he might have been driving improperly or something, could be something like that. are there other questions? yeah, okay. >> i'm from britain and i was impressed when i read the biography to find out the finishing school and what it was. as i understand the biography was in fact very good for the woman who was very fond of her, wanted her to stay for her fourth year of high school and they did not allow her to stay at all. >> that's exactly right. she didn't want to make it.

her mother had been one of great beauty and apparently when allen was a little girl her mother said something like well, you certainly are beautiful. and alan did not have good memories of her mother. her father was an individual who died in a drunken stupor and the fire was involved. and the father -- she really had a miserable childhood.

[inaudible] >> wow, thank you so much. [applause] >> this book is part of the university press of kansas modern series. for more information visit kansas press.ku.edu. >> we have in our society this reason over here and emotion over here in the two or more with one another if you're emotional but are not rational if you're rational that are not emotional. and society progresses to the extent of reason, which is trustworthy and suppress the passions who are untrustworthy. so this bias of human nature that we're fundamentally rational to respond and straightforward ways and has led to her academic disciplines that try to study human behavior using the method the physics,

emphasizing what they can count and model and sort of ignoring all the rest and i think it's led to an amputation in a shallow view of human nature where we nature were reemphasized things that are rational but ignore and articulate about things down below. and so it's created a culture in which we are really good at talking about material things are bad at talking about emotions. really good at talking about health and safety and professional skills, but about the most important things like character, integrity, we often have little to say. alexander mcintire said within a system that we still have the words for the late honor, but not a basic understanding of how they all fit together. he said imagine views science for the neutron or gravity but didn't understand how physics works and how they all fit together. that's where we are. and so i do think we have this imputation which us in a certain

way. and it us the direction that we are not always satisfied with. i went to high school at my folks still live in wayne, pennsylvania, just west of here. you see the parents are in many places in the country trapped in a certain style of raising kids. if you go to an elementary school up there in the third graders come out wearing these 80-pound back packs. the wind them overlaid beatles stuck on the ground because they want them to study and do homework and get ready for the harvard test. they get picked up in sobs and parties and bulldozed because they're not town it's okay as long as it comes from the u.s. foreign policy. [laughter] and they get mpeg to type uber moms who are cited a successful career women and make sure their kids get into harvard and they weigh less than their children

and they are doing but exercises during the moment of conception, in the delivery room, cutting umbilical towards themselves. learn chinese. [laughter] and they turn them into achievement proceedings and they're not really happy with it. they don't think this is the most important thing. they feel sort of trapped into a system in which they can't renounce. they are often in a system where they intuit that don't have a vocabulary for it. when people talk about morality often we end up talking. we the ben & jerry's ice cream company on foreign policy. i joke to one of my books that ben & jerry's should make a pacifist toothpaste doesn't kill germs. just ask them to leave.

[laughter] they've got a whole foods market, one of the enlightened grocery stores or other cashiers look like they're from odyssey international. with either seaweed recall veggie booty with cale perkins to come home and say mom, mom, i want a snack will help prevent: rep cancer. and so, you know, i think this is sort of the world we are trapped in, but we realized that not all there is and there's more to life and more we should be experienced in. and so i was thinking about this problem and gradually became aware of this other life they were looking into some of the deeper things. and on the wasn't the illusions. it wasn't only philosophers, but it was people's need the human mind, when this incredibly exciting. being done across a wider range

of spheres like neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, behavioral economics. people are looking into the human mind and really it's a revolution of consciousness if you want to put it that way because when you synthesize their findings across these many different tiers come you really start with three key insights. and the first insight is while the conscious mind for the autobiography of our species, most of the action in the most impressive action is happening unconsciously below the level of awareness. one way to think about this is the human mind can take in roughly 12 million pieces of information a minute of which you can consciously process about 40. all the rest is being done really without our being aware of it. a lot of the things that are going on are somewhat odd and my favorite research findings from the university of scholar is people named dennis are disproportionately likely to become dentists [laughter] people who are lawrence are

disproportionately likely to become lawyers because the crowd towards things which are familiar to which his y i made my daughter president of the united states brooks. some of the things are impressive. it's not a tangled web of urges that freud imagined. it's really just a different way of understanding the world and often yielding superior results. one of the tips i read about was if you have a tough decision you can make your mind can tell yourself you will decide by a coin flip. flip the coin, but don't go by how the coin comes up, go buy your emotional reaction. are you happy? that is your unconscious mind having made the decision in telling you what it thinks. and then the third area that happens unconsciously is really the most important. how do we relate to people? how do we understand and perceive the world? these are the fundamental things

