folding scissors. that pair of scissors was taken away two weeks ago. that pair of folding scissors, if you open them up has one inch of blade times two, and it's overall length is two inches. i have researched and can want find a basis for taking that away. do you have an explanation for that kind of subjectivity? were they wrong -- 40 times two is 80. you know, 320 times they were wrong, or right one time? >> we did an analysis on the prohibited items list on november 2005, that time frame with a risk-based analysis. >> i remember my tooth being taken away after liquids were a

problem in the british situation. you didn't have an answer. you took them away and then made the answer 3 ounces. the scissors, are they prohibited? >> during that analysis in november 2005, that time frame, we changed the prohibited items list, and the sis sore of a length less than four inches are not prohibited. i don't have an explanation why they would have been removed two weeks ago. >> eight weeks earlier i had a .12 millimeter taken away. it was five inches long. can you explain that one? >> small tools were another piece of the analysis that was done, and there is some discretion on tools where if it could be used as a bludgeon, it's prohibited. if it's a normal tool less than 7 inches, it's allowable. all that information is up on

tsa.gov. >> oh, i went there, but when you say you've got to be kidding, you get threatened. you get people who make it very clear they are law enforcement, so i'm concerned about something. i'm concerned that some people think less than 5 inch.12 millimeter open end box wrench is a bludgeoning tool and a point and cutting and two inches of little rest of the scissors are somehow dangerous, but they only do it very infrequently. please, as a guy with a motorcycle, don't ask me to explain why i had a 12 millimeter in a box from the wrong coast, but these things happen. you don't have a consistent system to test. today, you're saying we are safer, well, in fact, only a fraction of the people are going through the full body scanners and the full scanners are

repeatedly false positiving. suspect that true? isn't it true that my statement is fair that only a fraction of people go through them with huge false pos sieves today? -- positives today? >> today, only a fraction of the people go through them. they have false positives, not a huge number of false positives. >> how about in san diego, it's every fifth person that goes through gets a secondary. >> that's possible. >> 20% is not huge, but close enough to huge if you're one the people getting a pat down. you heard testimony here tread that in fact, low level x-ray is long standing to be a problem. what assurance do we have here today that you're not going to be the next situation in which you say, well, it's not a problem, but members on the day who go back and forth across this country literally 50 round trips a year are not getting

overexposed if in fact you implement full them this procedure. >> the machines have been tested repeatedly to show how safe they are and independently how safe they are, tested against standards that have a host of experts on them, and they set those standards that we work towards. we're well below the standards for this technology, the back scanner in particular that you're referring to. >> i'm referring to people involuntarily getting x-rays or forced to a secondary because they said, no, i don't want to. the trusted traveler, granted it's bankrupt, but that contributes to the question year after year after year, each time you find out what you didn't know which right now includes you can't detect a bomb sown into a human being, and as a result, you are not going to pick up a bomber willing to have surgery to plant explosives

under their skin. that's been said here and well adopted here today. -- well-documented here today. would you please report back to the committee the following: earlier today it was in the opening of mr. kair's opening statement, you talked about what people can have and not have in the consistent. i go through those check points all over the country regularly. what i don't see is i don't see anything that says here is a traveler's right. you have a right to a private pat. you have a right -- i know i'm over, but a lot of us have. i've seen tsa people traveling with another person to stand back, go over there. they are denying what you said was a right here today, and i hold you to post the tsa to post that i have a right to have my

spouse, you have a right to have your child or whatever with you during any secondary and not be told they must go over there, stand over there, you will be arrested if you don't move away. the exact opposite happened in the experience of thousands of travelers. will you agree to post so travelers know that your tsa people are wrong if they try to say stand back, you can't be there. >> sir, i believe the description about, you know, being able to have a traveling companion or family member with you particularly in the private screening area is up on the website. >> website doesn't make it. >> we will need to move on here. >> will you commit it's available to the public at the point in which they are being told that they cannot have that person with them? >> part of the challenge that we have is that sigh nag, you know, we run into having too many sipes --

signs out there, so having a posting is difficult for us because there's requirements. >> the chair recognizes that as a no. if you want to add testimony, this is the problem with trying to fit this in. about to be called for votes. it is the policy to recognize those who sit on the subcommittee first ring so i'm going to recognize the chairman of the transportation committee, full member of this committee and subcommittee first. >> okay, we -- have we bought 250 of the rapid scan scapers? is that -- scanners, is that purchased or being purchased; is that correct? >> that's correct, congressman. >> what's the estimated cost of that equipment? >> all told for the equipment purchase so far is around $122 million for both.

>> l3, did the former secretary chair off talks or communicate with either of you two? >> no, congress mapp, he did not. >> no, for me too. >> can you provide to the committee records of communications between those involved and the acquisition of the equipment? >> i'm not sure how to locate records. there was no one in tsa involved with him in the axis of the qiement -- acquisition of the equipment. >> can you provide the committee, can you check the records of representatives of, what is it l3 that you purchased that equipment from? >> i'm sorry? >> the equipment was purchased, rapid scan and millimeter wave. i'm interested in finding out the context of the former secretary with tsa either prior

to, during, or at some time of the acquisition, can you check your records? >> congressman, we can do that. i can tell you who was not involved in the acquisition of the machines any time after being secretary at least and clearly as oversight of the department, there would have been involvement before that. >> all right. we had actually the back scanner is nothing new. i remember five years ago we had a stick devices that you could deploy or software that would give you stick image rather than the full body scan rchg -- is that correct? are you aware? >> no, i'm not. >> i'm not. >> you're now testing that? >> the automated target software with the generic outline of a person. >> when do you expect those

tests to be finished? >> we have them on the millimeter wave, the l3 machines in the airports today. they will finish up with the specific testing on those by the end of this month. >> okay. >> with a 45-60 day -- >> i can't believe it because five years ago that software was available, so we didn't have -- objections were raised five years ago, and we were told that technology was available. you have testing in your testimony, testing began in 2007 incoming testing of eval-- including testing of evaluation of airports. when did you first notify congress you were going to deploy the equipment and it was fully tested? >> i'm not sure there was a specific time frame that we did

that, congressman. i know in our budget request when we requested the machines and funding for them -- >> denied evaluation of testing at those airports? >> provided very substantial briefings and -- >> that was after the deployment? at least to my staff. >> that's possible, congressman. i don't know that we came up in advance of the point to everyone on the hill. >> are you aware of the latest testing of the equipment that gao conducted in december? >> we're aware of gao's testing as well as the other ongoing testing. >> do you feel that, again, what this remind me of is the puffers, the failure rate was totally unacceptable. would you concur with that evaluation? >> i think we look at different types of testing and we think the machines are effectiveness

the types of threats we are looking at. we do daily testing in airports across the country. >> that's your self-testing. have you -- you have been briefed by gao on their testing? >> yes, i have. >> and you find that acceptable level of performance? >> i'd like to think we can perform very well at 100%. >> do you find the level of failure acceptable that gao reported now that you have the equipment in place? >> so the specific number i think -- >> well, first of all ring we're not talking numbers because it's classified, but the failure has been pronounced. mr. pistol said it was, that gao was clever. do you feel that, again, having reviewed this, is that a failure rate that's acceptable?

>> we spent, a quarter of a billion dollars on deploying this equipment and staffing it, and i've had it tested, and to me, it's not acceptable. >> i would like to see us do better. >> if we could reveal the failure rate, the american public would be outraged at that expenditure. it seems you opted for a sort of popularity poll. you said that 80% of the people do not object to accepted the use of that technology even though it doesn't work, so that's the basis on which we deploy it, expensive screening technology. >> no, congressman. that's a partial basis, but the other testing in the labs, field, and airports every day -- >> well the public may accept it, but i will not. thank you, and i yield back.

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>> i think it is logical to talk both about getting the job done right as he did to his nato counterparts, and about beginning transition and commencing the responsible drawdown and search forces again at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. those conditions that i will assess will clearly include an assessment of the afghan national security forces and their ability to do more as we do less, as we thin out but don't hand off in accordance with transition principles, needless to say the security situation and whether they can indeed handle it if it has been reduced to that point. and how they have grown in the capability, but we also must include as both of you noted governance and development. because those elements have a direct effect on the security situation. if governance is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people, it gains their support

and their willing participation, then indeed you are able to build in the heart and thoughts security gains. that is essential but is not enough. and then beyond that, of course, the gradual development in the economic realm, in the provision of basic services with increasingly those services being provided by afghan rather than international organizations is also essential to the. so these are the components, against the very broad components. we've got quite a rigorous assessment criteria that we employ but those are the big ideas, if you will, that form the core of our assessments. >> thank you. ranking member snowe? >> thank you, mr. chairman. just to question. focusing on that transition on getting to the point where the afghans take overstocked billy for all elements of the security

governance, i think the struggle is we lay out the arguments and i think you laid them out fairly well about why it's important what we're doing to try to get us to that point. what we need i think it is measurable signs of progress. what do we look to before that point when we're all gone? we could just leave and see if they can figure it out but i think we would all agree that's not a good plan at this point. what we need to see is measurable progress. what can we do in the next few months as well as the next year or two that shows here's evidence that he'll be able to handle it. they will be able to take responsibility for security, and again on governance. that's the biggest challenge in terms of the way the afghan government structure is put up. what can you give us in terms of measurable instead of saying july 2014 or 2011, here's will we need to be to know we have gotten where we can safely make that hand-off? >> congressman, a great question. we often are asked out there

when will the afghans step up to the plate in that kind of question, which i think is an understandable and reasonable question. these questions often take place while we're in kabul with visitors. and i will note quite often that in fact any area that they are located, it is afghans who have assumed the lead in security tasks in kabul. the greater kabul area which includes one-fifth to one quarter of the entire country's population. somewhere around 5 million or so people. and the face of security on the streets of kabul without question, the afghan police, and a little further out it becomes the afghan national army. and every single night in kabul there are precision intelligence a driven operations to capture, kill, arrest because we've actually gone to a week, the

