okay, we'll go back to industry and buy it. that's not going to cut it anymore. we can no longer just say buy the war and send it to theater. we now have to be efficient and effective in our use. that's the current environment. i'll go through quickly how that will change and where our focus is and as we move forward with different organizations and hear from the dod. one is regional requirements, and you've seen very recently some regional requirements that came out whether it be in libya or whether it be in the africa or the european, those regional requirements will become dominant, and so we have to be reactive to get the unmanned systems to the regions we need. secondly, the apportionment. if i say we have 100qm-1s or qm-9s which is not the number, but if we have a certain number

of unmanned systems, they are going to come home eventually. where do they go? who gets those? does the african theater get them? does the european air traffic control system allow us to fly unmanned system across the air space? next is contested environments. it would be hard to imagine we can continue to fly unmanned system in an environment that is not only friendly, but is not gps denied, that is not communications denied so we must continue, and we already are, but we must continue to develop systems that are hardened against gps denied environments, hardened against comout environments and ariel threats. there's stories about using these in theater from the iranian and chinese side.

that's going to continue. we need to continue to look at how we can counter that threat. how is an f-16 against the uaf? big or small. how do we protect and play against it? look at homeland security, what about the mexican threat across the border in the south as they bring drugs across using umss which is what they are doing right now. we talked about this, dod, the fiscal trade space. these are the choices we have, the weapons we have, these are the systems we have, we must effectively use what we have because our fiscal trade space is diminishing. we need to get the multiinstitution which no longer send one aircraft with a camera. we need a system that has multi-full motion video and if you pull an qm-9 off a target

what you are arguing and trading against. it increases the atonmy. if you talk to the pilots, they will tell you 90% of their job is pretty dang boring. it's very important, but it's pretty dang unexciting. you're staring at a white house or a bread truck. we need to come across saying what can the machine do that we don't need the human do so we can employ the pilots saying this is where we need your intelligence. we can have the machine do as much as possible. also in ted, that's processing exploitation distribution of images. we should have sort ware solutions to say, okay, if we need to figure out what the white truck is doing and where it's going, software solutions for ped should be going along. i hit a lot of points very briefly, and as i always say

when i talk to groups, i bring up more problems than solutions, but i'm telling you we are working on those. that's the current view and the future view. >> thank you very much. now handing the floor over to bruce black with the -- [inaudible] >> [inaudible] >> all right, thank you. thank you very much. i appreciate the opportunity to speak today. i tailored my briefing a little bit more towards actually being in theater, some of the lessons that we learned in actually in theater. there's thousands and the more we get into this, the more we realize either like bill said,

there's knowns and unknowns, and there's unknown unknowns, and we are finding out the unknown unknowns this these systems are tremendous and the opportunities are tremendous. first, just a quick overview, and you can see that the hitting on the slide here says air force cooperations, but you notice the biggest part of that is the united states, and we got a lot of little operating areas elsewhere that we got on the map there and a couple blips we don't have up there, but this is fairly representative of how we do business. we do most of our business here in the states. as an air force, we do everything what we call rso, remote split offs, so most of my people are here. i have a very small footprint forward, and that gives us some tremendous capabilities. the reason we can do that and the fourth word up there,

"global" the reason we are global and can do that is because we're net centric. that's one of the main lessons we have learned. our ability to put everything that we do both raw data and the process data and our ability to move it around is net centric. that has become a key selling point for a lot of things we're trying to push forward. in the u.s. flight plan, there's a vision for the next 40 years up until 2047, and all of that is based on being net centric. we learned our customer base gets extremely large. we learned that people also learn that they don't know what they didn't know, and all of the sudden, we've got -- well, it started as a cool science project and ga came to us saying this thing flies, want to play with it? we put it in bosnia, and oh my gosh, it works, get it out there so fast. i'm still flying the prototype.

they were fielded in 1994, i'm still flying the prototype aircraft. it's never gone into development. the mq-1, and just an example, for me to turn the lights on takes four f-strokes, f3f4, and 3-rbgs -- f8. why do i care about that as a pilot? well, it was built for an engineer, and he wanted to know how much power that bus was pulling. he cares because everything on that f7 bus is everything he cared about. they were not thinking about pilots, but we've been so successful, i said get it out there and get it to the field. the net centric aspect of it has grown with that. one of the things that we have come up with just recently, and it rooted its ugly head again. we got an inquiry why can't the air force and the army do things

the same way? we do things different. it's not good or bad, it's just different. the air force does everything very distributed, and there's a reason for that. based on what we do, after phase zero and face one of a conflict, i have no target set. my entire job is to service either the marine corp. or the army or somebody on the ground, joint forces, whoever, nato, so everything that i do is going to be given to someone else, net centric makes it easy. i can give it to whomever i want to. one of the latest endeavors was to help the forces with operation unified protecter when they said up their operations at -- when they set up their operations at nato five, somebody said, hey, wait a minute, our coalition forces can't see the feed from the

predator. can we get them the feed? wow, what a concept. we set up an antenna, and now they can see the targets we've been looking at for 20 hours, and, again, net centric. now, the army does is differently. they want to control the assets and keep them at the battalion level. they are not as necessarily net focused. when they have guys on the ground, they want to be sure they are taken care of by their own assets. different, but not good or bad one way or the other. training is different. our training is much more focused on actually having operators in the aircraft, control the aircraft through takeoff and landing, strike, making decisions and that type of thing, not so much just monitoring the aircraft so our training is different, different, not good or bad. one of the things that that type of construct alaws -- allows the air force to do, and

this is -- i know this is kind of a confusing slide, but if you'll take a look at the very top of all of those bars, you can see that we have most of our assets in the fight, and as of just recently, even more of those, the 15 mq-1 aircraft in the first column, those are even back in the fite. they someday in the fight. they don't rotate out. i don't have to pull my people in and out to give them breaks #. i leave a small foot fingerprint forward and everything is here in the states other than the fiberglass piece on the front of that speer. we have most of the assets in the fight, but here's the big plus. 90% of the people are in the fight, and always in the fight. i go all the way into the box, do my mission, go home to mama and i wash the car on saturday, and then i come back out and go back in the fight. i don't have to have my forces

constantly rotating in and out of theater other than that small forward footprint, and the thing that made that possibility is the net centric capability. we just went over 1 million hours on march 9. the army went over 1 million hours earlier in 2010. we went over a million hours on fq-9 and global hawk. i won't go into a lot of detail, but you can see how how fast, flying hours per year, it's an exponential rise. there's not an ending in sight. everybody wants more, more, more, and every is happy with what they get. we didn't know what the capability was until we brought it forward both in army and air force. heist kind of the --

here's the money side laying it out. blue air force, green army. you can see how we're controlled. as i said in groups in phase zero and one, there's targets. that's not bread and butter for us, but all the rest of it belongs to someone else. we're using these as a joint asset, and it's easier to be joint if i'm net centric and got the communications, if everybody knows what i can do and pump out what i do to everyone else. the army keeps theirs within the battalion level. not good or bat again, just different. you can see the next slide over that we do different things. for example, this is how many weapons we've dropped as of 12th january -- sorry. we're doing more kinetic

effects. the army supports the battalion and lets them do the effects. we are split evenly between the small and large uas's in the air force where the army is mostly small with small sliver of the medium aircraft. again, not good or bad, just different, and the customer that you're serving. the mediums you can see the air force has the large share of the medium aircraft in the inventory, and that's the reason we train differently, we fight differently, we serve different masters. this is what i call the victims of our own success slide. when i entered in 2005, we were just coming up on our 6th cap, and i remember somebody saying

