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it's washington your way, the c-span networks. now available in more than 100 million homes. created by cable, provided as a public service. fbi director robert mueller appeared recently for what's likely to be his last oversight hearing before the senate judiciary committee. he took his position on december 4 -- september 4, 2001. senators asked him about issues that stemmed from the september 11th attacks almost ten years later including policies of reading terror suspects their miranda rights and the reauthorization of the u.s. repatriation act. this is about two hours.

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>> today the judiciary committee will hear from director robert mueller. this fall the director will complete his ten-year term overseeing the fbi. he and i were talking out back earlier, and i don't know when i've seen ten years go by so quickly, and i'm sure the director feels the same way. he took over just days before the attacks of september 11th, and i told him a reference in elizabethan english, but it did seem it was almost as though they were trying to give the

director his whole ten-year term in about the first ten days. with all that went on. he's overseen a major transformation of the bureau. the fbi continues to perform all the functions of a federal law enforcement agency, it's greatly increased its role in insuring our national security. there have been growing pains and false starts, but director mueller has managed this transformation of a large and well-established agency with great professionalism and focus and will leave at the end of his tenure a better bureau than he had when he came in. the director has aggressively pursued both law enforcement and national security objectives while maintaining a strong commitment to the values and freedoms we hold dear as americans -- we hold most dear as americans. in commemorating the 100th

anniversary of the fbi several years ago, and i remember sitting there, he said, it's not enough to stop the terrorists, we must stop them while maintaining his civil liberties. it's not enough to catch a criminal, we must catch him while respecting his civil rights. it's not enough to prevent foreign countries from stealing our secrets, we must prevent that from happening while still upholding the rule of law. the rule of law, civil liberties and civil rights, these are not our burdens, they are what make us better. they made us better for the past 100 years. i was in that audience when he said that. i think it's fair to say the audience went across the political spectrum, and his statement was greeted with long and sustained applause. i've tried to advance these same objectives with carefully-calibrated criminal justice legislation like the jus disfor all act -- justice for all act, the u.s. patriot act

reauthorization proposal that recently passed through this committee. but i'm gratified the director shares that commitment, working to keep all americans safe while preserving the values of all americans. and i appreciate the fbi has shown signs recently of real progress on issues by the committee and the country, national security and counterterrorism are central to the fbi's mission. it's been heartening to see this steady seem of important arrests of those who do this country harm. earlier this month the fbi arrested a man for planning to bomb a march in honor of martin luther king day in washington. he reportedly advised some white supremacist groups. the plot he's accused of

planning came dangerously close to succeeding. had it succeeded with the bomb that he had, the results could have been devastating to a large crowd of people, and i commend the fbi for making this arrest. no one ethnic group has a monopoly on terror. now, this last congress we made great strides towards prevention and enforcement. i worked hard with senator grassley and others to craft and pass the fraud enforcement and recovery act, the most expansive legislation in more than a decade. it adds resources, statutory tools for effective prevention, detection, enforcement of mortgage fraud and financial fraud. we worked hard to insure that both the health care reform legislation and wall street reform legislation passed last year had important new tools for cracking down on fraud. senator grassley and i are hard at work now on new legislation

to provide greater support for aggressive enforcement of our fraud laws. and i'm pleased to see the fbi's been taking advantage of this heightened support for fraud enforcement. we've greatly increased the number of agents investigating fraud. they've led to more fraud arrests, but also, the taxpayers should be happy about this, they've led to greater fraud recoveries. and i'm glad that the fbi's maintained its historic focus on combating corruption. so i'd hope that they would continue. to track down the kinds of fraud that contributed so greatly to our current financial crisis and corruption which undermines america's faith in a democracy. in the last year i've been heartened to see the fbi's statistics continue to show reductions in violent crime despite the painful recession, and i commend the fbi for their work in combating crime.

i hope congress will continue to provide the urgently-needed assistance to state can and local law enforcement which is vital to keep crime down throughout the country. of course, areas of major concern include the fbi's continuing struggles with modernizing technology and information-sharing system. we will have vigorous oversight. and i know that today's hearing will shed light on these areas. but i thank the director for returning to the committee, for his responsiveness to his oversight efforts, but especially to his personal example and empressive leadership. impressive leadership over the past decade. returning the fbi to its best tradition. be you get to know the director and his family, you can see he carries the same values to work, and i commend him for that. i often say i commend him for the times when all things happening, he's called me at home or on the road or in

vermont and actually traveled to vermont with me to talk about it, and that meant, meant a great deal and means a great deal. and, of course, i thank the hard working men and women of the fbi. in our personal conversations we were earlier, the director and i were talking about how fortunate we we are to have the kind of men and women who put their lives on hold to uphold what's needed in this our country. in if our country. senator grassley. >> thank you. mr. chairman, oversight of the fbi is probably one of the most important oversight hearings that you have, and so i thank youment -- i thank you. i would take a moment to publicly thank you you, director mueller, for your service to america. and i do that just in case this might be the last time as director of the fbi you're before this committee. but i'll bet you after you're in

private life you'll be asked to testify on various things before congress in that capacity. because of your experience. while we have had our share of disagreements, director mueller, i've always appreciated your candor and your willingness to work with us to get answers even if we don't always agree with what those answers are. for instance, i know there's a lot of agreement between you and me on the need to extend the patriot act provisions that are set to expire in may. the three expiring provisions of the patriot act are very important tools used by law enforcement and the intelligence community to protect us from threats to our national security. they're vital to our ability to investigate, identify and track and deter terror is. terrorists. it was recently revealed that the fbi successfully utilized a

section 215 order as part of the investigation that prevented a terrorist attack planned by a saudi national in texas. in that case it was revealed that the individual in question purchased bomb-making materials such as three gallons of sulfuric acid, clocks, chemistry sets and a gas mask from online retailers, amazon.com and ebay. this case is the latest of many examples of successes of the patriot act provisions and your successful use of that. given the numerous threats we face and the fact that the three expiring provisions have not been found to have been abused, the senate should work to reauthorize the expiring authority without amendment. aside from the critical national security authority we immediate to reauthorize -- we need to reauthorize, i i want today eventually ask director mueller

about a report that was recently issued by the homeland security and government affairs committee released in february entitled, quote, a ticking bomb, unquote, that examine the tragic shootings at fort hood that occurred november, 2009. that report highlighted a number of problems at both the department of defense and fbi and found, quote, systematic failures in the handology of the -- handling of the hassan case including that an analyst on a joint terrorism task force was not provided full access to a key fbi database simply because he was from a non-fbi agency. i want to hear from the director or whether he agreed with some of these key findings, what is being done to correct any deficiencies in the way terrorism cases are reviewed and whether information-sharing has been improved. i will also ask the director some questions about fbi

employee personnel matters. i have long been concerned about the plight of whistleblowers within the fbi. director mueller has made it a priority and instructs all employees that retaliation against whistleblowers will not be tolerated. but, unfortunately, that directive has not always been followed by agents this field -- in the field, and i find one case particularly troubling. in 2007 a department of justice inspector general issued a memorandum finding that a 30-year nonagent employee of the fbi, robert culbis, was with retaliated against for protective whistle blowing. the inspector general found that, quote, the fbi management, new york field division improperly moved him from the position of a senior administrative support manager to several nonsupervisory positions, end of quote. one of those positions included being demoted to osha, safety officer. the retaliation was blatant and

included moving his office to a cubicle on a vacant 24th floor of the fbi building. the inspector general ultimately concluded that the decision to move him was in retaliation for disclosing wrongdoing to a special agent in charge of the field office, in this case, an attendance fraud by fbi agents. this is exactly the type of retaliation against whistleblowers that should never occur. so i'm working on a request that i shared with chairman leahy, you may not know about it, but i have given it to your staff. hoping that we can work together on this issue. but i would also request that the government accountability office conduct a top-to-bottom review of the department of justice's process for dealing with fbi whistleblowers. delays like the one in the colbis case send a clear signal to potential whistleblowers that reporting wrongdoing will only end up in an expensive

bureaucratic mess. another area of concern that i have relates to the fbi employee misconduct. in january of this year the internal fbi office of progressal responsibility -- professional responsibility documents were leaked to the trez press containing a number of shocking allegations of misconduct committed by employees of the fbi. an example, the document detailed fbi agents who were dismissed because they were arrested for drunk driving and engaged in improper relationship with fbi informants, leaked classified information to reporters, sought reimbursement for expenditures they never made, and in one i instance brought foreign nationals back into the fbi space after hours. i want to know more about these penalties, how they were determined. i think it is necessary and important to know in light of the fact that the inspector general found in the may 2009 report that there is a

perception among fbi employees that there's a double standard for discipline among higher-ranking and lower-ranking employees. director mueller, over the past eight months i've been investigating systemic problems at the philadelphia public housing authority, outlandish salaries, sexual harassment settlements and excessive legal billings just to name a few of the problems, and i'd like to express -- want to express my appreciation regarding the fbi's ongoing investigation and recent seizure of expensive luggage purchased as gifts by the philadelphia public housing authority. and i hope the fbi follows through vigorously in any criminal violations that may have occurred at the philadelphia public housing. finally, i want to ask the director about fiscal 2012 budget requests that were submitted to congress. i continue to have concerns with the fbi's agency-wide case management system known as sentinel. i want to know when this is

going to end, how much more taxpayers' money will be necessary and how the fbi plans to maintain the older case management database as part of the new system after a decade of upgrading the system. not another dime of taxpayers' money should be awarded until the fbi can prove the system will work and will be done on time. that's a lot to cover, i thank you for your patience as i cover those items. >> thank you mr. chairman. and, director mueller, please, go ahead, sir. >> thank you. and good morning, chairman leahy and ranking member grassley, and other members of the committee who are here today. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee. i will start by saying that the fbi faces today unprecedented and increasingly complex challenges. we must identify and stop terrorists before they launch attacks against our citizens. we must protect our government, businesses and critical infrastructure from espionage and from the potentially

devastating impact of cyber-based attacks. we must root out public corruption, fight white collar and organized crime, stop child predators and protect civil rights. we must also inscheuer building a -- inscheuer building a structure that will carry the fbi into the future by continuing to improve our business practices and training and develop the next generation of bureau leaders. and we must do all of this while respecting the authority given to us under the constitution, upholding civil liberties and the rule of law. the challenges of carrying out this mission have never been greater. as the fbi has never faced a more complex threat environment than it does today. over the past year the fbi has faced an extraordinary range of threats from terrorism, espionage, cyber attacks and traditional crime. a few examples. last october there were the

attempted bombings on air cargo flights bound for the united states from yemen directed by al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula. last may there was the attempted car bombing in times square aided by ttp in pakistan. these attempted attacks demonstrate how al-qaeda and its affiliates still have the intent to strike inside the united states. in addition, there were a number of serious terrorist plots by lone offenders here in the united states. their targets ranged from the martin luther king day march in spokane, washington, as mentioned by the chairman to a christmas tree lighting ceremony in portland, oregon, to subway stations in the washington, d.c. metro system. and while the motives and methods for these plots were varied, they do and were among the most difficult threats to combat. the espionage threat persisted as well. last summer there were the arrests of ten russian spies

known as illegals who secretly blended into american society in order to clandestinely gather information for russia. and we continue to make significant arrests for economic espionage as foreign interests seek to steal controlled technologies. the cyber intrusion at google highlighted the potential danger from a sophisticated internet attack. and along with countless other cyber incidents, these attacks threaten to undermine the swigty of the internet and to victimize the businesses and persons who rely on it. in our criminal investigations, we continue to uncover billion dollar corporate and mortgage frauds that weaken the financial system and victimize investors, homeowners and, ultimately, taxpayers. we also exposed health care scams involved -- involving false billings and fake treatments that endangered patients and fleeced government health care programs. the extreme violence across our

southwest border continued to impact the united states. as we saw the murders last marr of american consulate workers in juarez, mexico, and the shooting last month of two u.s. immigration and customs enforcement agents in if mexico. and throughout the year there were numerous corruption cases that undermined the public trust and countless violent gang cases that continue to take innocent lives and endanger our communities. as these examples demonstrate, the fbi's mission to protect the american people has never been broader, and the demands on the fbi have never been greater. and to carry out these responsibilities, we do need congress' continued support more than ever. let me briefly discuss two areas where congress can help the fbi with its mission. first, we want to encourage congress to retors the three fisa tools that are due to expire later this spring. the roving intercept authority is necessary for our national security mission and provides us

with tools similar to what we use in criminal cases already and have used for a number of years. the business records authority permits us to obtain key documents and data in our national security cases including in our most serious terrorism matters. and the lone wolf provision is important to combat the growing threat from loan offenders and home grown radicalization. these are authorities all of which conducted with full court review and approval are critical to our national security. second, the fbi and other government agencies are now facing a growing gap in our ability to execute court-approved intercepts of certain modern communication technologies. we call this problem of going dark. with the acceleration of new internet-based technologies, we are increasingly unable to collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation and pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking.

as well as to terrorism and espionage. let me emphasize at the outset that collecting this evidence has been approved by a court, but because the laws have not kept pace with the changes in technology, we cannot obtain -- often we cannot obtain the information responsive to the court orders from the communications carrier. and we look forward to working with this committee and congress on the legislative fixes that may be necessary to close this gap and preserve our ability to protect all americans. lastly, let me say a few words about the impact of the continuing budget resolutions on the fbi and on our work force. the support from this committee and congress has been an important part of transforming the fbi into the national security agency it is today. before our trans-- but for our transformation to be complete, we must continue to hire, train and develop our cadre of agents,

analysts and staff to meet the complex threats we face now and in the future. under the current levels this continuing resolution, the fbi will have to absorb over $200 million in cuts, and without any changes the current c.r. will leave us with over 1100 vacant positions by the end of the year. put simply, these cuts would undermine our efforts to continue to transform the bureau and undermine our efforts to carry out our mission. i appreciate the opportunity to review the fbi's work in responding to the far-reaching threats we face today before you today. i also want to thank the committee for your continued support, the support over the years that i have held this position. and not only support for me, but most particularly for your support of the men and women of the fbi who do the work of this great institution. thank you, and i'd be happy to answer any questions, mr. chairman. >> well, thank you.

thank you, director. and, again, i reiterate my, my personal feelings and appreciation for what you've done and for the openness you've shown and we've had, when i've had questions and others on the committee and all senators, i think, have found you to be very accessible. earlier this month, i mentioned this in my opening statement, about the fbi arresting kevin hopham in connection with a plot to bomb a parade in honor of martin luther king day in spokane, washingtonment of -- washington. and what i've read in the press was the bomb was very sophisticated, the plot almost succeeded. a large number of people around there, at least looking at some of the press photographs, if bomb had gone off, the results would have been horrible.

he reportedly had ties to white supremacist groups, and i mention this only because i don't want to lose sight of the fact that domestic terrorism may not be as visible as international terrorism, but also a threat to us just as timothy mcveigh in oklahoma city and others. what is the threat posed by domestic terrorism? how would you, just generally. not this particular case, but generally how do you see the threat of domestic terrorism? >> well, every -- we have not lost sight even with september 11th of the devastation that was wreaked by mcveigh in oklahoma city in 1995. and we have, certainly, before then but most particularly since then been, had domestic terrorism as almost as important an issue as the international terrorism that we have seen over the years. whether it be white supremacists, militia

extremists, sovereign citizen extremists, we continue to undertake investigations with adequate -- where we have the predication to make certain that these groups do not present a terrorist threat. i will tell you that most concerning is, yes, the groups themselves in some ways, but most concerning are the lone wolves, those persons who may have had some loose affiliation with one of these groups but have, may have been rejected by the group as being too extreme or individually found the group was not extreme enough and then on their own undertake an attack. and so that is, i would say, the possibility of a activity from a lone wolf is the thing we're most concerned about -- >> those would be the people who would be the hardest to track, i would take it. >> that is correct. it's very difficult to put into

place the capabilities of alerting us when one of those individuals looks like they want to go operational. >> unibomber, people like that. >> exactly. >> will very hard. no, i agree with you on that, and i raise this just because i would hate to have anybody lose sight of the fact in a nation of 900 million -- 300 million people and the size of our country we do face questions of domestic terrorism, and we have to not just at the fbi level, but state and local, others keep track of that too. last week the press release of an fbi memorandum providing guidance in the field of the interrogation of terror suspects arrested in the united states, you could have people playing on all sides of the debate about how to treat terrorism suspects, but as i cowgd tell the memorandum essentially reiterates current law. when i first became a prosecutor, miranda came down. you had's cobee doe, then

miranda. i remember working with a policeman in my jurisdiction how you adapt to it. you have your regular training programs for any new fbi agent how to do it. this memo reiterates the requirements of the miranda decision. it restates the narrow parameters of the public safety perception, and there's always been -- contrary to some of the plain rhetoric -- there's always been a public safety exception ask makes no -- and makes no changes, requirements of the suspect in court. the agents believe the suspect has valuable intelligence, they can continue interrogation even beyond the recognized parameters of the public safety exemption and understanding the possible exclusion in court. ..

in the sense that the quarles decision, issued by the supreme court that establishes the public safety exception was applicable to a discrete set of facts relating to a robbery and what we have to anticipate is how that public safety exception translates to the area of terrorism and our guidancers on the side of obtaining that information we need to prevent the next terrorist attack but within what we think could be the parameters of the public safety exception if and when

the supreme court has an opportunity to look at how expansive that particular exception is. >> you have to assume they will. i recall being in a long meeting with the president and and i believe attorney general holder joining the meeting part way through and we were talking about whether we would would make changes, try to make changes legislatively to miranda. i argued that you can't really do that. the dickerson case, the supreme court said that miranda is a constitutional decision and they legislative act would, could not overrule that but as a constitutional decision it has been your experience i take it that the supreme court has carved out certain areas that show practicality in there? >> for wont of a better word?

