's metallics that in the metal detector that we get screened with so far. that's what would have them felt up, but after they come back, after they have the operation, when they leave the operating scene and the hospital, what happens is they're picked up by maybe a taxy, taken to an airport, and they become not a patient unless, but just a standard citizen.

that's what i heard from the care givers in remote alaska and talking about is that they then, not only is it the stretcher or the wheelchair or whatever their brought to in the hospital, that has to be searched, taken apart, and they are very invasively examined. this is absolutely -- mine was not anything compared to what it would be for these people, and this is alaska. this is the experience they go through under the current system, and that's what the legislature is hoping we do is revert to the less invasive. >> certainly, we have to secure airplanes. there's a terrorist threat. >> absolutely. >> but you would never pass somebody who has some sort of prothetic device or an implant

device or something like that in theory should not pass or get through the whole body imaging machines and others, so do you have a suggestion as an alternative? >> the fact is that until february 20th, i really had not thought much about this. i just kind of -- well, actually it was actually in october that i really started thinking about this, not october, november, but i have had many, many letters from many, many different people who traveled all over the world, been through all kinds of screening devices. as i understand it, there's two close friends go through in this last year, and both in holland and israel. they have extraordinarily successful screening devices that are very noninvasive, very. >> your personal experience, going back to the fourth

amendment under reasonable search and see see sure, these pat downs are invasive nonetheless. many of us believe this would be deemed a sexual assault on a person. >> absolutely. >> your personal expectative, 30 seconds here, based on what you've experienced in the pat downs, how would you relate that to the fourth amendment and the definitin of an assault? >> i think it's absolutely an assault, and it is the worst kind of assault in that it's essentially similar to reactions that people get with that. what i haven't seen are studies. what i'm not seeing is the oversight that gives us a chance to really look at this and find out what's happening to our americans. i'm worry the about my state,

but also my fellow americans. >> thank you, thank you, appreciate it. recognizing the gentleman from massachusetts for five minutes. >> representative, thank you for testifying today, particularly the difficulty is caused you, and it wasn't an good experience and it's not easy to testify. thank you for coming this way to testify today. you hit it on the head. everybody would like a less invasive, but equally effective process on that. that's what the oversight is trying to get to is that path. in the opening statement i made reference to the fact there is apparently a technology there that is being tested that would not give a full body image, but rather like a gumby or a stick figure and identify the only anomaly like if there's something strapped to your leg, and that's the only area patted down or investigated. do you have a feeling about that aspect of it?

do you think that that's still a problem? >> the problem appears to have been the not having done adequate study for their not to have been really the time taken to make sure that we're doing no harm, and that's -- that's the most critical role any lawmaker has is to do no harm, and not taking the time is something i think we have to fix. that is -- that's doing our job. >> i understand your take on that, and i understand congress has to take responsibility for that with the so-called shoe bomber after they faced the confrontation of doing nothing and that seemed in their collective wisdom to be the way to go because the situation was there and they did what they thought was best at the time and was told that was effective. my question in particular was if there's not an image of your

individual being up there like a stick figure or whatever, and if there's an anomaly detected in an isolated location of your body, and that area is the only area inspected, what is your reaction to that process? >> i think you have to look at the whole process. one triggers the other. it's created -- and the thing that's the most troubling to me is that as i look add all of the -- look at all the people on the airplane getting on, they are all guilty before they are proven innocent, and that we got to get away from that. we got to really start respecting people. >> i guess, are you saying basically let everybody on unless they have a tell-tale sign? >> absolutely not. absolutely we have to do the kind of screening that gets us the best result, but it doesn't have to be the -- thee technology that is there

now is not -- >> i get that. i wanted your opinion on an alternative one, but you don't want to give your opinion on it. >> not without facts, proof that it's good. not without proof that we've done our job. >> that goes without saying, but i'll yield back. >> the gentleman yield back. now recognizing the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much. and i can understand what you've been through. both my daughter and i had the misfortune of triggers these machines with an anomaly and the search we both endured was very invasive and you have the greatest empathy from me. one the things you didn't address or if you did, i was racing through your testimony and didn't hear it. my question is would you be willing to submit to some form of background checks surrendering your finger prints

to get into a trusted traveler program to get in a more trusted security? >> i would consider that to be reasonable, and that kind of alternative is one. there are others also that are doing -- using psychological procedures that actually help create a profile, not a racial and not a cultural profile, but one that actually will scan that identifies people who are obviously up to no good, and there are ways of coming up with that. that's been found in other places, but it's a matter of actually looking elsewhere and seeing if there aren't other options. there usually are. >> it's my understanding that the tsa profiles boxes, but they

don't pro file passengers. they profile a box based on its shape, country of origins, and from where it was shipped from. we take no effort at all to determine if you're flying in from, you know, middle america or a foreign country that's hostile to us. your level of screening is the same. that defies logic. that's not a question, but a speech. i'll yield back my time. >> we recognize the gentlewoman for five minutes. >> i thank the chairman, the committee, and the ranking member of the subcommittee especially for their curtesies, and i thank the chairman of the full committee and as well as the ranking member of the full committee for their curtesies. it's a pleasure to see you this morning. i'm not on this committee, but the ranking former chair of the

transportation security committee with oversight over tsa and on the homeland security committee. i will tell you that many of my waking hours address the question of professionalism and more training for the transportation security officers, and i think you would venture to say as one who needs flying as a mode of transportation that in most or many instances, our tso officers work within the realm that they have and use the skills in an appropriate manner, but you are right. we have to look at those issues that our colleagues have indicated may impact the fourth amendment, may impact the dignity of all travelers. i want to put on the record that i am going to join with the ranking member of our committee, homeland security, thompson, writing a letter to ask for alternative protocols for

individuals in your situation and also individuals who are traveling with medical devices and traveling with other medical equipment, traveling with a caretaker, and we expect to hear from them very soon and working with this committee. i do want to pose -- i look forward to utilize your testimony, your written testimony, and listen to my friend and colleague from texas about the trusted traveler and there are a lot of options that we could look at. my question to you would be to establish the fact that there are threats to the united states. you still believe that that is the case, is that true, representative? you have to be oral on the record so they can report it. >> thank you, thank you very much. yes, i certainly do agree with you, and it's absolutely essential living where we do on

the northwest perimeter of our country. we're right there. we're at the place where we really need to be constantly alert and that's exactly why i have the feelings i do is that i need to keep my population safe and strong so that they can be watchful too. we're the ones who are going to see trouble coming from another direction. >> you have the eyes and ears. >> yep. >> we laid that ground work and we know the transportation security officers play a valuable role in that, and you too watched that fateful christmas day when we saw a unique effort of trying to blow up a plane and harm the united states, the christmas day bomber. that generated this enhanced review if you will, so would you offer to me any other thats you have about briefly on what enhanced security measures you think we should take?

>> thank you very much, and the list of things that you're asking for, some kind of an exemption or a way people can avoid the more intense kinds of screening, any kind of prothesis at all is a problem. any kind of, not just medical, but when people have pacemakers, and the things that people are going through is just amazingly severe, and i agree with you that the tsa employees that i've seen are doing a really good job of improving their attitude, their treatment of the public seems to be improving, and so it's the procedures itself. >> just a few more minutes if i might just say. have you gone through an ait

machine? have you gone through those moshes? -- machines. >> that is the full body? >> yes. >> yes, i did twice actually. >> that's when they found something in one -- my point is to conclude by saying on that point you went through the ait. we thank you for that. we need to look at protocols that then respond to how we address individuals with medical concerns, devices, pros thet ticks, and with that, i yield back. thank you for your curtesy. >> thank you, glad you could join us. we now recognize the ranking member from maryland. >> thank you, first of all, representative, i want to thank you for being here today. sometimes when we are addressing issues that are very personal,

it's very, very difficult because what it says is that we are opening up ourselves to the public, so we'll be watching you on c-span tonight, some of them are washing you right now, and so you not only become exposed to, you know, a few folks, but you basically become exposed to the whole country, and for that, i thank you because you said some things that really touch me, and there's two elements that kind of hit me. one you talked about the training and whether this person was properly trained and you talk about curtesy, and then you

also talk about the invasiveness and the medical situation, and some kind of way, and then you also talked about how there's some things that people just should not have to go through, and i guess, you know, i'm just trying to make sure that we strike the balance. one thing for sure is we can try to make sure the tsa administrator brings some type of sensitivity training if they don't already to their folks. i have relatives with experience with medical situations and they have certain devices that might send off any machine or whatever, but i can understand that. they need to be sensitive to that too, and there's nothing that is worse than somebody not

being courteous to another human being. president obama has said something that i wish i had up vented myself -- invented myself. he said, "sometimes in our country we have an empathy deficit." empathy deficit. we've got to -- what i'm hoping is that your testimony will allow us to strike the balance, and i know you want -- you fully understand safety, but you also understand privacy. you understand making sure that a plane doesn't come down out of the sky, but you also are making sure -- you also know that there are millions upon millions upon millions of people who travel who don't have an idea or even think about bringing harm.