in the air force saying you're going to 30 caps. everybody wondered how. each line is where we thought we were going to be, and every time we started to get there, we got told do more, do faster, do more, do faster. again, people not knowing the capability until it was brought forward through the communications and net centricness. you mean, i can see what my troops are doing over -- and over the next hill? that was made possible because of the net centric capability. there's another bump there in the last line going up to the top. we've been asked to do it again, and there's really no end in sight. somebody says 65 cap, and we were asked the other day what are you going to do with that once iraq and afghanistan are down? well, so-com wants to keep what they got, and pay-com doesn't have anything yet and north-com

duped have anything yet. we'll stay busy your quite a while even if it's just second missions. i bet we stay pretty busy. here you can see that growth in just pure caps from 2004 to now, a 12 00% increase, and they asked us to do it again. it was brought up that -- or i'm sorry, mr. barry brought up whether we should call them unmanned aircraft systems. the air force got away from that because the only unmanned thing is the little piece of fiberglass at the end of this really long intensive sphere. if you look here, one mq-1, mq-9 cap fully petted is 180 personnel depending on what type

of things i'm taking care of, so it's very man-intentionive so we call them rpa's now. if you go to the global hawk system, it's even worse. we're talking 400 people to get to fly to aircraft, to do the planning, to get the information back, to do the processing they have to do, and then to spit is back out, 400 people. nothing manned about unmanned aircraft. if you play this out to the end, and again, this is a busy slide. this is your money number right here. if we get to 65 caps, steady state which means 10 crews per cap, five mission intelligence coordinators per cap, the full ped, everything that i'm supposed to have we are programmed to have, it's going to be 12,000 people supporting 65 caps of aircraft. we can't do that.

that's too much. that's 10% of my pilot force going to be in an unmanned system. there's got to be a belter way to do it. there's got to be a better way through the net centric, the communications, and automation we hope to bring to all of this. one of the things that we come up with, and right now what we're running now is a one crew one cap so we have to spit out the bodies, and we were having a tough time getting pilots through. we came out with the 18 answers, and we take people out of other air force platforms or other air force areas and put them into the unmanned aircraft. right now, the air force is on track to get to a full force where all -- not all, but most of our operators are going to be the 18, people we brought in and trained how to fly strictly remoted piloted aircraft.

some people asked whether or not that's working? should i take the guy, put them in a plane when they are not in regular pilot training? there's pros and cops both -- cons just way. it's just like my other group. some guys are stars, some guys are not so good. if you judge each guy, put him in the training, give them enough trains, they got the mental. the lane is set now to go ahead and start putting these guys in mq-9's. the confidence is growing in the community. the religion this is a little background on the 18x, and you all can read that, but the reason i wanted to show you this slide is right here you can see our cap growth, but the thing that i wanted to bring forward to you on this one is that what we have become is very much a rainbow force. national guard right now is carrying nine of the caps of the

53 that we currently have. we're going to take another five more. we have gotten very much away from well, the guards are flying, do one special thing. you can't tell the difference between the guards, reserve, and active force. we are all one. as a matter of fact, we trade between the two when we are light in one place, active duty guys help a guard unite or send the guard when we have to surge. we've gotten very much away from the old paradigm of it's just a flying club. we're now in combat, fully engaged, and going forward. the other thing, again, that i want to bring forward that allowed that to happen is the net centric and our communications, our ability to have different units everywhere feeding into one, serving whatever customer, wherefore in -- wherever in the world it needs to be. one of the things we have a

problem with is a cap is no longer a cap. we tried to get away from the word "cap". that's an old word from air combat control. the word advertised 24/7 ops. we are not providing that right now because they say they would rather have more caps out there than 24/7 coverage. up stead of 53 caps, we can provide 35 if we did 24/7. the reason is we have to transit aircraft back and forth. that should be handled autophase zeroically -- automatically through communications and net centricness. the other thing on this slide i want to bring up is every one of these aircraft brings different things to fight, but they are all called a cap. when you say i want a cap overhead, well, what is it you want? we need to be thinking about my -- what do i bring to a

fight? what is my capability of this aircraft? what is the capability of the censors i want to bring to the fite? what is the capability of the system, and we need to think about the whole entirety of the system, the dmiewn cations of the system and the censor to the system, not necessarily the piece of fiberglass. all that is is a truck to carry the capability that i want guard . this is my last slide, and this is just showing what happens in human nature, and as we learn, we get better and better at things, and you can see 10,000 crews to get one target during world war ii, now i got one guy flying four aircraft in the mac, and hopefully through automation, one guy can watch a swarm of these things go out with a strike packages, carrying

extra weapons for designated aircraft as lower wingman, being the tankers for everyone. i should be able to get to the point where there's one guy watching this happen making the key decisions, but the aircraft doing the basic flying. we know how to do that, but what enables that is number one, by net centric capabilities, my communications, and the automation i need to do this. now, in my speech here i brought up a couple of obvious points. the one key one that is see is a big player that really needs to come toward is like the geico commercial with the guy and the old porsche drying down highway 1 and the 800 pound gorilla next to him and doesn't care. our communications. if we go a day without space, i don't care what you hang on the aircraft. right now, we're toast, and hopefully this forum is going to help bring out new ideas to get

us guard on that. we have to -- we have to get that communication hurdle taken care of, and that's probably one of the bigger players, one of the big areas that i see we can improve upon. thanks. >> thank you very much. we're going to introduce the general -- [inaudible] tom in >> thank you. i'll take a moment here and find the file. it's a very short presentation. [laughter]

one of the advantages of going in the back is that i really get to reenforce a lot of the points that the two folks before me made, and you'll see some of the same themes coming to the floor again. these are inheritly joint and involved in what all the services are doing. we're involved with the army and what they're building. we are actually now in the forefront of what the navy is doing, and so we get both the good and the difficult points of all of those, and we're also interested in unmanned aerel system from a variety of areas, but the fact is driven by the current fight, it's all about isr right now which is why you have an up tell officer rather than a pilot talking to you.

it's also colored by the way that we see the world. you know, right now the bulk of u.s. military forces are in one theater of operation. socs are scattered across the world. we have a lot of folks in the same area of operations, but we have a very large number of folks in other parts of the world. the other aspect of this photograph is in the so-com commander uses this to point out that the places we tend to go and increasingly go in the future are not the areas you can see from space because they are lit up. they are the dark areas, areas without a lot of infrastructure or governments, near the areas where terrorists tend to go and hide. those are the areas that soc is anticipating. we're in a lot of them now, anticipating going to more of them or in greater numbers in

the future. that's implications for what we're looking for out of the unmanned system performance and some of the things, for instance, where the cornel talked about -- colonel talked about the basing and the footprint. that aspect how we view the world here colors our approach to the problems. i talked about isr being the focus of unmanned systems now, and we believe we've seen an evolution on isr where we have moved from over the course of a year to a fairly large static easy to find targets where we looked at long term planning, where we were doing sampling of the battlefield for awareness, that has moved down to pursuit of increasingly fleeting targets, difficult to find now to the point where we are concentrating on individuals, effecting operations in near realtime, and where we are having to get away from sampling

because we don't have the luxury of 50 years looking at a single cold war opponent and gathering knowledge where the knowledge is extremely die name kic and -- dynamic and because the enemy is changing his behavior in reaction to what we do, we're putting more surveillance rather than just battlefield sampling which drives the need for 24/7 continuous surveillance, and really that's illustrated by this picture here, and this one's been around for a couple of years where in conventional warfare, the focus of reconnaissance was about finding the enemy, look for the dust cloud and a rifle division coming through the gap. it was more about making combat forces effective. how do i dissect those key elements within the enemy construct to fly my combat power in the most effective manner possible?