>> i have to wait and see what the supreme court does. in the meantime our principle responsibility when it comes to counterterrorism is stopping the next terrorist attack and consequently you look at each case as an opportunity to gather that intelligence and information that will stop the next terrorist attack and that is foremost on our minds but doing that within the construct given to us by the congress and the supreme court. >> this memoranda gives some flexability. >> it does. >> thank you. i mentioned your tenure began just before the september 11th attacks. wrapped up just before the 10th anniversary of that. you see a big transformation. now your successor, whoever he or she might be is going to sit down with you if they're at all wise, certainly i would recommend it, to talk about what's

happened the last 10 years and certainly views of the next 10 years. i mean you have that hand that leadership over, what would you say the most, what would you tell them the most effective way to manage the extraordinary amount of data that is gathered by the fbi? i mean you've got, like a tsunami, the data that comes in there. how do you do that, identify threats and hold our values. what kind of advice would you give them would be my last question? >> generally my advice would be to rely on the people on the fbi. i started a week before september 11th. i was new. i did not know really how the fbi operated as far as looking at afar and assisting the united states attorney. remarkable thing how that organization together to undertake the responsibilities of responding to september 11th. and so regardless of what one does as the director,

the fbi as an organization and institution that has the strength to carry us. with regard to the tsunami of information that you talk about, one of the lessons we have learned since september 11th there have been a profusion of databases, different database, given different authorities. and what we have needed over a period of time and not only us but others in the intelligence capabilities cape pablts of federated services pull information out from disparate databases and put them together to prevent the next terrorist attack. as much as you can do digitally, and as much as you can do with databases there is always the human element, personnel element that is ultimately successful. developing the persons capable of sifting through this data with the help of algorithms and the like is as important as developing

the digital capabilities to sort through it and so continuing to build the analytical cadre, continuing to build the type of agents and analysts and professional staff that know and understand the technological area but know and understand the human element of it is as important as anything else. that's what we try to do. build up that capability since september 11th and, i would expect that my successor would continue on that path. >> thank you, very, very much. senator grassley. >> director mueller, i'm going to start out with a question or two that probably you touched on in your testimony but i think it's important that we get answers to specific questions. it's in regard to the patriot act. and you know the three provisions that are expiring. do you agree that these three provisions should be made permanent? >> yes, sir. >> have these three tools been useful to the fbi to

prevent terrorist attacks in our country? >> they have. let me, if i briefly can mention the business records provision that's been used over 380 times. you alluded to an instance where it was used recently. it's absolutely essential we have the ability to gather these records through that provision, whether it be for identifying intelligence officers from other countries. these records enable us to get hotel records, travel records and the like. without that capability we would, would be, it would be difficult to develop the cases and the investigations in that arena as well as the counterterrorism arena without this provision. the roving wiretap provision has been used more than 190 times. it is limited in the sense we have to show that the individual for whom we wish this authority is trying to avoid surveillance. again, it is viewed by the court before it is issued.

as i did mention in my testimony we've had this capability on the criminal side of the house for any numb he -- number of years. it has been help in national security and important. the one we have not yet used is the lone wolf provision but i still believe that is important. we have come close to using knit several of our cases. 9 one thing i would point out there that the only time it is to be used is on a non-u.s. citizen and with court, court approval and consequently while we have not used that provision, with the profusion of lone wolf cases domestically and indeed some internationally, my expectation we will be using this in the future and, i believe that it's important that it be reauthorized. >> i think that your answer shows that if these provisions were not reauthorized or if they were substantially weakened by including new requirements that it would be debt

trimeantal to the agents in the field, would that be a correct assumption? >> yes, sir. >> and do you, i kind of, from your point of view whether any of these three provisions have been subject to any negative reports of finding abuse? >> i'm not aware of any. >> let me go to flee other tools not set to expire. i'm not part of the needed reauthorization. these are the foreign intelligence surveillance act hand register and track and trade orders national security letters, delayed notice search warrants. the fbi regularly uses pen reg strer trap and trace authority in both national security and criminal areas s that the a correct assumption on my part? >> yes, sir. >> under current law these authorities have the same legal standard relevance, that's correct? >> yes, sir. >> isn't it?

do you believe increasing the legal burden on these investigative tools is necessary? >> no. speaking generally i would say, no, i believe we are at a point in time where there has been the appropriate balance between on one hand the necessity for addressing the terrorist threat and threat from other criminal elements in the united states and yet on the other hand the protection of privacy, civil liberties. i think that balance has been worked out satisfactorily over the years since september 11th. >> national security letters are an essential part of building blocks of national security investigation. they never had a sunset in law. do you think that they need one now? >> i do not. >> delayed notice search warrants are primarily a criminal tool, not a national security tool. is that right? >> correct. >> has there been any criticism of their use that you know of requiring us to change the delay from 30 days to 7 days? >> not that i'm aware of. >> is there any advantage to

decreasing the delayed period? >> i, did you say decreasing the delay period? i think the suggestion was decreasing it from -- >> 30 to 7. >> that is something we'd have to look at the impact there but, i am not aware of any abuse or any, any activity that, that warrants, directs or mandates such a change, let me put it that way. >> at least as of now i conclude that you would not be able to say that you support a change at this point? >> i would have to look at the legislation and quite obviously the last word is that the justice department in terms of abuse letter. >> okay. i'd like to go to the electronic communications protection act. there's a coalition called the digital due process coalition. business and interest groups supporting probable cause standard for obtaining all

electronic communications regardless of its age, the location or storage facilities or provides access to information. do you support raising the legal standard for obtaining electronic communications to probable cause determination? >> i do not. and, that would be tremendously problematic in our capability of undertaking and successfully undertaking the investigations to prevent terrorist attacks. >> okay. >> we use the information, not the, not the subject, not the content of communications but the existence, in fact of communications to make the case for probable cause that would enable us to utilize a more intrusive investigative powers given to us by congress. if that standard was to change, it would severely inhibit our ability to make those probable cause showing to the court in order to continue the investigation as, as is warranted.

>> let me ask you specifically along that line, if you think the legal standard to be taken information through a pen register and trap and trace order should be increased to probable cause or 2703-d standard? >> no. for the same reasons as i stated before. >> okay. do you agree that the change like this would be unworkable and burdensome? i think you've answered that, that it would be burdensome? >> i would have to look at the particular provision and look more closely at it to answer that particular question. >> i think, i have more questions but i think my time's up. so i'm going to leave for a few minutes to go to agriculture but i'll come back. >> thank you, thank you very much. i yield to senator. >> thank you, mr. mueller. i remember like yesterday when you came on board as for all of us, with all of us time goes by very, very quickly but i want to

express my deep, deep admiration and respect for you as a person and, and as an individual with the capabilities that you have and have demonstrated over the past 10 years. you have been a crucial asset to our country and i along with, i think everybody who has been connected with you over these past 10 years looks at your tenure in terms of how much it's done for our country and how much we owe you by way of appreciation. >> thank you, senator. >> want to speak just a bit about what happened at fort hood. as you know the senate homeland security committee released a report critical of the fbi. they said that the fbi conducted only a cursory investigation into evidence that existed that the shooter was frequently involved in talking with an al qaeda-affiliated terrorist overseas. the report also said that the fbi failed to give the

pentagon full access to an fbi database that likely would have sparked an in-depth inquiry that would most likely have avoided what occurred at, fort hood. going forward, which is really all we need to be concerned about at this time, what can you tell us about new procedures that are in place that will head off another fort hood in the future? >> let me, say at the outset that this is one of the pieces of information on the individuals responsible for fort hood was, it was found in one of the thousands of cases we handle day in, day out. but what we found as a result of hassan's incident, attack on that day was that there were gaps we had to fill. immediately afterwards we looked at our procedures.

we found we could do much better job in information-sharing with dod and consequencely today elements of the department of defense serve on our national joint terrorism task force. they are in many of our joint terrorist task forces around the country but most particularly which have formalized process where we sit down, go through all the cases whether dod case or our cases that may touch on dod so we have before us both entity as full review of those cases that may impact dod. secondly, we put into place technological improvements relating to the capability of a database to pull together past e-mails as, and future ones as they come in so that it does not require a individualized search. so putting together a technological improvement to enhance our capabilities. lastly, we, not lastly,

actually, two more things. thirdly, what we had done is assure that we have not just one office that is reviewing, say, communications traffic but have a redundancy of review at headquarters as well to make sure certain we don't miss something. lastly you alluded to the, an analyst's inability to either access or knowledge of a particular database. we underwent an extensive training initiative for all persons serving on joint terrorism task forces in the wake of what happened at fort hood to assure not only the persons that have access to the databases but were knowledgeable and knew when and wear to utilize those particular databases. so i do believe that we have, addressed the issues that came to our attention immediately after the fort hood incident. >> director mueller, the ability of american companies to outinnovate and

outcompete the rest of the world is more important today than ever. in 1996 i worked to pass the economic espionage act. this is a law that makes it a federal crime to steal trade secrets and yet the fbi estimates that u.s. companies continue to lose billions of dollars each year when criminals do steel their trade secrets. i'm currently reviewing the economic espionage act to see what improvements are needed to better protect american companies. as a first step in this process i'm introducing legislation to increase maximum sentence for economic espionage from 15 to 20 years and sentencing guideline range. you support these penalty increases when you work with me as we consider additional updates to the law and do you have any suggestions as to what we should be doing? >> i would have to quite obviously consult with justice in terms of the response but it seems to me i would think we would look

quite favorably on of the suggestions of enhanced penalties in this arena. of course we would work with you and your staff in terms of looking at what other areas might be improved through legislation. >> maybe you can respond to this. in 1996 we considered including a federal civil private right of action as a tool for companies to combat and deter theft of trade secrets. at the time we decided to forego this and rely on state trade secret laws. other criminal laws like the computer fraud and abuse act contain companion civil, federal civil remedies for victims. what are your views as to how prosecutions and investigations could be improved if a private right of action was available, might you support a change of this sort? >> i think we, and by we i mean ourselves and the justice department would have to look and see what's in the statute. i might be leery at the outset of including a private right of action.

maybe because i would be, somewhat concerned about overlap and a conflicts in term of investigations and it's something i would think that we would have to look at very closely to determine what adverse impact there might be on our ability as the government actor to pursue these cases if there was a private right of action. not saying it should not be. many. i'm saying something we ought to look at closely before, before justice department gives a position on whatever legislation is proposed. that is proposed. >> finally, what, advice would you give your successor in avoiding pitfalls that you experienced during your tenure? >> whoo. i would say rely on the great people in the fbi.

just remarkable organization. remarkable grouping of people. i would also say when i've gotten in trouble because i haven't asked the hard questions and i've been satisfied with answers that, that were, fine on the surface but there are areas where i should have delved deeper and found out the answers myself. i could kick myself and some of those arenas. one of the other things i would say it is important for us in the organization to understand what is necessary to protect the american public. to grow and adjust to the new threats that are coming so much faster than they did, 10, 15, 20 years ago and be flexible and agile to address, to address those threats. and, the organization has to do what it needs to do for the american public as opposed to what we may enjoy or like doing, as prosecutors or, as agents.

and the bureau has always done that in its history and we're going to have to do it and swifter, faster in the future. >> thank you very much. senator gramm. >> thank you, sir. i would like to acknowledge your service for probably one of the most challenging times in american history. i appreciate what you have tried to do for the country and the whole force. >> thank you, sir. >> mexico, you mentioned in your testimony about border patrol agents being killed. what is your assessment of the violence in mexico? is the border areas more dangerous and where do you see this going in mexico? >> i think anybody looking at that, what happened the last several years in the along the border but also inside mexico in terms of increase in homicides, the breakdown of the, to the extent there was in a, a cartel, i don't want to say

justice but restraint as long since been lost with increase in homicides despite the efforts and intent of the calderon administration from the outset to address it. from our perspective the concern is the violence coming north of the border. from our perspective we've seen and had several years ago an uptick in kidnapping of individuals who may live in the united states but have businesses or family in mexico, be kidnapped in mexico and the ransom sought from persons in the united states. we put together task forces to address that. that has been reduced somewhat. we have, a priority of looking at corruption along the border and we have a number of agents looking at border corruption. we've had a number of cases of border corruption we have successfully investigated. we have put together fusion

squads or, individuals from, who are familiar with corruption, familiar with the narcotics trafficking, white-collar crime, money laundering and the like in the squadds that we are using to, hybrid squads we call them to address the activities on the border. and finally we put together a intelligence capability down in el paso that brings in intelligence from each of our offices as well as our legal attache in mexico city and headquarters and we integrate that with the other players working on the border. >> would you say it would be a fair observation that securing our border is probably more important than ever? that criminal activity is growing and that terrorism threats are growing and that we should really look at securing the border as a national security imperative? >> i think securing the borders always has been a national security imperative, yes, sir. >> but it seems to be even

more so from your testimony. now you machinesed something in your testimony, you should ask, maybe ask hard questions. i think that is probably good advice for us all. when it comes to miranda warnings is it the fbi's view that miranda warnings are required for interviews that involve tell-against gathering for national security purposes? >> if there is a, no intent to utilize the results of those interviews in a courtroom and the purpose was, gathering intelligence, yes, it would be, that and that happens all the time, particularly overseas. >> is it fair to say that homegrown terrorism is on the rise? >> yes. >> is it fair to say that we need to get our laws in shape to deal with a new threat which is people attacking us who may be american citizens themselves here legally? >> yes. >> so wouldn't it be fair to say that we should as a nation, the congress and the administration, try to find a solution that would

withstand court scrutiny to deal with the fact that when we are facing this threat, that providing a lawyer and reading someone their rights when they may involved a act of terrorism is something maybe counterproductive at times? >> i'm not certain i would go that far. i would say that we are bound by what the supreme court has issued in terms of -- >> do you think congress should be involved in helping you create a solution to this problem? >> i would have, it would be nice if congress could but we've got the supreme court as ultimate arbiter in terms of application to miranda to the admissibility of statements. >> i totally understand what you're saying but it is my view that miranda warnings are not required if the purpose of the interrogation is to gather intelligence about existing threats or future threats because when you fight a war, you don't read people miranda rights on the battlefield. where is the battlefield?

is united states part of the battlefield? >> i wouldn't speculate. i know, persons that say everything is a battlefield now. i would stay away from speculating on the battlefield. i know where you're going but, stay away from the definition of battlefield. >> in all fairness to you i think it is pretty important to know where the battlefield is. to me the battlefield is here at home. we caught people trying to blow us up that are connected with people in pakistan allegedly. so, mr. director, i think home is the battlefield and we need to craft solutions in light of this growing threat and i look forward to working and i would urge the administration to come to congress to see if we could work together but under your policy guidance, this memorandum, how long can you hold someone without reading them their miranda rights? if you catch someone here in america, an american citizen who you suspect being involved with al qaeda or some foreign entity

terrorist group, how long can you hold them without reading them their rights? how many questions can you ask them and when do you have to present them to court? >> generally within 24, 48 hours one has to make the presentment to court at which point in time they will be red their miranda warnings. depends where you might be. it may be longer if you're not that close to a magistrate. >> right. let's continue to ask the hard questions. so under the policy, under the problem with presentment to court -- >> yes. >> -- you're talking about 24 or 48 hours. is that enough time to gather intelligence? >> it may well be. in certain cases we -- >> could it well not be? >> it could not be. >> yeah, i mean you might actually want to call foreign intelligence services and see, do you know about this guy? you would certainly want to call the cia. you would want to call the dod and want to make a good assessment. i think the honest answer is presentment and miranda warnings need to be looked

at anew in light of the domestic and in light of homegrown terrorism that is just my view. i want to invite the administration to be a good partner on this but i feel like we're less safe with the current policy because the questions i've asked about the how long you can hold them, 24 to 48 hours without a presentment problem is probably not a good solution to what i think is a growing problem. . . >> so when we're deciding what's

the right number to pick, you're losing $200 million, is that correct? >> yes, we are. >> and plus what you're asking in 2012s is that really -- >> i'd have to -- depending on what happens in 2011 -- >> right. >> -- will dictate 2012, and what we're struggling to get is what we did not get if 2011 for '12. >> you know we're deeply in debt, right? >> absolutely. absolutely. [laughter] >> thought you might agree with me there. and you've looked at this budget from being, from a perspective that the nation's deeply in debt. >> yes. >> and you're telling us, the congress, that due to the threats that are multiplying exponentially, that you need this force to protect america. >> yes. >> thank you very much for your testimony. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you. and i want to thank you, director, for your service. you started a week before 9/11, and it's been quite, quite a

decade. but thank you, you've done an excellent job. >> thank you, sir. >> i'd like to discuss, first, a issue that effects a small upstate community, newberg, new york. as you know, two years agnewberg saw gang activity. there were shootouts in the streets, repeated bank robberies, numerous homicides. at the time you and attorney general holder assured me the fbi and other federal partners would work closely with local law enforcement to counter gangs operating in the area, and you've done a good job on that. spring this work led to an fbi information, a multiagency sweep involving some 500 local, state and federal law enforcement agents and the arrest of 70 gang members in the city of newberg. it's not a large city, so that was very significant. early last month there was another sweep, ten more gang suspects were arrested.

and there have been reports now that the fbi is considering moving its hudson valley resident agency to newberg. i want to personally express my strong support of such a proposal. when i toured the streets with the local police department and your agents, residents thanked the officers and agents and saw hope. as the community works to rebuild, i know that housing the fbi within the community will serve as an important gang deterrent, an important community resource. so can you commit to consider newberg closely as the location for the fbi resident agency location? >> i think i can make that commitment. i know the decision is in process and that the activities in many or about newberg would be a factor amongst other factors as well, but certainly we would consider the activity that you alluded to in terms of where that resident agency should be located.

>> okay. and if space, if you're having any space problems, we'll find 'em for you. [laughter] okay? but it's very important. >> i understand. >> i hope you'll do everything you can to do that. >> yes, sir. >> okay. second question deals with the background checks pilot. in 2003 congress passed criminal background check pilot program as part of the protect act. the legislation was introduced by senator hatch, co-sponsored by a number of senators on the committee, i was one of them. this pilot program was established to determine the feasibility of a nationwide fingerprint-based background check system for volunteers of youth serving organizations like the boys and girls' club, the national mentoring partnership. thanks to the great work of the fbi and the national center for missing and exploited children which processed background check requests of 90,000 records have been requested and used since this pilot program's inception. 6% of the records included criminal histories of concern

including serious offenses, sexual abuse of minors, assault, child cruelty, even murder. so, director mueller, has the fb with i experienced any problems in -- fbi experienced any problems? for instance, does the fbi believe the costs associated with this pilot program to be overly burdened or the work overly complex? >> my understanding is that we have, there's been no problems with the processing of these requests through nicmec, a tremendous organization. so we have not seen any problems. and i do believe that the charges that we, what we charge for, appropriate charge, and my understanding is there have been no problems in terms of receiving the monies for those check. >> as you know, nicmec recently announced it would no longer operate the pilot program leaving a number of youth

service organizations without access. so given the bureau's experience with the pilot, do you agree such a permanent program could be helpful this continued protection of our children? are you willing to work with whatever organization takes their place? >> we would take directly from those youth services organizations the requests for doing the background checks. >> good. >> and consequently, i probably cannot say to what extent that would be going back to that practice would be detrimental to either those organizations or others. >> okay. but you're willing to work and make sure ha this gap is filled again -- that this gap is filled again. >> if there is, indeed, a gap there, yes, we're willing to work with the organizations in order to make certain that the process is undertaken efficiently. >> okay. finally, gun checks. the president himself has noted information included in our gun check system which is supposed to prevent guns from being sold to the wrong people is, quote, often incomplete and inadequate.

the fbi relies on state government to supply many of the records about people who are not allowed to possess guns, and there are lots of examples of this. people who are involuntarily committed to a mental institution by a state court, someone on probation for a state crime fails a drug test. and yet we are finding that many states are not complying. do you have any idea why so many states are not doing anything to help you enforce federal law many this regard -- in this regard, why we're not getting the information we should to be on this list which, by the way, everyone supports? this is once there's a consensus that, say, a felon or somebody who's adjudicated mentally ill not get a gun, that they be on the list so they won't be sold a gun. >> we do everything we can to encourage the states to provide us the information that would be present and prevent the sale of those particular guns.

i don't think there's one particular factor that contributes to the inability or unwillingness of a state to provide that information. it may well be it costs additional time and money to ferret out that information and put into place a process to insure it goes in the nix. all we can do in the bureau is encourage that the states provide us that information. >> well, if you could just send us things we might be able to do. now, as you know, i've been working on legislation on this for a long time. representative mccarthy and i passed a legislation about the mentally infirm, adjudicated mentally infirm after virginia tech. recently, jared loughner, the tucson gunman, was rejected by the army due to his drug use. it seems to me such information could have been sent to nix under existing law. so given that the president has stated that the nix improvement act hasn't been properly implemented and loughner's

ability to purchase a firearm even after admitting to the federal government -- this is when he was applying to the armed forces -- about his drug abuse, would you agree to examine the implementation of this legislation to insure it's serving its intended purposes? >> as i say, in every one of these instances we encourage, but we have no ability to do much more than encourage the responsiveness. >> okay. and can you provide me with updated numbers in the next few days on how many people have been identified as drug abusers by each federal agency? >> i think i -- we can. >> great. thank you, mr. chairman. my time has expired. >> thank you, senator schumer. and senator sessions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director mueller, thank you for your service. you came to this office with unparalleled experience, the proven judgment and integrity to lead the agency in an effective way. i believe you've done that.

