>> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. .. >> it is just under two hours. >> thanks so much for coming to this evening's panel discussion with several of the contributors to the new anthology, the people reloaded. the green movement and the struggle for the future of dhahran, which i have the honor

of coediting with my friend and comrade from you will be hearing shirley. first of would like to thank the department of middle eastern, south asian, and african studies here at columbia university for sponsoring this event tonight. i would also like to thank the middle east institute at columbia university and the colombian university graduate school of journalism for cosponsoring. finally, i would like to think the publisher of the book. in particular i would like to express my appreciation to my friend, hamid dabashi, who made all of the arrangements for this evening's discussion possible. and this book was published it seems like a long time ago now.

the book was actually published at the beginning of this month. this weather event vote world historic month of february 2011. and when the book was published at the outset of that urey the world's eyes were locked on egypt. although it ron figured in much of the discussion and analysis surrounding the upheaval with the iran and 1079 revolution and looking something of a compared inspector. the green movement was by no means in the headlines, as it had been from the time of this explosive emergence in june 2009 through roughly december of that year. indeed, many had pronounced the movement dead. in fact, been an odd assortment of actors to this view ranging

from the islamic republic to the likes of hillary man avert to some of the radical left. we assembled the people reloaded in no small part as a way of refuting this few of showing that all of the movement could no longer be seen on the streets it is very much continue to live and had, in fact, it transformed iran's political intellectual and existential landscape and profound and even permanent waste. that was at the beginning of this month. best, we are still in figurines just two weeks from the day from mubarak's evacuation it. two weeks out the green movement once again made its presence felt.

staging a major demonstration on monday, february 14th and solidarity with the egyptian resort -- revolution, a demonstration that the iranian government denied permission for despite its own profession of support for the egyptian revolt. six days later on sunday the green movement returned to the streets and has now announced, as you may have heard today, that it will be back on a weekly basis. what does the reappearance of the movement mean? how does what one of the contributors to c-span.org, what he calls the resilient rebellion of iran. this is what we are here to discuss this evening before of

the contributors to this volume, hamid dabashi, ervand abrahamian , and my aforementioned co-editor, nader hashemi. a few words about each of them. the professor of iranian cities and comparative literature at columbia university and was for many months the host of the week in green which in my view was not only amongst the very finest sources on the green movement available in the global digital a lament was but a contribution to the green movement. his many books, far too many to mention here, include : just mention of view, close up, and ronnie in cinema, past, present or future, published in 2001,

and ron, a people interrupted published in 2007, the grain movement and the usa. the world is my own. and just out, a religion of protest. ervand abrahamian is distinguished professor of iranian and middle eastern history and politics iran between two revolutions, widely regarded as a ministerial reference point. essays on the islamic republic published in 1993. kirk hurd confessions, prisons, and public recognition in modern enron published in 1999.

most recently the history of modern iran published in 2008. teaching irani in and middle eastern studies at rest -- rockers and is a frequent contributor to a range of contributors. her current interests and the political art and music, women and gender and fundamentalist religion communities in america and women's rights movements in a wrong and to the global comparative context. nader hashemi teaches in the least and islamic politics. he is the author of islam, secularism, and liberal democracy toward a dietetic -- democratic theory for boonen muslim society and is as mentioned, michael editor on

c-span.org. before we begin by hearing from hamid dabashi it is appropriate that we open with a poem that opens this book. that poem is by the classical persian poet. how lovely that the coach passengers up that palm are here this evening, like a difference. the palm is titled : those who stood up for tolerance. beattie's of lowe's reunion be remembered. major's days be remembered. but the always be remembered. by now this poisoned by the bitterness of grief. with the toast of those happy drinkers be remembered. although my comrades are free from remembering me, i remember them all constantly.

the land captured and bound by this misery, they the attempts of those who stood up for tolerance peeve remembered. even though 100 errors constantly flow from my eyes,. it's with us? gardens. may it be remembered. for now on the secret of remain unspoken. have pity on those who must keep secrets. me that you remembered. without any further ado, please join me in the welcoming hamid dabashi. [inaudible conversations] >> thank you. good evening, everyone. before i even start up like to apologize for having to run out

immediately after my short remarks because of some scheduling conflicts i have had to call myself tonight. i actually have to be in asia were we are celebrating the cinema of to fantastic iranians have just been sentenced to six years in jail for making films. we are celebrating their some of and taken the occasion to shed light on other it was none political prisoners and union activists, students write this, women's rights activists and so forth. i do apologize. i am actually delighted that my good friend and colleague and comrades, danny postel and nader hashemi are coeditors of this brilliant and pioneering book in which allied to have been included by the gracious

attention to my work. not only a guide into what has happened over the last year-and-a-half, but also a historical document of people who have been concerned with the events and as a participant observers have been writing about this. the so-called green movement in iran which is a grass roots massive uprising tickets if not centuries in the making in my judgment is a healthy and organic movement. it is a movement that is unfolding right in front of our eyes and is changing in various dimensions and has major stations and episodes chemistry to illustrations, then transformative writing and

declaration. so forth in my judgment it has produced some of the most fantastic documents. and also debates and so forth. for those of us trying to keep our hint of the poles of the movement this historical document is a good springboard for further reflection. now, another significance of this book -- i have to be cautious not to praise it too much. some of the best writings that have been done on the subject. as a result it will help you stay away from two sets of noises that are generated about not only what has happened in iran, but equally if not more importantly what has happened in north africa over the last month and a half.

i was just telling my friends and colleagues that when i was in my late 20's and early thirties there was only one revolution, and that was the iran revolution. now there are 15 revolutions happening at the same time. i feel like a kid in a candy store. what i say about the green movement is equally and even more compellingly applicable about other revolutions and movements that are happening in the region. and that is the concerted effort to assimilate what is happening packard into power standard categories, concepts, understanding, whereas i'm absolutely sure that we are witnessing is of more historical magnitude. we are right in the middle of it. we don't know the proper balance for. people compare it to tim in

square, the falling of the berlin wall, the revolutionary movement of 1848 which are attempts to edfors, the proverbial blind and the document. but it is of a historical magnitude in my judgment. there is no question. events such as the obscenity of president obama vetoing the security council and resolution draft tax of preventing the further armed robbery of palestine with the sending of two dilapidated and useless ships through the suez canal or taken advantage of the distraction and a san as there is some historical event happening, grabbing land. these are attempts to distract from what is happening.

now, specifically i would like to draw your attention to these sets of writings by people who are by no stretch of imagination old, knowing, or agree what happened. the suit right cautiously and from the depths of historical knowledge and academic and scully commitment to judicious writing, that is exemplary. now, two sets of a tentacle riding that i want to warn you against by those ridings and statements by a regime changers, those who are for region changes and the opposite. i call them regina fixtures. then we this husband and wife.

mr. and misses frequent-flier. thousands of us cannot step foot in my homeland. these couples are frequent-flier strong back and forth. not a single person word daikon after the obscenity of this couple. it's just beyond comprehension. whether you are a regime changer or a region fixture, but they are doing, they are distracting from a systematic and consistent effort to try to come to grips with the reality of what is happening, and that is no easy task. the fundamental fact is that three huge movements that predate the green movement, a labor union, labor movement, student movement, and women's rights movement, are at the roots of economic now function, social alienation, and cultural

transformation that we are witnessing. the the language of islamic public. yesterday saw the manifestation of the ministry of intelligence coming up with this cocoon of the erie that they have created a wrath themselves and abused 72 million human beings, with that are members, the rest of the population, and also the useless expatriate opposition but they have generated as their own mirror image. in other words, islamic republic over the last 30 years has created enemies that look exactly like us in language, the scorched, aspiration, and so forth. the healthy body of what our

children have called the green movement is the harbinger of an entirely different phenomenon and is imperative for us to try to keep our eyes of the ball and try to understand it. of course our understanding the changes because the movement changes. since perduring 14th it has absolutely nothing to do with a beautiful day of valentine because it's on the persian calendar. the movement has into the third phase. the third phase that in my chair -- judgment is a more radical face that is not necessarily mean blind and the violent. the demand has become more radical and we are witnessing the beginning of an interchange necessary interaction between the green movement and those three social movements. so what i would like to say is that currently a year-and-a-half

after the cabinet of the green movement particular attention is being paid to something called e charter of the green movement crafted and cosigned with lots of debate about this charter. the acceptability of the constitution, and there are many iranians who don't accept the totality of this constitution and certainly don't agree with the item of the supreme authority. nevertheless, in my judgment in this document, the charter of the green movement, we are beginning to see a narrative the space of conversation on a massive national scale about the future of peron as a democratic, peaceful, non-violent transition to democracy that i think is crucial for us.

