shown already held there might be some appetite for people to cut back on spending and the same with rubio, there are data points to say people are willing to say we do need some cuts for things on the longer term. >> host: i suppose on the smi optimistic note -- >> guest: i am optimistic americans will get it right. >> host: i hope you're right. we have to close down. i want to thank dambisa moyo for being here. her book how the west was lost, lots of good data, lots of big contentious ideas and proposals. thank you very much for being with us and for watching. ..

and the prospects for success. it was held at columbia university in new york city. it's just under two hours. >> thanks so much for coming to this evenings panel discussion with several of the contributors to the new anthology, "the people reloaded." the green movement in the struggle for iran's future, which i had the honor code again with my friend and comrade,

nader hashemi from whom you'll be hearing shortly. first, i'd like to thank the department of middle eastern, south asian and african studies here at columbia university for sponsoring this event today. i'd also like to thank the middle east institute of columbia university and the columbia university graduate school of journalism for cosponsoring. finally, and that you think the publisher of the book. and in particular, i would like to express my appreciation to my friend, hamid dabashi, who made all the arrangements for tonight's discussion possible. when this book was published, seems like a long time ago. the book was published at the beginning of this month.

this rather eventful indeed one might say world historic month of february 2011. and when the book was published at the outset of february, the roadsides are of course blocked a knee-jerk. although iran featured in much of the discussion and analysis surrounding by people in each out like iran's 1979 revolution invoked something of a compared aspect to. the green movement in iran was by no means in the headline as it had been from the time of its explosive emergence in june 2092 roughly december of that year. indeed, many had pronounced the movement dead. in fact, and not assortment of back tears took this vehicle, ranging from the islamic republic itself to the lakes of

flint and hillary mann leverett, to summon the radical left. nader and i assembled "the people reloaded" in no small part as a weight of refuting this view, of showing that although the movement could no longer be seen on the street, a very much continued to live and had in fact transformed iran's political, intellectual, indeed existential landscape in profound and even permanent waves. i was at the beginning of this month. yes, amazingly enough, we are still in february, just two weeks to the day from the parks evacuation. in three days out from the pivotal event, the green movement once again made its presence felt on iran street, staging a major demonstration on monday, february 14 in

solidarity with the egyptian revolution. the demonstration that the ukrainian government denied permission to fight its own profession of support for the egyptian revolt. six days later, on sunday, the green movement returned to the streets and have now announced, as you may have heard today, that it will be on a weekly basis. what is the reappearance at the movement mean for the future of the islamic republic and how does what i would be caused resilient rebel and relate to the width of uprising, roiling the middle east and south africa? this is what we are here to discuss this evening, but for contributors.

hamid dabashi, ervand abrahamian in my aforementioned coeditor, nader hashemi. a few words about each of them. hamid dabashi is to professor of iranian studies in comparative literature at columbia, university and was, for many months, the host of the week in green, which in my view was not only amongst the very finest sources on the green movement available in the digital comments, but what is in fact a contribution to the green movement. hamid's many books, for too many to mention here include close-up, iranian cinema, past, present and future from 2001. ayn rand: a people interrupted published in 2007.

iran: the green movement in the u.s.a. the fox and the paradox published last year and available for this evening. the world is my home, a hamid dabashi reader also published last year. and just outcome is she is in, a religion of protest. her blond eyebrow man, distinguished professor of iranian and middle eastern politics at beirut college. his books include iran between two revolution, published in 1982 and widely referred to as the meanest real reference point. tortured confessions in public recantation in modern iran published in 1999 and most recently come a history of

modern iran published in 2008. hamid dabashi teaches middle eastern studies at records and is a frequent contributor to a range of publications including tehran bureau. her current research interests include political arts and music in iran, women and gender and fundamentalist religious communities in north america and women's rights movements in iran and the global comparative context. nader hashemi teaches middle eastern islamic politics at the joseph corbo is too cool for international studies at the university of denver. he is the author of islam secularism and liberal democracy tricky democratic theory published in 2009 and is as mentioned, my coeditor fully reloaded. before we begin by hearing from nader

hamid dabashi, i think it's appropriate that we open with the palm that opens this the period the palm is by the classical persian and how lovely the co-translators are here this evening. block mode only be chaotic and bill hayek. the days of those reunions be remembered. may those days be remembered. may they always be remembered. they mouth is poisoned by the bitterness increase. and the toast of those happy drinkers be remembered. although my comrades are free from remembering me, i remember them all constantly.

though i am captured and bound by this misery, made the attempts of those who stood up for tolerance be remembered. even though 100 rivers constantly flow from my eyes, sans beirut irrigate for those who make gardens may be remembered. from now on, the secret of hafez will remain unspoken. have pity on those who must keep secret. may that be remembered. without any further ado, please join me in welcoming hamid dabashi. [applause] >> thank you, danny. good evening, everyone. before even start, i'd like to apologize for having to dash out immediately after my short

remarks because of some schedule he conflict. i have to actually be where they are celebrating the cinema who just been sentenced to jail and 20 years fans of making films. we are both celebrating the cinema and also using the occasion to shut like another less known political union activists, women's rights act to this and so forth. so i do apologize. i am absolutely delighted that my colleagues and comrades, danny postel and nader hashemi of this brilliant book in which i am honored to have been included by the gracious attention to me word is

published is not only excited to read this happened over the last year and a half, but also has some historical document of the buddhas then concerned with iran and has participated and observers have been reading about this. the so-called green movement in iran, which is a grassroots massive uprising decade, if not centuries in the making in my judgment is a healthy, organic movement. it is a movement that is unfolding in front of our eyes and is changing the dimension and this had many jazz stations in episode of street demonstrations and episodes of transformative ratings and declarations that in my judgment to produce some of the most

fantastic government of iranian history and also visions in debates and so forth. so for those of us who are trying to keep our hands on the polls of the movement, this historical document is a good springboard for further reflection. now, another significant that this book is i have to be cautious not to praise it too much because i'm included in it. it is some of the best writings that have been done on the subject and will help you stay away from to set the noises that are generated about not only what has happened in iran, but equally if not more importantly things that have happened in north africa over the last month and a half. i was just telling my friend and

colleague that when i was in my late 20s and early 30s, there is only revolution and that is the iranian revolution. and this year they are 15 revolutions happening at the same time. if you like a kid in a candy store, not knowing quite what to do with myself. so what i say about the green movement is equally about other movements have been in the region. and that is the concerted effort to assimilate what is happening backwards into her standard categories, for, whereas i am absolutely convinced we are witnessing is a historical magnitude that we are right in the middle of it, we don't know the proper metaphor, the proper allegories, people collect the berlin wall, the revolution of

