i have other things, depending on what the publishers want. >> thanks for your time. >> thank you. >> bruce riedel looks at pakistan's role in the global jihad movement in the subject of "deadly embrace." it's at politics and prose in washington. this is about 30 minutes. >> politics and prose is timely for a number of reasons. one, it is almost exactly two years ago from the day in which i finished the first draft of the strategic review for president obama on american policy towards afghanistan and pakistan and we began the laborious process of vetting it through the united states government. it was almost exactly two years ago i flew with the president on air force one to los angeles to

go over with him during the spare time he had on a five-hour flight. at this point, i'm impelled to give my standard disclaimer, my views today are solely my views, they are not the views of the obama administration, or of the president, and please do not confuse whatever i have to say with the views of the obama administration. secondly, of course, as you noted in the introduction, we are in the midst of a major crisis between the united states and pakistan, the deadly embrace has become literally quite deadly in the last month. ramon davis, who was apparently an american diplomat, i don't know who he works for, don't ask me, shot to death two pakistani citizens. a third pakistani citizen was killed by another american driving a vehicle coming to his

rescue, and in the weekend after one the widows committed suicide. she believed the government would not stand up to the united states of america. the family has said if pakistan gives ramon davis back to the united states, they will all commit suicide one at a time. now that may all be a bluff, but there aren't a lot of government that is are going to call the citizens bluff on something like that. we have high drama, supply versus supply, -- spy versus spy, and it comes after a difficult relationship. the a cy office in the country was named in the pakistani

press, he was outed. he had to be pulled out the country, literally at night. if that wasn't bad enough, "the new york times" and the "washington post" citing cia sources said he had been outed by the pakistani intelligence service, the interservice intelligence director at isi. now i've been engaged in liaison with foreign governments for many years. this is not normal behavior. we don't usually do this. we don't usually out each other, and then talk about it in the newspapers. since the arrest of mr. davis, the president has said very clearly is a diplomat and must be given diplomatic immunity. we have already canceled a trilateral afghanistan, and pakistan meeting for cooperation in the war to work against al qaeda. pakistani's president zardari's

march visit to the united states is in jeopardy, and president obama's promise to pakistan in 2011 is clearly in jeopardy. and if this wasn't bad enough, if you listen carefully to spokesman on both sides, there's a sense of doom and foreboding behind this relationship. pakistan's chief of army staff general ciani was here last fall. when he went home to pakistan, he said he was the most bullied man in the world. again, that's not normal in mill to mill relations. if you read carefully, there's clear concern in our government that have there could be a 9/11 type mass casualty attack in the united states, dateline to mcat any time. last may, we almost had one in

times square. and there's concern there could be another mumbai style mass attack in india dateline pakistan. and there's concern that i write about in my book that pakistan could actually become a jihadist state. that's thinking the unthinkable in terms of pakistan. it's not the most likely outcome by far, it's not eminent, it's not inevitable. but for the first time in pakistani history, i think it's become a real possibility. the stakes here couldn't be larger. pakistan is the 6th most populous country in the world with 180 million people that will soon within a decade be the 5th largest. it is a second largest muslim and surprise indonesia within a decade. this is the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. today pakistan is obvious -- is on the cusp of becoming the 5th largest nuclear weapons power in

the world. for those of you who don't walk around with a cheat sheet, who are the top five, us, russia, china, france, and the united ud kingdom. pakistan is close to surprising the united kingdom and on the trajectory to be the 4th largest. it's the host to more terrorists groups than any other nation. per square kilometer, you can't find more terrorists with the possible exception of the gaza strip. pakistan has an extraordinary complex relationship. on the one hand, it's been the patron of many of the terrorists groups, the group that attacked mumbai in 2008, it was a subsidiary, and yet it is at war with others, the pakistan and taliban. it's an extremely violent war. last year there were over 2,000 terrorists attacks in pakistan.