in irregular warfare, it's about finding the enemy because they blend in very well. once we found them and have a picture of the network, bringing combat power to bear requires, i don't want to say less effort, often less resources. here's an ill los vaition from an operation a few years ago in the middle east that illustrates this. it starts out with a person because we are looking at networks compromised of people. we are not looking at military organizations where the individuals are, you know, pieces of a machine where you draw and find a tank platoon in the trees, you can draw the rest with a great deal of confidence. you're looking for people and the relationships between people and that's extremely die dynamic, and they change as soon as they know you are watching. we watch for a couple of people, and they may take weeks using intelligence from a variety of

sources, uav's being one. we look for a pattern of life. we want to establish a pattern between what different people are doing, how they relate to each other, what their activities are, and at that point, this is where uav's come into their own and aircraft surveillance comes into its own because we move the as sets rapidly and we can perch over a target for a long period of time from distances where we are not observed and the watch doesn't know they are being watched, so in this particular case after about a month of establishing the basic pattern in finding those key target elements, we flew another month, $1,000 of surveillance, and frankly, that's light. ..

operations that started in a period of dark danceable effect operations happening later that same period of darkness. so what does that mean in terms of capabilities that are looking for? we talked a lot about fmv. full motion video has been very kind to us. it's not necessarily the wave of

the future. the desert has been a very clean environment for the terrains favorable. where did a lot of work if you're ever going to do more work and whether the more difficult chewiness that we need vehicles capable of flying in darkness in all weather. sensors that are capable of operating conditions of flow. log on station experience. we talked about losing people in what we call blinks, gaps and surveillance of less than a minute. the ability to have a vehicle that can stay out there for a while rather than have to continually switch short endurance vehicles is extremely important. curt altered to talk about multicam. the multi-payloads on the platform fibula to swap them out to pay what conditions are the maturity between sensors and fuel and cargo hooks in you name it. the isr is the flavor of the

moment right now, it's not the only thing, probably for a good day and main thing. expeditionary was another thing that came up in kernel bushey's talk. the dark areas don't have a lot of a lot of basing opportunities. we are working with different services to see what can we do it in order to go into print a footprint down, in order to put it in smaller areas or fly out the back of ships or other things that will allow us to move it into theater in a more rapid manner. in a lot of ways that's what we're required to do. just as importantly, the tools to plan, how to coordinate these, especially when you're talking interoperability is a huge area for us because we are fine systems from the army, from the air force and will be in the future from the navy. in fact, within this decade we will be flying nt ones from both

the air force and the army will be find both predators and great evil spirit right now the systems aren't exactly interoperable even though they look the same and that is something that is going to cost us a little more pain than it will the army or the air force individually because her having to fight them in closer courtney should. the crews are working closer to the individual army or air force are. and the backend. what do we do without this data once you get it? the dissemination, fusion of that data coming off of the sensors and other sensitive data with david vitter collect the is extremely important because the original purpose to flying these missions if something isn't done with the operative mission if what is the effect. what decisions are being driven by the outcome of that mission. so what are we doing? this gives us an idea of what

kinds of systems were flying now. you'll see we perch the spectrum from handheld systems that we put they had held so attains of guys all play up to flying predators and we are flying reverse right now with the special operations plans. rosa taken advantage of the platforms provided through the theater process that the services or flame out there. so a good deal of air force mission and some of the army missions are being floated by the services and support of sof. the tongue-in-cheek answer to what happens about the aircraft are although scouts once iraq and afghanistan come back down from tampa, we've got the answer. we're going to take women were going to employ them someplace. the key thing on this also is the sof are doing things

differently in terms of a system from the rest of the services. where premier leasing service equipment, whether that's using that offered by the services or whether that's into special operations. in fact, the programs, the enhanced handheld that was developed for naval special or warfare and roderick in the expeditionary ues, we're working with the services to but does not become service records in the future. our goal is not to develop a line of systems unique unto ourselves. it doesn't help interoperability and is not the ability to work with the services and certainly doesn't help the fiscal environment. we're looking at everything else going out there. what are the challenges that we see for the future? a lot of you don't have anything

to do with the platform itself. in fact, several can be applied to me and platforms to was unmanned. this is something that we think this area of development has to address. the first thing is really the data. the appetite with information and data. and a tuning data versus just information. the appetite for the forward is growing almost every day, all the way down to the level. we are continually delegating requests from the 12 or 16 out there. how to. huckabee conductivity to a wider variety of sensors? had we get whiter fees from a variety of aircraft? right that we could have been able to purchase aircraft overhead and how do i into a network of aircraft, working the region that they're operating

within and out of a deep conflict is across? and so how do we work that out so everybody can get what they need and the thieves are coming back to them. i talked a little bit about the sensors earlier. you know, being able to detect, identify and track individuals. were talking about people, main battle, not mobile missiles. were talking about people through weather, environments with the background clutter helps them blend in very, very well. we have the disadvantage in this case over an easily identifiable clothing. our adversaries don't have the same disadvantage. they blend into the general population in the penalty getting around are growing. they're they're tremendously gnomic going to get worse. ltd. for what footprints, those dark areas and hard to get the same in those areas.

plus, most of the places where we do have post-nation cooperative agreements, they don't necessarily drop 10,000 folks onto their territory. so we're specialists in the operations world about putting in small teams. how'd we make are supporting uas assets with the same footprint. some of that goes to the split operations that colonel black talked about. we perch the back and in the sanctuary area within the same theater. there's probably thinks we haven't thought of, which were looking to the industry to help us out with. colonel black talked about communications. everything about this unshared communications. we have reliable chunk of bandwidth. it's been able to get at the bandwidth at the right time. i've got to know that if they are. there are kinds of operations

were conducting. you have to know. not 80%, not 90%. we have to know 100% that that availability is going to be there and is going to work in that the challenge right now. the last piece as we move into the phase where we're moving a lot out of mostly u.s. laterals direct action into the bye week group, into operations at those nations. the governments have agreements with the population and it goes back to the footprint issue, but right now the visual signature at uis means one thing. if i drown in there. that is a tough nut to crack.

it's a generic looking manned airplane with lumps of bumps on it. i put a predator on the ramps in every plane spotted the country knows what it is, why it's been probably going to turn up on the internet within six hours. that is something that's a challenge for us because the one piece of the footprint you can't put backwards if the air vehicle at both. airspace immigration. the humanitarian operations over haiti. the air force deployed unmanned aerial system stomach to do some of the damage surveys and such. we have manned aircraft in that area inside of 24 hours. it took us two weeks to put predators down in puerto rico, which is u.s. territory. it was how did they get that john mayer inside what was very congested there's days? a lot of transfer inside and out. how do they teach conflict?

what we're finding is the airspace immigration may actually be easier once you get outside the u.s. and europe where there is a very structured you got a lot of countries out there. we are finding that there are some advantages where we can work with the military since they are -- they come in and say we're going to catch you chunk of airspace. that's not a panacea though. they still have to look out for the simple interests. we're not going to go into some country and say hey, we want you to shut down their ways but they're bringing in your air traffic because we think you need to fly. it's not happening. it's long-term. it's got to be addressed. the last piece of technology sharing. mr. barrie mentioned something about the nct are. i've looking not out in my job

before i got down here and looking as we try to proliferate technology to solve these other two problems because, how do you get uavs to be more accepted? to get them out during cross surveys, fire watch, fisheries, patrol. so they become more ubiquitous than other areas. their signature decreases and the willingness to open up their space increases. but the technology associated with unmanned aerial systems is largely the same technology associated with missiles. and how do we teach conflict that? or should we teach conflict that? as those in open question. so, i think you've got the view from all three of us now an alternate over to mr. barrie for the next portion.