so, the gist of water and trying to say is there are lots of noise is whether they come from washington or to run out paris about the grain movement. but the body of the green movement by his started trading its own language, this course, leaders, and the banality of. under house arrest, but being under house arrest does not mean that in no longer are at the center of a social uprising. mandela and gondi, of course there are many examples. in fact, in my judgment their imprisonment, being under house arrest has given in necessary spin to a movement that in some respects has hit a plateau with the same but the argument that

he would have probably turned out to be somebody like obama have been generated huge expectations. so not having office gave momentum to the social uprising. social uprising went on for a year-and-a-half. the fact that he has been put under house arrest has placed the movement into a different category. debates are obviously taking place, mostly in persian as it should be. some reflections are expressed also in other languages including english, but to conclude with us started, the significance of a booklet this for those of you who want to be up to speed with what has happened, the running debates,

and everyone agrees to the nature of this movement, this is an excellent place to start. danny postel and nader hashemi have done as a fantastic service by this relentless and tireless job that they have done to bring us up-to-date. thank you. [applause] >> thank you so much, hamid dabashi, for those generous words and for that food for thought. i noticed that some of you came in after my interaction, and just briefly going to reintroduce for those of you who just arrived, our next speaker, nader hashemi, who teaches police and islamic politics at

the joseph cornell's school of international studies at the university of denver. in addition to being my calendar he is the author of the book of islam, second -- secularism and it, proceed. [applause] >> thank you all for coming tonight. our book that he has very generously praised his tanker route the contributions of three individuals, she spends her time between london and tehran with several essays as does muhammed who is one man, an institution he teaches at the university of southern california. some penetrating analysis. and the third person is hamid

dabashi. his characterization of the movement and some of his political writings have been the most insightful and important on the green movement, particularly his observation. first and foremost a civil rights movement that seeks to transform iran he a process of reform, not necessarily a revolution. he made one important observation in the summer of 2009 that when i first read it i strongly disagreed with. i thought it was wishful didn't when he said they green movement and politics is setting a standard for the region. it is transforming the politics of a broader arab and islamic world. completely shaping the morals. but i sort of thought about that

when i first read it and looked to egypt and north africa and just did not see it. a year-and-a-half later i think he deserves credit for being a very observant because the model we saw coming out of the green movement in the summer of 2009 was effectively reproduced in egypt and tunisia in ways that are very similar to the broad contours of similarities that explain and unite events in a run in the summer of 2009 and since then and recently in north africa or the following set of observations, the fact that the movement for democracy is fundamental in non-violent, social protests. the emergence was unpredictable and unprecedented. a new face of politics. his movements are characterized by the fact that they are not ideological. these debates between secular religion and secular some don't

matter to the people who are part of this movement. there are both secular people who are very much part of the movement, and rigid fundamentally an economic grievances, but political grievances and objections that they have with respect to the authoritarian order in which they live in and to their call explicitly for a democracy and civil and human rights. the democratic youth is central to this story. they are politicized, they are highly educated, and internet set the. no clear structure and held these are organized. a sample, but there are hundreds and thousands of individuals who are part of this movement. that is a broad picture in terms of uniting in ron with egypt and tunisia. there is also significant and qualitative differences that we

need to a knowledge in order to understand what is taking place. that is what i want to spend the bulk of my time talking about and comparative fashion. iran in comparison and contrast to egypt. it is important to acknowledge said every country has its own star and obstacles that democratic forces have to overcome in order to reach a democratic transition. if you just compare iran with egypt, the last 30 years iran political islamist leaders come to power and consolidate power around the some time that bar comes to power, 1981. we have had about 30 years since then were both countries have been characterized bobbly as of authoritarian political regimes. there are key differences between decisions that need the identification and have consequences for the server for democracy, particularly in iran.

and at one to argue that in the case of iran in contrast egypt and tunisia that the islamic republican, until relatively recently, has been in tune with a much higher degree of internal legitimacy than mubarak of brad. just consider the following markers. since the revolution there had been consistent and regular presidential, parliamentary, and letter municipal elections that up until 2009 were never completely free bulb, but warfare in the sense that the announced results reflected what was taking place at the ballot box. a few moments in 2000 parliamentary election that was caused because the movement, but broadly speaking there were elections that were not free,

but were basically fair. they could never make a claim in terms of the elections that take place. a qualitative difference. limited and the system in terms of internal debate reviewed a round factional rivalries, intense back and forth between different factions that taken place in the public sphere. there have been moments where in iran the public debate was very open, particularly the first term of the president, in ways that don't have any parallels. at think that is another qualitative difference. iran at least can make the claim that it as been critically independent from the control of external powers. foreign policy is generally an independent player. the bark by contrast has been part of the american foreign policy program for the region, highly dependent on the u.s. and western support. iran is qualitatively different.

they have been politically independent. and is to give you an example of how the regime despite all of its failings, up until 2009i would argue that it still had a certain degree of legitimacy. that is reflected in the fact that in 2009 we had a phenomenal event or about 80-85 percent of the electorate shows up to the ballot box to cast a vote hoping this people who voted for the opposition, the they could change the course of the public, not drastically, but change back to the performance days. the fact that people were voting in high numbers suggests that they believe the electoral system had a certain degree of legitimacy. it could shift the direction which speaks to a certain degree of legitimacy. no wonder is this now because the 2009 elections were largely stolen, but up until 2009 you

did have a certain degree of legitimacy as reflected in the high voter turnout. never been in evidence anywhere in egypt or tunisia to the same extent that we have seen in a ron. the key point that i'm trying to make, all things considered, the islamic republic of iran still has a certain base of support within the country that is not very wide but his deep. what i mean by that is that there is a core base of support that is deeply ideological and commited to the regime. some of it is religious, the love to go, some due to a sense of self-interest, people feel that their livelihood and careers are tied to the existence of the established order, and that put that percentage of support approximately between 15 and 25%. on top of all of this that

15-20% is reinforced by virtue of the iranian regime's ability to manipulate to keep teens in order to preserve its hegemony and itself in power and immunize itself from criticism. these two things are the themes of islamic authenticity and anti imperialism. i mean the following. the islamic republic of iran claims to be the embodiment of islam on a, ruling in the name of god. supreme leader is considered to be the representative of god on earth. constantly reinforcing that. of fans ." he was speaking to a group of beseeched paramilitary units. he said obeying the president is

the same as a bang got. his logic is that because the supreme leader is a representative of god on earth, therefore obeying him is equivalent to obeying god. most young people today, most educated people don't buy into that, but segments of society that are deeply port, religious, that don't have access to the internet and satellite tv are affected by that. it makes sense. it is a small percentage. they buy into that argument. that is particularly why the regime is very determined at preventing alterative interpretations. we have it translated a very famous. the moral conscience for the

green movement providing a clerical and theological representation of legitimacy. that is why he was under house arrest. this theme of authenticity that is being used to consolidate itself. the second in his anti imperialism. claims to be the vanguard against western intervention, a beam of rejecting western intervention is one of the key organizing teams. deeply emotional. the troubled relationship is a relationship of that, and people rally to this theme of rejecting external intervention. the regime constantly uses this theme, and dumps it, and gets some internal support for it. islamic authenticity and anti imperialism are themes that mubarak could not utilize.