of whether we'll have successful, unsuccessful, fulfilling, unfulfilling lights. the second insight is the notion that the enemy is thinking. emotions are at the center of thinking. people of strokes and lesions that can process properly or not supersmart, dear super dumb. they tell you what you value and what you don't value. you cannot make rational decisions. so emotions are not separate from reason. they are the foundation of reason. i'm a middle-aged guy not comfortable talking about a motion to one of the scientific term is iran to which gets at the truth is they took a bunch of middle-aged guys put them in smri machines and watched horror movies and had them explain how they feel about their wives. it was the same. sheer terror.

my wife say and write a book about emotions is like condi writing a book about gluttony. it's not a natural thing and yet emotions are at the center of how we perceive the world, value the world. they are the center of harpring organizes. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> kim eisler, what is the world's most powerful firm? >> williams cawley represents all of the tv anchors, all of the big correspondent for most of the networks for the "washington post," all the way up to barack obama, sarah palin, the bushes. a few weeks ago i did the firm that runs the world and is involved into this book when you cut down to the nub of washington politics and media,

williams and connolly are the players are the ones who sort of are the players for everyone. >> how did they grow so big and powerful? >> relatively speaking they are not so big, they are only about 250 lawyers were a lot of firms are up hundreds of thousands. that is one of the things about the book that makes them unique is that they do not accept lateral partners like other firms do. in other words, stealing partners with other firms. they look at themselves as an elite banneker together, sort of like a baseball team that are placed together in the minors. the third of the thesis of the book is when edward williams founded the firm, he was the most powerful and famous lawyer and the united states. after he died in 1988, five lawyers, robert barnett, larry patino commend the president of the boston red sox and a couple other guys took the firm and moved on to be even more

powerful it then went edward bennett williams was alive. that is thesis of the book. people might remember where the prosecutors ended a getting in more trouble than the case when stevens did. i think we hear all the way back to the beginning. the prosecutors are more oppressed than the clients. in fact and 35 years he never lost a case. the cases i've gotten into trouble or lost their jobs countless times. >> u.s. alleys north, to write? >> he told me about how brendan sullivan was like a manager in the film, he was sort of interrupt him, kicked him all the time, had these long conferences, but something

important was happening and brendan sullivan would be combing him down. a lot of interesting insights into brendan sullivan where most people who follow the law realized he got only the best trial lawyer in the united states but the most interesting as well. >> did the partners in williams & connolly participate in your book research? >> i developed a re-relationship with them, so yes. they were very cooperative and helpful and did some element of trust in me because i didn't just pop out of the bushes and all of a sudden sam wording of the. already established relationships with all of the partners but brendan sullivan and bob burnett. >> kim eisler new book, "masters of the game: inside the world's most powerful law firm." >> next on booktv, vietnam war

veteran, bing west discusses his book, "the wrong war." this hour-long program argues a counter insurgents strategy has led the u.s. to strain afghanistan. >> what i would like to do in the next 20 minutes is a view an overview of two things with afghanistan and the first is, what is the nature of war? and the second, what is the strategy? and why do i call it strong war. the nature a base on i have about 10 years and battlefields of vietnam, iraq and afghanistan. and ms. barber said, the generals are okay and secretaries of defense and president may have rules, but they better keep their egos under control because in his book war and peace really had it

right. what actually happens in war has much more to do with the tenacity of those than pronouncements from on high. i'll try to show you why. am i to just bring you to very quickly with a war looks like at the strategies in it and then turned it over for questions. most of my time in afghanistan i have been there and just about to go back to my 10th trip so i have about 18 months altogether, 10 trips over the last four years. i spent them all with different platoons. army platoons, marine platoons, special for a outputs and associated afghan unit. and they generally was in the mountains, the hindu kush area of the top of the time span, a wonderful place, but unfortunately we were pushed out of their and we're looking at mountains because i'll show you