nearly 10,000 pakistanis died or were wounded. how did we get here? that's the subject that i try to address in the deadly embrace. i try to do it by looking at three narratives and see how they interconnect with each other. the first narrative is pakistan's own internal. the second is the u.s. pakistani bilateral relationship, and the third is the rise in global jihad. what we think of here in america is al qaeda, but it's a much larger movement of the like-minded organizations who share the same goals, if not the shame leadership -- if not the same leadership. the history is fascinating. extraordinarily complex. at one level, there's a struggle between those who created pakistan, who had a vision of

pakistan that was going to be a modern, democratic, largely secular state that would look a lot like england in the river valley. against him from the start, islamic extremist, who imposed pakistan because they wanted to control all of the subcontinent, and have now come around to waging war against india. then there's the struggle between the civilian government and the military. pakistan has a military which is seized power four times in some 60 years. one of those, general zealhoc deserves the title of the grandfather in the 1980s. he was our partner in the war against the soviet union. we'll come back to that. these various struggles interact constantly in pakistan. making it a very unpredetectivable mix. and pakistani history is also littered with murders and

assassinations. from the first prime minister who was murdered in 1948, to ben vary bhutto, to the governor just a few weeks ago. in most cases, we don't know who did it. it's like we are reading an agatha christie book. but they never tell us. the bilateral relationship is a roller coaster. we've been up and down, best friends, most allied country in the world, and we've been at each other's throat. if this was a soap opera on television, it would get number one ratings. because the drama is so high. all of the ups are built around great secret projects. the base that flew over the

soviet union, nixon's trip to china, the war against the soviets, and more recently, the war against al qaeda. all of these secrets, of course, don't remain secrets for very long at all. they all come out. one standard though, is that the united states consistently has always supported and endorsed the military dictators. we love pakistan's generals when they take over. sometimes the beginning we are reluctant. but soon we come around. and it's bipartisan. republicans and democrats alike have fallen in love with pakistani generals. there's also great individuals, charlie wilson, great movie, but also larry pressler, a little-known senator who's the man who's bill caught off military assistance to pakistan. when we cut off assistance, we

told the pakistanis we were not going to deliver 30 some odd f-16 they had ordered and paid for, we weren't going to give them money back, and we were going to charge them rent for taking care of them. larry is not a well known figure, every pakistani knows who larry is. pakistanis has a consequence have come to conclusion that america is a fair-weather friend. pakistanis have numerous jokes. i'll use the cleanest that i can. pakistani's think america sees the country as a tissue. you use it and you threw it away. i'll move to your imagination what other things they come up with. lastly, the global jihad. the global jihad was born in pakistan and the war against the soviets. don't get me wrong, i think what we did in the 1980s was the right thing. we changed history. we brought down an evil empire,

and we freed millions of people. but one of the unintended consequences was to create a frankenstein which pakistan has nurtured over the years. all americans know who osama bin laden is today. what i try to do is my book is tell you about someone else. abdallah, who is the intellectual forefather of the global jihad. he wrote the formative pieces about al qaeda's philosophy and narrative. he's the founder, co-founder with osama bin laden of the services bureau, which became al qaeda, he's the so-founder of the group that attacked mumbai, and he's a significant figure in the founding of hamas in the gaza strip. so he's the trifect that of

international. it's the combination of things that have produced the dangerous pakistan today. what to do about it. well, i've learned in book talks that i'm supposed to leave with you a tease. and not tell you the last chapter, otherwise, why would you buy the book? so my tease is my answer to what to do about it is in the last chapter. but i'll start with a simple rule. humility. 60 years of american interact with pakistan demonstrates we can do a great deal of harm. there's very little evidence that we can do a lot of good in pakistan. take the hippocratic oath to begin with. do not support the generals, even though the politics are as corrupt as can be. there are no heros in this story.