there were military generals. there were religious figures. there were deeply secular in their political ideology. with respect to anti imperialism, that does not apply because both of them are deeply dependent upon western and u.s. aid. in that respect if you put it all together the regime is able to draw upon a certain base of support that is not very wide, but is deep. i think those are qualitative differences opposed huge challenges and to get of the way forward. you can't ignore that reality that is there. at think in many ways, in particular the wayside just articulated, this is how iran is distinct in terms of its internal politics and to ignore that and pretend that simply, you know, if enough people can

get to the equivalent of freedom square that there will be in momentum that will follow events that happened in egypt is wishful thinking. pains me to my last point, and that is the lesson we should be learning from libya. reports today from the u.n. human rights coalition suggest that there have been massive atrocities but thousands of people killed. the last stand will likely be in tripoli. reports today that libya has a chemical weapons stockpile. does anyone think for a moment that he will not use those if needed? and all of this has forced me to think about the parallels with the wrong. we have people who are not content of an option. able to get on a plane into southern france. if you follow and listen to the

rhetoric and saw the events. about ten days ago because scene that is very instructive. 120 members a rallying around the podium paying for the blood of opposition leaders calling for their execution. there are people who are willing to kill thousands to not conduct one tenements clear, but multiple if needed in order to stay in power. looking at the events in libya, looking at how signatory leaders and regions are willing to use massive amounts of state violence poses -- it requires at a minimum,'s as of us who are part of the green movement in terms of how you overcome that particular item have any answers, but to simply ignore it and say that we can bring about

a democratic transition is wishful thinking. the green movement is at a critical movement. it has been inspired by these movements in egypt intonation. i personally am very optimistic about the future, but more of a long return the near term. i hope that some of my remarks have been able to shed some light on the internal politics of iran and the obstacles l.a. in the way of a democratic transition in the coming months and years. thanks. [applause] >> thank you. next we will hear from professor ervand abrahamian. observe -- >> i want to address the question, what can we do to help the grain movement?

a man other iranians or nine iranians. the conventional answer to this question is, we can help the green movement by kidding our president to be a forthright speaker, directly on the issue of suppression that every time heads of broken he should be at the podium hopping and speaking on behalf of the protesters. in addition to this the argument is often made that the best way to help the reform movement in iran is to have economic sanctions to put pressure on the regime. this will weaken the regime, and by weakening the regime we will be helping the protest movement to bring either change, internal

change, or rushing change. these have become, actually, pretty much conventional wisdom since the crisis of june 2009. mainstream newspapers like the new york times, washington post, subscribe to this notion. i would like to argue that actually this two-pronged strategy helps the regime and undermines the reform movement. i don't think it can be fine-tuned or modified. at think structurally basically this regime about strategy is actually diametrically wrong. did you think -- let's take the first one about helping -- speaking out, especially the president or american officials speaking out on behalf of the reform movement. the people's heads of being

smashed, people being executed, expect protests, especially high-ranking people in america will speak out in protest. any-jerk reaction. most people in america would have that reaction. especially among liberals and people on the left. ever since woodrow wilson there has been this idea in the liberal perspective in the united states that there is -- the united states has a mission to spread humanitarianism and liberalism. this is almost a duty in american mainstream psyche that the u.s. is a good light that helps other people to have freedom. as the president of france said at that time, the good lord had

only ten commandments. woodrow wilson camera along with 14. these were, of course, it even from woodrow wilson's time per taken somewhat cynically abroad and were seen often as weapons in u.s. foreign policy brother and the spread of humanitarianism. the average iranian is very suspicious of the united states and the notions of democracy or reform. every time any u.s. president speaks on this issue it does not really it resonate because people have the memory of 1953 and a long time of oppression supported by the united states.

at think this is a very important cultural difference between the average american and the average iranian on you as -- what u.s. is. hatpin to conferences where they said the u.s. was able to help in eastern europe. what can it do the same in iran? the fact is that in europe you have the russians. the united states has a good image because of historical experience. in iran the u.s. has a bad image. the u. s is the former soviet union having basically been implicit in the long time of dictatorship. these parallels are actually displaced because they distort how iranians look at the united states. also we have a tendency to think that each administration comes

with a clean slate. tricky dick may have been a nasty guy, but a new president like obama comes with a clean slate and is going to completely change policy. people outside the united states have more of a historical mission. they put presidents in lineage and do not see huge prison policy. i'd think in many cases foreigners are much more in tune with reality than the u.s. perception that each administration is very differ from the previous one and can drastically change policy. so will we have seen since june of 2009 is that presidents and, of course, the secretary of state almost eager to jump on

this issue. almost every time their is a demonstration. favor and supporting the demonstrators which is somewhat obscene when you compared to what was happening in tunisia and egypt where you have a prolonged time of demonstrations, mass demonstrations. they were dragging their feet about supporting him, but in enron they quickly jump on it. this has obviously taken account for what it is an error on, but this is an issue that is being exploited by the imperial power to understand -- undermined their version. even if they don't like the regime it fits into what was being talked about, the anti imperialists rhetoric that reinforces the notion that the reform movement is actually being used by the u.s. states. the best thing that the united states can do is set up and

don't talk about it. human rights is of very important issue, too important to have the lettuce its government involved. human rights issues should be ready. human rights organizations. also countries that have a better record, especially countries in europe, scandinavia have a much better, basically the track record on the issue of human rights. when they actually intervened they take it much more seriously. iranians who have families in jail find it more advisable to go to sweden are denmark and get those governments to intercede rather than to come to washington because they know washington is not really going to help.

so i would auge that the best thing for u.s. administration is actually to not get involved in the issues of helping the reform movement, talking about it, and even trying to encourage. these things are basically used by the government to undermine the reform movement. the second issue about sanctions and nuclear issues, the overall administration came in with great hope of change. he had actually before coming to the white house talked about changing the course of the bush administration toward iran. he had implicitly accepted the

right to be enriched uranium. he had spoken respectfully to the iranian government and the iranian people and offered an olive branch. he had gone -- he had not demanded that iran should stop in richmond before negotiations. these were all seen as major changes from the previous administration. it was in fact that these demands of the bush a ministration had slowed in the type of initiations. now, obama policy of engagement from the very beginning had a great deal of opposition in the state department to reedbuck both in israel and the state department, iran was not to have any in richmond whatsoever because any enrichment but too dangerous and would provide an

existential threat to israel. so there was a distinctive threat between obama and hillary clinton on this issue. we don't know and won't until documents come out from the state department would house. there was a shift in obama's position. in the next few months, especially after 2009, he certainly that you can tell reading between the lines, the policy shifted back to what it was before the obama came in during the bush administration. how can you tell this? well, he stopped saying that enron had the right to have investment. they started talking about iran as a big hit in my power, the

old rhetoric that somehow iran had this aspiration to rebuild the old empire, blowing up the iranian military power. iran spends less money on military than any of its neighbors, including turkey, as raw, pakistan, even iraq spends more than in rhonda's. so it has a large melissa, almost none navy and more air force to speak of. the propaganda and rich by the administration is that somehow iran is a major military threat. another subtle indication is the one major person in the administration who was interested in the engagement. after a few months they found personal reasons to retire and leave. you don't have to be a

criminologist to know when personnel changes like that occur, they are indicating policy changes. the obama administration plans that it is following dual policy, that it is on one hand pressuring and doing pretty drastic sanctions, but at the same time is offering an olive branch. so this has become the public persona of the administration. in fact, i think one looks not at what they say, but what is revealed and what is negotiations. the only offer is that the sanctions and pressure, there is no offer of negotiations.