i salute you for it. the country has been lucky to have you there. i've worked with the fbi many, many years, and i have the greatest respect for the men and women who serve in that fabulous agency. truly, i think it's fair to say the greatest law enforcement agency in the world. would you agree? >> i can't dispute that. [laughter] >> i didn't think you would. >> they have some problems -- >> it may not be perfect, and none of us are, but it is a great institution with fabulous men and women who serve every day long hours and doing the things that are necessary to help protect us from crime and terrorist activities. i'd like to follow a little bit, follow up a little on senator graham's questions about the miranda warnings and the nature of the struggle that we're in with terrorism today.

i remain totally baffled by this administration and, frankly, your perception that those who are dedicated to the destruction of this country who enter our country with the design to attack and kill americans somehow should be presumptively treated as criminals and should be provided miranda warnings and other legal protections that we provide american citizens, but the kind of things that have never been provided to enemy combatants on the battlefield. and, first of all, i want to just make clear that i don't think it's speculative about where the battlefield is. i think the battlefield is where the enemy is attacking us. and we've seen that they are attacking us in our homeland. so i guess my first question is,

how do you feel about the fundamental question of the apprehension of someone directly connected to al-qaeda in the united states bent on attacking the united states? do you believe that should be treated as an act of war or a crime? >> i am going to leave that up to others to decide. i will tell you that we as an organization if responsibility is given to us under the laws to make the arrest and we, and there is an intent and a decision made by the president -- whichever president may be, whether it be bush before or obama now -- that the person go through the federal district courts and the procedures that are mandated that we go through in order to have testimony admissible in a

courtroom. now, a decision can be made by the executive that they not go through the federal criminal process of the united states which is a decision to be made by the executive at whatever point in time -- >> well, i would agree -- >> -- and then different procedures kick in the. but if we are given the mandate to make the arrest and take them to trial and convict them under our courts, then there's a pathway that has been decided by the executive that we must follow. >> have you made a recommendation that that is the way, the presumptive way -- >> i have not. no, sir. >> are have you opposed that? -- have you opposed that? >> that is an issue that is left to the president, and -- >> then decided at a level wof you? >> >> way above me, yes, sir. >> well, i don't know. you've had a long-time appointment, so you can speak candidly about what's important to protecting the safety of the united states of america. and you're not just expected to come here and rubber stamp what some decision is made in the white house. but according to the documents

you put out on custodial interrogations, you say that the fbi policy, you will continue to adhere to the fbi policy regarding the use of miranda warnings for custodial interrogations of operational terrorists. and you define operational terrorists as an arrestee who is reasonably believed to be either a high-level member of an international terrorist group or an operative. it goes on to describe that. so let's take the situation that senator graham was asking you about, and i think it's very important. if this is an enemy combatant, and i believe many of these terrorists are associated with al-qaeda or other organizations committed to the destruction of the united states, then they should be seen as a potential source of intelligence information that could help us identify who else may be in this

organization, who else is threatening the united states. and isn't it possible that you can obtain that kind of information through effective interrogation techniques? >> well, i agree with you. it's absolutely essential and our first -- when we have individuals who are involved in terrorist attacks, our first objective is to obtain the intelligence, and what our guidance is to our persons is that should be your objective -- >> well, that's effective, but you indicate that there's some potentially window of public safety exception which is not clear in any case law that i'm aware of. not really clear what this public safety is. i don't think, as you indicated, it can't exceed 24 or 48 hours when they have to be brought before a federal court if you're treating them as a criminal, right? >> well -- >> looking -- >> if you're going to be treated

in the courts of the united states -- >> how many hours has the court ever approved -- >> [inaudible] >> well, my time is about up, mr. chairman. it's an important issue. >> [inaudible] >> i'd like to get a square answer. >> and i'm happy to answer. >> well, first of all -- >> let me just say it's important -- >> -- let me tell you this, and i'll let you answer further. i believe that an individual arrested carrying a bomb about to board an airplane in the united states directly connected to al-qaeda should be treated as an enemy combatant, does not need to be taken to court in 24 or 48 hours and given a lawyer, does not need to be given miranda rights, may need to be subjected to weeks of interrogation utilizing the best information and techniques we have to find out who else in this country may be prepared to

kill thousands of american citizens. and for you to say and not acknowledge that miranda warnings can be counterproductive to that is inexplicable to me. so i'd be glad to hear your comment. >> well, i haven't exactly said that, senator. what i have said is that if a person is -- >> [inaudible] >> may i finish? if a person is arrested in the united states under our laws, we are guided by the statutes and by the supreme court in terms of what we can do. we have expanded and identified what we anticipate we should get when a terrorist has been arrested in the united states in terms of intelligence, and that is the first thing without miranda warnings we do. but, ultimately, if that individual is to be prosecuted in the united states there may welcome a point in time where miranda warnings are warranted. if a decision is made that the person is not going to go through our courts, that is a decision that's made by the executive and we, quite

obviously, would follow that. but that person would not be in our custody or going through what we do day in and day out under the criminal justice system of the united states. >> [inaudible] . under the exception. >> under the exception? it's indeterminant. and we've had a number of occasions where we've put off bothmy miranda warnings and presentment where the person agrees they want to cooperate with intelligence for a period of time. >> they agree. >> thank you, senator. senator franken. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director mueller, i'd like to associate myself with all the other senators who have commended you for your service. thank you so much. i'd also like to commend you for aggressively investigating mortgage fraud and predatory lending cases. recently, i became chair of a new subcommittee on privacy, technology and the law, and one thing i learned as i've been

preparing for the subcommittee's work is that at the height of the subprime lending crisis in the summer of 2007 the number one buyer of internet advertising across all industries was the subprime lender. this was a company called low rate source, another top five internet advertiser in this period may sound more familiar, countrywide financial. and, mr. chairman, without objection, i would like to add the nielsen net ratings reports to the record. >> without objection. >> my point here is that subprime mortgages didn't sign themselves, and one of the key ways that countrywide financial and other subprime lenders identified their target, their targets was by gathering data about the those customers online to see who might be a good mark in targeting them online, often

without the customers having any idea that this was happening. is this a trend that the fbi has seen during its investigations of subprime lenders? >> i am not familiar myself with that. i'd have to get back to you on it, but we can do that. >> well, the record, seems to me, this is an area in which the fbi would be well served by working with the federal trade commission. can you tell me what you are currently doing to work with the ftc on this issue? >> again, i'd have to get back to you on -- i know we have a number of task forces and working groups with them, but i would have to get back to you with the specifics. >> i appreciate that. a while back i saw representative peter king, chairman of the homeland security committee in the house, say on tv pretty categorically that there was no cooperation from the somali community or from community leadership in

minnesota after a very small number of members of that community went to somalia to train with al-shabab. my experience is that no one is more upset about what happened than the twin cities' somali community itself, and my understanding from talking to law enforcement is that there has been real cooperation from the community in minnesota. is that your understanding? >> yes, sir. i think that the somali community in min annapolis was -- minneapolis was taken aback by the number of young men who had traveled to somalia to work withal shah -- al-shabab and that community understanding what had happened to that community and the threat to the young men in that community became very cooperative in terms

of not wanting that to happen again. >> yes. that was my understanding, and i actually took some umbrage at chairman king's remarks regarding that because it was quite categorical that, he said quite categorically the opposite was true. and i take umbrage on behalf of the somali community in the twin cities whom i represent. now, it seems to me that it would make sense to have a somali face on some of our counterterrorism efforts in this the somali community in minnesota. are you actively working to encourage and recruit members of key community like the somali community to actually become field agents? >> yes, we are. we have not been as successful as we would like, but we continue to press hard and recruit from all segments of the community. >> thank you. many incidents have come to light recently of banks and debt

collection agency, agencies fraudulently signing affidavits. thisthis has likely resulted in wrongful foreclosures and in consumers paying thousands of dollars in many money that they don't owe. in fact, lori swanson, minnesota's attorney general, filed a suit just yesterday against a large debt collection company alleging that it improperly signed hundreds of affidavits without verifying information. this has reportedly resulted in situations like that of a woman from egan, minnesota, it's a southern suburb of the twin cities, who has pursued -- this woman was pursued for years for a bill that she had already paid on time. she repeatedly sent her canceled check as proof of payment to the debt collector, but it took her a very long time to get the case dismissed, finally, by a court,

and she has never been able to repair her credit. do you think existing penalties for this type of fraud are strong enough? what more can we be doing to deter this kind of activity since it's so hard to make the victims whole after they've been defrauded? >> first, i'd have to give some thought as to what additional legislation is necessary, whether it be enhanced penalties in a particular area. i can tell you that we have a number of investigations going into this general area, and we have found that with the success of these investigations we do have indictments, and persons do go away for a substantial period of time. i'm not familiar with this particular case, so i can't say whether those activities in that case are under investigation. i couldn't anyhow, but i can assure you we have a number of investigations. >> don't tell me anything i shouldn't know. [laughter] as you know, i've been very interested in the how mortgage fraud has affected minnesota.

after our last oversight hearing, i submitted a question for the record asking you to explain the process by which the fbi chooses to prioritize resources for mortgage fraud cases. you said the fbi addresses the most prolific schemes that have the greatest impact on the communities where with fraud has occurred. want -- i want to follow up on this because minnesota hasn't just been affected by really big fraud cases, we've been hit by smaller frauds, too, where someone comes in and offers to refinance someone's home loan, gets all of the homeowner's information, then just steals the check. when it arrives. do you have the resources you need to investigate these smaller schemes and not just the highest profile ones? how are you working with state and local law enforcement to insure that these outrageous cases of fraud are being prosecuted? >> >> well, what we endeavor to do

is to work with state and local law enforcement in the form of either task forces or working groups. and we have currently 94 of these task forces and working groups around the country. we have 400, i know almost 340 agents, i should say, doing this. we could use some more, but we do do a triage across not just the federal, the universe of cases in the federal arena, but also with state and local law enforcement to see if we can't get resolution of all the cases across the board. and so we will sit down with a working group and say, okay, how can this case be best addressed? some will go to federal court, some will be handled in the states by district attorney, but our endeavor is to make certain we get all cases we can addressed in some way, whether it be at the federal level, state or local, and that requires the coordination with state and local law enforcement. >> thank you. and, again, thank you for your

service, and i hope your next job is slightly less pressure, but i do want you to keep serving our country, and i know you will in whatever way you choose. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you very much, senator franken. senator kyl. >> thank you very much. director, i want to add my voice to those who have thanked you for your service. we appreciate it very much and, obviously, do wish you well. i would note, though, as in my case, your job isn't quite done yet. i asked the chairman if we might be calling you up one more time before you left. he said probably not, but i wouldn't hold your breath yet. >> i'm with the chairman. [laughter] >> let me, first, follow up on a question senator franken asked. the fbi does rely on the cooperation of the muslim community to investigate radicalization, particularly of young muslims in the community, is that not correct? >> true. >> and i gather it would not be helpful to your earths if members of the muslim -- efforts if members of the muslim

community refused to talk to fbi agents without having their lawyer present. >> i'd say at the outset, everybody in the united states has the right to have a lawyer present, but what we would like is for these communities to encourage their persons to cooperate with us and provide us the information, the trip wires that will help prevent the next terrorist attack. >> so it's not particularly helpful if they're advised that they don't, that they do not talk to you unless they have a lawyer present. >> i'm familiar with one of the la cards that one entity had across the board urged persons not to talk to the fbi. and that is not the contributions we want from our citizens to stop crime, stop terrorist attacks. >> any citizen for that matter. >> anything. >> right. let me ask you about, could you describe just for the record in about 20 seconds what your team telecom mission is? >> team telecom. >> well, as i understand it, you've stood up a mission which assists in the evaluation of

cyber activity by foreign corporations, for example? maybe i should set the stage. i was just trying to set the preliminary stage. you're familiar with the chinese companies zte? >> yes, sir. >> and there are a couple of specific things that your team telecom has been advised. maybe you have a different name. >> the government looks at purchase of companies by -- >> right. and the fbi has a specific group that assists in that. >> yes, we do. >> okay. one of the things that's been reported is that our country's sixth largest cellular provider, u.s. cellular, is contemplating having what way build out its 4g network. given the fact that we were concerned about the potential contracting with at&t and sprint to the point that we intervened and both of those countries separated themselves and did not

move forward, what would your concerns be about such a contract with u.s. cellular? >> well, this is something i'm not certain we can address in open session. i can tell you the process is while we do not sit at the table with those who are in the sipius process, our recommendations or advice is often elicited, and we would do that in a classified setting. >> and the kinds of advice that the fbi would give would be based upon just hype hypothetically what kind of a concern? >> >> well, concerns that -- speaking generally not about -- >> just generally, yes. >> the concerns that through entities operating with the backing of the government that foreign governments may have access to classified communications, to our intellectual property through proxies, and so the process, has

been set up to assure that that possibility is examined, looked at and a determination made as to whether or not a particular purchase of a company should go through. .. >> whether you can inform us about any consideration that you would have their. >> at the outset i'm not somewhere with the facts of

that, but even if i were i do believe it is the type of subject that would be addressed in a classified setting. >> just so folks might not be quite as aware of this would understand a bit of background, this firm wauway has a background with people's liberation army of china, has supported strongly by the chinese government and at least in the past concerns have been raised about its involvement in the u.s. network. and that's the reason for the questions. would you have a concern about fbi systems being integrated for having wauway for example, being integrated into fbi systems? >> i can't speak to a particular company. i can say that ourselves, the intelligence community are always concerned about ensuring that the security of our systems and the persons that are working on our systems are providing the capabilities that support our systems. >> would that also include even

down to the local level? nor to any network that might carry sensitive information would be connected with one that would carry sensitive information, would potentially fall within the mission of the fbi taking a look at it, is that correct? >> it may well be. in those circumstances we would take a look at it. if you're talking about our system we would always be concerned about trapdoors or backdoors and ways into our systems. if there is a business purchase at some point we may be asked to look at the impact of the urgency. >> just generally speaking is there anything you would ask of us at this point? or greg gice ask you to think about that and supplied for the record any recommendations or suggestions you would have about assistance that congress could provide for you to do your part

of this nation? >> yes, sir. happy to. >> one last question. one of the things has been ongoing with the fbi and the department of health -- excuse me, dhs homeland security, has been the matter, i'm going back to the terrorist issue, a matter of lexicon. there's whether this is you don't call people jihadists or islam is because it gives credibility to their ideological foundation for their action. the other school of thought says if we're going to defeat a terrorist enemy we need to at least be able to call it by its true name, understanding its ideology, its motivation of the people, what makes it tick so we can effectively deal with it. where does the fbi come down in this matter of terminology? >> well, we call it as we see it. i understand there is some discussion out there, but nobody has ever told us how we are

supposed to describe terrorists or terrorist groups. and we tried to get the most clear definition, but i call it what it is. >> would you agree that when accurate description of some of these groups like al qaeda for example, is islamist? >> absolutely. >> extremists. islamist extremist is accurate definition. >> nobody, just to be crystal clear, nobody is suggesting that the muslim faith or islam is responsible for all of this. but in the name of their view, of their faith, a lot of folks, not maybe a lot but a number of young people have been radicalized and radicalized to extreme actions. and i guess it's the reason for the extremism. but there's no denying the connection in their mind at least to their islamist faith i

gather. thank you very much, mr. director. >> senator coons? >> thank you, mr. chairman. director, thank you so much for your testimony today, for your service to our country, for your diligent stewardship of the fbi. i have a number of areas i would like to touch on. for semi formal role as account executive i had responsibility for a county police department, and hopefully will be focusing some later this summer on the federal and local law enforcement interface and collaboration. the fbi has an enormous source of valuable intelligence, not just in the national security area, antiterrorism but also in reaching local law enforcement, drug interdiction, violent crime and so forth. could you just comment on successes in areas of improvement for fbi and intelligence sharing with local law enforcement and how you feel local law enforcement is doing nationally at moving towards intelligent-based police?

>> let me start with the information sharing. one of the great successes i think since september 11 is the growth of the joint terrorist task forces and that concept. to the extent that we've been successful in cases there, virtually all of them have been utilizing the resources of the fbi, other federal agencies, state and local in the context of the joint terrorism task force. i am a great believer also and task forces across the board, whether the mortgage fraud task force is our gang task forces, violent gang task forces. because the tissue the combined capability of the entities, but also gets everybody on the same page so those vehicles provide a sharing of intelligence. secondly i would say we are doing i believe a lot better job of informing generally state and local law enforcement of what is happening in the terrorist arena. we will all be, however, be to

the punch occasioned by cnn. and that's just a fact of life in this day and age. but right now we put out bulletins almost immediately after something becomes public with regard to a terrorist attack to allstate and local law enforcement all across the country. fusion centers, i think there are 70 odd around the country now, that also contribute to the sharing on many of these, the majority of them. with fbi personnel even though their state entities that contributed to sharing as we'll. there will always be some tension between ourselves and others, particularly when information that we are utilizing is classified because it may come from the cia or nsa. and persons who do not get that information are often frustrated. there will always be the attention. i think we have made substantial progress, and that's one of the pluses, positive aspects of what's happened since september 11.

>> how do you address concerns about classified information access? what your process or prioritization when you reach a tipping point to conclude it is essential that local enforcement have access? >> any person who is assigned to the joint terrorist task force goes through a background check and gets a top secret clearance. and so, if you're a state and local into on a task force coherent access to that which the agent sitting to your right and left have. in many police chiefs have also gotten clear just so they can have access to police chiefs or shares, access to the information. but it has been our position throughout, if a person is responsible for the safety of a particular community, classification should not stand in the way of getting the information they need to protect their community. if there is a threat to a particular wilmington, delaware, and speak hypothetically specked hypothetically. the chief of police has not got a clearance, but potential

threat you get the information on that. we will find a way together because i firmly believe those first of the responsibility for cleared security have a right if there is an immediate threat. >> that's very helpful. thank you. one of the area i forgot and collaboration with the attorney general was wasn't dna testing. we have only one state lab. our office of medical examiners which oddly comes under human services department is understaffed, overworked, significant backlog. this is a challenge in many different states staying on top of the developing technology. now that everyone watches it on tv, every defense lawyer believes there until to top level dna testing. there are significant number of defenders, thousands that hasn't been reviewed as well. one possible solution to this backlog that was suggested to us was to allow private labs to do some of the backlog testing, but there isn't fbi stand i believe

it is standard 17, that requires that there be a full essentially a public lab to double check for any work that is being done by a private levy for the fbi will accept the results. i just would be interested in what you're doing anything to assure that fbi regulations are not resulting in needless inefficiencies. our office medical examiner identified that standard as one challenge that essentially made it not worth their time to engage with private labs, to reduce cost and better speak up help them when they have significant backlog. >> there is quality control process from a technological review process that you're referring to, that is required at one goes through before it is ingested into the database. over the last year this has been an issue. we know those who were pressing it to avoid this, and it may be

in certain circumstances a bottleneck. to the extent it has been, we're trying to reduce that. and put into place more efficient capabilities to assure that that quality control can be done without slowing the ingestion of the new samples in the database. most people agree that there needs to be a quality control before the samples to go into the database. what we try to do, we continue to do is make that process more efficient, remove the time lags, and make certain that all of us want to get it as soon as possible, make sure it is done as efficiently as possible. >> thank you. i appreciate your testimony. >> thank you very much, senator coons. senator blumenthal? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to join in thanking you for your service over the years where i've had -- i know the

attorneys general of the united states appreciates your working so closely with them and being in a very close partnership. i particularly want to thank you for training and a tracking the great men and women of the fbi service. and on that note, i just want to come back to the question you asked about budget. the inability to fill those 1100 slots, in my view, would be really a disservice to the fbi, and severely disadvantaged its great organization. and i hope you agree with me in that. >> it would set us back. it's a setback and we been moving forward with the help of congress and the committee and appropriators, and this would stall the progress that is being made. >> ninety. i want to commend the fbi -- thank you. i want to commend fbi for its

focus on an area i think it's extremely important. in danbury it was a major set of arrests involving breaking a drug ring that was selling steroids to high school users in the danbury area, selling 70 bottles each month of these steroids to so-called individual users. and i know that very often we focus on street drugs and the dea has a responsibility in this area. but i want to commend the fbi for its focus on the steroid problem, which sometimes receives too little attention, or awareness. and i wonder if the fbi is planning additional efforts to combat the spread and use of steroids, particularly among young users, high school, college users around the

country? >> i would say this. generally it is not an area that we would, particularly this time of budget constraints, spend a lot of effort on particularly when it crime scene primary agency of the jurisdiction is dea. now, we have become involved in investigations with dea when steroids are coming from outside the united states with customs and border patrol, and we will contribute, participate in those investigations when we can divide something of a unique to further the investigation year but beyond that i would have to go back and see what we're doing, get back to you on that, but i cannot say that given the challenges that we have and the threats that we have that this would be as high priority as all of us would like to spend i know you have enormous challenges, and some of them we've heard today, but i would be interested

in your additional information, and also increase participation, support for other agencies that they would have a primary role in this. i do think that the spread of these steroids is an epidemic of their use, and acceptance of their legitimacy is one of the great threats to our young people today. and i appreciate your willingness to cooperate in the effort. thank you. on a subject that others have asked you about, the mortgage foreclosure issue, i have to confess that i am unhappy and frustrated with the most recent efforts by the administration to send a message in this hearing. the robo-signers which are a subject of an ongoing investigation by the state attorney general which i helped to initiate.

so far we have seen virtually no major actions by the task force that the president has appointed in the face of blatant fraud involving the robo-signers, false affidavits. clearly in my view criminal violations that are a fraud on our justice system. and i wonder if you could respond? >> i share that concern, and believe that there is fraud out there. and i can say we have ongoing investigations. >> i hope that we'll see prosecutions soon. i don't want to put words in your mouth, but if you share my frustration i hope you also share my belief that we ought to actions in. >> i don't disagree with that. >> thank you. on the issue of missing children, and you covered it a little bit, as you may know the fbi was very constructively

involved in a recent highly publicized search in the new haven area for a missing 13 year old, isabella, who fortunately was found after a few days. she appeared, in fact, she left her own home on her own initiative, so she was not actually abducted or taken. but as you know, this problem is pervasive around the country. in connecticut alone, a great organization does wonderful work, received 67 reports of missing children in connecticut last year and 19 are still missing. i know that the fbi has extraordinarily important, other tasks, but i wonder whether this has taken increase, has come to be seen as a subject of increased priority in the fbi?