afghans have gone to a rule of law based detention system in the greater kabul area for the most part. going after those organizations, taliban, haqqani network, and others are trying to disrupt security there and had indeed periodically conducted sensational attacks, although the past nine, 10 months or so, those periodic attacks notwithstanding have seen really quite good security by really any standard. in fact, president karzai a few months back was asking what was it that was leading to this, and it was of course a comprehensive approach but it was indeed afghan forces in the lead disrupting these different cells that are trying to carry out attacks on the afghan people and afghan institutions. so i think right there you have a very good example, essentially of what wright generally looks like, and we will see if that's among the areas in which

transition may proceed when president karzai makes his announcement. but we've literally only got to, basically two battalions a little bit more of that than isaf forces there. they have stepped back already in what we would call any tactical or even operational watch stage even at this point. >> thank you. the other question is about why it's important to make it clear that we are at some point leaving. i know it's a difficult balance because you can make the one argument and they know they have to wait us out, but on the other hand, if we don't make it clear that we are leaving and we appear to be an occupying force, we strengthen the insurgency. we also create dependence in some different elements of afghan society. the goal here isn't that the second we leave, the other side wins. the goal here is as we said, that we build up the strength of

the afghan forces and afghan government so when we leave, the afghan people win. but talk a bit about why it's important to deliver that. >> is a very important message. first of all, it undercuts the taliban narrative that we intend to stay for ever, that we want permanent bases, that we want to dominate the region or take afghanistan's mineral wealth. you name it, there's a number of different conspiracy theories out there, and this pokes a hole in all of those. second, it does indeed depart a message of urgency, and i think we have to remember that president obama's speech, the whole july 2011 issue, if you will, was intended to complement the message of a norse additional commitment and the first of december, west point, 2009. 30,000 extra forces, tripoli the number of civilians, substantial

funding request for afghan national security forces and so on. that was complemented, but we are not going to do this for ever. 18 months from now afghan forces are going to need to begin to step up to the plate as well. and i think that message of urgency has resonated frankly. i think it has made a difference. and secretary gates in discussing this whole issue with sasc a couple weeks ago i think what effectively laid out on the one hand his normal resistance to timelines and so forth during iraq, but also his recognition of the value of again a message that can convey a sense of urgency to all of our partners, but specifically to our afghan partners so that there is not a sense of dependency that is infinite. >> if i may just add, as we begin this transition process, we are also placing great

emphasis on discussing with the afghans with the nature of a long-term partnership might look like. because even as we begin to draw down of our surge forces, and eventually can envision a broader reduction our military presence, we don't intend to leave afghanistan in the sense of abandon, lay them to their own devices. we are as the president said from the beginning, we are making enduring commitment to our core goals and to the partnership with afghanistan to achieve them. that's going to involve long-term security assistance. it's going to involve help in building the capacity, the economic development and so forth. so we are very actively discussing the terms of that partnership even as we begin this transition process to reassure them of our commitment. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. bartlett. >> general petraeus, a bit more than a week ago you graciously

hosted us in kabul. you are very generous with your time and energy, sir. because of time and resources permitted, you gave us a longer and more thorough brief than could be afforded by your testimony here today, so i've had more than ample opportunity have my questions answered. i therefore would yield my time to our most junior member who was present here, congresswoman. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you so much, representative barr look at images want to tell you how much i appreciate your testimony here and being with us. general because, as the commander of our forces in afghanistan, what is your view on the advisability of the house of representatives passing resolution offered by representative kucinich that would call for the removal of all u.s. forces from afghanistan

no later than december 31, 2011? and specifically, how do you believe our troops would use such a measure and how deeply the taliban and al qaeda would use such a measure? >> well, to start with the taliban and al qaeda obviously would trumpet this as a victory. as a success. needless to say, it was completely undermined everything that our troopers have fought so much for and sacrificed so much for. ultimately though, this is about power vital national security interests. and as president obama has identified them, foremost among these is in ensuring that al qaeda and other transactional extremists cannot reestablish century such as they had in afghanistan under taliban rule when the 9/11 attacks were planned in afghanistan, the initial training of the attackers was carried out in

afghanistan before the attackers moved on to germany and in u.s. flight schools, and then carried out their acts of terror. so needless to say, this would close the door on the very, very hard fought effort, and a mission that i think is seeking to achieve a very, very important security objective of our country, as well as of our allies. again, there are 48 contributing nations, including the u.s. i think among the biggest alliances, certainly way beyond just nato, nato plus, i sat nation's. and what it would do in the region of course would be a really incalculable consequence as well speak of and for our troops?

>> well, you know, when we have taken, in particular i think tough losses, and i remember the first time when i was a division commander in iraq in 2003 and we had a horrible night. we had two black hawk helicopters that collided. one was circling an operation and the other one transited it. 17 great troopers were killed in a single crash in a single night. and as you might imagine, this has all been at the organization can think about, even after we have done the recovery in the middle of the night and everything else. and on the way out of the command post the next morning we were trying to go through the motions of getting back to the normal battle rhythm because you drive on, you have to continue the mission, and a young private first class actually saw me walking out of the hallway of the command post. and he literally put his arm

around me, and he said, you know, sir, that's a 17 reasons to get this thing right. we've had well over a thousand reasons to get this thing right, and many thousands more whose lives have been changed forever because of grievous wounds. and again, obviously this would not allow us to get this right. >> thank you so much. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. andrews. >> thank you, mr. chairman. madam secretary, thank you for your service. general petraeus, thank you for your heroic embrace of a couple of major problems for this country, and all that you've done to help solve them. i'm going to go back to mr. smith's questions about the metrics that you'll be looking at, and we should be looking at, to determine on the ground conditions that would determine the pace at which we would withdraw.

i notice on the charts educators, page 16 of the document that is ansf capability in the field. these quality measures of police and afghan military readiness, are they going to play a central role in your determination of the on the ground circumstances? >> they do already, and they certainly will. we look very closely at the capability of the forces. we tried to make this as rigorous and absolute force right as we can. these are not measures of just quantitative items. in other words, it's not just today at 80% or better of their equipment, doesn't work, this and that. and also includes subjective evaluation of leadership in the organizations, and, frankly, they're fighting capabilities. >> i noticed that on both the police and army readiness measures, none of the units are

in the green or independent level yet that you are looking at. but it does look like the training is good. the police units in may of 2010, 35 out of 293 units were at the effective with advisers level. by february that was 96 out of 313. in the army, a similar comparison would have made a jump from 27 years out of 115, up to 52 out of 157. what do you think is going to happen to that pace in both the police and the army, let's say the next six month window, what can we expect? >> well, we certainly have every objective of increasing again the quality of the performance of these organizations. keep in mind that one reason that they are generally not seen as capable independent activities is because the forces don't have the enablers that are necessary to do this.

and that's in fact our effort with the afghan national security force is a shifting increasingly from building more infantry battalions or afghan national civil order police italians, in other words, combat forces to build a more combat support forces, artillery, some light army -- >> i would assume if that works we may see exponential jump in readiness because as more leaders become more about tested, they can elevate the level, is that right? >> i'm not sure that i was shared exponential. i think we'll see a steady increase in the development of these forces. but again, the real challenge you just put your finger on, congressman, that leadership. leader development. and you can develop private soldiers, you can develop young policeman, but development of leaders who can command companies, battalions, brigades and cores in the shockers, just as in ours, takes years and it

takes not just again training and experience on the battlefield. it literally takes education and professional military develop. >> i want to come back to the comment where you are concerned about, excuse me, the wrong page. to express her about underfunding our a.i.d. and state department efforts. i think i know the answer to this question, but describe to us what you think would happen if we made the error of underfunding those efforts as a follow on to the sacrifices of the servicemembers in uniform. >> again, it would deprive us of the ability to build on the hard-fought security gains. again, security is the foundation on which all else is built. and once you have it though you do have to build on it because it actually strengthens the foundation. this is not a linear development. this is not security and

governance and development than confidence or what have you. although there is all a little bit of the. there's a spiral of a great bit of progress in the security arena allows a bit of progress in local governments, which now lets the markets reopen which means that people give you more intelligence, tell you where the weapons are. >> just as that up will -- upward spiral can proceed, a downward spiral can get us back down. >> they can enter a death spiral and that's what you are always seeking to avoid, needless to say. >> thank you very much for your time this morning. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. thornberry. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate y'all's efforts to put a silver lining on the dark cloud of the july withdrawal date, but as i summarize your testimony, it is we are just getting the inputs right. we are making significant progress, that progress is fragile and reversible and we're going to leave in july no matter what.

