[applause] >> yeah. i'd like to begin by bringing jeff laurenti from the century foundation to give us an overview of the report and start this panel. jeff? >> thank you, larry. you have heard, now, for an hour and a half a discussion about the merits of counterinsurgency as a way of providing a fix to the problem in afghanistan. when the new administration, then-new administration came into power two years ago and afghanistan seemed to be going to hell in a hand basket, the suggestion that counterinsurgency might be the way to repair the deteriorating relationships there really captivated many in washington, and it became almost a cottage industry among washington think tanks looking at counterinsurgency as a way militarily of fixing the situation. now, from century's kind of

vantage point in new york, this seemed an unbalance of what had been done over the previous several years but not likely to result in a long-term peaceful afghanistan. and we embarked on a process with encouragement from the carnegie association in new york to think about how we could assemble an international group, a substantial american component but also a major international component, given that it is foreign hands that for 30 years have been deeply involve inside creating and in propelling the direction of afghanistan's conflicts from the soviets to the pakistanis to the post-2001 afghanistan. and we recruited for this purpose two exceptional leaders, lakhdar bra himy special envoy in the late '90s and then

again after the fall of the taliban regime and thomas pickering who has been undersecretary of state for political affairs in the united states and ambassador to any place that mattered, it seems, in terms of this conflict including the u.n., india and russia. and a brilliant cast of members, three of whom will be on our panel this afternoon, to look at how one would be able to find a way towards a long-term peace in afghanistan. the report, and many of you may have picked up copies of this as you came in, basically looks at three questions, and they are played out in the chapters of this report. first, why bother to negotiate? which was a question that came up repeatedly in this first panel. second, what is there to negotiate? what would be on the ageneral defor -- agenda for negotiation both in terms of domestic

conflicts and those international hands from outside that have been engaged in one way or another. and, third, how do you get a negotiating process under way? and the, these three questions, this international task force which included tokes from -- folks from both allied countries and some that are not quite so allied, most of the permanent members of the security council had citizens on this panel, former russian foreign minister, former chinese representative to the u.n. as well as some of our european friends and people with deep u.n. experience. and the final report has generated a good deal of interest in all of these national capitals and in afghanistan on both sides. and we think that this discussion that we're about to have right now should be quite

interesting. and enlightening, even, in terms of how we put afghanistan and the prospects for putting afghanistan through a negotiated settlement on to a long and steady course of peace and stability. so with that, larry, i will invite larry who will be moderating the interpanel discussion, and we'll be back to moderate your discussion with the members of the panel. larry. >> thank you, jeff. let me join everybody and welcome you here to the center for american progress and, also, thank the century foundation not only for producing this report, but for asking me to be on the, on the task force. i've got to tell you it was one of the more enlightening experiences i've ever had, particularly traveling to to afghanistan with people from many other countries in the region. our panel today consists of three very distinguished people. first, ambassador vendrel,

former e.u. special representative for afghanistan and, also, was the personal representative of the u.n. secretary-general to afghanistan. the ambassador, basically, was in iraq from 2000 until -- [laughter] the ambassador was there from 2000 to 2008. he's had -- if you look at all of the places the u.n. has tried to broker peace, you'll find that ambassador vendrell has been in just about all of the places as a special representative of the secretary general. east timor, cambodia, new guinea and myanmar. and he's also been involved in the dealing with personal representative to the central american peace process pack in the '80s -- back in the '80s. that was an awfully big issue. the second member of our panel, dr. marvin weinbaum, who has

had, basically, careers. he's been a professor, he's worked in the state department in the bureau of intelligence and research, and now he's a scholar in residence at the middle east institute here in washington. the author of many, many books and hundreds of articles dealing with part of the world. our final panel is steve coll a contributor at the new york magazine. he spent 20 years at "the washington post" where he was a correspondent, senior editor and managing editor. he's also the author of a number of books, two of which have won pulitzer prizes and, of course, probably the most well known is "ghost wars: the secret history of cia, afghanistan and bin laden from soviet invasion to september 10, 2001."

