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tv   U.S. Senate  CSPAN  April 11, 2011 5:00pm-8:00pm EDT

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that was one the considerations at that time. has that -- i'd like to ask you, has that changed? secondly, i have another question to ask about our presence there. >> i would say in my two years roughly as the commander of eucom, you have not felt any restrictions on my ability to do the kind of training and maneuver in germany or any of the other countries. in fact, germany hosts -- i think you visited there, sir, big training center there. probably a premier training facility, we have brought 17,000 people there in the last year. >> yeah, i think it was before you arrived. >> i think it was. i went over to eastern europe, bulgaria, and romanian. they wanted us to come over. i wondered where it was now. let my ask this, there's a lot
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of criticism since the downgrade. i was shocked when i read your written testimony and found that it was down 80% from where it was in the '90s. i didn't realize that. now that being the case, there's still some mail come going on there. there's parochial reasons for that back here also. with that being the case, would you talk about any kind of a consolidation that's taking place that is going to justify any milcon and how it works in our current position? >> sir, we are doing a great deal of continuing search for the efficiencies, and we are consolidating our footprint, and having doing so over the last five years. in fact, i'm testifying in front of the milcon subcommittee and will have a chance to lay it out. i think we have a responsible plan that strikes a balance in what we need to do to support our families in europe, as well as maintain the headquarters that's undertaking the
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operations we're seeing today. >> yeah. okay. yeah, because there's -- and i'm sure you will get asked a lot of questions about that when you are before the appropriations subcommittee. the partnership programs of states, there's some, what, 20, i guess, going on right now. i know my state of oklahoma in aster baa january, is it time ad resources spent with the activity? >> sir, we have 22 resources around. the one from oklahoma, for example, does everything from military training to police training to oil fields training, i mean it -- we try to match up the state with the country. and i think the presence, for example, of the oklahoma state partnership program has been very helpful in azerbaijan in maintaining the access through
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the transit routes. multiply that by 22 all around europe, and you can see the ban for the buck here is really quite significant. >> that's good. that's what i'm getting from our people there. so i assume that was the case. i just came back from spending some time with -- in israel, and in talking to prime minister netanyahu in some length. his first comment was welcome to the earthquake when we got over there. everywhere -- we've been talking about libya, iran, syria, egypt, and so it is, you know, we have that only one great friend there. do you think we are doing enough to ensure the defense of israel? any comment that you can make on that? >> i had the same conversation a week ago with lieutenant general ben benny gance. we talked all around the region. israel is watching the events on
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the peripheral, as they should be. we are doing that across everything from missile defense to weapon systems to training to intelligence exchange. it's a good time for all of us to recognition exactly what you said, that israel is in the middle of an earthquake zone. and we're from a military to military perspective working very closely with them. >> well within i was going to get into a couple of other programs that i know you are enthusiastically supporting and have in the past like the train and equip. let my mention if there's not time to answer this, general, my concern has been back when we took out our plans for the ground based interceptor in poland with the necessary radar in the czech republic by the time we would receive the same capability, we are looking at a program that there's really not any definition in terms of when
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it will come along. what i'm talking about is the sm3 block to be the long range program. right now we don't -- it's still a concept. my feeling is that the others like the block two a and other programs are good, they are coming along. we have the capability and all of that. for the record, since my time has expired, i'd like to have you share with me whether you share my concern over the fact that we would have had in my opinion that capability much sooner. and when our intelligence gives us a range that iran is going to have the can't that we all dread thinking about, somewhere between 2015 and 2020, to me, that's what keeps me up at night. if you could for the record get in as much detail on that as possible, i would appreciate it. >> sir, i'll provide it for the record. >> thank you very much. >> thank you very much, senator inhofe. senator reid. >> thank you very much, mr.
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chairman. thank you for your service and testimony today. admiral stavridis, the president has quite rightly ruled any ground forces entering libya from the united states. but there are at least looking ahead and there is the possibility that through many possible outcomes, gadhafi regime departing swiftly or rebels ejecting it, that there would be a need for some stabilization on the ground. is that something that nato is considering? >> sir, i wouldn't say nato is considering it yet. i think when you look at the any fact of nato, having gone through this as many on the committee have with bosnia and kosovo, it's clear that the possibility of a stabilization regime exists. and so i have not heard any discussion about it yet. but i think history is in everybody's mind as we look at the events in libya. >> the events are obviously
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moving fast. >> i understand. >> let my ask another question which is related is that as you pointed out in your opening testimony, significant number of forces in afghanistan are nato forces or european allies. what effect, if any, as the current operation in libya had on their ability to maintain their presence in afghanistan? >> as i was saying to someone the other day, if you can be lucky in terms of how a crisis unfolds, one aspect of the libyan crisis that the types of forces, ships, and aircraft principally are precisely the forces that are not in such high demand in afghanistan, the landlock state where the taliban have no air capability. in that sense, i'm confident that we'll be able to move forward and keep the resource balanced both ways. again, i want to say the allies have been very forthcoming with ships and aircraft as i pointed out in talking to the chairman. and i'm confident that we'll
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have the forces that we need to do this in both places. >> i assure you once again for the benefit of senator lieberman and i point out the decisive role of submarines in conducting the operation. >> senator lieberman will be happy to here there are submarines involved in this. they are part of the nato force that are doing the armed embargo, and are a stated requirement. >> and also are delivering land attack missiles? >> indeed, they are. 196 of them from key west submarines, for example. >> thank you. we had the opportunity, i want to open this up to general kehler also, to talk about the emerging cyber dimension in warfare, and our lack of preparedness, senator mccain referred to it in his comments also. from your perspective as the nato commanders and strategic command general, can you do the general comments?
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>> thank you, sir. from a nato perspective, because that'll be different than what bob will talk about. from a nato perspective, we're very aware of this. it's part of the strategic concept that just came out. nato has two organization that is focus on this. one is the nato cyber defense center in appropriately inist -- a nation that has suffered a cyberattack, and also the nato computer incident response organization, which is part of my organization in the shape headquarters. those two together work with general alexander. i would say we are also pushing to engage with european private sector. just as general kehler said a moment ago, the private, public nexus is important, so we can
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connect with u.s. forces through chief alexander and up to his boss, general kehler. >> can i follow up? you've just appointed a system of public-private partnerships? this is a whole range of public-private partnerships? >> exactly. we are learned how to do and much better at interagency operations. a growth area is private-public. where they connect in cyber is probably the prime example at this moment. >> any other sync that are doing what you are doing? >> we're sharing that idea now. i think there's general interest in it. >> general kehler please, any comments would be helpful. >> i would just add that you've hit on the key aspect with the public, private partnership activity. certainly here is a domain that is largely in the public domain. and so i don't think we have much of a challenge any longer convincing people how important cybersecurity is.
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what we see here is a threat that is evolving from everything from the old nuisance hackers, the 13-year-old in the basement down the street to exploitation where people deliberately come in and steal things through cyber space from the networks to denial of services or other activities to perhaps a place where they will go to destructive activities. and in every one of those cases, as you look at defining the role of government as defining the role of the department of defense, defining the role of private industry, and others, that's the issue that has foremost on our plate these days. making sure we have put in place the right relationships, the right roles and responsibilities in some cases, making sure that we have the right authorities in place so that we can act at what our cyber experts would call network speed. which is a very tough challenge for us. most of the frustration that i think many of us have is that it
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seems like we're always closing the barn door after the horse is gone. we have to be in a position here where we can do better in terms of protecting ourselves. i think we've done a lot over the last couple of years to get the department of defense in a better place. it will not happen overnight. we started with the collection of networks that we are trying to make behavior as one network for the department of defense, that in and of itself is a challenge. but we are are making progress here. the next steps that with have to take though, is to have better situational awareness, that's a shared responsibility between the combatant demands, and broader into the public domain. we have to have better capacity. that gets to our ability to recruit and train and retain the right cyber experts, and then, of course, it gets to the authorities questions so that we have properly sorted out this balance between our constitutional protections and
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our need to act on behalf of the nation, of course, the appropriate civil authorities in the lead. so those are the challenges that we have today. those are being worked very hard in many places. and i'm confident that we're making progress. but we will return to all of you as i was asked to do earlier today with some specific suss. >> my time has expired, just a final comment. and you may get back today or just make an end in the round of questioning. i think we've become so dependent on things like gps systems, do we ever train at nato or strategic command offline with a compass? which is a very challenging device. gps is easier, or in the concept of installation, redundancy,
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that is old systems that, you know, in an emergency you can get offline and use them? i guess, my focal point would be if a natural disaster can wreck a havoc in japan, someone messing with their control systems could produce the same effects. i think we're at verge of a whole new dimension in warfare, i'm glad that you gentleman are thinking forthly about these issues. thank you. >> well, i think senator reid raised an important question. would you get back to us on the issue of redundancy and backups, including some of the old fashion types that are more modern technologies are interfered with. could you get back to the committee on that? >> the answer is we are not as good as we need to be. but we are working on it. >> this is an area where which coalitions are helpful. many of the allies aren't at the same level of technical capability.
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we get a widow into doing other ways of business. i will provide an answer. >> thank you. senator brown. >> i would wondering if you could both comment on the level of disruption, if any, under the command, caused by the crs that we are dealing with. >> i'll start. our principal concern at this point is twofold. one is the start of military construction products -- projects, that'sing being more and more of an issue for us. secondly, there's just kind of a psychological over hang that is disruptive to the troops because although they know their pay and their essential services will continue, many of the functionalities that support them are vested with our civilian work force. that would be problematic as well. >> i'll pick up on that, senator, in that first of all, we're in the interesting time period now where many of the
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combatant command headquarters are becoming over 50% civilian work force. so the civilians are concerned about what will happen here and will there be a government shutdown and how it will impact them? and i share their concern. second, i'm also concerned about the issues that are outside the department of defense's budget, and specifically what i'm interested in is making sure we continue the investment plans that were laid in for the national security agency because of the work that they are doing for us regarding the stockpile and the anticipation that they have that we will need to provide additional investment so we can restore the stockpile as we go forward and do the appropriate life extension programs. so i'm concerned about those two things, and have been somewhat reassured that in this stockpile work, i believe that we are okay to continue as it is, but i'm concerned. as long as the cr process is going on, those two things are
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okay. >> i can tell you just for the record and based on my personal dealings with the caucus, no republican is talking about shutting down the government. we are hoping to come together to not only address the budgetary concerns, but come together and give the country the stability it needs. i'm going to continue to work in that regard. general kehler, also, i know -- is it true that -- and i believe it is, but i want to hear it from you, that the cyberattacks are growing as we talked about for 17 minutes last april, the dod networks, along with other networks, were routed through china? is that accurate? >> i'll have to get back to you on that. i'm not -- that one doesn't jump into my mind. but let me find out and i'll get back to you. >> yeah. it's -- if you could actually because, you know, obviously, that has a great concern to me and many others.
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you know, i know when you came, before us, and we confirmed you, it was one of your concerns is dealing with obviously the cybersecurity and people whether it's the everyday, you know, young hacker, or establish terrorists cells, trying to gain access to vital security information, and i concur with the chairman. if there's something that you need that you don't have, you know, i'd like to know about it. you talked about, you know, being reactive versus proactive. i for one would like to be, you know, very proactive. >> sir, if i could though, just add a point. i'll check and make sure that i understand the issue that you are asking about. however, having said that, one thing about the global internet is that it's global. and the pathways that information takes through that internet are sometimes interesting pathways. having said that though, for our commit -- critical information
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in the department of defense, we take care to make sure the information is properly protected. we have more work to do. i don't want you to think that we are not taking steps to make sure the information is protected. >> no, i wouldn't think that. thank you. admiral, you know, i like many others have been wrestling with our involvement in libya. on the one hand, i understand the need to protect innocent civilians. you draw a line in the sand when you recognize enough is enough. i'm also wrestling with and i've been asked the question, who's next? you know, under what circumstances do we do the same thing with other countries that are fashion very similar circumstances? are we going to now be the northern light for the entire region? and in fact, be there to basically address every concern of every country? i guess that's my first question. if you could comment on that.