1848, which are attempts to sort out the proverbial dark room with an old-fashioned trying to figure out what exactly it is, but it is the historical magnitude in my judgment, no question. and event such as the affinity of president obama vetoing a security council resolution draft of preventing the further armed robbery of palestine and the useless ships through the suez canal and islamic republic were taking advantage of the ministry of distraction to some historical event. these are attempts to distract from what is happening around us. now, specifically about iran, i

would like to draw your attention to the sets of radiance by people who are by no imagination knowing or agree what has happened, but those who write cautiously and right from the depths of historical knowledge and academic scholarly commitment to judicious rating, that is exemplary. now, two sets of identical ratings that i want to warn you against are those ratings and statements by reaching changes, john dolphin michael ledeen and richard perle, you know regime changes in the opposite that i called them the regimes, mainly husband-and-wife frequent flyer. thousands of us cannot set foot

in my hometown in these couple are frequent fliers and come back with absolute gibberish about what would happen in iran. not a single word that can be beyond comprehension. so whether you are regime change or are regime et cetera, what they are doing our distract team from somatic efforts to come to grips with the reality of what is happening. the fundamental fact is that three huge movements that predate the green movement, labor movements, student movement and student rights movements are at the root of economic malfunction, social alienation and cultural transformation that we are witnessing in iran.

and our attempt is to try and see what particular way the green movement is the political manifestation of it. the two other parallels that reflect are the language of the islamic republic in the ministry of intelligence coming up with this continuing the theories they have created around themselves and abused 72 million human beings whether they are the rest of the population and also the opposition of groups that they have generated as their own mirror image. in other words, the islamic republic over the last 30 years has looked exactly like her. and language, whereas the healthy body of what our children in iran on the green

movement is the harbinger of an entirely different phenomenon that is imperative for us to keep our eyes on the ball and try to understand it. and of course i understand the changes because the movement changes. since for the 14 have absolutely nothing to do with the beautiful day of valentine. the movement has entered a third phase. the third phase in my judgment is a more radical phase, but radical phase doesn't necessarily mean blind violent. the demands have become a radical and perhaps your witnessing the beginning of an interchange and necessary interaction between aggrieved movement and the social movements. so what i would like to say is that currently, a year and a half after commencement of the green movement, particular

attention is being paid to something called the charter of the green movement, drafted by mrs. b. and cosigned and there are lot of debates about this charter. because in effect, it is except about the constitution and their many iranians who don't accept fatality of the constitution, certainly don't agree with the item of the supreme authority ruler. nevertheless, in my judgment, in this document, the charter of the green movement, we are beginning to see a near two space of conversation on a massive national scale about the future of iran and the democratic peaceful nonviolent transition to democracy that i think is crucial for us. so the gist of what i am trying to say is there a lots of

noises, weather comes from washington or tehran or paris about the green movement. but the body of the green movement itself has started generating its own language, its own discourse, not only its own leaders, but modality of it leadership. moussaoui is under house arrest him about being under house arrest does not mean you are no longer at the center of the social appraising. i mean come examples of mandela and gandhi and both et and the israeli prison -- their many examples. in fact, in my judgmentcommandeer imprisonments, being under house arrest has given a necessary spin to a movement that in some respects has hit a plateau, with the same argument that the

president iran would have turned out to be someone like obama, having generated huge expectations and look what has happened to them. so, his not having office gave momentum to the social appraising and social appraising went up for a year and a half. the fact that he is now under house arrest i believe has placed the movement into a different category. debates obviously are taking place mostly in person as it should read. some reflections are expressed also in other languages, including english. but to conclude with what started the significance of a book like this, for those of you who want to be said about to speed, what has happened to the green movement? what are the running debates? as they said, everybody agrees as to what nature of the

movement is. this is an excellent place to start. they have done all this a fantastic, fantastic service by this relentless job they have done to bring us up to date and have the repository of what our thinking is that where we need to go. thank you. [applause] >> thank you so much, hamid for those generous words. i noticed that some of you came in after my introduction, so you just briefly going to reintroduce for those of you who are just to write our next speaker, nader hashemi, who teaches middle east and islamic politics at the joseph korbel school of international studies at the university of denver.

in addition to being a coeditor on the "the people reloaded" is the author of islam, secularism and liberal democracy for the democratic theory for muslim societies. nader. [applause] >> thank you all for coming tonight. our book that hamid dabashi generously praised is anchored on the contributions of three individuals. not saying i would be be spent her time between london and tehran has several essays in the book, as does mohammed said he me, which is one man sorted into the tuition who teaches at the university of southern california and has written the most intriguing and papal analysis of the green movement, several in the book. in the third person as multiple essays is transcendent.

in his characterization of the movement -- some of his writings, political writings have been the most insightful and important on the green movement, particularly observations of the green movement is first and foremost a civil rights movement that seeks to transform iran via process every form, not necessarily revolution, although those two lines are becoming blurred today. he made one important observation in the summer of 2009, that when i first read it, strongly disagree. i thought it was wishful thinking on the part of hamid dabashi when he said the green movement and politics emerging under iran and the summer of 2009 is setting a standard for the region and it is transforming the politics of the broader arab and islamic world. it is completely shaped the moral compass orientation. and i thought about that when i first read it another two future to north africa and i didn't see

it. a year and half later, i think hamid deserves credit because a model we saw coming out of the green movement in the summer of 2900 reproduced in egypt, tunisia come in ways that were very similar, some of the broad contours for similarity is that i think explained and unite events in iran in the summer of 2009 and since then recently in north africa at the following set of observations. the fact is movements for democracy are fundamentally nonviolence, social protest movements, their merchants was unpredictable and unprecedented in the sense that argued into the new phase of politics in the region. these movements are characterized by the fact they are not ideological. i mean, debates between islamist in fact there is don't matter to the people who are part of this movement. they are both secular people who

are very much a part of the movement. the arbor day fundamentally economic grievances, the political grievances and objections that they have with respect to the authoritarian order in which they live in in their call is basically for democracy and human rights. the democratic youth is central to the story. new generation emerge to come of age. they are politicized their parents generation. they're highly educated and internet savvy there's no clear leadership structure in terms of how these are organized. the phenomenon as a representative sample, but their hundred and thousands of individuals who are part of this movement. so that is that is sorted for a picture in terms of uniting iran with egypt and tunisia, i think there is also a significant and qualitative difference is i think we need to acknowledge or

understand what's taking place in iran today. that's what i want to spend the bulk of my time talking about. i ran in comparison and contrast to teach it and tunisia. it's important to acknowledge that every country has its own internal story and on internal obstacles to democratic forces have to overcome in order to reach a democratic transition. so if you sort of compare iran with egypt for a moment, the last 30 years, you know, iran's political islamist leaders come to consolidate power in the same time the bird comes to power. in 1881, we have about 30 years since then. for both countries have been characterized bradley has authoritarian political regimes, there are key differences between those regimes that need identification can have consequences for the struggle for democracy, particularly in iran today.

and i want to argue that in the case of iran, in contrast to egypt and tunisia, that the islamic republic, until relatively recently, has been viewed as a much higher degree of internal legitimacy than mubarak and ali's regime ever had. considering the following markers. in iran since the revolution, there have been consistent and regular presidential parliamentary and later municipal elections that up until 2009 were never completely free, but they were fair and the sense that the announced results reflected what was taking place at the ballot box. there were a few moments in 2000 parliamentary elections that were fudged because of the reform movement are the 2005 election has questions, but broadly speaking, there were elections that were free, but basically fair.