and he followed that up in 2008. so if i could ask my fellow panelists to come up here, and we'll begin the discussion. [laughter] >> the toughest part of getting a negotiation going. okay, what i want to do is i'm going to ask each of the panelists to spend five or six minutes in the beginning responding to the question and covering the points that jeff raised. our negotiations -- are negotiations possible? is now the time to do it? who should be involved, and what are the chances for success? so let me begin with you, ambassador vendrell. if you would address those points, i'd appreciate it. no, from there. no, right here. [laughter]

>> well, what the report is proposing is not necessarily that there should be immediate negotiations with the taliban. what we are proposing is that immediately, as soon as possible, there should be an exploratory envoy who would go to the region, talk to the various afghan parties, and by the various afghan parties i mean the taliban and also the various taliban groups, but also talk to civil society and talk to parliamentarians in afghanistan and, also, should explore with the neighbors -- particularly pakistan and then iran, india, probably also others like russia -- how could talks with the taliban and the

association with the taliban, how could they be structured? and whether there is some element of a political will to reach a political understanding, a political settlement. so we don't know at this point yet whether the taliban, for example, are willing to talk. they at times give private shalls that they seem to be -- signals that they seem to be willing, but we don't really know. in public, probably taking the most appropriate line, they say, no, we don't want to talk. i say the most appropriate line because traditionally you negotiate under the table claiming you don't want to talk. and we have done the opposite. we have been saying we want to talk without actually talking. so not surprising that they are saying no. but we don't know. are they under pressure. >> or are they not? but the reasons why we this

should start immediately is from my point of view at least counterinsurgency is not working. jeff mentioned that counterinsurgency was the name of the game. quite honestly, i don't think so. i think it's counterterrorism. if it is counterinsurgency, it's obviously not working because counterinsurgency has two sides. there's a military side, but it has, also, a political side in terms of having a government worth defending, a government that brings about the rule of law and who, who has improved governance, who is less corrupt than it is now, and this hasn't happened. so i don't see a counterinsurgency policy working. and, therefore, we are saying a military solution by itself isn't going to work and, therefore, what we need is to see if there is a possibility of reaching a political settlement.

because the alternatives are actually worse. the alternatives are that we have a deadline more or less of 2014, we -- the current military approach in afghanistan appears to be to kill as many mid-level taliban commanders as possible, but there are many people who are worried that this approach will only lead to a more fragmented taliban led by younger people who may be even less willing than the taliban at the moment is or appears to be to reach a settlement and who may resist any political agreement that the elders might eventually arrive at. so we think that this needs to happen now. now, there are many interests, many countries and people who may be in favor of the status

quo. civil society in afghanistan for a very good reason are afraid of negotiations that might lead to a reversal of the gains achieved over the past nine years. and to that we are saying, no, talking does not necessarily mean that you're going to accept all the taliban demands. and i would hope and i feel it is the hope of the office of this -- the authors of this document that western countries would be supporting afghan demands, afghan men and women demands that the political gains achieved over the past ten years in terms of human rights, in terms of political freedoms and in terms of women's rights would be preserved. so we're not -- but they are worried, and they are worried about that we might suddenly pull out and leave them there. but then there are all kinds of other interests who are far less

respectable. .. >> to then step in. so, what we are simply saying is what we need to do as soon as possible is to start a process to find out where all these areas elements stand, and how

could, if there is enough, enough political base, how could negotiations be conducted. >> thank you. so marvin, start friday, start negotiating? >> actually all of us would like -- negotiations leading to a political certainly. the afghans have been in a state of conflict for 33 years. what's interesting to point out that the previous 40 had been used of political stability. as i see it, let me begin by saying this. i believe that what we have here today, despite all of the talk about negotiations that might get started, secret talks that are being conducted, my bottom line here is that the prospects for genuine serious -- excuse me

-- top levels of negotiation to end the war are very dim. obviously negotiations are not an end in themselves. we have enough current examples of negotiation going on between india and pakistan over kashmir or the israelis and the palestinians on a two-state solution. to prove the point that just giving to the negotiations is not what it's about. and in those two cases, the ingredients of an in state solution are really in fight. guided to blame can be said for afghanistan. a negotiated end to the conflict usually comes about when one party or the other seems destined to win, or has lost its will to fight.