[inaudible] >> -- standard rules and agreements. if you busy and i'll identify you and you say who you are. first question. [inaudible] >> due to generate defense use. mainly to colonel bushey since he's the first went to mention it. you mentioned our economy and nation security and operating test airspace for something that comes on with the m. q. x, how far would she want to take it, say a hike, airspace like jamming and everything else that goes along with it. would she want something that

plans its own missions or even something that might drop eventually. >> you bring up a very good point. when you talk about autonomy, you're talking about -- the definition is huge. we talk about something that can take us lands or are we talking about something that is autonomously find a red truck? are we talking about a system the given submission parameters and it has the ability to make vision critical decisions, which is what you're talking about. are we at a point where we can say generically here is where the target is? can you find the targets and tell me how you did? that would be fully autonomous and i respect for the machine would take over into all that. that depends on obviously the reliability of the system. right now are not at a point

where we can autonomously do things we should be able to do for my personal opinion. i don't think were at a point where we have systems autonomously engaged another system, but we can get to a point where we have a system to autonomously get there and probably have control. the rapidly approaching it all depends on reliability. >> i guess brown sof point of view, there is a great deal of utility and serving over some of the routine move from point a to point b. to take off the land to do some of the diagnostic things that any pilot has to do while sitting in the cart it. autonomy to do the missions

itself is going to be tough simply because the technology right now to reliably recognize targets, to distinguish different targets from one another. and that's making decisions. right now, making decisions is something that humans do reasonably well, machines do by force and that doesn't necessarily work so well. frankly that is one of the reasons why although there's a lot of talk about it, we'd get into air to air combat and part of the sof piece, but you're probably not going to the autonomous unmanned vehicles and teaching in aerial combat because the situation there is so dynamic and changes so

quickly and demands to be able to look and distinguish your environment around you in all directions very rapidly that are so demanding the tape elegy probably won't be for a decade or so. >> the one thing that does need to be pushed forward is autonomy and what we do with the data once we get it back. and that's a huge area that could be easily addressed by things that are out there now, algorithms now, our ability to track vehicles, our ability to put an aircraft overhead and say was that comes out of the box, tommy was something moves. and those are coming. those are well ahead.

>> andrew would be iiss. two questions. one, what is and he said the unmanned vehicles and border security issues that occur in all bushey mentioned. and secondly, picking up on the last point about technology sharing. have there been any cases where the restrictions on technology sharing have inhibited or caused problems for u.s. operations in theater? >> all hit the first one. we talked about border patrol, is that correct? having to interact with my brother and i'm systems for the department of homeland security and customs border patrol, they have been damaged over the dod

would have airspace access and they needed. they can say it's a national security issue and get out the airspace and they needed. however, they the same problems we do. they don't have enough crews, enough assets. so when you have three predators to patrol the entire mexican border, that's an issue. so you can hit the hot spots. they are using them affect lee. i'm not going to speak to how effective they are, but it do not have limited assets cruise, but to have greater access. >> i guess from talking to the gentleman who was actually wanting to customs and border patrol program two weeks ago, it's an area of great interest to them. also, one of the things i now doubt in discussion is putting

uavs on the back of the cutters. clearly it's an area of great interest i don't want to marvel in other people's material. the last piece about the technology transfer is not something that we want to do right now. so we're looking ahead, but we are the given discussions with countries. they clearly want the information. they want control or access to the services of information and at some point when we back u.s. presence out of these areas and want to leave them with capabilities and if you go back and look at the national security plan for the war on terror, which is a document, the

idea is not to leave the u.s. presence in area gratuity. it's to help different countries solve their security issues and leave them able to conduct their own security. if my systems are part of that, clearly they're going to have to play a role where there is going to be some capability transfer, to elegy transfer and i'm sure you can have one without the other and people always figure out how. it has a comic at, but we'll see in the future. >> a question for go. >> thank you. amy commonwealth -- i'd also like to go back to colonel tradewinds partners about ues. i know canada and germany are using the israeli herring for that purpose.

other of their coalition partners who are using uas in the theaters? kernel blackhead mention the problem of using access to this feed. i mean, do we get to see from our allies in the theater? more generally, would your job easier if more of our coalition partners and allies had capabilities like this? like capabilities you expect? >> sure. i mean, that was part of the reason nato came into existence in europe was to make all the different forces interoperable and all the different standards of government in communications, data feed, ammunition and that sort of thing. unfortunately we don't have that ubiquitously enough to take

advantage and it doesn't necessarily work seamlessly with nato partners. i know some of the nato partners have not only operated both systems, but are operating u.s. built systems, italians and both of those who have reached the area. so they are amongst the more established partners. we see a lot of that. and yes, everybody does it it not necessarily over the same systems that might any other joint communications in theater, if the construction of the moment and so things are latched on to patch together need to work them whether they assemble that graphically and seamlessly in their place at the world as a

question. >> i concur. i was just going to highlight the point that first of all depends on what size and system you're talking about. if it's an army of very small raving unit from other system only talks to the four brigades anyway. so we are not talking a larger system has to be more interoperable, but the issue becomes the intelligence systems that the different countries use. that would be the interoperable piece you need to worry about. some of the countries use smaller systems. some of them use different brands of systems and you hit the two i was going to hit. so there are systems over there and i'm sure other countries have some of there, but i can't speak with authority to does.

>> colonel burton, u.s. army retired. you may avert he answered my an acronym but it was not familiar, so i apologize if that's true. it concerns electronic manning direct it to all the panelists. the question is, how vulnerable is a four hub to electronic jamming? a four hub remains of client area vehicle without a human being aboard. >> how vulnerable is that? very. it would be very misrepresented to me to say that we were targeted against electronic warfare. i will value that most systems, not all, most systems have what we call either a rally point for emergency mission in that it

doesn't hear from the operator. it has computer and sometimes the flight plan is continuing with your mission. if i don't hear from you i'm going to continue to not have my targets, but go to my target and surveilled and then come home. so there are ways of capturing data without communication, but as we've all brought up, communication link is key to electronic jamming is a challenge. >> i guess to add on to that though, the biggest worry often write down day-to-day is not electronic jamming. its reliability of existing make. and so, even a routine testing. i remember a few weeks ago to navy flight tested the uav at an airfield by the tungsten river

and lost the link in the airplane took off towards washington were tories here and they regained control of the aircraft and brought it back and it turned out well. that is not an uncommon problem right now. so we've been without somebody else's hope, communication reliability is an issue. >> returned we were using which covers everything, not only the ability to get the data back securely and can be seen by someone else. but the anti-jamming and reliability when you are a share comments, that's one of the big issues that we see as an enabler in the future. >> on the columns blank website, the uk's operation is known as the phoenix, when you fly at nu quite often there's the link.