are going to be careful about where we live and how we lead and we are going to try not to pull the rug out from under anyone. but if i'm an afghan time to figure out which side i'm going to come down on, or if i'm taliban trying to base my activities, or even if our own troops, i'm not sure i follow that logic. but i understand that the president said it and that's what's happening. but i worry about whether it undercuts our efforts there. general, i'd like to ask about corruption because we hear a lot about that, but i was intrigued by an article in the american interest i lawrence rosen who basically argues that the idea of corruption in a tribal society is fundamentally different from the way we view corruption. and as a matter of fact, he says that for afghans to understand corruption as americans do, more

or less entailed they're having to express the whole web of religious social and economic concepts that we have experienced. that really is asking too much. are we asking them too much on the anticorruption piece of this? >> well, thanks, congressman. at first, if i could just very quickly comment on the jul july 2011. i think you would be correct if it were not for the lisbon in 2014 date that was agreed at lisbon. that i think was very reassuring to the afghan people. there is no question that as we explained july 2011, the concept of a message of urgency to complement the additional huge commitment of the united states and so forth, that there was a residual doubt. but i remember going out into a small village in western

afghanistan a week or so after returning from the lisbon summit where of course all the nato-isaf leaders agreed that the goal would be afghan forces in the lead by the end of 2014 nad they were already talking about the concept of beyond 2014 with a nato and afghan and u.s. and afghan strategic partnership agreement discussions on which have now begun. and i was out there in this little village, no electricity, no satellite dishes, very, very little of anything, crowd gathered around in the marketplace. and i thought i would try to explain what a summit was and what took place in lisbon, a place far, far away and so forth. and i started into this, and i said there was a big meeting held a week ago. and he said do you mean the lisbon summit, general? and i said yeah. did you hear about that? and he said of course, we all listen to bbc path to every night. and he said we are very reassured to hear the leaders

talk about the end of 2014. so i think that again that the secretary gates explained, there is something to a message of urgency. there is something to undercutting the taliban narrative of staying forever. but there's also something closer to a responsible conditions-based space for drawdown. with respect to corruption, we are not of course trying to turn afghanistan into switzerland in a decade or less. there is a very realistic understanding of the conditions in tribal societies and in village by village, valley by valley in afghanistan. having said that, there is also a very clear understanding that what president karzai and we have agreed to call criminal patronage networks, these are individuals breaking the law in substantial ways, they enjoy a

degree of political protection and patronage, and they are not acting as individuals. they are networks. that these kinds of activities are a cancer that will undermine the very institutions to which we have to transition past and responsibilities for transition to succeed. he is quite seized with this. mcmaster, one of our brightest brigadier generals is heading the task force that is taking this on with our afghan partners, and the second or third briefing to president karzai on this when we laid out to him the criminal patronage network that was essentially headed by the surgeon general of the afghan military, he fired individual on the spot despite the individual having political protection. and then fired the entire chain of command of the afghan national army hospital as well. now, these are very tough issues here again, we are after what he

is innocent good enough for afghanistan, again not trying to apply a standard of the western industrialized democracy. but there are certain corrupt activities that you have to be dealt with and in particular, these that come under the rubric of criminal networks are a huge importance. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and secretary flournoy, and transport we appreciate your appearance here. once again, and i don't know how many more appearances there are going to be. but you have been just a tremendous leader for us and we all appreciate that. i want to complete the questions that mr. andrews asked about the capability, afghan capability in the field by the chart that you provide. and i too am looking for one that was.

so you said that does not include enablers. where does -- >> to be precise, the independent activity requires a sufficient level of afghan enablers so that they can be independent. and the challenge right now is that in many cases, although the capabilities are building, but in many cases afghan units still depend very heavily on isaf elements of our contracts or other vehicles to ensure their logistics, maintenance and other -- >> in order for that to change, on what are they dependent in terms of funding? >> again, the u.s. provided afghan security forces find is far and away the bulk of the funding. certainly there are other major contributors. japan for example, provides the

salaries for afghan police. there is another fund to which nato-isaf countries contribute, but again it is the afghan secret forces fund that is without question. >> does that 20-24% cut which i believe is in the c.r. and h.r.-1, how does that affect its? >> when that hits, and again, we project that that would hit perhaps sometime in june, that would have an enormous affect, a negative effect on our effort, needless to say. and it would undermine, it would undercut our efforts to develop the enablers. because again, we've always had a progression that first you develop the guys that can help you in the fight, actually out there against the insurgents. and gradually build institutions, the ministries, the branch schools, leader developer courses. by the way, literacy programs have featured very probably now. we finally bit the program -- bit the bullet.

with basic training we also do basic literacy now and we're way over 100,000 that have been either train or in the process. >> can you provide a timeline then? getting the independence and moving that to that place, even with the funding, sounds like a very ambitious undertaking. >> it's essential. we have to again into the afghan forces over time can support themselves, both with combat service support and then the actual combat support. artillery, mortars, they are developing helicopter fleet. this is, i cut it out of the narrative to just cut time, but we occasionally say that this effort is so big, it's so complex and so challenging that it's like developing, building the world's largest aircraft

while in flight, while it is being designed and while it is being shot at. >> do you think that's one of the reasons that the u.s. has grown so impatient with this effort, that trying to get one's head around it is a very difficult thing to do? >> i think there are a number of reasons. again, i think the biggest is would have been at for 10 years. and and fortune as both the undersecretary and i explained, we've only been at it in the right way with the inputs having been gotten right, without for less than six months or so. just last fall, although clearly as we were developing the inputs we are also seeking to produce output speaker if i could just add, you mentioned the potential cut the funding for the ansf that the c.r. would involve, and i think it would be devastating at this point. battle in terms of building there for the capabilities for independent operations, but also these are the same, this is the

same funding that support units that will be critical to continued partnering, to eventual transition where they start holding real ground or expanding the amount of ground that they hold in the late. so they could really complicate broader timeline the arches the department of the nsf. so it is really, really crucial to keep that funding at the appropriate levels. >> thank you. >> thank you. mr. jones. >> mr. chairman, thank you. madam secretary, general petraeus, it's an honor to have us -- have you before us today. i want to read a couple of comments and then i'll have one simple question for you. i pull the close from secretary gates a couple of weeks ago about the 2014 withdrawal. i want to read this too. it said that is why we believe that beginning in fiscal year 2015 the u.s. can with minimal risk begin reducing army active

duty and strength by 27,000. in the marine corps by 15,020,000. these projections assume that the number of troops in afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014, in accordance with the president's strategy. so i assume from that that we are talking about 2014, 2015. with a large number of military in afghanistan. just a couple things. i've got can't leashing in my district. i think i'm pretty close to the marine corps. i don't have a military background, but i listen to them very carefully. and i have a couple of friends who are generals were active duty. a couple that are retired. i'm not going to mention their names. it wouldn't be fair so not going to do that. but recently, i was down in jacksonville, and spoke to a group and i said i know you will probably would disagree with me,

but i'm forgetting -- i'm for getting our troops out in a safely. so this marine in 31 years in the marine corps, retired as a lieutenant colonel, said no, let me tell you. i talk to active duty marines, and many of them are just tired and worn out. they don't see the endpoint. i'm getting to something else, and then the question. so, he said, i said, well, could i usually name during a debate? he said i'll give you a letter. and i'll just read a couple of senses and i'm getting towards the end because time is moving for. it makes no difference we're there for 40 years the result will be the same. the war is causing the united states billions of dollars a month. we will still continue to get more young americans killed. afghans have no in state for us. it has no in state for the i urge you to make contact with

all the current and newly elected members of congress and ask them to in this. if my comments was issued in this effort you're welcome to use them and my name, lieutenant colonel dennis adams. the retired general that i made mention to that i cannot say his name, but i think you would know it if i could, i asked him after the comments came out by senator mccain and lieberman, general, what do you think about four more years? these are his thoughts. i do not believe that 40 more years will guarantee victory, whatever that is. then he made comments about lieutenant general john kelly's son being killed. the other point, i won't have time to go through that to give you a chance to answer the questions. but in the latest poll that was released yesterday i believe by the abc news "washington post"

poll, 73% of americans say united states should withdraw a substantial number of its combat forces from afghanistan this summer, but just 39% think it will. after listing to secretary gates who i respect and i respect both of you, they are right, it ain't going to happen. my point is, i probably would not be sitting here 2015, you may not be sitting at the panel in 2015. but if they would be a general or a battle sector that would say to congress in 2015, we just need two or three more years to train the afghans and to make sure that their governments can withstand, give me your thoughts on three or four years from now, having to say that, would you think we're making progress, do we have to be there longer than 2014, 2015, or would you be honest -- not you personally, at the people sitting there, would

they be honest with the congress and say, you know, 15, 16, 17 years, for god's sake, how much more can we take? how much more can we get? >> well, first of all, carpeting, let me just reassure you of something that i have told you in this body for and also sasc. and that is if i ever felt we couldn't achieve our objectives, that i would be very forthright with my chain of command, with the present of the united states and with all due. i believe the objectives are of enormous importance, as i stated earlier. you know, when the president asked me to deploy their on very short notice there was only one possible answer to that, you know, i may not be at this table, probably won't be in 2015, but i'll tell you that my son is in uniform, and lieutenant petraeus just completed a tour in afghanistan

which thankfully we were able to keep very quiet and redeployed in november after serving as an infantry platoon leader. we are very proud of what he did. he thinks he was doing something very important. i understand the hesitation of the u.s. people. i'm impatient. i remember one of your colleagues, actually came to iraq for about six months into the search, the height of the violence, it was extraordinary difficult, and she told me up front, she said general, you need to know that i'm a member of the out of iraq caucus. and i said congresswoman, so it may. but i just want us to get out under the right conditions. and i think that's what we're trying to do here, of course. is to achieve our objective, gradually to transition tasks to our afghan counterparts so that we can indeed and off something to them that is sustainable,

that avoids that country becoming the kind of sanctuary that it was in the past. the truth is we have tried a hands-off approach in this region before. in the wake of charlie wilson's war, we got tired of it. we cut off all funding, and the results were what they were. i'm not sure that that is the right course of action in the future. >> thank you. mr. cooper. >> thank you, mr. chairman. madam secretary, general. appreciate your being here today. i appreciate your excellent work. can you tell me about taliban recruiting and the haqqani network and folks like that? to what extent are they augmenting their numbers? are they augmenting their capabilities? >> well, congressman, the both

of the taliban are from within a relatively small radius of the fighters are within relatively small radius of their village, their valley. the leaders may come from other areas, and, indeed, there is a recruiting of suicide bombers that does take place in some of the sanctuaries in pakistan with the senior leaders of course never setting foot in afghanistan, but rather exhorting their troops to fight on my cell phone or hf radio. with the haqqani network there is indeed more recruiting that does take place in north waziristan, although that area is under considerable pressure from the counterterrorist campaign that is being conducted there. >> when i see a chart like the one on page 15 about afghan

national security force is growth, how would you plot the chart showing talibans forces or haqqani networks' or other insurgents that our troops have to worry about? >> that's a hotly debated topic. and we have a methodology for trying to determine the numbers of talibans, keeping in mind that, of course, it goes out and goes down based on fighting season, based on how things are going and so forth. recognizing that there's a fair amount of the population in afghanistan, after 30 years of war, that can adopt chameleonlike attributes as required to survive from day to day. the general assessment is that there's been somewhere around 25,000 talibans at their peak that may be active at a given time. there's no question but there has been significant losses sustained by mid-level leaders and fighters in certain areas in

