this culminated in a roughly 2,006 with an effort within the mtcr to make an exception for uav but were not especially adapted to penetrating defenses. the problem was in addition to this being turned down by the mtcr nations the problem is even the uav are not a specially designed to penetrate the defense's and fellow defense environment in addition to uav that goes low and or slow can be difficult to intercept. we still don't have a appropriate defenses against

these although we are working on them. and finally, what i call the two-stage cruise missile that orbits of side of the defendant areas that can deliver munitions into the defended area still is a threat. and many such two-stage systems have been proposed including systems designed to intercept the ballistic missiles in their faces where a uav would orbit waiting for the missile to be launched in what collier of a missile interceptor at the ballistic missile and systems designed to target the launch of ballistic missiles. all of these, even if they could penetrate defenses very well

would be serious systems to consider. in addition to this attempt to revise the mtcr, various concepts have been proposed about safeguarding, quote on quote, they couldn't be used in an offensive manner. many of the safeguard system some of the context of software that would make it impossible to use or to modify. without going into that in detail at this point that me just suggest anyone who believes in such a concept should look at the history of the hacking of automatic machines at the bank's the british professor at the university computer laboratory can bridge named ross anderson has written extensively on the

subject. relatively unsophisticated criminals who don't have extensive access to the atm machines can hack the software from the machines and the measures that's been going on over the years on the subject. compress that with the recipient who would have it in his full control for decades and who would be responsible for repairing and maintaining and logistically supporting the uav would have extensive access with the inside as well as the outside of the vehicle and any concept with safeguard becomes extremely questionable.

the problem is to share the benefits of unmanned aerial vehicles, the benefits we have heard about extensively this morning, isr and even the munitions delivery to share with our partners without increasing the threat of cruise missile proliferation how are you going to square the two objectives? here's my proposal to read that the united states engage in a serious program of providing uav services to our partners as an alternative to providing the uav hardware itself. the missile technology control regime defines as an export only the transfer of items outside the, quote, jurisdiction control of the government as long as it

remains under the u.s. jurisdiction or control it's not restricted by the missile control regime. the idea is we would provide uav services and let our partners have shot or control, let them have access to the downwind and so let them have the benefits of the uav. there is a precedent for this. in southeast asia, nado, david ignatius mentioned one with turkey, in some cases the buzz word for these operations are fee-for-service arrangements. but if there's any questions we can go into some of these precedents. what are the at vintages of the services will it allows us to share the benefits of them more widely.

it makes it unnecessary for us to dumb down the uav systems we might want to use with our partners. it might make them more affordable depending on the financing arrangements. it avoids the slippery slope where we start to undo the main tenets of our missile nonproliferation policy and the next stop on the slippery slope being to share space launch vehicles are interchangeable with ballistic missiles it gives us the efficiency of having a central operator. we've heard about the problems with the army versus the air force on operational concept some it's worse when you're trying and to deal with international partners. by having a central operator it would allow for the aerospace integration which we have heard about this morning.

better interoperable become a better band but use. is there a disadvantage to my proposal? the main one i've heard is that nations sometimes think it is their sovereign right to own, completely alone the hardware that is being used for their purposes. well, if this is the problem than the nation's ought to consider what is necessary to have a uav operation. let me just read what "the new york times" says about our uav operations in the global hoc operations in libya. the are 35 revet eavesdropping planes and intercept communications from the libyan commanders and troops and really that information to the global hoc, which zooms in on the

location of the armored forces and determines roskam ordinance. the global hot sand as the court and instead analysts at the ground station who pass the information to the command centers for targeting. the command center diems accordance to the sentry command and control plane which in turn to rex the war plan to their targets. and "the new york times" didn't even mention the satellite communications that were necessary to leave all of this together. this infrastructure, is this to be sold along with the uav? i doubt. even if the nation wants a sovereign right to control its going to depend on this kind of an infrastructure and it's very likely that it's going to have to depend continuously on the u.s. or large multi

organizations. so there's nothing really radical about providing services as an alternative to providing the hardware itself. let me close by reading a statement eight years ago by thomas cassidy, president and ceo of general atomics which developed the predator. he said the last thing a forward commander needs is to maintain and operate airplanes. what he needs is intelligence support. somebody looking and then piping video directly to him on a little tv set that we have already made for the special forces people. that's the way to operate the uav, and that's the way to prevent the missile proliferation. >> thank you, richard. we will now move to the question and answer period and we will use the same rules of engagement that were employed this morning.