there's no thomas jefferson. there's no john adams. there's a lot of aaron burrs, but that's what we got to work with. secondly, there are no magic bullets. no simple solution to the problem. we can't buy off pakistan. we tried to do that in the last decade. we gave them $12 billion in unaccounted funds. that's an estimate. because nobody in the united states government knows how much we actually gave him. we can't invade them. this is a country twice the size of california with the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. invasion is crazy. but understand some circumstances, you can envision an american president with very few options otherwise the use of military force. there are extraordinarily difficult tradeoffs in this relationship. and the most difficult ones revolve around the nature of our relationship with the ifi.

the ifi is our most important partner in the war against al qaeda. the ifi has delivered more al qaeda prisoners and has given us more targets than any other liaison partner in the world, and yet is our most difficult partner at the same time. leon panetta in hearings summed it up this is the most complicated thing he's seen in government. he's been around in government for a long time. just one final comment before i take your questions and comments. the research for this book is obviously difficult to do. we're talking about secret intelligence organization, the cia did not like to have it's truths revealed, even by it's own former employees, the isi doesn't like anyone to smoke around the isi, and despite my

many requests, al qaeda and osama bin laden has turned down by request by interview. i always requested by interactive camera. what i have been able to do over the course of government, both in and since i left, speak with the interview of many of the key figures, including four presidents, including secretary of state, including the american ambassador, including every corrector general of the -- every director general of the isi, i've spent time with bhutto, and president musharif. did they tell me the truth? of course no. but i think i've done the job of reaching out and trying to get everybody's story. with that, i look forward to your questions. if you want to ask me what to do

it, if it's the first question, of course, aisle going -- of course, i'm going to tell you. [applause] [applause] >> okay. come to the microphone please. >> go ahead here. >> well, if you can summarize what you are going to do about it. it was a very tempting tease. >> the united states needs to do several things. first of all, we need to make sure when we work with pakistan, we do not undermine the civilian government authority. that doesn't mean not dealing with the military, it means always ranking our priorities and engaging with the civilians first. not because we are in love with president zakaria, or his replacements, but because we should be supportive of a process. one the thens i would emphasize

about pakistan today, when you look back over it's history, this is a country that has fought consistently for democracy. not very effectively. but they have gotten rid of four military dictators. it's not egypt. egypt sat under a military dictator for 30 years. pakistan does not sit still. they want democracy. there are consistencies in pakistan that are seeking democracy. we need to help enable them, not undermine them. secondly, and i'll just mention too, we need to address the issue that obsessing the pakistani army. and that's their relationship with india. when the president set up the afghan, pakistan special envoy office, he got half right. you can't deal with pakistan without dealing with pakistan. but the other half is equally important. you can't deal with pakistan, without addressing india.

we cannot be a mediator between india and pakistan. the indians will refuse that. but we will be a facilitator. and in otherwise somewhat grim picture tonight, let me give you one piece of good news. last week after pakistan and india agreed to resume the high level negotiations process, which was suspended after mumbai. not because either side thinks there's a great chance of success, but because both sides realize there's no viable alternative. we should encourage that process. there are things that we can help do to push india and pakistan towards a resolution of the small differences and ultimately their big differences. let me give you one small difference. if you want to fly from islamabad to new delhi, you can't get there, you got to go

to mumbai, tehran, there are almost no direct flights between the two countries. there's less than 1% of the gdp is engaged in trade. that is not normal. this is not natural. engages change in south asia is the big idea that the united states should support. >> could you please comment on pakistan's dilemma in trying to prevent the forces crossing their borders into afghanistan that continues as such a concern to our forces, knowing that the enemy seems to be escaping into pakistan so frequently? >> the forces we are fighting in afghanistan are primarily the afghan taliban, in several different flavors.