then the weaker party gets what it can get. another condition is where there is a stalemate, and both parties reach some sort of a compromise, usually pleases neither, and then we have the koreas. northern ireland probably falls somewhere in between. in any case, success negotiation took place, not over weeks or months, but years. you can get a mower, quicker solution, of course, when one party surrenders in effect and unilaterally turned over. again, i don't believe that any of those conditions applied in afghanistan today. the century foundation report, and i was not a member of, those who were involved in writing the report, i think it's premised on the notion that there is already a stalemate or in your

stalemate. there are others who want to see negotiations move quickly, now who believe it is necessary because we have already lost. i don't believe that reflects the reality of what is on the ground today. i'm afraid that in the desperation of many in this country, and in europe, to find a way out we convinced ourselves that if we show enough dedication to finding a solution, that the right mechanisms will somehow get the talks on the way and good things will come. what is supposed to facilitate this in many of the plans is a commitment that says to a smaller military footprint. however much the taliban leadership is evolves talks, a growing number in this country, especially of columnist, bloggers, think tank, pundits and also diplomats refused to take no for an answer.

instead point to the signs or some interests. nearly all the people that they base their conclusion on had once been associate with the taliban. and the truth is that when they did, they were not people of great influence. they were not part of the kandahar shura. i recall in the state department our negotiations with the former foreign minister who was one of those interlocutors now, and when we tried to get him come and, sorry, the qatar shura who have come to some agreement on the yielding of osama bin laden. many of those pushing hard for it to clock him i believe are using the western concepts of political sentiment where what you do is you trade ministerial positions, a provincial appointment and constitutional revisions. the taliban have long indicated

that sustain for the constitutional system and for the current leadership. they do not practice collision. andy and i submit they are true believers. at least the top leadership. therefore they have limited political ideological ambitions. and that these will, when they prevail, he demonstrated. but the taliban has always stressed from the very beginning that it's an islamic movement, that transcends ethnic divisions. by the late 1990s they had made the transformation from those simply wanting, to liberate afghanistan to islamic militants committed to a higher cause. no one really expected the taliban will lay down their arms in agreement. why then should we expect that

they will disown al qaeda? they have had more than a decade in which to do just that. and they don't particularly like their arab allies, they never liked them, but that has not led to any distance between the two. interestingly, the taliban has in a way stuck to its principles. they could be doing far more now, and it surprises me that they are not. a grand bargain is achievable and have talks that drag a. it would certainly add to the confusion for many afghans and others of whether they are effectively the enemy or negotiating partners. with everyone else saying that this cannot be a military solution, it may be that the taliban are the only ones who still believe in war. for the taliban leadership, the urgency of finding a political solution is a surefire sign that

we recognize that we are losing. and are preparing to leave and there's no reason to even pretend to compromise. the simple fact is the taliban leadership in pakistan believes that it is winning. this winter and spring in kandahar and helmand, but this is never discourage them in the past. we now know when we applied sanctions before 9/11 that the war we squeeze the leaders, the more we felt their faith was being challenged. our early negotiations with the kandahar shura found them be leaving that time and god were on their side. and you don't certainly compromise with god. i believe that karzai is sincere in wanting peace like most others. certainly he would like to see them into the fighting and enhancing his own reputation. at a time that he really believes in a deal.

he's too clever not to understand that he's not likely to survive any real power sharing. his high peace council is window dressing to keep the ethnic minorities, the other ethnic groups from thinking that he's going to strike a deal behind their backs. karzai endgame is that by adhering to be the peacemaker, and at the same time holding onto his loyalists he puts himself in the best position to survive once the international community deserts him, or pushes him out, and he believes both of those. the united states at the same time can ill afford to stand in the way of automatic process. we've been hearing about. lesson being being accused of the spoiler. now, we can't have, we can't have a long-term relationship, military relationship bases or anything which smacks of a