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do you have any thoughts on that? >> senator, i think the president in his speech last night addressed that concern and did it very well. and i think that's the policy level at which a decision like that would be made would be in the executive branch with the president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, obviously at my level, my job is to provide options from the military context, and then when given the military mission, execute it. and our current mission which we've talked about is everything from the humanitarian, to the arms embargo, to the no fly zone, and protect the population. i'm comfortable with the mission that i've been given. we're executing that. if and when there are other decisions, then certainly we'll be prepared to do that. >> i appreciate the job that you are doing and obviously, you know, you say jump, they say how far, i understand that.
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i like many others are obviously concerned if there was a next. is it true that we have been flying virtually all of the military aircraft into the region over the last couple of days? is it us mostly, or not? >> no, sir. it's -- i can give you just a rough idea of the numbers. >> that would be great. >> sure. we have flown the majority, i think in very round numbers out of 1600 sortees, the united states has flown 950 of them. so we have probably flown 65% of the sortees. as we now get nato into the picture, i think you'll see that u.s. percentage go down significantly. i think you'll see the allied component of it go up. but i think for ballpark purpose, about 60/40 u.s. allied. and just to give you one other number, few don't mind, the actual strike sortees, the bomb
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dropping, we're roughly 50/50, u.s. and allied. so i think the allies contribution has been reasonable. i think it'll increase a bit as we get into the nato. >> in terms of submarine tomahawk, et cetera, we're the only ones? >> in terms of tomahawk missiles, those were virtually all from the united states. there were a handful from the brits. but for all intensive purposes, the tomahawk were u.s. mission. >> what's the cost per tomahawk? >> i'll find out and get back to you. i want to say $1.5 million. >> that's my understanding as well. how many did we drop? >> 200. >> that's real numbers. when we get into the conflict. here we are wrestling with cuts billions, and we're drops billions on the other hand. you know, like i said, who's next? what's next? i'm a little concerned as to
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where we are doing from here. i'll deal with that in other measures. i appreciate you coming and find these helpful to understand the whole picture better, thank you. >> thank you, senator brown. senator manchin. >> sir, admiral general thank you for being here and thank you for your service. i can tell you i've met the finest that america has to offer. they are right in the department of defense and in the services of all of our military. with that being said, do you all plan, and admiral, either one can answer and asking for supplement appropriations from dod from congress here to support libyan operations? >> sir, those -- a decision like that would come from the secretary of defense or elsewhere in the administration. but that would not be something a combatant commander. >> total cost has been quite high as far as i know that senator brown just mentioned it.
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we are all concerned about that because we are making difficult decisions here and then right here in america. and the cost that we're spending elsewhere it's real concerning and i think the first week was possibility $600 plus million. >> sir, again, i'm probably not the right person to give you a set of numbers. but i think it's fair to say the operation will be in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars. i think it's fair. but i'm not the right person to ask. i can certainly convey that to the department? >> do you have an estimation on timetable? >> i think it's difficult to ascertain that. >> do you believe in any part of the coalition that puts ground troops in libya? or are there ground troops in libya now? >> sir, there are no ground troops in libya -- >> by any coalition or nato? >> not to my knowledge.
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i have heard no discussion of doing that. >> you don't know any coalition -- we said we will not -- as americans we will not put american troops on the ground in libya. is that still correct? >> it is correct, and in the conversations around nato over the last numbers of weeks as it was debated, there was no discussion on the ground troops any other partner. >> and to both of you, maybe you can start it off. why do you believe the image of the united states is so poor in the middle east with all that we try to do and all of the good that we try to do, why has the image of our country been so poorly received? and is it all time lows as i'm understanding? >> sir, i -- i can't really
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speculate on why that is. >> you've seen the poll? >> i have. not being in the region and looking at that information and having my own opinion. >> we have everybody opinion that comes. everybody has a little bit different take on this. the bottom line is i've always said, when you are an unwelcomed visitor, you usually leave. we don't seem to be a welcome visitor over welcome neighbor if you will to the arab league, even though they might want us for certain areas. we don't seem to have the support of the people. we are here trying to liberate the greatest country in the world, we're the most generous. for some reason, that doesn't transcend. i don't know if it's something that we're doing wrong from military end of it, or from our policy end. do y'all have any comment on that whatsoever what we can do to improve our image? >> i would say as to why the
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united states is challenged in parts of the middle east has to do with our overall operations in iraq and afghanistan, which by and large have not been popular in that part of the world, both muslim countries and our relationship with israel which is at odds with many of these muslim states, and, in fact, it's important, however, to make the point that we do enjoy positive relations with many of the arab nations. certainly at the military to military level. and if i could, i'll give you two concrete examples of that. both stem from my experience in nato. one is the nato engagement with what's called the mediterranean dialogue which has as it's partners morocco, tunisia, egypt, algeria, as well as israel. it's possible by working diligently and finding zones of
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cooperation to improve these sort of relationships. and the other place that i would mention from a nato perspective, and also an area in which the united states has good relations with muslim countries would be in the gulf, where the istanbul cooperative initiative counts among the members all of the gulf state there is. in the coalition that we're undertaking today, senator, we enjoy the support of the uae whom are flying actual missions as part of it. i think your point is well taken that we need to work on this. but -- all is not lost, and i'd close by saying we enjoy a very positive relationship with a very prominent muslim nation. that is turkey, who is a member of nato, involved in the coalition with us, is in afghanistan with us. so it's very possible to have very positive relations. >> but our relations are poor;
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right? as far as the image of the united states being in the middle east from the citizens. >> i think that's a fair statement, yes, sir. >> okay. let me ask just another question that i have. you were talking about the rules of engagement, which i took to understand that basically we're able to engage whenever we think there's any threat or harm to american troops or american mission? so you feel free to do the rules of engagement apply in libya? >> yes, sir. they will. along those lines, as well as rules of engagement that permit everything from stopping ships that we think are bringing weapons in, to stopping gadhafi's force ifs they are attacking the polllation or demonstrates they will. >> what about the taliban and the al qaeda that we know of? you don't have the same green light on the rules of engagement there as you do in libya?
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>> the rules of engagement in pakistan are fund the -- fundamentally different, yes, sir. than the libya campaign. >> when we know there's harm orchestrated and directed, we can't do a thing about it? >> i think general petraeus addressed this last week. he could tell you he's in constant dialogue with the counterpart across the pakistani border to try to work on the cross border issues. :
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>> he's right in asking for it. we whether -- will ask the right people to keep us up to date and a week by week estimate as well. thank you for pressing that. senator mansion, and senator is next. >> thank you, chairman. thank you admiral and general for your service to the country and the troops that serve underneath you for the important work and sacrifices they are making for us. i know you described, admiral, what the mission in libya. how do we define success in
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libya? >> i think the mission that i am given under in which i'm operating at the moment, the military mission, has some clear metrics associated with it. let's take the arms embargo, for example. that would be zero penetration of libya with arms coming to resupply colonel gadhafi for example. i think the metric would be are the population safe, are the civil yaps under attack? what we want to overtime establish is a situation which we call in nato context a safe and secure environment for the population. in terms of the no-fly zone, the meme -- met tricks are obvious, no flying without authorization from nato. the humanitarian mission we were
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assigned are people receiving the care and so on. that's the mission we've been given and we have reasonable metrics to apply going forward to meet those policymakers. >> certainly understand and appreciate that. my question is getting at overall, what's the objective? how do we measure success in libya? meaning if we have gadhafi in power and he waits us out, one of the concerns i have is what is our strategy is that's the outcome? >> i think that if you look at what's happening today again in london where 40 nations come together to discuss this, i think virtually every nation's leader spoke to the desirability of the departure of colonel gadhafi so how the international community arrives at that i believe is a combination of the work that's being done in a military context under the auspices of the u.n. security
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resolution and nato coupled with the economic sanctions, the financial control of assets of libyan goods that are outside, the travel restrictions, but putting that pressure on the regime in libya, i think you have the best chance of achieving what the heads of state indicated they desire. >> don't you think it will be difficult without military involvement to get a man like gadhafi to go? >> i think it's hard to say. when you look historically at different leaders, sometimes they stay and they fight and they die and sometimes they crack and give up, and they leave the country. there's a wide spectrum of what could happen going forward. i think it is clear that the international community indicated by the statements of the leaders by different countries have indicated it's time for colonel gadhafi to leave. >> i'd like to follow-up on a question that senator inhoffe
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asked you about with the relationship we may have with al-qaeda and the rebels in libya. there was open source reporting earlier this week that al-qaeda affiliates in north africa stole air missiles for libya recently. can you tell us about that incident, and also what does that say, if any, about the relationship between the al-qaeda and rebel affiliates? >> i want to go off the record to answer that for you to give you the best response. >> thank you, i appreciate that, and i appreciate that some of that information might need to be classified, but i think it's a very important question for us to understand in this committee. i'd also like to ask you about overall with your command of, the command of the european
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forces. to be a member of nato, we asked each to commit 2% of gdp towards nato spending, and yet not everyone has yet. in fact, what we are seeing is even our strongest allies, for example, the united kingdom and france are dealing with the same budget pressures we're dealing with here in the united states. how do you impact or believe that that's going to impact nato, and also given the fact that we're relying substantially on nato for our involvement in libya right now, with people withdrawalling from their commitment in terms of percentage they are willing to spend on military spending, how do you think that impacts our readiness going forward and this conflict in libya? >> i'll give you the good news and bad news. the good news is that it's a resource rich alliance. the gdp of nato is about $32
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trillion. it's about twice the gdp of the united states, and the gdp of nato is about half that of the world's gdp, so the good news is there are resources there to meet these commitments in my belief. the bad news is, senator, what you just pointed out. our allies in many cases are not committing even the minimum 2%, and i find that -- i'm concerned about that as i look at the future of the alliance where some members are meeting that commitment and others are failing to do so, and i think it is incumbent upon particularly nations like ours very much meeting the commitment and our leaders to continue to make this point. thank you for asking me about it. it's something i talk to all the uniformed military members constantly.