the pakistani government in the 1990s did not create the afghan taliban. but they were the midwife. the pakistani army believes to this day that the afghan taliban is an asset for them. that sooner or later, the americans are going to leave afghanistan. and there will be a struggle for influence there and their biggest asset is the afghan taliban. up until a year or so ago, they believe victory was in sight. they were going to win in afghanistan. we were going to pull out. hold on to your asset if you think they are about to win. but over the course of the last decade, the pakistani taliban -- i'm sorry, the afghan taliban has given birth to a mini me, the pakistani taliban. which targets the government of pakistan. so the pakistani military has an

extraordinary difficult job of trying to parse the difference. they are still convinced the best way to deal with this is to fight those who are your enemy, and use those who are your asset for the future. the united states in a very american way, of course, says do more. you got to take the entire thing down. pakistani's look at us and say you are hopelessly naive. first of all, you won't be here when push comes to shove. we'll be on our own. secondly, we need these people. we want to continue to have relationships with them. this conflict over this fundamental issue is what is at the heart of this spy versus spy battle today going on in afghan -- pakistan.

these different points of view. >> thank you. i emigrated from india to the united states 30 years ago. my question is the piece between kashmir and all of kashmir in pakistan and india, there were reports -- there were reports even the line now between pakistan. so my question is if the army could control after this piece the islamic radicals in in -- in pakistan, will there be ever a solution for -- will there be a time where pakistan could be like india? because thomas friedman wrote two years ago, the democracy in india gave raise to what india is today, whereas the military

dictatorship and islamization of pakistan led to all of that. my question is because the people are the same culture and the language, so you are comment and answer. >> this is a very important question. let me just for the benefit of the rest of the audience, put a little bit of perspective here. general musharif after he first tried nuclear intimidation, small war, several high profile terrorists attacks and threats came around to diplomacy. he was a slow learner. but he got to the right outcome. the outcome that he negotiated with the indians, and i talked to him about it, and the indians, it was a deal where the cease-fire line would be recognized so that india would

be respected, but it was a permeable border for kashmirians. like maryland and virginia, exaggeration, a lot more like europe where there's not a lot of border stoppages. unfortunately, the sell by date with the pakistani people expired at this critical moment. he says his partner in this negotiation was general ciani, now chief of army staff. if that's true, there's some grimmer of hope here. this is a good deal for india. indians who think about it may feel some level of satisfaction in watching the arrival and trouble. but if they think about it at all, they know that their vision of a bright shining india, one

the great leaders of the 21st century is impossible if you are connected to a failed state, or worse a jihadist state next door which has hundreds of nuclear bombs target on you. i am convinced, prime minister in particular understands this. it's a good deal for the kashmirians more than anyone else. they have lived in a nightmare. the hard part is selling it to pakistan. the good news here is president zardari wants to do it. that's why he embarked on a new peace process, that's why mumbai happened. the dark forces in pakistan literally wanted to prevent it from going through. they carried out an operation. we cannot make this happen. we can help indians and pakistanis make it happen.

we can be cheerleaders, go to u.n. for support, but we have to do it in a way that's uncharacteristic. we cannot talk about it all the time. we cannot have a special envoy for kashmir, we cannot give constant press reports on how we are doing. we have to be sophisticated, subtle, and under the radar screen. many of my colleagues that worked in the u.s. government say i'm dreaming. we can't do it. pakistani is a country that's easy to be pest -- pessimistic about. we have to try to raise our game and sights and see if we can help them do it. >> hi, one question and two points. your language say there are 50 al qaeda.

why are we squared of 50 people and spend billions chasing them? i urge you not to talk about pakistan or afghanistan. this is a collection of nature with the army that leads the country. they are the pashtuns, pashtuns especially troublemakers. and sunni/shiite agendas. in these cultures, they are led by three mens and one german. and that's a terrible thing to happen. and we are two and a half million, where it's a combination of mormons and muslims. >> i've never heard of that characterized as mormons. i'm going to steal that line. >> yeah, the terrorists.

but anyway, you know how the massacres have occurred by the sunni taliban, we have been smited by the sunnies for years. hard work. what i'm getting the community is paranoid, the country is collapsing, the taliban are murders the qatar people, and everybody was helping with the blood. my view, i've known for 40 years, afghanistan is collapsing and just like other places, like sudan, new nations, new states being created, very few people are prepared for that chaos.