particular. there's also no question that these are resilient organizations, and that they can find others to put into these positions. although there's been quite a replacement of taliban leaders in recent months in particular, because of upset by senior leaders with the performance of those on the battlefield in afghanistan, and also by some in some cases literally just having enough of it and voluntarily taking themselves out of the fight. speaker so your estimate would be that the taliban was about 25,000, top ranks have been hurt, i wonder what their current troop levels or force levels, about 25,000? >> again, it's too early in the fighting season. again, the way the methodology works is you literally built the organization as best you can in an analytical way by identifying. we have pretty accurate tree

diagrams if you will, wire diagrams and a link diagrams that show who the leaders are at various levels, who they work for, and roughly how many fighters we assess that they have working for them. and as you aggregate this for a particular district and province, then country, that's how you get the estimate. and i'm not sure that we would say that we are at that point in this particular fighting season by any. we still us is that there's a fair number of leaders who are either just coming back or preparing to come back. >> about how many people would be in the haqqani network? >> let me take that one for the record if i could, and i will provide you the classified numbers of that and show you the structure of that organization. >> how about their fighting capabilities sequence the haqqani network is generally assessed to be, again, the most

challenging. again is an organization that is certainly the senior leadership is very unlikely to reconcile. weather is on the other hand a reasonable prospect for reconciliation of mid-level and below taliban leaders who are in afghanistan, even the possibility of some of the more senior leaders breaking off and considering reconciliation. the fact is that there are some former senior taliban government members are reconciled, if you will, living in kabul, and are occasionally seen as conduits by the national peace council and those who are still active. >> i see that my time has expired. thank you for your service, general. and thank you for the support in a great state, especially the screaming eagles. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to sort of move forward a bit and ask an

optimistic question. let's say that we move forward a number of years, and to put together the structure, and really afghanistan is looking pretty good if you got to local police going, the military and all, even their support networks are somewhat developed. my first question is, then how capable are they to sustain something like that with the order the weight is an with the infusion of people, and across the border? how much of a threat, and you think they can be strong enough to basically hold the border and maintain some level of civilization? >> well, obviously a lot will depend on what pakistan does over the years to help its neighbor to the west. it is generally assessed that most effective way of influence in pakistan in fact is by having it see that afghanistan is going to turn out reasonably well. that indeed a talibans, haqqani network, and some of these other

organizations will not prevail, and, indeed, therefore to reassess what relationships might exist with some of these organizations and whether it's time to deal with them a bit more on pakistani soil where they have the sanctuaries, noting that the pakistanis have sustained enormous losses in the conduct of quite an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign in what used to be the northwest frontier province, and then in various of the agencies of the federally administered tribal areas while noting again that they also recognize that there is clearly more that needs to be done and that there are areas that need more attention. >> so i think the answer that i heard was it really depends all lot on pakistan. >> well, clearly what happens in afghanistan is related to what happens in pakistan, but also vice versa. and really even more broadly regionally, i think you have to take into account the actions of iran, the actions of the central

asian states, and certainly india and and even beyond that, russia and others are all very important actors in the regional context of this effort. >> but your point is, a good example in afghanistan kind of sets a higher bar for some of the other countries as well? >> and it gives them reassurance as well. but clearly assert central asian states and all the way entourage are very concerned about the prospect of transnational extremism flowing out of afghanistan, together with the flow of the illegal narcotics industry. that has enslaved populations, enormous segments of population in iran as well as in again russia, europe and some of it even makes its way to the united states. >> i was going to be my second question, general. the economy, i do think of afghanistan as a very well-to-do economy. and its main product apparently is her win in poppy.

do you believe in phasing out that trade or do you just try to eradicate it whenever you see drugs? how does that build into an economic model to rebuild on the foundation of stability that you're trying to create? >> well, first of all we should keep in mind that there are literally trillions with an s. on the end of dollars of minerals in the ground in afghanistan. now, you've got to get them out of the ground with human capital, with the capacity and transportation and everything else, to be able to exploit that for the good of the people of afghanistan. but there are small steps going forward in that regard. there are more tenders after now for some of these different opportunities, and it's our hope that this will reach critical mass really and they will see an economic chain reaction take off at some point as companies realize the extraordinary potential that is there. in some cases with minerals that

are in very short supply elsewhere in the world. so that's a very important component to this. the illegal narcotics industry is a concern for a number of reasons. number one of course is that it's again, it's insulating parts of the population of not just afghanistan, but more so many of its neighbors in what beyond that. >> general, how can you have rule of law in a country if the major export crop is illegal? >> our time is getting a little close, my question is just my practical point of view, when you've got people on the ground, do you see it destroyed or whatever, how do you approach -- >> first of all, if you deprive the little guy of his livelihood, you have just created more insurgents. so number one, if there is eradication, afghan government eradication, we may support with an outer ring of security, but we also ensure that there is

compensation so that these individuals are not out completely. our target really is the big guys. it's the industry bosses and the large infrastructure that supports this industry that we go after, and that's our focus. >> thank you general. >> ms. sanchez? >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, madam chair, today and general, once again for being before that i had a couple of questions for you, general. we been in afghanistan about 10 years, and we've lost over 1400 u.s. lives. and we have spent more than $300 billion on this military operation alone. we've invested over 26 billion in training and equipping the afghan national army, and all -- although we are trying more of those soldiers i don't see that much progress with respect to stability or safety in the country. because were i said some, it almost seems like this war is ultimately about who can outlast

whom. and i think we are sacrificing a lot of lives and wasted a lot of our resources over there. so i would really like to ask the question that former chairman asked lasher, and that is what's success look like in afghanistan? >> thanks very much, congresswoman. success in afghanistan is a country that's can secure in govern itself. and in so doing prevent the reestablishment of sanctuaries by al qaeda and like-minded groups. clearly, success will include enduring level of some international support, very different in character, they're give and level one would think that the present. but again, i think most countries, you recently had the australian prime minister here. i think she addressed congress and talk about the importance of a commitment beyond 2014, given

the recognition that afghanistan, while it is ultimately potentially very wealthy, certainly is not in that situation right now. >> general, with respect to that, there's carly 40 some countries or in the coalition with respect to afghanistan. i know that we've gone from april 2000 we have 39,000 american troops there, we now have over 100,000 in afghanistan. but it seems to me like some of the others like poland, 2600 troops, canada's 2600 troops are scheduled pulls out at the end of this year. italy and germany just announced they'll begin withdrawal. of the troops. president obama has committed when he did the surge that even though the group the number of troops in the janus 10 to over 100, that's almost doubling or tripling it, that he would start to withdraw this year also,

somehow mission has gotten in this and now we're in 2014. the other day, i can never do, deeds or somebody said, or maybe it was the vice president would be in there with combat troops past 2014. so, you know, we keep coming back to this fragile and reversible, we are making gains but it's fragile and reversible. how long do you think our allies stick with us? how long do you think the american people stick with this? how much past 2014 with this day, in your opinion, conditions on grand? it seems to me like we could be hearing 2019 and we would still be in the same place. fragile and reversible. i mean, what does that really mean, general? >> i can never have enough of this. first of all, again, canada actually is indeed going to move its combat forces out of the

kandahar area, but it has plans as it has announced to reinvest substantial number of those in the train and equip mission which is quite important -- >> train and equip, train and equip it everybody wants to train and equip. we spent a lot of money in train and equip but -- >> and these are critical trainers. and again, if trainers are the key, the ticket to transition as the nato secretary-general has stated, then it means a great deal if canada fills a substantial number of the 750 trainer shortfall that we currently defaced. >> let me ask you because i've run out of time here, corruption. i mean, i have been at this corruption thing for a while now, and understand that, in fact, there was just a long time, a server node it's no

longer have to say that corruption permeates the afghan states. corruption by and large is the afghan state. the afghan government does not so much serve the people as it preys on the. what are we doing about that? i have somebody who's close to you out there who is telling me everybody's on the take out there. >> well, would welcome the opportunity to have brigadier general mcmaster briefed you on what we are doing with the task force which is one of the initiatives that i launched a couple of months after taking command. he's working with the afghan staff of the security council but he and i have breeze president karzai three or four times. it was after one of those as i mentioned that president karzai on the spot find the afghan surgeon general, and hung with that despite some political support for the individual, despite his failure in criminal activity in not meeting his sacred obligation to wounded

warriors. so we would welcome again that opportunity, or if he's back on mid-tour leave or so, to lay out because there's a great deal of effort in that regard. there's also a considerable effort to determine that our money is not part of the problem, and as part of that we have debarred nine contracts for example. there's dozens more that are under suspension, to make sure that indeed if money is ammunition as the counterinsurgency guidance states, that as the counterinsurgency contracting guidance states, it needs to get into the right hands. but we welcome the opportunity lay that out for you in detail. >> thank you, madam chair, get a for your service, and thank you general for your service to our country. >> thank you. mr. forbes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, thank you for being here. we know that you are not just a good soldier, you're a great soldier, and that's not a plug. that's just factual.