the policy changes back to the bush administration. iran has to really stop in richmond, give up its nuclear program, and basically submit to u.s. dictates, something that neither the reformers nor conservatives more alter can say their with a lot going to except. basically forcing iran to submit to. and if you then ask administration people what if they don't, if iran does not submit they really have no answer. the interlined implicit answer is they will have economic pressures until the regime collapses. of course with oil at $100 a barrel it is unlikely that the regime is going to collapse because of economic pressures. the fact that there is no

serious attempt to engage can also be seen in the with the leak bleeps. on iran they reveal a great deal with this new. they reveal that when the turkish and brazilian government put together a package to go to it peron, did a compromise where iran would it be continued and richmond but not to the point that they could actually build nuclear weapons, this would have been something that i think the old obama would accept. when the turks and prison and put this together about the u.s. told them unceremoniously to mid their own business. they had no business dealing

with this issue. they were not interested in the negotiation. this was, of course, very reminiscent of what happened in 2003 when at that time the swiss ambassador came to washington with a grand bargain from enron to settle the issues. he got the same response. he was told to mind his own business, that this was not something that the bush administration was really interested in. at think what has happened, you can see a continued, the bush administration once it settle down really continued -- the obama administration continued to put pressure because they want to limit.

it is much more drastic. of the things that actually you can see that are very revealing is negotiations between high u.s. officials and the sod. in these documents, what the u.s. is told is that under no condition is a wrong going to have a nuclear program. if they also tell the u.s. that it will resort to assassinations, seven times, and interestingly and most insidious of all, using minorities and tensions to bring a bad regime change. this is exact quotes. use minorities and tensions among minorities to bring about rushing change. constantly harping on this notion that iran is from

different ethnic groups and that you can and find these ethnic groups and bring down the regime through basically ethnic rivalries. so it's reminiscent of iraq and the old imperial policy. and so will we have seen in recent months such as the assassination of iranian nuclear scientists, the 7 tons of the nuclear plant, bombings, shootings, one does not have to be parent to think that those incidents, all actually linked to this policy of israeli dealing with the wrong. so with this to pawned policy, what does it do? if the u.s. government is seen

as actually supporting the reform movement the reform movement is therefore seen as a fifth column, working with the ethnic divisions, saboteurs and ordered to pursue israeli-us goals. the last thing reform movement wants to be associated with is the yet the state's, even with the united states claiming to be supporting the reform movement. now, some people feel that if there is between tirana and the united states, if there is a nuclear agreement this will strengthen the regime. the regime will then survive another 30 years. all with this notion that somehow the united states coming

in and actually making this grand bargain will stabilize the regime for the foreseeable future. this is actually an unwarranted. if you look at what is happening throughout the region, the countries that are most stable are actually the ones who are most friendly with the united states. with the u.s. eighth is that stabilize and the regime. on the contrary, it seems to destabilize them. who is most friendly? in the past, of course, mubarak. yemen, bahrain. what countries to you find more into its? stake, of course, the ones that are the most formal. we often think of anti-american, anti imperialists. in fact, since 2003 he made his

peace with the united states. he went even overboard in many ways. being one of the first countries to nationalizes the oil industry, he was one of the first to denationalize. he handed over the oil industry to foreign companies. he also was, in fact, coming out from the cold so much so that he was the truly embraced by the senate and lieberman and it kind of these a rice. his problem is in some to is not due to being opposed to the next stage, but being friends. i hope to live long enough to see the data being replaced -- embraced by the likes of senator lieberman. havel be a good sign.

[applause] >> they do call professor. last but not least, goldbarg bashi. then we will have q&a. >> first of all, i would like to say, thank you for including me in this panel. i really don't feel worthy. i only have a small article in this wonderful collection that you have put together a. i am grateful. nonetheless, i am happy to be included even though it is a little embarrassing because i think that women's issues need to be discussed. i'll take the opportunity here to talk manny about women's

issues and questions pertaining to women's rights in iran. .. >> northeast of you know -- most of you know that the civil rights movement that began in the aftermath of the electoral crisis was in be june 2009, almost who years ago. so, now, this has been a mainly nonviolent uprising x the principle feature of it has been this nonviolence which has been

maintained mostly by women. we saw this clearly in tunisia, we saw this clearly in egypt. i think all of you must have seen that picture of the egyptian elderly woman kissing a riot police. we didn't see pictures like that from iran, in fact, but, so the nonviolent aspects of these movement have been maintained by women in iran as well. last week al-jazeera interviewed star da by --al zardari, medical reformer, and al-jazeera which, obviously, doesn't have sort of a feminist agenda like any other news organization chose to call her the mother of the revolution. and this made me very happy for my egyptian and my arab sisters and brothers, but at the same time it made me a little wary

and sad because i remember in last year, well, in 2009 when the ayatollah died immediately many within the green movement, even our nobel laureate called him the spiritual father of the green movement. now, this was a little scary for me because i have had the privilege of meeting with the ayatollah myself in if his residence, and i sat with him. often when i see the pictures of young people in his office, i remember myself there too. and i asked him very clearly, you know, what he thought about women's rights, and he said, you know, when it really comes to the letter of the koran, we cannot, we cannot change laws. and just because the rest of the world thinks something about women's rights, if it pertains to the very letter of the koran, we're not going to change it.

so this, for me, was very alarming that right in the middle at the height of the green movement when the ayatollah died, even our nobel laureate called him the spiritual father of the movement. whereas in egypt despite the fact that egyptian women have suffered from public sexual harassment, something we don't quite have in iran, not at least that openly, we have women's participation in the public in a far larger scale than egypt, egyptians manage to have a lot more women out in the streets and, also, they have a mother of the revolution, and we don't. so this makes me a little worried from the iranian thing. i'll quote the ayatollah for you in this an interview that i did with him in 2003. he clearly and very boldly told

me that women's rights must remain under the maine of islamic law. you see, i'm quoting here, if people around the world want to say certain thing about women, for example, being equal to men in matters of inheritance or legal testimony because these issues pertain to the very letter of the koran, we cannot accept them. of course in iran we cannot accept those laws that are against our religion. on certain occasions when these laws contradict the very clear text of the koran, we cannot cooperate. men in general, all things considered, are productively more active in both intellectual activities and practical activities. those aspects of the islamic law that are based on the very letter of the koran, the answer is no. you can read my interview with him online. so this is, obviously, worrying that if father of our green

movement, despite the fact that he is, he was, you know, a courageous cleric, he sacrificed greatly for his, his beliefs and exposed some of the most horrific human rights abuses in iran, his idea of human rights were sort of public rights mainly to do with activism, legal things and not really women's issues. so this makes me a little wary of the, both islamists and also the masculine aspect of the green movement. so women in iran, despite the fact that like most women in the region have had a very long history of political and social participation going back to the middle of the 19th century with the persona of the tobacco

revolt which, really, women maintained, the constitutional revolution, literary movements, leftist movements, the ousting of the shah and even in the islamic republic despite all the very blatant gender discriminations women have managed to be part of the social and public and political life and contribute to it. and initially in the preelection campaigns and in the post-election uprisings women were in great numbers. but we saw those numbers decreasing, this was exactly the opposite in egypt. so these are some of the things that worry me, so i think we need to look at the region and learn that sometimes we get a little ahead of ourselves that, well, you know, we have a peace laureate, and we have, you know, this history that predates, for example, i don't know, tunisian women's rights and things like