then all the mubarak could never make the claim in terms of elections that took place. there has been limited pluralism with iran's political system in terms of internal debates, seriously intense back-and-forth between different factions that has taken place in the public sphere. there is then moments went in iran the public debate was very opened, particularly president talk to me in ways that don't have any parallels to mubarak and our zoe's regime. that is another qualitative difference. i ran at least to me to claim it's politically independent from control of external powers geared its foreign policy is generally an independent player in politics of the region. ali and mubarak by contrast have been part of the american foreign policy program for the region and have been highly dependent on u.s. and western support. police the islamic make the claim to have been politically independent. to give you an example of how

the regimes in iran, despite all of its failing repression, up until 2000 night would argue it still had a certain degree of legitimacy. and that is reflected in the fact that in 2009 behind this phenomenal event, were 80% to 85% of the electorate chose to the ballot box to cast a vote, hoping at least those people who voted for the opposition could change the course of the islamic republic, not drastically, but change it from pop to finish back to the reformists days of mohammed. and the fact they were voting in high numbers suggest they believed the hud legitimacy that they would show up, there'd be consequences that would shift the islamic republic. that speaks to a certain degree of legitimacy. the elections are largely viewed to be stolen, but up until 2009, you didn't have a certain degree of legitimacy as reflect it in

the high voter turnout. i mean, these turnouts have never been evident anywhere in mubarak's egypt or ban all eastern asia to the same extent as seen in iran. the key point here i am trying to make, all things considered, the islamic republic and still have a certain base of support within the country that is not very wide, but it is deep. what i mean by that is there is a core base of support that is deeply ideological and committed to the regime for a variety of reasons. some of the religious, theological, some to self-interest, livelihood and careers and the established order and i would put that percentage of support approximately between 25%. asked me during the q&a how i came up with that figure. on top of all of this, that 15% to 20% of support is reinforced

by virtue of the iranian regime's ability to manipulate two key themes in order to preserve its hegemony to present itself in power and immunize itself. these two themes that the islamic republic does successfully are islamic authenticity and the famous anti-imperialists. the islamic republic of iran claims to be the embodiment of islam on earth. it claims to rule in the name of god the supreme leaders of the 12th imam who is representative of god on earth. and it constantly reinforces. there's a famous quote when he was speaking to besiege paramilitary units in august 2009, to give you an example company said quote, or being the president is the same as obeying god in his logic is

because the supreme leader is representative of god on earth and he's given legitimacy to the recent elections, therefore, use of heard of but did the shots came to see there for obeying him. most young people today, most educated people in iran don't need to that. but segments of iranian society that are religious, but don't have access to the internet and satellite tv are affected by that in a religious society it makes sense. it is a small percentage, but they buy into the particular arguments. that is why the machine is very determined and preventing alternative clerics to provide an alternative narrative. in the book we have translated the very famous fatwa the conscious green movement providing essentially clerical

theological legitimacy of the islamic republic. that's why he's under house arrest for so long. the theme of islamic authenticity could regime uses to consolidate his health. the second theme is interfere with them. it claims to be the vanguard against western dimension, theme of rejecting the organizing teams of the politics of the middle eastern 20th century. the emotional topic. iran's very troubled relationship with the west over the last 200 years is a reflection of that people rally to the theme of rejecting intervention in their politics of of their country. threshing constantly invokes it and they get some internal support for it. these two themes, islamic authenticity and anti-imperialism are things that denali could not utilize in order to gain public port for obvious reasons. mubarak and all the were military generals.

they were religious figures. they were deeply secular in their political ideology. with respect to anti-imperialism, that doesn't apply either because both are deeply dependent on western. in that respect, if you put it all together, the regime in iran is able to draw upon a certain base of support that is not very wide, that is deep. i think those are qualitative differences and they pose huge challenges in terms of the way forward for the green movement. you can't ignore that reality that is fair. and i think in many ways, in particular the wayside just articulated, this is how iran is distinct in terms of its external politics into sort of ignore that and pretend that simply coming you know, if enough people in iran can get to tahirir square, freedom square

and occupy it, there will be a momentum that will follow up and that happened over a nietzsche is wishful thinking. and that brings me to my last point, the lessons we should be learning here from libya. reports today from the u.n. humans rights commission suggests that there have been massive atrocities in thousands of people have been killed. gadhafi's last and will likely be in tripoli and the likely be massive. reports today that libya has a chemical weapons to build. does anyone think for a moment that gadhafi was not used as chemical weapons if the name? all of it forces me to think about the parallels drawn. insider in today we have people that are gadhafi like in a sense there is no option for them. they will get on a plane to go to southern france if they feel they have lost or are losing power. if you follow and listen to roderick, i think 10 days ago we

were called to see and do. start give him 120 members of iran's hard-boiled parliament rallied around the podium again for the blood of the opposition leaders, calling for execution. there were people in iran who are willing to kill thousands, not when tian an men square, but multiple is needed in order to stay in power. so i think looking at events in libya, looking at how gubernatorial leaders and machines are willing to use massive amount of parents to remain in power poses i think -- requires at minimum a moment to pause for those of us who are part of the cream is made in terms of how you overcome that particular obstacle. i don't have any answers and how when sort of priest on for me that challenge, but to simply ignore it and simply save a street demonstrations we can bring about a democratic transition is wishful thinking.

the green movement is sort of i think the critical moments. it has been inspired by these movements any junk and tunisia. i personally am very optimistic about the future, but more the longer term future than near-term future. i hope that some of my remarks have been able to shed some light on the internal politics of iran and the obstacles that lie in the way of a democratic transition in the coming years. thanks. [applause] >> thank you, nader. next, we will hear from professor ervand abrahamian. >> i want to address the question of what can we do to help the greens movement. a week, and meet either

geraniums are non-iranians living in the united states. the conventional answer to this question is we can hope the green movement by getting our president obama to be forthright and speak directly on the issue of suppression in iran, that every time heads are broken in iran, you should be the podium helping them speaking on behalf of the protest. in addition to this, the argument is often made that the best way to reform movement in iran is to have economic sanctions to put pressure on the regime. this will weaken their regime in the week ending the regime, we will be hoping the protest movement should bring either change, internal change a regime

change. these have become actually pretty much conventional wisdom says the crisis in june 2009. and most mainstream newspapers like "the new york times," "washington post" have ascribed to this notion. i would like to acknowledge that this two-pronged strategy helps the regime and undermines the reform movement. i don't think it can be fine-tuned or modified to help it. i think structure basically this from regime from the strategy is actually diametrically wrong. let's take the first one about helping -- speaking out, specially the president for american officials speaking out on behalf of the reform movement. it is of course natural that people's heads are being smashed

or executed, especially high-ranking people in america to speak out in protest, sort of like a knee-jerk reaction. i think most people in america would have a knee-jerk reaction, especially among liberals and people on the left. ever since woodrow wilson, there has been this idea in the liberal active in the united states that there is the united state mission to spread humanitarianism and liberalism and it's a sort of august judi in american mainstream sidekick at the u.s. is a good light for people to have freedom. as the president of france said that time, the good lord had only 10 commandments and woodrow

wilson came along with 14 of them. given that the woodrow wilson's time taken cynically abroad encinas weapons in u.s. policy rather than writing i've humanitarianism elsewhere. and in iran, especially because of obvious reasons, average iranians are very suspicious of the united states, for sponsoring notions of democracy for reform in iran. every time any u.s. president speaks on this issue, it doesn't really resonate because people have the memory of 1953 and the long period of depression in supporting the united states. this is an important cultural difference between that of