>> eli lake from the "washington times." i have a question for colonel bushey regarding the tensions between the united states and pakistan over intelligence contractors. what impact do these negotiations have been on the uas war on pakistan and are there any contingency plans at this point at the pakistanis say they would no longer allow this sort of thing? >> two questions are outside of my realm. i'll answer from my youth. that becomes the basic issue. obviously we took our targets based on our strategic needs and maybe down to detect goa made. and i assume you're talking about basing our assets and pakistan. is that the question? [inaudible]

>> yes, depending that the nature of the mission was. obviously if you are talking about the mountainous regions between pakistan and afghanistan, our assets from afghanistan have one of flakes and endurance that we can reach and see a long distance. if we were politically unable to fly over their airspace, that we would have to come up with other means of surveillance. obviously unmanned aircraft are not the only means of surveillance. i would impact the provision. >> good day, royal add-ons royal air force. he made a comment earlier with your very important slides about air force and army and the phrases it's not good, not bad, just different.

with the financial constraints it will fight to ensure eventually as they are in our country. cannot praise telecom although it's not good, frankly won't do it because it's got to be good because it's usually supported. different isn't something surely you can afford. so that is my first question. the second question, referring back to those sites as well is that those two different approaches, the use half an army, not good, not bad, how much do you each teabag over your systems, satellite systems, use that process, how much is one relying on the other or are they basically excuses? >> i'll take the second half of your question first. everything that we do, like i said come is commonly distributed. the army uses all of our head when the user fees.

do we have army intel analysts and the tgs that are doing work with us. what goes back to an essay is a very purple organization, not blue-green or way too anything but very purple. so we tee off each other back and forth. and again, what i'm trying to get forward is when you think of the uas, unmanned aerial system as opposed to an rpa cometh into the whole entirety of the system. if were talking about the fiberglass piece on the end in controlling the aircraft, the army disciplined way, we put another. if you look at the entirety of the system, it's very purple and may be looking and learning a lot but we do for everybody, including my brethren on the ground, the army and marine corps. in your first question again.

[inaudible] -- unlimited and with her two sets of people doing the same job using their own bandwidth are sharing the same amount that restrict bandwidth? >> and not goes into micom issue. the very first thing i got to the dirhams time as they stood at the stop and i was hoping them as they got ready. the very first question anybody asked us to be of a satellite footprint and do we have seen that capability? that is going to be one of are assured issues in the future. we have to figure out another way to do that as we get more out there. it's not just the rpa is. it's the guys on the ground talking back and forth about the data going back and forth. i feel sorry for the navy. when you try to put one of these things on a carrier, which is going on that tries to jam anything within 20 miles, how will i control an airplane?

if they've got some serious issues that they're going to have to cover. >> i want to piggyback on the way the army does the ped is very different. the information product is truly what we call purple. the army's version of ped is to go for a small group of people image applied unit to process the information very quickly get it back to the soldiers. the air force's version of ped is generically reach back. if they have second round-trip, and the information comes back and essentially distributed to a system where we'll have access to it. that means the access is just different on how they're employed. it's going to be very important that we get those more joint in the future. i agree with your point that we can no longer have a deployed forward any predator that scott

ped deployed back at the five different dcgs we have. >> recently the army has been asked to look at what it would take to do up so we were doing it and are doing the study right now. and i guess to summarize that up, good or bad may be a bad word. flexible. we didn't notice that it was going to turn out this way. it just so happens the century gives us a tremendous amount of flexibility. i think as we go forward everybody will realize the flexibility is important. >> i can tell you from a joint command's point of view the differences are driving us nuts. seriously, the army and the air force are not operating in the same architecture. as we have to integrate those two to operate them. they're not only technical challenges. the technical challenges are

easy to solve. i can put the boxes on the great eagle with operations. but the pet question, we have found a tremendous amount of value in combination of reach back and forward deployed roach in.turn in making the work of a tailor the size of the forward deployed footprint to match the mission requirements. so we may be guilty of melts in the two to build a third different although we think it takes advantages in the good points of each and hopefully discourage some of the bad points. but when we love god -- there is no soft service. nobody goes into socom in a

different uniform with a stitched over the pocket. so we rely on services for the base level of training. that means we're having to get into the school houses, not just the intel school houses, but the school houses where they are teaching people how to fly and operate because it's more than just staring the platform. there's a mindset to have these platforms are operated in the way the army aviators trained to think about operating his platform is different from the way that an air force operator is trained to think about operating his platform. were having to mesh all of those together and were sharing that information back to the services. you know, there's a lot of crosstalk and that's what the center of excellence insists on the first place. so you know, there's a lot of very lively crosstalk sometimes people get pretty passionate about defending their services

point of view. but i know from within a small joint command, those differences are significant sometimes and it takes a fair amount of buffer to make them work together and hopefully this didn't become that the end is tastier than the ingredients you started with. it still is a lot of work. >> question in the front row. >> hi, major armstrong, air force strategic policy in turn. i am a big believer in uavs and that they will be a big part of the future of air power. a lot of time debates of my peers constantly bring up the fact that uavs are desensitizing compiler further pushing up buttons and killing people far far away. would you say to that? >> i'll take it very simply operate -- i cut my teeth on

predators have yet to in 2002. so first of all, when i go and interact with the second went up there quite a bit, that's wearing stationed right now. if you go up there and you look at what they have, they are very much in breach that they're going into combat. they go through restricted area. they go through combat zones. it's as if were going to a combat. you are put into what we call the more your east coast, the warrior mentality before you ever stop to a ground control station. it's very much emphasized every day that you are there, you're executing a mission to potentially save lives and you're executing a critical mission. so was impressively done. if you see they are given the

warrior he sows. it is kind of funny, colonel thurston who is going out there always said that some of the crews complain about the long drive between las vegas and creech and that they want the base to be closer. and he would laugh at that and say that it's important because there are so much stress. they are definitely in combat at the 45 minute drive home is pretty nice deal to turn to turn on the radio and get your mind off of things before you step back into the real world. again, the 45 minute drive of going out there is getting you ready to go into combat. so i think they do a great job out there of putting the warriors out there on the warrior ethos. >> i agree. the pressures when you are actually -- the first time you get a line from a guy on the ground you can hear his voice and you can hear the bullets whistling, you feel the

pressure. it doesn't matter whether i'm in an f-16 at 20,000 feet over the top of the battlefield or whether i'm sitting in the box listening to that guy in micro view. i would actually say that my situational awareness of what he is going through at that time is probably better that showed up, i'd stationed throughout the web and left. i see my effects. i launched, listened, i was within for the five hours prior to that. i would say we're very much in the front. >> you know, you look at the interface. what a predator pilot instance of operators see through the wall mounted on their aircraft is pretty much the same view that isn't a c-130 since the seat of the similar ball mounted

on his aircraft, which is in a hole at different from what somebody in an f-15 or be one may see different image. the nature of air warfare is that it you're not nose to nose with the enemy most of the time. and i think whether it's 10,000 feet or 10,000 miles, if your head is in the fight, you're sensitized to it and particularly because there is knowledge, every crew that's out there extends back to folks in the exploitation, not just the folks in creams, the folks on the tps is, they realize there are real warm-blooded guys out there that they are supporting them who are relying on their support. and it gets into their head just as if they were in theater. it doesn't matter whether they're forward.