madam secretary, we know how hard you work and that your heart is at the best interest of this country. general, you did mention that the gains we've had over the last decade are now fragile and reversible, but we've got the right inputs. we are headed in the right direction. but, you know, for the last decade everybody that sat where you said has told us basic with the same thing. we think we've got it right. we have to hope you're right that realize the possibility we are wrong. madam secretary, you also mentioned something that was active. you say we lost our focus on afghanistan. but that can be a little misleading to some people just hear it because it seems to suggest that maybe we went to sleep while we were not paying attention. the reality is you know, and i know you said this before, is we can focus everywhere. we have to pick our priorities and we have to focus, we moved our focus to iraq, had pretty successful situation there. we came back to afghanistan. but there are those who would

say that based on our focus in afghanistan we are now taking our focus off of other areas. some would say south america. we see the rise of drug cartels of there. some would say that pacific, and we are watching the anti-access denial strategies of the chinese were we still have no concept to deal with that. we are seeing an increase modernization of military of the chinese with cyberattacks and space attacks, which we don't seem to be focusing. we cut out are apt to into is while we watched the russian increase their production, their j. '20s and so some would argue we're not focusing on air superiority. we stop focusing on join us as much as we had doing away with the joint forces command. we have ship repair shortfalls of $567 million some would say we are risking reduction of service life of our fleet. and many of us feel that our lack of focus on shipbuilding could cause the chinese navy to outnumber our navy.

because both of you have lived with this along, help me to articulate the priorities of why it is important that we continue that focus in afghanistan, knowing all the things that we are a coalition in afghanistan, but why is it important we continue that focus even if it means taking our focus off of some of these other areas. and if so, how long can we afford to do that? >> let me just start out, i no general-purpose wants to end. first of all, i would say that we are certainly focused on afghanistan because we do have vital interests at stake. the core goal of disrupting, hispanic, defeating al qaeda, deny them safe haven is absolutely essential. we have to achieve that. not only in terms of where the bulk of al qaeda's senior leadership is, but also looking to the affiliates around the world. and i would say we have not taken our focus off the broader war against al qaeda, which is

global and in its dimension, not just in afghanistan, pakistan. but i would also tell you that secretary gates has very clearly enunciated the strategy that says first and foremost we do have to prevail in the wars we're in given what's at stake. but we also have to invest in preventing and deterring conflicts elsewhere, and we have to prepare for the future. so i would assure you with the work that the air force and navy are doing on battle, the our technologies are doing in terms of science technology, research, development, we are focused on the anti-access and denial problem like a laser. you can look at our investment stream to track the. you can look at the efficiencies that is pulled money out of unnecessary overhead and plowed back into the ship building program and elsewhere. so i would argue we have a lost our focus on those other priorities, but obviously given the stakes involved, allies on the line, we have to maintain our focus on afghanistan as well.

>> and if i could, congressman, first of all, i would really go back to september 2005 when asked to do an assessment in afghanistan on the way home from a secretary in iraq when i stood up the train and equip mission there. and after doing that assessment, the request i went back and briefed the pentagon, and this is when afghanistan was seen as the cold war we were winning. and i said mr. secretary, with all due respect this will be the longest campaign and the long bar for all the following breeze. and had to do with the damage of the 30 years of war, the lack of capital, the lack of infrastructure, the literacy rates, all of the issues we have been grappling with. and i think have come into much higher believe since that time as we have focused more on that. over two years ago, two and half years ago when i took command, central command and focused and did an assessment of afghanistan, i concluded that we did not have the inputs right

and i stated that at that time. and i'm on the record at various times as having said that. therefore the games really are the gains of the past year. there may have been points along the way up until 2005, maybe beyond that where we thought as if things were headed in the right direction. but not recognizing the taliban are coming back. but rss but certainly retrospectively would be that the taliban has had the momentum in the country since at least 2005. there are areas in the country that we didn't realize until we went in and took them away from the talibans how long they had been there, how much infrastructure they had established there. now, with respect to again taking the focus off other areas, as former geographic combatant commander i would confirm that i think we can juggle more than one ball at a time. i think we can keep a log of plates spinning at one time. we may feel like the guy at the

circus who is racing around doing that, and we shortly have that capability, even as we rightly, as the secretary and the undersecretary have noted, do everything we can to win the wars we have got, which is of enormous importance. again, why afghanistan? because it's the home to al qaeda's senior leadership. it has been for decades. it has to be disrupted, dismantle, disputed -- defeated and it has affiliates there, other organizations that are want to be transnational extremists as well and cannot be allowed to become that. las..

>> are for expanding the training capacity that actually develops enablers, some of those in that 305, some of that in the projects beyond that. >> okay. so i'm getting to the comments of the minister of defense wardak saying some other reports ought to push that to 378,000. so if we're not there generally with, to get a 305 with what we have, what's your assessment of getting to 378 anytime soon with what we don't have? >> well, i think we will figure out how to do it at the end of the day, even if there is a necessity of diverting, perhaps, some additional u.s. forces, and they would be a mix of combat support and combat service

support. because, again, we're increasingly doing enablers, not just combat forces. >> right. >> perhaps hiring more combat trainers which is something we don't want to do, we want to draw those numbers down, and then accelerate the so-called trainer, the afghan trainer program which is also, now, starting to bear dividends. >> is this an isaf decisions or a u.s. forces afghanistan decision regarding the training? >> no, the nato-training mission afghanistan is an isaf organization, but it is a dual-hatted command just as isaf with the afghan security forces fund flowing to the combined security transition afghanistan commander who is also the mtma commander. >> has that decision been made to move to 378? >> it is not. there is a recommendation that has gone forward developed in close consultation with the minister of interior, minister

of defense of afghanistan, ultimately approved by president karzai. it is actually a recommendation of 352 as a floor, and if there are certain reforms that continue because the afghans are very much working on reforms in the area of recruiting, retention and reduction of attrition as well as leader development and some other institutional development areas. if those continue, then there are, essentially, incentives. so if you're doing this well, then -- and go to 378, and that's what has gone forward. that has, the endorsement of general mattis and the secretary, but it also has a recognition from all of us that there is a sustainability issue. >> right. >> and that is what policymakers have to grapple with. again, it's my job to state requirements and to do so forthrightly, and that's what i've tried to do. it is the job of others then to determine whether those requirements can be adequately resourced and what the long-term sustainment implications are as

well. >> and that's what we end up shooting back to us here many congress. secretary flournoy, i don't think that you are, i don't think the administration's talking enough about the long-term relationship that we will have with afghanistan. there's only, you know, in recent memory there's only one country that we've been involve with the with that we then left alone, and that was afghanistan. and so i think it's important to put this strategic relationship in context, and i want you to talk a little bit about specifically what this administration and what the karzai administration believes would be the element of a relationship that sees a decreasing military footprint and an in's creasing diplomatic and economic relationship with afghanistan because talking with folks back home, you know, their thing is get out of afghanistan. and the response is, well, do you mean literally america, united states of america has no

relationship with afghanistan at all? because that's what people hear, and i think we need to be telling folks we are not saying that. no one is saying that. but there is a relationship that we're going to have with afghanistan that is strategic, but can you give us, in 26 seconds, what those details might look like, and perhaps the chairman will be kind enough to give you some fore or bearns. >> i think as we begin the transition process and cutting the fundage of responsible drawdown, it's very important to clarify publicly and with the afghans what a strategic partnership entails, what this enduring commitment involves. i think first of all you can expect to have a security, cooperation or assistance component, a long-term commitment to helping the nsf continue to develop and build in capability. what kind of trade relations, what kind of economic assistance, what kind of collaboration on that front.

there will be a political and diplomatic component a people-to-people component. if you look at the strategic framework agreement that we came up with in iraq as a model, it's that kind of thing. laying out the elements of a commitment on both sides to a multifaceted interaction between the two countries over time. >> the chair exercises great forbearance, but if, if members want to use the five minutes to prepare their question, i will ask the witnesses to respond on the record in deference to all the other members that are sitting here that have questions to ask. mr. wilson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i will try to conform to the standard. and it will be difficult. but first of all, secretary flournoy, i want to thank you for your message on behalf of the administration, and you restated it, and that is we're not abandoning afghanistan.

that there's an enduring penn, strategic partnership that i interpret that that we will stop terrorism there to protect american families at home. i find this reassuring to the people of afghanistan, i note that it's appreciated by our allies and our troops serving there, and i hope it's a warning to our enemies around the world that we will not abandon the people of afghanistan. and, general petraeus, it's an honor to be back with you. i always like to point out that i'm very grateful personally. i've had two sons serve under your command in afghanistan. i'm very grateful my former national guard unit, the 218th brigade, the people of south carolina are very proud that they were there, 1600 troops, the largest deployment of troops since world war ii in afghanistan, to help build the afghan army and police. and you trained our new general, bob livingston, very well.

so we're very grateful. i know your success in iraq as the co-chair of the victory in iraq caucus. i appreciate the success of the surge, and then i appreciate the president accepting your recommendations for surge in afghanistan. and in my most recent visit there, i was so grateful to come back to the house floor and point out that the success of the surge is truly to encourage the people of afghanistan, their police and their army units, you've gained 70,000 more police and army personnel with great leaders like general wardak, and the american people need to know that this is also assisting with literacy, marksmanship, this is real world progress. with that, my question really is related to our longtime ally, pakistan. sadly, the country has been under assault by natural

disasters, political instability. what is the status of our military relationship with our longtime ally? >> well, first of all, congressman, the people of south carolina should, indeed, be very proud of their by decade, of the 218th, and it was great to have bob at centcom and wonderful to the see him now become ag of the state. with respect to pakistan, clearly, it has endured innumerable challenges in recent years. terrible natural disasters, a spread of the that rick key taliban pakistani that forced the initiation some two years ago of very tough-fighting, very impressive counterinsurgency operations in which the pakistanis have lost thousands of soldiers and also thousands of civilians. b the fact is that the

cooperation between pakistan, the afghan forces and isaf forces has never been better. we have had a number of meetings, literally just in the last couple of months, to coordinate operations where pakistan is continuing its offensive, and we will duct complementary operations on our side, on the afghan side of the border. again, there's also no question about the gains that pakistan has made against the you are the rick key pakistani and some affiliates, but there's also no question about the very worrying developments in terms of extreme i activity in -- extremist act estimate in pakistani with the assassination of the governor in punjab, and the reaction was troubling to many pakistanis, and more recently the assassination of the minister of minorities. beyond that, the pakistanis clearly recognize -- i've had

many conversations with their army leadership -- that more needs to be done against groups that reside in various areas of pakistan, in north waziristan, in bliewch stand that are causing significant security challenges for their neighbor and their partner, afghanistan, while also being fair to recognize that the pakistanis would rightly state that they have put a lot of short sticks into a lot of hornets' nests in recent years, and they absolutely have to consolidate some of their gains and solidify their gains and build on them before they can take on major new fights. nonetheless, there is a clear recognition among all of the importance of their doing that at an appropriate moment and, indeed, the u.s. relationship with them which has, i think it's fair to say, sustained degree of tension.