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it is very discerning. in terms of will it get better, i think we all hope that as we emerge from this series of global and economic concerns that there will be a rise in the economy, and there will be more breathing space, but in the immediate future, i agree with you. i think it's extremely concerning, and we should continue to talk and to encourage and to pressure our allies to meet those kinds of spending commitments. >> well, i certainly share your concerns particularly given the conflicts that we are leading throughout the world that that commitment has to be the commitment that we're making, so i certainly will be an advocate with that with our allies. i see that my time is up. i just wanted to reiterate to both of you that i think it's very important to follow up on the chairman's comments and senator mansion's comments that this committee get a very good information on the cost of the
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conflict in libya and regular updates given the miss cam challenges we face now in the country, and i think also particularly none of us want to see this diminish our efforts in afghanistan. i appreciate both your services to the country, and thank you very much for answering our questions today. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you, senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you both for your extraordinary service to our nation and again i, join my colleagues in thanking the very courageous and dedicated men and women who work under you in defending our nation and its national interests. i would like to ask a question about the health of the men and women who come to you after
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serving in conflicts or directly under your command conflicts in afghanistan and iraq, particularly as to brain injury and post-traumatic stress whether you consider the ongoing effort sufficient to address their needs, their health needs, in those areas. >> i'll start. i am particularly concerned about traumatic brain injury, and because of my duties with nato bringing me often to afghanistan and also because in my european command region, i have launched a medical facility, one of the largest military hospitals. i have a fair amount of opportunity to see all of this, and i think tbi, traumatic brain injury, in particular is something that needs more focus, and i believe we have yet to really understand the extent of
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the challenge we have ahead of us because of the con effect that many of our men and women are undergoing. it's an area that i focused on. my wife focused on this as well in terms of family and family support. it's difficult to diagnosis as you can appreciate, and we are all working hard on the challenge. i think it's worth highlighting particular from my experiences. >> senator, i would add to that. although there's not that many people deployed, we have a fair number of veterans returning to stratcom, and if i may, let me back up 60 days where we deployed people forward all the time. i share admiral's concern about
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i believe the care our warriors receive is there and the trips my wife makes to the hospitals in her work to do things with clothing for those who have been wounded, and all the efforts that go on there, i am
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encouraged by what i see, and i believe that our people from battlefield to lawn stool, to the area that occurs in all that, i think they get magnificent care, but we vice president gotten yet to the bottom of why our suicide rates are way too high, and there is some relationship here, but it is not a soul relationship with combat or the unique stresses of combat. there are other stressors in our people that are showing themselves, and so we are spending a lot of time and energy working on that. i know the service chiefs are working on that, the secretary of defense, and the chairman are all equally concerned. we have a lot to do in that regard. >> i want to commend both of you for your very eloquent remarks on this issue and particularly the suicide issue because i know
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that you and your colleagues are doing more than ever and the quality of care has improved in ways that might have been unimaginable just a few years ago, and yet in these areas of tdi and post-traumatic stress and suicide, we still have a lot of work to do, and i would just say i know this sentiment is shared by many of my colleagues that anything we can do to help you, we'd very much like to do. >> one more thought. i suppose it's a positive one. we have come a long way since vietnam in this regard. look at the literature post vietnam, a book about this is achilles in vietnam, a study of ptsd and et cetera effects, and we have learned a lot, but i think we're still in the
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studying phase, and that's an area we need to continue learning more about. >> thank you. in the brief time i have left, i'd like to ask you regarding the security cooperation that you lead with israel as a corner stone of the relationship in ways that are both large and small, how the phase adaptive approach concerning missile defense will be executed with regard to israel's security and israel's contribution to protecting europe. >> sir, we enjoy, as you know, an extremely robust broad spectrum relationship with israel, but our particular work in missile defense is quite strong. we have a whole series of exercises that we do. i had the chance to go little over a year ago and see one of the major deployments of this
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phase adaptive approach set up in and around israel. we keep ships that are engaged in that network. i'm very confident that that's an area where we have learned a lot, and that we are then going to be able to apply that in the european phase adaptive approach and knit all of that together, that knowledge that we shift from our work with israel to our work with europe and general may want to comment from his background. he's very deep into missile defense. >> i would just echo the relationship with israel actually goes beyond the operational relationship. there's a technical relationship there as well. i think that director of the missile defense agency has a strong relationship there, and we find, i think, as jim said, that there will be many positive lessons learned from our
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relationship with israel to be applied elsewhere looking at phase adaptive approach both in europe and elsewhere. i think an important recognition that you make here without saying it directly is the importance that we see to being able to counter the large proliferation of short range and medium range ballistic missile appearing in our feeders around the world and pose a threat to further deploying our troops and our allies. >> thank you for articulating that recognition on my part better than i could have done, and thank you for your testimony here today which has been very useful and important, thank you. >> thank you, senator. senator collins? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, you mentioned how important it is to define roles and speedometers -- responsibilities when it comes to cybersecurity, and i certainly agree with that
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statement. i want to make sure that you're aware that senator lieberman and i have been working on this for the past two years in the homeland security committee. the fact is that in our country, 85% of the critical infrastructure that is at risk is in the private sector, and it is the department of homeland security that has the lead in establishing that relationship. we are working, as the chairman mentioned, in a bipartisan way to try to develop a bill, and we need to do so because there are an astonishing 1.8 billion attempted attacks on government computers each month. i'm not sure people realize that the volume has just risen.
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as you prepare your comments for this committee, i want to be sure you're more fully aware of what is going on with our homeland security committee, and we will get you information about our bill to better inform your comments. >> senator, i am aware of all the hard work going on there, and i would appreciate whatever information we can get from that. i would add one other point if i may. the -- to me anyway, the interesting question for us over the whole time we've had a u.s. military, we have carved out the appropriate relationship between the military and civil activities. that's what needs to get carved out here is that appropriate relationship, and i think what is driven us in an interesting direction here is the speed in which with this is all emerging,
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and so the work you all have been doing in the homeland security committee and i think the moa established between the department of defense and department of homeland security is a very, very good start, and so thank you for that offer. >> thank you for that clarification. my concern was your earlier comments could have been interpreted as saying that the department of defense should take over our responsibility in this area that would be, i think, and would agree a mistake that would raise all sorts of civil liberty issues, and i don't think that is what you were intending to convey in response to senator mccain's question. >> certainly not, and thank you for pointing that out. >> thank you. admiral, i'm going to turn to some of the questions about libya while we do have you here, and, again, i do want to thank both of you for your service as well.
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stated in response to a question from our chairman that it was important to have a united nation threat solution and international coalition. don't you think that it also would have been helpful to have a congressional resolution that specifically authorized the military strike against libya given that there was no national emergency? on our part? >> i would defer that question to the executive branch, and then the president, or the secretary of defense. when i commented that it was good to have a united nations security counsel resolution, i'm talking about the military clarity that that provides in terms of the mission i'm supposed to do as a military officer is all about. >> that certainly is a fair response from the one that i thought you had. since you did answer the
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chairman's question about the desirability of the u.n. resolution, i did think it was fair to ask you that. let me turn to another issue. secretary gates stated that the action by the u.n. security counsel with respect to libya originated with the unanimous resolution of the arab league and also the action taken by the gulf cooperation counsel. now, i know that quatar and the united arab emirates are participating and providing some aircraft, but the fact is many arab nations in the neighborhood with significant air assets that today do not seem to be participating. from 2001 to 2008, we provided $10 billion in foreign military
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sales to egypt, another $10 billion to the saudis, not to mention $2.6 to turkey, 4.6 billion to kuwait. the saudis has more than four 4-14 fighters. i'm very concerned about the lack of the arab state participation in enforcing the no-fly zone. in fact, i believe they should have taken the lead. i realize that only united states and a few of our allies have the capabilities to provide intelligence, coordination, and lo logistics, but what is the reason that we're not seeing more of a contribution from their states in the region particularly those that do have
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significant air assets? >> i'm not sure i'm qualified to walk you through nation by nation in terms of why an individual nation would decide to either participate fully with air strikes or to fly in the no-fly zone, or to simply support the resolution in the arab political body. i can certainly go back to general madis who is the combat and commander of the region who really could walk you through every one of them, and it is a legitimate question. what i can say, senator, from a nato perspective which is where i touch this issue, we will continue to aggressively pursue participation by the arab states in all aspects of what we are doing. as i mentioned earlier in response to another question, we have two mechanisms for doing
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that in nato, the mediterranean dialogue and the istanbul cooperative initiative. those are two bodies we continue to move the requests forward and on a military to military level put pressure on them to participate in this. it is a good question. i will go back and have the department come back with a nation by nation breakdown to help understand it and from a nato perspective we'll continue to push forward to get as much support as we possibly can from the other arab states. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator collins. senator udall. >> chairman, good morning. gentlemen, let me turn to libya. let me make an initial comment. i support the actions of the president and this administration. they stood by while gadhafi moved on the towns and cities,
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and the western part of libya would have been indefensible. having said that, many questions are asked as they come to mind. admiral, if i might, as you know, the roble forces have been -- rebel forces have been welcomed by the civilian populations in the east, but if the rebels are able to close in on cities that are generally more supportive of the gadhafi regime, how will nato protect civilians caught in potential cross fire, and then that question can become even more important if you frame it this way. if rebel forces fire on civilian targets or military targets that place civilians in harm's way, how do we protect those innocent people? do we fire on the rebel forces, for example? >> well, from all that i've seen at the current stage of this conflict, we are working very
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hard to protect all of the civilian population, and in doing that, we are setting up air zones and this is where the no fly zone is actually more than similarly a no fly zone. it is a protective zone allowing us to use our air assets to interdict a situation in which civilians are coming under attack. in terms of whether or not we would part through civilians versus rebels versus opposition leader versus gadhafi forces, we have to rely on our intelligence, particularly or intelligence to have a sense of what's occurring on the ground, and then make condition-based decisions at that time. >> it is difficult though, admiral.
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>> it is difficult. >> as you present the various senator collins scenarios. as you move into densely populated areas -- >> indeed. >> how do aircraft prevent civilian casualties and other damages -- >> i think it will be extremely challenging. we are aided by a sense that i think is manifest in much of the country which is against gadhafi, and i think that as more and more pressure is applied, as we continue to apply both economic sanctions, financial freezing, we squeeze the economy, i believe that his support base will shrink and the tribal aspects will come together in away to achieve the policy indication in the
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departure of gadhafi. i agree, it will be difficult and conditions based as we move through. >> ideally the use of military force here is designed to create political space so the gadhafi regime falls either of its own afford and its own decision making or through outside forces, particularly brought to bear by the rebel forces. >> yes, sir. >> i think that's the end game using military force to drive political end. i see you agreeing in acknowledgement. i'll turn to general taylor, and i know you talked about itar. since i came to the congress in 1999, we've been talking about that in the way in which it restricts our private sector and increasingly, i think you could make the argument that it actually does the opposite of enhancing our national security because we are not developing the kind of capabilities that we
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might. .. the commander here is where there's impact us most and that is just as you suggest and if in fact our industrial base cannot provide the kind of capabilities that we need, then we need to go back and took a hard look at why
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that is. what impact that has on us as a military operational force of course depends on what it is that has been delayed, but there is at least one thread that runs back to an industrial base. it isn't the only thread there is at least one friend that says that export controls while well-intentioned, while some need to be there to preserve the best of our national security technologies and keep the devotees, that there is a danger here that export controls if not reviewed and refined can in fact create the opposite kind of situation here where our industry is no longer competitive, there for our industry is declining, there for their ability to provide for us is also declining. the president's new national space policy that was signed last summer and the recently approved national security
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strategy both pointed this out, and they both essentially say it's time for us to go back and take another look at itar. i think it's time for us to do that kind of look. there needs to be a careful balance struck between preserving and protecting our highest most important national security technology especially where they relate to space and cyberspace although that's not directly touched quite the same way but i think it's time for that sort of a review and i would encourage that. >> with well-intentioned efforts you can build walls so that those outside the walls can't see in or get in the same situation that applies to those inside of the wall it's harder to get out and see over the top of the wall. >> yes, sir and there are many instances certainly in my last job when i had responsibility the acquisition would come to us and say the reason we are having trouble is because of itar.
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again, i wouldn't -- it's not a blanket indictment of itar nor is it a blanket indictment of the intent behind itar. i do think though execution needs a hard review and that needs to occur soon. >> there's also joint jurisdiction about state and the dod and the committees involved, so i know the chairman is engaged. i think this is the time to push this in ways perhaps we have sent. >> is sewer and no question about it this is a shared responsibility and the department of state has a significant role in all of this. >> thank you. thank you, gentlemen. >> thank you. senator sessions? >> thank you mr. chairman and both of you for your service to the country and we appreciate your leadership and i've gotten to know both of you and have great personal affection and
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admiration for you. i do think senator mccain and senator john kerry were correct when they call early on for a no-fly zone in libya at the time when momentum was with us and we had a chance to be decisive in the ultimate the effort. as a result of the delay that have occurred, we now have a more difficult position and difficult situation. senator mccain to his credit is a patriot. he's not criticizing the president. his view is simply if this is the right thing to do what's support the president in his action. admiral, you mentioned that it's important to secure the u.n. and nato resolution before action and you noted that the entire
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international community is against him, but congress hasn't voted yet, we got approval from a lot of different places but we don't have one from congress and the general color, the no-fly zone it seems to me normally means you use our air force to insure the enemy air force is not able to attack forces that we think ought not to be attacked. it normally doesn't it seems to me the attacking by our air the enemy forces on the ground on one side of a conflict. would you comment, briefly?