it's a tough one, and so, again, i want to thank you because i believe that your testimony will help us try to get to that balance that we need, and i've said so often when we go through something, it provides us with a passport because we have experienced it, to help other people and to help address their problems because we become the greatest witnesses. somebody just saying it, talking about it is one thing, but when you've been through it, that's a whole other thing. i don't have questions. i just wanted to thank you, thank you for after going through all that you've been through and being exposed all the ways you've been exposed and now to even go through another exposure for the sake of balance, for the sake of safety, for the sake of the rights of all of our citizens on behalf of

our congress and of our nation, i take this moment to simply say thank you. with that, i yield back. >> gentleman yield back. representative, we're concluding the first panel. do you have any concluding comment you want to make briefly? >> thank you, mr. chair, and mr. chair, actually, the comment that all of this has brought to me over the last several weeks that i've been really the focus of a huge number of people coming and telling me things they haven't told other people is that the sense i've gotten is there is many people who have been losing the trust of their government through this kind of thing and that doing this right, that's one of the things that we really do is we win back the hearts of our people, and i believe in government. i think government is the answer

in its own way, and it needs to keep that idea in a balance. we need both public and private, but government can answer a lot of problems that we have, but without trust, we're not going to keep the kind of democracy we have, so thank you. >> thank you. thank you. i appreciate your time, your bravery for being here and sharing a very personal story. it represents the story of a lot of americans, and we thank you for the time and effort that you've taken to be here. it's a long trek to be here, but i assure you it's worthwhile. we thank you, and god bless you. for now, we'll go into recess here for five minutes while we prepare for the second panel. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> the meeting will now come to order. starting our second panel with a note by mutual agreement we're told that the tsa will show up at 12:15, so we are going to try to have a third panel at 12:15. nevertheless, we. -- we want to start with the second panel, and we appreciate you being here today. i'll do brief introductions and sweer you in. mr. marc rotenberg, dr. david brenner is a physician of by yo physics, mr. fred cate is a senior policy adviser at hundredton and williams, and

mr. stewart baker is a partner of steptoe and johnson llp. we appreciate your credentials and look forward to your testimony. all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. please rise and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear the testimony you'll about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative p. we will now start with opening testimonies. we would appreciate if you limit your comments to five minutes, but your entire written statement is part of the record. mr. rotenberg, you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman and members of the committee. i appreciate the opportunity to appear today before you. i also wanted to thank you personally for the leadership that you have shown on this particular issue which is of great concern to the american public. i also want to begin by saying

that epic fully appreciates the important mission that the tsa has in the importance of protecting aviation security. there's no dispute about that today. what i'd like to do is describe for the committee the work that we pursued over the last five years concerning a particular airport screening technology that the tsa has adopted and now hopes to widely deploy in u.s. airports, and that is the body scanner technology. we became aware of this technology almost six years ago. we followed it at the very beginning the concerns raised about the privacy impact, about the health impacts, and also w4r the technology would be effective. we were cautious at the outset, and we wouldn't make any strong statements until we obtained more facts to understand how the technology would be used, so it began a series of freedom of information act requests. we were trying to understand the

tech technical specifications, the protocols, contracts arranged with the venders, and we began to work with expert organizations, civil rights groups, groups across the political spectrum, and groups in the travel industry. as we became aware of the concerns raised, we've joined with the organizations and submitted a petition to secretary that poll tan know in the spring of 2009 shortly after we learned of the tsa's plan to make these body scanners the primary screening technique in airports. this to us seemed like a sharp departure from what the agency previously said about this technology, and so 30 organizations wrote to the secretary in the spring of 2009 and respectfully asked her to conduct a applicant rule making so -- conduct a public rule making so

there's an opportunity for the public to express views on the tsa's program, and so the tsa's decisions on the comment were ultimately subject to some type of judicial review. we urged her to suspend further deployment of the technology for primary screening because we felt the case had not yet been made, that they were sufficiently tested, and i will say, mr. chairman, it was around this time as well that your bill which you introduced in the house passed through the house with more than 300 votes which was essentially trying to drive the agency back to the same position to keep these devices for secondary screening where they might be used for special cases. now, the story actually gets quite a bit more interesting because in jan of 2010, -- january of 2010, we obtained the first set of documents we requested on the freedom of information act, and i've

attached to my testimony a couple pages. we actually have thousands of pages that fall into two categories, one is the description of the devices, and the second category is traveler complaints that the agency has received. now the description of the devices, talking about the procurement specifications and the vender contracts are very significant. what these documents reveal is that the devices was tsa described to the venders, in other words, the specifications that the agency outlined was for devices that had the ability to store and record and transmit images of the naked human body. now, i'm quite sure there's going to be some back and forth this morning about that -- what that means. the agency says they don't save the images, store them for a temporary basis, and then they are deleted. i want to make clear we have

been in a lot of litigated similar issues and have obtained more than 100 images of a body scanner device very similar to the one used by the tsa. this is used by the marshall service in orlando florida in the courthouse of the images routinely stored and record the. the tsa itself subsequent to the documents acknowledge they weren test mode. when chairman thompson pushed further, they were storying images in training mode. now the agency has over 2,000 images and we're referring back to the tsa, details images. 2,000 they are not turning over to us because they don't want the public to see this for whatever reason. i will conclude. there's a lot in my testimony, but just in conclusion, the

privacy issues here are enormous. the fourth amendment implications are e nor nows. there's the harm we see and the harm we can't. that's what i'm here to discuss. >> thank you. dr. brener, same thing, pay attention to the light, and we now recognize you for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my name is david brenner, professor for radiation research at the columbia university. i think one should preface comments by prove the scanning of humans at airports is both desirable and clearly necessary. as you know, there are actually two different ait advanced imaging technologies currently deployed.

that's x-ray scannerrings and millimeter wave scanners. in many ways they operate in the exactly the same way, both the analogy of radar. the difference as in the name is the x-ray back scanners use x-rays, millimeter waves do not, and these radiation doses is proven that x-rays are a cars -- cars jen. i will focus on x-ray back scanners. the individual risk, the risk of one average person going through the scanner once. the dose is involved is extremely low, and that means that the risks and risks we're talking about are long term radiation induced, also extremely low. in fact, we can put numbers on

those risks so the risks of an average person going through the scanner, their risk of a long term induced cancer is about 1 in 10 million. by any stretch of the imagine nation, that's a strong risk. i agree with the tsa's characterization, in that context, these devices are safe. of course, though, there are caveats there. frequent fliers, for example, who can go through a scanner 200 times a year, the risk is 200 times that. a flight personnel goes through 300 to 400 times a year. the risks are higher. there are also populations that are more sensitive than average, children are the biggest example there. children are more sensitive to radiation induced cancer than adults are. that's individual risk. i go along with the general consensus that you can consider

them safe in that context, but there is another way we always need to think about risk, and that's what we call the public health or population risk, an that's to do with both the individual risk and the number of people exposed to the risk. if there's a small risk, a few people exposed to the risk, there's not much public health concern. if there's a small risk, large numbers of people exposed, then you have a public health concern. of course, the issue here is that the tsa's plan now is to, the goal is to have everybody scanned with these new technologies, and number wise that means 700 million scans a year at the moment increasing in a few years to 1 billion scans a year. we're talking about an extraordinarily large number of scanners, and you can make a population estimate. well, how many cancers would you think would be produced by a year's worth of scanning if you

had a billion scans 1234 the answer is around 100 cancers a year produced by a billion scans. it's important to stress there's a lot of uncertainties involveed in that number, but it's the best we can do and it's done with fairly standard approaches. even with 100 cancers a year, you can certainly make the argument. well, we're talking about risks and benefits, the benefits of not having our airplanes blown up would, in fact, counteract that, you know, relatively small risk, but because we have two technologies here, the millimeter wave scanners and the x-ray scanners and both are apparently equally effective at doing what they are designed to do, but the millimeter wave scanners do not have that potential for a long term population risk, but the sphrai

scanners do, to our mind it makes a lot of sense that we should be thinking more about the using millimeter wave scanners and less about using the x-ray scanners, and i'll stop my testimony there. thank you, mr. chairman. >> we applaud anybody who leaves a good solid 8 seconds on the clock. we appreciate that. thank you for your testimony. mr. cate is recognized. >> thank you, mr. chairman. can i have his eight seconds? >> they have come and gone. [laughter] >> i want to thank you and you your colleagues on the committee on this subject. the tsa is a department that touches more americans than any other agency which has the power that is has, and now it's touching them intim matily and now they choose not to fly to be subject to that scrutiny. because they are subjected to

policies that are not made public, the reviews on the equipment is not made public, the oversight of the committee is exceptionally critical, perhaps more so than any other area. i've been asked to address ait effectiveness, and this is somewhat a complicated issue because we can talk about the effectiveness of machines or more profitably talk about the effectiveness of the machines as they add to a system of security that the tsa is carrying out at airports. it's in the latter context we can say safely that ait's introduced a distractions into the security system that may be weakening rather than inhainsing our -- enhancing our security at airports. it's useful to remember what ait ts do. they do not detect firearms, explosive, danger materials. all they do is identify what they consider to be anomalies on the body of a traveler.

now, that's a limited function. it means if the traveler discreets something in his or her mouth or internally, they can get through without the ait detecting it. if we define anomaly as currently defined to mean anything that looks different than they expect, we are generating millions of false positives a year. this is, of course, why we have to take tissues out of our pockets, dollar bills, and candy. these are anomalies by the ait. despite the fact these are advertised to the american public, they can see through clothing to see if you present a risk. the opposite is true. they cannot determine what a risk is. we have turned the tsa into coat room attendants trying to get our anomalous goods off of us to go through the machine to leave less for the tsa to have to screen. this high rate of false

positives is a reason for concern. the other is we have a very difficult time clearing the anomalies that do go through the system. because, in fact, even with a pat down search, we often done note what the anomalies are, and i mentioned in my written testimony that i was reminded of this last week flying, i have dropped an aspirin in my pocket, forgot it, the machine identified it, and you could think the billion-dollar technology could tell the difference from a aspirin and a threat, but it cannot. this required a pat down. the agent said what is this? i said an aspirin. he said, thank you, go on through. ofof course, he had no idea what it is. whether it's a dangerous came call, or an excomploasive. he had no idea. i put it in my pocket and i walked through. the search gained nothing. that is true in following on the first witness this morning with most medical devices, and i

experienced this as a diabetic wearing an insulin pump. if i have that on, i'm subject to a complete pat down and if that makes it more likely that i will be a terrorist or if i take the insulin pump off, i'm left with a plastic can in my stomach that carries the insulin. this is an anomaly, and i'm subject to another pat down. the agent says what is that? i say it's a canoe la. okay, they have no idea what that is. they say thank you very much. they are invariably polite, and i walk on through. one out of five say, you're on an insulin pump and i walk on through. when i asked the tsa what is that they are worried, they say they are worried i have bombs inside of me, and that's the mechanism for setting that out of. i don't know how great that threat is, but i know the agent has no idea at the end of the ait and search whether that is

true or not. they just know they tee tected piece of tubing coming out of my stomach, and i gave an excuse for it. i respect the job they have and comment on the extent of which so many tsa agents i encounter are courteous and well-intentioned. i think they are as frustrated as we are by the irrational policies they are asked to carry out. thank you. >> an even more impressive one second on the clock. we can't thank you enough for wrapping up your testimony. i challenge mr. baker to beat the goal as we recognize him now for five minutes. [laughter] >> i appreciate being here. i'd like to make three or four points. first, we cannot start this by

what tsa wants to do, but what the al-qaeda wants to do on blowing up planes over the united states. they are conscious about the security and shapes weapons to meet them. if we stop looking for a shoe bomb, they will use them. if we stop looking for underwear bombs, nail use underwear bombs. with that constraint, knowing it has too look for weapons and ts a,'s measures are relatively effective and appropriately shaped to the nature of the threat. they have only changed their protocols by and large in response to demonstrated threats that could have brought don planes and the changes they made are aimed at finding those particular weapons. i won't go into the privacy

sections built into the systems. you'll hear from the tsa about those, but they are by and large effective. i've been through pat downs. i think i would take issue with people who describe it akin to a sexual assault. i thought it was professional and while i would much prefer a scanner, the pat downs are not a shocking experience, at least they were not for me. returning to the caveat because i think there is a way in which tsa is not doing what it should and could. it is still looking for weapons. all of the measures it has adopted since 9/11 are focused on looking for weapons, and as representative cissna said, we are all treated as potential terrorists, suspects, and screened in the same fashion. we do not look for terrorists,

and the reason tsa does not look for terrorists is because it doesn't know enough about the people it's dealing with to identify a risky traveler. it doesn't know as much as a state trooper who stops someone on the highway knows about the person they've just stopped. it certainly doesn't know as much as other dhs elements like the border and customs agencies know about people coming across the border where, in fact, they know more and are able to move the travelers much faster. it doesn't even know as much as united airlines. if you said who is going to do a better job of using data to find terrorists? united airlines would have more data to use than tsa. this does not make sense, and that brings moe -- me to my last point which is we've probably taken the search for weapons as far as we can. there's people who think we have taken it too far. there's certainly possibilities for weapons.