that. well, not so fast. there are tons of things that we still need to learn from the region. the other thing that, which is promising, i think, is the fact that the demography in iran is similar to egypt and tunisia and elsewhere, very young. 80% of the population is under the age of 40. and just that in itself means that the green movement as a movement, as a revolutionary movement, hopefully, will succeed. now, how much women will gain from this, we don't know because right now tunisian women in the particular are very wary that some of the reforms that were made under president menally for whatever reason they were made, they're not going to be revoked like the iranian case when the revolution happened and khomeini regressed on some of the, some of the sort of positive aspects of the constitution and the laws

pertaining to women especially. egyptian women, too, are looking out. there are many mini mubaraks out there, and they are, they have to, they have to make sure that all of the sacrifices are not going to go to waste. so i think, i don't think this is a domino effect. i think it's a revolutionary fire that has caught on. now, i don't want to say iran began first and then tunisia was second. i don't think that is quite the case. there are many revolutions that predate the green movement, of course, even though for us it is a very special moment for us. many of us, this is the first revolution that we, that we remember. the most astonishing thing is that the anti-berlusconi demonstrations that we saw recently in italy were inspired by the uprisings in north africa. italians, thinking to

themselves, well, you know, if egyptians and tunisians can topple their dictators that are backed by billion dollar funding by the united states, why can't we? you know? get rid of this guy, berlusconi, which is a huge embarrassment on every front. so that's why i don't think this is a domino effect. it's more of a global, really, phenomenon, and it's wonderful to watch this. this is sort of our woodstock, and we participate through our online and so forth. now, the other thing that i am a little wary of, um, and which i think is the critique applies to both secular feminists and any other kind of people who are involved in the green movement is this sort of ultranationalism of kind that i witness even among progressive feminists.

and we've with seen this among our egyptian and tunisian and algerian and other arab sisters and brothers who were very keen to call their uprisings pan-arabism and in a way excluded so many other parts of the world. so, and i saw that during the green movement, especially at the height of the green movement when iranians felt they were the only people in the region that could possibly state something like that. now, pan-iranism, pan-arabism, all of these pan-nationalisms are racist, they're no good and especially for women because they're very masculine in their nature. so it's all hunky dory if you're on tahrir square and you fete very passionate -- get very passionate and you're waving the flags, but within that discourse, women's rights don't really play a role. so this is some of the things that i think both green activists whether they're

feminists or not have to be wary of as well as our arab brothers and sisters should be aware of this that, you know, these sorts of pan-nationalisms are really outdated, and they don't do any justice to, really, the spirit of these revolutions. so couple things that i want to end with is that many people have tried to downplay the revolutions in the region because, you know, the threat of islamism, i think at an audience like this which is informed, i don't need to repeat the fact that i think one of the best things, perhaps, of the islamic republic has been a good warning to the rest of the region and other parts of the world that theocracy doesn't work and nativist islamist ideology is pretty horrific. so i'm not very worried about islamism and so forth even though we see commentators bring

that up and, oh, what about women's rights. i think if there is going to be regressions on women's rights, i hope not, it will be by nationalists, not by islamists, i think. so this whole nationalist thing i'd be very wary of. and also the masculine, the masculinist aspect of these movements, especially the green movement. i mean, if you watch bbc persian, i mean, it's not a platform for the green movement, but it does discuss these events. rarely do they have a single female commentator, never mind, you know, activists themselves. whereas the presenters are all very attractive ladies. so, you know, there are things like that. and also the changing of the language. i still hear, you know, people using language and these sorts

of things. i think it's time to change the vocabulary and make it more inclusive. so it would be now i have colleagues here who are far more learned than i am to translate something like that. courage, basically, but in the context of being a young, able man. so these sorts of words are used even by women. so i think it's time, really, to shed these ultranationalistic terms, these masculine terms in the language, and for leaders of the women's rights movement in iran to in a more bold sense align themselves with the leaders of the green movement because right now we're not really seeing that. we're seeing student movement is far more involved, but the women's movement is still on the sidesteps even though body number wise we have had lots and

lots of women participate anything these, in these -- participating in these protests and so forth. so these are some of the things i've thought about, and i hope they're useful, and i'll be happy to answer any questions that you may have. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, goldbarg. and all of our panelists. i want to mention as well, i'm sorry i forgot to do this earlier. the book is available for sale outside this auditorium thanks to book culture and to melville house, our publisher for arranging that. the book is available for sale, and i though that the editors and contributors assembled here this evening would be happy to sign copies for you, inscribe them. let's take some questions. questions. let's see, aha.

mademoiselle leyla. so nice the see you. >> nice to see you too. >> why don't you take the microphone, leyla. thank you. >> nice to see you after many years. thank you very much, that was really good. i have one question. i think the professor mentioned that the united states should end, have not made any comments about what's going on in iran, especially about the green movement because that would be not helpful for the greens. i agree with that. but this is my daily dilemma. what should we do? we see that there is every day there is a lot of killings, abuses of human rights in the iran tortures, everything. in the industries and in the jails, everywhere. but at the same time we don't want to be the voice of the united states. so what should we do? to support the movement, but at

the same time not to make it difficult for those who are in iran? >> well, i think one can support the movement either directly by supporting the movement or through human rights organizations. somehow there's the notion that the u.s. government is so powerful that if we can get the u.s. government to do something, that will actually be productive. my argument was that's unproductive. the human rights organizations and foreign countries, i mean, if we have any influence through scandinavia, maybe austria, countries like that have, actually, much more credibility on this issue than the united states. >> i would just want to add to that and perhaps nader or goldbarg would like to chime in as well, because we've talked about this many times, leyla,

and this question comes up. she draws a very sharp distinction between kinds of support for the democratic movement in iran. she says we in the democratic movement in iran do not seek the support of foreign governments or the cia or neoconservative think tanks. however, we do seek support of global civil society, organizations, trade unions, women's rights organizations, people of conscious, writers, intellectuals, artists. and i think that's a very important distinction. you can see iranian trade unions, such as they are because we all know it's illegal to have an independent labor union in iran, but there are labor associations and trade unionists in iran who are, you know, beleaguered, many of their leaders behind bars languishing.

one just celebrated yet another birthday, the leader of the bus drivers' union in iran celebrated yet another birthday behind bars and in tremendous medical duress. but the beleaguered trade union movement in iran reaches out actively to trade unions in many other countries. there's a very active solidarity movement in that respect. so i think that's an important distinction. i'd also like to make a particular plug for an organization, a global organization that's based here in new york city called the campaign for peace and democracy which has done really, i think, an outstanding job of taking a principled and nuanced position against what the philosopher -- another contributor to this book -- has called the double blackmail. in other words, the campaign for peace and democracy has taken a very forceful position against

both u.s. imperialism and militarism on the one hand and theocracy and oppression on the other. and we happen soft joanne landy, the co-founder for the campaign for peace and democracy, here this evening. i don't know if you want to say any words, joanne, but today is quite a mow momentous day in the campaign for peace and democracy's work in iran. nader and i were privileged to be part of a delegation that joanne led to both the u.s -- exactly in the spirit of this -- against the double blackmail and consistency of principle. we went to both the u.s. and the iranian missions of the united nations today to deliver these statements and, in both cases, actually engage in dialogue with representatives of both offices. if you want to talk to joanne, i would encourage people to go to

the web site of the campaign for peace and democracy, sign their petitions not only on iran, but on many, many issues; egypt, libya, palestine, nuclear disarmament, many, many issues. and also to talk to joanne here before you leave tonight because that's a really fantastic organization. when we talk about global civil society, i think the campaign for peace and democracy is really a shining example thereof. joanne, did you want to say something and should we, perhaps, let joanne have the microphone for a moment so that everyone can hear her? there you go. >> [inaudible] well, thank you for that. we did have 12 peace and human rights activists go today to the two missions. we had someone from code pink, someone from pax christy, we had