iranians on u.s. is. often encompasses they say the united states as for the democratization process of eastern europe, why can't it do the same in iran? the fact is, in eastern europe, the united states has a good image because of the historical experience. in iran, the u.s. has a bad image. the u.s. is the soviet union of iran having basically been implicit. they are actually displays because they distort they have a tendency to think it might've

been a nasty guy, but a new president like obama has a clean slate and it's going to completely change policy. people outside the united states that they weren't historical notion that the president and they don't see each breaks and huge policy. i think in many cases, foreigners are much more in reality than the u.s. presumption than the previous ones can drastically change policy. so what we've seen in five june of 2009 presidents and secretary of state has been eager to jump

on the bandwagon almost every time there's a demonstration, they are out there and gave her of supporting the demonstrators, which is somewhat insane when you compare it to what is happening in tunisia and asia for a long period of everyday demonstrations and they were dragging their feet about supporting them. but in iran, they quickly jumped on it. this is obviously taken for what it is in iran, but this is an issue that's been exploited by the imperial power to undermine the regime. it fits into what nader was talking about the imperialist rhetoric of the regime that reinforces the notion that the reform movement is actually being used by the united states. and the united states can actually shut up and don't talk about it. human rights is actually a very

important issue, too important to have united states government involved. human rights issues in iran should be dealt with by you and the humans rights organizations and also countries that have a better record, especially countries in europe, scandinavia , have a much better basically track record on the issue of human rights and when they actually intervene in iran, they have been taken much more seriously. and iranians who cut families in jail nowadays actually find it more advisable to go to sweden or denmark and get those governments to intercede rather than to come to washington because they know washington is not what it's been. so i would argue that the best

administration is actually to not get involved in issues in the reform movement is talking about encouraging for cell phones or twitter or whatever. these can be used by the governments to undermine reform. the second issue about sanctions . he came with great hopes of change. he had actually before him because the white house had actually talked about support of the bush administration. he had implicitly accept it the iran rate to enrich uranium.

he had spoken respectfully to the iranian government and the ukrainian people. he had gone -- he had not that iran should stop enrichment before negotiations. these were all seen as major changes from the previous administration. these demands of the bush administration stalin a type negotiations. not the policy of engagement from the very beginning had a great deal of opposition in the state department and in israel. both israel and the state department, iran was not to have any enrichment because any enrichment was too dangerous for provide existential threat to israel.

so there is a distinct difference between obama and hillary clinton on this issue. but we don't know that we won't know until documents come out from the state department white house. there was a gradual shift in obama's position. he already in the next two months, especially after 2009, subtly, but you can tell reading between the lines, the policies shifted back to what it was before obama came in during the bush administration. it continued the bush administration. how can you tell this? well, he stops saying that iran had the right to have enrichment they started talking about iran is a big hegemonic power, the old rhetoric somehow i ran out

to the aspiration to rebuild the entire, blowing up of the iranian military power. in fact, everything does not have the military than any of its neighbors, including turkey, israel, pakistan, even iraq spends more in the military than iran does. so it has to have a large militia of almost no navy and no air force to speak of, yet the propaganda encouraged by the administration is somehow i ran as a major military threat. another subtle indication of change is the one major person in the administration who is interested in engagement after a few months on personal reasons to retire. and you don't have to be a criminologist to know that when

personnel changes like that occur, they are indicating a policy change. the obama administration now claims that it's following to a policy, that it is on one hand pressuring during the sanctions, drastic sanctions did the u.n., but at the same time his offspring and knowledge ranch incentive for negotiation. in fact, i think one looks not by what she says, but what is revealed and what is the negotiations is that the only author is the sanctions and pressure. there is no offer of negotiations. the these changed back to the

bush administration, that iran has to stop enrichment, give up its nuclear program and basically submit to u.s. dictate on us, something neither the reform conservatives in iran are going to accept. so it's basically forcing iran to submit. and if you can't ask administration people what if they don't, iran doesn't submit. they really have no answer. the headline, implicit answer is they would have economic pressures until the regime collapses. and of course with oil at $100 a barrel, it's unlikely the regime is going to collapse because of economic pressures. the fact that there is no serious attempt to engagement can also be seen in the

wikileaks. it is often said well, these leaks don't reveal anything new. i'm iran, debris field agreed amount. they reveal that when the turkish and brazilian government put together a package with albert dey to go to iran to get a compromise where iran would continue enrichment, but they wouldn't be allowed to enrich the point they could actually build nuclear weapons, this would have been something that i think the old obama would've accepted when the turks and brazilians put this together, the u.s. told them to mind their own business, that they had no business dealing with this iranian issue.

they were not interested in that negotiations. this was of course very reminiscent of what happened in 2003 when it got time the swiss ambassador came to washington with a grand bargain from iran to settle the issue is and he the same response. he was told to mind his own business, that this is not something the bush administration was really interested in. i think what has happened is the policy or is the bush administration wants to settle down and the obama administration continued to push policy of putting as much pressure on iran because they want to disband the whole nuclear program, not refine it, not limited. it is much more drastic than

not. other things you can see them in wikileaks that are very revealing his negotiations between high u.s. officials and most fat. in these documents, with most fat tells the u.s. is under no condition is iran going to have a nuclear program. he also tells the united states it will result to assassination sabotage the most insidious of all, using quote minorities intentions and minorities to bring about regime change is his exact quote. these minorities and contentions among minorities to bring about regime change. and they constantly harp on this notion that iran has formed a different ethnic groups and that

you can inflame the groups and bring down the regime through basically rivalries. and of course the old imperial policy in a group. so in recent months we have seen such assassination of iranian nuclear scientist, the sabotage of the nuclear plants, bombings, shootings and baluchistan and kurdistan. one doesn't have to be paranoid to think those incidents are all linked to this policy of israelis with how to deal with iran. so with these two foreign policies, what does it do? if the u.s. government is seen as actually supporting the

reform movement, the reform movement is seen as a fifth column working through the ethnic divisions of savage shares in order to pursue israeli u.s. goals. so the vast thing reform movement wants to be associated with was the united states, even with the united states claims contractor supporting the reform movement. some expect the community feel if there is a proper shot between iran and the united state, if there is a nuclear agreement, the regime, they survive another 30 years. there's always this notion somehow the united states coming and am actually making it a

grand bargain will stabilize regime for the foreseeable future. this is actually unwarranted. if you look at what is happening throughout the region, the country's that are most able are actually the ones that are most friendly with the united state. french with the united states or seems to destabilize them. in the past, mubarak, yemen, iran. what countries could you find more in cahoots with the united states, but of course they are the ones who laugh time. we often think of dolphy as anti-american, anti-imperialist. but in fact, since 2003, he made his peace with the united states.

he went even overboard in many ways. gadhafi be one of the first countries to nationalized its oil industry. he was actually one of the worst of the national eyesight in the last few years. he had the oil industry to foreign companies. he also infect came out from the cold. ..