i don't think we have developed fred's aspirin bomb, but there are possible weapons and places to hide them that are search for weapons is not going to find them, and therefore, we have to spend more time looking for possible terrorists, risky travelers, and i would submit that most people who travel today would say if i could give information, if the fact that i was just discharged from the hospital after an operation was information that available to tsa so that they could verify my story and speed me through the line, that would be a much better step than having everyone screened in the fashion they are currently screened, and so my suggestion for this committee, for the homeland security committee is that we allow tsa to set up voluntary programs, giving people a choice between a pat down and a scan, why not let

people say, you know, you can have any travel information, basic background information on me, if that will make the screening more effective and faster, i'd rather do that than go through the scan every time or the pat down every time. my suggestion for ways to improve the system that we have, potentially reduce some of the intrusiveness of the screening is to begin a process in which people can voluntarily agree they can give up information in exchange for a faster screeningment thank you. >> thank you. i continue to be impressed by the prompt nature of our panel. i would dually note that for future panel the moving forward. nevertheless, we look to move to the questioning phase. i'll start by recognizing myself for five minutes. mr. baker, you make an important point. many of us are concerned what happens if the tsa is more --

tsa screening theater than truly targeting those who pose the greatest risks. i, for one, believe the challenge before this country is how do we become more effective and less invasive? we should not have to give up our personal privacy in order to secure an airplane. no one has to look at my kids or grandma naked to secure an airplane. we shouldn't except anything less. i would ask nms concept to enter into the record three articles dealing w-9 same topic. $19 billion later, the bomb detector is a bomb. trying to fair out exclosive devices and the components there of have the conclusion that the best way to find the bomb making materials whether they are in

the car is the good old fashioned dog. nothing like a good german shepherd that's less invasive, much less costly. my fear is what the dogs don't have is they don't have lobbyists, and i really do worry that we have propelled ourselves into this false sense of security that these machines work, that they are safe, and that we're not storing any images, and i have challenges on all three of those fronts because through my research and the information i've seen, i don't know that that's true. again, i ask unanimous concept to enter these into the record. >> no objection, are those the studies or articles? >> articles referencing the study. >> thank you. >> without objection, they are entered into the record. let's talk particularly with this panel. i want to start with you, dr. brenner on talking about the safety.

i worry about the 65,000 people that are around tsa in close proximity to the machines on a daily basis. there's pregnant women, and even pregnant women working at the airports, people with pacemakers -- there was an article in "usa today" with a statement from tsa on friday saying that the machines they had tested were emitting ten times the allowable dose of radiation or the normal doze of radiation. do you have any insight into the release of that data and that information? >> well, coming to the final comment about the factor of ten, my understanding is it was an error in analyzing the data. >> are you aware of who conducted the test on the machine? >> i'm not. >> my understanding is the people who conducted the tests on the machines was the

manufacture of the machines. do you have any insight as to whether or not how that strikes you? >> well, it doesn't give you a great deal of confidence, of course. >> i guess that's -- as a member here, this concerns me. the people conducting the tests on the machines are the manufacturers, and even they have come to the conclusion that one-third of their machines are emitting ten times the rate. they'll say that that is a mathematical error, a training error, we didn't calculate it properly, but i -- we can't make mistakes with pregnant women and people with pacemakers. what would be the effect of somebody who is repeatedly in high doses exposed to that type of radiation? >> well, coming back to your first comment. it's very true that the general scientific community does not have access to doing measurements on these machines so we are reliant on studies

commissioned by the tsa or the manufacturers. >> what's been your experience in accessing that data and information along the way from the tsa? >> we have actually, mr. chairman, we recently submitted a request to the agency to make those materials available. we don't have expertise in that field, but it is our information that should be available to dr. brenner and others that those with expertise and others can provide judgment. >> mr. rotenberg if i could and mr. cate, the 9th circuit court of appeals has allowed tsa pat downs deemed as legal as long as it is close limited in its intronsiveness -- intrusiveness. >> very briefly. about the 9th and 3rd circuit

said that these techniques have to be minimally invasive and effective, and our case against the tsa is, in fact, they meet neither test. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would just echo that and add that when the national academy of sciences panel met for two years to look at the question of programs such as this, it recommended dooms of a framework that congress requires agencies wanting to deploy equipment like this to determine both intrusiveness and effectiveness. they do it on the record with goals and do it in a way to congress can provide oversight despite the fact that tsa paid for the study, they have not implemented the framework. >> thank you. i recognize the gentleman from massachusetts. >> i just want to comment, mr. chairman, the panel did a great job of keeping the time better than the chairman. [laughter] not being a stickler for time.

i don't say that. it's just humor. >> guilty as charged. i agree. >> we need to take the time we need to take on the serious issue, but y'all did much better. thank you. first of all, i thought your testimony was very interesting and very good, and i thank you for it. you're an expert on the technical security aspect or privacy aspect? >> privacy aspects and security systems, but not the technical side of this, that's why i didn't direct my testimony to that point. >> i thought the comments you made i was seeing the privacy angle, and then you hit the other angle. none more interesting than the last comment you made about there being a recommendation by the national academy of sciences for a proposed framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the privacy impact. your testimony is that the tsa is not doing that on every plan that they put forward? >> that is my testimony, sir.

i would say, of course, if they are doing it in ranking member classified -- a class classified environment, i would not know that. >> we'll have to ask them. >> i don't know if the particular framework of the national academy of sciences was followed, but certainly the machines were put through substantial testing even at the beginning of the end of the bush administration so they've been in testing for quite some time. >> but we're not sure whether it was the nas protocols or not? >> i have to say everybody has an idea on how to do the testing better, slower, have public comment, a judicial review, # but, you know, we had an underwear bomber christmas of 2009. these machines were deployed in thanksgiving of 2010. that was remarkably slow. if we had waited for mr. cate's process, we'd be standing around

with our hands in our pocket. >> all right. dr. brenner, one thing to clear up. to my knowledge, nobody refutes the fact there was a mathematical error made by the manufacturer what they tested it; is that right. >> yes. >> it's important to understand what the situation was, but there's a math error and whether or not that makes them bad at math is one question, but we have to get the facts on it. your testimony raises potentially serious public health concerns, so i want to understand it correctly on this. the american college of radiology released a statement, and it said they were not aware of evidence that either of the scanning technologies of the tsa is considering would present bilogical risk for passengers screen. before that, the food and drug administration, the national substitute for standards and technology, and the john hopkins university physics laboratory all determined the radiation

doses for individuals scanned by x-ray back scatter machines was minuscule and far below the industry guidelines. according to those studies, one x-ray back scanner scan is equivalent to roughly two minutes of traveling in an airplane in altitude, one hour spent outside, or eating one baa banana. do you disagree with the three studies that say the total radiation expoture given by one bang scanner is equal to the every day activities? >> well, i don't think it is to eating a banana, but i agree in general with the comment of the individual risk from a single traverse of the machine is small. i gave you a risk estimate of one chance in 10 million which is by any stretch of the imagine mages small. i don't have a disagreement with

the comments other than the banana. >> you say your best estimate is that 1 billion scans potentially cause 100 cancers per year? >> yeah, multiply a billion by one in 10 million, and that's what you get. >> people can get cancer from stepping outside or two minutes in an airplane? >> there's no doubt that a lot of cancers that we get in our every day existence, i mean, 40% of us get cancer, are radiation induced. we know this to be true. . .

it would be great if the community had access to these machines. we do not. >> thank you. on the yield back. [laughter] >> without noting the time, we will move to recognize and the gentleman from arizona for five minutes. >> in my former life i was a dentist for 25 years.

we do understand there's kenya with aspects of the

and the uncertainty. >> it seems to me the point we keep bringing up in this committee is a self reporting numbers based upon government agencies. and so we are reliant on with the government gives and it doesn't seem we are parlaying of those or comparing apples to apples. a lot of times to compare apples to tangerines, so we are having problems with that data and it seems to be the biggest problem here. mr. baker you diluted to something interesting. i'm from arizona as well, and you talk about a multitask affect that tsa is in the gifted in regards to analyzing certain factors of its passengers and actually have noted something about border security. isn't there a place for the enter agencies to be developing cross referencing of looking at passengers? and what would hold that up? >> absolutely there is. the cbp has access to a lot of

information and uses it well. they easily scrutinized about one out of 200 of the people who crossed the border, and the rest just walk through with 30 seconds or less showing their passports. and providing more of that information to the tsa said that tsa can make decisions about the type of screening that it will do for passengers is something that should happen. it has begun to have been i understand in the context of flights from europe to the united states. not so much the information is shared by the there are shared decision making process these. i think the tsa will be nervous about getting that information because in the past congress had made a big fuss about them having any information about traveler's claiming that tsa has a travel dossier on us and so it would be helpful if they got a

certain amount of authorization or encouragement to actually use the data in a don't think i'm the right person to address that. that has certainly been where they analyze the quality images to work backwards to figure out

how much radiation those must have been given to produce those images from arizona state and the conclusion was the doses had to be hired than the dozers the manufacturers are suggesting. >> do you have an opinion on that? >> on the broad issue of whether these are an effective -- are they worth the risk i would say they are not worth the risk and in fact much to the annoyance of mr. baker's earlier point russians in fact knowing more about travellers or those that wish to have known more about them would be far more effective. one of the things we always say on securities is focus your resources on the greatest risk. we've got the entirety of the system of doing the exact opposite >> thank you very much. i yield back my time. >> the gentleman yields back with an impressive time frame. now i iran denies the gentleman from maryland for five minutes.