please identify yourself and your affiliation. but as the chair i will use the prerogative of asking the first question if you don't mind. and this is to all three panelists. we talked about the future and the use of the uav, but i would be interested in your thoughts about two issues. are we more concerned now with the technologies that our adversaries would use to counter the use of the uav or are we more concerned with an adversary obtaining uav and using the capabilities against us. >> i will just jump in very quickly. we are an information based military. we had wonderful slides and talked about precision replacing maps and in terms of how

americans fight the war to read the depend upon the precise information, depends upon precise information, so we are more dependent on this kind of explicit knowledge and any anniversary that i know because we've traded for these other attributes. so i think that i would be more frightened with someone interfering with our ability to create precision and having similar programs for they would be less had at at optimizing them. estimate your specific questions we are concerned with both because at some point in the future because the rapid distribution of technologies as a result of the globalization

and other things there will be the point when our adversaries do acquire the capability not as fast as we have in terms of being able to achieve the same level of precision. we've got to be concerned of the ability to grab the technology as well as getting a hold of the members. this is one of the issues that we are still wrestling with in the context of all of the services and allies is the airspace controlled, very simple but the way the we've used it in iraq and afghanistan in terms of the complexion of the remotely piloted aircraft really complicate our ability to deal with an adversary who may inject ten, 20, 100, 1,000 remotely piloted aircraft into friendly airspace which goes back to something general haydon brought

up current day operations we are operating in a permissive airspace. so, after serious don't even have to have real smart remotely piloted aircraft to have very significant complicate the air defense situation. >> richard? >> if they are adept as cruise missiles imagine the defense problems dealing with what was described this morning as a swarm of uav. it's difficult enough right now for us to intercept rats coming in at both high and low, high altitude and lower altitude. the defense tend to look one way or the other and we are trying to develop better cruise missile defenses. but as you get large numbers of

even primitive uav adapted as offensive weapons by the adversary you have a much more complicated problem. >> yes, right there. >> thank you. edward georgetown university. we've been talking about relatively large objects. but there is interesting work going on to miniaturize the platforms down to the realm of birds and even insects. where does that stand, and what does the panel see as the future of the devices like that? >> i will jump in here. there's a lot of work being done on the ne no -- nano uav that depends upon the perspective but there's a lot of potential, huge potential. imagine 20 years in the future we are sitting in the room like this, who is to know whether or not, and let's say that this is

a secure facility that fly over there is in transmitting everything going on to an external source or from an offensive perspective to be able to have an insect sized vehicle hanging around anniversary leadership passing on that kind of information so there are enormous potentials associated with microbes and nano uav. >> i would reinforce what david said and have to add in my second flight i do consulting for companies very much involved in those kinds of activities. the only thing i would add to what david said is there's an awful lot of energy because if it becomes more available, it is almost a natural half down what you suggested.

>> in the first row? >> my guess for the next generation uav one of the big problems especially that is operating in the aerospace communications colonel bush suggested earlier that perhaps we man or something along those lines. would you agree with that concept, and i guess what would you see in the next generation platform like at nqx? >> the next generation nqx cannot just be an extension of where we are with the current fleet of aircraft. we can't afford to build a variety of different systems, each one specialized for the particular role and by the way,

technology allows us to bring many more capabilities together on a single platform, so the characteristics on believe will be important in the next generation remotely piloted aircraft uav are modularity, too rapidly allow changes in configuration that allow that to change mission tied to go from surveillance mission to a strike mission to a cargo mission, to a communications mission, you get the idea. the greater degree of autonomy. for a variety of reasons greater autonomy helps us in the survivability challenges when we are operating in the contest were denied aerospace and then the third characteristic that we are going to have to focus on to the degree more than we have with this first generation is the survivability. not necessarily in the context of the low observed ability that

may be one part of this, but also in terms of operating. there is the notion of the fraction systems where you produce sufficient numbers in a network or a honeycomb structure such that if part of them go away as a result of adversary actions the entire year network still covers, so those are what we need to zero in on as we move to the next generation remotely piloted aircraft. quickly with respect to the loyal we men that is a concept and operation that yeah, we ought to get advantage of the unmanned aerial vehicles to amplify corrected and sticks of manned aircraft and enhance them without adding a lot of cost. >> he was in a position to train, organize and a quick and

provide some he is looking to the future and the experience has been kind operating with what is currently available. to reinforce the so my instinct over the four decades is all the advantages fleeting. there will be countermeasures and we will have these kind of challenges, so it's good now that the air force in particular is trying to deal with the battle after next. >> thank you. bill snyder? >> hudson institute. i formerly served as the undersecretary of state when the zero original mtcr was negotiated and i supported the core aim of that agreement at that time because it focused on what i believed then and continue to believe is the decisis problem, namely preventing adversary is from being able to develop means of