strategic relationship and have reconciliation at the same time. it is one or the other. all this said, looking for political solutions is what we should be doing. but notice that i use the plural. negotiations must be pursued i believe at a tactical level rather than at a strategic level. that's with local agreement and integration. it's not -- involved emigration. that's not a grand bargain for the haqqani network. it is with the middle and lower level taliban. the causes of the insurgency and its being sustained our local. and so are the solutions. until now the discussions about one that might go into negotiations have been the terms of elite to delete. not reflecting the interests of civil society and the public at

large. any success politically as likely to come village by village, militia by militia, but only in the event that there are military gains that people believe him. we are not them. negotiations are not a substitute. and military -- when mentioned, are unsustainable without improvement in people's lives, services, and their freedom from predatory and abusive government. they are access to better government and above all, the rule of law. in conclusion, i don't know if this is still possible. the odds against stabilizing the country much less defeating insurgency are long ones. we got a late start. with our enemy, and right now we sometimes are our own worst enemy with our policies. it is a rotten government that

karzai leads. there will be difficulties building an afghan security force, sanctuary in pakistan makes it all the more difficult. may be impossible. at the same time, the consequences of failure in meeting our objectives which involve global terrorism, regional stability, those are objectives and the consequences of not meeting them, i think, are rather, are rather frightening. let's not fool ourselves into believing that there are very -- or any current plan b's out there that are benign. the best we can hope for at this moment at least is coming close to realizing our objectives with the insurgency, a counter insurgency. we need to give it every opportunity to prove itself.

that doesn't mean indefinitely. i fear that we are likely to lose the war here before we lose it in afghanistan. >> thank you, mark. steve, you were the first one to break the story about negotiations going on since you broke in all kinds of things. we have pakistanis going over to afghanistan, talk about a common front. we've seen afghan officials confirmed these talks are going on. are they still going on? are they serious? is this the way we ought to be going? >> i think they are still going on. they haven't delivered yet a framework for substantive negotiations, and they may never. i don't think either side knows in the end whether the vision of offshore formal negotiations that would include the taliban having, for example, a political

office that was protected by agreement of negotiating powers, for example, representatives can turn up and speak in some sense for the taliban leadership. whether that is going to come together or not. i know there is an in tension more this year than in any previous year since 9/11 to try to construct such a negotiation. but my impression is that it talks about talks have almost reached the point that you remember from your eighth grade dance, you know where there's like two groups of people along the wall talking to each other about what might happen. and then somebody looks at the watch an old evening is over. nothing has quite happen. so i'm not sure whether, what into to your question is. but i would just try to add to the two could, and quite different, framing remarks that we heard so far by coming at from a third perspective. i think rather than passing

confident judgment, i respect the two different judgments we've heard on whether or not counter insurgency, per se, is going to succeed, whether it is fitting, what it needs more time. i would just start with a different way of attacking the same question, which is that in the counterinsurgency field manual it is a fundamental premise that any practitioner or tourist of counterinsurgency worldwide would know, that 80% of the intended affect our political. so that's the nature of counterinsurgency. it is meant to be a political doctrine. so the question in afghanistan is what is the nature of the politics that would bring counterinsurgency towards success, however you define success? and i think the art in an afghan, rather than talk about abstractly, i think any afghan context there are a couple of models to think about. one is the model that i believe

the command certainly has great direct experience with, which is a model transported out of iraq and out of the surge in iraq, and now tries in an adaptive way being laid down in afghan conditions. in that model politics is as marvin argued for, local and it is based on militia-based security, local police. and whether our negotiations with the enemy, they are done at the unit level under the rubric now in the american jargon of reintegration. is sometimes confusing i think even for think take tank attendees could establish between reintegration and reconciliation but they are intended to describe two different kinds of negotiating with the enemy. reintegration is a process similar to ddr programs and after were you being particular armed groups into particular local disarmament settings, convert them into other jobs,