>> i wouldn't, i would say it's always been a priority. when a child is lost, every special agent in charge wants to work with state and local law enforcement to find a child. and will participate in the investigation so long as there's a federal basis. and generally, that is, the thought being may well have been taken, abducted across state lines. there are occasions where we have to withdraw from investigations where the child has been found, yet there's some investigative work to be done, but we have lost federal jurisdiction basis for their but i get a when a child is lost, we as was every other law enforcement around brings whatever we can to make certain that we find that child. with experts. we have an expert team that are set up specifically to go to an

address that circumstance when a child is lost. >> i welcome that response, and i would note that it marks a departure from many years ago when missing children were thought to be exclusively a local or state issue. and particularly now that many missing children are likely to be taken across state lines, either by parents or others, i think that's a very commendable approach spirit i can tell you that while not all missing children find a way to a blackberry, many of them do. and we monitor that all the way up to the top. >> i thank you very much, and again, thank you for your extraordinary service to this nation. and i think since i am the last questioner i may enable you to leave this hearing unscathed and

unwanted, and thank you, mr. chairman,. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. and my only concern is we have the communication system law-enforcement act which i helped draft back in the '90s, we worked closely with the bureau and everybody else. i recall part of it, i drafted in my office the predecessors and others around i hear concerns it may go dark. i just urge you and your office, work with me and others who don't want that to happen, to make sure that we can keep this going. do i have that assurance? >> yes, sir, absolutely. >> i thank you very much. i appreciate you being here. appreciate mr. blumenthal wrapping it up. >> thank you, sir.

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>> so what are the specific harms to consumers? and if there are harms, then condition should be narrowly tailored to address those. but the merger process should not be an excuse to implement rulemaking, an issue that don't

arise because of that particular merger. >> "the communicators" tonight on c-span2. >> watch all the events in the current spin the debate and the preparations for next years budget from capitol hill and house and senate floor, to the white house and around washington online with the c-span video library. search, watch, click and share with everything we've covered since 1987. it's what you want when you want. >> the chairman of the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission told senators recently that on site storage pools of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors is considered safe for at least 100 years. during testimony before a senate subcommittee chairman also said his commission is re-examining the spent fuel issue as part of short and long-term reviews of u.s. nuclear plants are calling the crisis and an earthquake in japan. spent fuel pools at the japanese plant have been blamed in part

for some of the radiation leaking from the site. california democrat dianne feinstein chairs this hearing. it's just under two hours. >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the energy and water appropriation subcommittee's oversight hearing of u.s. nuclear power safety in the aftermath of the japanese nuclear disaster. first, let me say on behalf of this subcommittee that our thoughts are with the people of japan who continue to suffer. i spoke to ambassador on saturday and conveyed my really deep sympathy. i think for all of us who have been watching this on television day after day and through the horrors of both the earthquake and the tsunami, that we want to

extend our very best to the people of japan, and our deepest sympathy for what is an enormous loss. 9.0 earthquake and results tsunami occurred 19 days ago. as we speak, workers at the daiichi site continue their work to contain the situation with the reactors and pools. they have been called national heros, and so they should be. it will be months before we know what happens and why, so it's too early to call this a hearing about lessons learned about the disaster in japan, but we do know enough to start asking critical questions about nuclear energy policy in our own country. last week, i visited california's two nuclear power plants with representatives from the united states geological survey and the nuclear

regulatory commission. the diablo nuclear power plant is near the city and it's the largest employer in the county. 424,000 people live within 50 miles and employees 1200 people. further south, 7.4 million live within 50 miles of the nuclear generating station near san clementi. i came away from those visits with some good news. i feel much better about the safety precautions that are in place at these nuclear plants. i was very impressed with the dedication, the confidence, and the professionalism of the large staff that run these facilities and the regulatory agents who guard against risk, but we need to reconfirm that these facilities are designed to endure the threats we can

perceive and prepare to respond to the scenarios we never imagined. that's why redundant systems, backup systems, and plans are so important. most significantly, i truly believe we must begin to rethink how we manage spent fuels. spent fuel must remain in pools for at least 5-7 years, and those pools that the firemen are pureeing water into in japan at which time these rods can be moved to safer dry casks storage. however, these tools often become de facto long term storage. with fuel assemblies reracked, thus increasing the heat load of the pools. in california for instance, fuel removed from reactors in 1984 is still cooling in wet spent fuel

pools. this process may have regulatory approval, but i have a hard time understanding why the nuclear regulatory commission has not mandated a more rapid transfer of spent fuel to dry casks. reports out of japan indicate there were no problems with the dry casks at daiichi. to me, that suggests that we should at least consider a policy that would encourage quicker movement of spent fuel in dry cask storage if that's true. we must also consider what broader regulatory reforms may be necessary beginning with the review of the united states power plant safety. i'm very pleased that the nuclear regulatory commission will undertake both short term and long term reviews of nuclear plant safety, and, mr. chairman, i thank you very much for that. this kind of self-reassessment is really appropriate.

today, i hope we'll get a more complete picture of what the nrc intends to do with these reviews and how quickly they are likely to act on any new safety regulations. in addition to nrc's self-assessment, i think we should take a look at some independent analysis of our nuclear power plant safety with specific attention to threat assessment and the design parameters of our plant. japan has now suffered two earthquakes in the past four years that were larger than the japanese thought possible, and each devastated a nuclear power plant that was not designed to endure a quake of that size. the lesson is that we need to think carefully about whether our country has properly estimated the threats to our nuclear facilities and design the facilities to endure them,

and independent review of the design basis for all united states' plants i believe should be a priority. the nuclear rnd program funds work related to existing plants. future reactor designs and waste issues, and the question becomes do we have the right focus on balance to promote increased safety? the spent fuel at daiichi posed significant problems contributing to at least one of the hydrogen explosions, so what can our r and d programs do to address issues of remaining spent fuel energy and hydrogen? funding constraints are already requiring programs to rerank research and development priorities. perhaps the events at daiichi will also contribute to that rethink. it is clear that we lack a

comprehensive national policy to address the nuclear fuel cycle including management of nuclear waste creating more waste without a plan increases our risk and exposes task payers to -- taxpayers to my payments to utilities. this hearing is not focused on knew lack waste, but i think it's hard to look at the other aspects of nuclear power and not recognize our lack of appropriate permanent retrievable storage. we will be exploring these issues today. our first panel we will hear from greg jaczko, the chairman of the nuclear regulatory commission. i had the pleasure of meeting with him and look forward to his testimony, and from peter lyons, the acting substantiate secretary for nuclear energy at the department of energy. our second panel will include

dr. ernest moniz from mit who has a long history in this area and is currently serving on the blue ribbon commission developing a long term plan for nuclear waste. we will also hear from william, the operating officer at psg power. they operate the same reactor model as those at the daiichi site. our third witness on the panel is dave lockbomb from the union of concerned scientists. he has a long history inside and outside the nuclear power industry, so we look forward to their testimony. let me now turn to my distinguished ranking member with whom it's a great pleasure to work. we worked together on the prior session on the interior committee, and i think this is one of our very first hearings

on this committee. i want you to know i very much look forward to working with you in the same way we did on interior. >> thank you for that, and thank you for hosting this hearing in a timely way and having the witnesses here whom we ought to be hearing from, people who know what they are talking about who are in charge of the safety usefulness of our nuclear program. those of us who support nuclear power as part of the mix of electricity generation in the united states and for the world ought to be among the first to ask questions about what can we learn from what happened in japan about the safety of our own reactors, both 104 commercial reactors we have in the united states, those that are on the drawing boards at the nuclear regulatory commission, and, of course, we have a large number of nuclear reactors in

our nuclear navy that has been operating since the 1950s, so the questions i'll be looking forward to hearing more about are many of the same ones that senator feinstein spoke of. what kind of safety enhancements have been made at our nuclear plants since they began operation -- i mean, our current plants. how will the next generation of reactors have improved safety capabilities over reactors already in service, not just in the united states, but around the world today. what about new technologies? one of the most important things that the federal government can do about clean energy is research. we have the capacity for that. that was -- they reminded me, we're the ones with the national labs, with the great research universities, and if any country is going to have advance

research in clean energy, it ought to be the united states. we can do that for ourselves and for the world, and nuclear power is one area where we can have that. the chairman mentioned one, better ways of recycling used fuel. the other would be the small module reactor. can we build 125 megawatt reactors or smaller reactors as a part of our future? there may be other areas so those are the questions i'll be looking for. i thank the chairman for reminding us of the scope of the japan tragedy. it's important to put the entire event into perspective in several ways. one is the size of the quake and the size of the tsunami and the size of the tragedy. there's hundreds of thousands of people, for example, still homeless in japan, and just as california by its proximity to being on the pacific ocean,

tennessee has an unusual relationship with the people of japan because over the years we've become the state with the most japanese manufacturing, we have many family and friends. in our state from japan, and we felt this tragedy even more than we might otherwise have. another way to put it into per specialive is to be aware of the record of safety in the united states nuclear industry, and i want to confirm this with our witnesses, but my understanding is the only deaths we've ever had in connection with reactors was in 1981 with a research reactor, and those are not used anymore in this country. the 104 reactions we have in the united states have never produced a fatality. the navy ships that are -- that have reactors being in operation

since the 50s have never resulted in a fatality from a reactor accident. while we've heard about three mile island, the worst nuclear accident we've had in our country i suppose in the last 30 years anyway, no one was hurt at three mile island which many people don't believe when i say, but i want to confirm that with our witnesses as well. no one was hurt at three mile island so that nuclear industry, nuclear plants has a safety record in the united states that's not surpassed by any other form of energy production. we unfortunately have coal mines that blow up, gas plants that blow up, oil rigs that spill. all of that is a tragedy, and we hope we continue a good safety record in our nuclear plants. one or two other things -- i think it's important to keep in perspective what our alternatives are. every form of energy we have

carries with it some risk. again, in listening to those talk in great britain with madam chairman this past week, they are going through the same sort of analysis, but here are their alternatives. 45% of their electricity comes from natural gas, costs twice as much as ours does and that comes from russia. they are closing their coal plants because of their climate change rules, and they know it provide a few percent of electricity, takes up a lot of space for an island without a lot of space, so their only option is really to build more nuclear power plants which is what great britain is planning to do. as we look around the world, we see that nuclear power provides 15% of the world's electricity, 30% of japan's electricity. there's 65 reactors currently under construction worldwide from russia, china, brazil, and

korea. 25% of our electricity in the united states comes from nuclear power. 75% of our clean electricity, that is no sulfur, nitrogen, or carbon comes from nuclear power. it's hard to imagine how we have a future in the united states without substantial expansion of nuclear power especially since some coal plants are going to close and some nuclear power plants are going to close because they are old, so that makes this hearing on what we can learn about safety even more important. i thank the chairman for holding the hearing, and i look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. >> thank you very much, senator, for those excellent comments. senator lautenberg, welcome. would you like to make a brief statement? >> yes, i would like to make a longer one, but i will make this brief. just to say, madam chairman, this not only obviously is

timely, but we're pleased to have mr. jaczko. i had a chance to meet with him yesterday, and the review we had was very productive, and i will also attest to mr. jaczko's durability. he came in from japan, and i was half asleep coming from new jersey, 10 we welcome you here ago, both witnesses, and i look forward to hearing from them and thank you for having the hearing. >> thank you both for being here today. you both have been involved with the crisis, and as senator lawsenberg just said, you returned from japan, so we'll most interested in your observations and update on that situation, but also want you to be looking forward and talk a

little bit about the issues the united states should consider in learning from this event. your formal statements, gentlemen, will be part of the record, so please summarize in your oral statement. mr. chairman, we will begin with you. >> thank you, chairman feinstein, ranking member, and senator lautenberg. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the regulatory commission to the tragic eventings you discussed in japan. i traveled to japan over the past weekend and just returned yesterday, and i went to be able to dreactly convey support to our japanese counterparts, and i had an opportunity to meet with senior japanese government officials, and i consulted with the nrc team of experts who are in japan as part of our effort to assist the japanese response in dealing with the reactors.

that is one small part of a broader u.s. effort to provide assistance to the japanese with regard to all the challenges they face as a result of the hurricane and sue nammy -- tsunami. i too would like to reiterate my sympathy to those all effected by the earthquake in japan. our hearts go out to those dealing with the aftermath of the disasters and are reminded of the long and difficult road they face in recovering. since friday, march 11, when the earthquake and sue tsunami struck, the nrc's head quarter operation center operated on a 24 hour basis to monitor and analyze events nuclear power plants in japan. despite the high level of support provided by our agency in response to the events, we are focused on the dmes responsibilities and ultimately ensuring the safety and security of the u.s. nuclear reactors.

in spite of the evolving situation, the long hours, the intensity of efforts, the nrc staff approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination, and professionalism, and i am very proud of the work they have done and the work they have done a part of a larger u.s. government effort. on march 11, as you mentioned, an earthquake hit japan resulting in the shut down of more than 10 reactors in japan. the tsunami caused the loss of normal and electricity to ten units at the fukushima daichi site. we began interacting with the japanese regulatory counterparts, and by monday dispatched 11 total nrc staff to japan. as our discussion and understanding of the events on the to unfold, at a certain point we gained a limited amount of information that led us to believe that there was a possibility of a further dead

agree gages in the reactor. based on the information we had, we looked at that situation relative to what we would do here in the united states and determined that if a similar situation were to happen in the united states, we would be recommending a larger evacuation out to approximately 50 miles. i would stress that was based on limited information and was a conservative and prudent decision that we made so based on that information we provided a recommendation to the u.s. government and the ambassador in japan issued a notice to american citizens in japan to be advised to evacuate or relocate to 50 miles beyond the plant. here domestically, we continue to support efforts to monitor at nuclear power plants and through the environmental protection agency system. we continue to monitor radiation levels that would be seen in the united states, and i want to

stress and repeat that we do not believe that there is any likelihood of levels of radiation in the united states that could cause any kind of public health and safety concern. now, i want to focus a little bit with the remainder of my opening remarks on the reasons we believe we have a strong regulatory program here in the united states. since the beginning of our regulatory program, we've emphasized the philosophy of defense index which recognizes nuclear reactors require the highest design, oversight, and operation, and it really does not rely on any one single layer of public health and safety. designed for every reactor in the country takes in site specific factors and includes a detailed evacuation for detailed eventings such as earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and tsunamis.

there's multiple levels of radiation released to the public in every design. they are reverse and redundant safety systems required to be maintained in operateble conditions and frequently tested to be sure the plant is in a high condition of readiness. we are, however, a learning organization, and we continue to take advantage of the best available information that we have to refine and improve our system, and one of the most significant changes that we made after three mile island in 1979 was an expansion of our resident inspector program which now has at least two full time nrc inspectors at each site where we have the ability to have unfedderred access to the site at any time. we've also developed requirements for severe management to ensure that in the event, all of the things that we think are possible to happen in the event of something like

additionally were to happen, we have these severe management guidelines in place to ensure that we can deal promptly and in a systematic and methodical way with the unique safety challenges that may be presented. in addition, as a result of the events of 9/11, we identified important pieces of equipment that we require licensees to have able and in place with policies to deal with the severe type of situation in japan right now. our program of continuous improvement will also include lessons learned from the events in japan. we have already began with activities and the resident inspectors and others in the four regional offices. we issued an information notice to licensees to make them aware of activities they should undertake to verify their capabilities to mitigate

conditions due to the severe type of accidents including the loss of significant and operational safety systems are in effect and operational. now, although we are confident about the safety of u.s. power plants, our agency has a responsibility to the american people to undertake a systematic and methodical review in light of the events in japan. on march 21st, the commission established a senior level task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our processes and regulations to ensure if improvements are needed and make recommendations to the commission and policy director. this review will basically encompass two pieces, short, and then ultimately a longer term review that will incorporate the best variable information we have from japan. both reports will ultimately be made available to the public. in summary, i believe we a strong regulatory program in place looking at a wide variety

of severe, physical, and natural phenomenas. nix to that, there's a program in place to account for the things we may not know today, and ultimately, we've required all the plants to have equipment and procedures in place to deal with these severe accidents in the very unlikely event we will see this develop here in the united states. i thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and i'll be happy to answer any questions you have. >> thank you, mr. . secretary lyons? >> thank you. chairman feinstein, ranking member, senator lautenberg, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the issues in japan, research programs relevant to nuclear safety. the accident itself is in my written testimony, but now focusing on the ongoing programs. to assist in the country's

response, the national nuclear security administration's nuclear incident team operation center was promptly activated and has been continuously staffed by nnsa and opposite nuclear operation personnel since the accident. the purpose of all activityings is to understand the progression and offer advice to japanese officials who have the direct responsibility to manage the accident recovery. the doe employed 40 people and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment including nnsa's air yell measuring system and a number of management response teams. the aas measure of con contamination on the ground deposited from relief plumes. the readings are consistent with reduced levels of radiation compared to earlier measurements and show no evidence of

significant new releases. in addition, nnsa monitors train port of radioactive materials released from the plant. as chairman jaczko stated, we do not believe the radiation released by the plant poses a public health danger in the united states. almost certainly low levels, trace levels of raid ya activity con tributed to the accident is traced here. the response team use lieses the capability in a wide range of analysis. we are working at the u.s. embassy in toke ya with nrc staff and other industries. doe and the nrc worked directly with the institute for nuclear power operations or npo and the

nuke collar energy institute to encourage formation of an industry-led assistance team. they are now leading this industry team deployed both in japan and at npo head quarters in atlanta. the secretary adviser reached out to director and other scientists for technical advice. they are in touch with them on a daily basis as well as with an internal team of scientists and engineers to am amize the situation, suggest new approaches, and evaluate the potential solutions. beyond our response to the accident, the research development and deployment programs of my office are highly relevant to future decisions about potential options for nuclear power in the united states. our proposed small module reactor program explores designs and offer safety advantages of passive systems. we are conducting research and development at a high

temperature gas reactor designs offering inherent design safety features. our light water reactor stainability program is exploring whether the lifetime of reactors can be extended with no compromise and safety. research and fuel cycles is also in my office. while we wait on guidance on the future, we are conducting research and development into a broad range of options for the nation's fuel cycle with special attention to safety, environmental protection, and nonproliferation. safety systems are key to all of our programs. like the research areas, fuel plannings that cannot produce hydrogen in an accident, or fuels impossible to melt have obvious relevance. the new hub based in oakridge national laboratory provides key exalteds and capabilities used

to assess and improve the safety of reactors. deputy stated we view nuclear energy as a very important come poppet to the overall portfolio we are trying to build. they are focused on ensuring the option for safe nuclear power remains open to the nation. in conclusion, the earthquake and resulting tsunami brought tremendous devastation on japan. at the department of energy, we are making every effort to assist the japanese people in their time of need. thank you. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, and we'll proceed to the questions. mr. chairman, if i might begin with you, the ranking member mentioned there are 104 operating power reactors at 55 sites in our country. i understand there are 48 dry casks storage facilities in the united states.