>> mr. baker, i want to follow-up on some of the questions that the ranking member if you recall he was asking about a number of issues and they're seem to be some -- they look at these measurements in different ways and so we are in the situation congress has to make critical decisions about the nation's homeland security and public health based on the scientific evidence. it seems to be all kind of ways they do these measurements. and the questions have been come up with regard to those measurements. considering the conflicting scientific estimates on this issue and the sycophant of the security risks, what you think mr. baker should be the next

steps that congress should take? should we request further scientific analysis one of the actual results on the machines instead of just using extrapolate it estimates? is that -- >> i'm not a medical experts and so i am cautious about expressing the view on that. i can tell you there are some costs to the leyba only on the risk of the travelling public but for those who are worried about waste and abuse in government right now there are two competing machine suppliers to do body imaging. if you say we are not going to buy from the people who use backscatter x-rays than you are giving the other machine supplier of the monopoly and you are going to get the reply is that reflects that monopoly so it will have a significant cost, and i think you need to bear that in mind as to make a decision. >> well, professor kane, a

privacy law professor at indiana university stated in his written testimony, and i quote, and since imaging technology is generally not effective at the greatest security of airplanes and airports. in fact, it appears the way in which the tsa has deployed the machines actually may be determining, undermining rather the security of the u.s. transportation infrastructure, and of course. mr. baker, do you agree with the professor assistant? >> i think that these clearly add to our security. perhaps if you compare this technology to some imaginary technology that was perfect you would say these machines are not as good as that imaginary technology. but if you compare them to the magnetometers that are the alternative they are clearly much more effective at finding things that now could be used as weapons that couldn't be used 20

years ago, and therefore they are very likely the best alternative we have today. obviously would be great to find something better. i am a big believer in all this but the only work for about half an hour and then they have to go play and the cost 30 or $40,000 a year on that basis. so it's a great solution although i guess i have to say i have a golden retriever who's searches of me are more intrusive than the tsa has been. this may be the best deployment for the next five years. >> tsa has evaluated and testing advanced imaging technology in the field since 2007 and deployed the machines slightly in 2010. mr. baker, in your experience has the ait team's been testing field use and are you aware of

other technology that is readily deployable on a mass scale and has a reasonable chance of preventing the terrorist attack from explosive brought on to an airplane? >> i'm not. we did do quite a bit of testing in 2007, 2008. we had high hopes for the machines which would use explosive detections basically of an electronic nose, and they just didn't work reliably enough. they are much more reliable, and i would be happy if we could use chemical sampling than the technique ait uses but we haven't found a way to make that work effectively yet. >> finally, in his testimony mr. rotenberg testified they should use the cost of ait for primary screening in the 2000 line legislation would restrict the use of the ebit to a

secondary screening only. in other words, only if the change in our pockets set off the metal detector to be directed to the whole body scanner. mr. baker on your experience does it make sense to use ait only for secondary screening? >> i think that's nuts. the whole point of the underwear bomb was that he didn't set off the magnetometer because of was designed not to set off the magnetometer and so only using technology the defined and underwear bomb when somebody set off the magnetometer is to use it in the context where it doesn't matter. >> i see my time is expired. pfannenstiel i now recognize the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you. i appreciate if the witnesses would indulge if i kind of bounce around with several different questions. they've undergone the pat-down and do not find this intrusive. was this the pat-down you took when you opted out or have you triggered an anomaly and receive

a secondary more intrusive pat-down? >> i've gotten the opt out search and i have set off the anomalies with change in my pockets but the search consisted of having to show what set off the anomaly. so i'm confident there certain kinds of anomalies the would produce a more detailed search but i haven't been through it. >> i have. you don't want to be through it. >> this one is to dr. brenner. have you done any studies regarding to the exposure of the tsa agents, on the typical for a logical applications x-ray technicians are required to wear detection devices to determine their a can of the exposure to the radiation. are we doing anything to protect our agents from radiation that may spell out of these machines? >> the film badge monitor won't

protect the tsa agents but will certainly give an estimate for the future use what they are being exposed and it makes no sense to me whether they're wearing fell because film badges to be in any medical setting anybody has any association with ionized radiation. >> i don't know if you are married or not, but i am going to assume you are. would you let your pregnant wife goes through one of these machines? >> i probably would not. >> okay. and you indicate that the backscatter x-ray is more dangerous than the millimeter wave technology. are there any risks associated with the wave technology we are aware of at this point in time? >> the scientists were trained never to say something is perfectly safe but there is no evidence of risks associated with the millimeter wave and there are no biological mechanisms that are established

that would lead us to conclude that there are risks associated which is in contrast to the x-ray situation we know exactly how the x rays cause cancer. >> great. and your organization is a privacy advocacy group that i've been familiar with for some time and only understand your stance on the intrusiveness of on these especially the ones that show the image. what would your organization stance be or if you can't speak for your organization commodore stance on the actual voluntary trusted traveler program where the government is able to database certain information about you to allow you to bypass this type of invasive scanning. speed the police study those programs as well, and i think what we have concluded is that there is simply no silver bullet. for example, the traveler

program which was a registered traveler program had collected a lot of biometrics on the frequent fliers that were 100,000 deep background checks so they could get the certification and go through the lines more quickly and found themselves in financial trouble. >> they went out of business right after i gave them my credit card. [laughter] >> i can sympathize with that. >> but the story gets worse because having collected this extraordinary amount of personal information used to conduct the authentication in the airport that was the chief business on set and they turned around and wanted to sell the database that had required and it took the class of customers that accompanied them to actually going to the court of new york and say you can't do that, you can't sell our personal information that we. so my warning and while i do not disagree that a lot could be done to improve the assessment of the passengers as one of the recommendations of the iata,

this approach has been tried and there are some risks. >> do you think the airlines might be a better organization? i know the continental airlines keeps good track and every time we get 35,000 miles to get a free trip. >> it is 25,000 on united by the way. >> hopefully we will get a better in this the merger. this is one of the things that has always seemed odd. in other words of the concern is trying to make sure the people you know which is another way of saying the people you can trust go through more quickly the airlines to have the information. peter the frequent fliers and the people you know less well are the people you want to look more closely. that's the basis of the approach that's recommended by the international aviation transportation association. >> thank you. i yield back my - two seconds. >> the gentleman yields back and recognizes the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much. i'm going to the gentleman,

think you for your testimony for some rapid-fire questions if i might. dr. brenner, is anything we can do to fix the ait machines in your opinion? >> recall there were two different types of machines, the millimeter wave has far as we go to the camano don't have long-term. the x-ray machines potentially do and certainly one of the things we should do is have these machines available for the general scientific community to study them rather than just have to use

>> for any individual going through the scanner if you have a billion a year which is where we are heading, a very large number of stands each with a small individual riss would ultimately lead to the population. >> would you complete -- and i take issue with the billions the wino that our previous with this indicated trouble for her is airplanes you could see it would be important and not ended to

try to mend the situation that we are addressing in the security and equal concern as well? >> of course we are trying to make the risk benefit and that is the millimeter wave. >> mr. baker are you familiar with the lone wolf concept how are you? familiar with the individual act of terrorism and don't need to be in a crowded. had we ever seen before the eshoo bomber that kind of incident, was that a first for the united states? >> that was a first. it's been a positive first for mr. abdullah on christmas day when we discovered someone had enhanced their body? >> a was a first as well. >> can you suggest, if i could very quickly, refer you to

administrator pistol's comments about the idea of the multi layered concept of technology -- excuse me, of imaging the evidence imaging technology into the multi layer approach of the security, is that important? >> i think it is. we have to get al qaeda the strong sense that the tactics don't work and the advanced imaging technology is the only approach other than very intrusive pat-down said that make us reasonably comfortable that al qaeda can't with bombs and to their underwear and get on planes. so yeah i think it is our best current use in the context of the broad approach. >> and you can see we live in a new world. >> absolutely. >> - a strong champion of the fourth amendment and the opposition to the unreasonable search and seizure. you testified that ait may be

capable of transforming the passengers. the tsa testifies both types of machines imported are currently in capable of storing or transmitting images. do you dispute this testimony that the machines are currently not capable of storing or transmitting images? >> absolutely. on page nine of my testimony that is the technical specifications. >> are you suggesting you want to completely e. eliminate a major force in security or would you suggest we amend it and not in it? >> to be clear our techniques have to be effective and have to comply with the fourth amendment. >> let me just indicate to you that by introducing legislation that will require the tsa to retain but also indicate they cannot in any way hold the images or they have the capacity to do so, would that be a

comfort to you? >> i would like to see the technical specifications. i am saying if you look at page nine, it will tell you exactly what they can do. they can enable or disable the filters that can access the test mode. they can export the rall image data in test mode. that is the tsa requires the vendors provide. >> i would end by saying that i think mr. rotenberg's representation is his, and we will look forward to making sure we fix but not in the the problem. >> thank you. the gentleman yields back. we recognize the chairman of the transportation committee mr. mika for five minute. >> thank you. when i had the responsibility for putting together the transportation security system for the united states after the

9/11 attacks of course i looked for different models. a british were probably the best in advising us because they were the only country that had a countrywide system for screening and also the had been plagued by terrorist attacks, domestically for years. additionally, i contacted various federal agencies, and i talked to those who run the federal maximum security prisons and other state organizations who also dealt with probably the most the face of types of screenings of both prisoners and people who visited them.

i was told even with a body cavity search which i don't even want to describe here with screenings, with electronic equipment that both drugs, contraband weapons penetrated the system. i've been a strong advocate of using whatever means we can put in place that would provide us security but i do believe in the earlier system that we have launched several efforts, very expensive. when the chechen bombers destroyed aircraft we were seeking a quick solution. we knew we didn't have deployed at the airports the equipment

and i was told that offer would be the answer. i went to new jersey and tested the cover, went through at least three times with some material that should have set it off and none of the three times did it set it off. but i was assured it was just a technical problem and they started as you know and expensive deployment and was not advised when they were deploying the backscatter ashes and millimeter all the light interest them to look to the millimeter wave i must say they had been supportive of using had financed technology that i think the important thing is testing. i was told the puffers would work and didn't. god only knows where they are sitting and i asked the

committee staff to fiasco. now we are going to buy $1.5 billion of equipment. i had the equipment tested. the results are classified and i asked the members to review them. i can tell you the equipment is badly flawed. it can be subverted. our staff went out and subverted of the equipment. they informed me in a very simple manner mr. kissell said well, they require more training and the gao is clever. what does he think the terrorists are? terrorists have gone from a very sophisticated shoe device and i was awakened in texas in the liquid bombers and we put in measures to try to deal with that. the diaper i had in january

tested the system for the pat-down which is supposed to catch what this equipment doesn't catch or be another device. i can tell you i can thwart the system not only visually, and not that clever, but most folks know they are not going to touch your junk and more than enough dangerous material can't get through because that system is flawed, too. i'm very concerned about the testing of this equipment before it was deployed and looks like we have a bigger's one our hands. and if it wasn't half a billion it's going to be another half a billion because they couldn't possibly use the existing personnel or transfer some of the positions of the 3,770

bureaucratic positions in washington to get their butts out working on line. of course making $105,000 on average a year and mr. pascrell told me yesterday when i went before the appropriations committee distort the average at $28,000 a year. we have also seen them move from a diverse now to cargo. they are slightly by passing these machines, would you say they are planning to blow up planes over the sky with electronic remote devices and would you say that would be effective? let the record reflect all - head shakes.