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>> search, again, from my role in stratcom black, that is a difficult point for me to comment on. i've heard of the operation described as a no-fly zone, but i think actually there's some additional language that goes with that in the characterizes the operation that's been conducted. >> the additional language comes from the united nations apparently, which is nice to have, but i would ask you, admiral, what if china had vetoed the resolution, what if turkey were some other country in the nato family objected and the era will lead -- arab league had objections to this? with the united states than stand by and allow the slaughter to occur?
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>> that is a decision about squarely rest with the president in terms of making an executive branch decision, and then in terms of my point saying that the united nations security council resolution was a good thing to have is that this simply broadens the mandate from a military officer perspective the u.n. security council resolution lays out the military tasks clearly -- >> well i think that would be interesting that you seem to be taking as your command the united nations and the rules of engagement if authorized, and we don't have any united states rules of engagement i understood what clarity, certainly not from congress. it's not your fault. i'm just saying, it's been bypassed in this has been breathtaking and the idea i hope
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there is no suggestion we are establishing a precedent by which the united states won't act unless multiple international bodies have proved that action, because i remember the famous patent quote, a good plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow. sometimes that means a lot of lives at stake, promise, aggressive action can be decisive and military conflict in that true, admiral? and the delay can be fatal to the success of an operation. >> that is true, and we see examples of that in history. >> admiral, we love our european allies, and they understand you've proposed and suggested we might delay the withdrawal of some of our brigade from europe. we have i believe for now and the plan is to come down to two,
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and it our german friends are some of the best economic and political partners we have in the world. however, tell the american people why we have to have 40,000 troops in europe if they are cutting their budgets for more substantially than we are cutting hours. >> to look for this one we currently a four brigade combat teams in europe as part about 35,000 soldiers that are there comes up to 40,000 at times. there was a decision made several years ago to cut back to two -- >> the kodel trouble to examine the basis that would be in the wording, it was during that time we were closing the u.s. bases under the brac policy. >> and so, subsequently in the course of the quadrennial
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defense review, the department decided to take one more look at that decision as to whether we wanted to cut all the way back to two or reduce some other level of that. that analysis has been going on for about 68 months and is now reaching a final decision. so i don't think, in fact i know that hasn't been announced as of yet, but i believe that your fundamental question is why we have troops in europe at this stage given that they have the resources to defend themselves and so forth. there are legitimate reasons for a reasonable number of u.s. troops in europe and as we talked about earlier we are down from 400,000 in europe down to we've come down 75% already since the end of the cold war and the reason for them is partly what you're seeing right now is the use of these bases as forward areas from which we can
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operate in afghanistan and iraq and libya as we are today and the deterrence is also the insurance and its training and working with the as allies. >> i believe in your statement to say it is a demonstration of the united states commitment as the european committed to defending itself, doesn't need to have us defend them? we've got your opinions that pretend to help us in afghanistan but who won't allow their soldiers to fire their weapons. the gao reported a cost $17 billion for the dod installations in europe and estimated 24 billion through 2015 to operate and maintain our bases. is nato so frail that we've got to have another $1.8 billion construction project to maintain
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perhaps more troops and the plan has called for >> we are working very hard at making every reasonable reduction in the numbers and troops but i would argue let's take afghanistan as an example. we have 40,000 non-u.s. troops in afghanistan with us. we've lost very tragically 1400 of our young men and women killed in action from allies have lost 900 killed in action on a proportional basis it's actually higher than our own losses, so they are in the fight in afghanistan, and i would argue that part of the reason they are there with us in afghanistan and with us in libya is because of those enduring commitments fully taking your point that we ought to look at every reasonable way to reduce it to the minimum in order to give a word u.s. taxpayers -- >> i know you're familiar with japan and the fleet that's there and how much japan supports about 40% of the cost of our
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military bases in japan. our duty to the europeans have gotten too uncomfortable under the american umbrella and reducing the budget substantially across-the-board. we are trying to hold hours at a minimum reduction needy without reduction and they want us to keep more and more troops there. that is a situation that cannot continue, and both of you need to know that when our government spends $3.7 trillion takes in 2.2 that we are an unsustainable path as the federal reserve chairman has told us and money is going to be tight and the defense budget and these are some areas that seem to me real savings can occur without weakening our ability to defend america. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. senator nelson?
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cementer nelson all i'm sorry. >> thank you. admiral and general for your service and all of those that serve with you we appreciate so much the commitment to the defense of the country. general kehler in your testimony to discuss the need to build a new u.s. strategic complex and note that reliably and assured command control and communication through the president of the nuclear forces are fundamental to our strategic deterrent. this requires resolving some gaps in our capabilities, gaps that need to be addressed and will be addressed by the plan strategic command control complex and the nuclear command control communications and note that the air force base to the extent you can expand on the plan and requirements of the strategic command and control complex would you please try to
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explain some of it that we can understand it's more than a building, it is a housing structure for the command. please outline that. >> yes, sir. strategic command as a location fulfills a unique role in the overall national nuclear command and control system. it's a unique mode if you will on the network of nuclear command and control, but it's a unique note. the fact that we came to discover with great clarity when we had an 8-inch water main break in the building back in december and seriously impacted our ability to get the job done. therefore, as we look at retaining the diprete nuclear command and control capabilities those things that the strategic command right now that are
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encompassed inside that physical plant, the headquarters building itself we are talking about unique planning tools and unique operational command and control activities and we are certainly talking about unique fusion capability to begin to pull the pieces of not only our nuclear command and control but space and cyberspace and other pieces together as well. so as we went forward to look at how we need to address the affordability is we have, the physical vulnerability is from what is now an antiquated as a local plan that was never designed to do when we are asking the command to do today in fact when the physical plant was built the had one mission and that is nuclear deterrence today that is one of many missions that strategic command has and as we look at this the physical plan isn't going to be capable of keeping up. there for the analysis that is
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done prior to my arrival leads us to believe the best course of action is to create an updated control mode with the appropriate planning tools and other things to surround that with a new building. and that is the pathway that we are on when we will get building a new building i think that that's not an adequate way to describe this. because a new building is one thing, what we're actually creating here is a command and control mode, nuclear command and control mode, a planning center that has unique capabilities for global planning requirements that has to be housed in a facility that can support that and so those two things together is what we are asking the congress to support. >> thank you. admiral, the onset the operations of libya, the president noted u.s.
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capabilities to established the no-fly zone in other words, the tomahawk missiles in the u.s. point those capabilities in support of the u.n. resolution and with the partnership of nato on the understand that the committee, our committee has asked and is working to get a cost to date for the mission along with weekly cost reports and i appreciate this is i believe needed because there's really two questions that go beyond what the role of the mission is and that is the cost - a number of people ask me if there isn't any kind of an exit strategy the same people didn't mrs. early asked the question about iraq or afghanistan, they're asking it right now could you give us some indication what we're looking at in terms of cost to date just on
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the basis of medieval parking it. >> as i mentioned a couple of your colleagues i'm really not the right person to asked. i would say that it's the operation as it runs over and be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. hundreds of millions of dollars a pledge to chairman levin to take back the message to the department that you're looking for. the cost to date and weekly updates and i believe there will be registered lot and clear that the department and i understand that. in terms of an exit strategy, i think events at this point are so fluid we are five weeks into this thing. the first set of protests began on the 15th of february, the u.n. security council resolution is 30 days later 17th of march,
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nato has taken over the mission and everything has moved extremely rapidly and i look at the spectrum of how this could untold and where is our exit strategy until we have a little more clarity moving forward. >> with respect to nato do you have information that would indicate what percentage of the total cost for the total budget of nato is borne by the united states government as a percentage? >> i will find out the answer to that. i think that the nato budgeting structure unlike the united nations which is balanced in some ways bigger nations pay more i think that the nato, and funding pool is exactly that, the common funded pool and i don't think the united states pays a disproportionate share of
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nado costs. when you get into operations nato is doing or any operational setting the costs were why were they fall which means the nation is bringing before to the fight is the one that pays for the force and in that sense taking afghanistan is an example, the united states is two to one in terms of the ratio which is roughly twice the cost for example but those are rough estimates. i will refine those and report back to you. >> the would be fine. thank you very much to both of you. thank you, senator nelson. senator cornyn. >> it's good to see you both. i have number of questions i want to ask the admiral but i appreciate your service and what i want to do is focus my attention on the admiral
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stavridis. i'm struggling a little bit to understand what the plan is now we've intervened in libya and then handed things off to nato especially given the unrest still the extent and egypt and places like loranne who knows where this will spread and how it will end, and i think part of the -- part of this inability to understand what the plan is is because the president and here again this is not your fault, but the president didn't come to congress and engage congress in this discussion about his intentions so that's why we have a lot of these questions. i want to ask you first of all to help me understand as you understand what the contours are of the new doctrine of
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intervening for humanitarian purposes, and not win secretary gates said our vital interest nor our eminent threat was likely to come from libya but we intervene to save civilians which i understand any human being with a heart would be compassion for. terrapin civilians killed in protests against the government. we know syria is a state sponsor of international terrorism that has facilitated the entry of the foreign fighters into iraq that have killed american troops. we know that syria is composite with iran and the shipment of weapons through syria to lebanon but hezbollah can use to attack israel since it strikes me that
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libya as bad as colonel gadhafi is he's been in power 42 years, while libya and why not syria, can you help me understand as you understand why libya, why not syria? >> as to why libya, i think that as we look at the nato side of this thing and that's where i am somewhat qualified to speak on this in terms of u.s. policy decisions i think those more fairly rest with at my level general hanft and africom, secretary defense gates and so forth what i can tell you from a nato perspective is the nato organization looked at the imminent possibility of a massive slaughter in been gauzy i think that catalyzed nato command was the ability that nato had because of the
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geography of libya being so close to italy and was looking at the potential out comes from that even from a european perspective of potential mass migrations, destabilization in the egypt was a significant concern and in the halls of nato, so i think it was, senator, a combination of proximity, the sense of eminent mass disaster and the capability, and here i would draw historical parallel going back to the conflict in bosnia which you may remember in the 1990's there was an event at a place called you may remember where 8,000 men and boys were executed essentially in a day or to come and it was as a result of that the canada catalyzed need to read that time and it's fair to say the memory of that and the fact that he was looked as though what were going to
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fall on potentially have a solar scenario based on the statements of gadhafi and his son i think all that came together. >> i think it was general powell who claimed the pottery barn rule if you break it you own it and we've seen that our intervention in iraq and afghanistan not to go exactly as we might have planned to say the very least which causes me concern about what the future is going to mean in libya under the nato command, just so we can understand this i believe the question senator nelson was asking, my understanding is your correct in terms of the financial contribution makes me to nato out of the 132,000 troops in afghanistan about
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90,000 of those are u.s. troops but they fall under the nato command, correct? >> this search to sharpen the numbers slightly, 98,000 u.s. troops and 45,000 non-u.s. troops about two to one would be the ratio. >> thank you for that. is nato adequately resources in terms of personnel and financial resources? >> in afghanistan, yes, sir. and another set of numbers worth noting and i mentioned them to one of your colleagues of killed in action there been sadly over 1400 u.s. so 221 would expect about 700 of the allies and 900 allies have fallen so they are in this fight with us and taking losses and i believe making a significant contribution.