>> first of all i would like to thank denney for including me in this wonderful panel. i only have a tiny article in this wonderful collection you have put together so i am grateful. but nonetheless, i am happy to be included even though it is a little embarrassing because i do think that women's issues need to be discussed so i will take the opportunity here to talk mainly about women's issues and

questions pertaining to women's rights in iran. the rights of the revolutionary movement across the arab world have obviously galvanized iran's civil rights movement. for a while we thought the world had forgotten about iran and sometimes when you read al jazeera that still seems to be the case. but we are trying hard to remember and certainly in iran, the youth have tried to learn and they've been inspired by their arab counterparts. so we know most of you know the civil rights movement began in the aftermath of the electoral crisis in june, 2009. almost two years ago. now, so this has been made mainly of nonviolent uprising and the principal feature has been the nonviolence which has been maintained mostly by women.

we saw this clearly in egypt. i think all of you must have seen that picture of the egyptian elderly woman kissing the bride get with police. we didn't see pictures of that like iran and fact. as of them on violent aspect of these movements have been maintained by women in iran as well. last week al jazeera interviewed the great iconic feminist from egypt medical reformer and al jazeera which obviously doesn't have a sort of feminist agenda like any other major news organization chose to call her the mother of the revolution, and this made me very happy for my egyptian and arab sisters and brothers but at the same time a

little weary and sad because i remember last year -- well, in 2009 when ayatollah died. immediately many went in the green movement even our nobel laureate called the spiritual father of the green movement. now this was a little scary for me because i had had the privilege of meeting with the ayatollah myself in his residence and i sat with him. often when i see the pictures of young people in his office i remember myself there, too, and i asked him very clearly, you know, what he thought about women's rights and he said when it comes to the letter of the koran we cannot change the laws and because the world thinks something about women's rights as it pertains to the lesser of the dambisa koran we are not goo change it so this for me was

alarming that right at the height of the green movement, when the ayatollah died, even our nobel laureate called him the spiritual father of the movement. whereas in egypt despite the fact that egyptian women suffered from public sexual harassment, something we don't quite have in iran, not at least that openly. we have women's participation in the public and a far larger scale but egypt egyptians managed to have a lot more women out in the streets and also the head of the mother of the revolution and we don't. so this makes me a little worried from the iranian things. i will quote the ayatollah for you in an interview i did with him in 2003. he clearly and very boldly told me that women's rights must remain under the brand of

islamic law. you see, i'm quoting here, if people around the world want to say certain things about women, for example, being equal to men in matters of inheritance or little testimony because these issues pertain to the very lesser of the koran, we cannot accept them. of course in here on we cannot accept those that are against our religion. on certain occasions when the laws contradict the very clear text of the koran, we cannot cooperate. men in general they are proactively more accurate in both intellectual activities and practical activities. those aspects of islamic law that are based on the very letter of the koran the answer is no. you can read my interview with an online. so this is obviously worrying that if the father of our green movement is the ayatollah,

despite the fact that he was a courageous cleric, he sacrificed greatly for his belief and exposed some of the most horrific human rights abuses in iran, his idea of human rights were sort of public manly to do with political activism, legal things and not really women's issues, so this makes me a little weary of both the islamists and also the masculine aspect of the green movement. so women in iran despite like most women in the region have had a very long history of political and social participation going back to the middle of the 19th century with a persona in the movement to the tobacco revolt which women have maintained constitutional

revolution will literary movement, leftist movement, the ousting of the shawl and even in the islamic republic despite the blatant gender discrimination as the women have managed to be part of the social and public and political life and contribute to it and initially in the pre-election campaign and the post election uprising, women were in great numbers but we saw those numbers decreasing. this is the opposite in egypt. so these are some of the things that worry me. so we need to look at the region and learned that sometimes we get a little ahead of ourselves. that well, we had a peace laureate and this history that predates, for example, i don't know, the women's rights and things like that, well not so fast, there are tons of things

we still need to learn from the region. the other thing which is promising i think is the fact that the demography in iran is similar to egypt and tunisia and elsewhere, very young. 80% of the population is under the age of 40, and just that in itself means the green movement as a movement has a revolutionary movement hopefully will succeed. how much women will gain from this we don't know because these women in particular are very we read that some of the reforms that were made under president ali for whatever reason they were made they are not going to be like the irony in case where the revolution happened and khomeini free breast on some of the positive aspects of the constitution and the law pertaining to the women

especially egyptian women to our looking out there are many mubaraks out there and they have to make sure that all of the sacrifices are not given to go to waste. so i don't think this is a domino effect. i think it is a revolutionary fire that has caught on. i don't want to say iran began first, i don't think that is quite the case. there are many revolutions that predate the green movement of course all over us it is a very special and moment for us, many of us this is the first revolution that we remember that the antidemonstrations that we saw recently in italy were inspired by the uprisings in north africa. battalions' thinking for themselves. welcome if the egyptians can

control their dictators that are backed by billion dollar funding by the united states, why can't we? you know, get rid of this guy who which is a huge embarrassment on every front. so, that's why i don't think this is a domino effect. it's more of a global phenomenon and its wonderful to watch this. it's our what stock and we participate through online and so forth. the other thing i am a little weary of and which i think is the coupon to both with secular, feminist and any other people involved in the green movement is this sort of ultranationalism kind that i witness even among the progressive feminism. we have seen this among our

egyptian and algerian and other arab sisters and brothers who were keen to call their uprisings pan-arabism and in a way excluded so many other parts of the world. so, and i saw that during the green movement especially at the height of the green movement when the iranians felt that they were the only people in the region that could possibly see something like that. now, arabism and all of these nationalisms are gracious, no good, and especially for women because they are very masculine in their nature. so it's all hunky dory if you are on the square and get a very passionate and you are waving the flag but within that discourse the women's rights don't play a role so this is some of the things i think have both green activists with their feminists or not have to be weary of as well as our air --

eda brothers and sisters should be aware of the pan nationalisms are outdated and they don't do any justice to the spirit of the revolution's. a couple things i want to end with is many people have downplayed the revolutions in the region because the threat that islamism is informed i don't need to repeat the fact i think one of the best things perhaps of the islamic republic has been a good morning to the rest of the region and other parts of the world that doesn't work and the islamist ideology is pretty terrific. i'm not worried islam and so forth been the we seek commentators bringing that up and what about the women's

rights? there's going to be digressions on women's rights i hope not, but will be by the nationalists not islamists. as a whole nationalist thing i would be very wary of and also the masculine aspect of these movements especially the green movement. if you watch bbc persian it's not a platform for the movement but it does discuss these events. rarely do they have a single female commentator, never mind activists or so where the presenters are attractive ladies and so there's things like that and also the changing of the language. i still hear them using language like these sorts of things.

it is time to change the vocabulary and make it more inclusive, so now i have colleagues here who are far more learned than i am to translate something like this, courage basically what in the context of being a young and able man. so these sorts of words are used even by women so it is time to shed these alterman nationalistic terms, these masculine terms in the language and for the leaders of the women's rights movements in iran in a bold cents to align themselves with the leaders of the green movement because right now we are not really seen that. we are seeing student movement is far more involved with the women's movement is still on the site is that even though the body number wise we have had lots of women participating in

these protests and so forth. so these are some of the things i've thought about and i hope they are useful and i will be happy to answer any questions that you may have. thank you. [applause] >> thank you to all of the panelists. i want to mention as well i'm sorry i forgot to do this the book is available for sale outside of this auditorium thanks to the book culture and no phill house, the publisher, for arranging this. the book is available for sell and i know that the editors and contributors assembled here this evening would be happy to sign copies for you. let's take some questions. questions.

mademoiselle, so nice to see you, lala. >> nice to see you. thank you. that was very good. i have one question the professor mentioned that the united states shouldn't make comments about iran and especially about the green movement because that would be not helpful. i agree with with that this is my daily dilemma? what should we do? every day there's a lot of killing of human rights in iran, torture in the industry everywhere but at the same time we don't want to be the voice of the united states, so what should we do? support the movement, but at the same time not make it difficult for those who are in iran.