it gets into their heads. >> i'm bernard from the postgraduate school. which you've been saying is reminiscent of the marine fliers who are obliged to train as ground officers before they enter an airplane is my understanding. i guess i've heard more and more about the difficulty of finding and manning cruise for the unmanned systems. is there a case to be made that the requirement -- our first requirement that your pilots on the ground, in fact were silver wings? that perhaps in the point you've been making this more relevant to web in 19 the aircraft and actually entering combat from the ground station. the difference between not in

more peer isr, we are presuming the army and other nations feel that the requirement that the operator be a certified pilot is not as strong or not is present. >> i'm going to throw one out to does annoy the person who can speak to that. you have to understand that the requirement is so fastly emerging that there is no we need 600 unmanned aircraft, we need 500 crews. it changes every day. so for us to be incorrectly these units, it is tough since the required changes almost hourly. so we're running as fast as we can to catch up. to go back to your crew qualification author of the year for. if they're going to operate in

the national airspace system, they have to be trained to a certain standard. to train a pilot to fly in the national airspace system may have to be pilot qualified and that was the standard answer on why the air force was pilot qualified. we are working towards common crew qualifications. but again, bruce can definitely get you a better answer. >> to answer questions during the shorter term, we're not cutting corners. the 18 taxpayers are getting a full round of this is what it's going to take two mammoth aircraft, to deliver weapons, to act as an mission commander. and that is the air force point of view. i don't care if you came from a desk or you came through upt, when you sit down in the seat, you have to perform. and we are spinning guys that the same rate, through the same program that would do the regular pilot. some of them are taking a little more time because they don't have the air sent.

were not cutting corners on it. if the guys are ready to go into combat, the last thing we're going to do is give them a gun. >> from our point of view, were looking at the fact that the air force created an entirely different airfield for uav operators. a large part of regular pilot selection has to do with physiological fact there's a putting a man in a cockpit that you don't have to deal with if you're sitting in the ground station on the ground, but the skilled operating system will still require a lot of those. in fact, looking across all the services when we look at what the army is doing with the larger unmanned systems, when we look at the two quick reaction platoon set are operating out in theater right now, they have god aviation trained folks operating the systems. when we look at what the navy is

doing right now with fire scout systems that is flying off the back. it is using folks from the helicopter attachments, aviators to find us. just because there is a certain amount of knowledge required to operate a flying vehicle as opposed to the physical pieces for having a man in the crowd. because there is a subtle distinction between the two, but i think that's where the air force's tackle the problem head on. >> i wanted to follow up on eli blake's question but in a different form may be. could you talk a little bit about the political diplomatic constraints and compare and contrast them with unmanned aircraft versus manned aircraft flying into adversary airspace.

thank you. >> again, pretty much our land. asin, pretty much out of our land. as an operator, the effect of what i do matters not whether i'm sitting in it or whether i am sitting in las vegas doing it. and the consequences of what i do are real and we treat it like it's real and the air force treats it like it's real. in my opinion, if you're asking that because this isn't my leg, my opinion is that we should always do that and that we should never say that this is remotely piloted and should be treated differently. >> and that's why you'll never hear one of those that pierce a drone.

a drone indicates a airplane that's in the air just find a lot in waiting to be shot down. that's what it used to be used for, but these airplanes are very intelligent. the perception of unmanned versus manned a six family important and were very sensitized to it. part of our job is to educate people on the capabilities and to be realistic about the limitations of these aircraft. so i think it's basically a perception that we need to work on, but these are just like manned aircraft, but there are limitations we have to acknowledge. >> other than some of the issues we talked about with airspace restrictions, which are really driven by the sea and avoid standards that are posed in the civil airspace, you know, we haven't seen a lot of difference. i mean come you're talking about flying and military control dares raise over in theater,

where they are established airspace controls. are you talking about sensitivity of? it is an airplane. >> hi, sir coupland for an ngo called civic and im happy to hear about the training and sensitivity that goes into operating these aircraft from within the dod and within the services. i don't want to get too off topic, but my concern is that cia operators are not getting the same training sensitivity, et cetera and that we don't know anything about their targeting processes. are any of you able to speak to that? [laughter] >> i will echo the know, but say that in this form i can tell you i know was operating than they

do. they get the same sensitivity training. we share some of the same information, so i personally know we guess that the training, but i'm way outside of mailing to insert sufficiently. >> next question. >> i'm also with the ucg policy interns. along the line of manned versus unmanned and making sure we keep that mindset, every other brings death and destruction as a man that the enemy can shoot at. whether or not they have ability to do that, there's someone they can target, except with uavs. this is a sticky area. i don't know if we figured it out, but is the operator when he leaves his ship is the unlawful combatant cannot be targeted and fired up because of the only place we can do it?

>> i'm going to do that one first. and the reason i'm going to do that first is because if you go back and you look in the winter issue of the air force is professional journal, there was an article by a retired officer about the necessity or lack thereof, you know, the nature of war being exposed to violence and whether that was true or not. and i ended up writing about a page worth those rebuttal, which is the most recent issue if anybody wants to go look at. i guess the core there is there is nothing in the laws of warfare and nothing in the history of warfare that demands that everybody exposed themselves equally to violence.

so the idea of the eye have to be shot not in order to shoot at somebody else does a goldwater. and in fact, if poor kids, poor use of resources and that's not to say that -- words that fair. it's not supposed to be fair. it's about getting the job done for the least amount of violent possible applied in the most effective and efficient manner to do something. that's the nature of it. that's why they train us not to be discriminate any train us to be effective and efficient. so you know, that sort of goes back to the question that was asked earlier about hey, do folks sitting 10,000 miles away have their head in the fight? yes they've got their head in a fight for a lot of different reasons.

i think the same thing right now if it helps that they are supporting guys who are their exposed to violence directly on the ground. that brings the sharper edge to it. the same thing would be true if it was in theater diction section or something like that. everybody is very cognizant of what they are doing and what the effects of what they are doing. nobody takes this lately and that's because we're trained that way from the beginning. >> anybody else? >> i would shudder to think that we would expose our troops as lawful combatants on the drive home from las vegas, but i don't -- you know, i haven't talked, but i would shudder to think that would be true. i guess one other thing is the long-term conflict or develop amongst nationstates who agreed

for lots of good reasons to limit the effects. a lot of the adversaries we are fighting now don't subscribe to the same live in may not feel the same restrictions. so when we talk about was the lawful combatant, you know, does a terrorist group that will take over civilian aircraft to use them as weapons, with a feel any compulsion to observe the love, what we regard as lots of conflict? what about drug cartels? the rules are different for them. >> one last question. >> i don't think you answered the last question about whether that individual, the uav operator attack a lawful combatant. is there any reason you can say

he could not be targeted? that is a person in uniform is conducting conflict. it doesn't matter where he is or if he's a soldier gone back to his own base. he is a lawful combatant. >> from a deployment standpoint, allowing him to employ weapons, are you talking about from the standpoint of somebody who's targeting? abstained from the latter, it doesn't matter because those people don't observe the same rules from the standpoint of whiskey a lawful combatant allowed to employ weapons against an enemy target? absolutely. >> i'm looking at the other side but that is the u.s. individual can be targeted legally under the laws of war. why not. >> i couldn't tell you why not. i mean, that would be getting into legal opinion that certainly am not qualified to

give. i reiterate my opinion for the adversaries that were fighting out is irrelevant because they don't observe those rules. >> okay i just like to thank our three panelists for the excellent presentations. i would gladly -- thank you very much everyone. [applause] will be back at 10:30. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> all right. thank you everyone for attending. we will now move into looking at the future of unmanned aerial vehicles or assets to systems as they are called and look at the implications they have for policy and strategy. just note that about 20 years ago we worked on a project out of stanford i'm looking at the value at the advance reconnaissance strike force that

was used in the gulf war and just how capable it was. but one of the targets that we couldn't get to during the war with these sensitive point target -- time sensitive point targets like the scud launchers. so we took a look at technologies that would be needed in order to effectively target and take out such assets. and at the time, this type ologies weren't there, but there was this dream to use uavs and isr role to direct our combat aircraft to these targets. now we're 20 years later and in fact we do have the capability. so i'm very interested to hear what our speakers today had to say about what the future of uavs might be. granted they won't be talking specifically on some of the technical issues, but rather on the policy and strategic issues. we have three speakers. we have the tenet general david deptula, chief executive officer

and manager of knapsacks and former deputy chief of staff for isr and the u.s. air force. we also have general michael hayden, principal of the chair chuck associates group and former director of the cia and nsa. and dr. richard speier, an independent consultant and former official with the u.s. secretary of defense office and commonly known as the father but the visual technology. without a hand the microphone over to general deptula. thank you. >> thank you, michael. i tell you what, this is a very, very rich subject area and i am going to do something a little bit out of character for a retired general officer and i'm not going to use any powerpoint. [laughter] but my remarks are actually designed to stimulate the following discussions that i

think is generally where people come and find the most benefit. i'll give you my bottom line right up front and that is that i certainly believe that the future of remotely piloted and/or automated aircraft is very, very promising. ..