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>> my staff handed me an article that quote general caldwell of the training commission who said that nato still faces a shortage of 740 trainers needed to train afghan soldiers and policemen so assuming that nato is able to handle its commitment in afghanistan, could you explain if in fact nato does decide to deploy stabilization forces, that means boats on the ground, and in libya that would include u.s. troops under nato command, wouldn't it? >> if nato decided to deploy troops, whether or not the united states decided to participate with troops would be a national decision for the united states let me turn it around in terms of the no-fly zone that we are enforcing right now, senator, germany for
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example has chosen not to participate in that mission, so it's not required that every nation in the nato participate in every mission. there is a capability to choose among them and that tends to balance itself out. the germans who are not in the libyan operation are contributing 5,000 troops in afghanistan, they are actually the second largest contributor there. >> with me conclude. assuming humanitarian crisis that you detailed and the president talked about last night is sufficiently compelling to warrant the intervention of the united states military and now nato's involvement can you imagine any set of circumstances where nato would pull out and allow that humanitarian crisis to continue or do you think it is more likely than not that they would see it to some sort of a satisfactory conclusion that did not involve a massive
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loss of innocent civilian lives? >> it's dangerous to talk about a hypothetical, but i think that based on the conversations i've seen and heard around nato as the alliance signed up for the mission i think nato will see it through the conclusion. i will give you a practical example if i may, kosovo, 1999, the alliance decided to go in and went in with air strikes that then send boots on the ground. when i took the job two years ago there were 15,000 nato troops in kosovo today that's come down to about 5,000, that is okay. that's indicative of the ongoing level of engagement and by the way of the 5,000 troops only about 700 of them are u.s. troops. >> d.c. any scenario under which gadhafi, the nato mission would be deemed as success where gadhafi would remain in power?
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>> the overall international community speaking to the leaders has continued to indicate the designer for colonel gadhafi to lead. the nato mission at the moment is humanitarian, arms embargo, no-fly zone, protect the population. how you square that trading will be determined in the weeks and months ahead. >> thank you, senator cornyn. senator hagan. >> thank you mr. chairman and to both of you for being here and the great job your doing for the country. we do appreciate it. one of my concerns has to do with the stem of education in the schools, and technology, engineering and math, and i know developing and expanding and sustaining the steady stream of the specialists is critical to the national security and in
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your statement you indicated that this labour work force is growing, but retaining recruiting adequately trained and equipped cyber warriors is challenging. and you also mentioned the importance of partnering with the nations educational and commercial information technology entities to spur domestic math and science interests and this is certainly an area i am extremely interested in. i was recently reading after the four nations the u.s. his fortune than reading, 17th in science and 25th in math so this is a huge concern. can you describe your efforts in recruiting a steady stream of cyber warriors and how can the congress help you in this regard and have your staff can engage with universities and high schools that specialize in the education. but the answer the middle question first. we appreciate the congress continues to mengin stem and the fact that he will have as a part
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of your general agenda some of you with specific agenda items to continue to push that is important for all of us and i think for our overall national security and not just in cyber but as i look across the board in strategic command we are the beneficiary of a great deal of our high-tech weaponry and no question about it in the industrial base that produces that as well as in the military members that we have to recruit to be part of those operations this dennis' critically important across-the-board. let me get to the specifics of cyber. each of the services have put together programs to recruit, train, certified and retain cyber specialists. we've put from strategic command a bit of a demand signal on the service components.
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for example, what they brought to the cyber command initially was the policing up if you will all of the surface specialties that already had a hand in the cyber business. we said to them the last year or so is that's not enough. we need to increase the demand signal and so we are now going through requirements studies if you will, the first was completed with a lead on the surfaces requirement for a thousand more cyber operational people, the split among the service to about 300 each and the wheels are turning to produce those. it's now up to us to come back and quantify with a little bit more fidelity what additional cyber capacity we need. we know we need more. the question is how much and what skills. as of the services are being responsive in this regard. all of them had their way to record from the beginning at least one of them has put in
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place of the requirement into the basic military training for basic cyber awareness almost like every marine is a rifleman and every sailor is a firefighter, every service member certainly every year man i can speak for a surface i just came from every airman is going to be a cyber defender and i think that that kind of philosophy is going to be very helpful in the long run. in addition advanced degree projects that have been put in place in the air force and been taken in the navy so to retain the people as they go forward i think this spring to be a great deal of ability for us to try to keep up with the private sector which as you know most of the rapid advances occurred, the services that make me feel good as the user of those capability is they are looking hard at the reserve components and the national guard because where it makes sense for us to link up the reserves and the guard with
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the civilian community that they are attached to and they come from is in cyber. go to places like seattle or silicon valley or the carolinas are places that are the hotbeds cyber high-tech activities are those are ideal places for the reserve units or national guard units that can do double duty if you will, keep a foot in that civilian community while bringing those kind of talents to the national security as well. so i would tell you that i believe that the wheels are turning. the progress has been made. we are looking ourselves that what joint training might look like, but joint certification might look like. how is it we ask the services to provide complementary capabilities, not competitive capabilities, and so far what i've seen out of the services they are amenable to working with the speed and cyber command in all of those ways -- i will
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make one other plant. the deputy security fence has a role in this and he has been very vocal in his commitment to want to have the department position the to have the capacity to we know we are going to need for the future. >> i can see that you are very interested in this because i think it is something obviously for the national security, and we need to do a much better job and i know that you are at competition with the private sector, too. i'm glad you mentioned carolina. a couple of weeks ago i asked the secretary of defense for policy meshaal flournoy how our nato policies can significantly growing and capable afghan national security force. psychiatry flournoy indicated that this is an area for potential reinvestment by the nato and i sat partners particularly some of the partner forces redeploy change the
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nature of their commitment to the mission and can you describe the effort at conveying to the nato allies the importance of maintaining forces in afghanistan that appropriate levels and providing additional funding for the afghan national security force trust fund and i was in afghanistan and have an opportunity to visit the training center and there was a lot of good work going on. >> thank you, senator. i'm very pleased as i think you were with your visit with the overall training effort. lieutenant general who heads up that mission who has about 5,000 people on his team come at any given moment they have about 35,000 afghans and training, they tried 100,000 afghans for example literacy speaking of education which is an extraordinary thing in addition to all the war fighting skills they're teaching basic reading
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to the many of these young afghan men and women. we are encouraging the allies to do now is some of them are withdrawing forces to shift those to the training mission and i will give you to practical examples, the canadians who have fought very valiantly in afghanistan decided to downsize the combat mission but they added almost a thousand people to the training mission which is flowing into afghanistan right now. the second 1i would mention are the dutch who fought very valiantly and took casualties in southern afghanistan, they decided to shift to the training focus and they are moving to bring 545 members to focus largely on training with a few other activities as well so we are shoving them as an example to other nations and as we begin the transition this summer in kabul and sharif and upon sheer
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-- we are going to be able to turn over to the afghans to the war fighting and take some of our forces to do the training and in the and that's how we've will succeed in the security dimension and afghanistan we are going to train our way to success. >> how about the funding? >> the funding is that place and at the moment i would hasten to say largely overwhelmingly from the united states, and that's something we need to work on with our allies. and this is an area, center, where even nations that are not in the troops on the ground portion of this i think can be very helpful. there are 70 nations engage financially and afghanistan. 48 almost 49 have troops on the ground, but trade space is a place i'm encouraging our national folks to focus our diplomats to focus on funding this afghan security training
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trust fund. i agree that is an area they could do more. >> thank you. >> thank you. senator vitter? >> thank you, mr. chairman and both for your service and thanks to all their great service of the men, women who serve in uniform with you. admiral, i think the fundamental confusion about the such region in libya is the statement is that we are mostly there to avoid the humanitarian catastrophe. everyone knows that the greatest threat towards that end ms. gadhafi remaining in power and regaining control of the country. yet gadhafi is a vehicle of the operation. it doesn't connect. can you explain that to us? >> i can only explain what i do as a military officer leading
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from the nato perspective and the military mission life been given is to focus on all the things we talked about in the course of this hearing which range from the humanitarian operation to the arms embargo to the no-fly zone to protecting the population. now, as distinct from the military mission that i am charged with, as i listen to all that the time has come to. i think the way those connect is a sense of by our participation in protecting the people of libya we create a safe and secure environment in which the people of libya can make a determination and that they then have the ability to undertake the kind of effort that would in effect create a regime change as we've seen in other nations in the middle east. so i think that it's fair to say
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that the regime change is an aspiration that has been articulated by many world leaders and under discussion today in london nine sure the military mission i have at the moment that i am focused on that i am charged with is one that i described to you a moment ago. i don't think the two are directly linked but they may connect over time particularly if we had other tools to the kick in terms of the financial squeeze, in terms of the travel restrictions, finding the money and crushing it off i think our all part of this. but again, we are very early in the process. we are six weeks into it. and at the moment, my focus as the nato commander is on the military mission the i've been given. >> can you imagine the progress of the gadhafi force is not posing serious humanitarian threats?
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>> i think from everything we've seen the last five or six weeks whenever gadhafi's forces have an opportunity to move and operate, they pose a threat to civilians very much so. >> i guess that's my general point we are somehow trying to have it both ways. this is a humanitarian mission but we are not taking sides on the civil war iraq. my point is that is round in a square pay and you can't do it, and i think would be more constructive to be direct and clear about it so we know what we are getting into or not getting into. if you have any reaction on that? >> i think those are plants that would be taken up with the policy makers in the department of defense. i believe you will have a series of hearings in which that could be appropriately addressed. at my level as a military officer i'm very focused on the mission that i've been given from my civilian leadership.