>> finally, with the surgical implant i would leave this question with you. we know that now the folks that gave us some of these devices and attempts are moving to the body cavity inserts which we saw in saudi arabia and the surgical implants. is this equipment, can you tell me will that detect that kind of a threat? i see mr. brenner, you need to mobilize this for the record. >> no, they cannot. >> i confirm know it, it cannot penetrate. >> no, it would not. >> do you care to -- >> i agree. >> thank you. we now recognize the gentleman from massachusetts for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses for their help of the committee. there are privacy concerns raised by the use of the advanced imaging technology and

we are all looking for ways to maximize security while minimizing intrusions on the privacy. ai understand that the tsa is currently testing software used in europe on the machines that show only the screen with a humanistic figure, something like this. actually more like gumby than a stick figure. this is a way of identifying an anomaly on a passenger without revealing particular details of that person body and from the privacy standpoint to allow an officer to physically inspect the area of the body where the anomaly occurred. but at no point in this system would any human being ever see an actual picture of the passenger being screened. they would be capable of

deploying this software across many of its machines in a matter of weeks or on months. >> with the employment of this software results the privacy concerns raised by your litigation? >> let me make a few brief points. regarding the european experience, it is important to note very few european countries are adopting the ait. manchester airport has id which is where the automated target recognition software is being deployed. it will be tried and dropped. we are really alone right now at this point in treating the air travelers as we do in this country. but people do point to this because they have applied to the atr and it's a different configuration. the other thing you need to know about this is that the tso what the remote delinks location, it will be standing there in front

of the passenger looking at the so-called gumby image and identifying the person now in front of them by the way the areas of the body from the anomalies and that would then lead to the subsequent pat-down to resolve with the anomaly is. you could say that is less intrusive because the image is not as detailed, of course with the tsa tour was previously is the reason they have the tsl in the remote viewing facility is to avoid the problem of the viewing passenger. now you are back into the realm. the other problem is the devices will still record the image and its unfiltered form. all of these techniques it is simply a photo processing technique like when you have a digital camera. you take a word from no and you can make a black and white, convert it if you want to, but what you start with is the actual image and that is with the tsa will have and the

remains our concern. we think more needs to be done to try to resolve the problem of the unfiltered image that the device will capture. >> but, in terms of -- if there is no need -- if they aren't using the detailed image to make their assessment, i'm assuming that it would be less problematic. >> it's a bit of a trade-off. the image that is displayed on the screen will be less detailed. no dispute. on the other hand, the image that is captured will be the same and instead of being in the remote rooms will now be in front of the passenger so that is roughly where you wind up. >> the current system in front of the passenger, they have to actually. others bhatia so in front of the

passenger and he's communicating by headset with another tso and the to tso in the remote viewing rooms as we have a problem under the right arm and you need to look there. >> meter dak tso under this scenario that will be looking a detailed image of the passenger. >> would be a generic figure. now i will say -- >> i don't see how the privacy dimension is encountered here if you're looking at this what does it matter whether the person is in front of the passenger or not if they are not looking at a detailed image of the passenger? >> yeah understand that part, and they are not using the detailed imaging for any purpose in this process, so i imagine that could be deleted.

>> i want to point out also in terms of the rollout when the administrator was asked about the use of the stickney class number this was in front of the senate commerce committee he expressed a lot of concern and said it was at least in testing creating a lot of false positive. maybe they've solved this. >> my time is expired. >> the gentleman yields back and i now recognize the gentleman from california of this committee for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> is helpful to the questions and answers coming before this particularly mr. lynch i appreciate yours and the transportation chairman because i think a lot of people have worked hard on understanding how thoroughly useless this technology currently is. that is an assumption i am making but let's walk through so if i make sure i have an

agreement at the current time with the 50,000 tsa professionals we only check a small fraction of the passengers is in the true if you get all the places including san diego where to be honest we have all the stations accept in order not to back up downtown san diego they do random anecdotal if you will. so first of all from the security standpoint, we are not secure it is just majority of passengers do not go through if they are necessary. do you agree with that? >> i'm sorry, i don't. >> you think if we just pick up half the people we are going to stop the bomb at random? >> screening has a value for the touring terrorists. they don't want to take the risk they will get picked up. >> these people are willing to blow themselves up and you think they're scared of getting caught? >> they do not want to get arrested and failed. so the random screening does have a place.

i would prefer -- >> let's continue along because this is the old problem we have, you take away our civil rights and say but it has some value but certainly not enough. crazy people who put shoes in their bombs, you are saying they wouldn't have done it if they felt they might be caught, is the right mr. baker? they thought they might be called? >> much less likely to try. >> we will assume these products cut in half the likelihood of the bomb blowing up an airplane. we will give you that. is it worth 57,000 individuals and the countless millions of dollars to cut in half but not even come close to eliminating them would be my rhetorical question. mr. rotenberg i want to go through a couple of items with you. if it is possible to have technology to do completely automated checks using something similar to these products so

that there is no human element accept an x in the case of the high likelihood of something which is a legitimate anomaly would you say when that technology is ready to be used you would consider it? if it met all of those requirements? i want to qualify you a

i gave them all my fingerprints and i was dismayed when i found out they were going to sell their assets, but in fact i pay to give them more

than in this library year about what they ask the simple question including you, mr. baker since you think everything helps a little, false id is easy to get, people get it every day when they come to th

>> a false sense of security, and, in fact, are a part of a security peter, as i call it, that don't give the degree of confidence that i would like to see. your concern is that just by going through the metal detector there are things that go undetected. conversely aren't there things that go through a whole body imaging and that go undetected. >> not effective at coming up. >> are you familiar with the government accountability of this, unclassified report in march of 2010 that said, ," it remains unclear whether the a

icy would have detected the weapon used in the dec. 20 -- 2009 incident. >> i'm aware of that, and i understand the argument they are making. it remains unclear to outright that, as well, i will point out. the important thing to say here. there is no perfect solution. we have to find a solution that is better than what we have. and i don't see something better than these machines. >> while you mocked the idea of using a dog because you have an overly aggressive schnauzer. >> i don't mean to market. it is a great idea. it just -- >> would you agree or disagree with the pentagon that says that this is a more effective way than the current -- we have a slide. i just returned from afghanistan to with three weeks ago. if we could pull up that slide. how many whole body imaging machines to you think we have deployed? >> i have the idea. >> how many have reemployed it to a rock or afghanistan where

we have literally over 1,000 of our men and women in harm's way where we have to deal with threats on a daily basis. what i am looking at is people who are really, truly concerned about what is going on in the green zone, dealing with improvised explosive devices which come at them in every way, shape, or form. we are not applying whole body imaging bit machines, but dogs that work for 20 minutes, wholly inaccurate. that tsa is failing us because they have so become it insisted on technology. technology for technology's sake does not work. technology is great, but if it does not work it is not good. what i worry about is as this is someone from massachusetts pointed out, it's going to a dummy-like kind of thing. what if the technology is not working? i wish there was a full solution, and we did not have to a deal with the reality of a threat that there are truly terrorist that want to kill people and broke things up.

i worry that the tsa is a little too anxious to deploy technology even though we know from of parallel experience in afghanistan and pakistan and what not, they are so quick to deploy technology at an enormous cost, an invasion of technology, when there are things out there that will make us more secure. i show us this picture because three weeks ago they were not importing whole body imaging machines, but dogs. >> we have one of the most highly secure events, the state of the union, they bring in the dogs. i worry that we deploy $30 million bringing in with the suggestion that they work only to find out that they did not. the last point, and mr. baker, i appreciate all of you being here. there was one part of your testimony that troubled me, this part that you found that -- this is a quote from your testimony. critics are making a privacy mountain out of a molehill. you also said privacy concerns

are counterproductive. in this day and age when we are trying to balance the for the amendment, the right of americans to be secure, how do you justify saying that the privacy concerns are counterproductive? we heard testimony from the representative to say that critics are making a privacy mountain out of a molehill. >> absolutely. because if we had listened to the privacy advocates we would have no machine is deployed, no protection against the kind of bombs that were used on december 205th of the then magnetometers that do not work. that is the result of privacy lobbying. i think it is counterproductive. >> i, for one, wholeheartedly disagree. i think that a lot of people have offered a reasonable use of certain machines in certain instances. i, for one, believe that as a secondary screening device the whole body imaging machine does have a certain place. somebody has a hip replacement,

knee replacement, i think that is a productive use. >> i guess the question or the encouragement i would have moving forward is to try to find a balance between the fourth amendment we have, increasing the security of the airport, lessening the invasive this which is what we should be striving for. i now recognize that the woman from brought -- massachusetts. >> thank you, mr. chairman. think our witnesses. an interesting idea. i don't know if anyone has the technical expertise that warrants the fair question. i think mr. baker, with the a icy detect a powder or liquid explosive? >> my understanding is that it can detect unusual balks, volumes, and different textures that don't match the body or that are not, you know, don't fit the body profile.

but to some extent there is an amount of judgment in that. one of the things i worry about with these county figures is that judgment is going to be made by the machine. we have to make sure that they can do that right. >> so at any rate it would not identify it as a powder or liquid explosive, something normally not on a body. >> could i speak to that? >> short. >> we have to have had time to procure the specifications. the rich questions you asked is on page. it is the key excerpts. i can tell you looking to the documents, the problem, the threat assessment and the tsa began the ai t was plastic knives, ceramic kinds, plastique, c-4, dance, nonmetallic images. ..