nader and danny, steve shilum who many of you may have known. who were some of the other people? my -- i had only three hours of sleep last night. >> we had an immigration rights lawyer here in new york and very active with -- and kathy kelly of voices for creative nonviolence. >> right. right. so it was a really important confrontation with this very funny u.s. guy in the u.s. mission to the u.n. who kept, who told us he had unitarian parents, and he really thought that so much of what we said was right and how much he really agreed with us. so we kept, you know, thanking him for his solidarity but pointed out the terrible things that the u.s. government is doing, threatening war against iran and the sanctions and so forth. anyway, i think that this is really, when we organize these statements -- i have some copies

here, and the war threats and sanctions against iran, support for the struggle for democracy inside iran -- when we do this kind of thing, we really are aiming at a lot of different audiences at the same time. so, first of all, we want to change our own government's policy from the kind of war-like imperial policy that it has. second of all, we want to change the iranian government's policy from the repression it does, and thirdly, we want to change our own peace movement. bring out the natural sympathy that people in the peace movement have for people who are really their counterparts around the world, but who feel afraid if they speak up, they're somehow, they're somehow helping the u.s. government. we want to say, wait, no. that's not what's going on. we're really helping the peace movement and helping our iranian counterparts by standing up in an independent way and differentiating ourselves. and that's a mission. i've actually been in the peace movement since i was 12 years

old and, you know, it's my movement, but i've always felt like this is something we have to work on and never stop. >> thanks, joanne. anyone else want to contribute any comments to that before we move on to the next question? that was hand up right here, i believe. yes. >> [inaudible] >> let's get the microphone, yes, thank you. one second, please. >> thank you. thanks to the panel for the great presentation. this is mainly for professor abrahamian based on your work in the previous social movements. what keeps me thinking about the difference between what is happening today and the iranian revolution in 1979 and then before that the constitution, revolution and the tobacco revolt is that pseudoleaderlessness of this movement. although some have risen up to a

certain level of leadership in the movement, but they never got to a point that the general population would consider them the leader of the movement. are there parallels of this type of social movement forming around not a clear-cut leadership? and in either case, if yes or no, do you think that would have any effect in terms of the success of this movement? in other terms, do you think the population would have to wait until a leader actually comes out who can be recognized, identified as the leader for the movement to be able to move further up? this thank you. >> nader's more appropriate at answering this, but my attempt would be to -- in special situations where you get charismatic figure appearing, you really need a breakdown of order and so on.

and it's usually a good sign if there is no charismatic leader. [laughter] we've had enough charismatic leaders in the 20th century. so i think one good thing about it, of course, egypt no one was -- and, of course, the press was saying how can you have a movement without a leader? who should we go and talk to? it's movements that, i think, are stronger when it's like that. and i think the green movement is, i think, has that advantage. so if something happens to mow valve i have, it's not the end of the movement. the only rare time you get charismatic leaders that it comes out looking good in history is someone like -- [inaudible] he was overthrown, but usually charismatic leaders end up ruining a lot of things. [laughter] >> nader, i agree that you would be an excellent person to answer that question.

>> not really. i don't want to bore the audience with sort of looking at parallels between what happened in the 1906 revolution, but i have been thinking about this whole question of leadership and the benefits and the negatives of it. and i think if iran actually does get to a point where it's a democratic transition, because it does have, as you said, a quasileadership structure, it will find itself in a better position than where egypt and tunisia is now where there is this sense, for example, in egypt because there's no clear leadership, they can't really challenge the military council. but if iran does get to a point where the regime collapses or there's a transition, it's pretty clear that the interim leaders would have massive popular support, would lead a movement of interim transition where there would be a rewriting of the constitution and elections and then a movement toward full democracy. and so i think in that sense iran's, the fact that there is sort of, you know, a leadership does help the struggle for democracy but only in that phase

of the struggle when you get to the post-transition period. but, you know, if you talk to musa i have and others, they claim they're not opposition leaders. they're humble about it. and that's good and bad. they're showing their humility, i think it's a problem of charismatic leadership that wants to consolidate power as happened in 1979, but it's also bad in the sense that, you know, because there's no clear leadership structure, a lot of these demonstrations, protests don't have the coordination that, ideally, you would like to have in order to challenge the regime. there was a piece written recently in "time" magazine about the question of labor and the green movement and why hasn't the green movement worked with labor groups to promote strikes, and that's a signal of the weakness of the green movement, and they -- but i think the problem really is a structural one. because the green movement is somewhat of an amorphous structure. i mean, there is this sort of leadership, but they're not

coordinating these demonstrations. i mean, it's really grassroots activists who are sort of organizing the timing and the place of it. so, you know, broadly, you know, thinking about the issue of leadership, it has both its benefits and its negatives. i'm, i would ideally hope that the leadership structure would solidify itself. and the recent developments has been there has been this in the last, you know, few weeks this emergence of this coordinating council of the green movement which is really based both abroad and inside iran that is now starting to organize and coordinate it. they just announced two days ago that on the last three tuesdays of the iranian calendar year they're going to have strikes and demonstrations and protests. and i think that's really important because, you know f if you want to push the movement forward, you have to have someone who's laying out a vision and rallying the masses and engaging in mass mobilization. that's how you exert your pressure in relationship to the regime that dominates the politics of the region by virtue

of its military might. so, i mean, those are my comments on the leadership. >> goldbarg, did you want to add anything to that? >> i wanted to ask my colleagues here, i had a consideration with a -- conversation with a colleague from rutgers who comes from to land, and she was emphasizing the fact that really it's the labor unions, it's the trade unions that were at the very heart of really salvaging these eastern european revolutions in the late 1980s and in poland in particular. and what i wanted to ask you was when it comes to sort of third world, muslim world, people ask, who's the leader? when we're talking about, say, the anti-war movement in the united states, nobody asks who's the leader of the movement. these are spontaneous movements, and they feed off each other and, you know, they just, they spread. do you think there is an orientalist element in the

question of who's the leader? >> um, well, it depends on who's asking the question, the individual, right? but, no, i don't think in and of itself it's a racist question. one of the differences in the united states with respect to the anti-war movement, that's manifesting itself in a broadly democratic society, and so there are multiple leaders, and there's more freedom of movement for exchange and discussion. in the case of, in the case of iran historically, i mean, i think it's partly due to just historical tradition. there always has been some sort of charismatic leader that man tests -- manifests itself at a moment in time, so there's a natural question that, you know, and expectation. but i don't think in and of itself that that question is, you know, racist or orientalist. >> i would just add to that that i think tunisia and egypt are very instructive many this sense, and this is one of the

parallels of the movement, the leaderlessness or what some people would call horizontallism, a term that comes out of the argentinean experience. sociologists are starting to study these phenomena more and more internationally. in tunisia and egypt, i mean, for example, mark engler had a piece on the arguing the world blog a couple weeks ago talking about how a lot of western media commentary, and he actually accuses the western media of a certain kind of fetishism about this notion that this uprise anything egypt came out of nowhere, that this was totally spontaneous. just because a movement doesn't have identifiable leaders or a leader doesn't mean there aren't organizers. there's a lot of organizing that went into the egyptian uprising. it didn't just happen all of a sudden. a lot of, like, weeks and months, actually years. you can look back, the labor movement was laying the seeds for this, or at least strong elements of it for years.

and the same thing in iran. i would just like to quote, actually, it's too bad gary thicke couldn't be with us tonight who also is on the faculty here at columbia. there are so many metaphors and images of what is the green movement, is it a movement, is it a network, what kind of structure is it? he actually uses the image of gallonly on. he says rather than a hierarchy floating down from one or more individuals at the top or even the classic cell structure of a clandestine organization, the iranian opposition most resembles a tangled bundle of nerve cells where each part of the system is constantly and instantly in touch with all other parts. i thought that was an evocative image. we'll take one -- let's take one more question. i think there was something -- yes. yes. please. wait for the microphone. >> is reform possible within the system?