in recent weeks in particular as a result of the case involve offing the state department employee -- involving the state department employee. but hopefully, we can move forward, take the rearview mirror off the bus and resume the very cooperative activities that have characterized the relationship in the past. >> thank you. >> we will have one more, ms. boar call the low, then we will call a five-minute recess, and then we will begin with mr. turner. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. madam secretary and general petraeus, it's -- thank you for appearing today, and it's nice to e see you again. to begin, representing guam, the closest neighbor of japan, i wish to extend our prayers and condolences to the people of japan in that they may recover from this horrendous disaster. i have, as you both know, traveled extensively through

afghanistan and central asia since 2003, i might add, where i met you, general. and i have seen success. i want to make -- place that in the record. just three weeks ago i traveled with the wilson codell, it was a very factual codell, and i thank you, general, for the very informative brief that you gave all of us. now, i have my first question is to the secretary. i believe one of the keys to advancing democracy in afghanistan is to educate the women. madam secretary, you touch on this in your testimony briefly in the formation of the afghan consultative peace jirga. my question for you is what other measures are coalition forces involved in to encourage the advancement of women's rights? >> well, i think at large there are a number of u.s. policies

and programs designed to sort of secure and enhance the role of women in afghan society. there are a number of state department programs, usaid programs. every time tear clinton -- secretary clinton goes, she gives great prominence to these. but in terms of the isaf forces, and i know general petraeus may want to speak to this, one of the things, one of the innovations that's occurred is using our own female soldiers, marines, troopers in female engagement teams, the lion necessary program where they are actually able to to into afghan villages and access and engage half the population that otherwise would be off limits to us. so they are working face to face with afghan women at the local level trying to insure their voice is heard, that they are a part of the process of transforming an area from insecurity to security and then, you know, in terms of being

participants in the broader golf nance and so -- governance and so forth. so that's happening at that local level all the time. >> thank you, thank you. madam secretary -- >> maybe i could add on that. >> i'm going to get to you, general. i have another question for you, but i will get to you. i tended to -- i was with speaker pelosi on a codell, and we -- it was strictly women, meeting women pote in military and the afghan government. and they are very vocal, and they spoke about security. that was the main thing. they wanted the u.s. to provide security for them so they can go out and teach and meet with the afghan people. general, to what extent, if any, must corrupt behavior by those in government in afghanistan be countered in order to support stability? what exactly is needed from president karzai in order for corruption in the afghan system to be countered successfully?

during a dinner with ambassador eikenberry on this recent codell, we understood from the parliament members who attended the dinner that this corruption in the government still exists, and i know this is a little out of your realm, but i think that poll techs and the military -- politics and the military are comingled in the afghanistan. i understand there isn't even a speaker yet appointed in the parliament, is that correct? >> no. actually, there was a speaker elected a couple of weeks ago, and the committee members have been being selected as well more recently. in fact, as i noted yesterday, i think there are 10% more women in the afghan parliament than there are in the u.s. congress. >> oh, well -- >> if in part because this is a constitutional requirement for certain levels, but it does reflect, i i think, a degree of

seriousness about opportunities for women which, certainly, a very, very conservative society. there has to be constant attention to that. i would point out, i think the most important advance for women, though, is actually in the area of access to education. it's well known that under the taliban during which there were less than one million in school at all in the any case in elementary school and so forth, now there are over -- this year we believe there will be 8.2 million according to the minister of education, and where over 30, 35%, we believe, will be actually female students. so this is quite an enormous step for them and a great opportunity. there are actually two afghan female generals, there are growing numbers of afghan female police and soldiers. don't get me wrong, there are all kinds of barriers, institutional norms and others that have to be confronted in some of these areas, but they are proving themselves and showing top of enormous value in

these operations. indeed, i think it's afghan commanders that increasingly recognize the need for that. and then finally, the corruption that has to be dealt with is clearly that which threatens the institutions to which we will transition, have to transition, and that corruption which completely undermines the legitimacy of the governmental organizations which have to earn the support of the people. >> thank you very much, general. thank you, mr. chairman. >> the committee will now stand in recess. we will reconvene at six minutes after 12. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> committee will come to order.

mr. turner's recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank both of you for being here today and for your leadership on such an important issue as afghanistan. we all know that as we look at the threats to the united states that afghanistan, of course, was the source of the, of the attack from 9/11, and we appreciate that it is a security environment that must be secured for the united states and for, as we go forward. general, you and i actually have had several opportunities to talk about afghanistan. i was last in afghanistan as you had taken the leadership position there, and my issue that i raise just about every time is the drug trade. we see, excuse me, i've got a problem with this chair. switch chair here.

the, everyone identified the drug trade as a source for corruption. funding the taliban, funding the insurgency, causing instability in government, also suppressing the issue of the transition of their economy to legal production and to a stable economy from which then afghanistan could grow. general, i've held up several times this chart. i'm going to show you again. this shows the historical production of of poppy in afghanistan going back to 1991. and what i like about this chart, crs did this, is that it shows that we actually have as we were looking at responding with a troop surge, we had an opium production surge. if you fold this chart in half, you can see that from this side you have the historical levels of production, and then you have these four years which are really the last four years that are spikes in opium productionment you --

production. you indicated that really afghanistan had turned since 2005, and you can see from the chart, actually 2006 is the first year opium production spiked. it is almost double the historical levels of production, and i know now 2010 there was a reduction as a result of disease among the crops. but i don't think people are projecting that it's going to go back to half again. we all know that the list, the to-do list of what to do with this includes e eradication, attacking the labs, attacking the cash, attacking the leaders and the leadership, looking for ultimate crops and supply routes, but general, nonetheless, even though that remains a to-do list, i'm not confident we're being as effective as we need to be. knowing that this goes directly to the heart of really what we're facing. i looked at your written testimony, and, general, you do mention in marjah the turn around there and that it was

prior affected by the narcotics trade. but what i don't see in your testimony, really, the drug trade being identified as major initiative that we need to attack and address. we look to prior testimony that's come, that this committee has heard. we heard in 2006 general james jones stated that the achille ease heel of afghanistan is the narcotics problem. i think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of far cot ticks -- far cot ticks, the money it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements. general, are we doing better, and what do we need to do? this is, obviously, a time where we look to how do we bring resources to bear on what you're undertaking. >> well, thanks. and, in fact, we are doing quite a bit better. over the last six months, for example, we assess that we have found and destroyed some three times or so the weight of the

illegal narcotics products of various types and also attacks on labs and so on. the fact is that i think your slide, and we probably should help you update it pause, again, it did come down this past year now, and it appears it's going to come down further this year, but what it shows is that insecurity and taliban control lead to production of poppy and, therefore, the flourishing of the illegal narcotics industry which provides somewhere around at least a third of the funding for the taliban movement. the other elements coming from illegal activities like kidnapping, extortion and so forth and then outside remittances, donations. if you look at slide 12, in fact, in our packet there, you'll see what happens after isaf and afghan forces control an area for a period. and we can work through the process of crop substitution, of

providing wheat seed and other alternative crops rather than having to resort to the poppy which in many cases the taliban forces the people to plant and to harvest because, again, that provides substantial revenue for them. so there has been considerably more emphasis on this over the course of the last six months. again, as the slide shows, nalla was an area of very heavy concentration of poppy production, and it has become an area, now, of virtually no poppy production. and it's not just the blight that has led to a reduction in poppy cultivation, but also literally just to less cultivation as well. so, again, i think there's much more attention on this than there has been this past. it was fortuitous that you visited when you did and showed me the slide that you did when you did because it, indeed, helped. it was a catalyst for a pretty

substantial examination that we did of this problem. thank you. >> thank you, general. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. courtney. >> thank you, mr. chairman. want to thank both witnesses for their outstanding testimony and service. general, in the slide presentation, the last slide which talks about strategic risks, one of the storm clouds here was the inadequate state usaid resourcing. you know, you ghei a very, i think -- gave a very blunt and, i think, honest answer about the resolution which we're going to be voting on tomorrow, and i want to first of all thank you for your answer to senator graham about your concerns about the budget that came out of the house in terms of the cuts to usaid and the state department in general. one of the frustrations for a lot of us during that debate was that the -- it was framed as cutting discretionary domestic spending, but in fact,

obviously, the state department and usaid was brought in to those cuts and just to be very clear on the record here, i mean, in 2010 usaid was funded at a level of $1.42 billion, the h.r. 1 cut that to 1.3 billion which was about a 14% reduction from what the president requested for 2011. you know, for a lot of people, though, usaid is just an acronym. it just doesn't mean anything to the average citizen out there, and i'm just wondering if you could maybe fill in what that means many terms of the work that usaid is doing in the afghanistan and how integral it is to both a successful diplomatic, but military strategy, and the quicker we can pivot away from a military footprint in that country. >> well, thanks very much, congressman. in fact, i sent a letter to senator graham in response to a question that he asked of me, and it was put on the record

yesterday, and it might be worth sharing, in fact, with members of this committee. the bottom line, though, in that letter was that i stated that this category of funding which is so essential to building on the hard-fought security gains that our troopers sacrifice so much to achieve, this category is really a national security funding issue, not just an eshoo of foreign assistance -- issue of foreign assistance or some other element. again, without that construction of governance and development on the foundation of security that is achieved by our men and women in uniform, you cannot consol tate your gains -- consolidate your gains. you can't solidify them and, indeed, build on them as we say. >> another slide which was submitted, i think it was slide 13 which was some photographs of school openings, and there was a