>> well, i think one can support the movement either directed by supporting the movement or the human rights organizations. somehow there is the notion that the u.s. government is so powerful that if we can get the u.s. government to do something about will be productive. my argument is that is unproductive that if human rights organizations and other foreign countries i mean we haven't any influence through scandinavia the countries like that have much more credibility on this issue in the united states. >> i would just want to add to that and perhaps nader would like to chime in on this as well because we talk to the lala this question comes up.

she is asked this question a lot and draws a sharp distinction between the kinds of support for the space movement in iran. she says we in the space movement of iran do not seek the support of the foreign government or the cia or neoconservative think tanks. however, we do seek the support of the global civil society, human rights organizations, trade unions, women's rights organizations, people of conscience, writers, intellectuals, artists and i think that is an important distinction. you can see the irony in trade union such as they are because we know it is illegal to have an independent labor union in iran but there are labour associations and trade unions in iran who are beleaguered many of the leaders behind bars languishing.

he just celebrated another birthday, the leader of the bus drivers' union, celebrated a birthday behind bars and a tremendous medical unrest. but the reach of actively to the trade unions in many other countries. there's a very active solidarity movement in that respect. so i think that's an important distinction. i would also like to make a plug for an organization of a global organization based here in new york city called the campaign for peace and democracy, which has some i think an outstanding job of taking a principled and nuanced position against what the philosopher and other contributors were to this book has called the double black male. in other words the campaign for peace and democracy has taken a very forceful position against

both u.s. imperialism and militarism on the one hand and a theocracy and repression on the other and we happen to have joe, the co-founder of the campaign for peace and democracy here this evening. i don't know if he wanted to say any words, but quite a momentous day in the campaign for peace and democracy is work on iran and they were privileged to be part of the delegation that joann fled to both the u.s. and exactly in the spirit of this against the double and blackmail and consistency of principle we went to both the u.s. and the irony in missions of the united nations today to deliver the statements in both cases actually engaged in dialogue with representatives of both offices. if you want to talk to joe and i would encourage people to go to the web site of the campaign for

peace and democracy and sign their petitions not only on iran but on many issues. egypt, libya, palestine, nuclear disarmament, many issues and also to talk to joe wan before you leave tonight, because that is a really fantastic organization. when she talks about the global society i think the campaign for the peace and democracy is a shining example of that. joanne, did you want to say something and should we let her have the microphone so that everyone can hear her. there you go. >> thank you. we did have 12 peace and human rights activists vote today to the missions for code pink.

many of you may know who were some of the other people? i had only three hours of sleepless night. >> we had [inaudible] is an immigration rights lawyer in new york and very active and kathy kelly of the voices for creative non-violence. >> was the really important confrontation with this very funny u.s. by who kept saying he had unitary and parents and he thought so much of what we said was right and how much he agreed with us so we kept thinking him for his solidarity but pointed out the terrible things the u.s. government is doing threatening the war against iran and the sanctions and so forth. anyway, i think that this is really when we organize these i have some copies here and the war threats sanctions program

against iran to support the struggle for democracy and find iran. when we do this kind of thing we are aiming at a lot of different audiences at the same time, so first of all i want to change our government policy from the kind of work like imperial policy that has. we want to change the irony in government policy of the repression and third, we want to change our own peace movement, bring out the natural sympathy that people in the movement have for the counter parts around the world but who feel afraid that if they speak up there somehow helping the u.s. government. that's not what is going on. we are really helping the peace movement and helping our iranian counterpart by spinning an independent way and that is a mission. i've been there since i was 12-years-old, and it is my movement but i've always felt this is something we have to

work on. >> does anyone want to contribute before we move to the next question? there was a hand up here. for. >> thanks to the panel for the presentation. this is for the professor based on your work in the previous social movement, what keeps me thinking about the difference between what is happening today and the iranian revolution in 79 and then before that the constitution revolution and the tobacco revolt, the leader of this movement, are they kind of risen up to a certain level of leadership of the movement, but they never got to the point that

the general population would consider the leaders of the movement. are there parallels of this type of social movement forming around not a clear-cut leadership and in either case if yes or no do you think that would have an effect in the success of the movement? do you think the population would have to wait until the leader actually comes out who can be recognized for the movement to be able to move together? >> [inaudible] a special situation where you get charismatic appearing you already need a breakdown of order and so on, and it's usually a good sign if there is

none. we've had enough in the 20th century. one good thing about it is egypt was there wasn't and here of course the press was saying how can you have a movement without a leader who should we go and talk to? and it's a movement that is stronger when it's like that and i think the green movement has that advantage so if something happens it's not the end of the movement. you get the charismatic leader that comes up looking good in history but that's because he's overthrown. it usually charismatic leaders end up ruining a lot of things. >> i agree you would be an excellent person to answer -- >> i don't want to bore the body is looking at parallel between

the 1906 revolution but i've been thinking about the question of leadership and the benefits and the negatives of it and if iran does get to the point it's a space transition because it does have a as you said equals leadership structure it will find itself in the better position than egypt and tunisia where there is a sense for siplin egypt because the opposition is united and there is no clear leadership they can't challenge the military council. but if iran gets to the point where the regime collapses or there's a transition is pretty clear they would be interim leaders who would have massive popular support who would lead a movement of the transition would be the rewriting of the constitution and elections and a movement towards full democracy and so in that sense iran's fact that there is a leadership does help the struggle for democracy and it that says the struggle

when you get to the post transition period. but if you talk to mussolini it's interesting they are humble about it and that is good and bad because it is good in the sense that they are showing humility and it is an acknowledgement of the charismatic leadership to consolidate power as 1979. but it's also bad in the sense that because there is no clear leadership structure a lot of the demonstrations and protests don't have the coordination you would like to have in order to challenge the regime. there was a piece written by recently in the "time" magazine about the question of labour and the green movement and why hasn't it sort of worked with the labor groups to promote strikes and that is a signal of the weakness of the green movement but i think the problem is a structural one because the green movement is an amorphous structure. there is a set of leadership but they are not coordinating these demonstrations.

it's grassroots activists organizing the timing and the place of eight. so broadly thinking of the leadership issue it has its benefits and its negatives. i would hope the leadership structure would solidify itself and one of the recent developments is there has been this in the last, you know, few weeks of this emergence of this court meeting council of the green movement which is really a broad and is starting to organize and coordinate itself so they just announced two days ago that on the last three tuesdays of the calendar year they are going to have strikes and demonstrations of protests and i think that's important because, you know, if you want to move forward you have to have someone laying out a vision and engaging in the mobilization and that's how you exert your pressure in relationship to the regime that dominates the politics with the military might. so, those are my thoughts on the question of the leadership.