i mean, it seems like there's so many elements working against it; the revolutionary guard, the guardian council. it seems like you have to dissolve these elements before real reform can happen. and if you do that, it seems like it's open revolt. what would you recommend for reform to take place within the system? >> let me, well, it's a good question. i mean, the question is how do youty soft those -- dissolve those institutions of control? one way would be to just go for sort of a tunisian and an egyptian model where there is a call for comprehensive regime change right from the beginning. those are the demands of the protesters. i think to do that in iran -- and i think this is the calculus of the green movement leadership -- would result in a section of iranian society withering away and not supporting the green movement. because, i think, the green movement like all social movements has layers of support. i think the strategy that the green movement of reform as

opposed to open revolution is, this many ways -- in many ways, one that's open to debate whether that's the best strategy or not. i come back to, fall back on the question that, look, that's a decision for people in iran to make. i have my own certain preferences, but those people who are on the front line have to make that decision. the decision that they've made is that they want a policy of reform and gradual sort of transformation. >> but the most recent slogans from february 14th and february 20th, the two most recent manifestations of the green movement in the streets, one of the most prominent slogans in those demonstrations was down with the dictator. that is not reformest. >> no, you're right. >> are bringing the dictator down is not reforming -- >> no, but the leadership of the green movement. i mean, there's a tension between what the leadership is sort of advocating at a strategy and what i think what elements on the street, particularly the youth, want.

they say they want more radical reform, but the leadership's position and strategy is one of still working within the framework of the existing islamic republican constitution with all of its flaws and it problems and trying to really highlight the inconsistencies and the hypocrisy of the regime who claims this is the founding document that they are governing, but they're only implementing certain segments of it. so calling for, calling for implementing those elements of the constitution that deal with the rights of the people, that deal with the question of the right to protest, article 27. that deal with the right of having, you know, free, having political parties, having sort of greater freedom for political activity and trying to highlight the hypocrisy of the regime. that's the strategy the regime is using. whether that will, you know, bring down the guardian council or the revolutionary guards in the near future, it's an open question. but at least that's the strategy that they've determined to be the best be to push this movement forward, and it's up to

iranians to decide whether they feel that's a useful strategy or not. >> i'm sorry. this seems to be a problem between -- >> can you talk into the microphone. >> >> there seems to be a problem between the leadership of the green movement and the people in the streets. none of the leaders have denounced the revolutionary guard, yet the youth are calling for his downfall. >> because to do that would effectively result in a shift in strategy, right? because part of the constitution incorporates the constitution of the -- institution of the supreme leader. o so the downfall effectively mean you'd have a shifting strategy calling for regime change. my sense is eventually that's going to have to happen at some point given the repression of the regime, given the sense that i think eventually there's going to be a critical mass that is going to develop where people are going to be frustrated. i think it's difficult for the existing green leadership movement to do that because let's not forget, you know, the

leader, i mean, is in many ways a sort of accidental hero. i mean, i don't think he anticipated this position he was in. he's really, i think, been caught up by the events that transpired after the 2009 election. and ideologically all of the leaders of the green movement were part of the system, right? that radical break that we would all like to see them adopt as a way of pushing for democracy is, i think, an unrealistic expectation because they are still very much, i mean, they still pay lip service, right? to the ideas and i'd i don't imagine of -- ideology of the ayatollah khomeini. so i tend to come down on the fact that there are people in iran who still buy into, there are people in iran who are not radical revolutionaries. they're reformists, but they're moderate reformists. they still feel there are elements of the islamic republic, as i tried to say in my remarks, that are worthy of

salvages. particularly this idea that for all the fail yers of the revolution, it did at least manifest one element of the cult revolution in 979, and that was the call for, you know, independence from foreign control. so that gives, you know, that sort of, you know, gives the system some sense of, you know, credibility in the eyes of some people. and i don't think that -- my own reading is that there's not a critical mass of people who are willing to call for a mubarak or benally type style of regime change at this moment in iran. the young people, yes, increasing as we move forward, yes, but not on february 25th, 2011. so that has to be taken into consideration in terms of planning strategy. i mean, that's my reading of it. >> professor? >> >> yeah, i think, i mean, this question is it reform or revolution regime change or what, it's a valid question.

but in this a political context it's a divisive question because it automatically says it's one or the other, and who benefits out of this one or the other? >> it's actually the regime. because if you're trying to get a mass movement, bring in especially the balzar, a lot of working class people who with are still not in the reform movement. if you have ultra-radical slogans, it's more likely to put them off rather than draw them in. so the new slogans, it's people on the outside said, well, if this is good sign, it's more radicalized. i thought it would, actually, the regime likes those slogans because this will point out to a lot of people, here is the alternative. they want to overthrow the regime. they don't want to open it up or reform it. and it works into their thing. so i'm a bit suspicious of some of these slogans.

this is where influences come in. if voice of america, other things outside are having these type of slogans, it can be easily picked up there rather than if something is genuine. slogans that were used last year like what happened to my boat had much more a-- my vote had much more appeal than down with the dictator. there are plenty of people in iran who still feel that the dictator is god's representative. so why lose that support by doing that? why not have a slogan that appeals to many people? >> and yet i would just add that the ground shifted, right? the first few weeks after the june 12, 2009, election, the main slogan was, indeed, where is my vote? that poetic one sentence that captured the world's attention. and yet that peaceful, poetic, simple question was met with,

what? a pair rockism of violent to presentation with hundreds, thousands of protesters, peaceful, nonviolent protesters jailed, tortured, raped. you have a police state in iran that has noticed that that slogan has disappeared as a result. also because the results of the election itself are no longer on the immediate agenda of the green movement. so i think that the ground has shifted. it's true that they are very much creatures of the system of the islamic republic, otherwise they would not have been allowed to run for president, and yet they themselves have been somewhat if not radicalized, at least pushed by the experience of the crackdown that ensued the immediate post-electoral aftermath. i would just add one last thing which is that this reform versus revolution thing is a bit outdated in some ways.

timothy garten ash had the clever phrase which tried to speak to the sort of, you know, the ways in which these two things, you know, kind of bleed into one another, and mahmoud saadri gave a presentation in which he tried to capture some of those nuances. let's take one more -- yes. oh, wait, can we have your -- the microphone? >> just going back to a leader of the movement or just the movement, would it not be even easier for a regime to just get rid of it if there were one or two people that they could lose as opposed to just a movement that's growing from the crowds? >> or even more effectively brainwashing -- >> exactly, yeah. >> i agree with that. >> there was another hand up.