>> you and i are close to agreement about pakistan's problems today. you brought up more of the divisions within pakistan between the punjab majority which dominates the officer core, which seizes as the state, which everybody else is second or third class citizen. that's absolutely true. you raised rightly the growing strength of extremism, highlighted by the murder of the governor. extraordinary things, his own bodyguard shoots him to death and the bodyguard gets all of the favorable attention. [inaudible comment] >> 1,000 lawyers go to protect him. the battle of the soul of pakistan is under way today. how it will turn out, no one knows. there are a lot of very

dangerous possibilities. i'll just make one comment about 50 al al qaeda. with all do respect to the director of central intelligence, i've been engaged in the business of counting insurgents and terrorists for 35 years. we don't have a clue. anybody that says they know is either bluffing, or something worse, al qaeda is a lot more complex problem than 50 individuals. i wish the united states government would get out of the business of body counts. we learned in vietnam, that's not very helpful. and getting into the business of thinking about our enemy, you know, more flexible way. >> first on the theme of global jihadist movement. how do you see the global

jihadist forces interacting, dealing with, and coping with the change that is undefined and in play. this is a struggle that could have serious implications for a lot of things here. a lot of people are talking about it, but don't know a whole lot. your opinion would be interesting. second, recalling some figures from the past. i wonder what you think about the future of colonel gadhafi. >> i think colonel gadhafi's shelf life can be measured in days. i certainly hope that's the case. he has demonstrated what he's been for the last 40 years, dramatically to the world. all of the myths have fallen. he's a murdering terrorists. killed several hundred

americans, pan am 103, he's been engaged in one act of terror after another. i hope this is the end of the game. i don't see a negotiation between the opposition and colonel gadhafi like between hosni mubarak. the egyptian revolution, i think, is much more significant. al qaeda has been caught on the back foot. really taken off guard. al qaeda's philosophy was the only way to bring about change in the arab world was jihad. violence, terrorism, and that violence and terrorism should be directed against the crusaders and zionist. that's you in this room. what's happened in egypt is a regime change through a largely peaceful, not 100% peaceful, but the largest peaceful mass-based movement. this doesn't fit. the model. the pakistan -- the al qaeda

relationship, and in particular, number two egyptian who has fought hosni his entire life and participated in the assassination 30 years ago was unable to put out a statement for almost a month. we finally put a statement out last weekend. guess what's to blame? napoleon bonparte. yup. he invaded egypt 200 years ago, he set upon the decline, and it's all his fault. he's promised additional statements to bring up to the current day. while this is very consistent with al qaeda's narrative and history, it shows you how off they have been. but there are several scenarios in which they can come back.

if the promise of democracy now turns into something much less, then there will be a radicalism. in libya, we don't know who the kids are. we don't know what they are fighting for and who they are looking to. in yemen, we know part of the opposition is al qaeda. for now we have suffered a certain setback. it's good news for us. but this game is just beginning. you know? the easy part of the revolution is toppling the dictator. the hard part is providing jobs for 85 million egyptians. that's a really hard thing to do. >> how much people do we have in line there? okay. two more questions. >> okay. quick question on the

geopolitical scene on pakistan. china has a border with pakistan and india. and they have a border with afghanistan. they have their own agendas and strategic imperatives. the chinese actually have a lot more influence in pakistan than the u.s. although they take our money, but the influence is coming from china. they call us the all weather friends. china does look at the u.s., and they look at india as a quasi, and i was wondering in they have interest in createing some stability like "the new york times" a story where they funded the technology for the nuclear reactor to make bombs. just now in the world of proliferation, they are encouraging pakistani to build nuclear woman. what's your take on the chinese? and do we discuss it in the

book? thanks. >> briefly, you characterize china quite rightly. from pakistan's perspective they are the all weather friend. they are taller than the himalayas. they have given the design for the bomb. in any clutch situation, the chinese haven't done anything more than we have. china's sort answer is they are in a quasi rivalry with us and indian, but they are also in a relationship with us and india, and china are trying to figure out how to balance all of this together. so for me, it's the high road here is to try to get the chinese to roll with us in this. they don't want the jihadist state in pakistan. they don't want to see the