delivery of weapons of mass destruction whether it is a declared war clandestine program. however, i've found that the invisible hand of technology has produced perverse consequences, and as a result, the manner in which the mtcr is now being executed is counterproductive through its original aspirations the focus has been taken off dealing with the wmd program in that there's no correlation between the denial of exports on uav or other unmanned systems and countries that have clandestine programs. it's an in discriminant effort that this serving mainly to prevent friendly allied countries from acquiring these capabilities and there's a lot of anecdotal evidence to support cut. moreover it is serving to create a parallel who will produce what

are basically a simple error vehicles the will be widely used. we've seen iraq under saddam hussein convert the manned aircraft into the unmanned platforms of its quite a simple thing. so i think that the whole approach to the mtcr needs to be re-evaluated so that our friends and allies can get the advantages of this equipment while we work diligently to deny access to this technology to countries with clandestine or declared wmd programs. >> efficient to crack on the comments i remember the valuable work in putting together the mtcr, and the question is what

with the world be like if instead of this problem plagued implementation of the mtcr which is one could freely export the best unmanned vehicles to any customers anywhere and i believe the world would be a lot less safe in that situation you would have a spread of the most advanced cruise missile technology. if you did not have careful restrictions on the unmanned vehicles and the technology that is developed in technologies like iraq described was very primitive and would be much

easier to deal with the technology the we are developing. consider the alternative future of the excising on the unmanned vehicles controls i don't think it would be a pretty future. >> of the missile proliferation is something that i focused on for many years, and i would argue actually that scud missiles has returned to the ballistic missile technologies more than anything else. what we are seeing today is countries are moving away from the technology is moving into the propellant from we are seeing that now in iran and we will probably see it to a greater extent in syria in the

future so there's a flip side to the argument by providing the technologies you really dissuade countries from taking the approach of developing this knowledge needed to develop new and better systems. we could argue about this over the years at some point, but i just wanted to prove that point out there. >> you want to try to renegotiate the missile technology control regime or try to skirt it and thereby erode its legitimate and still desired impact. and in addition to the will of the arguments richard brought up, reinforcing for the isr as a service member won a lot of our allies look upon the platform as that which they want to have, and i think anyone who's actually done this knows the platform is and the central part

of the process of four from an efficient parcel and l.i.e. by is the platform of pool exotic backend the we know is difficult to create is still a burden they have to meet as the surface could ease that burden and second. we have allies with whom we would like to share the technology for interest we have with them in common they also have other interests that are not in common with us. purely illustrative but let's use pakistan as an example we but like to enable them to do all sorts of surveillance on the western border. that would not be in our interest if there were used on the eastern border. a sale of that creates i think terry serious geopolitical tension whereas the surface, the use can be somewhat shaped. it might be very desirable outcome. >> david, did you want to have?

>> next to andrew, and i promise to get out of the front row. >> thank you. snyder i'd like to ask the panel what do we know and what lessons might we have learned about the uav technology of the experiences of china, israel and others who may have used the technology is already in where iraq was mentioned but i was wondering if the panelists might comment on the experience of other countries. >> i really don't have a good idea, and i can see in some other states like the israelis what i've been able to observe publicly falling we have used the same out lines, but i'm sorry i lack the detailed information. >> there's enormous interest the word in the united states is that we are ahead in some regards, but in others in the

one the was just touched upon and that is the reloading of the previously manned aircraft last generation aircraft we know that the chinese have taken that to heart and instead of sending all of their last generation aircraft to the boneyard like we tend to do the free loaded them and as a part of their integrated air defense architecture to create some very significant challenges for anyone who would want to and would complicate an air defense environment if such a scenario was to the gulf so they're capitalizing on the technology that excess in the reloading, using older systems which is pretty smart.

>> others that have used the services as to oppose to the uav hardware. israel is an example. they not only provide services to countries like the netherlands, germany or afghan operations and the israeli military contracts with the israeli firm that provides uav fee-for-service arrangements. other examples, turkey. here's something from david ignatius of the washington post. the united states has quietly created a joint centralized command center with turkey for surveillance from the surveillance drones flying over northern iraq. turkish officers look over the

shoulders of their u.s. counterparts that the imagery and are free to target suspicious activities when they see it. the united states doesn't pull the trigger it just shows pictures. other examples of this are southeast asia where the u.s. navy is working with a number of regional countries to establish a fusion center in singapore, and nato where the global talks are part of a new program where they direct the operation of the global talks with the participating countries all get unlimited access to the downlinks. so that at least from the uav perspective is what some of the other countries are doing. ..