let's see, yes. this gentleman and then over there. yes. >> um, one question for professor abrahamian. i'd like to know how did you get to the 15-20% number for support, and between the two revolutions, you had a very in-depth analysis of the social classes and social roots of political oppositions that were involved and various social movements, political movements before the 1979 revolution. these days we have two lines of debates around the social classes that are of the green movement. one is around this claim that most of the people involved in

green movement are from the middle class and upper middle class, and i would like to know your take on that. and, secondly, a lot of people say even if that's true, even if that's the case, still, that's the part those people are the thought leaders that are driving the engine of the society or that probably they will be enough to make a social change happen. so i'd like to know your take on both of these. >> very quickly, the freest elections that existed in the islamic republic of iran were between about 1997 and about 2001. when the reform movement sort of surged. and if you look at sort the results of those elections, they were, they sort of demonstrated consistently that the conservatives sort of hard-core ideological support of the

regime hovered around 20%. 70/30 the first time, but in the 2000 presidential elections, the reformists did quite well. if you look at all those elections, there was always this solid base of support that the regime could draw upon, and it hovered around 20%. now, of course, this this is non exact science, and depending on what moment in time we're talking about, but just my general reading of politics is based on those opinion surveys, those elections there was a solid base of support that the regime could always count on, they would come up to the polls loyally, and it would hover around 20%. sometimes it was higher into the 30s, but i would put it if i had to put a rough sort of estimate, it would be around the 20% figure, so that's what it's based on. >> i would like to quote ervand abrahamian although he would certainly be in a better position to quote himself, i have his exact words in the front of me about this question of the class composition of the

green movement. in his essay in this book -- which i should say was originally published in the london review of books and which carries the evocative title "i am not a speck of dirt: i am a retired teacher." >> i'm not retired, by the way. [laughter] >> the professor is not retired, he was quoting a teacher, an older gentleman in the streets of tehran who was engaging, participating in the one of the demonstrations, the largest demonstration. and as many may recall, ahmadinejad had referred to the protesters after the elections as garbage or specks of dirt, one of the signs that this, this sign that this particular gentleman was carrying with him had the poetic expression, "i am not a speck of dirt, i am a retired teacher." and that became the title of the professor's essay in this book. but in this essay, professor

abrahamian describes this particular demonstration that took place on june 15th, three days after the contested election, which was held at freedom square in tehran. around a million people heeded the call. the conservative mayor of today on put the number -- tehran put the number at three million. the conservative mayor. reminiscent of the rallies held during the 1979 revolution. as in the 1979, the security forces were kept away to prevent crashes. here's the key point: the rally drew all kinds of protesters; old and young, professionals and workers, students, women wearing sunglasses and head scarves as well as those in full-length garb. lines of protesters five miles long converged o -- on the square. from the better off northern districts as well as from the working class southern ones.

and just one more on that, one more quote on that point. in another wonderful essay in the book, an essay called "this magic green bracelet." she says the following: a simple glance at the background of iran's prominent student leaders tells you that by and large they are not the children of the affluent citizens of north tehran but, instead, come from provincial working class families or are the children of rural school teachers and clerks. the western media cliche of an opposition limited to the urban upper class belies the current realities. these future leaders of iran commonly hail from the very heartland of ahmadinejad's purported support base. so i would simply say that the class composition of the green movement and interestingly enough, in the egypt and tunisia as well, is multifaceted.

you have every social class represented. and you also have very importantly in iran the strong support of trade unionists. not the entire working class, to be sure. but those organized laborers in the iran who see their interests interlocked with organized labor. >> [inaudible] >> if i could, actually, add to that. i think that the big demonstration is a moment of enthusiasm where you do get overwhelming support, and can that's very cross-class. but once things settle down, sort of when you're looking at core, where is the real opposition, then i think class interpretation, class dimension is more important than cross-cultural. and it's interesting that we use

the term class because for last 50 years american social scientists have said there is no such thing. we're wasting your time. but now it seems that it's back. it's a way of analysis. here i would agree, i think the core of -- or the vanguard of the movement is the university educated, modern middle class. so you could put it upper, upper middle class. and that's where the consistent support comes from. and during the election i think you got a lot of support from the poorer sections of town. you could see this with journalists who were there. they reported that even in the southern part you would expect a lot of -- [inaudible] you just didn't get it. it was much more passive. the enthusiasm was in the north, but down in the south you didn't actually get much support. and since the 2009 what we do

see is, of course, the consistency of the middle class, the educated demonstrators and so on. of course, you get some people from the south. but what is actually you can see a limitation is there hasn't flowed into the bazar. they might sympathize, but they don't seem to go on strike or join. in fact, i saw someone last week was saying he went and observed the big demonstrations where people went to the bazaar to gather support. they stood there and watched. they weren't unsympathetic, but they were not joining which is very different from '79. and in the working class you also find the more organized people, bus drivers are, obviously, very

indiana-ahmadinejad -- anti-ahmadinejad. but you haven't had major strikes. clearly, it's not like '79 where you're going to get enough antagonism against the regime there that they're willing to go on strike. so the class analysis does apply that it is still very much the core of it is there. that doesn't mean then what regime claims, well, the regime has the support of everyone else. it's much more, you can say, apathy, passivity, but not enthusiastic support for the regime. so the core of the regime is about 20%. and this you can go back to the first election. i would call that sort of the

evangelical support. they support the regime because they really believe in the return of the imam, and ahmadinejad really plays into that. that's his main, basically, pitch. it's not just a secondary thing. he uses -- that's how he gets his support. that's why so much time is spent on the imam and the return of the imam. we may joke about it, but i think 20% of the public basically buys into that. and before we get to orientalist, it's exact power of the united states. [laughter] iran in politics is not very different from here. what's the course of the republican conservatives is the 25% evangelical support. so as long as you talk about, you know, return of jesus and so on, you're going to get that support. be you deny the existence of god, you've got that in your pocket.

so it's the same thing with regime in iran. added to, that of course, the state because it has money has a clientele system. so it can, actually, plug in and get enough recruits from people who want the fringe benefits, you know, the motor bicycle or something. in any society you can always find people willing to break heads for some extra pay. so it's, the class analysis, i think, overall explains it. then you have to look at the state structure. >> yes. let's get the microphone over to that end. oh, no, i was actually -- sorry, joanne, i do want to hear from you, you know, but -- >> [inaudible] >> we'll try to get you in again. >> [inaudible] >> the microphone doesn't seem to be on, actually.

but perhaps -- >> my question is -- [inaudible] has accomplished everything it wanted? >> it does seem like in the last several days, in the last several months it's moderated it position by trying to take nonconfrontational approaches in dealing with the nuclear program in order to prevent sort of a flock of support for the regime by using the stuxnet worm and not having a high value targeting program with the predator drone like they do in afghanistan and pakistan. so my question is, since the u.s. government and u.s. foreign policy's kind of in a bind, how do you think that that's going to affect the green movement? because if they were to directly allow israel or something to use military force, wouldn't you see a rush of support for the rescream because of having -- regime because of having some kind of, you know, outright attack and that would undermine the movement? solidarity somewhat?

>> who would like to respond to that? >> i'll start. they -- even before obama, the bush, second bush administration ruled out military attack, so that's not on the table. if it was, it would actually strengthen the regime, and one reason i think they don't want that is it would. but i don't see any moderation or shift in the obama administration last few weeks. as long as they're refusing to follow the track, the turkish and the brazilian track, and that was an opening. i mean, that was a clear opening they could have taken if they were interested in negotiations. they closed that shut, and they're basically insisting that iran should come to the bargaining table accepting oil enrichment which is, basically, a no-starter. so unless a change in that, i

don't see any breakthrough in the negotiations. so the result is where do you go now from there? the administration really doesn't have a policy beyond that. >> nader, would you like to add about 30 seconds to that -- >> yes. you're absolutely right. a military attack by israel on iran, the regime will declare a state of emergency, arrest thousands, execute hundreds and then it's over with. with respect to the obama administration, i haven't seen any qualitative change in terms of their policy. it's fluctuated, you know, over the last two years, but nothing qualitatively different in the last two or three months that you're pointing to. so i think we're just, perhaps, misreading what's coming out of the white house. >> folks, i'm afraid we have now been here for two hours. that is going to wrap up the formal program this evening. there will be more time afterwards, however, to chat up the panelists and have copies of the book signed to purchase

them. i want to thank everyone for coming tonight and in particular our co-sponsors and our speakers. [applause] >> the people reloaded is published by melville house. to find out more about the book and its contributors, visit mhpbooks.com. >> you're watching booktv on c-span2. here's our prime time lineup for tonight. starting at 7 p.m. eastern, jack cashill argues that barack obama was assisted in the writing of his 1995 memoir by bill ayers and contends that the president's life story is different than the one presented in his biography. ..