rather, well, a quote shooting a bullet into our enemy's heart which is a pretty vivid metaphor in the context of showing kids lining up for school. but, again, it really shows the really strong connection between -- and that may have been a surf project, but nonetheless, usaid is all about school construction and the fact that that's how we win. >> absolutely. this particular district where the school's being opened -- and it's the district governor now, mind you, not us -- he's the one that is saying this is akin to shooting a bullet into the enemy's heart. needless to say, that school was not opened under the taliban. in marjah there were zero schools opened under the taliban. that was a nexus of the illegal far cot ticks industry -- narcotics industry. there are now fife schools open -- five schools open and also five others that are under

construction. now, it may well be that these are cerp-funded, but the idea is we all work together. as it comes to the afghan infrastructure fund, that is jointly administered between the military and state/aid, and i don't know if secretary wants to mention something on that. >> i would just say that at this particular point in the campaign when we're actually getting traction on the security dimension, we're creating space for those things to happen as general petraeus said. you know, it's even more important now that we maintain, if not increase, the funding for some of these critical, the early stabilization programs as soon as you clear an area, oti goes in and immediately starts programs to engage the community. agricultural development which is the heart of the afghan economy, capacity building so that, you know, afghans will be

more able to do for themselves over time, dispute resolution which goes at the heart of what the taliban, you know, really competes directly with the taliban and the role it's tried to carve out for itself. these are critical programs, and if we only fund the military piece, you can't actually get across the goal line without state and aid assistance as well. >> thank you. >> thank you. mr. kline. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, madam secretary, general, for being here, for your testimony, for answering the questions. thank you, general, for hosting us just a few weeks ago. the chearm, mr. reyes and i were out and had terrific briefings, a great chance to visit. we were concerned about some of the briefings we got on corruption but uplifted by many others. thank you, also, for your son, and please thank lieutenant petraeus from me and, i suspect,

from the whole committee. it was, it was surprising, almost shocking that we could go to marjah, no body armor, walk through the market, talk to proprietors, go to a school opening, cut a ribbon for opening a school for 500 kids, ten teachers, but tremendous, tremendous progress. so mr. forbes said that we have to hope ha you're right -- that you're right in your estimation of progress and anticipation of the afghans taking over responsibility. and based on a lot of what we saw, it appears that you are right. there is certainly progress being made. and one of the places where we are definitely getting it right is the effort that general caldwell and his folks have undertaken and are doing in training the new afghan national

security forces, the police particularly seemed to be, were making progress where we didn't even think it might even be possible to make progress a couple of years ago. and the brilliant idea of including literacy training in a country where you've got a -- i think they said these recruits coming in 85% can't read or write at all. they can't even read their own name. and so now effort to get them up to what we're calling the first grade level, see spot run, i think, is going to pay tremendous, tremendous dividends in their capability, the chance for professionalism. i was just hugely heartened by that. and so when you look at the improved quality of the new member of the afghan national security force with this change if how we train them, i want to go back to mr. larson's question

about the 378,000 total in strength, if you will, of ansf in october of 2012, i think, is the date that's being talked about. so i have just a really simple question. to you support -- do you support that number? and i know you put a 350 and some enablers, but overall, are you supporting that goal, and do you think we can do it? is? >> i support it if and only if, again, our afghan security force partners meet the reform goals on which they're already making progress. so they would need to continue progress in the areas of recruiting, retention and then reduction of attrition as well as a variety of different leader development initiatives that are critical. indeed, without those then it's not worth continuing it. if they do that, that is a very

tangible recognition of, in a sense, a reward for an incentive for meeting the very important benchmarks for the continued development of quality as well as quantity. whether they can do it will depend, in fact, on reduction of attrition in particular. they have been ahead of glide path so far in their growth, in meeting their growth goals, but as this increases, of course, it becomes increasingly challenging. so we'll have to see how they do, again, in meeting the attrition reduction goals. >> let me ask -- >> the answer is yes. >> okay. do you think they will -- all right. thank you very much. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> we like honest answers in today's modern military. [laughter] >> thank you. mr. loebsack. >> thank you, mr. chair. madam secretary, general petraeus, thank you for your service, thank you for being here today. it's always good to see you at these hearings and in the past

in afghanistan and hopefully in the future as well, general, i'll be able to see you in afghanistan at some point. at the outset, i do want to note that the iowa national guard currently has roughly 3,000 soldiers deployed in afghanistan, that's the largest for our state since world war ii, and you're kind enough to assent to a video interview with my colleague, bruce braley, when he was there recently with the codell. the second brigade combat team did deploy last summer and is operating in, i believe, five provinces throughout rc east. 734th agribusiness development team deployed a few months before that, and thank you, madam secretary, for your comments about agriculture. i'm really proud of the team working in the agriculture sector. i think they're doing a great job. it's not iowa, that's for sure. having been there, i have a sense of what agriculture is like in afghanistan. but i think it's an essential component to the strategy.

and i think it's safe to say that all iowans are very proud of our national guard and their activities there. what i want to talk a little bit about is what we mean by legitimate governance, what we mean by successful governance and what we mean by successful development, and i'll just preface it by saying before i became a congressman, i traveled overseas principally to the so-called third world a number of times. i talked comparative politics -- i taught comparative politics. i know the word nation building has not been part of the vocabulary of this administration for some time, but i'm one of those who has a lot of concerns about nation building. and i understand why folks aren't calling what we're doing necessarily nation building, but when we talk about defining success as afghanistan being secure and able to govern itself and part of that being able to

create a legitimate governance system and also being able to engage in successful development in this a country which i think -- and correct me if i'm wrong -- is still about the fourth poorest country in the world, extremely poor. having been there, i'm very aware of the lack of infrastructure, all the problems that they face. i guess my question is the, how do we define things like provision of basic services, for example, when we talk about governance? madam secretary, if you would. thank you. >> well, i think when you look at golfer nance, we start -- governance, we start bottom up at the local level to say what are the essential components. things like a functional shura that's representative of the population, a decent district governor, a decent noncorrupt, nonpredatory police chief. some funds available for basic development programs whether it's coming from kabul or the

international community. there's some basic building mocks that as you -- blocks that as you put them in place really start to make a difference at the local level. afghanistan is going to be a poor country for decades. the economic development timeline is very, very long, and that's part of the long-term relationship that we'll, we and others in the international community will have with afghanistan. this will be something we work on with them for many, many years. but the key we're focused on right now, what are the key governance and development pieces that are absolutely essential to the core goal to getting to the point where afghanistan can take the lead in securing and governing itself with continued help from the international community, but of a nature that looks more like a traditional long-term assistance program? many. >> general, do you want to weigh in on that? >> well, first of all, you know, i think you're right that nation building has a bit of a pejorative connotation in this

town. but the fact is that we've also gotten away from that a tiny bit because we want to convey a sense that we are quite measure inside our objectives in afghanistan. we're not trying to build, again, switzerland in that country. we're trying to help afghanistan achieve what is sufficient for afghanistan. afghanistan right or afghanistan good enough. so we have measured objectives that are based on a very realistic assessment of the challenges that confront i there. confront us there. among the provision of basic services that i would add to what the secretary described and partly embodied in the shura council is the issue of resolution. this is an area where the taliban can compete with local governance if it's not done well. inteed, this is the area -- indeed, this is the area in which swat valley the pakistani was able to play on grievances

because of the lack of speedy justice because of the way the system was set up there this northwest frontier province. so that is another important component of this, and again, this is all part of achieving that legitimacy in the eyes of the people, governance that serves the people, that doesn't prey on them, that is transparent and sufficiently, again, representative of integrity as well. >> thanks to both of you, and thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. rodgers. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'll thank the witnesses and, general, in particular i want to again state i don't think any of us on this committee can often enough tell you how much we appreciate your service and the sacrifice you and your family are making. the nation owes you a great debt of gratitude. you touched on this subject in your opening statement, but i wanted to be more specific. one of the commands you have is the joint urgent operational needs which is for persistent surveillance systems which

provide actionable intel to decision makers to counter ieds and protect convoy ises. do you have enough of these systems, and if not, how many do you need? >> we do not have enough. there is an urgent operational needs statement in, in fact, a joint operational needs statement, and i'll get that to you for the record what the specifics of, by each different category of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system. i will tell you that the secretary of defense has done an incredible job -- first when i was in iraq as the commander there, then at central command and now that i'm in afghanistan -- in doing everything humanly possible to produce this as rapidly as it can come off the ais assembly line and out of industry, as he has done with the mrap all terrain vehicle and a varian i of other items -- variety of other items we desperately have needed. >> you mentioned the use of blemps over there along with

cameras on poles. are they manned or unmanned? >> there's nobody in the blimp, but there is a team down at the base that is, obviously, steering the camera and i forget how many people are actually part of that team typically. and then that ties into the operations center of the unit in whose area it is being employed. >> excellent. and the last question i've got, make things simple for a simple fella from alabama. when you look at the afghan security forces and the way you found them and the point they are developed now from a professional skill set level, do you consider the way you found them a zero and the way you want 'em when you're gone a ten, where would you say they are on that scale? in their development? >> well, with respect, i wouldn't want to label where they were a zero. again, there's been enormously hard work there. and the fact that we had not gotten inputs right doesn't mean there wasn't a tremendous amount

of productive activity in building institutions, in building infrastructure, in building human capital and everything else. it was just that we hadn't applied enough and in some cases didn't have the right constructs, organizations, resourcing. but, i mean, there's no question that there has been significant improvement in them, again, not just in terms of quantity, but also in terms of quality, leader development, infrastructure development and now increasingly the development of these critical enablers that are necessary so that we don't have to continue to enable them in every single category. >> right. >> and, again, i -- if general caldwell and his team have done magnificent work, first, in the building the nato mission in afghanistan which has been a big part of this so that we have all the nato countries and nato/isaf countries engaged, not just those that are following the u.s. lead in what used to be the si stick ca, but in many cases