>> there's not any evidence there's a public health safety problem, but because going to one supplier keeps the costs lower so we may use one with a public safety question over one that doesn't for a cost

effectiveness measure. >> there will be a cost to going to a single sole supplier for something as significant as this purchase. >> we have to decide whether or not the cost outweighs the risk. >> absolutely. the tsa view has been that all the studies suggest that the risk is -- >> we should explore that a littlement finally, not to be contentious, mr., but to raise the point that, again, we should go back to having a framework for evaluating the effectiveness and privacy on everything. there are 300ai 1-rbgs machines -- 300 ai 1-rbgs machines in iraq and afghanistan. i quote from an article from march 1, 2003 that examined the possibility of replacing bomb- sniffing dog. they require rigorous training, testing, and validation exercises and various

operational scenarios and with different types of explosives. the animal's performance requires retraining declines over time, and after extensive fieldwork, the dogs were tired after 30-120 minutes. dogs exhibit comaipging moods tray can affect performance and they trigger false alarms because they detect chemicals that can appear in other forms other than bombs, and terrorists can move to bombs with little vapor. i wouldn't totally exclude dogs, however, i think they are to be put through the same evaluation process for privacy indications with that. as we move forward, we'll try to do that. >> any other members seeking to ask questions of this panel? with that, we will thank the panel members for their

participation, your efforts, your time in preparation of this testimony. it would allow also for five legislative days for members to submit other information. we would also ask and hope you cooperate if members have additional questions that they submit those to you. if you can provide the answers back to us, we'll make sure the other members of the committee have that. we thank you for your expertise, insight into this, and thank you for your time and effort to be here today. the second panel is adjourned. >> we had talked about as they dismiss here, we need time to set up the third panel, but i've learned this committee room is scheduled and committed to that needs to set up and whatnot from 1:15 on. consequently, it's going to be the chairman's prerogative to delay what was supposed to be two gentleman from the tsa that were going to be here as part of the second panel insisting they

have to have their own hearing and can't sit next to someone they disagree with, that we are going to delay that third panel and reschedule it hopefully the first week of april. >> mr. chairman, i don't understand this at all. we have this whole discussion, resolve the issue, we've asked the tsa to come here. they are here. they came across to accommodate the chairman, having this on their panel now or separately now is not a time at all. it takes a minute half for new name tags and 45 minutes minimally to have this hearing which extends this 45 minutes. there's no rational for that. i'm upset of the process we were cooperative. tsa came downtown. it would be effective for them to testify. it's inappropriate, and your reason is not sound enough to give us a true matter of why you won't let them proceed. i ask the chairman reconsider,

allow them to come out now, they have 45 minutes. you can have them come out again, we can work that out for another term, but the way of having gone through the process this morning, bringing the chairman and the ranking member of the full committee in, discussing it out, having an agreement, inviting them here, sending them away is totally inappropriate and disrespectful frankly. >> well, i appreciate the comments and working nature of our staff and the members have here together, nevertheless, i do believe this is of keen interest to most every member on this committee. i want to allow adequate time to hear their testimony and members to question them. we are also under committee rules allowed to have multiple rounds of questioning. we have right now just a handful of members here without any sort of notice that would give them adequate time. we have run over by a good 15 minutes longer from the time we thought we would start the third panel.

in deference to those members who do want to participate on this panel and ask questions given the late nature of which this second panel was there and begin the fact that -- given the fact they had notice, we had planned on, they committed to being here for this panel number two, they certainly had adequate time to do that. i don't want to step on -- >> rather than relit gat -- >> the gentleman will -- if the gentleman -- >> i have a difficult time. >> the gentleman will suspend -- >> i don't know why i should agree. >> no, the gentleman will suspend. the agreement was they were going to come here and participate on the second panel. they refused to do so, and they came to that election by themselves. >> the chairman not present this morning when they were going to come -- >> i will be happy to yield. >> why don't you? >> no, not until i'm finished. >> you're not happy. >> i'm not happy. not until i finish these

comments. we anticipated this panel would reconvene for panel three at 15u 15. it's well past 12:15. the other thing is we have another committee that has done research and work and preparation and members adjusted their schedules in order to accommodate that hearing which is less than an hour from now. consequently, i want to do this the right way. i want to do it the right way for the tsa, for every member on this panel, so we have adequate time to get to the issues that need to be got out, so with that, i am suggesting, in fact, i am ruling that we are going to move this third panel to the next -- to another date. >> you said you would yield, will you? >> i'm sorry. >> you said you would yield, will you? >> yes. >> other than putting this off, let me say one more time there's 45 minutes. you don't know the panel was going to go an hour any yay and

45 minutes could be adequate. get them started, get them out here, if you want to bring them back later, you can do that. you have essentially all the members you had earlier here and they were made aware we had an agreement this morning that tsa was coming on as the last panel. this is no surprise to anybody. everybody had testimony from last night. i find your whole reasoning behind this totally lame and inappropriate, and i'm not pleased at all with having come to an agreement on that and have you come up with a lame excuse to put that agreement aside. i ask you one last time to reconsider and let's do this the right way, keep our working relationship as we've had it on this. it the cooperative idea to rely on each other's word. >> can the gentleman yield? >> yes. >> mr. chairman, i know we may not complete this, i've been assured that the next subcommittee could move a little bit to give us additional time. i'm assured we won't have votes

before 1:15 to 1:30. my concern, which i share with the chairman, is that we will need to ask the tsa to be willing to come back if we do not conclude by the time of the vote. if that could be agreed to, i would join with the other gentleman to try to start. we wouldn't need the agreement. >> i would no way impede that and support that if we need them back and that's appropriate for them to finish. >> on a point of order? >> any other gentleman? >> yes. not to eat up more time, but they are here. i just want to point out that, you know, your hearing, our hearing was a conflict with a lot of other hearings when we scheduled it. that's why members are back and forth. there's no guarantee that won't happen again. it's the way things work here. i do like the comprehensive aspect of this where you had a bunch of good panels in here and

i'd like to hear from the tsa. i hate to waste time. we got 45 minutes to go at these folks, and i have questions to ask of them as i'm sure you are. if we have to bring them back, we will. i yield back. >> any other member wish to speak to this? >> this committee stands in recess for five minutes while we redress and make a ruling at that time. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conve >> the committee comes to order. we will start our unanticipated third panel. i appreciate you two being here to answer questions before the committee. it is my understanding having worked with both sides and my understanding from the two of

you, i have yet to speak with, that should this panel run short, that is members not be allowed to fully ask all the questions that we have here today, that you both will personally agree to come back and participate in another hearing as a follow-up. we'll call this part one of part one of this hearing, and i would hope and expect that the two of you would also be able to attend that second hearing. we'll come to it by mutual agreement in terms of date. it will be your own panel so you're not offended by anybody. is that your understanding? >> mr. chairman, yes it is. >> mr. kair? >> yes, mr. . >> as long as we have the ranking member here and there's an understanding of how that will proceed, we will proceed. mr. lee kair, assistant of add min stray tear for security

options and rob kin kane is assistant administrator for security technology. do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give it is the truth, nothing but the truth? let the record reflect they answered in the affirmative. we ask is to allow you to take five minutes for your opening statements. adhere to the red light that appears before you. there's some leeway with that. keep your comments to five minutes, and you can submit any additional testimony you cannot give verbally. at this time, we week news first m. kane for five minutes. >> good afternoon. we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the transportation

security administration's risk base driven approach to aviation security and specifically the use of advanced imaging technology. as a chief technology officer, i will focus on the aspects and lee will discuss the human aspect. before going into detail, the technology is vital to the nation's ability to keep travelers safe in the 9/11 world. we face a determined enemy bent on our way of life. they arrested a man planning an attack on the dc subway system and a young saw disrespectful frankly -- saudi man was arrested. whether it was a failed attack in 2009, the plot in october, or the intelligence plots we see every day, al-qaeda and intelligence groups continue to target our system. we have to detect today's

threat, not yesterday's. we have a able system that works in several measures. one aspect of the check point is what we're hear to discuss today. mr. chairman, well hidden devices are among the gravest threat to security. while there's no sell veer bullet, this gives us the best opportunity to detect the threats. we piloted the technology in early 2007 knowing of these threats. following analysis, we employed the technology nationwide. after the christmas day attack, we accelerated it. we know that well-concealed devices like those used in 2009 are detected by ait. up to the image operator to recognize the anomaly. beyond effectiveness there's two issues to address. ait units in airports cannot

store, print, or transmit images. it requires different software to make this a possibility. the officer reviewing the picture does not see the passenger. ait does not produce photographic quality images to permit personal identification. we are now testing other detection software to further enhance privacy by eliminating passenger's specific images and highlighting the anomalies on a outline. this provides the same detection capability of previous versions of the imaging technology. passengers appreciate it. on safety, this technology is safe tar all passengers and employees. the radiation from back scatter machines has been independently confirmed by the food and drug administration, standards and technology, john hopkins university, and the u.s. army among others. all this testing confirmed that

the radiation dose is well within established standards. they are incapable of producing the energy required to generate radiation at a level to exceed the established standards. fail safe mechanisms are up stalled to shut the machines down should they begin operating in unexpected ways. multiple tests occur on each individual unit before it is used to screen passengers. ongoing tests goes on every unit to confirm safe continued operation. additional testing is tested if a machine is relocated. they are required to notify fda and tsa if they have radiation levels above the standard. we committed to all radiation tests online so the public can see for themselves if their home airports have safe technology. while reviewing older reports, there were errors in the contractor's recordkeeping. we are taking steps to ensure they are not repeating including testing those where they are an

error, retraining the work force. they are doing those surveys, extending the evaluation of the protocols and having increased expertise on our own tsa experts review the surveys. these steps enhance our ability to ensure all technology is safe. with that, i turn it over to lee. >> thank you. i recognize mr. kair for five minutes. >> good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today regarding the transportation security administration's use of imaging technology at airport security check points. as stated, current intelligence reminds us that commercial aviation remains a top terrorist target. on christmas day, farouk attempted to blow up a plane with a device that would not and could not be discovered by a