their 10,000 feet high. this is your classic afghanistan. the other half of my time i spend this out. this is where mullah omar and the taliban began their attacks and this is entirely different. this is a view that is extraordinarily similar in nature rained to vietnam. now, 90% of the fighting takes place between those two axes along the pakistani border. the rest of afghanistan is not as well involved because this issue is an issue of the pastun tribe along the border and also on the pakistani side accounts for about 90% of the taliban and 90% of the insurgents. the issue in the north is shown by this particular picture. this is the famous valley that the movie first ipo my friend

did the movie and i certainly hope it's going to win the oscar. i was teasing them. they were on their way out to be. i was going to meet with you, but any of you looking at this wouldn't take you to two like i said are you now why don't we just take a drive down that road into the cornell valley and by the way, all the tribes are unfriendly and up on the hillside and you would know immediately, bing, that is not your smartest idea. we did that. and for four years we attempted to get the cornell valley and we couldn't. all of our troops are wearing 80 pounds of armor. the enemy is not wearing any armor. so as a result, when you think of the war in the north, for

instance what we're being shot at what this picture from where the other side. you have to go down 2000 feet in a 2000 feet on the other side to get there. if you really were in good shape you could get there in about seven. so with a lot of long-distance shooting that could go on forever because this is the famous durand line. i took this picture and you notice there is this particular port break here and that was the taliban sport and they were moving up everyday to the border because that pakistan. and then they were coming over and taking meals and bringing their ammunition down and shooting up this kernel. they say will go up on the border. he said with any luck one of those sons of will shoot a dose and i can shoot back in

self-defense. all they did was way back to us. this is the last sanctuary called pakistan and extends for 1500 miles. notice the road. they drove every night and unloaded the ammo came across the border. the other problem you have in dealing with afghanistan is called pakistan. 1500 miles. now let's understand the essence of what we're doing. we went in in 2001 because the taliban had supported al qaeda from 3000 americans at the world trade center. so we went in to get the son of a gun, but would have been? in my judgment, several things happened. president bush, god bless them, have this religious beliefs in liberty for people.

and i think he fused that with his role as president. he took that an extract it and said we should give liberty also to the iraqis, which is a noble idea. but sometimes you have to be pretty hardheaded about how you put an idea into action and we weren't able quite to do it. so they looked around and say who's really going to do this idea, they say we have this thing called the united to its military. so what happened was we took counterinsurgency. that's something i know an awful lot about because i thought it really high for many, many months. but we converted it and turned it into nation building that was based on a social contract or the social contract was the united states of america would give the people money and as

much security as we could. and money we give about $14 billion per year. in return, we expected them to turn against the taliban. all we really wanted them to do is tell who among the taliban because everyone is wearing civilian clothes, we don't speak pashtun. we have no idea. if you point out to the mafia is among you, i'll take care of the mafia. that the deal. that was the social contract. it's everything we've been doing for 10 years. i'll show you what happened. we have something called tribe royalty. look at this picture. this is a place called ganja gal that is 500 meters outside the battalion base and for four years they tried to say to the

people, what do you want? will help you and occasionally sniper shot. they were never able to really persuade the people. so year and a half ago they said well, the american battalion commander who is really kind. it said all come in and help you with your marks. and as we were driving in, looked at them. here are the kids in those kids are about 12. they were coming out on the road as fast as we were going in. these were tough little kid. i thought zero, it ended up in an ambush the tribe had said and during the ambush eight afghan soldiers were killed. four americans were trapped and killed i hope this young man, he is as rough as he looks,

corporal dakota mightier and he should get the medal of honor for what he did. it was corporal mayer, god bless them, who came to the floor and when his commander choate and didn't know what to do because you're the fire from everyplace am a corporal mayer took over the entire battle and extricated the other americans of the taliban. what really got to me more than anything else was the treasury that is unexplainable. i want to way inside what do they know about pashtun, what do they know about americans? when i got the chance to turn just like that. we went over into a town and notice the person with the blue arrow, for reasons we got into.

it would be unfair of me to reveal what we're doing, but the company commander knew he just randomly took people and was a random search. he was after the cell phone and this one guy. he had killed some of the people in a town who had driven over as well as he killed a couple americans. so we have been right there. he reached into his pocket and took out his cell phone whose subject to the next guy and none of them knew. and the minute got to be in the light the guy.