trained them, upright of methods. and and reconciliation refers to strategic negotiations with any leadership. those two processes are not mutually exclusive, in principle. and in african settings, for example, they are often going on simultaneously. in this case the model that's been emphasized coming out of iraq has excluded strategic negotiations. in part because they didn't go on in iraq. we did negotiate with iran about the future of sadr's status in iraqi politics. for obvious reasons. so there is a mindset that emphasizes local militias and reintegration as the best form of politics, to carry a counter insurgency's premise that most of the successful effects of counterinsurgency are delivered. now, i have doubts about how well that applies in an afghan setting. i won't dwell on them but i just mentioned the idea that an

approach to security in afghanistan after three years of militia violence, that is premised on the creation of more to local militia, just kind of begs a little bit skepticism. the second model that i think is worth considering, in which i do think is more century foundations work, in which they do think is also still under consideration by central command and i certainly others in the obama administration is the model suggested by the soviet exit strategy which essentially tried to blend the reintegrati reintegration, local militias, defections, with a kind of balance of regional diplomacy, the geneva accords being region deposed on steroids. and some strategic negotiations with sections of the enemy. in the context of the regional

diplomatic effort. now, this is not 1989 and it's not 1999. this is afghanistan after 10 years of very heavy international involvement. very heavy outside capital flows. extremely complicated sets of distortions inside the political economy. so none of these models really is adequate, you know, in a box. but i do think that the idea strategic negotiations integrated with other politics is a better way to approach question than just to consider it an isolation. i guess that's the point i want to make on that. now, is there any. a basis to justify the pursuit of negotiations with talibans unit leadership? marvin says no. i want to offer evidence on the other side. first of all what do we mean when we talk about the taliban? they are fragmented. we are not talking about the

islamic him right anymore. we're talking about an organization that includes teaching leadership that is mostly present in an entity that we best understand of the sure that is of itself not exactly a transparent or well-established organization. then they're our allies to which some of them substantial important like the haqqani network, others less substantial and less important but still under arms like others. and then there are local militias under commanders in the field who may be appointed and have allegiance to assure. but there are -- command-and-control is buried in questionable. so, if you ask then in the next who is it that would be susceptible to turning up at the uae clinical office or an anchor or a stable political office, we are talking about the graying

generation. some of the ministers doubtless of the quetta shura who have been signaling. now, would ask to come forward? i agree it's unknown. now, why would they be interested? one is a generational divide. they are not at that time of life where driving and land cruisers, you know, into kandahar and having an 80% likelihood of being struck by a hellfire missile in the next 30 minutes, not as it did at 50 as it was at 45. and i think it is clearly as you see often in these kinds of insurgencies, one grouping of generational leadership that is interested in another way of doing things. there's also 10 years since 2001 of pakistani coercion that has clearly animated sections of the older generation that is stuck

in pakistan, dependent on isi for passports, depend on pakistani tolerance for the license to run a stop around the corner, to rent a home. everything about the life and now they have children and their cousins and brothers, and everybody is subjected to pakistani permissions. and afghans as a windows is fiercely refined and especially the taliban having been in power for some years would wish to restore their own independence. and i would say also, it's important to take note that while they have -- they were not very significant. reconciliation has already occurred. sections came in under the ambassadorship. they are now sitting in kabul. they were the sort of targets of opportunity that you in seen in 2004, 2005. but the model of successful reconciliation is already established in a number of

significant cases. other undeclared but nonetheless reconcile taliban already make up part of the body politics in the army of afghan. people change sides in the fall 2001 without necessarily advertising it, ambassadors. and then finally, the quetta shura does communicate and successfully negotiate already in afghanistan. humanitarian aid is negotiated routinely in afghanistan. my impression from talking to the humanitarian who rely on direct exchange with taliban leadership about access to particular territory is that the quetta shura can deliver its promises about 80% of the time. i'm not sure i want to drive the jeep under those odds but that's essentially an indication that this is not a fantasy, that they can deliver even in areas where they're dealing with young commanders. now, why would you take these

risks? marvin said very provocatively negotiations are not an end result. i agree with it. i do think though there is an objective that is achievable even to partially successful fragmentary negotiations, for example, the surrounded par four for years. -- darr for. broke off action hud accepted -- by reducing violence they created a permissive space for other kinds of politics, and for traditional counterinsurgency affects. so the objective would be to reduce violence and then to use that violence to extend the sources of other successful political and military strategy. now, i would just and then by stepping out of the case for trying this, and emphasized that