metal detector. our dedicated adversaries is dependent upon our ability to have the latest technologies and procedures. as head of the security operations, overseeing the work of the front line security employees, i assure you our nearly 50,000 officers and managers at over 450 airports nationwide are dedicated to our important security mission. every day tsa screens nearly 2 million passengers to assure they arrive safely. there's a variety of safety teaks to ensure the transportation systems are secure including advanced imaging technology. while there's no silver bullet with aviation security, a combination with our check point procedures and the work of the dedicated work force provides us with the best tools to detect threats. passengers may request alternate

screening. as we deploy technology, tsa evolves pat down procedures as well as mitigate threats. there are a few things to clarify regarding the pat down procedures. first, only a small percentage of passengers require a pat down during the secretary screening process. they are conducted by same gender officers and all passengers have the right to request private screening at any time during the process. anything, any passenger may choose to be accompanied by an individual of their choosing such as a parent, guardian, or traveling companion throughout the process. while it is necessary to ensure that all passengers are properly screened, tsa is sensitive to passenger needs. for example, our officers are trained to work with parents and passengers with special needs to ensure a respectful screening process for the entire family. additionally, tsa's office of civil rights and liberties maintains a coalition of more than 70 disability related

groups who partner with tsa to inform the check point screening procedures including the use of advanced imaging technology. we continue to work closely with these groups to ensure we are constantly improving the training we provide to the officers which ultimately enhances the passengers' experience. while we continue to work with the stake holders and partners, we are dead kitted to -- dedicated to inform the traveling public regarding the use of technologies such as ait and our procedures. we want to ensure the traveling public understanding the screening process while protecting the information terrorists could use in an attempt to circumvent screening protocols. we worked with parters to post signs in the airport, ait, website, and via press conferences and social networks platforms. through this, tsa reached millions of individuals nationwide to inform them about airport security policies and procedures.

additionally, tsa is committed to answering questions and receiving feedback from the public regarding their screening experience. to achieve this, we utilize a number of communication tools including the tsa accountant center, talk to tsa web feedback tool, local customer service managers, and up put on the tsa blog among other avenues. tsa is committed to building upon best practices to mitigate risk and make the transportation system as safe as possible. earlier this month, administrator outline the a vision for the future of airport security screenings as we develop additional risk-based initiatives that shift away from a one size fits all approach from airport check points. tsa anticipates this approach will enable tsa to better focus resources while enhancing the passenger experience. we want to thank the subcommittee for holding this hear on tsa's use of advanced imaging technology and for its

work in overseeing the agency's efforts to ensure the transportation security. we are pleased to answer any questions you might have. >> thank you. i'll now recognize myself for five minutes. we have a great need in this country to secure aircraft and transportation in general. the threat is real. let there be no mistake from anybody anywhere that the threat is very real. i appreciate the good hard work that the tens of thousands of agents do. most are trying to do a good job, working hard, placed in a difficult situation. in fact, # a lot of them who siped up to do this didn't envision they would be involved in pat downs and ding things they were not anticipating to do. i appreciate both of you in your degree of participation with public service. mr. kane, for instance, 20 years in the coast guard and whatnot, we appreciate that. nevertheless, i do and am very

frustrated from the lack of candor coming from the security administration. the tsa has a notorious reputation of doing things differently than what they say. that's not an attack of you two. i want to note at the beginning it is not a direct criticism on any one of you personally, but given that you're sitting here, an i'm glad you are, and we're going to have this discussion, i just want to note that it is our role and responsibility to make sure that we improve security and still protect people with their fourth amendment rights, that we min minimize the nature in which this technology is deployed, not just the technology, but the pat downs as well. with that said, i want to start to dive in here a little deeper on the machines and start, for instance, start with you, mr. kane. these machines as i understand it were built to the

specifications; react? >> yes, mr. chairman. >> yet i have heard "the imaging technology we use cannot store, export, print, or transport images." is that true? >> the machines in the airports cannot store, transmit images. the software packages on the machines does not allow that in the airport. we have machines in the testing environment where we do have that capability. >> same machines though right? >> same machines hardware wise. >> same machines. >> hardware wise. >> you just -- my understanding, and i'm looking at the freedom of information act put out there in the specifications put out. let me read a few things. enabling and disabling picture filter shall be modified by user shall be defined by the user's

access. when in test mode, the whole body imaging machine, the wbi, allows exporting the image data in realtime, shall provide secure means of high speed transfer of image data, shall allow exporting of image data raw and reconstructed. did i misread anything here? is that accurate? >> i believe you are referring to probably a prior specification, some of which we've cleaned up in subsequent engineering change proposals to make sure the test modes are separate. you referenced a test mode. that mode does not exist in the airport environment. those machines have a different software package. >> you said the same machines have those capabilities. the network, each of them are built with a quote on quote network interface with an ether net interface connection. the network interface is con figured with an ip address that suggests it's transferring images, is it not? >> none of the machines today

are networked. that capability is in the hard -- are not in the hardware of that machine. >> they have the capability of doing it, and you actually do capture and transmit images; right? think about this. from the stand point of the fact someone goes through the machine, capture the image, it's transferred into another room. that image appears on the screen. >> that's correct. >> how is that not capturing or transmitting the image? >> the point is we don't save the image or transmit them. that's the same part of the meres and that review station is part of that the advanced imaging technology machine, and, of course, there's a display monitor on the machine to look at the image to identify anomalies to be resolved. >> under oath, i want to ask you both, do you transmit images that you have captured in airports ever? have you done that?

>> captured in airportings, i'm completely uni ware of having done that. i would say no under oath we do not transmit images from the airport. >> have you ever done that? >> i'm unaware of us doing that. >> i'm uni ware, sir. >> you have in your specifications that you have to have these capabilities. why was that in there in the first place? >> clearly, when we developed in type of technology like any other piece of technology we have, we have to do extensive testing, do extensive training to be able to deploy those machines, therefore, we have the capability on those machines to operate in the test mode, to capture images, to be to transmit images to other machines in the networks we use in testing facilities we have that capability. we don't have that capability in the airports. we separated that capability completely out from anything that's in the airport, and the

other piece we have images we use that were taken from volunteers and typically those are paid volunteers that we use in the testing processes to capture the images. >> what about the so-called level z access? imaibilitys under quote on quote level z access, enable and disable image filters, export raw image data in test mode, identify level access capabilities, down load data. how many people have user access level z capability? >> that's a question for mr. kane. >> sorry. >> mr. chairman, i'm in the sure of the exact number, but i'd like to say the specifications to make sure we give greater confidence to people we were not doing the things people are talking about, we removed the capabilities from the access. those are maintenance technicians and people in my lab have that. >> can you provide provide this

committee the e-mail or the paperwork that would verify you changed that and when it was changed? >> mr. chairman, i certainly will do that for the record. >> when i see under the tsa website, "the image cannot be stored, transz mitted or printed and deleted once viewed." that's false right? it has that capability. >> it's not a matter of flipping a switch. the software on the airport machines does not allow that capability in the airport. the software in our testing machines is a separate software and has that capability in our labs. >> has it ever had that capability? >> in those initial, first, i believe 47 that we rolled out, that capability was on the machines to flip that switch, that z level access that you're referring to. we recognize we wanted to change that, and we made a change in the airports and retrofitted it

to the machines in the airport. >> the committee would appreciate that paperwork. my apologies, i did not realize how far over time i was. i will now recognize the gentleman from minnesota for five minutes or more if you'd like. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i think it's important to get the questions answered that you need answered. i have no objection to the time. let me popped this to death to be clear. i'm reading the requirements on sensitive security information, and it says tsa policy dictates the passenger privacy is maintained and protected during passenger screening. to ensure the passenger's safeguards systems prohibit the storage and exporting of images during normal screening operations. while not used for normal operation, the capability to capture images of nonpassengers or training in evaluation purposes is needed. to ensure the image capturing

remain private, there's two distinct modes, screening mode and test mode. during screen mode, they are prohibited from passenger data including tsp. during test mode, they are not capable of conducting passenger screening. is that accurate to you? >> yes, congressman. >> okay. so what we need to do is give assurances to people who are doubtful on that. how do you suggest we do that? >> it's very difficult times to do that. we talked about it. we offered up the specifications, made some of those changes you referred to, changed the specifications to make it clear on how we operate the machines, put out an impact on how we are trying to operate the machines and straightforward with the public with the sign nag and the other messaging

mechanisms to make it clear on how we have the data. >> it is the ability to do the things you said obtained in the cast ware opposed to the hardware? >> at one time you could flip a switch, but we separated that kate, and the operate machines don't have that ability. >> if you want to go to the airport, the software at any begin airport is disabling all the problems he has or concerns that he has? does not allow them in >> it's difficult to see that at the airport from a nonexpert, but we can -- >> take an expert with him? on that? okay. do the millimeter wave scanners as effective or more effective? >> i can't talk about the specific requirements and

capabilities in open hearing. >> you can't tell me whether or not they are effective as the others? >> so what i would say is both met our specifications, so we have specifications we put out and both met the specifications in very near similar levels, and they flipped a bit depending where you used them. >> i mean, i don't accept your answer that you can't tell us in open session, but i will for the moment because the basic point is it's interchangeable and the tsa is satisfied with whatever machine is at a begin airport that it's doing the job you wanted done? >> that's fair to say, congressman. >> now, the only reason you don't go just to the wave scanner where there's no issue at all with regard to radiation, is the tsa says it is so low that it's not a problem? >> that's one the reasons. it is very safe technology, and it's very, very low radiation as we tested independently many

times, but the other is it is useful for multiple technologies. as we talked about, we need to address the threat. having a number of people working on the problem of addressing the threat is useful to us. having competition in the marketplace where we are the primary buyer in the world of technologies useful to us as well. >> i'm all about competition on that as the f136 debate will cft, but the fact of the matter is if you thought it was a risk of danger, you take the chance of anomalies than take the chance with the competitor. >> we think the technology is very safe, yes. >> will you make available to the public your evaluation studies and make the equipment available for up dependent testing? >> we've never made the equipment available for independent testing. that would expose it to a lot of public information that we wouldn't share publicly in terms of its capabilities. >> you don't think there's a way to do that and not expose it? it's done all the time.