but what got to me was he didn't know this other pastuns. when you just pick people out randomly at very low. it's like what the heck are you doing? they were polite enemies, out to kill you. they wouldn't smile. they never smile at you and avoid talking to you except when they meet medical supplies. which you could stand among them and they just look at you. the village elders would come up once a week to get their medical supplies. 15 minutes and then we start shooting again. with even more bizarre as they took this photo and shot the

next week attacking a port in another village and he had a bandanna with all the korean markings. we want to be politically correct. we are all secular. that's exactly wrong. the islamic religion to these tribes had to change that quickly becomes islamist. they sincerely believe in being an islamist. some of them are -- some of them are really hard-core. i've asked the afghan soldiers who'd been with me, can you tell when you talk to somebody? and they said no way we can tell.

what we have is the situation, in my judgment, where the people as a whole are watching in afghanistan while the americans fight. in afghanistan i see the people as the prize, but not the means of winning the war. and our doctrine is to safely protect the people they will come over to our side and protect the taliban and therefore be the means of the word. you believe one or the other that is a long way of looking at life. they're going to come over and don't think they're going to help you to win. this is one of my favorite stories on the right-hand side is wonderful man. he was in a to senator kennedy and of course he was killed

shortly after the picture was taken. we went into the one that was nowhere. i mean, you couldn't find this village if you tried. we got in there and they shot one taliban going in. and then we sat down and began our conversations with the village. i do boston red sox hat on. but what of the elders said to me, without? i said that the world series champion. they said you must be pretty good i said were very good. he saved you a place? i thought i can get with this. he said what is one of your scores? i said maybe 75. the mini talk to the others in the pashtun for a minute and an interpreter was giggling. i said what do you giggling? is underscoring cricket is 100 to 120. he said to the others now he knows why you're so old and such

a terrible player they sent you to afghanistan. they had a sense of humor and so i said to them what do you want? yucaipa list that was going to cost $25,000. every single afghan. if you lock it in you're american, here's my list. so they said okay, i'll get to the stuff. but hey look, we the firefighters had to shoot one guy. tell the taliban to stay at appears that we don't have to do that anymore. tell us who they are it will take care of them. and this would've been kidding me what done it then how could we do that? and neck top, that's up north. that down south where the sea is you get into an entirely different situation. down south do the runoff of this

is a round from the north and you have the servers that cover it for afghanistan in the south. and the corps of engineers at the united states of america in the 1940s and 1950s built thousands of canals down there. and as a result, it is highly fertile and it looks just like vietnam and has the same kind of bush that you can high-end. it is called the green zone. it is also a course for 90% of the pair were in an opium of the world come from a not so everyone makes there. down there the fighting is inverse and you can't see this, but every single afghan not trusting his neighbor over centuries has built a compound out of mud and straw with walls that are sick.

and so they hide behind the walls, knowing when you shoot back you will do that much damage in that the nature of the fighting down there. i was just down there two weeks ago in an area called staying in and this is one of the flags were flags are flying whenever we went on patrol with the marines. marines moved forward. they've got their flags with them. i thought wow, i'm back in the 15th century. i thought this is really interesting. and you're pushing against them, pushing against them. and then i talk about why am i surprised at this? and then i realized by the british had spent four years and they have believed in this win the hearts and minds and they

were wearing soft covers in the marines came in to take the position from them and the british said by the way, you can't go any more than 200 yards of the district to collect all the rest of taliban. i said that's kind of the deal we have. so even after four years, they've spent $60 million in change not being. now what do you good news before bad news. good news, nowhere that terrorists can win in afghanistan. it just can't happen. i never thought i'd see the day as an infantryman that i was perusing the air force that they really help in our fight, but all that is gone now. we live in a world that i would never want to see. we have advanced the united states of america so far the rest of world which is why we don't believe in as many troops.

on the right-hand side here is an advisor was a great young man and not as looking through -- she's looking for a tiny little scope. and you see the white arcane. that's a white shroud and one of the snipers had just hit the taliban about a kilometer away in an aircraft with a 25,000 feet and is taking a picture of the whole thing and sending it down to map to a sitting next to me and he is looking. wherever we go with patrols today. i was on these other patrols. we got into a fight and the first thing he said was where is my air? and every single company now, most of them now have limbs. there are blimps in the company positions fine at about