>> did you want to add anything to that? >> i had a conversation with a colleague of mine at rutgers who comes from poland, and she was emphasizing the fact that it's the labor unions and the trade unions that were at the very heart of salvaging these eastern european revolutions in the late 1980's and in poland in particular and what i wanted to ask you this when it comes to the third world muslim world people ask who is the leader whereas when we talk about the anti-war movement in the united states nobody asks who is the leader of the movement, it's a spontaneous movement and the feed off of each other and the just spread. do you think there's a sort of racist oriental list element in the question of who is the

leader? >> i don't think it is a racist ? think the difference is in the united states with respect to the anti-war movement the anti-war movement is manifesting itself in a space society so there are multiple leaders and freedom of movement for exchange and discussion. in the case of iran i think it is partly due to the historical tradition. they're always have been some for the charismatic leader that manifests itself at a particular moment in time and most of that ayatollah khomeini. so there's the question that, you know, is racist or oriental. >> i would add that i think that tunisia and egypt are instructive in the sense and this is one of the of the parallels in the movement what some people would call

horizontal. the term that comes up in the experience and social movement, sociologist sar starting to study these phenomena more and more internationally. in tunisia and egypt for a sample mark had a piece on the are doing the world will be couple of weeks ago talking about how a lot of the western media commentary, and this is where he actually accuses the western media of the sort of fetish about this notion that the uprising came out of nowhere that this was totally spontaneous. he is actually just because a movement doesn't have identifiable leaders or a leader it doesn't mean that there aren't organizers. there's a lot of organizing that went into the egyptian uprising. it didn't just happen all of a sudden. a lot of weeks and months and years you can look to the labor movement for a fleeced the strong elements of it for years and the same thing in yerevan. i would like to quote that leads

to bad garrey couldn't be with us tonight, he's another contributor to the book who is on the faculty. columbia. he actually -- there are so many metaphors and images of what is the green movement. is it a network or what kind of structure is it? he uses the image of the ganglion. he says rather than the hierarchy flowing down from one or more individuals of the top, or even the classic steel structure of the clandestine organization the other iranian opposition must resemble the dingley in thank the bundle of nerve cells where each part of the system is constantly and instantly in touch with all other parts. that was an and dhaka its image. we will take one more question. i feel there was something -- yes. please. >> is reform possible within the system? it seems like there's so many elements working against it, the

revolutionary guard, the guardian council. it seems like you have to these of these elements before the reform can happen. and if you do that it seems like it is open revolt. so what would you recommend for the reform to take place within the system? >> it's a good question. the question is how do you dissolve those institutions of control. one way would be to just go for the sort of tunisian and each option model where there is a call for comprehensive regime change from the beginning. those are the demand of the protesters. i can't to do that in iran and this is the calculus of the movement leadership would result in the section of pyrenean society withering away and not supporting the movement because i think the green movement also has layers of support. the strategy the green movement of reform as opposed to the open revolution is in many ways, you

know, one open to debate whether that is the best strategy. i would come back on the question of look that is a decision for people within iran to make. i have my own personal preference is i can sort of issue some sort of direct, but those people who are on the front line have to make that decision. the decision that they have made is that they want a policy of reform and a gradual sort of transformation, not radical. >> the most recent slogans from february 14th and february 28, the two most recent manifestations of the green movement in the streets, one of the most prominent slogans in the demonstration was down with khomeini coming down with the dictator. that isn't reformist. bringing him down is and reforming. >> it's the leadership of the green movement. the tension between with the leadership is advocating is the strategy and what i think element on the street particularly the want more radical reform of the leadership position and strategy is one of

still working within the framework of the islamic republic and constitution with all of its walls and problems and trying to highlight the inconsistencies and hypocrisy of the regime who claims this is the founding document that they are governing but only implementing certain segments of it and so calling for implementing those elements of the constitution to deal with the rights of the people that deal with the question of the right to protest article 27 to be with the right of having three political parties and for political activities and trying to highlight of the hypocrisy of the regime and pointing out that's the strategy the regime is using. whether that will bring down the doherty in council or the revolutionary guard in the near future it is an open question. that's the strategy that they've determined to be the best to push this movement forward. and it's up to iran to decide

whether it is a useful strategy or not. >> there seems to be a problem between the leadership of the grain movement and with the people are saying on the streets with the guardian council yet you are not they're calling the downfall. part of the constitution incorporates the institution of the supreme leader, so the downfall means it would have a shift in strategy calling for the regime change. it has to happen at some point given the repression of the regime, given the sense that i think eventually it's going to be the critical mass this could develop where people are going to be frustrated.

it was an accidental hero. he anticipated this position that caught up by the events that transpired after the 2009 elections and ideologically they were part of the system, that radical break that we would like to see them about as a way of pushing for democracy is i think an unrealistic expectation because they are still very much -- they still pay lip service right to the ideas and ideology of ayatollah khomeini highlighting his democratic system men's and ignoring the others so i tend to come on the fact there are people in iran who still buy into, the reformists but moderate reformists, they still feel they are elements of the islamic republic as i try to say in my remarks that are worthy of salvaging particularly this idea that all of the feelings of the iranian revolution and ideals of

1979 the revolution did at least manifest one element of the call for the revolution of 79 and up the call for the independence reform control that gives -- that sort of gives the system some sense of credibility in the eyes of some people, and i don't think that my own reading is that there's not a critical mass of people willing to call for and mubarak style of regime change at this moment with in iran. the young people, yes, increasingly as we move forward, yes, but not on february 25, 2011. so that has to be taken into consideration in the planning strategy. >> professor? >> this question is that the reform or revolution regime change or education. i wonder when the political

context because it automatically says it is one of the author and who benefits this one or the other it's actually the regime because if you're trying to get the mass movement bringing and especially the bizarre a lot of working-class people not involved in the reform movement. if you have all true radical slogans it's more likely to put them off rather than all the men. it's more radicalized. actually the regime likes those slogans because i would point out to a lot of people here is the alternative. they want to overthrow the regime they don't want to open up or reformat and works into the thing. and i'm a bit suspicious of some of these slogans. this is where external influences come in.

if the voice of america and other things are having these types of slogans it can reasonably creep up rather than if something is genuine. the slogans that were used last year to get much more appeal than down with the dictator. we debate on the dictator but there are plenty of people in iran who still feel dictator is regarded representative so why use that support by doing that? why not have a slogan that appeals to the people? >> i would add the ground shifted, the first few weeks after the june 122009 election the main slogan was indeed where is my vote that political one sentence that captured the world's attention and yet that peace will come up with a simple question was met with a paroxysm of violent repression with

hundreds of thousands of protestors, peaceful, nonviolent protesters jailed, tortured, raped. you have a police state in iran that has noticed that slogan has disappeared as a result also because the result of the elections are no longer on the immediate agenda of the green movement. so i think that the ground has shifted. it's true that they are very much creatures of the system of the islamic republic otherwise they wouldn't have been allowed to run for president and yet they themselves have been somewhat different radicalized of least pushed by the experience of the crackdown that in sood the immediate post electoral aftermath. i would add one last thing which is this reform versus revolution is a bit of an outdated paradigm in some ways. there are timothy garsten has the clever phrase of a

resolution which tries to speak to the sort of -- the ways that these two things kind of bleeding to one another. and one of the contributors to this book gave a presentation last year called resolution iranian style in which he tried to capture some of those nuances. let's take one more. yes. wheat, can we have the microphone? >> just going back to the leader of the movement or just the movement, wouldn't be easier for the regime to get rid of it if there were one or two people that they could lose as opposed to the movement. >> there was another hand up. let's see.