if my numbers are accurate, does this mean there's 17 reactor sites with no dry casks storage option? >> your numbers are correct. there are some sites that have not yet gone to dry cask storage. we anticipate in time, all sites will move in that direction. the -- >> fuel rods just remain in the spent fuel pools? >> correct, and for those plants not in dry storage, they remain in the pools. these pools are very robust structures that are designed to deal with the kinds of natural phenomena that we designed the entire reactor site to. it's very thick reenforced concrete structures generally 4-5 feet thick walls with very thick floors. they provide a robust protection

for the fuel. >> let me ask this. what are the regulatory requirements relative to spent fuel? they can just sit forever in spent fuel ponds? >> the way our requirement -- we have requirements about the minimum amount of time that the fuel would need to be in the pools so generally we think about five years or so is a reasonable time frame for the fuel to need to be in the pool simply because it's very physically hot. that heat needs to dispate and that needs to happen in the pool itself. >> do you have a maximum time? >> we don't have a maximum time, but we do analyze the fuel that's in the pool, and for instance, if new fuel were to be added to the pool, that goes through a rigorous analysis to ensure that's done safely and securely. >> so one shouldn't be surprised in these plants to see fuel in

those spent fuel ponds for decades? >> that's possible, certainly. many sites have begun to move as you indicated, their fuel out of the pools into dry storage. generally what the utilities like to do is reserve some amount of space in the pool to be able to take the fuel that's in the reactor at any time and move that into a pool so that tends to be the condition at which -- if they lose that ability to have that extra space, then they will usually move to dry storage to store the fuel. >> well, in the two plants i looked at, with respect to the dry casks, the cask at one plant were standing outside, and the casks at the other plant were in a water resistant building. are there any standards for the storage in dry cask?

>> the dry cask storage systems are required to be certified by the regulatory commission to meet rigorous standards in dealing with phenomena and ensuring the safety of the fuel itself. there are two types of systems generally used, and i think you saw examples of those two types at the plants you visited. we approved those, and, again, they meet our high standards for natural phenomena, for ensuring the fuel will stay sufficiently cool, and that we won't have any type of nuclear reaction in the fuel itself. >> why are there no better standards for spent fuel pools? you have good standards for the reactors, but it seems to me not much for the spent fuel. >> well, the spent fuel pools are considered safety significant systems, so they meet a lot of the same standards that the reactor itself would have to meet.

for instance, the spent fuel pools themselves are required to withstand the natural phenomena like earthquakes and tsunamis that could impact the reactor itself. they require the spent fuel that is required to be able to deal with these severe accidents. i also -- it's also required to be able to deal with the possibility of any type of nuclear reaction happening in the pool itself, so there are very high standards, and they are very comparable to the reactors as well. >> well, didn't japan have similar standards, and yet the spent fuel pools could not withstand the tsunami, the earthquake? >> at this point, we don't know exactly what contributed to the spent fuel pools in japan. it's unclear whether that was a direct result of the earthquake itself or whether there were some subsequent actions like the hydrogen explosion that occurred

creating a more difficult situation with the spent fuel pools. i add from what we do now right now, there are six spent fuel pools in japan, and we believe with a good level of confidence that certainly in the spent fuel pools for unit one is operating normally without any particular challenge. the unit pool at the unit two pool as well has operated fine. the challenges really are with units three and four, but units five and six were also operating in a stable way at this time so we vice president seen challenges with all the pools in japan. >> is the result of the two that failed, was it cracks in the superstructure of the pond itself? the pool itself? >> right know, you deponent -- right now, we don't know for sure what the situation is. we believe it's possible that there was perhaps a leak in the unit three pool and perhaps

other challenges with the unit four pool, but, again, we don't know at this point whether that was the result of the earthquake or tsunami or subsequent events that happened. we'll look at that in the short term and longer term reviews. >> thank you very much. senator alexander? >> thank you. continuing the chairman's comments, most of the comments we read here in japan from the reactors comes from the inability to cool some of the rods of used nuclear fuel; is that right? >> i think there's really two issues we're looking at. one is ensuring the continued cooling of the reactors themselves and maintaining cooling in the pool. boast are important. >> it's a cooling issue basically. >> it is. >> now, when we talk about used nuclear fuel or spent fuel, by my mathematics roughly speaking in the united states, the amount of such stuff that we would have in the united states could be put on a single football field

20 feet deep taking everything we produced over the last 35 years; is that right? >> i've seen estimates like that, that's approximately correct. >> how long -- and right now that used nuclear fuel is stored on the site where the nuclear reactor is according to your rules and regulations. how long can that be safely stored there? >> well, right now the commission recently affirmed a decision we've made over the years that we call our confidence decision, and in that decision, we looked at what the long term impacts, ultimately the long term and environmental impacts are from that spent fuel, and right now we believe that for at least 100 years that fuel can be stored with little impacts in health and safety or to the environment, and in addition as part of that decision, the commission asked the staff and agency to go out and take a look to really see if

you were to go out 200-400 years if there were safety issues that could arise presenting a challenge to the approach we have now dealing with spent fuel. right now we believe this is material that can be stored safely and securely in either the spent fuel pools themselves or dry storage. >> so what you're saying is a that most of what we read in japan in terms of the reactor problems has to do with the cooling of used nuclear fuel or spent fuel? that in the united states the amount of that fuel, that stuff that we produced over the last 35 years, would only fill a football field 20 feet deep, that it is stored at 104 -- well, how many sites -- >> 65 sites. >> 65 different sites around our country either in pools or dry storage and it's the

commission's estimate it can be safely stored there for up to 100 years? >> that's our assessment right now; yes. >> now, i want to complement the president when he started his administration. i was afraid we'd be on a windmill policy, but so far it's been thoughtful and balanced including through this crisis. he's appointed excellent people to your commission. dr. chu is a strong appointment guaranteeing loans to the nuclear plants, and more important or equally important is he has a distinguished panel looking at the future of used nuclear fuel, and i want to ask you to comment on that, you or mr. lyons, and as i understand it why we can safely store used nuclear fuel on site for 100 years, but what the president and others are suggesting is that we research a belter way to

-- better way to store it that might include reducing its mass by 70%-90% making it that much smaller, finding ways that plutonium wasn't separated from if, recycling it and using it over and over again. the bottom line would be is we're comfortable to store it as is up to 100 years, but over the next 10-20 years, looking for a better way to use recycled fuel, and that's what we're hoping to find from the recommendation of the president's commission. am i approximately right on that or what comments do you have? >> i defer to secretary lyons to that. >> as you note, the commission is to explore a wide range of options for management of used fuel back into the fuel cycle, and certainly at the department of energy, we are eagerly

awaiting their reports and suggestions and guidance. the interim report of that group is due by july 29th, final report by january of next year, and we anticipate that gives a range of guidance on the programs at the department of energy. while we await that report, we do maintain a broad spectrum of research ranging from the cycle that the country has now in understanding how that could be improved or sustained all the way to different options including the reprocessing that you're describing, and i'll give you our goals providing a set of options to the american people certainly guided by the output of the commission that can lead to a long term sustainable policy for used fuel management in the country. >> thank you. >> thank you very much, senator. senator lautenberg? >> thank you, madam chairman, thank you, both, for your

excellent testimony. dr. jaczko, do we have a better regulatory system than japan? is there a difference in the two systems? >> well, i think every country that has nuclear power takes a different approach to dealing with the safety of the reactors in their country. i think we have a system that is well suited to dealing with the safety of the reactors in this country. it's a system, as i said, that relies on multiple layers of protection, and it incorporates a strong basis in technical information, and we have a very strong presence of inspectors at the reactor sites, so we think this provides a very strong system to ensure the safety of plants in the united states. >> we -- in our conversation yesterday, we discussed the total review of all plants in

america, and i think that your time target was 90 days; is that correct? >> we're looking at a short term review in 90 days, and that will be followed by a much longer term review as we get more detailed information from japan. >> so we can be reassured that the problems that we saw japan will have a review of possibility here in our -- with our plants here in the country? >> absolutely, that's the focus of these reviews. >> well, the -- you know, we have the oldest plant, commercial plant in america, built in 1969. the fukushima plants i think were built in 71, am i correct on that? >> yes. >> is there any question about age of facilities that might

have contributed to the difficulty there? >> at this point, we don't know what the exact causes of the situation in japan are, but, again, if we look at the situation for the u.s. reactors, all the reactors that we have that are of a similar type have undergone modifications and improvements to deal with the kinds of situations that we're seeing in japan. for instance, it's been known since the late 80s and early 90s that the accumulation of hydrogen presents a significant challenge. the reactors of this type in particular were modified to ensure they could better mitigate or reduce the likelihood of that hydrogen explosion. we think we have a program or we have a program that addresses these issues, but we will do these comprehensive reviews to ensure that there suspect any information that -- isn't any information that we missed that can better enhance the safety.

>> mr. jaczko, can we say without fear of contra dick that our -- contradiction that our plants in normings are updated, able to deal with any malfunctioning of the operation? in 2009, april, i'm sure you recollect april of 2009, august of 2009, we had low level tridium leaks. that's a semidangerous material, and what assurance can i give the people in the surrounding area, that, hey, did we find any health risks with the leaks or were there examinations called for in the area, and did we find anything within those families

that they have to be concerned about? >> with regard to the leaks, we believe that's not an acceptable situation for any power reactor in the united states to have that kind of a leak. with regard to the oyster creek leak, we did not see any indication of any risk to public health and safety as a result of those particular leaks, and, in fact, the facility has made significant modifications to dramatically reduce the likelihood of something like that happening in the future, and i would add that those leaks were not in systems that directly effect the ability of the reactor to deal with accident errors or ensure the reactor itself or the spent fuel pools continue to function safely and securely. >> thank you, madam chairman, and thank you, again, witnesses. >> thank you, senator.

>> some of the record will remain open? >> it will remain open. >> thank you. >> senator durbin? >> thank you. it's a pleasure to be part of the committee. three mile island was 1979; correct? >> correct. >> i would say since then it's been frozen in place, no major expansion across the united states on the heels of that controversy, and i'm wondering now if the same thing is going to happen as a result of japan whether there's serious questions raised about operations, about design, and about nuclear waste that will once again cause the industry to stop, reflect, and probably slow down any plans to advance. i also understand the economics of energy as i've been told that natural gas, electricity power creation is cheaper and safer in

many respects, so that seems to be the general review of what i see coming from an outgrowth of this tragedy. we have a hearing last week in illinois because half of our electricity is generated by 11 generators and two of them have the same design of fukushima and representatives of your agency came as did state and local and the private sector, and we had a long conversation about many things including nuclear waste on site in illinois. 7200 tons worth of those nuclear nuclear -- pardon me, spent fuel rods. i recall from my college pushing the boulder up the hill barely getting to the top, it rolls back to the bottom of the hill. we roll the boulder close to the

top, but never quite reach it. i don't know ultimately whether it's $90 billion current estimate of investment will ever take plaices, and if it does, it's ten years over the horizon before a decision is made. i have to ask you a question that came up in our hearing. what about the situation with reprocessing? there was a time we took a national position on it to be an example to the world not to reprocess and create an opportunity to use plutonium for the develop of weapons, but i think what is happening or what i see today is that two of our major allies in the world, britain and france, france in particular, have decided to reprocessing is not only okay, it's a great commercial up -- investment, and they are receiving waste from other countries, reprocessing, dramatically reducing the size of the remaining radioactive challenge. is that thinking from the carter

administration really appropriate today? are we not in a world that is accepted reprocessing? should we not be looking at it ourselves as an alternative to a $90 billion investment that might come online ten years from now? >> well, senator, i briefly answer from the nrc's perspective and dr. lyons probably has a better answer. we are currently doing work to develop an infrastructure to support a reprocessing facility in this country. that activity is probably at medium to low level priority in the agency because of what we see from the commercial sector about interest in the immediate development or deployment of a reprocessing for a facility, but there's discussion now, and perhaps dr. lyons can give you more. >> there's a lack of interest in the commercial sector? suspect there our government responsibility --

isn't this our government responsibility? >> it is possible, but it could be a private sector development of a private reprocessing facility to do that. >> but is if your belief that the private sector and nuclear power believes maintaining these pools across the united states is a viable alternative? >> well, from the agency's perspective, we think that can be done safely and securely. the ultimate decisions on managing that spent fuel are really decisions outer federal government and the private steek tore itself -- sector itself on how long they want to maintain that. for instance, some facilities lose more fuels more quickly in dry storage, others leave it in pools. >> the push for the mountain came from the private sector. the argument was we don't want to be spoom any longer for these spent nuclear fuel rods with the danger associated with them. we want the federal government to accept the responsibility we believe is there and believe the

yuka mountain. you say they are not interested in that development? >> i think there is some interest right now. i would say as with any type of fuel, there is an industry that provides fuel for the reactors. there are economic considerations that go into whether or not reprocessing is the most effective way to provide that fuel, and i think in many ways that's what is driving the commercial side in terms of their interest in reprocessing or no reprocessing. it's a cost issue in many ways right now. >> i'm over the time, but in dr. lyons, if you want to respond. >> my respond is very length yi. there's many, many questions and maybe i can come back to it in other rounds, but just a few questions. you started with will the incidents in japan impact both here on nuclear power. personally, i think that's a review the nrc will conduct. the iaea stated there will be

reviewed comparing lessons learned. i think all the factors will come together to help understand and certainly for the nrc to decide whether regulatory changes are required that may impact the progression of nuclear power in the country. you alluded to, and i certainly agree, that the very low price of natural gas, the absence of any value placed on carbon certainly tends to favor approaches to new power like natural gas and that impacts any of the clean energy solutions. i can launch into a discussion on reprocessing, and i'd like to do that, but we are way over the time so i'll leave it up to you folks whether i should proceed. >> this is any first hearing, and i don't want to abuse the privilege. [laughter] >> thank you very much, senator. this has been very interesting. i want to thank you. i want to move on, but i just want to say something.

mr. chairman, you said that spent fuel could be stored safely and securely for 100 years either in spent fuel pools or dry casks. i'm amazed that storing it in these pools for that period of time, these pools are racked and reracked now more and more of them, how -- you know, when the design basis of these plants was put into effect, a lot of the threats were not present. you know, we didn't really about a terrorist bomb at our nuclear power plants. we do today, and, you know, all these spent fuel rods, very hot, again, some of them have cooled off somewhat, and i always thought that dry casks were the best kind of long term storage. to me, 100 years is long term storage. >> well, there's certainly -- i

think this is very much an issue that the commission is going to take a look at again without a doubt as part of the short term and long term review, but the information we have right now shows that beth of the methods are equally safe for a very long period of time. what obviously if you are getting to 60-70 years of spent fuel pool storage, that likely would not happen because that long period of time the reactor has likely been shut downgoing through a period of decommissioning. in that longer term scenario, you would likely see most of the fuel being moved into dry casks at that point, and as the fuel does get cooler, the likelihood of the very severe type of accident from the spent fuel gets reduced significantly. the concern is that you have a fire essentially in the release of a lot of raid ya active material from the spent fuel

pools. as the fool ages, the likelihood of the fire reduces dramatically. i adjust as a final point -- >> you're adding new rods all the time. >> as part of the process, we have required the license sees when they add new fuel, they add it in such a way that they balance the various -- kind of distribute the hot fuel in such a way that it really reduces the likelihood of this type of fire so they move and shuffle all of the fuel each time so that you always have hot fuel surrounded by much cooler fuel to reduce the likelihood of these challenges, but you really play out the much longer term, 60-80 years. we envision at that point most fuel moves out of the pools and into dry disornlg. it's, of course, the hot fuel always has to spend some amount of times in the pools to cool off to the point to be moved, but, again, this is something that i'm very confident we will be looking at as part of the

both the short term and long term review. >> thank you. .. >> so that will be another contribution to this overall discussion of the longevity of dry cask storage.