5000 feet. they have a camera that's incredible. just like you're watching the superbowl pictures. we can see a person. they can see a person tries to put honest person you can see it. and they also have f-18. every f-18 is that kind of the camera in every unmanned vehicle. this means as fast as we get into a fight and he placed in the were able to call off and someone will be looking down same there over to our right. they say i've got a guy with a long rifle and a couple other guys at the a case. which one do at me to take first? is it's probably a sniper. it's an f-18 pilot to so far up you could need here. this was the notion that the taliban -- how did the taliban

take power in the 1990s? first, pakistan give them all the equipment. second, went they had the equipment they have to move. how do you move in a country twice the size of wyoming. he did on one or two kinds of vehicles. pickup trucks or motorcycles. most of the taliban today are equivalent to the 1860s tosh tunes or comanches. but albright and a duck and hide very well, but the albright on motorcycle. and that's their horse. well, there is no such thing as writing anywhere anymore nastiness and the were not watching. it were not watching you can select who is struck. therefore i am not that concerned about the taliban because i don't see how they do it. so when i see is the endpoint here is were not going to win over the population to get it

and we're not going to build a modern nation and asking if and. i mean, karsay is -- karzai -- what were do i use. it's difficult to run a country when you're in. 's on understanding. but he did for another four years. the issue in afghanistan is very simple. leave something behind to take care of it child but not us. that happens to be the afghan soldiers. and all they need more than anything else at this particular point is an infusion and a belief that they can win. that's the most important thing to give them, more than anything else. and these are the guys who can do it. spent a lot of time with special forces units over there. special forces units are terrific guys and they like what

they do. they are really good soldiers. and they give us the leverage if he put them together like this unit i was with, the marines gave them a rifle platoon to work with them, so you had 10 senior sergeants from the army for almost 30 and then you had 40 young guns on russia and the marine corps who were probably in their young 20s. and so you had 50 americans than 500 afghans in the battalion. you had a ratio of about one american every 10 afghan soldiers. and they held their own territory the same as any american battalion. so when i look at it, i say it can withstand is the wrong war for our current strategy of nationbuilding. and immediately you can say, how would you solve the problem of karzai, kabul and the government. i basically sneaking up insane

south korea, possibly pakistan. egypt. what they all have in common? they have an army who was so close to the people that they kept the rain on the government and gradually got on the people side and became a civilizing force, not a force of repression. and what i'm saying is the afghan army can let the afghans take care of their own politics. that happens to be the army begins to control karzai to a certain extent, so be it. i don't think we should continue for another decade with a strategy of nationbuilding. i think we should reduce our forces because we can add advisers and change the ratio. right now the ratio is one american to unmask and. and i'd like to see the ratio between afghans, one american.

but with the new air power shown you, i'm not leaving someone out there is a sitting duck. and giving those people the power to control. second, reduce the dollars. this is what we've done herself in the last couple of years. honestly, if you give something to somebody for nothing, what do you get in return? nothing. lyndon johnson tried to have the great society and ended up with entitlement. we know the culture of entitlement in afghanistan for the same reason. forget something and expect nothing in return. i don't think it's good for a country to do it. in the last thing we do is tell them, stop nationbuilding him that our forces get back to doing what they do very well and that is destroying the enemy. so that's why i call it the wrong war. that's all i have to say.

i'll be willing to take any questions you might have. [applause] >> hello, mr. weiss. my name is antiwar, intelligence research and the d.c. metro area. my question is what we'll need to happen before the afghan government and americans can take it from here? >> we have to tell them. let's leave it up to them, indeed. they are never going to tell you to go home. why do you want to tell somebody to stop laying the eggs? so it's us who have to say to the afghans, you have to start stepping forward instead of allowing them to control the pace. and i believe we're getting to the point where will do that. when i'm out there with the troops, the troops get it. the troops like fighting in the reenlistment rates are high. morale is high on this they are

closing that the enemy. this notion of going around building stuff all the time, they don't really believe that's the solution. so i think we have to push them. we can't wait for them to tell us. >> i came in a little late. i remember very well. that's what i heard. one of our problems in vietnam was we were fighting what they call a civil tree. with a conventional army and the government we were fighting with didn't have the support of its people and we lost, even though we had advisers and eventually the army performed so poorly in conduct themselves. why do you think that won't happen here?