>> it's a much -- some transfers of uav's are going to be consistent with some nonproliferation policy, and in particularly in the case of isr-type uavs which have so many benefits as outlined in our panel this morning and in this panel, and don't pose any credible threat of wmd delivery.

yes, if some of our even unfriendly states were to acquire these isr-type capabilities, we wouldn't welcome it, but still nevertheless the net benefit would probably be to our advantage on this because if the russians or the chinese were to have an increased isr capabilities, you know, that's not perhaps the end of the world for the united states. what is clear is we're not going to be able to afford as much isr-type uav's as we want. there's other countries out there that want to share some of this burden and at their own cost, and it seems to the extent the mtcr presents an obstacle to our allies getting these kinds of systems. it seems to undercut national security objectives. there could be cases where a

rent a predator makes sense particularly where the united states and the other country share objectives almost entirely. one can measure counterpiracy, counternarcotics that a country might be perfectly willing to rent u.s. uav services in such a situation, but israel, although it may be happy top rent out on this, it's impossible for me to imagine that israel would say, okay, but we'll allow the united states to control our regional isr in the middle east. >> anyone want to try to tackle that comment? >> i'll try. >> okay. >> the -- let me give you an analogy. space launch vehicles, what's wrong with selling space launch

vehicles to most other countries in the world? after all, they are not forthe delivery of weapons of mass destruction, therefore, putting satellites in orbit. well, the problem is that space launch vehicles have technology that is interchangeable with the technology of ballistic missiles, and that's also the problem with large uavs. what about the question of lack of interest in what mr. suchan called rent a predator where countries may agree to accept uav services for counterpiracy or counternarcotics but would otherwise want to have full control over the system for their own defensive purposes. well, that's still leaving open

the question of this huge infrastructure that's necessary to make the uav part of a system for connecting sensors to shooters. i describe the infrastructure, everything from satellites to e-3s to rc-135s to personnel on the ground communicating with each other through secure channels. are we going to sell that as well? >> well, i'd like to see a provocative comment followed up by a provocative answer. [laughter] >> well, right here. >> hi, general, thank you for

referring to one of our great british tabloids, "the guardian," and i feel i have no other option to possibly not defend, but point out facts from the paper. this is not a paper i'd even wrap my fish and chips in -- [laughter] but that's my own point of view. the article in which the article referred to with unmanned aircraft systems raised some very interesting points. the parol leal raised in "the guardian" starts with a quote which states, "it is well that war is so terrible, otherwise we would grow to fond of it." the paragraph explores the dichotomy of having the ability, as you refer to, the -- the ease of which you can fight at

distance, but it does state at the end, and i want to just put this out before i do ask a question. the discussion in this paragraph must be tempered, however, by the fact that the moral responsibility on every commander to reduce loss of life on both sides is clear. the use of unmanned aircraft prevents potential loss of lives and is thus, in itself, morally justified. i want to point out this document is worth reading, but the question i bring on, the moral justification and perception against those of which the unmanned systems are used, do you think as we're looking at strategy for future, the future strategy development by using these technologically advanced at-distanced systems that you actually possibly accentuate the problem? >> only if one allows adversary to manipulate the perceptions in

the manner of which their use has been distorted for all the reasons we've been talking about here. first, you -- i think that in my points that these perceptions exist regarding the degree of atonmy or control that has been handed over to machines. the point that i was trying to make, and you know, without taking a side regarding the legitimacy of the publication to which you referred to, it articulates a point of view that is out there, and that's why i brought it up is it is not correct that today the united states or any of our allies are

handing over control to a machine. that's my point. i believe that -- and that's why i also stated as we move into an area with greater and greater atonomy with these systems, we will run into some very significant and severe policy implications. i mean, i don't think anybody today is willing to hit a button and say come back in 24 hours and tell me where you put those 12 it ,000 pound weapons -- 2,000 pound weapons. first, this statement is that we have more people in the loop and i wouldn't trying to be humorous. we have more people in the loop regarding these remotely potted systems than we do in man systems. there is -- they are very human.