>> thank you very much, gentlemen. this was very helpful and we appreciate it. thank you for being here. i'm sorry. senator durbin? >> if i could do just one follow-up question because what i raised the issue of reprocessing, i thought that chairman's allusion was to the economics of it. and can't be the of these be to the economics of reprocessing and deriving some sort of a fuel source from that and dramatically reducing the waste that is left behind as opposed to the current cost of cooling pools, tasks, and ultimate national repository? >> senator durbin durbin, if i may, i'd indicate that we do have research broke ranks that span the gamut of different options for the backing of the fuel cycle and that certainly includes the reprocessing that you're addressing. we will be providing guidance on mr. s. was the economics, i have never seen a study that claimed

that it was less expensive to use reprocessing. there may be other reasons why one would want to reprocess but i'm certainly not aware of any study which says reprocessing would be a lower cost option. nor am i aware of any utility in this country that is pushing to move towards reprocessing. there certainly are companies for whom that is their product that would be very interested. also, you mentioned the situation in france and japan. let me just note that part of our research is designed to understand some of the limitations on particularly the approach that is used in japan, if your ex approach which we would not utilized in this country from a number of different perspectives, including environmental concerns. >> if i can for second, correct me if i'm wrong how i understood during the debate on yucca mountain that it was agreed that the ultimate responsibility for

store this nuclear waste was to be borne by the government and taxpayers spent that is correct. >> and so when you say that the commercial private sector does not support a reprocessing, it would seem to me that we are to be asking for the taxpayer's viewpoint whether an economic alternative if we are ever to build yucca mountain and transport all the waste in america to that site. >> welcome the nuclear waste policy act also requires that there be a fee levied on all nuclear power use that is intended to cover the costs of what ever back into whatever disposition shifts and is to be used. so whatever the cause of that will become and the courageous a one mill per kilowatt hour assessed on all nuclear power, that is intended to cover the backend. to the extent perhaps additional would be required for other backend systems, that would be passed along. >> my last question. i'm sorry, madam chair, but taking the current french

approach on reprocessing, are you saying we are done in economic bottle to compare the cost of reprocessing against the costs of initial repository? >> there have been a number of such models. i certainly can't characterize all of them quickly, but i'm quite sure the majority if not all of them would say that the repository, i'm not saying -- the repository approach probably is a lower cost. but there may be other reasons, and this is part of the blue ribbon commission review. there may be other reasons that would drive one towards some form of reprocessing. i believe it would be different than what is used in france. >> center, if i could perhaps clarify my reference to the economics. the economic comparisons that i'm referring to is the cost of fuel that would come direct from uranium that is mined in the ground, as opposed to the cost of fuel that would come from reprocessed uranium. that's the economic comparison that i was referring to.

in that case, right now the price of uranium generally favors the naturally mined uranium as a source of fuel. so that was the economic comparison i was referring to. >> thank you very much. >> madam chairman, your indulgence, please for a question that i have. it's puzzled me since you testified at an earlier hearing, dr. jaczko. the nrc's requires evacuation plans that only four areas within 10 miles of the plant. but the united states government has warned americans in japan to stay at least 50 miles away from the damaged reactors there, and the ships were turned around i think it was at 60 miles. when i asked you at the previous hearing what you thought was a safe distance, i think that the response that you gave me was 20 miles. can we clear this up? why not require the same kind of

evacuation plan to address the same distance here at home? >> well, senator, this is likely an issue we'll be looking at part of our short-term and long-term use. the 10-mile distance in the united states is the distance at which we develop preplanned and compared it graduation plans. so it's based on an event that would happen in a very short period of time for which you and have the ability to develop additional planning for evacuations beyond a certain distance. there is always the possibility that if anything were to develop like it has in japan, that additional protective actions could be required beyond 10 miles. but the requirements we have in place are for those, the preplanned that needs to be done so that if you got an event that happened in develop very quickly, you wouldn't have to

take the time into developing evacuation plan. they are already developed and ready to go as soon as that if it happens. but, of course, if the events in japan showed, it was something that happened over a portion of many, many days before we got to the point at which we look at information that indicated you could have to go to a greater distance. so far, the data coming out of the plant continues to show that a safe distance there is approximately 20 miles. so there's the work we do to preplanned which right now we believe 10 miles is sufficient, but that is not necessary the end of any protective action. you couldn't take additional action be on that. >> kind of a continuing basis to find out what's a good conclusion of this that you come. thank you. >> thank you very much centered. we have been joined by senator graham. please, if you'd like to make a statement or ask questions, just -- >> ask questions, great.

mr. chairman deeply the nuclear power industry in the united states is well regulated and generally save? >> i served as the chairman of the nrc but it is well regulated. and we do believe we have a strong program to ensure protection of public health and safety. >> would you advise the caucus to continue to pursue nuclear power as part of energy production in this country? >> decision is ultimate about what to do with nuclear power really are beyond, really our responsibility expect just as a citizen would you like to see america have more nuclear power in the future? >> i as a citizen would like to see nuclear power that is safe and secure, and that's fundamentally my job as chairman of nuclear regular commission. >> deeply the nuclear power plants that we're talking about constructing in the future are more modern and more save? >> certainly the plants that are under consideration have enhanced designs and safety

features that at least at the design stage and on paper seemed to indicate that they would have an inherent safety advantage over the existing plant. i want to stress if i could we believe the plans that are in existence, a to meet our requirements for safety and security and the new plans could potentially have some additional enhancements over that. >> like new cars have things that all cars don't have, but we still drive older cars. i have an older car. i feel safe in a. i will buy a newer car made him feel more safe i guess. at the end of the day, one of the big impediments, the benefit of nuclear power is increased good jobs in my view, and doesn't the pollutants in the air. is that your understanding? >> again, the focus with the agency is way to make sure the nuclear power, that is in this country safe and secure, and we continue to have a program we think that ensures -- >> i called clean energy, do you

agree? >> you know, i tend to not like to get into discussions about those spent let's talk about spent fuel pool. i think i didn't hear his questions come senator durbin is making a point about what should we do with spent fuel. i been a fan of the french reprocessing system, but quite frankly secretary chu has convinced me, and i think it was the best secretaries of energy we've ever had since i've been in congress. i like him a lot. incredibly smart. he's convinced me if we will be patient, maybe in the next decade plus there will be new technologies developed on the spent fuel reprocessing front that would be worth waiting on. do you agree with that? >> well, again for the nrc perspective, we would just want to make sure that spent fuel can be stored safe and secure into that we think that's the case right now. >> mr. lyons? >> let me start, senator graham, by heartily agree with my boss,

secretary chu spirit both of y'all are very smart. >> yes, we are very interested in exploring a wide range of options on the backing of the fuel cycle. >> you think would be beneficial not to duplicate the french system right now? >> the fudge system uses the pure x. process. they made improvements in it over the years. but we do have some issues related to possible proliferation. from that cycle. as well as environmental issues. we think that with research we can do substantially better. that's the research that secretary chu these leading to my office. >> is a shutting mountain down helpful or harmful? >> let me answer in this way, senator. i came to the department after the decision had been made, and i heartily agreed with the secretary that yucca mountain is not a workable solution. because i believe that the

equation needs both a technical and a local support. as a resident of nevada for many years, i saw the lack of local support. i do think it's possible and certainly the blue ribbon commission is working towards approaches that may not only provide interesting technical options, but i hope can be done in ways like has been done in many international venues of having strong local support. >> thank you. i think that is the key to this is probably local political support more than anything else. but we'll just move on right quickly. can you tell us what -- did mock still anyway contribute to the disaster in japan? >> no. >> we have a program to create mocks fuel in america that would take plutonium weapons and convert them into plowshares. do you support that? >> yes, sir. however, yes, i more of the program and true of --

>> if i could just indulge my college similar, there's 34 metric tons of weapon grade plutonium that are in excess here in equal the amount of russia. these are literally nuclear weapons. is a process called mox or you can take the weapon and diluted down. and great commercial fuel. you are literally taking a sword and turning into a plowshare. that program is going on in south carolina. i just want to thank the administration for being supportive of the program after some things being said and asked about the mox program i would like to get straight. again, do you believe that producing mox chill here in america makes sense, this overall safe and you recommend we continue to do so? >> well again, sir, when we cross the safety i need to go back to great but i certainly understand that the nonproliferation aspect -- >> it is huge, isn't?

>> yes, sir. >> you are taking weapons grade plutonium off the market. do you support the mox program? >> we've done a very thorough analyses of the use of mox chill and right now all the information that indicates it can be used safely spent thank you very much for your testimony. >> thank you very much, senator graham. thank you so much. we will proceed to the next panel. i would ask the witnesses to come forward as quickly as you can come and staff to change name cards. g[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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we reviewed a written statement, so if you can summarize and we can have a more informal discussion, i think that would be most useful. you for the prior panel. we would be interested on your reactions and reflections. >> madam chairman, ranking member alexander, thanks again for the opportunity to present and discuss some views on the development of nuclear power in the united states in the wake of the fukushima events. i must i buy emphasized that my testament are purely my personal views, not those of pcast, the blue ribbon commission or mit. fukushima has reopened the global discussion about the future of nuclear power, but we could don't know how this debate will end. however i think some outcomes are a very good bet. the cost of doing business at nuclear reactors will go up. expected relicensing a 40 year-old nuclear plants for another 20 years will face

additional scrutiny. these plants like those in fukushima lied on reactive safety systems. and third, the options for the entire spent fuel management system i expect will be reevaluated. let me selectively address a few of these issues. first, cost. currently operating plants would certainly face a very expensive proposition to retrofit is designed threats are elevated substantially. this calls for a plant by plant review. of coursereview. of course, include specific circumstances like a seismic. in many cases, however, perhaps most i expect a design basis threats are likely to be deemed sufficiently conservative and remain unchanged. oregano decisions about safety records can be assisted by application and new capabilities, among them the kind of advanced modeling tools being developed at the first

innovation have at oak ridge. i might say with major image engagement. of the types of retrofit could be more easily absorbed into the normal operations. such as transitioning, to get higher safety margins, i believe that the slow pace of this indicates historically r&d program fully aligned with strategic priorities but the current roadmap i think is a big step in the right direction. new nuclear power plants are already challenged let's face it, by high capital costs and increased costs, capital or operating, could tip the balance for many projects depending upon many financing and cost recovery factors. we -- reducing the financial risk premium for nuclear power is a major objective of government support, principally through the loan guarantee program in fukushima does not help in this regard. an entirely different approach to new plans lies with small

modular reactors, and these could be a powerful way to address the cost issue of moving from economies of scale to the economies of manufacturing. but i do want to say and i'm very enthusiastic about these but i do want to say there's a catch-22, that these economies of manufacture cannot be realized presumably if we have a sufficient string of order for a great wind down set of technology options. that would be a complex interplay of government and the many proponents of end customers for the currently contending numerous assets them are designed to private fukushima get ministrations about a budget for 2012 that would greatly enhance the level of activity for bringing smr's to market. i believe that program is modest, ostensible and deserves support. second relicensing the relicensing decisions at the nsa will almost certainly experience some delay. is the anticipated life extensions are not realize at

any appreciable degree, we have to face the issue of replacing potentially tens of thousands of megawatts of non-emitting generations. on anemia problem because our natural gas situation, but if we want to have those zero emission options for 2020, it is an immediate challenge to develop them and they do want to emphasize among those options we must retain next generation with advanced safety systems, including smr's. third, spent fuel management. the fukushima problems with spent fuel pools, co-locate with reactive will undoubtedly lead to reevaluate a spent fuel on management strategy. our reports have advocate well before this we should be moving in any case to consolidated spent fuel storage. this has many drivers. among them resolution of federal reliability issues if we are not living spent fuel away from

reactors. and i believe congress should allow use of the waste fund for development of consolidated storage. but eventually the spent fuel must go to a repository. mighty is, my recommendation in the end is to consolidate spent fuel dry cask storage be established as soon as possible, as i discussed. and that a geological repository be established as soon as possible or defense high level waste and spent fuel. that is, i would argue going back, reevaluate the 1980 decision to go mangling defense and civilian waste. separate them because i believed for many reasons we can move much faster towards a defense waste repository which would in turn developed a minute amount of knowledge and experience for a waste to foster. thank you and look forward to the discussion. >> thank you very much, dr. moniz.

>> chairman feinstein, ranking him alexander, thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today. my name is william levin, i'm president and chief operating officer of psg by which is a sissy of public service enterprise group headquartered in newark, new jersey. we are a merchant generating company and has a product 40,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity. we own 100% of the hope creek nuclear station, 57% of the sale of nuclear station, and 50% of the other station. i appreciate your invitation to testify at today's hearing to discuss the status of u.s. nuclear energy industry and application of the fukushima nuclear accident on nuclear energy and the united states. i am testifying today on behalf of the nuclear energy institute, nuclear energy industries washington-based policy organization. my remarks today will cover four points. first, u.s. nuclear power plants are safe.

second, safety is at the u.s. nuclear energy industries top priority. third, the u.s. nuclear energy industry has a long history of continuous learning from operational events. we will do the same as a result of the fukushima event. and forthcoming u.s. nuclear energy industry has already taken proactive steps to verify and validate our readiness to manage extreme events. we took the steps of early without waiting for clarity on the sequence affairs at fukushima. regarding the first point, u.s. nuclear power plants are safe. they are designed and operated conservatively to manage the maximum credible challenge is appropriate to each nuclear plant site. u.s. nuclear power plants have also demonstrated their abilities to maintain safety through extreme conditions, including floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. u.s. nuclear reactors are

designed to withstand earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and other natural events equal to the most significant historical event our maximum projected events for march with conservative without any breach of safety systems. regarding the second point, safety is the u.s. nuclear energy's industries top priority in complacency about safety performance is not tolerated. we know we operate in an unforgiving environment where the penalties for mistakes are high, and where credibility and public confidence once lost are difficult to recover. all other safety related metrics tracked by industry and the nuclear registry commission demonstrate high levels of excellence. forced outage rates, and plant safety systems actuations, worker radiation exposures, events with safety applications, and lost time accident rates have all turned it down year over year for a number of years.

regarding the third point, the u.s. nuclear industry routinely incorporates lessons learned from operating experience into its reactor designs and operations. i could point to many, many examples of improvements made to the u.s. nuclear power plants over the years in response to lessons learned from operational events over the last 40 years. let me just list a few. in the 1970s, concerns were raised about the ability of boiling water reactor mark would condemn us to its design was team is vented. subsequently, and the united states operating with a mark when contained implemented modifications to dissipate energy released today pool and and so stringent support to a comment loads that be generated. in 1980 and nuclear registry commission concluded that additional station blackouts of sbl, registry requirements were justified and issued station blackout will to provide further assure us that allowed both

off-site and on site emergency ac power system would not adversely impact the public health and safety. the spr will is based on several plant specific probably stick safety studies operating experience and reliability, action sequence and consequent analysis and data between 1975 and 1988. and third, since the terrorist events of september 11, 2001, u.s. nuclear plant operators identified either beyond design basis vulnerabilities. as a result the u.s. nuclear plant designs and operating practices since 9/11 are designed to mitigate severe accident scenarios such as aircraft impact which includes the complete loss of on site power and all on site emergency power sources and loss of large areas of land to the industry develop additional methods and procedures to provide cooling to the reactor and the used fuel pools. and equipment at all u.s. nuclear power plants to ensure that plants are equipped to deal with extreme events and staff are trained to manage them.

regarding the final point, u.s. nuclear industry has only started assessment of events in japan and is taking steps to assure that he was reactors could respond to events that may challenge safe operation of the facility. these actions include verifying each plants capability managed to severe accident centers develop after 9/11 that i previously described. verifying each plants capability managed a total loss of offsite power. verifying the capability can to mitigate flooding in the impact of floods and systems inside and outside the plant and performed lockdowns and inspection of important agreement need to respond successfully to extreme events like fires and floods. in conclusion, madam chairman, it will be sometime before we understand the precise sequence of what happened at fukushima. before have a complete analysis of how the reactors perform, how equipment and to perform, how the operators performed. as we learn from this tragic event, however, you can rest assured we will learn from those

lessons incorporate them into our design and training and operating procedures. this concludes my oral testimony, madam chairman, and i look forward to answering questions the committee may ha have. >> good morning, madam chairman, and ranking him alexander. i push it it is up into travel of your from chattanooga, tennessee, to provide my testimony today. among the many challenges workers face at fukushima dig nuclear plant was a need to provide cooling for radiated field in seven on site spent fuel pools. the refill was mature come when inside the core of an opera and reactor, it radiated fuel so hazardous that the plant has an array of emergency systems whose sole purpose is to protect the fuel from damage by overheating. some of these emergency systems feature motor driven pumps, while some features steam driven pumps. these emergency core cooling systems can be powered by the electrical grid, but emergency diesel generators, in some cases by on site batteries at the diversity and redundancy of these emergency core cooling systems provides high but not

absolute assurance that the radiated fuel will be adequately cooled. if the highly reliable cool systems fail, the radiated fool in the reactor core is encased within strong concrete walls four to five feet thick. this structure provides additional assurance that the public is protected. after being discharged from the reactor core, the radiated fuel awaits transfer to a federal repository which does not exist. united states has been more than $10 billion on a proposed repository at yucca mountain in nevada that the department of energy faces and in its engineering challenge, citing a repository because that location must isolate the fuel from the environment for at least 10,000 years into the future, or merely 42 times longer than we've been in the united states of america. ..

>> instead, the pools are often housed in building with sheet metal siding like that in a storage shed. i have nothing against the quality of the storage sheds, but they are not suitable for nuclear waste storage. the bottom line is we failed to manage the risk from the rate

aided storage at the power plants. we can and must do better. there's better ways to manage the risk. first, transfer to dry storage and update the emergency procedures for spilled fuel accidents. currently, we fill the pools to capacity and put the overflow into dry casks keeping the pools filled with the fuel maintaining the risk as high as you can achieve. a better strategy would be to reduce the inventory. less radiated fuels in the pools results in a lower heat load in the pools giving workers more time to cool and reestablish water inventory reducing the likelihood of damage. having less of it in the pools means the cloud emitted from the pool is much, much smaller

posing less harm to people downwind. following the 1979 accident at three mile island, they updated procedures. before that, it relied on diagnosing what happened. if the operators misdiagnosed the accident, that directs them to actually take the wrong steps for the accident they faced. for what caused the abnormal conditions. they are significant improvements over the pretmi days, but no procedures respond to spilled fuel accidents. emergency procedures have to be provided to derive the same safety benefits.

thank you. >> thank you very much. gentlemen, i'm certainly not a nuclear expert. you are far more so, but the first time i've been in a nuclear plant was in past week, and i had an occasion to visit the two in california k spend the whole day doing it, but what jumps right out at you is the difference between the containment of the core, the spent fuel pool, the location of that pool, and the dry cask situation. here's the question. there's a major study apparently by bob alvarez at the nuclear policy institute for policy studies for the use of dry cask storage at nuclear power plants, and he con tandz that -- contends that dry cask has the potential to reduce the overall risk associated with reactor

storage of spent fuel. let me ask each of you from your view point, why does industry practice appear to be to keep the spent fuel in pools much longer than the required 5-7 years? why wouldn't they move it aggressively to dry cask? >> thank you, madam chairman. first, i think at a very high level is what i would say from the history of our nuclear power program, i would say that the storage, storage of spent fuel between, the reactor and presumed repository, has been an afterthought, not really part of the serious policy discussion of fuel cycle design. as a result, of what one seens in some sense what is logical to a plant operator, operational decisions, so as david said, the

dry cast storage is viewedded as overflow when the pool can't handle anymore denseification. what i think we need to do is stand back, really ask what is our whole integrated system about storage and disposal, and that's exactly what i call for. in fact, i think the move to dry cask is essential furthermore for a set of reasons we have to think hard about consolidated storage presumeably at federal reservations to solve a host of problems. >> thank you. i agree with you. >> thank you, madam chairman, and certainly the topic of used fuel and how we dispose of it is one worthy of significant discussion, and i would not characterize the industry having a reluctance of putting unusual bundles into storage. one of the helpful io lemes is lack of a national strategy.

if i could offer one thought in the area is we want to limit the number of times we have to handle used fuel, and so we want to be able to take it out of the pool once, put it into storage and have it go where it can go. not alling casks are designed for transportation example. if they are stored on site for a long period of time, we want to do that. if they have to be transported, they have to be a cask that can do that. you know, we were essentially planning for what we believe the direction of the country was heading, and we know how to do it. we asked if we consider things like supply chain availability of these sorts of things and have the training and qualification of the people that need, you know, to do this sort of activity, but i wouldn't characterize it as a reluctance on our part to do it, but rather lacking with the national plan and develop our plan to match up with that.

>> are you saying you believe as an operator we would be better off with a federal policy that essentially set the handling of waste? >> no -- >> and have either regional repositories or a national repository in >> what i was referring to, madam chairman, is what is the ultimate disposition of the issue? where will it go? what's the most effective way to get it there. >> thank you. >> i agree with the point that spent fuel storage on site was an afterthought and i agree with the position that it's been a shifting thought. the government keeps saying we'll take fuel at such and such a date, and then that date splines by quite a bit. it's difficult to base a decision on how best to store on site fuel when the parameters shift year to year so i think i agree with bill that it's not been reluctance, but that shifting paradigm that keeps causing problems. >> dr. moniz?