this is a war where our crowns are enough. >> i hear by analogy it always becomes difficult for one more to another. what happened of course in vietnam the variable that was mentioned was the north vietnamese are russia and china with 18 divisions of artillery and tanks with artillery and tanks. i believe that in afghanistan the taliban cannot mask. they have to be able to go against the city or any large target. i don't believe they can do that, number one because of the air we now have. but number two also i don't believe pakistan is going to do again what they did in the 1990s. pakistan had not been behind the taliban in the 1990s, they would not have seized control. you need in order to have an army comes amity who supply a

new. and the pakistanis now i given it to them with a thimble, doing just enough to keep things stirred up. i don't believe they want to suffer america's wrath by really seeing here, you can how bout this. i don't think it's ever going to happen again. >> so, general petraeus has been fighting the last war. should he go or is he doing the right thing? >> i don't like to get into personalities. >> i was thinking the strategy. >> i think our strategy is evolving as we speak. notice that the lack six months petraeus emphasizes more with our special operations forces have been doing in order to take up the global cadre on the taliban side. i would hope that gradually -- gradually everyone kind of shifts.

but again i get back to my philosophy of history. my philosophy of history is in the general do as much as they think they are doing. it has to do an awful lot more with what young men are doing on the ground. and once we send a signal you no longer have to do nationbuilding, they're going to get back to their basic tasks. we are military, not a nationbuilding force. i think that's the way were to go. i'd be very surprised if this summer he did not see us really withdrawing our troops. i'd be very surprised if you didn't see us by june beginning to say hey, let's try and wrap this up. >> mr. west, i am struck by the similarity of what you're saying, the strategy are recommending now i'm both the line taken by the u.s. military

in the early years and for that matter the strategy pursued in a chemist in between 2002 and 2006 when there were 30,000 to 45,000 special forces and special operation forces, troops on the ground in a grand total of 5000 international troops in kabul, using local allies to try to track down the taliban and technology. didn't work. i profoundly didn't work. most analysts point to insufficient population security is one of the reasons that didn't work and the reliance on local warlords from a local intermediaries who use does as a force. so how exactly is the strategy are recommending differ from what put us here in the first

place? >> well, i think three things. first, it has only been in the last year or two that i have actually seen the of the linkage between air underground. i mean, that is really a step forward for anything. second, we are not using local warlords and now have an entire afghan army. what i'm saying is put that army out in front the way it should be, though we never had before. and third, i don't believe the population gets us anywhere. gradually you have the afghans help themselves, but i think we're just spinning wheels. i think we should get back to as we begin to pull out and i think we're going to with maximum pressure on the taliban in a way that only americans can build a beard now everything is a risk. it could be the in the end.

the only alternative that would be we could persist in what we're doing at the level we're doing it in a decade of them may give the statistics. we have 65 battalions and we have roughly -- we have 240 companies and each company has three to four outposts if they go all the way down to the khartoum level. we have a dozen outposts now in afghanistan. there were 7000 pashtun villages. and that 100,000 we are only taking one seventh. so even if we did it right, i look at the arithmetic and go while, the arithmetic is overwhelming. >> if were not protect in the population and he pointed out the elusiveness of the taliban,

how will you find them to them. >> i think that comes down to something we americans cannot do. we haven't been able to do it. the average sees the taliban and only three in the year and he may get one or two shot in the entire year. they are not massing. that's why set it's like fighting the apaches. we have thousands of american soldiers in the west running around. we're not going to change that. we cannot. the issue becomes whether the afghans themselves can do it. before we try them, we won't know. i'm not sure any choice is going to work. i'm pretty confident it will work because i don't believe they can mass. until we actually see the afghans doing the job for themselves, we won't know.

right now the other thing that bothers me is we have one district in afghanistan over to afghan control. that really concerns me. even now reverend says we do a better job than we did. i know the marines say to me, when are we going to test them? but there's always the risk. some think we have to watch out for this one. one other thing though, if you look at on the particulars, how do you see this thing indeed? think you're trying to in today's market and everyone of us knows for going to fail. no one's in the stock market. no one can pick the end in afghanistan. i give it a 10% chance that something happens that none of us could think of today. he chipped. i mean, none of us anticipated

egypt and libya. something wild have been simply say how did we all missed out? to give it a 10% chance that karzai is gone. i do how, but he's no longer part of the equation after a while. i give it a 40% chance that we'll muddle through the way we're talking to gradually pull forces out and it'll be okay. i give it a 40% chance the karzai and the people of kabul pulley henry kissinger. if you recall the nobel peace prize in 1972 in the war in vietnam and that there will be some sort of messy deal between the taliban, pakistanis and afghans that will cause all of us to scratch her head and say, why did we lose all those troops in that end result?