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>> okay. the cost of this, we are getting reports on the ongoing cost of the operations. can you tell us generally what current defense accounts are being used to offset the cost? >> no sir not within my purview either as a combatant commanders when i'm flying forces to africom the budgetary train that comes behind it is handled by each of the individual services and so the department of defense would be able to give you that answer and as i will mention to the chairman i will gladly convey that that. >> if you could add to the request we talked about before that we also get a report specifically about where money is coming from. thank you. finally, intelligence. the president specifically highlighted intelligence as a significant continuing u.s. role in his remarks last night. at the same time, on the same
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day, the admiral stated that we have limited intelligence capability and specifically we don't know who the rebels are. those seem like inconsistent comments. >> we are very early in the process, so i think what admiral was talking about a limited intelligence he was talking about the opportunity to understand who was in the opposition, what is their background, what are their connections, who are they talking to and we are in the process of working hard to gather that intelligence right now. in terms of intelligence support to the mission brusquely we're talking about the every of capabilities from satellites to signals intelligence to other aircraft gathering intelligence
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said those elements kind of come together. one is a resources and enable our and the other is an approximate intelligence requirement and by enabling and using the resources in the operation we have a much better chance of gathering dhaka specific intelligence of the opposition that we very much need. >> thank you mr. chairman. cementer shaheen. >> admiral stavridis come at tunnell kehler, i'm sorry i missed your testimony but i delighted to be here and have you both here and a general kehler, it's nice to have you here as the commander for the first time of stratcom but most of my questions on nato and related civil director general stavridis. >> and general kehler is going to put in a request to laws testified with me. >> i'm not surprised. but i only have one libya
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questions that should make you feel better. i want to pick up on the concern raised by senator collins about the arab involvement and the mission in libya and i share the commitment expressed about maximizing d engagement on the part of the arab allies and what's happening in libya and i know some have expressed concern that having the mission led by nato might discourage some of our arab allies from participating. can you tell me if that is your view and when you have heard from arab countries about nato's leading the mission? >> i can't, senator, i don't agree on the statement shifting the mission to nato will reduce
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arab participation and i base that on several factors. one and i mentioned a couple of times in the hearing, one is the sub organizations we have that nato about the mediterranean diet of which has five animations from and the periphery of the mediterranean in fact almost all of the ones in north africa except libya and the cooperative initiative which is similar organization in the gulf states of the arabian gulf. both of those organizations give me tell an ongoing set of relationships with i believe 11 arab nations in total and we have kept each of those and overwhelming the the impression we get is the arab states are very willing to operate with nato. as you know, we already have to. there's a couple more coming, a
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more sensitive conversation, but i think the range of participation and engagement in the end doing this under nato auspices will be very positive and will continue as i told senator collins and i will come back to you in 30 days and fall on that particular point. >> said they would be participating as partners sitting around the table as decisions are being made? >> i would say for military operations the 28 member states of the north atlantic council will be the deciding body and this is parallel to the situation in afghanistan where the 28 nato nations are the actual military decision makers. around that nucleus of the 28 nato nations, the political partners come together and there is a very free dialogue and yet, they don't have delineated control over the military of
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revisions and that is pretty functional arrangement i think. >> thank you. now i want to switch to the balkans. he mentioned kosovo and the reduction of nato and u.s. forces. is it your assessment that we are making good progress? one of the concerns raised was when i was at the brussels conference was concerned about some of the police sites in kosovo and the extent to which they would be secure if the nato forces withdrew. >> i think we are making very good progress in kosovo. if you look at that time scale, ten years ago we were literally launching tomahawk missiles into belgrade to kind of kick off that conflict just over ten years ago. when i came on the job we had 15,000 troops. because we've been able to maintain a safe and secure
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environment we reduced to 10,000 in february i came down to 5,000 troops. i'm very comfortable at that level. in the year i will take another look and i think we are going to work our way out of the job and kosovo because the ongoing dialogue between serbia and kosovo continues to improve. in terms of the sensitive sites, we started out with nine of those and we turned over six of them at this point. we are about to turn over a seventh. the final two are particularly sensitive and we are going to hold those i think for some number of months into the future but you are correct to raise that as an indicator of what we will get as we go forward to ultimate we close this mission out. but overall, i am pleased with the progress and i believe we are on the right trajectory. >> that's encouraging. in last april, nato placed a number of conditions on bosnia's
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membership action plan and i was one of those who argued that it would be important to offer for bosnia as they are trying to work their way through some of the governmental structures, and at this point, however, given the challenges that they've had in putting together a government, can you talk about what progress there is in moving forward and what message the people in bosnia might want to take away if they watched the leaders squander what i think is a real opportunity? >> i think you categorize it correctly and that there is continuing acrimony between the three major groups in bosnia which i think is holding them back from making significant progress on the map at this time. one concrete example would be
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the application of the defense properties which are distributed among bosnia and the serbian ethnic populations bringing those together in a centralized way we have yet to see progress on that and that is for example one of the conditions of the movement on the map. so i'm not encouraged about that. we continue to work with them and try to move progress there because a team that's very important and i am concerned about bosnia falling backward if we don't all continue to work together. >> i would ask about the new strategic concept and i will save that for another time. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator. i just have a couple of questions. first of all, admiral, you testified earlier you are comfortable with the mission that has been given to you that
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i take it that means that you view the mission is sufficiently clear. is that correct? >> speaking as a nato commander i hold this as a nato commander, yes, sir. it's clear with the north of land council has tasked me with. >> in use in your comfortable -- >> i am comfortable with that mission. >> the fact that there's not get an exit strategy isn't troubling to you? >> it's early in the process and i'm confident one will develop and even in london today may give us an indication. >> okay. general kehler, you've made reference or were asked about the phase of that approach. can you tell us -- well, let me ask you, do you support this fazed at its approach? i'm not sure you're point blank answer that question. >> yes i do.
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>> and why? >> missile defense for the united states has been based on two major objectives. objective number one has been to make sure that the homeland, our homeland is protected against a limited ballistic missile attack from north korea and to extend that if the even warrant and iran develops a similar capacity. at the same time, objective number two that has emerged has been to make sure that we are responding to the regional threats we see that are growing at a very, very fast pace. so the phased adaptive approach is intended to put resources into theaters where we need to add to the defenses of the u.s. troops and our allies, but to do so in such a way that it builds upon the threat i support that and that's the right way to go forward. i think that gives us a prudent
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way to go forward and it allows us to hedge our activities as well and i think inherent in both pieces of this missile defense activity that we are putting together there are appropriate hedges in place that allow us to adapt and respond as needed. >> the regional threat is a existing threat, is that correct? >> a regional threat is an existing threat and growing. >> is it true that the phased i doubt if approach addresses the existing threat? >> it does. >> unlike the previous approach, is that correct? and existing threat for the short and medium-range missiles? and particularly the irony in missiles. >> yes, and that includes missiles from other actors as well. >> the advantage of the phase
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deductive approach as i understand is it addresses that existing threat. >> now the other threat that is to the homeland can be addressed by, hopefully by the existing offense we have on the west coast including alaska, california, is that correct? >> that's the ground bass midcourse defense system. >> thank you so much, both of you. >> sir, if i could, i would like to make a comment about a naval officer because i would like this to go into the congressional record. vice admiral robert mueller died yesterday, vice admiral, the
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africa command and you met him, every member met him. he came around and create the africa command along with general board. he died last night, but i wanted to save the record the performance of africa command during the libyan operation has been exemplary, and i believe that the quality that the vice admiral built into that were part of it and i wanted to see that on the record. >> thank you. we appreciate that. what was the cause of his death? >> he died of als, lou gehrig's disease and it is commonly known. >> thank you for making reference to him and his fallin and service. thank you both for the services you given to our country for the men and women with whom you work and your families. we stand adjourned.
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[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] ..
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>> lets me one of our top honors in this year studentcam
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competition. this year's theme's students to produce a video about an issue or topic that help them better understand the role of the federal government. today we go to bloomington indiana and talk with her prizewinner, gabe wheeler, an eighth-grader at laura's middle school. highgate. >> hello. >> gabe, why did you create a documentary about the funding of indiana's education system? >> i made this down because over the past year, our school had to make some cuts in programs. they took out several including foreign languages. >> what did you learn about the financial state of indiana's education system? >> i learned that there is not enough funding for all the programs in a crisis. >> do you think of financial state of indiana's education system is affecting your education? >> it could have if it were to
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be cut. i wouldn't have been able to -- okay, without the tv i would have been able to win this contest and i guess my future goals would have been effective. >> what role do you think the government should play in the improvement of indiana's education opportunities? >> to provide money so that we can keep important classes like foreign language, business tech in our schools. >> what did you learn in your interview with indiana secretary of education dr. tony bennett? >> i learned that tony bennett plays a key role in helping indiana's education crisis. he is the man that everyone goes to and he is in charge of i guess what people need to cut or whatever things. where the money is supposed to be going to. >> in your interview with
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mr. tony bennett, he says high expectations can outweigh limited state budget when it comes to student achievement. what does he mean by that statement? >> i think he means as long as we can educate high expectatione education, the education crisis. >> what is the message you would like to share with people through your documentary? >> i would just like to share that basically there are many things that need to happen to solve this education crisis and i guess not just in indiana, but everywhere else in the u.s.. there are lots of things that need to have been. >> thank so much for joining us today. >> thank you. >> and here's a brief portion from gabe's documentary, improving educational opportunities and in a time of crisis. >> some communities, some activities, -- so i think we hae
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to begin to have these types of discussion so we can identify how important are the arts, how important are -- were they in terms of our core mission? >> standby. the tv going live in five, four, three, two, one. cut. >> i'm sorry kids but this program has been cut. due to budget cuts. we are eliminating all classes and all programs that do not have a direct impact on test scores. turn those computers off. >> you can see this entire video and all the winning documentaries at studentcam.org and continue the conversation at our facebook and twitter pages. >> throughout the month of april we will feature the top winners
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of this year c-span studentcam competition. nearly 1500 midland high school students submit a documentaries on the theme, washington d.c. through my lens. watch the winning videos every morning on c-span at:50 eastern before "washington journal" entering the program meet the students who created them. stream of the winning videos anytime on line at studentcam.org. >> president obama recently gave directives on the way the country's response to major emergencies like the recent oil spill in the gulf, problems at a nuclear plant or a possible terrorist attack. the presidential directive is similar to an executive order. white house senior director for preparedness explains the directive in an event designed designed -- at george washington university. this is 50 minutes. >> the president's highest priority is the safety and
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security of the american people. he is committed to securing the homeland against 21st century threats, by preventing terrorist attacks, preparing for emergencies regardless of their cause and investing in strong response and recovery capabilities. we aim to prevent what we can and respond rapidly to what we must. in support of that commitment, last week president obama signed a new presidential policy directive on national preparedness, ppd eight. the directive outlines the president's vision for strengthening the security and the resilience of our nation through systematic preparations to address our security. including acts of terrorism, pandemics, significant accidents, hence catastrophic natural disasters. what i would like to do this morning is to outline our approach to preparedness, tell you more about the directives and what departments and agencies are already doing to
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move out and embody its principles and leave time for some discussion. i brought copies of the ppd in hard copy for those of you here this morning and the directive will be posted later today to the web sites, the department of homeland security and the federal emergency management agency. our approach to preparedness, which is reflected in ppd, rests on three key principles. first, we are focused on a olive nation approach aimed at enhancing integration of efforts across federal, state local and tribal territorial governments, closer collaboration with the private and nonprofit sectors and our engagement of individuals, families and communities. as we have seen during countless incidents, which have informed our development of the directive, from the 2009 h1n1 pandemic to the response to the
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bp deepwater horizon the oil spill, national response has strengthened when we leverage the expertise and resources that exist in our communities. all of us can contribute to safeguarding our nation from harm and we must continue to lean forward together to prepare for all hazards. and you have seen this principle already. it is reflected in the department of homeland security's quadrennial homeland security review. it appears as a cornerstone of our approach to help security reflected in the national health security strategy of the department of health and human services and you can see it and hear it in the approach of fema administrator craig fugate. he talks about those who have suffered disasters not as big dems, but as survivors, who can help their community respond and recover. craig has initiated a whole of community planning effort that
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recognize these communities are inherently strong and resilient even in the face of disasters. this approach relies on understanding and meeting the true needs of the entire affected community, engaging all aspects of that community, the private, the nonprofit, the public there's. and both defining those needs and devising ways to meet them. and strengthening the assets, institutions and social processes that work well and communities on a daily basis to improve resilience and emergency management outcomes. you can also see it in craig's rotation program that brings private sector representatives into the fema operations center so that the government can learn from and leverage the private sector's expertise, a boy trying to re-create functions that the private sector does well every day and learn how and where
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public private efforts are best applied during emergencies. and you can also see all of government approaches to identify over the horizon and short term threats. the u.s. government continually detects, assesses, and preempts terrorist threats. the national counterterrorism center brings together the entire intelligence community to review and prioritize these threats into the daily threat matrix. so, across the federal family, the focus has turned outward to how we integrate our efforts with one another and how we integrate better with the communities we all serve. second, we seek to build a key capability we would need to confront any challenge. capabilities defined by specific and measurable objectives are
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the cornerstone of preparedness. rather than rigid approach is that apply in certain scenarios, it's specific assumptions come true a focus on capabilities will enable integrated, flexible and agile all hazards efforts tailored to what we know our unique circumstances of any given threat, hazard or actual event. for example, building flexible capabilities such as search-and-rescue and medical search, enable the response to a wide range of business events regardless of their cause. fema's hole of community efforts demonstrates this approach known as the maxima of maximums. the focus is on planning around a catastrophe and 13 core capabilities were extraordinary levels of mass casualty damage and disruption overwhelm our traditional plans and assesses.