>> can i add a point? i agree with bill. it's the absence of a system that allows rational decisions. as bill mentioned, it's important, there's not a consistent policy on things of sizes of casks which is quite important, but if i may go back, you invited comments on the earlier panel to comment on the issue of the 100 year storage which chairman jaczko mentioned. we think that there is a good case to be made for the integrity of 100 year storage, but the reality is it's based upon extraordinary skimpy data base, and this is an example of the kind of research and development priority we should have been having and now is being revived post fukushima, and now it's more important.

this gets to bill's point about handling the fuel. well, it may be the fuel can be contained for 100 years, but what about when you move it then? will movement compromise integrity? these are the issues we need to have a system view of number one, and number two, i would say this is one of the many reasons where i personal favor consolidated storage because if you bring the fuel together, and there are not any issues, you can have at that site the infrastructure to deal with those problems in the spent fuel if there are any after 80-100 years. >> thank you. senator? >> doctor moniz, if the nation can't agree on one repository, how will they agree on multiple sites? >> thank you, senator. first of all, the consolidated

sites i talk about are not necessarily repositories. >> well, places where you would haul the fuel to put it so it's the same issues of local support, and we do not. >> certainly, by by the way, i strongly support the idea that we should -- we have to find public support in regions to move things. now, i think having a dry cask storage facility is different from a repository. i don't claim it's easy. it's tough. also, i just -- for example, such a location would have, for example, a substantial research and testing infrastructure. >> yeah. >> around the spent fuel. that's the kind of design we need i believe. >> yeah. i'm -- the -- would you agree that the dr. chu's plan and

others that we could number one safely store on sight our used nuclear fuel while for the next 10-20 years we develop aggressive research and development to try to find a better way to use, recycle nuclear fuel? do you think that's both wise and safe to do? >> yes, sir. first, i would say that we don't see any large differentiateing on safety, security, or cost of distributed storage versus stallized storage. there are other system reasons we preferred centralized storage. >> while we do the research and development, is it safe to store it on site? >> yes, it is. on terms of the research and development program in the report last year, we put forward exactly that kind of a program, and i should add it is based

upon something that secretary lyons inferred that current processing approaches have merit, but we need to develop more advanced approaches. >> may i ask you -- i want to ask you two questions in two minutes and 25 seconds. one is about radiation. we see on television news that a trace of radiation is discover in the united states as a result of the japanese accident, yet testimony in the previous pam was we shouldn't worry about that. why is that true? >> well, a brief answer, maybe david has more specifics on it. the information i've received is that the measurements in this country including in my home state what is the magnitude what we consider to be levels of concern. >> is it true every day we

receive some radiation naturally? >> yes, sir, in the united states, the average citizen receives about 300miliram a year, half a of cat scan. >> and maybe another 300 from scans -- >> on average, yes. >> and that's no harm to a person to receive? >> well, you know, it's an area i'm not an expert in. there's a lot of argument going on about so-called linear hi pot . >> you mentioned the work that mit and oakridge are doing in modeling knock lar power plants. i understand it, that's based on the supercomputing capacity there that this subcommittee and

congress and president are asked to fund on a yearly -- [no audio] >> right now, forever

because there's no other plan, and in some dry casks -- so let me begin with you, what do you think of that idea? >> an independent assessment is never a bad thing, but i think equally important or more important would be the nrc undertakes the longer term review and come up with a lot of lessons learned informed by with the work of the ie is doing and the work that the industry is doing and the independent assessment would do. i think it's vitally important for the senate or congress more

broadly to look at the results from the nrc's review, what they've identified, and the schedule for implementing that. if they need more budget in order to make the things happen on a more timely basis, that needs to happen because the best plan in the world doesn't really help anybody until it's implemented, so i think the nrc will come up with a good list of things to do to make our plants less as a vulnerable that to thing, and it's important they get to the end of the effort as quickly as possible. i think the congress can help set priorities and get this done expeditiously as possible. >> thank you. >> madam chairman, the industry will be looking at their own assessment of this event, you know, coordinated through the institute of power operations in concert with the world association of nuclear operators and nrc does a review independently. we're committed to the safety of our plants. we welcome any and all assessments and certainly an independent assessment is fine just to be sure we got a right.

>> thank you, thank you. dr. moniz? >> i would agree. it's unrealistic to think we can move forward frankly without a major assessment and independent system will be called for. what that means exactly, independent and who would be the independent body is not entirely clear in my view. >> well, with the national academy of science be able to put that kind of body together which is what they generally do when they look at something? >> yes, i think the national academy is certainly an option. sometimes they move more slowly than one would like, but i think if they -- in my view, perhaps with a strong connection to an outstanding technical group like npo, for example, could be a good way of putting together a review. >> thank you. anything else, senator? >> no, i'd like to thank the witnesses for a very helpful

statements that you made and thank the chairman for looking into this. as i said at the beginning, it's very important that we talk about nuclear power. you know, nuclear power is such a complex mechanical operation that is makes sensational television news whenever there's a problem even though hundreds of thousands of people in japan are homeless and 1,000 bodies washed up on a beach one day, the news was about the nuclear reactors. it's important as a country we similarly learn how to honestly ask questions to continuously improve what we're doing, but at the same time, you know, lots of people die every year from pollution, from coal plants that isn't collected in pollution control systems, and from other forms of energy production, so i

think it's important we keep it all in perspective and recognize that the safety record for the generation of nuclear power in the united states really couldn't be better in terms of harm to people. it can always be improved. there's lessons from three mile island, but no one yet has contradicted my statement that no one was hurt at three mile island, so this is helpful testimony, and i think, madam chairman, the most important thing we can do is advance the research on used nuclear fuel on small module reactors, on any other safety enhancements that might be recommended that would continue to help us produce large amounts of reliable low cost clean electricity of which i think nuclear power is an important component. >> well, thank you, senator. of course, i come from a state that's in the ring of fire, and the ring of fire has had some

very big earthquakes around it. one of the things i learned from the usgs was that the sea bottom as large as the state of maryland moved in a seduction under the plate, and that launched the tsunami which was amazing for me to hear, so, you know, i think no one ever saw it in design basis that that kind of thing would happen, and let me just ask, do each of you have a last thought for us? because -- anything you'd like to say, and then we'll conclude rapidly. >> i think the point you make about what is it we don't know is obviously something we challenge ourselves with every day which is really the reason why these procedures we've referred to were developed in a little over a decade ago so that

we could respond, you know, to the consequence of the event versus figuring out what the event is, and that means if the heat is loss, what do you do? if you lost ac power, what would you do? you know, we ask ourselves continually those what if questions and what have we missed here, and i'm sure there's learnings out of here we can apply to our practices to improve the safety of our facilities. >> thank you, thank you. i was with the ceo of southern california eddison, and he said the same thing you did what what we know is what we know and we have to challenge people with what we don't know, and i very much agree with that. dr. moniz or mr. lachbaum? >> i would just say as obviously the event in japan was tragic even if there are no lives loss from the radiation released, that was a multibillion asset

becoming a liability very quickly. we need from the economic cost of the accident learn as much as we have. the industry is going to do it, the nrc is going to do it. it's shame on us if we don't reap the full lessons gained from that. >> thank you. >> perhaps a few comments about research and development programs, something under the direct purview of this subcommittee and you'll be considering it. just note that last year we issued a report of the future of the nuclear fuel cycle. i wanted to note the areas that we noted for research and development viewing these as real gaps historically in the program, life extension for lwr, some technologies, some new tajes like fuel planning that we mentioned earlier, advanceed

fuel development, the modeling and simulation as identifying and quantifying uncertainties, dry cask life extension, other concepts including enhanced waste forms for storage and disposal. i emphasize that this is way before fukushima. this is last year that these kinds of technologies which are about the workhorse of our nuclear fleet, like water reactors have been deflected, and i think these should be a strong priority. we could have in addition to this something that senator alexander referred to is a program for the future of the possible closed cycles that might make sense for reasons of waste management or resource extension, but our view is if nuclear power is to play an important role in the next few decades, it's these things we

need, the storage technologies, the new fuels, the new safety modules, ect.. i urge in your consideration of the doe budget that these are given a lot of attention. >> you make a lot of sense. senator? >> may i ask permission to include in the record an article from the guardian in london on sunday from a leading environmentalist in the country that headlined from fukushima made me stopped worrying and love nuclear power. his comment was atomic energy is subjected to the harshest test and the impact on people and the planet has been small. the crisis of fukushima converted me to the cause of nuclear power. this is -- >> oh, my goodness. >> well -- >> the effect has been -- >> of the reactors. >> on the reactors, but the effect on the country and on the people and the economy, on the

seabed, i mean, it's enormous. >> the effect of the reactors. this is his comment, but he reviews in his article that the disaster goes through all the other ways of producing energy and concludes that atomic power has to be a part of the discussion. >> we will put it in the record. >> this is one person who is an environmentalist who had that unusual reaction to the disaster. >> it is unusual. your thoughts have been very helpful, and i just like to ask if you have other thoughts, please communicate them to this subcommittee because dr. moinz is right, this research and development program is directly under our jurisdiction and we need to consider the things you mentioned, and we will, so thank you, gentlemen, very much for the testimony. it's very helpful, and the hearing is adjourned.

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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> we have some more live events coming up today. in just a couple of minutes a congressional hearing on nasa's proposed 2012 budget. that gets underway shortly on our companion network, c-span.

>> the nato commander taking charge of operations in libya said intelligence reports suggest the possibility of al-qaeda elements within opposition forces. admiral roberts however said he has no reports suggesting al-qaeda links to the leadership

of the opposition. on the policy of regime change, he says the mission allows the people of libya to achieve that goal. this three hour senate arms services hearing including testimony from the head of u.s. strategic command responsible for u.s. nuclear weapons programs, cybersecurity, and other areas. >> this morning's hearing is one in a series of posture hearings held annually with the combat and commanders as part of this committee's review of the president's budget requests for the coming fiscal year budget. our witnesses are admiral james, nato supreme commander here and commander of the u.s. european command, and general c robert taylor, commander u.s. strategic commander. welcome you both.

no strainers to the committee serving as commander of the u.s. southern command. this is his second appearance before this committee in his current position. he comes at a most important time. being supreme ally commander in europe, in other words, our nato commander. this is general taylor's first opportunity to testify before the committee. having assumed command and responsibility just two months ago. he is not new to the issues, however, as most of his career was involved in strategic and space systems. on behalf of the committee, i thank you both for your long and distinguished service. we would also like to recognize the men and women who serve in the european command area and around the world as members of the forces of the strategic command as they support and enable a wide range of important global missions.

please pass along the appreciation of this committee to them for their commitment and their dedication and to their families for the essential support that they provide. once again our servicemen and women have been called into harm's way. this time as part of an international coalition to prevent the qa qa's opposition. they fight for human rights that are inspiring others in the arab world. president obama took a thoughtful and deliberate approach to u.s. involvement in the libyan crisis emphasizing that a military mission be limited and also have the support of a broad international coalition incoming the endorsement of the united nations and the arab league. securing the support and

participation of an international coalition has been critical both for regional and international acceptance of the use of military force and ensuring that the risks and costs of operations are not princely americas. the president has consistently made clear that the u.s. leadership of this mission would be limited in time, that there would be a handoff of command and control to a nato-led coalition which currently includes at least two arab countries. president obama has reiterated that to it is a u.s. goal that colonel gadhafi should go. we applied significant tools of national power to increase heavy pressure against colonel gadhafi and his family, a travel ban,

and a freeze on more than $30 billion on libyan assets. today, representatives from coalition countries as well as from the united states, the arab league, the african union, and other arab countries are meeting in london to dos the international effort in support of a libyan people. gadhafi is more and more isolated and his military capabilities are degrated and air strikes will continue as long as he continues to threaten his own people. the international community including critically important arab countries have responded to gadhafi's repression with u.n. security counsel resolution 1970 which imposed sanctions and weapons viable against libya, and u.n. security counsel resolution 1973 which authorizes the use of "all necessary

measures to impose a no-fly zone and to protect libyan civilians from the threat of attack by the gadhafi government." while coalition operations to enforce the security counsel resolution were initially under a task force led by the u.s. africa command, they have provided important support to establishment of the no-fly zone. maritime and air assets based in europe participated in the no-fly zone and in operations to protect civilians, stra ncom demonstrated their capabilities when they bombed airfields in libya. our coalition partners brought significant assets to no-fly missions against libya. enforcing this comes from ten countries and maritime

operations are conducted by nearly 40 ships, two-thirds of which are provided by coalition partners including aircraft carriers from france and italy. last week, nato took charge of enforcing the no-fly zone and embargoes against libya. the that toe political body agreed to take command of all aspects of the military operations under u.n. security counsel resolution 1973 including the mission of protecting the libyan people. the lieu tent heading the task force reports to admiral and his capacity as nato supreme ally commander to europe. the president carefully laid out and set out the mission and helped organize a *u7b mandate

and coalition to pursue it before that mission was launched. it has gained momentum and achieved some notable disease, and so far without any ally casualties. it is a unique moment in history when the international community comes together and acts to stop a tyrant who is mas considering his people. the president from the beginning said the military mission did not include regime change. if it did, it would require outside ground forces which the president clearly and properly rejects. our military leaders, fear of mission creep has been understood by the president and respected. those who favor including in the military mission, the tackling of gadhafi, need to address the problems created by getting deeper into the land of an arab country, putting ourselves in the middle of a civil war, almost certainly destroying the coalition, and ignoring the u.n.

mandate. the creation of that international coalition and mandate are of historic importance and essential to avoiding pitfalls. the goal of the effort is to make it possible for the libyan people to have the opportunity to decide gadhafi's fate just as the egyptian people decided mubarak's. if the situation on the ground in libya continues to be volatile and gadhafi continues to threaten his own people, then the issue arises as to whether the coalition should arm the opposition in libya because such a step must be considered in the context of a nato decision that will require consensus. one critical consideration is whether providing arms to the rebels would be consistent with the mission and the mandate for intervention and perhaps most importantly whether the nato coalition and its partners would maintain the critically essential unity if such a policy

were adopted. president obama has been cautious in weighing the conditions for the use of military force. i believe he will continue to wait carefully -- weigh carefully the pros and cons of providing defensive arms such as heavy vehicles and arms in afghanistan. the troops and partners make up the vast majority of the 48 countries and more than 40,000 non-u.s. troops participating in the nato-led assistance community force. along with 90,000 u.s. troops, our isef partners' contributions have been significant, and we honor their sacrifices. at the nato summit last corp, they agreed to endorse the afghan's government assuming responsibility for security. this is an important and

welcomed step and president car disci announced the first round of provenses in taking a security lead this summer. if we are to succeed, our message and actions must be two-fold. we must part a need offer jen sigh to take ownership of their country's security which is why i'm a strong supporter of the july 2011 date set by the president to begin reductions of u.s. forces and begin accelerating the transcigs of security responsibility to afghan security forces and at the same time, we must assure and reassure the afghans that is as they assume more and more responsibility for security, we will be there to support them. our european allies need to focus more on seeing this mission through to a successful conclusion and nato members need to meet isaf requirements for

trainers for the afghan army and police. the balance of my statement i put into the record, and i will call now upon senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and let me thank our witnesses for joining us this morning and for their many years of service to our nation. on behalf of the entire committee, i'd like to extend our thanks to all the brave men and women in uniform. you lead and sacrifice so faithfully for us. i want to echo the chairman in saying it's a pleasure to have general kehler for the first time in his capacity as u.s. strategic command and it's a pleasure to have the admiral back to discuss the many complex challenges in the european command especially with u.s. forces engaged in operations in libya and with the transcigs of that to nato command. the chairman said there's a hearing this thursday on the current operations in libya, so

let me just say briefly the decision to intervene momentarily was right and necessary, and i believe that last night the president made a clear and convincing case for that. the president's action surely averted a mass atrocity in benghazi. had we not intervened, refugees would destabilize tunisia and been devastated. turning a deaf ear on muslims who are pleading for our rescue and this would have become a fertile breeding ground and ideology for al-qaeda. we prevented the worst outcome and now have the opportunity with libya forcing gadhafi to leave power. i disagree with the president that the use of force is ruled out, but facts on the ground

show we are taking necessary steps to do so. with our support, opposition forces are making significant progress towards that end on the ground and would insert that u.s. and allied air power is the key element in whether these rebels, antigadhafi forces succeed or fail. we need to keep the pressure on gadhafi and add to it where possible. gadhafi may crack. i think it's very possible he may do so, but i don't think we can place all of our hopes on that outcome. a long and costly stalemate it not in our interest. it is not in our interest to have a 10 year stalemate in iraq following operation desert storm and a long and costly stale meat in libya is not beneficial to any of the parties. our focus with libya is we must remember how many diverse

security issues are being addressed in both commands our witnesses lead. in european command, many of the diverse armed missions of our forces intersect from cyberattacks, terrorists, to building capacity in supporting nato's campaign in afghanistan to map tan the strategic balance of forces with other euro asian powers. in addition to libya, i'm interested to hear in what steps if any are taken to support the rearmerment of georgia. it's not our means to leave a country without the means to properly defend itself. we are interested in an update on the initial phase of our deployment of the european based adaptive approach to missile defense as well as the progress made in projections and the timeline set forth by the

president for phases two through four. this is especially important in light of recent statements by russian leaders rejecting state of u.s. policy of deploying all four phases of this critical missile defense program. i know that both witnesses have been involved to varying degrees in the search for commonground on missile defense with russia. we're eager to hear the witness' assessment on the prospects of such cooperation ever occurring. general, you take command of strategics at a critical time as we embark on the nuclear and weapons complex, defining capabilities for the 21st century, and cement the role of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare as core competencies. the president's budget for fiscal year 2012 represents the initial investment in what is a costly, yet vital reup vestment in nuclear weapons

modernization. importance of congress fully funding the long term modernization of the weapons complex should have been driven home last year during the debate over the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, and yet in the full year fiscal 2011 appropriations bill that congress has now considering for dod, the house cut the president's request by $312 million and the senate cut the request by $185 million. these actions are very troubling to me, and i'd like to know whether you share this assessment, general, as well as how such cuts affect your command's mission of fielding safe, reliability, and effective strategic forces. finally, on the issue of our cybersecurity, i was struck by a statement general keith alexander made in recent testimony in the house arm services committee and he said, "we're finding we don't have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. bluntly, we are very thin in a

crisis that would quickly stress our cyber forces." he was clear that the threat is not a "hypothetical danger and remain concern that the com lacks the legal authorities and the sufficient trained personnel to fully perform its critical role in the realm of cybersecurity." again, i welcome the witnesses, and thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator mccain. admiral? >> chairman, ranking member, members of the committee, thank you. it's a pleasure and honor to be with you here and also a great chance to be with bob kehler for his inaugural testimony as you pointed out. i want to take a moment up front to mention some of the things we're down at u.s.-european command in three categories. one is military operations. one is partnering in training

with allies and friends, and the third is something i think is very important which is engaging with the inner hags. -- inneragency. i'll conclude with a word about libya, but i'll start with afghanistan. at any given time, about 80% of the 45,000 non-u.s. troops who are in afghanistan come from europe. at this moment, we have 12,000 u.s.-european command soldiers who are deployed. we very much focus on afghanistan from u.s.-european command and try our best to support general jim maddis and of course, general dave petraeus, our nato and u.s. commander in afghanistan. like general petraeus and, of course, he was up about a week ago, i am today cautiously on the -- onon the --

optimistic. we have a coalition of 49 group contributing nations, largest coalition in history, and it is making, i think, measurable progress in the transition to afghan-led security operations so i can talk more about that in the question and answer period, but i did want to register my sense of optimism, cautious on optimism for our progress in afghanistan today. in terms of partnership, i think that's a very important aspect of what we do at u.s.-european command. 51 nations who are part of our military to military relationships. last year, for example, we did 33 major exercises engaging about 50,000 folks. we do a significant amount of training across the spectrum, senator mccain, back in gadhafi, and i think --

georgia, and i think that partnership building is why there's 41,000 non-u.s. troops today with us in afghanistan. third point quickly, inneragency, we are also very engaged in european command with our inneragency partners, and i think that's important. everything from disaster relief where we were engaged with both israel and russia last year after forest fires to working with the drug enforcement administration on extending the flow of narcotics out of afghanistan because the profits goes right back to the pockets of the afghanistan. those three things are where we are trying to focus military operations, our partnering, and on our very good work with the upperagency. in terms of future challenges, we talked about afghanistan. we are also very concerned about the ballistic missile threat as

senator mccain said. we with talk about how we are doing, and i think the animal is reasonably well on the phase adaptive approach. we are seeking the right balance with russia and finds zones of cooperations where we can. military to military is very important and we mentioned terrorism and cyber, and all those things are indeed on our plate. a word about libya since the chairman and ranking member mentioned it in their opening statements. i would like to clarify that i wear two hats. one, of course, is u.s.-european command, and in that u.s. capacity, i am what is called a supporting commander. i am supporting the lead combat and commander, general carter ham of africa command. he is the principle u.s. operator largely responsible for leading the coalition that has

been in operation for several weeks. my rule here is in logistics and moving troops forward for him, and i can, of course, talk about that. my other hat is the supreme leaders of europe, the supreme officer for nato, and in that regard, as senator mccain and senator levin mentioned, we are, in fact, taking this mission. we already took the arms mission several days ago. we've taken the no-fly zone, and now we are prepared to take over the protecting the population, all of which stems directly from the u.n. security counsel resolution. we are in the process of transcigging to a nato-led operation from this coalition, and i can certainly talk about aspects of that in my nato hat as desired. i hope that gives you a quick overview of what we are focused on.