>> i'd like to have you a question. in the book there is less than disaster they talk about the bombing of north vietnam and killed a result, it better. when i posted were interviews of the north vietnamese, they feel their resolve. and i know these drone attacks as they understand or control but each one of these in california, but their joysticks. if i had a family member killed by his own attacking is controlled by someone 10,000 miles away, i'd be enormously upset. what is the impact when they are surgically applied successful, that's great. you've read about the things where i think just one of those incidents at the specs so far that i just question the zone.

>> you know, i don't know. i mean, you can argue either side of those kind things. i don't know. i know what i would do if i were in charge, but that doesn't mean that you're not right and we're not just stirring up a hornets nest and that gets back to this great hold the radical islam really has all the middle of nowhere. i just want the answer. i do know one thing. i do know al qaeda has put the word out to the other side. the question is are they more concerned about the people are getting the enemy? if al qaeda or taliban were upset about that, they just wouldn't go with their arms and the compounds with the kids, which is they are trying to use them as a shelter and we all know they are. al qaeda put the word out almost a year ago now.

no three operatives will go to any café anywhere in pakistan. i thought we're getting to them. that's how scared they are. they have good reason to be that scared. so all three of them will get together. [inaudible] >> i would. you configure a marine in the air. >> hi, i am wondering how the afghan army is going to do a better job as far as who is controlling pashtun villages and pashtun -- i mean, i assume the villages are non-pashtun and the others speaking the language, i'm not sure how bold do much better. but are there significant numbers of pashtun in the afghan military? >> i don't mean to be

pollyanna-ish. you are right. this is all tribal. the pashtun believe it is their birthright to be in charge of all the other. we gave them karzai and they're all waiting for karzai because he is one of figures. but the army is mostly tajik and the northern and when you get to the south right as they don't speak pashtun. they're absolutely right. they say you know as well as we that their army is occupying as much as we are, to which i say yeah, we know that. what other options are given then that's going at the afghan army which isn't the same, which the other gentleman is right.

there are those pashtuns that we can break, so i'm really not sure how this will really ever played out. i am more sure though that your. that's a problem. >> my question picks up a little on his but it's more about u.s. wars, talking about the wargo coulter -- warrior culture and the advanced technology culture. and you are calling non-a strategy of advising, funding. do you see that in our system and administration of the american culture generally continues the evolution of this kind of a very sophisticated, multi-dimensional culture.

we needed elsewhere, too. certainly none of these guys can speak posh to and which are saying they need to be all to do. >> i'm about to give an answer, but i have to tell you that i did not come up but was how i wanted to win. this book, 70% about whether troops are doing today. i try to show what's happening on the battlefield after battlefield after battlefield and the grid of these young men which gets to the military at the. this is going to be my next book if i can figure out how to celebrate it. there is in america, and military east coast, warrior eat those you cannot be responsive if you don't have it. unfortunately, no one in western europe has it and it unfortunate now gone under the kingdom, which breaks my heart.

it's still here in the united states and of the comes from. the that i know are one half of one have a 1 cent of the eligible population. 75% of all males of the ages 18 to 20 are not physically and mentally capable of being recruited into the military. somehow there is this small group who volunteer for the military. then they volunteer to know exactly what you do and they want that experience and they want to be the warriors and guardians. and the interesting thing is their reenlistment rates are so high now that they can't keep everyone in that wants to be in. when you're out on the road with these kids and it -- i shouldn't say kids, but i can because they are my sons and grandsons. i was just out with this platoon

for two weeks. and this platoon, god bless them, their platoon commander had lost his arm and leg to one of these malevolent ieds and the corpsman running to rescue him was blown up and killed. the platoon commander wants to stand not to duty in the marine corps. they also lost to others and made others evacuated. so 12 out of 40 were gone when i got there and all they want to do every day was go out and stick it to the enemy and make a difference is what they were doing. they were also scratching on the wall the difference they were making, which is what you have to expect when they are out there fighting and they have their flag on the other side. but that causes me to believe that we have this core group