>> radiation wise, we have done that with independent value day tores, john hopkins and standards and technology just making available to the public to look at those machines, no, we wouldn't be able to do that. >> but other than making it generally available to the public, you would make it availability to other up dependent sources qualified to make an evaluation? you would do it if set up appropriately? >> yes, sir. >> okay. do you know whether or not the materials that were used by the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber or whatever you call them could have been detected by the ait machines? >> what ait does is detect anomalies on the body. those are anomalies to the body, so, yes, it detects those materials. we have found, you know, tested against similar types of materials in the labs and certainly on the operation in the day day-to-day use.

there's thins similar to those types of materials as well. >> one the witnesses testified that the department of homeland security and tsa basically funded a national academy of sciences report where it made a recommendation for evaluating the effectiveness of all initiatives in a systematic way and then had a process out there. do you follow that prosays when evaluating the different techniques? >> i think if you talk about the process we use for developing our technologies, yes, we use a systematic process in doing that. >> do you use the one from the national academy of sciences? >> the one from the department of homeland security. >> do you know how that measures up to the congress recommendations? >> i don't. >> can you get that for the record for us? >> certainly. >> how your policy and standards and evaluation process lines up with the national academy of

sciences in the 2008 report paid for by the homeland security and tsa. >> yes, sir. >> thank you very much, i yield back, mr. chairman. >> chair now recognizes the gentleman from texas for five minutes. >> thank you very much. y'all, in response to privacy concerns you implemented the pat down search as well as the secondary pat down search for ano , ma'am -- anomalies. you could do searches at the airport and pat downs are legal, limited in its intrusiveness as it is consistent with satisfactory of the administrative need that justifies it. limited and intrusiveness is key there. look at the slides we've got up here. i'm concerned that these -- these are not even the secretary pat downs, but the primary pat downs.

this is a child, another child. there are people who would go to jail touching a child like this. do you think these are the least intrusive means you can come up with to ensure security? >> sir, we actually sit every morning in an intelligence brief where we learn what is coming at us from our attackers, and what is evident to us is that the, those that wish to do us harm are very willing to use techniques which go against our social norms and try to use things that will use our process against us, and that was proven out actually in flight 253 with the placement of a bomb that used all nonmetallic components,

and so we have done extensive testing in what techniques we can use in order to be able to detect items like that using process and technology so that we can mitigate that threat while also being as conscious as possible about the passengers experience coming through as well as allowing passengers to expeditiously -- >> you indicated in your testimony that only a small percentage of passengers have undergone a secondary screening. i've had the misphenomenonture of -- misfortune of being one of those passengers. i was taken into a private room without the option of having anyone accompanied my. i was thoroughly searched. a rescran would have avoted that. isn't that less intrusive when

there's five anomalies detected on my body? >> without getting into the sense of security part of when we do what type of screening, when we have an anomaly in a sensitive area, we do want to make sure that we properly screen that area using a pat down. any passenger is authorized to have a companion in that private screening room with them, and we use whatever technique we can. >> i would have rather had this happen in the sun. despite as embarrassing as it was, i preferred to stand out there and let the rest of the people at the airport see what i was subjected to. i'm concerned also about the safety of your hard working tsa officers. why do none of the officers that work around the x-ray machines in particular not wear the same safety badges that anybody who works at a hospital is required

to wear? this seems like a low-cost way to ensure the safety of the people working for you. >> congressman, these are different, and they are very, very low levels of radiation used by these machines, and they are well within public use limits. there are national standards for implementing a program that you're referring to, and we are well, well below any of those leveling that cause us to put the radiation badges on the workers. >> i can understand why you're not willing to open up the entire software process to peer review, but would you be willing to allow up dependent agencies or independent science community to test the amount of radiation that these machines emit? >> sir, we have done a number of independent tests, and we have ongoing independent tests for all of these machines in the airports. john hopkins did the study on the back scanner technology as

an independent body. the army's public health command comes into airports. they look at our radiating machines in airports, and they use test and survey methods and they've done extensive testing on the machines. clearly, and consistently they show very, very low levels of radiation. >> i see the time expired. i'll wait around for the next round of question. i have another page. >> thank you, the gentleman yields back. i now recognize the gentleman from maryland -- or illinois? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for being here. how many of these machines are in place now? >> there are nearly 500 in airports in 78 different airports. >> how many do you need if you're going to use them at every location and every gate? >> we're working through what that would be. some depends on the final capability of the machines especially with this automated

targeted software we bought. you get more people through those. that's somewhere less than 1800, but the number will be something less than that. we have around 2 200 airport leap -- lanes in the country. >> is there a concern you have? if those were all in place, with the new technology and the time to get through, it would not change the time it takes to get x number of people through o'hair operate a day? >> congressman, we arecepstive to that -- sensitive to that. the final number depends on the technology. right now you see it in an airport sitting in a walk through detector to alleviate that concern. we won't cause that to be the impact at the check points.

>> is there a projected time frame to have these all in place? a range? >> i can tell you that we have nearly 500 in the airports today, 500 in the president's fiscal year budget request. how the fiscal year plays out, we'll see, but we think there's 500 within the level and fiscal year 12 question is for 275 more additional machines. >> you mentioned the new capabilities and technologies that would be more generic in terms of what body images are shown? >> yes, you see at the machine itself a generic outline, same for everyone, and you just see that, and the anomalies show up on the that. that allows to do the resolution at the machine to a very limited pat down or targeted pat down.

if i keep my blackberry in the pocket, and the officer has to resolve that alarm there in my pocket. >> the reason i'm asking if it seems like it's a reasonable period of time before the technology is available, you want to start shifting to those right away before you purchase 2200 of them. >> that technology will be available and stated a number of times we expect the next procurement to have that capability. >> thank you. i yield back. >> earlier, i heard exactly what you said, i want to make sure. have any of these machines transmitted, have you e-mailed, have you sent anything back to the head quarters, and i believe your answer to that was you were unaware of any; right? >> correct. >> why isn't the answer to that no? it doesn't even have the capability. that gives me a pause to think about that, and you came to the

conclusion, well, not that i'm aware of isn't definitive as no, it's not even capable of doing it. it's like if i said can your airplane, did you fly to new york in the airplane? no, it can't fly. >> i can tell you no authoritatively since we rolled them out in airports. i was no involved with the program from inception, i don't know what occurred earlier in the programs' inception. i'm virtually for certain, but i wasn't in the airports and how they were used in the airports, but tsa says we vice president. i just can't say before my time there. >> i appreciate that, but just because you're on the record, i find the inconsistency between the record. i won't take the time of this committee, but that is the

concern. instead of hearing a definitive no, it's not capable, i read specifications, ip address, ether net, it basically has the capabilities, and that's the challenge. i've taken this gentleman's time. i yield back my time and recognize the gentleman from maryland for five minutes. >> chairman, i just noted you all stopped the clock for about two or three minutes, so did you know that? let me just say, gentlemen, you all have a very tough job. you have a very, very tough job. you were not here earlier when i said that. you got to protect the public. at the same time, you have to make sure you have a fair balance so that you're not intruding into people's lives unreasonably and their bodies,

and that's a tough one, and as i listen to all of what has been said so far, there has been an overhanging at this hearing, and i think with the chairman's statement just now, there is a very, very significant shadow hanging over tsa, and that is clearly that and it goes to a five letter word, "trust." and you all, i mean, you know, when i listen to all of discussions, you all, there's a lot of information you cannot divulge, and i'm no intelligence expert, but i would imagine part of the problem is you don't want to let people know what certain things are happening with these

machines so that they can get around them i guess, am i right? does that make sense? >> yes, sir. >> on the other hand, you have a congress who whichments to -- wants to know and the public wants to know, and that's kind of a tough situation, and i guess what i want to get to is, you know, i want to have that trust. i want to believe that just like members of congress raised their hand and swear to protect the people we represent, that you all go in there every day trying to figure out how you can best protect every single person that uses our air ways, and so how would you all suggest begin all that i -- given all that i just said and what you know that we establish,

get that trust back, you know? because apparently, and, you know, the more i think about it, it's so easy to lose the trust when you can't give up so much information, when you got millions of opportunities for something to go wrong, but how do we get back there because that's what it's all about. i mean, first of all, you have to have the trust, but there's another piece of this. you've got to do things in a way that is least intrusive, but there has to be a level of trust for people to believe that you're doing it in the least up trucive way -- intrusive way, so help me with that. >> mr. congressman, all i can say is when you look back at previous attacks even since 9/11, our adversary does look for processes or prohibited items which are items which are

not prohitted at the time such as 9/11, they used an attempt not prohibited at the time or look at what our process is and try to use the process against us such as the richard reed shoe bomb. they recognized at the time that using a nonmetallic improvised explosive device through a meal detector was a vital way of going through. we have to look every day what are we seeing from a threat perspective and trying to put processes or technology in place to avoid that type of a risk or threat, and at the same time be able to communicate with the traveling public so they know what to expect when they come to the check point. it is a balancing agent we have to balance every day, and it boils down to having a very active dialogue with the american public. we use a variety of ways to do that incoming, you know -- including, you know, pretty rebust dialogue on the internet.

we have an award winning blog where we encourage the american people to have that discussion with them about why it is we are doing what it is we do every day, and we want to make sure that the traveling public is able to navigate our screening process. >> out of time, but i wanted to ask you this. when the heard the representative earlier testify ring one of the things she talk about is training, and there seemed to be, you know, i think part of trust too is that people feel that they are treated with respect, that they may be going through a difficulty, but somebody hears them, understands them, somebody has empathy. i think that goes a long ways towards trust also, and i just comment and my time is up. >> yes, sir, i couldn't agree with you more on that. we imp size to the -- emphasize to the officers, who are some of the most trained and tested of any profession out there. one of the things we emphasize with the officers is proper

communication to deescalate the traveling process, just traveling much less screening is a stressful proposition for a family going through. our officers are trained and for the most part do a good job of deescalating stresses. we retrained our entire work force about two and a half years ago to emphasize customer service as well as security because the two actually go hand own hand. we have another training initiative this year to get at that same exact issue of good communication that deregulates stress to a system in getting through -- it's a partnership with the american public where we want them to help us in the screening process going through our check points. >> gentleman yields back. we recognize the chairman of the overall committee from california for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you for your patience in getting through a long day. this is an important panel.

we waited for you two because this committee has serious doubts about the effectiveness and deficiency and authority for some of the things you're doing. i think that's pretty clear. the chairman is particularly interested in the full body scanners. i'm interested in the overall process, so as someone who was here on 9/11 and remembers president george w. bush telling us it wouldn't change america, i'm concerned that it has. you represent 50,000 well-meaning people. i debate well-trained because your turnover is still pretty darn high and it's hard to have that many new people and say they are well-trained. every time i go through security i see training. that's a good thing, but i see the need for training every time i go through. let me give you something other than full body scanner for relief. i fly more than 40 round trips a year plus overseas trip. for more than