i'll conclude by saying i'm proud of the men and women serving there. i'll carry back the comments of the chairman and ranking member and the whole committee. i conclude by saying we are very grateful for the congress, for the senator, and the house of representatives for the support you give us for taking the time to come and visit us, and for your interest and your questions which sharpen our responses and hopefully help us contribute to u.s. national security. thank you, sir. >> thank you very much, and general taylor. >> senator mccain, chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to present my view on the united states strategic commissions and priorities. as you noted, i'm humbled to appear today for the first time as the commander of strategic command and pleased to appear with the nato commander and

working forward to working with in the coming years. no question, mr. chairman, today is national security's land scape is marked by conflict, constant change, and complexity in facing a significantly different operating environment than those we experienced in the past. on the threats we face, weapons of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the american people when they are pursued or possessed by violent extreme is or state prolife ray tores. to deal with the environment today demands faster or more comprehensive awareness, strategic thinking, flexible planning, centralizeized excuse, and unprecedented information sharing. our mission is clear, to detect, detour, and prevent attacks against the united states, and to join with the other commands to defend the nations should

deturpts fail. as we implement the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and we are also the strongest possible advocates in favor of the inp -- investments needed to sustain the nuclear weapons complex that underpins it. while nuclear deterrence is the number one priority, there's broader responsibilities. this demands our full commitment as well, so in partnership with the other combat and commands, our next priority is to improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address regional problems especially where those problems or where the capabilities to address them cross regional boundaries, and on that note, straitcom is also an important part and you mentioned we provided be-2's

early in the operation, we a also taking steps to make sure they have the space capabilities they need to make sure that the networks are there and operational and have sufficient capacity and are secured and also provided planners forward to africa command on a variety of issues that stratcom had expertise on. we are engaged on ongoing operations there as well as our long term engagement in other regions of the world in support of the other combat and commanders. our activities primarily in that regard are meshing planning and capabilities for things like missile defense, isr, war fair, combating weapons of mass destruction, and all of those efforts, i believe, bring unity of effort to regional operations and increase effectiveness to the capabilities we can bring to bear. another priority is to improve

our capability and operating concepts in the civil and national security areas of space and cyberspace. space, of course, is increasing congested and competitive, and it's importance to the united states goes beyond national security. ensuring uninterrupted access to space and space capabilities and improving our awareness of objects and activities in space and enhancing the protection and resilience of our most critical systems are all essential objectives. achieving that demands continued up investments and sustain our capabilities while we also pursue increased opportunities with allies and commercial partners. our greatest challenge in cyberspace is to improve our ain't to operate and defend the dod network at network speed. to ensure critical activities continue even in the face of adversary attempts to deny or disrupt them.

the subunified command are working hard to improve organizations and relationships, enhance our network situational awareness protections, increase our capacity, and to develop the human capital we need looking to the future. we have much to do, but we also know today's fiscal environment means we have to maximize the effectiveness and taxpayer value. we'll continue our efforts to identify ever possible place where we can become more efficient while becoming more effective, and finally, we're committed to taking care of our warriors, government civilians, and their families. to this end, we fully support the efforts of the services to properly train, equip, and care for the men and women and work diligently to be sure they have a safe and positive work environment. mr. chairman, great challenges lie ahead, but so do great opportunities. they perform their mission with remarkable skill every minute of

every day. i look forward to working with you and the committee addressing these important security issues. thank you again for this opportunity, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, general. let me say first round of seven minutes. admiral, let me start with you. do you agree that it was important to secure international support and participation including u.n. resolution and including support by muslim countries before commencing military operations against libya? >> senator, i think any time the united states can operate any coalition environment, that's to our advantage, and, again, afghanistan, i think is a good example with 49 partner nations, so i would agree with that. ..

>> thirdly, i would say access. to do an operation like libya, or afghanistan, over coming the tyranny. not everywhere is international airspace and high seas. >> now is the decision making process that lies ahead of us. what will happen if gadhafi's forces appear to truly stop fighting? who would make the decision as to whether or not that was real and then what the response should be? is that a military decision in the field?

[no audio] >> atlantic council could be evaluated for whether there would be a shift in direction which would be given to us. >> and if the evaluation was

that there was a real stoppage of war by gadhafi against his own people? what's the effect of that? >> well, i think there would be actually another level that this discussion would have to go to which would be the united states nations, since the authority for nato to participate in the operation, 1970 and 1973. taking your hypothetical, if there was an assessment by nato that this had changed conditions on the ground, then i think there would be depending on the situation, a probably pause in activity while it was evaluated at a political level as to further steps. >> in terms of arming the opposition forces, is there a consensus within nato or the north atlantic council as to whether to arm the opposition forces? and have you made a

representation, or have you received one from general bashar? >> i have not made or receive such an recommendation. we're very early days at this point. >> do you have any recommendation on that at this point? >> i do not at this point. >> has nato engaged with the libyan opposition forces with the nato representative? >> there is not a nato representative on the ground in libya at this time to my knowledge. >> shifting to afghanistan, admiral, you continue to support the beginning of reductions from u.s. forces by afghanistan by july of that year? >> general petraeus is evidenting that -- evaluating that now. i'm awaiting his recommendation. >> i believe you said you support the president's decision to rely on the pace to be determined by conditions on the

ground. >> condition based. i agree. >> in terms of the pace. >> yes. >> is that still your position? >> yes. >> during the committee's hearing on february 17th, admiral mullen said the decision to begin reductions of u.s. troops in july of this year is given the afghan leadership a sense of urgency that they didn't have before that decision was made. do you agree with admiral mullen? >> i do. i would add that it has also energized their efforts in training the afghan security forces, which i think is central to whether or not we will be able to begin those reductions. >> and do you support increasing the end strength -- increasing the end strength targets for the afghan army and police by up to an additional 70,000 personnel? >> i -- >> by the end of 2012? >> i believe that addition afghan security forces will be necessary over time. i have not done the specific analysis of number or timeline,

but i believe our current target of 305,000 would probably be better served in the long term to have an increase in the number, yes. >> the statement was that president obama affirmed by the russian missile defense could enhance the allies. is the combatant commander responsible for working with

russia, would you agree or do you agree that missile defense cooperation with russia if done propertierly -- properly. >> i agree, several steps would have with getting the point and settled and in place. that would have to be connected with a nato system. because i think it's very important as we approach in a nato russia context. that would be the next step would be connecting the missile defense through the at dmd and missile base. thirdly, i think at that point, you would have the possibility, as you mentioned, of finding a zone of cooperation that would provide missile defense cooperation between the united states in a nato context and russia. >> thank you, admiral. thank you mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

admiral, would you agree that when the no-fly zone was implemented gadhafi was basically at the suburbs or in the outskirts of benghazi, and as stated, there would have been a massacre of very large proportions? >> yes, sir. i think everything about his history would tell us that. >> would you agree three weeks earlier if they had imposed the no-fly zone when the momentum was on the side of the anti-gadhafi forces it's very likely that gadhafi would have fallen then? >> i think it's hard to say if gadhafi would have fallen then or not? >> isn't it clear that the use of air power and armour is what reversed the tide against the anti-gadhafi rebels? >> yes, sir. >> and so at least in the view of some of us, an opportunity was passed up by not invoking a

no-fly zone three weeks ago which would have been prevented gadhafi from using his superior armour and air power to drive the rebels all the way back to benghazi. so there's an upside and a downside to seeking coalitions. there's an argument that you could act in warfare when the opportunities present themselves. and you do agree that air power is decisive in the conflict on the side of the anti-gadhafi forces. >> it has been thus far. >> the u.n. resolution as i understand it says it would take -- we should take all necessary measures to prevent humanitarian disasters for the libyan people, all necessarily measures; right? >> yes, sir. >> and the lieutenant bashar

said it should remain the same to help the civilians in population centers under the threat of attack. do you agree with that, general bashar's statement? >> yes, sir. >> does that mean that that protect and helping the civilian population centers goes all the way to tripoli? >> i think that any time there is a threat to the population of libya we have sufficient rules of engagement to strike against forces that are demonstrating hostile act or hostile intent against. >> so there is hostile intent taking place in the city of tripoli? wouldn't you agree in suppression of anti-gadhafi forces? >> i think any gadhafi force that is are demonstrating hostile intent against civilians are legitimate targets. >> basically what's happening here we're saying that we won't over throw gadhafi by force, but in the interest of protecting

and helping the civilian and population center under the threat of attack, we are moving rapidly to the west? and media is reporting correct that we are employs ac130 and 810 to provide more targeted and closer protection for civilians? >> that is correct, sir. >> so the only other question, i know this is a very tough one, there are persistent rumors that gadhafi really has very few friends. and it's likely that at some point he will -- they will crack and he will either leave, be killed, whatever. is that something that you think is a pretty good possibility that may happen? >> as i look at this situation in libya, senator, you can see a wide range of possibilities out ahead of us that run from a

static stalemate to what you just described, gadhafi cracking. i think that if we work all of the elements of power, i think we have a chance at a more than reasonable chance of gadhafi leaving. because the entire international community is arrayed against him. i think the events today in lon do where 40 nations are gathered to discuss this would lend weight to the theory that as secretary gates said in testimony, or on a talk show, he probably doesn't need to be hanging any new pictures. >> and he clearly -- we just want him gone, whether it be chavez or meet hitler and stalin, or be in a criminal court -- is that? >> i think international community, every world leader has ascribed to a statement along the lines that gadhafi

should leave libya. >> but a stalemate is not an acceptable solution? i think we learned that from the iraq experience after desert storm that sanctions and no-flies zones don't succeed. is that a lesson that we could draw from that experience? >> i think a stalemate is not in anybody's interest. >> thank you. is the united states at present providing defensive weapons to georgia or helping georgia acquire such weapons? >> sir, we are working with georgia in training their security forces -- >> i'm asking about -- >> and in terms of defensive weapons at this moment, we are not providing them high -- what i would term high end military defensive weapons. >> you know, it's hard for me to understand since the russians still occupy territory that is clearly georgian territory, and continue to threaten georgia, and yet we're not even giving them weapons with which to defend themselves.

it is not presencable. do you believe the russian federation is serious when the leaders say they will draw from the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty if the united states draws from all fazes of the adoptive missile defense? do you believe they are serious? >> i'm not familiar with their making that dramatic of a statement. i've seen other statements that would indicate they intend to continue a dialogue and discussion with us moving forward across missile defense sphere. >> general kehler, does d.o.d. have the necessary legal authorities it need to responsible to a cyberattack? >> senator, it doesn't have all of the authority that is it needs. in fact, in some cases, our role has been defined at this point to defending, protecting the dod network, the relationship outside of that is being established with the department

of homeland security that does have the lead for protecting critical infrastructure across the united states. so there are limits to what dod can do today. >> would you do me -- would you please submit to the committee in writing what you think is necessary in order for us to give you the capability to defend this nation against a cyberattack? a lot of us feel that that is the new battle ground of the 21st century. and for you not to have all of the tools at your disposal to protect this nation's national security interest in the event of a cyberattack is not an acceptable situation. we have been bouncing around between different committees and intelligence and armed services and homeland security, and everybody has got a different idea. i think it would be -- we would be well served if you would provide us at least in your view what is absolutely minimal necessary in order to defend the country. >> yes, sir, i would add one

other point. the dod has reached out to industry at this point to do a pilot problem with them to see as we work through what that would take, what additional authorities might be involved there. but i think there are additional steps being taken now. i will provide you my thoughts more later. >> thank you, general. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator mccain. >> the authority and other agencies have all of the authorities that they need and that they work together to make sure that there are no cracks in our defense and that the -- there's clarity in terms of the who has the authority or responsibility for the response as well. so we'll share that with senator lieberman, senator collins, and the other committees. senator lieberman. >> thanks, mr. chairman. let my pick up very briefly on

what you said. i think, general kehler, your testimony which i know to be absolutely valid, that you don't have sufficient legal authority, although i suppose in a time of crisis, the president could invoke his constitutional authority as commander in chief to direct the pentagon to take the action that we have to take really is a claireian call. i hope people hear it, we are not adequately defended from cyberattack today. the fact is that the department of homeland security which senator collins and i on our committee oversees has been working much more closely on these matters with the pentagon and the nsa, but we urgently need to get over classic senate committee territorial turf battles and pass legislation

this year to clarify authorities for protection of american cyber space, including as you suggest, particularly the majority of american cyber space which is privately owned. and there was an encouraging meeting a couple of weeks ago which was convened by the two leaders, senator reid and senator mcconnell and ranking members on the committees, we're on the course now to try to get legislation hopefully before the senate, by the end of the spring. so i appreciate what you've said. i thank you both for your service. admiral stavridis, let me come back to libya now and your role of nato. your description of the chart of the line of authority was helpful to people. as we say now that the u.s. is learning over authority to nato, it's very important for us to

understand what nato is. i'm glad nato is involved, of course. it both because what's happening in libya is not just a concern to america or threat to america. it's a concern to most of the rest of the civilized world, and therefore, it's very important that nato and our allies in the arab world be involved. but it's not -- when the u.s. turns responsibility over to nato, it's not like we're taking a hot potato and throws it to somebody else. we're nato. we're not all that is nato, but we're at the heart of nato. we're most of nato. we have great allies with us there. just to go over this quickly, three missions now moving to nato control. the arms embargo, am i correct is that now being overseen by an italian officer? >> yes, sir. just add to what i said earlier, there's an italian three star in

naples -- >> right. >> -- who has demand of the maritime piece of this. >> right. >> and then there's a -- a canadian three star who is the joint task force commander. and the air piece will be run out of turkey, out of ismir, turkey. who has a u.s. three star, and a french three stay. so you have italian, french, canadian, american all in the chain of command. just to put a metic, of the 40 officers that are involved, only five of them will be american as we move forward. >> and the civilian protection mission, who's that under now? >> that's under lieutenant general bushard excusing through the other two officers. >> let's follow that up. who do they report to? >> they report to the nato joint

force commander naples who is an american four star, sam locke leer. so there's good continuity in that as we hits in both of those operations. >> right. so we've got -- we've got continuity and another american officer. does he report directly to you? >> he does. >> okay. and obviously you are a distinguished american admiral. we're proud of you. thank you for your service. you report to the north atlantic council? >> i do. i would add that my report goes through a committee, a military committee, headed by an italian four star admiral, who is actually the senior officer in nato. >> right. >> that committee takes my advise, puts a military eye on it. admiral mike mullen is an

american member of the 28 person body. it's all of the chiefs of the defense, chairman of the joint chiefs, then the advise goes to the north atlantic council. >> am i right the north atlantic council gives you, if i may put it in these terms, general authority, but does not have to approve every mission that you carry out. >> yes. >> for instance, if gadhafi's forces are surrounding a town in libya, you don't have to go back to the knack to get approval in terms of protecting civilians to attack those -- >> right. yes, sir. >> okay. i appreciate that. i make the point that having nato involved is critically important for all of the reasons the president said last night. but it's not like the u.s. is not involved. we're very centrally involved, and we should be. >> yes, sir. and again, that chain of command that i just described is not

dissimilar to the one that we used in afghanistan from a nato perspective. >> right. as you know we have taken a very forward leaning understanding of the part of the u.n. resolution that talks about all necessary measures to protect the libyan civilians. again, i think that's the right thing to do. we have effectively based on the u.n. mandate prosecutorred a campaign of airstrikes against gadhafi's forces which has not only protected civilians, but also paved the way as general carter ham said yesterday, i believe, for the rebels to call them freedom fighters in libya to advance. i wanted to ask you whether your confident that nato is united in it's interpretation of the civilian protection mission going forward so that there will not be a dimmunition of that

mission in the days and weeks ahead. >> sir, i'm confident that i have the rules of engagement that i need to continue the campaign in the manner to witch it's been conducted. >> i want to ask you a final question. my time is running out. as you know we're under grave budgetary pressure. there are calls to reduce the u.s. military footprint in the european command area of responsibility that you have. i'm struck by the fact that what's happening in libya makes the argument for the continued importance of our military footprint in europe and and i believed our operations in north africa. i wanted to ask you if you'd just take a moment to essentially respond to the point that's made. hey, the second world war is

long over, the cold war is over, what the heck are we still doing in europe? >> senator, i always like to start answering that question by putting some context to it. if we could, let's go back to the end of the cold war, when there were 400,000 u.s. soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines. we had 1,200 bases and sites around europe. that was a big operation. we've now reduced that by about 75%. we're down to 80,000 u.s. troops in europe, we have come down to about a dozen main operating bases, we still have lots of little outlying sites, but we've reduced the overall footprint 75%. i think the european platform permits us to reassure allies, to deter, to conduct military operations as we are doing today in afghanistan and in libya, and to do the training and building of partnership capacity. those are vital functions.

so i'm comfortable that we can take a little bit more out of that. at bit more efficiency, and we've looked very hard at that over the last year. and we're very close to a decision that i think will make some minor reductions in that. but overall, i think we've seen the real value of the european footprint. and i really applaud the virginia come of the congress which has supported it. because for the four reasons that i mention, i think it's a very valuable one for us. >> thanks, admiral, thank you, general. >> thank you, senator lieberman. senator inhofe. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think most of the questions on libya have been asked and i suspected that would be the case. there's one other one that's sensitive, i think, somebody has to say it. there have been several reports about the presence of al qaeda in the -- among the rebels and among with whom we are associated. what are your thoughts about that? >> sir, we are -- as you can

imagine, we're examining very closely the content, option, who are the leaders in the opposition forces? the intelligence that i'm receiving at this point, makes me feel that the leadership that i'm seeing are a responsible men and women who are struggling against colonel gadhafi. we have seen flickers in the intelligence of potential al qaeda, hezbollah, we've seen different things. but at this point, i don't have detail sufficient to say that there's a significant al qaeda presence or any other terrorists presence in and among these folk. we'll continue to look at this very closely. it's part of doing due diligence as we move forward on any kind of relationship. >> i will say this critically of you, of course, you didn't make this decision.

wouldn't that have been a good idea to find out before we took some of the steps that we are taking? >> well, i think from the moment this crisis has unfolded, i think there has been a great deal of intelligence applied to this. although, general ham as the africom commander would be in the best position to give you detail on that. >> yeah, i was planning on talking to him. let my carry on what senator lieberman was saying. i was going to approach it from a different perspective. back from the '90s, it was actually jim jones at the time was talking about the reduction of our presence, our installations, our personnel in western europe. at that time, one the reasons was with the, and this is particularly true in germany with a lot of the problems that were existing at that time, the environmental movement, there were somewhat restricted. and what our capabilities were going to be in terms of how many hours we can