yes, this gentleman and then over there. yes. >> one question for professor hashemi i would like to know how did you get to the 15 to 20% in support of the regime and for the professor abrahamian, between the two revolutions you had the analysis of the impact and the social roots of the political positions that were involved in the social political movements before the 1979 revolution. do you think we have to lines of debate around the social class's that are of the green movement r.e.m. this claim that most of the people involved in the green

movement are found as middle class and upper middle class, and i would like to know how we were taking that and second, a lot of people say that even if that is true, even if that is the case, still, that is the part those people are the engine of the society or that probably will be enough to make social change happen. i put like to know your take on both of these. spec that that existed in the islamic republic of iran was between 1997 and about 2,001. if the reform surged and if you look at the sort of results of those elections they sort of demonstrate consistently that the conservative sort of hard core ideological support of the regime hovered about 20%.

170 in the first time that the 2000 presidential elections the reform did quite well. but if you get those elections the was a solid basis of support the regime could draw upon and it hovered around 20%. depending what moment in time we are talking about, but just my general reading of the politics is that based on those opinions surveys of those elections there was a solid basis support the regime could always count on it would come out of the poll and it would hover around 20%. it could go higher sometimes it was high into the 30's and sometimes lower but i would put it if i had to put a rough sort of estimate around 20% figure. >> i would like to quote although he would certainly be in a better position to acquit himself. i have his exact words in front of me about this question of the composition of the green movement in his essay in this

book which i should say was originally published in the london review of books and which carries the title volume not a speck of dirt i am a retired teacher. the professor himself is not retired, he was quoting a teacher an older gentleman in the streets of tehran who was engaging purchase of pitting one of the demonstrations, the largest demonstration and as many may recall ahmadinejad had referred to the protesters after the election as garbage or specks of dirt. the sign this gentleman was carrying with him at the political expression i am not a speck of dirt i am a retired teacher and that became the title of the professor in this book. but in this essay of the professor he describes this particular demonstration that

took place on june 15th, 3 days after the election to be held it was held at the square of freedom square in tehran. the conservative mayor of tehran put the number at 3 million. they were held in the same square during the 1979 revolution. the racket way to prevent clashes. the rally from here is the key point, the rally drew all kind of protestors. old and young, professionals and workers and students, women wearing sunglasses and head scarves as well as those in full length clothing. lines of protesters 5 miles long converged on the square. as well as from the working-class southern once. and just one more on that one more quote on that point and

another wonderful essay in the book someone nader mentioned called the green bracelet. she says the following. a simple glance of that crowd of iran's prominent student leaders tells you that by and large they are not the children of the citizens of north tehran. but instead they come from provincial working-class families or they are the children of the rule schoolteachers and clerks. the western media cliche of the opposition limited to the urban upper-class the law is the current reality. the future leaders of iran commonly hail from the heartland of ahmadinejad recorded support base. prehire said the composition of the green movement and interestingly enough and egypt and tunisia as well the multifaceted. you have every social class

represented and you also have very importantly in iran the strong support of trade unionists, not the entire working class to be sure but those organized labor's in iran who see their interests interlocked with organized labor >> i think the big demonstration is the sort of moment of enthusiasm where you get the overwhelming support and that's very cross class. but once things settle down and when you are looking at the core where is the real compensation, then i think the press interpretation, the question mentioned is more important than the cross-cultural. and it's interesting that we are using the term class because the

last 50 years american social scientists said there is no such thing. but now i seem that is pointing away. here i would agree the core of the vanguard of the movement is universally educated on the middle class and upper middle class. and that is the construct. during the election i think you got a lot of support from the poorer sections of town. you could see this with journalists who were there. they reported that even in the southern parts you would expect you just didn't get it. it was much more passive. the enthusiasm was in the north but down in the south you didn't actually get much support. since 2009, what we do see is of

course the consistency of the middle class educated demonstrators and so on. of course you get some people from the south. but what is actually the limitation is there hasn't flowed into the bazaar. it is my sympathize but they don't seem to go on strike or joint. the demonstrations where people went to the bazaar to gather support. they stood there and watched, they were not unsympathetic but they were not joint which is different from 79. and in the working-class you also find be organized people, the bus drivers are obviously very antiahmadinejad, but you

haven't had major strikes on it isn't like 79 where you get antagonism against the regime willing to go on strike. it's still very much the core. that doesn't mean with the regime plays. the regime has the support of everyone else. it's much more you can say at apathy but not enthusiastic support for the regime. so the core of the regime is about 20%, and this you can go back to the first election. i would call that sort of the evangelical support. they support the regime because

they believe in the return of the demand it's been basically the picture. it's not just a secondary thing he uses. that's how he gets his support. that's why so much time is spent on the return. we may joke about it but i think 20% of the public basically byes into that. and before we get too oriental it is the power of the united states. [laughter] >> the party is not very different. what is the core support of the republican conservatives since the 25% evangelical support? so as long as you talk about, you know, return of jesus and salam were going to get that report if you deny the assistance of god you've got that in your pocket so it is the same thing with the regime in iran.

and to that of course the state because it has money has the clientele system so they could get enough requests from people who wanted the fringe benefits not a bicycle for something and the society you couldn't find willing to break for some extra pay. so the class analysis explains how to look at the state's. >> esen? get the microphone over to that end. >> i was sorry. >> the microphone doesn't seem to be on actually. but perhaps --

>> [inaudible] it seems like the last several days and months to moderate the position by trying to take them on confrontational approaches dealing with the nuclear program in order to prevent sort of i flock of support for the regime by using and not having the hi targeting program with predator drones like they do in afghanistan and pakistan. since the u.s. government and the foreign policy is in a bind, how do you think that that's going to affect the green movement? because if they were to directly allow israel or something to use the military force, wouldn't you see russia's support from the regime for having some kind of, you know, outright attack and that undermined movement of solidity somewhat? >> i will start.

even before obama, the bush a second bush at a demonstration ruled out military attacks and that is in on the table. if it was, it would actually strengthen the regime and the one reason i think they don't want that is it what. but i don't see any moderation or shift in the obama administration in the last few weeks as long as they are refusing to follow the tract from the turkish and the brazilian track and that was an opening, there was a clear opening the could have taken if they were interested in negotiations. they closed that shot, and they basically are insisting that iran should come to the bargaining table accepting the enrichment which is in no starter. so unless there is a change in that, i don't see any breakthrough in the negotiations

so the result is where do you go from there? the administration doesn't have a policy beyond that. >> would you like to add 30 seconds to that? >> the attack on iran is finished. the regime will declare the state of emergency and execute thousands and then it is over with. with respect to the obama administration, i haven't seen any qualitative change in policy. it's fluctuated, you know, over the last two years but nothing qualitatively different in the last two or three months you are pointing to so i think we are misreading. >> i'm afraid we've been here for two hours and that is going to wrap up the formal program for this evening. there will be more time afterwards have ever to chat with the panelists and have copies of the book signed to purchase them. i want to thank everyone