if these are political traps from other political solutions, they are i agree very much with what mark was saying at the end, that negotiations cannot be seen as a political strategy. they had to be seen as one element of a much broader and more determined and more resilient clinical strategy, in general it would be in the interest of international community and asking us to migrate energy and investments from of military operations toward political operations for the purpose of securing afghan unity and stability for the purpose of reducing the direct rule, the unsustainable role now played by international forces. those other political tracks are probably looking out over three or four years more important than the strategic negotiations that i am nonetheless defended. i which is quickly pick them off, it would include transition beyond president karzai's term successfully, the prevention of his usurping the constitution

term limits that now confronting most of the afghan opposition was afraid he was going to rig the parliamentary elections and delayed the seating of parliament for the purpose of securing permission to extend his rule. now they fear something else, which is the use of politics and current extraconstitutional negotiations and processes as an end run around the electoral process and transition. it would be a tragedy if the attempt to negotiate at any level, even reintegration, created space for the president to run around the constitution. parliament and with the international community's rare unified and successful support was needed, was defended, now is a flawed but independent basis for clinical activity in afghanistan and must be permitted to advance, and protected. and i think those kinds of

prophecies, which also require international diplomacy, regional diplomacy, and direct negotiations among afghans and supporters have to be understood as the more important track in which these other kinds of negotiations with the taliban should be seen. >> thank you, steve. francesc, you had a great opening statement. let me ask you to follow up and deal with some of the points they raise. and in particular the question is it will end up like kashmir for example, or somebody negotiating from a position of weakness? is it can only be done on the local level? i mean, basically how to respond to the objection particularly raised by marvin? >> well, first of all, talking and fighting are not incompatible. and in many situations, and the

report doesn't suggest otherwise, one can continue the military operations, both sides, i'm sure the taliban would want to do the same. at the same time talking and trying to find an agreement. second, the kashmir example is, i'm sorry to say, a very bad one. in fact, indians in pakistan have not been talking on kashmir. have been talking about each other. and there's been no sensitive by the international community to push the two sides towards a meaningful discussion and agreement. to some degree you can argue it's a failed process, not because they're talking. because they're really not talking. and again, of course i entirely agree that talking is not for the fun of talking. it is to -- i cannot suggest know what kind of settlement will be agreed. i would hope that we would all be working to assure that, i

repeat, the gains achieved over the past 10 years are on pace. so i also, when you talk about talibans while they were in power, quite different situation. i mean, i was an envoy to them between 2002001. yes, the sanctions did not have an impact because they were in power. now, we are now talking of a situation where they are under severe attack, military attack, where they are being squeezed by the pakistani, and where i would imagine that there believe in being able to start all over again in 1996 essentially, but i repeat, and one final point. i'm very sorry that a couple of

years ago the term reconciliation came in. reconciliation is a misused term for what we at times say in afghanistan. reconciliation as used in afghanistan means talks with the taliban. if you like negotiations with the taliban. reconciliation traditionally happens after the peace agreement, and there is reconciliation at the lower level. so what we are now talking is, is talks at the high level. now, i don't believe that it is going to be feasible to have talks at the local level, as you suggest. that will deliver serious results. it will lead to an -- of afghanistan, and we would have an enormous number of militias in a group which may continue the fight on the ground even if it is a political settlement.

>> let me follow that up. of all of us here you know president karzai the best. do you agree with what marvin characterization of him, what is he really concerned about? >> you know, i've known president karzai since before he became president. and i have had, used to have, i still have a great deal of respect. now, he was pushed into that position. he was put in that position because the international community having decided to -- needed a figurehead to a pashtun figurehead. now, after he was appointed, he was not supported in the way that he deserved. the u.s. in particular, but to some degree also the europeans and the u.n., basically said to him, you have to deal with the warlords. we made no attempt to disarm or disband the warlords. the very people who have brought