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this effort is a concrete step in making the all of nation whole of community principle real and operations. another example comes from the centers for disease control and prevention. just a few weeks ago, the cdc released 15 capabilities to serve as national public health repaired the standards to assist state and local public health departments with their strategic planning. third, we are actively pursuing more rigorous assessment systems that are focused on outcomes so that we can measure and track our progress over time. we simply need to do better and articulating our current level of preparedness and demonstrating what innovations have worked. fema and hhs are very actively evaluating their grant programs, aligning them around the outcomes to be achieved and seeking to clarify program guidance so that we have even
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better data to answer key questions such as are we prepared? how would we know? and how better are read this year than last? and so consistent with these principles, we undertook a conference of review of our national preparedness policy. as part of that review we spoke with 24 national associations that represent a wide range of stakeholders including a variety of disciplines, law-enforcement, public health, emergency, medical services, emergency management, the national guard, and i'm pleased to see that a number of representatives from those organizations are with us this morning. and we also evaluate our preparedness policy in light of the requirements of the post-katrina emergency management reform act of 2006. the result of that review is a policy we announced today. it replaces homeland security
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presidential directive 2003. but for a few minor exceptions that are noted in the new presidential policy directive for ppd. the directive calls for the establishment of an overarching national preparedness goal that identifies the core capabilities necessary for the spectrum of preparedness, which encompasses five rod missionaries. prevention, those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. protection, those capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and man-made or national disasters. mitigation, those capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by taking steps to lessen the impact of disasters.
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response, the capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment and meet basic human needs after an incident occurs. and recovery, those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by the incident to recover. and these capabilities will be defined in terms of risks and objectives. first, the risk of specific threats and vulnerabilities, which will aim to defined using objective risk factors. who needs the capability? where, and how much they capability is needed and why? and concrete, measurable and prioritize objectives to define what needs doing, how much, how fast and for how long based on a critical specific reform its objectives that will define each capability. the directive also calls for the development of a national
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preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the nation to meet the national preparedness goal. the specific planning, organization, equipment, training and exercises needed to build and maintain domestic capabilities, what you are recognized as the preparedness cycle of effort. and with respect to capabilities, we heard clear feedback from our stakeholders. one size does not fit all. communities have different needs based on the risks they face. that said, we believe it is important to come to agreement on a fugue critical, if you priority capabilities that most communities will share. for example, medical search, information sharing, so that communities can concentrate on what they realistically need instead of a one-size-fits-all approach for a one-size-fits-all approach.
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this focus on capabilities will also drive the evolution of our planning efforts which will seek to identify how we can most effectively mix and match our capabilities where needed to be the most agile and flexible in our approach. since the ppd requires capabilities-based planning frameworks across the five mentioned in -- missionaries i mentioned. as you know, we have a national response framework, which is currently in the process for review and revision. the national disaster recovery framework is a requirement already provided in statute and that is the framework for prevention, protection and mitigation will similarly galvanize planning around the key capabilities necessary for those objectives. that said, the intent is not to produce unwieldy and long documents that merely take up space on our shelves. our stakeholders were also quite
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clear on the need to streamline and rationalize all of the guiding documents and plans. because we recognize and at the local level especially at the same person who has to develop the plans, the documents and grant application packages that we call for is the same person who has to respond to the next fire or the next heart attack. and so we want to move away from overly burdensome requirements, and does we will aim to continually streamline and simplify. there are many federal departments and agencies that support act goodies across the national preparedness spectrum. and the ppd specifies a number of roles and responsibilities. notably the department of homeland security will undertake the interagency efforts to develop the national preparedness goal to -- system and annual report.
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these are multidisciplinary efforts by design and will involve many departments and agencies. we have also, in the ppd and otherwise, placed a renewed emphasis on individuals and community preparedness, which we believe is a cornerstone of our national resilience. the public played a critical role on our nation's emergency management team in every type of incident. our goal is to empower americans with information about the risks we face and the actions we can all take to protect ourselves and our communities. for example, during the 2009 h1n1 pandemic, the cdc communicated clear messages to the american people about what they could do to prevent the spread of disease. and you probably all know this instinctively now. cover your cough, stay home if sick, keep sick children out of
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school. so we are very confident in the american people when provided information about the risks they face and what they can do about it will take appropriate action. fema's ready campaign at ready.gov provides simple and practical steps all americans can take to become better prepared, including how to repair a family emergency plan, an emergency supply kit and how to get involved in community preparedness efforts. given your expertise and your interest in this morning's topic, i am also confident you are probably among the most prepared audiences i can imagine, but i would be remiss if i did not mention the basics even here. our challenge continues to be making more effective use of the resources we had in our communities and at all levels of government.
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and it is no surprise to you that yes, our resources are constrained. our thinking need not the. so that we measure and track your preparedness efforts over time, based on the key outcome measures i have talked about and communicate our level of preparedness to the congress and to the american people, the directive requires the preparation of the national paired this report every year. a clear, articulation on the return we receive for investments in preparedness is even more critical in the current fiscal environment. the good news is that the nation is better prepared to navigate a catastrophic incident than ever before. this is true first and foremost because of the ongoing integration of efforts across all levels of government. but also because of the active engagement of the private sector's, the nonprofit sectors
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and individuals and communities. ppb eight aims to enhance further disintegration of efforts. i i actively breaking down barriers between levels and layers of government, we are more agile and better able to mix and match respective capabilities to confront unique circumstances. for example, dhs hhs and the department of defense are leading the implementation of the president's executive order 13527 to establish capabilities to dispense medical countermeasures during a large-scale biological attack. those departments have broken down barriers and for the first time we have seen the hhs and they fema planners working alongside not just one another but with state and local public health and emergency managers to solve what we now are some very serious challenging requirements of rapid distribution of medical countermeasures that would be necessary to save lives.
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in addition, as we saw during the earthquake in haiti, and are seeing in the current response to events in japan, many departments and agencies from states and usaid, hhs, dod, the nuclear regulatory commission, the department of energy are enhancing international cooperation and collaboration on the ground throughout the disaster management assistance. we will study every aspect of the response in japan so that we can learn lessons from these unprecedented earthquake, tsunamis and nuclear emergencies. beyond the ppd itself, we are seeking to be smarter in our approach by identifying rate limiting steps in planning accordingly, reducing decision points before disaster strikes, reducing points of failure during simplification, developing emergency documents to enable lifesaving action and
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authority to optimize speed. focusing on the outcome upfront and establishing well understood what it articles for communication and coordination and then practicing them through exercises, such as the upcoming national level exercise or nld 2011 which next month will simulate a catastrophic nature of a major earthquake in the central united states region, of the new metric zone which includes eight states. while all disasters are unique, there are things that we can and are doing every day to assist in better navigating whatever catastrophe might occur. the president's new policy on national preparedness aims to enhance these efforts. i want to thank you for your time and attention this morning and your interest in our national preparedness, and i very much look forward to our discussion. thank you.
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[applause] >> thank you ran. that was a great overview of the directive and also preparedness in general. something i think everyone in this room really believes in. icd five former college from bush bashers should hear us well his new colleagues from the obama administration. i think preparedness and homeland security and general is one one of those bipartisan issues that is out there today, so brian i can't think of a better sign of bipartisanship than you occupying by former -- at the white house. >> we still have a few things you left. [laughter] >> the brian on a serious note, resilience. that is aware that our task force and that we talked about a little bit at the beginning, is focused on because resilience seems to be one of those words -- i don't want to call it a buzzword but one of those words that affects a lot of different issues, and if you could provide us a better
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understanding of what resilience means to you and to the obama demonstration and how that really interacts with what you just discussed i think i would be useful way to start this conversation. >> i would be glad to and it is a very useful question. at thanks dan. when the president integrated these staff of the national security council and homeland security council following presidential study directive number one, he created a resilience directorate, which spans the full range of preparedness through response activities. and we decided very early on that we need to approach the term in a way that was easily understood by many different disciplines, and so we did a little research based on the research skills that i've i have learned here at gw and found very quickly that some two dozen disciplines use the term resilience, from systems
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engineers to folks who work in the environment and ecology, and what he came clear pretty quickly is that it was not going to be fruitful to spend six or eight months arguing about the precise dirty eight words that would need in one single definition of resilience, but that rather, we would focus on a few key principles of resilience that we thought all of the activities and everyone who was trying to advance them could see themselves and. and so as applied to this discipline, those principles included was standing. we have to be able to withstand an incident, adapt ring. adapt to change, because incidents bring us different circumstances. and then rapidly recover. and so those three principles we
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stand, adapt, rapidly recover became the organizing principles around our resilience activities and so we think that owners and operators of critical infrastructure can see themselves in that. their facilities need to be able to withstand disruption and rapidly recover and adapt to change. we believe that applies at the end at the family level to be able to withstand ideally built upon some preparedness steps you have taken, and so you will see these principles articulated in the national security strategy, where resilience has become an imperative to guide our work. the principle is featured in the quadrennial homeland security review, but all of these programmatic efforts to support those principles we have gone
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beyond the notion of definition alone and gone beyond any notion that it is simply a buzzword, but that we believe these efforts will enhance not just our security but our resilience as a nation, will leverage the strength and inherent resilience of the american people who can withstand disruption, who can adapt to change, and you can rapidly recover. >> let's drill down on a specific situation that the world is facing. the question has been raised here and that is nuclear preparedness. we are all very familiar with the disaster in japan and many of us are asking now how well prepared are we here in the united states? is recently today in the "washington post" that particular question was on health care facilities. could you address nuclear facilities? bsa mentioned in the remarks we
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are taking a multi-do very close look at the response in japan so that we can learn the lessons they are. we have done a number of initiatives and efforts to aggressively prepare this nation for radiation emergencies of any type because as you know, we could experience a radiological emergency from nuclear power plant, from an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device but i will just highlight a few of those efforts in june of last year, we issued the second edition of planning guidance to state and local colleagues for preparedness for an improvised nuclear device. it includes planning considerations for sheltering, for evacuation and for communicating with the public ahead of these kinds of events. as you know, the key message to
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a community in any kind of incident would be the same and that is follow the instructions of your local emergency management and your local theaters who have the have the best information about what is happening on the ground. but we think it very important to mitigate for the american people ahead of these kinds of events. and it is the second edition because it takes into account the latest and scientific evidence from a number of studies that the department of homeland security and other aspects of the u.s. government have funded to understand better what the thread is and what actions would he most helpful, because the guidance on whether to shelter in place or evacuate may differ depending on the type of event, and so we have tried to focus on what are the right timing considerations and how do we communicate to the public? the national exercise or nle process in 2010 actually focused
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on events related to radiological emergencies, including a september 2010 exercise that included state and local government around the accidental release of radiation from and where power plant. and just a few weeks ago, the cdc convened after two years of planning i might add, a conference on preparedness for radiological emergencies that involved 450 state and local radiological preparedness experts. so even during the midst of a response where those folks and their technical expertise were needed at home, they all assembled in atlanta to discuss our preparedness for this. and so again, that was planned well in advance, which led us to ask our colleagues what they were planning for two years from now just so we could be ready.