those aircraft will be controlled by people and to what degree of autonomy they employed is where lies the significant policy implications. with the give you another example. today there are few if any unmanned aircraft systems. this is one of the top. the colonel black brought up in the last session he shows you the charge. there's really nothing unmanned about this system at all except for as the colonel and referred to that piece of fiberglass up the front end of the system that takes nominally about 180 people to maintain one a predator reaper order to and on the order

of 400 per global hot. yet the majority of the department of defense uses this terminology i tell you words matter. some of you might think it's splitting hairs, but they do really matter and i'm going to tell you why or give you another example here in the second. but it's one of the reasons why the air force began to refer to some of the systems that we operate as remotely aircraft because that's what they are the vehicles are on me and said the unmanned aerial vehicle is an accurate term of the unmanned aircraft system is not. last year i was in a conference similar to this one talking about the air force plan for the remotely potted aircraft in the future and came to the question and answer period someone asked me a question about how we are getting along with the federal administration, the federal aviation administration in terms of working this piece control

issues. and before i give my answer preface and ask if there's anybody from the audience and nobody put up their hands. an audience of about 500 people and by and by three answered the question was nice to the faa and talked about some of the challenges that we have and working in the remotely potted aircraft in the airspace control system but afterwards alden hall this gentleman comes up to me and says i'm bob smith from the faa. i said i knew there were some of you in here. listen i just wanted to let you know that the single most important thing that the air force has done to facilitate moving forward and getting uav operating control air space as we started referring to them as remotely aircraft instead of aircraft systems because now we have people inside the faa that

understands there is absolutely a person in the loop and chills run down my spine and i am thinking do you think these things are just out there flying away by themselves? of course there's a person in the loop, but i submit to you that's why words matter and it's very, very important. with respect implications of the remotely piloted aircraft use we listen to some of the excerpts from a news report on monday about the official british ministry of defense document entitled quote, the u.k. approach to the unmanned aircraft systems. the article was from the guardian entitled, quote, the terminators. madrone strikes prompt ministry of defense to ponder efiks of killer robots. here is a bit from the article. the use of unmanned aircraft and the situations raises huge moral and legal issues and threatens

to weaken become a court more likely as the armed rabat's takeover from human beings. according to an internal study by the ministry of defence. the report warns the dangers of an incremental and involuntary journey towards determinator like reality in which humans are haunted by robotic killing machines that says the pace of technological development is accelerating at such a rate britain must quickly establish the policy on what will constitute, quote, acceptable machine behavior, in def quote. this is from the report. it's essential before the unmanned systems become ubiquitous if it is not already too late, we ensure that by removing some of the horror for at least keeping it at a distance, we do not risk losing our controlling humanity and make the war more likely warns the reporter. well, ladies and gentlemen, i

would tell you that in fact today there is actually more ethical oversight involved with unmanned aircraft vehicles than involved in the air delete command aircraft. that might seem counterintuitive this, but it's true. recall that 180 people number associated with operating a single cap and that by the way that 180 number doesn't even include the lawyers that are involved in the process. so depending upon which organization is using these things that's going to be a significant additional number of people. now, all that said, in the future i would submit to you that policy issues with respect to remotely piloted aircraft, uninhabited aircraft vehicles

will become significant with greater and greater degrees of autonomy. that's the issue, yet the perception is today we are already at that stage of autonomy. we are not there yet. when you send a young man or young woman into a single seat aircraft that has 10,000 pounds of ordinance on it, or relinquishing much more control and oversight than you are when you are employing remotely positive aircraft today. a couple of comments on the cultural implications. i think a lot of those, some of the common perception is out there are out of sync with reality. you know, there is a old wise to allow their that the air force had to have been dragged along cooking and screaming to adapt to remotely positive aircraft and i tell you that is

singularly not true. the ethos of the air force surrounds how you can best exploit the advantages of operating in the third dimension and operating in air and space and remotely potted aircraft to provide a real as a metric advantage that's reflected in that investment in the capability area and you saw on the chart 1200% increase in these vehicles over the last nine years. with respect to accuracy and collateral damage i would tell you they're delivered weapons are in fact the most accurate means of large scale for supplications. but perceptions and very effective use of perception management by our adversaries can create perceptions much different than reality and they may have a debilitating effect on the use of one of our key

asymmetrical what advantages. from the same article that i mentioned earlier, listen to this, quote, there is one school of thought that suggests for the war to be morrill as opposed to just legal, quote, it must link the killing of enemies with an element of self sacrifice or at least risk to one's self. are these people serious? some of this was raised earlier today. the taliban who do not comply with the laws of the international conflict are actually the number one positive civilian casualty in afghanistan and pakistan so it is okay for them to kill because they are at risk? i thought or i happened to be a supporter of general patton's notion of what your objective needs to be is to make the other poor dumb son

of a bitch bayh for his country, it is to be projecting power without full our ability and what the remote pot aircraft do for us is allowed us to obtain and asymmetric advantage for our adversaries can't respond. okay. our remotely piloted aircraft subject to what i call exuberance. what i mean by that is the certainly introduce an enormous and have significant concept and it just but i would suggest to you we have to be careful about how far folks go in terms of trying to adapt this remotely par the technology to the panoply of different missionaries that we conduct. there will be times and places where you want of a human being in an aircraft even if you can't

remove the system. so a couple of topics that i'm sure may introduce or stimulate some ideas and i look forward to addressing further in the question and answer period. next we will hear from general haydon. >> thank you very much. i want to make one thing clear to everyone. i'm not here to directly or indirectly confirm or deny anything that our government has in terms of confirm or deny with regard to operations. and while some of you may dwell on the fact my last job we need to keep in mind i was an air man for 39 years on active duty and worked routinely with folks like dave and much as it but i wanted to share with you was developed during that broad experience. listening to the opening comments today, the first panel

sitting in the back. the systems have become so ubiquitous that i think for certainly david i. but is it for the 04 level and below it is hard to imagine a world in which we didn't do this and do it this way they become so omnipresent. i don't have to imagine that world. i existed in that world for most of my military career. though i think the air force really does get good marks hysterically for embracing this new approach into the new technology. and the creation as we began to inject these kind of vehicles into the flow of our air operations was fascinating for me. i was the chief of intelligence for u.s. forces in europe for you, and we first began to use

the remotely piloted vehicles during the war in bosnia and by some alleged culture within the air force and the limitations of the platforms they are trying in two years. but in a short part of time partly measured 18 to 24 months as the jade to my dialogue with the heirs of commander one from you want me to do what with what air freeman that aerospace to listen, mikey, which is how the address, we are going to have strikers do this and i want that right behind them taking pictures so i know what's happening and in a really rapid development. you can understand why. when you have demonstrated in the first panel by the folks the practitioners here today, the