indian economy, because they are investing in the indian economy now. tricky? hard to do. but something that we can be. iran is a more difficult partner. the short version is in afghanistan since 2001, iran has largely been a supporter of what we want to do. because they hate the taliban. the trick here is to somehow segue off their relatively positive pursuits in afghanistan from the -- from so many other things where we have very serious disagreements with them. that's a very tricky diplomatic problem to pursue. >> do know harm, does that suggest that the drone attacks are counterproductive? >> it's -- i'm glad that you brought this up. if i were to teach -- i teach at

john hopkins. if i were to teach, of course, in decision making, i would use the drones as a classic example. the drones which is an operation prison obama inherited from president bush, president bush created the infrastructure, obama very skillfully has exploited it, but it started under bush. our only real way of putting pressure on al qaeda and pakistan today, and it works, it has put a lot of pressure on them. he used to put out a message every week. last year he put out four messages. two of them were less than 50 seconds. it's not because he got laryngitis. it's because he fears the drone. on the other hand, the drone is productive. even though the isi provides the

targeting information, and beneficiary when it comes to the taliban. this is a classic example of what's hard in making decisions in government. there's not a naturally easy solution. i will be 100% candid and up front. i support drone operation. i recommended increasing drone operation two years ago. i think we need to be careful not to become drone addicted. drones are a platform and a weapon system. they are not a strategy. we cannot destroy al qaeda from 30,000 feet in the air. pakistani cooperation is essential to doing that in the end. this is a real world problem. if we don't keep the drones up, the danger of mass casualty attack in the united states will increase very significantly. if we keep doing them, we drive

away a significant part of the pakistani people. there's no simple answer to this problem. in the long term, the best answer is to get the pakistanis to take ownership of the drone operations. the pakistani government doesn't want to take ownership of this. it much prefers to let obama and leon panetta take all of the flak. it demonstrates the contradictions that are at the heart of our relationship with pakistan and which make it such a difficult partner to work with these days. >> thanks. >> thank you. [applause] [applause] >> you are watching book tv on c-span2. 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books every weekend. >> wendell potter is a former

executive with signa health care. mr. potter, your become coming out "deadly spin" what's it about? >> it means finally i'm able to tell my story in a method that i haven't had a chance to do before. to take people behind the scenes to make sure that people understand what really goes on in corporate america and how influential we are in influencing public opinion with the sole purpose of changing policy and influencing public policy. in particular, you use the debate on health care. how the insurance was able to shape how the legislation took shape and now it was finally passed. >> what was your role in influencing how people saw health care? >> my role was to try to make sure people understand or misunderstand in fact some of the problems that we have in this country in terms of the

number of people who are unsure -- uninsured or summons -- or underinsured. the reason for this is the insurance industry wants to make sure the profit are projected. they don't want to have too much change, because it can upset wall street. >> what will people learn by reading "deadly spin"? >> they will learn what goes on and why they think what they think and how and what goes on the scenes to influence how they think and how they act. >> now as far as the health care reform act that passed this year, what's your opinion of it? >> it's a start. it wasn't perfect. it certainly was influenced by the special interest. but it's a big win also for consumers. because it does a lot of thing that is will help consumers. it will outlaw the practices of

the health insurance that should have been outlawed a long time ago. it will bring a lot of people into coverage who haven't had coverage. there's 50 million of us. this will help bring a lot more people into coverage. >> does it benefit the influence companies? >> it does because it will give them new customer. of they were successful in keeping a big part of the reform out of the bill. that was to create a public option. they won that round. they'll get a lot of new customers and revenue. it's somewhat of a win/win for them. it will keep private health care system in place. some people don't like that. but it will keep the private insurance industry going. it will also bring a lot of people into coverage who haven't had coverage and access to care. >> and finally, mr. potter, what's your response to people who may say you spent 30 x years and now you are writing negatively about it. >> i've h