we went to afghanistan before the taliban took over. and slowly he has adapted to the situation in which he is dealing with some very nasty characters. now, i think we don't need to go back to know that power corrupts, and i think there has been an element of corruption, not so much in him but in terms of his family. and the danger is that both he and the person who is not mentioned but is very much a power broker, marshall, who is a top warlord and probably someone who committed a series war crimes or crimes against humanity, is now his right hand man. and this has become the families of the two, have become a kind of signature which is going to be much more difficult to remove to some degree. that's a much because president karzai himself wants to stay in power but because he wants to protect the business interest and interest acquired by the two

families. >> steve, you know a lot about the taliban. do you agree with what marvin said about the taliban really would like to bring al qaeda or they would basically act the same way they did before 9/11, given what's happened in the past decade? >> well, i agree that there is no evidence that the taliban has ever made a hard decision to repeat al qaeda. and if that opportunity. it had incentive. there's been a number of occasions when some taliban actually, as you here the accounts of internal discussio discussions, some taliban have openly argued it's in our interest to comply. but omar has never sanctioned such decision and there's never been a coalition within the quetta shura that has been willing to take that decision. now, you can argue about why that is. we don't really have great evidence about the integral

discourse. the fragments of it, what marvin says are certainly very compelling accounts of omar at various points saying i have the answer to a journey and i'm simply not going to betray someone or an organization i believe is right just for the sake of non-muslims. but there are also more sort of realist arguments that get forced into this pixel essentially it is an untested proposition as to the current setting, but there's a historical basis to be skeptical about omar in particular. that leads you to the few that i think is current in the obama administration, was cut last year, last time i knew, that you almost have to find an extra mullah omar strategy if you want to have any hope of breaking off sections of the quetta shura and can actually exploit the indication, the clear indication that they're providing in interest of negotiations under certain circumstances. you're going to have -- mullah omar, separate mullah omar from the separation in theory, you

know, shouldn't be impossible since he is not really as i understand very much present with the shura from meeting to meeting any a. exactly his status is, you know, is a mystery. but i do think that if you're asking the question about what their conduct in the period from 1998 until, you know, 2002 suggests, that was an era where mullah omar's decision-making was much more central than what is hypothesized. we could go on here. >> marvin, if you take a couple of minutes and respond to what you want here, but also addressed the point that has been raised about maybe a soviet exit strategy exit strategy type of deal. does that fit in at all with some of the things you thought about rather than sort of kashmir and israel-palestine? >> well, i think the evidence is

that how ever important he is, and certainly not day to day operations, talking about mullah omar, nevertheless, all of the elements do pay homage to him. and that continues to be the case. he still is a man who commands great respect, not only among the core elements of the taliban, but even with the pakistani taliban. so, and certainly with the haqqani family. but again, we don't know. i think the problem here with this divorcing the two is that if they were to come in with a pledged -- a pledge that they would distance themselves from al qaeda because al qaeda under those conditions is not going to go away necessarily, first question you ask is why should we believe them. maybe this is a tactical device

to get their kind of settlement. but let's assume now that they are sincere, and let me introduce an element which we haven't discussed. and that is, what probably would be the showstopper for various kinds of reconciliation, and that is the northern, northern. they made it very clear here that they are very suspicious of any kind of negotiation. and that indeed they are prepared to fight if necessary. certainly the hazara group which has the kind of blood feud with the taliban would be most likely to do so. my point here is that we haven't spoken about the possibility, the very real possibility because they're heavily armed, of a civil war. and in that context whatever might be agreed to by any

parties here could very well be put in advance at least while this war goes on. and i think once we get into that, probably whatever agreement was reached would be largely null and void. when the taliban find themselves conceivably involved in a proxy war which will involve iran and russia and its clients, and india very likely will be involved as well, in that kind of setting, can you imagine mullah omar who is rather say no to the radical islamic community, be it lashkar-e-taiba, jihadi groups, or any, including, including osama bin laden, can you imagine saying no, i made a pledge here that i wasn't going to depend on

you. that seems to me foolish, because at that point in time in the conditions of what he is involved in the civil war he will be looking for whatever support he can get from any source he can get it from. >> can i say one thing? >> quickly. >> just on the mullah omar subject, under the bob woodward ruled that if you talk to a journalist off the record and then you pass on the ground rules come off, i would say it that i had lunch with ambassador holbrooke last year. and he said in the course of discussing this very subject, if i could kill either osama bin laden or mullah omar at this stage i think it would be more productive to kill mullah omar. >> okay. i'm not happy -- that was a very