isr index was it intelligence intelligence the estragon was affordable insurance. we always like endurance we can do it. reasonably well within our current checkbook. some folks ask me about that phrase i just used, exquisite intelligence. so many dreams a minute and how much were permeating the spectrum by just simply said remember the neighborhood you grew up i grew up in a big city. by the time i was ten or 11i knew the corners like hang out on all day long and what corners i have to leave when it started to get dusk and when the black

van was at that location it would come back home. that's actually the kind of knowledge this unblinking stare, this absolute persistence. if you are patient enough it gives you about the three focus areas of the various parts of the world, and i would add, i am struck by the kind of special operations command multiple times during his presentation said this is all about individuals. it's not about formation, it's not about heavy equipment, this isn't chasing crumbs soviet forces germany to determine what the brigade is in or out of garrison this is to tracking a very specific human being which makes it absolutely optimal for the current war, now with that said it is absolutely optimal for the current war let me tell you something i believe is a

truism that the intelligence officer the future is never a straight line for the past. this is going to bob and weave and dhaka and turn and so it would be wrong for us to not only struggle leading to the future into the street line our experience for the past one, three, four or five years and there are going to be some points out there that cause that line to bend and let me just suggest as david has some of the pressure went as we look out into the future and number one a truism from athletic you are never as good as you look when you're winning you are never really that good. and keep in mind, it is hard to imagine a better environment for these platforms than the ones in

which we are operating today. it is permissive in every dimension. it is permissive fiscally, in terms of the air defenses that do not exist. it is permissive in terms of basing and it is permissive in terms of the freedom of action within the air space. it's permissive within our use of the spectrum to send and receive signals and its permissive in terms of no one else trying to override our signals in that kind of environment so it be careful but extrapolating these platforms performing so well and they really are into an unknown future in which the permissiveness not exist in the same way. the second point, we need to be careful with our language because it might confuse our

thinking. i, we refuse to these as isr platforms. when you look at the term isr it is a fairly wonderful term but it's been corrupted. if you break it down into what intelligence is and i think i know that and then surveillance from the reconnaissance these are surveillance platforms. if used well they can create intelligence, but they are not in and of themselves intelligence platforms. and in fact, our language and emphasis on them betrays particularly american trade. when it comes to intelligence, we generally apply an uneven emphasis on the technical collection and just call that intelligence. to underscore a point and frankly to emphasize the success but more extrapolating blindly into the future this isn't really even about intelligence.

this is targeting. and these have been wonderful targeting mechanisms but let's not pretend it's more than that. let's understand that. a third point i would share with you. these are creating an environment that is bigger than all outdoors and the folks working the back end. and if we are serious about this and we move this way into the future, we can't begin with the sensor and then looked the platform and look to the back end as an afterthought. that's the intelligence portion, that's the analysis, the absorption of the data. right now we have a crisis in processing exploitation and dissemination. that's where the real challenge lies and we need to keep that in mind. use of the tremendous growth in on mant isr platforms.

we have other khomenei platforms. we have a whole family of man platforms and overhead platforms. this tremendous growth has absorbed a significant amount of american treasure. to go into the future to think that that can continue without affecting the other baskets i just mentioned. what does the success in that basket, unmanned air breathing isr mean to the future investment in the other two baskets. we're breathing manned isr and overhead systems is something we really need to explore and finally, the last point suggested by david at the back end of the earlier discussion, there are some liberal arts questions out there about this whole new play of the war. i'm with david i'm very comfortable. consistent with the laws of the

conflict and american military tradition, consistent with about everything i can think of but not everyone agrees. forced to give a speech for the targeted killings for example. and we've got others out there are doing for many folks and publicly well-informed looks like david ignatius the columns in "the washington post" david would use the phrase romanticize version of the warfare if you are not at risk you don't have as much moral authority to put other folks at risk. it is only going to get more serious as it has become more widespread and well known. and as we take the steps that were suggested the backend of the first presentation as we have to get more automated at the back end because of avalanche of the data coming out, this question of a robot

like response to creating legal action is going to become more and more prominent. so again, like the general i am quite comfortable with how we are doing it and that we know how to do this well into the future but this will be an issue that will have to be addressed for us to put this if within the broad global and particularly within the american political culture. so again, tremendous platforms but they are really tremendous for today's problems. there are issues out there that will affect how that goes in the future. thank you. >> thank you, general. hartford panelist today is richard speer. >> thank you. because these remarks are on the record, i am going to forgo all humor. [laughter]

i'm going to discuss a problem that i helped create and a possible solution in the future. the problem if it is indeed a problem and not an advantage concerns the missile technology control regime or mtcr for short. the origins of the mtcr reside in national security directive number 70 which was signed by president ronald reagan on november 30 if of 1982. in it, the president directed us to hinder the spread of nuclear capable missiles, and he defined specifically what was to be hindered of relevance to this conference is that we were to hinder and unmanned rocket

powered or air breathing vehicle that could reasonably be modified to carry a nuclear warhead a significant distance. that meant unmanned air vehicles in the process of designing and negotiating and implementing the mtcr from that time to its public announcement in 1987 we gave a specific engineering definition to what should be restricted most tightly and that is any unmanned air vehicle reconnaissance, target, cruise missile, whatever. any unmanned air vehicle capable of delivering 500-kilogram payload for a sophisticated weapon to arrange 300 kilometers

the range -- the strategic range in the most contact feeders that we could see. there were some rare exceptions to this if you read the mtcr documents, you could see that the exceptions are cumbersome and rare and this means not usual at all. and the mtcr because it is a policy, couldn't under the international law supersede treaties the required technical exchanges such as nato's programs. but otherwise, there is a strong presumption to deny exports uav that exceed the 500 kg threshold that is a fundamental tenet of our missile nonproliferation

policy. let me expand a little more on this and read the clear statement that was given to the press on the day that the mtcr was announced april 16th, 1987 concerning uav. we are as concerned with cruise missiles as with ballistic missiles. however, the threat of the proliferation of cruise missiles is developing more slowly. one reason is that unmanned air vehicles that could be used as the basis for cruise missiles and that are available on the world markets have in the past, been a relatively small with little or no payload. target drones do not need to carry more than a relatively light packages. however there's a trend towards the remotely piloted vehicles some of which are intended to provide the option of munitions

delivery. this may be a route to the cruise missile proliferation. we were pointing specifically at mtcr, remotely piloted vehicles not only as something that could be flown on a one-way mission loading up with a nuclear weapon flying them into a target, but also as vehicles that could be used as let's say two-stage cruise missiles where the vehicles would make a round trip, but when approaching a target or outside of a defendant zone could release the munition that would go on to the target. this was all anticipated in the discussions leading up to the mtcr and the announcement of the regime. the regime was widened somewhat in 1993 by adding concerns with

chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons, adding a strong presumption of denial if a vehicle of any range or payload was intended to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and covering vehicles that exceeded the 300, 500 threshold, quote, regardless of their purpose, again, emphasizing that uav and other vehicles ostensibly for other purposes do munitions' delivery would be covered if they exceed that threshold. as expected, after the mtcr was announced, engineers in designing systems for export built right up to the threshold

of 300-500. this is the reason we gave it a specific engineering definition. the predator of the time of the mtcr and embryonic form and the 750 fell below the 300-500 threshold. but later they exceeded that threshold including the reaper and the global hoc which was basically developed a decade after the announcement of the mtcr. so starting in the late 1990's, they're began to emerge pressure to weaken the mtcr come to make an exception for unmanned aerial vehicles of the various