there are skill sets required for trainers we don't have in our inventory. we don't fly some of the smaller fixed-wing aircraft, and yet some of the former soviet warsaw pact countries that are now either part of nato or troop-contributing nations of isaf have those skill sets and have been very helpful in that regard. thank you. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> ms. son gas. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you, secretary flournoy and general petraeus, for your testimony here this morning. i opposed president obama's initial request for supplemental funding for the surge of an additional 30,000 troops because i had questions about our strategy in afghanistan and pakistan that the i felt were unanswered and did not feel comfortable increasing the number of service members serving there without answers to those questions. i have been there three times

now, and i still have strong reservations and many unanswered questions, so i'm glad you're both here, and i'm glad that the president has carried out several very deliberate assessments of the challenges we face. i want to congratulate you for establishing a timeline and benchmarks to success which you describe as an afghanistan, quote, that can secure and govern itself, unquote. however, i believe this timeline and these benchmarks are almost entirely dependent upon the actions of a corrupt central government and be on the growth and the size and capabilities of the afghan national security forces, both very difficult challenges, and you've had many questions about that today. general, "the washington post" reported a few weeks ago that we have recently made significant gains in marjah, and you've allude today that today and talked about, as have others who recently visited. violence has declined, more civilians are cooperating with our forces, and last september's

elections had a high voter turnout. however, this progress required the deployment of 15,000 soldiers in a full year of fighting to secure a town of less than 80,000 people. and we were supposed to be well on our way by now to securing kandahar, a hub of taliban activity with a population of half a million. with progress this slow, why should we have any confidence you will adhere to the timeline with substantial redeployments beginning this summer? why should we believe that the current strategy will succeed across the rest of afghanistan by 2014? >> well, first of all, with respect, congresswoman, i think the number of u.s. marines that we ever had in marjah was a bit less than 4500, and we'll get you the exact number. i think it was a few hundred less than that. and the last i saw i think we're down to around 1600 now. so even though we haven't

formally commenced transition in marjah because there are a number of other issues and challenges that have to be dealt with before we can get to that point, there's no question that we have already been able to thin out our forces and have our afghan partners expand their presence and capability. that notwithstanding, this is a tough fight, and i don't want to diminish the challenges that continue to confront us there. but the fact is that we have, indeed, been able to reduce our forces substantially and that we have been able to reinvest them, if you will, in other areas further out from the population centers and then in other districts where they were needed. >> but, general, nevertheless, it took quite a bit longer than you initially anticipated -- >> not longer than i anticipated with respect, congresswoman. i think i'm on the record talking about how long these take. i think it is fair to say that we used some rhetoric at that

time like governance in a box that turned out not to be in the pox and that kind of thing that was -- box and that kind of thing that was unhelpful and, indeed, there have been times when we have made pronouncements in the past. but we have, frankly, tried very hard on my watch to underpromise and overdeliver. in fact, if you look at the record and my statements on jar ri and districts west of kandahar, you'll see that we were very cautious in our projections of the rate of progress there and, frankly, ultimately we did actually state that we had actually done it a little bit faster than we had anticipated. this is hard government work. it is tough fighting in very, very difficult conditions. almost like the hedge rows of normandy in certain respects in some of these districts. and, again, i would submit that on my watch as the commander that i have been very, very

circumspect in projections about what it is that we will do and in explaining what we have done and that there are a lot of caveats and that what we have tried to do is be as forthright as we possibly could. >> nevertheless, these gains are fragile -- >> and that's my statement as well. >> that's why i think you stated here today is we have sort of a fork in the road where those who see this fragility supporting continued investment in those who seeing that fragility wonder similar my how much longer can we hue to this strategy? thank you. >> thank you. thank you, mr. conaway. >> dade, michelle -- david, michelle, thank you for coming this morning. my dad served and fought with the 101st in if korea, and he was very proud of his affiliation with that fine organization. we talked about corruption, there is some corruption we can do something about this our supply chains and our care and feeding of our team. as you push into that, give me a

couple of -- let me give you a couple of questions on that about connections between u.s. contracting and corruption in afghanistan as well as what are the barriers that you need to identify the maligned actors in the systems and what can congress do to give you either new tools or new authorities to deal with things that we can do something about when it comes to corruption? >> well, first of all, congressman, it's a great e question. -- great question. and senator brown and i i think it was senator aya have introduced greater authority when we identify the contractors have been carrying out, essentially, corrupt practices or practices that undermine what it is we're trying to do as counterinsurgents. so that would be quite helpful. we have also requested some 60 or so individuals with special

skill sets to help us with oversight of these various contracting activities. now, these are quite highly-trained and experienced individuals. it's another area in which secretary gates ha worked -- has worked exceedingly hard to encourage the services to find these individuals and to provide them to us. i think we're about halfway there in that, and there's a good prospect for additional ones coming. we have formed two task forces, task force 2010 and task force spotlight. the latter focuses on the issue of private security contractors as we move forward, an area of legitimate and understandable concern to president karzai as they can take on the role of extralegal armed groups if not careful without ip sufficient over-- insufficient oversight. and then the other's looking at all contracts. and we've reviewed several hundred contracts to this point. there is a small percentage of those that we have identified

many which there have been activities that either undermine our counterinsurgency effort or corrupt or a combination of the two. and in those cases we have, indeed, debarred nine contractors and then there are a couple dozen more, a few dozen more that are under suspension with the possibility of debarment. >> would this legislation give you access to the books and records of the contractors that you may not have access to now? >> that could be a provision. again, i'm not the expert on the legislation other than to have been assured by those who are experts that it would be very helpful to us and what it is we're trying to do. >> all right. >> we occasionally are unable to take action as swiftly as we would like to. >> okay. michelle, most of us think that afghanistan will be a country in which the world will have to pour resources for a long time. can you give us some sort of

scope as to what we currently spend there as isaf writ large versus the afghan economy, and what are y'all's plans, you know, post our leaving, whatever that might mean for the troops? the afghanis have got the national police and national armies and local police in place and all that's working, can you give us some sort of scope as the to how that country continues to fund that infrastructure of security? >> congressman, i'd like to get back to you on the figures, particularly the comparison between what we are spending versus the afghan gdp. so if that's okay, i'll take that and get back to you with figures on the record. but i think, you know, we are seeing the beginnings of growth in the afghan economy as they begin their agricultural sector back. but i think long term the key elements are going to be

creating the capacity to really build a strategic minerals extraction industry that actually benefits the afghan people and the afghan government, not just the foreign companies who come in. >> or the production. >> [inaudible] -- to them as well. building a whole -- they really don't have a customs taxation, they have no real revenue generation system that's above board and sort of formalized and so forth. so part of what we're doing is providing advisers to the various ministries, particularly the finance ministry, to help them put some of these structures in place. >> all right. [inaudible] as a go by. that doesn't work. >> okay. >> thank you for your service, appreciate it. >> thank you. ms. bell by. >> thank you, mr. chair. thank you, secretary flournoy and general petraeus, for joining us today. i know it's been a long day, and i can see you're down at the

bottom row, so congratulations on making it this far. i want to reiterate what many of my colleagues have said, we appreciate the hard work and sacrifice of both of you and the troops that you lead, and coming from the state of maine where we do have national guard deployed and have sent so many of our citizens to this and other wars, we know what this sacrifice is. also in maine when we look at the costs of this war, we feel that there's been an extraordinarily high burden to our state when you divide that up. it's about 3.4 billion, the cost of our state residents in paying for the war in afghanistan. and i continue to hear from my constituents about the astronomical costs both in lives lost and the resources we sacrifice at home to support the ongoing mission. i want to talk a little bit about that. as we've seen earlier, 75% of americans have said that a substantial number of combat troops should be removed from afghanistan this summer according to a washington post poll released this week. many, like myself, are deeply

concerned that this will not be a reality come july, and i think we know that's true. every day more and more americans are looking for an end to this war, but as we sit here and talk about it, there really doesn't seem to be a soon end in sight. dod budget documents have forecasted a drop of u.s. drops in afghanistan from 102,000 to 98,250, that's only 3.5% reduction which can hardly be described as an accelerated transition n. the president's final orders for escalation, he defined the mission as setting conditions for accelerated transition to afghan authorities beginning in this july. however, i believe there's a lack of transparency and accountability, and this has raised some serious concerns, and it's also made it more challenging to fully understand some of the conditions on the ground. in recent months i believe there's been a significant reduction in information about the war in afghanistan coming from the pentagon. for example, you have made it clear that a key ingredient to a successful counterinsurgency strategy is for the population

in afghanistan to support and have confidence in they are government. as you once put it, and i know you have again, you cannot kill or capture your way to victory in afghanistan. this makes it hard to understand why data collected quarterly about the support of afghans, the support that they have for their government was dropped from your most recent report to congress in november of 2010. i'm interested in knowing whether this decision has been made to no longer collect this data and if decision has not been made, why it was omitted from the report. one of my major concerns as well as the loss of life and one that i share with my constituents is if taxpayer dollars are being used appropriately. reports by the gao special inspector general for afghan reconstruction and of orrs have raised serious concerns about the potential waste of u.s. taxpayer dollars associated with security and reconstruction efforts in the afghanistan. last april the department of defense reported that afghan civil service support's program

will disperse 85 million in support of civil service reform efforts from january 2010 through the end of the project in february 2011. the department also reported that the u.s. government was transferring 30 million directly to the afghan ministry of finance to support the civilian technical assistance plan, and in fy-2010 a billion was appropriated for the commander's emergency response program with the goal of continuing reconstruction and development work. i know you have spoken this support of that program, but i have serious concerns about how it is spent and have not seen any accounting to congress about those, how those u.s. taxpayer dollars have been spent. i know this is a lot of information to provide in my last minute and would be happy to see it in writing, but i would like to know more, and i would like the committee to have more information about how u.s. taxpayer funds in the commander's emergency response obogram have been used and what