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>> that we have taken a number of steps to improve our preparedness for a wide range of radiological emergencies, but we will take a very close look at what is happening in japan so that we learn even more. >> i think it would be for all of this come after katrina, typical conversation comparing to katrina but the key there is that we want to make sure that her government learns from this. do you feel today that we are better prepared as a result of katrina and kimmie become even lead to higher level higher-level preparedness as a result of what happened in japan. >> i don't want to make comparisons to specific events because they are each unique in their own way but that really shows us why the focus on capabilities is what we believe is the most effective way to approach this, that if we build out certain core capabilities we will be able to respond to a
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wide range of incidents. and so, we know that based on guidance and planning and organizing, training and equipment, that local emergency managers, local public health, local law enforcement can put those things together in ways that they need to, to respond to the most flexible and agile way. so, i think this approach of focusing in on key capabilities being very clear about the outcomes we are intending to achieve will make us even more prepared. >> let's take some questions now as we are made waiting for the microphone to be passed around. please raise your hand if you would like to ask a question. i task force first, anyone who would like to ask a question. the microphone is back there. so marco, right here, front row. i will say again a special thanks to her task force members
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who have been working on these issues and we look forward to putting out her first report very soon. marco please introduce yourself. >> marco warren on the task force. brian applauded administration getting this out. i noticed in a long and difficult process but certainly hopefully it will prove to be a productive one. my question really revolves around measurement preparedness. is part of the national preparedness report that has to be done, you have to base it on standards, definitions of various levels of preparedness from capabilities and etc. from planning. the challenges i spent agreement on what those measurements ought to be across the federal government, state and local government. what do you do as the next steps to achieve some discrete set of measurements that folks can actually agree to, buy into and therefore apply resources for so they can be better? >> obviously it is engagement of the stakeholders with a focus on what the key capabilities are. the cdc for example did that. if you go to cdc.gov -- i'm
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sorry don't recall the exact page, but you will see the 15 capabilities that working with their state and locals -- stakeholders at the state and local level. they said these were we are the core things we need to focus on in terms of building capability, the ability to do medical search, the ability to distribute and dispense medical countermeasures. it is an engagement process with stakeholders, and so the implementation of the directive is the next step. those consultations in the development of those measures is where we go from here. but it certainly recognizes that we can't do it all here at the federal level. there or are not federal solutions in terms of we identify for every community what we think they need. they understand their risks. we need to focus on their understanding and try and focus on the core capabilities and
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agree how we measure those. >> it ellen kerney. former chief operating officer at the american red cross. and again, i listen for the words about ngo's and in the discussion and they are criticaf you don't want to go to specific events but when you take a look at the disaster the size of katrina, the only groups that can bring that number of people to help the displaced survivors are ngo's, whether it is vital organization, red cross, catholic charities, the list goes on and on but it always has been and i think it probably still is true that the assumption is that the ngo's have the resources necessary to short notice implement, care for large numbers of displaced
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people. that is not necessarily true because it is quite expensive for ngo's to warehouse materials large enough, not for small family, not for a small tornado and not worry small flood but for truly large numbers of displaced people i think is a flaw in any philosophy that believes ngo's are going to be ready to respond to a large migration of people. just interested on your thoughts on that. >> the key principle all of nation obviously includes the non-governmental organizations, and as with planning with their state and local colleagues or with individuals and families i think it is only through that sustained dialogue and experience working together as to understanding what oath the capabilities and the nonprofit sector are, what the challenges are, what we might do to address
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those, and so again, without any incident or assumption you have described about what has been done in the past, i think we need to continue to evolve our approach in terms of how we work together collaboratively. and so, many federal departments and agencies that are on the frontline of response engage the nonprofit and the ngo community. we have seen it and all of the incidents that we have experienced in this administration from the influence of pandemic to the vp deepwater horizon oil spill, and so we will continue the dialogue so that we do understand what organizations can and cannot bring to the table so we set realistic expectations and that we don't make plans based on the assumptions that won't come true because we haven't fully understood what the capabilities
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are. so i take the point that further understanding and collaboration are needed and will aim to do even more. >> the next question? wait for the mic. deputy secretary of defense working through the national response framework with us. >> thank you dan. former deputy security of defense for homeland security integration. thank you for being with us here today. thank you for all that you do in thank you for continuing to move the ball up the field. one of the difficulties associated with much of the fine work you have done in the things you have talked about here is that even at the interagency level, as dan and i would say that the old drg, inevitably the response we would get from many agencies when you would discuss
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the need for this type of preparedness and planning and capability development, was that covered under the act? how am i going to pay for that? i don't have the people to send off to training that is required to have interoperable planning systems and that sort of thing. so commensurate with many of these things and the new ppd, rb starting to look at the resourcing and the leadership required to give everybody an alignment to be able to execute this fine plan? >> well the interagency has, as you know don from your prior experience and thank you for that, very robust discussions on how to build those capabilities. we have encouraged discussions that focus on making the best and most effective use of the resources we have. i can't really speak to ongoing budget goucher shins or specific
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requests, but obviously the discussions around constrained resources to speak directly to the all of nation approach, and that is making sure that we leverage the resources that exist, not just at the federal level, not just at the state and local levels, who are similarly constrained in their resources, but looking to the private sector who does things like supply chain management and logistics of movement of people and things very effectively, and so leveraging those resources as well, making them part of a community planning effort, the non-governmental organization community and that is not within intent to shift costs. that is within intent to leverage those resources because those folks want to help. they are members of that community are going to send
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their personal and professional interest to be actively engaged in the response to and recovery from incidents at the community level, and so you are absolutely right, we need to continue to have robust discussions of how we improve our preparedness efforts and that takes leadership conversation. i hope you agree with me that they president issuing a new directive is a clarion call in that leadership for improved preparedness. >> the next question is from a guy who epitomizes the bipartisan nature, security and someone who has called into service post-9/11. democratic congressman, paul mikhail. first of all thank you for your service as a marine and the administration. we have had many conversations, so i noticed something you are passionate about. former assistant secretary of defense or homeland.
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>> good morning and thank you for the kind words. branca to see you again. brian, as i reviewed the pdh it seems in your remarks corroborated this, seems to -- good capabilities-based planning my question is, if we were to have a truly catastrophic event of the type that we had with hurricane katrina or in fukushima today, where the local community experience is comprehensive and traumatic damage for many public servants perhaps of the victims or in this case a few of the survivors of the original event. in light of that damage of the local level for instance in new orleans, one third of the police department did not report to work after the event occurred. if you moved to capabilities-based planning where you have got an inventory of capabilities, in the aftermath of the truly catastrophic event of the type
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envisioned by the 15 national planning scenarios, who would assemble these capabilities into a deployable force and if you only have an inventory of capabilities rather than a scenario-based plan, would you in the aftermath of such a crisis be able to quickly assemble those capabilities in order to save the maximum number of flights? >> appreciate the question. scenarios don't go away. scenarios are still very useful to tease out requirements, but in the evolution of our approach to planning, we have been starting with the core capabilities and how they are organized which actually can see reflected in the national response framework for example, but identifying the structures and processes through which we bring those capabilities to bear in deployable ways. we are going to continue to look at the nrs and the other planning processes that are necessary to make sure that they take account of the capabilities
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and how do you know those processes need to be brought to bear. but let me move away from that for a second. you know what we have seen throughout the incidents we have confronted is that it really is the mixing and matching of capabilities at all levels of government that provides the most flexible and agile way to do things. planning as you know more than most in the room, incredibly useful in terms of building the relationship, identifying gaps etc., and i think i will borrow from general eisenhower, no plan survives first contact. so what we are seeking to do or use of scenarios to tease out requirements through these conversations to identify the core capabilities that then allow us to have a more detailed operational level discussions if you will about okay, now how are those brought to bear, but we
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have gravitated away from -- it is just an evolution in the approach because of what we have seen in the incidents we have confronted that we think the best way to approach this is through focus on those core capabilities and then have the frameworks in place to have a conversation about how they apply. >> another question? the question down here. >> we were able to refer darrell to gw a few months ago. >> we still feel the loss but we know the students, faculty and staff at the george washington university are more safe as a result. >> i'm steve franco was from itt defense. i would like to ask about an international aspect of their policy. obviously, they have an avian flu breakout in asia or perhaps
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a release of radioactivity of some measure and some orange soil that could impact on the united states, what are the aspects of international cooperation that are embodied in this ppd? >> the at ppd largely focuses on the development of our domestic capabilities by certain events such as the h1n1 pandemic and the current situation. those capabilities can be -- internationally so we are working on our international collaboration and cooperation, and many u.s. governments -- agencies are providing technical assistance, and so again as we look to identify what resources and capabilities we need here, we are also looking to strengthen our international partnerships because again among
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the first incidents that the administration confronted was the influence of pandemic, which as you know steve would say global event sablan. and so our conversations about what our capability was to develop a vaccine and anti-viral in a quick manner was immediately a global conversation. our experience there led the president to propose a medical countermeasure initiative that he first introduced in the 2010 state of state of the union address that lucas is on how we more rapidly and reliably developed medical countermeasures, and we have made a number of proposals pursuant to that initiative to remove the bottlenecks in the development process for medical countermeasures, but that is the example of the kind of capability that, while it may start domestically, the threats we face and some of the incidents we have already
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experienced are truly global in nature, and so a longer answer perhaps than you wanted to a short question about how we see this affecting our international collaboration and cooperation, but we believe focusing on the development of our domestic capabilities while in tandem we tend to enhance our collaboration and partnership is the right approach. >> as a firefighter i care about how these issues impact state and local officials. we can talk about policy in washington but where the rubber meets the road really is our nation's first responders. i will ask a question. we have plenty of fire chiefs and i was looking at them to ask adam is a member of our steering committee. his day job is fire chief of the city of alexandria.
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>> thanks for coming. i guess in that name, how does this policy acknowledge the fact that local first responders are always going to be the first to deal with disasters and emergency incidents within a broader concept of federalism? >> well it i mean the capabilities development and the conversations to understand what is possible and what is needed at the local level certainly acknowledges the system. a directive does nothing to change that, and the national response framework and its relationship in terms of roles and responsibilities, we will continually evaluate but there is no change here to the recognition that locals will always be on the front lines, but we do think that a renewed emphasis on a principle such as the olive nation approach and a
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renewed emphasis on individual and community preparedness actually aims toward bringing individuals and families more into the preparedness equation such that it might actually reduce the burden on local response and by that i mean it those who came prepared to, the needs on public response systems you know, should reduce accordingly, and so the ppd recognizes that there are respective roles and the federalist system. code that is not changed, but it also recognizes we truly do need to understand from our state and local colleagues perspectives what are the risks they face and how do we help them most effectively build the capabilities with that understanding in mind? >> other questions?
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we have talked a guess about federal federal government, state and local government, ngo's, the private sector, right? anybody from the air want to ask a question? i will just ask an open-ended question. how does the private sector fit into this? >> well, first and foremost the private sector or members of their community and we see that, and we recognize that they have the same interest we do and withstanding events, recovering rapidly and adapting to change, and i think it is an area that we have great opportunity to understand even more what can be brought to bear. the example i gave and is one of many, where craig fugate has a rotation program for executives to come into an operations center. you notice a language issue. the private sector may not fully appreciate that it is an observation, may not fully
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appreciate what goes on in the operation centers and what are the types of questions the government is asking. what are the immediate actions that the government is attempting to take and how good the private sector's expertise assist in that effort? on the other side of that equation, we may be attempting in government operation centers to re-create functions that we have neither the expertise nor the time to deliver, and that exist in the your and are available for the discussion to understand what is there. and so, we believe the private sector are members of the community. they have an interest in protecting their employees. they lived there. and we think there are resources there that bear further exploration and conversation. and so we think it is an area for great opportunity for advancement and so we will continue those dialogs.
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>> my last question will be on next steps. my assumption is that this is beginning rather than the end. another in other words there is a lot of directives that will have to be carried out by department agencies and likely through interagency processes. can you describe how that will occur? >> absolutely. we move into an implementation based phase but as i already mentioned because the conversation with the interagency with their stakeholders really did shine a light on some key principles, departments and agencies have already looked out according to some of these principles in developing some key capabilities are brown certain disciplines in engaging the private sector and engaging individuals and families. that is not to say there is not a good deal of additional effort that is now required to implement the presidents direction, but the best news is that departments and agencies did not wait because of these principles were important to them as well.
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they have started to take action already, and so we will move into the implementation with departments and agencies and the further out outreach to our state and local colleagues and individuals and families to enhance our national preparedness. >> brand that made perfect --% this token of our appreciation and thank you for being here today by. >> thank you very much. thanks all. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]
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