-- [talking over each other] >> i would disagree with them. i think that mullah omar despite everything one thinks and knows about him, is, can be -- probably no one else could. and second, on the issue of taliban and al qaeda, i have no idea as to the reply, but one thing i know, if i were taliban and wanted to break with al qaeda, i wouldn't discard in advance. there are two cards the taliban will hold in any talks. one would be the fact that they're fighting. and two, they leak to al qaeda. you don't take that out until there is a settlement. >> okay. jeff, we're not going to turn over to questions. jeff will moderate a.

and please come in your question make it short, as quickly as you can. we would like to give everybody a chance to get into and also identify yourself and ask the person that you would like to answer the question. >> groups in three questions for the panel can pick and choose how to reply. first i will abuse the prerogative of the moderator, the q&a by posing -- >> one question. >> the core goal for the insurgency is the eviction of all foreign forces. and without that, no deal. and even these taliban foot soldiers who go and we're the fight and had to be reintegrate sa what motivate them was to get those foreigners out, and they still want to see those foreigners out. so the question is, is washington ready to pull all of its troops out as part of a deal? or are washington's allies in afghanistan were to contemplate it. and to what extent does what

goes on with regard to the american presence in iraq or pledge to pull out by the end of the year, factor into afghans see the reliability of an american guarantee withdrawal? to question number one gives with the withdrawal of u.s. troops as part of the deal. and questions next? yes. >> and please identify yourself. >> off expect from a? >> independent tv producer. i wonder if by all afghanistan and pakistan middle east, and all this fight and no timeline really, or potentially it can stay forever. and what they are saying i really don't understand the nation, first of all, what is real purpose. and second is if you are talking corruption, you are always named other countries have the corruption officials, military,

but there's corruption right here in the united states as you can see. they can have -- [inaudible] that doesn't seem right. >> thank you. so what's the real mission purpose and the question of corruption not being just afghan but also -- [inaudible] >> i we promoting democracy when we don't have democracy your? >> thank you. and right behind you. >> i apologize to those who are still in him. i asked this question to the previous panel. >> you want to stand at? >> i'm sorry, i'm tethered here. i'm with npr and i would like to ask the panelists to you talk with this kind of influence of the pakistani government over the taliban in pakistan. in light of that russia pakistan's role be in any negotiated settlement, if any?

thank you. >> so shall we start on these three questions? real mission and corruption and pakistani role. francesc, why don't you -- start with you. >> i think that one is simply trying to find out if there are enough, if there is enough, enough conditions to start talking. or even when one is talking. i don't think it's impossible at the same time to be having discussions with the afghan government about this region partnership. for as long as it is clear that this is something that would happen if talks with the taliban were to fail, in other words, this is not a commitment to stay put or to have permanent bases that this is something that would have to occur if there was

no peace settlement reached. so it's a slightly different thing. on corruption, the importance is not what we think about corruption in afghanistan. the important thing is what the afghans feel it and afghans feel, calls -- although their use to crack in the past they feel the level of corruption and cheese at the moment is in tolerable. and this is -- be legit fashion what we're saying in the report is we need to have been deeply involved. they're going to be an important part of any talk in the negotiations. they will have, it is a essential they bite into the talks and into the final outcome, but at the same time talks must not be done through the. it is the way we approach the taliban.

>> on that last point, it would be a path to failure if we allow the pakistanis to negotiation on behalf of the taliban. and that failure would include the failure to realize pakistan's legitimate interests of a stable politically durable afghan settlement. and one reason is because taliban leaders at every level where they've been able to talk about this issue in some kind of independent way and the size that their own credibility as negotiators, as people capable of making a bargain and holding to it with other afghans, is instantly undermined if their afghan counterparts see them merely as instrument of pakistani strategy. they have suffered under that structure and label for a long