they happen to be assets that contribute to our advantage because it is frustrating for our adversaries because there's no way, in this current crowd, that they can affect the application, force, or oversight from the systems, so, of course, how are they going to respond? they are going to respond through an information mechanism to attempt to instill in the minds of the collective body politic that there's something wrong about using these systems. that's why i, you know, information is a key element of conflict, so my point is, yes, there's the potential that we need to be very sensitive to, and i would suggest that your military and government and ours is very sensitive to it, that's why as was discussed in the earlier panel, the people that

are operating these things are very much in the fight, and i can make the case that to a degree those that are present may not be because the folks who are operating these systems have more awareness of what's going on than someone who is restricted by only using the senses that he or she was born with. >> to kind of reenforce what david said on both points. one is this will get harder as the ocean of data said earlier becomes greater and how do you absorb it? in present tense, the other part of david's comment is very, very true. because you have this persistence and exquisite level of intelligence, it allows the decision maker in relative comfort with folks to challenge his thinking, for example, how long have you had capture the

target? how long you been looking at this? how long has the target been in this compound? what's the history on the compound? pull the history of everything we've ever seen at this place. what's the pattern of life here? what's the incoming weather look like? how much longer do i have to make a decision before i begin to lose the opportunity? i only have two weapons, a hell fire and gbu-12. give me the bug splat of a hell fire. what's the range for using the 7-k on the hell fire. okay, bring it around, bring it in from the north, let me see the bug splat from the north. okay, now show me the gub12 in the circle. okay, those things are possible only because we're doing it this way, and frankly any commander who is fighting this kind of war must go through what it is i just described and one of the guys down the table who is a lawyer, and making sure it is

absolutely consistent with the laws of armed conflict, with the principles of proportionality and so on, but i do admit that's going to be harder as this goes forward, and you have to depend a bit more on automation just because of the volume of data. >> yeah, i just want to add a little something to that. you know, we talked this morning, and in this session a little bit about the separation of the operators of these systems from the actual theater although they are observing it very closely. i haven't really heard too many people talking about the use of cruise missiles or ballistic missiles where you have someone in a silo pushing a button who is extremely removed from the battlefield, but doesn't see the results of what he's using. i'm not sure i see why there is such a growing concern. i mean, there should be a concern, but this labeling of uavs as something that's very abstract, i don't think it is.

i think it's less abstract than other weapons we've been threatening to use over the last generation. >> that's because the adversaries interjected this as a question in the minds as an attempt to limit the use of what is very, very effective. that's why it's a question. >> yeah, i'll stay with our british colleagues here. >> david ofton from the royal air force. i want to ask the panel for their view whether the usaf achieved the correct budget balance on the platforms and the analysis capability that needs to underpin them, and to that end, is the use of a number of caps as a metric somewhat unuseful? >> let me take that one on. [laughter] the answer is a complex one, but

i'll summarize it. the answer is yes, and i'll just be quite forward about this. yours truly is the one who four years ago we want to the chief of staff, the air force, when he was standing up, the first deputy chief of staff of intelligences and suggested with the logic this is not just the chief deputy challenge for intelligence, but also for reconnaissance for the reason that if you focus or use the traditional approach to aircraft, the focus tends to be on the aircraft when, in fact, if you put all the parts and pieces as general hayden said earlier, i separately require training, requirements, and focuses than the surveillance for the reason sans, but they have to be treated as a cohesive whole, as an integrated entity,

otherwise one loses the understanding that the vehicle that's flying is just a small part of the output or the effect of why you're flying it in the first place. what we did was put together this organization to highlight the fact, and i don't like the term back end because it's really the desire to output of this entire enterprise, and that is information or knowledge, so i would tell you that the united states air force has done a very good job in highlighting the importance of the distributed commonground system which is a horrible acronym, but, you know, try to explain that to your brother, sister, wife, whatever, if they didn't have knowledge of it, but it is, in fact, an information fusion system that takes the raw data that comes from these platforms and then

analyzes it and turns it into usable information in a very, very rapid way and gets it out to the soldier, airman, or marine in the space who needs it. yeah, we have the right focus in the context of a little bit different. i mean, it's difficult dealing with the military because the military tends to be very, very conservative and set in their perspectives, but, you know, we have to move beyond platform focus into enterprise focus, and that's what you're getting at. it goes back to, and let me stop there because i'll go on forever, but the second part of your question is regarding caps for orbit as a measure of merit, and the answer is an unqualified whole-hearted no. they are not the measure of or the best measure of effectiveness to determine isr

sufficiency. just like what was shown on one of the charts. the soldier, marine, and airman don't care about how many orbits are flying about, but their situation being improved by what's going on in this enterprise, so, you know, we work very hard to try to get people to get off the notion of counting orbits. i'll give you a very good case in point. right now, the air force is fielding a system known as a wide area one surveillance pod set. everyone's focus has been focused on full-motion video. mq-1s mq-9s and ravens have a single data feed for motion video. well, today, this surveillance podset when put on an aircraft

can automatically look over a very, very wide area about the size of a small village, and then transmit directly to users ten different video images and with a bit of processing, up to 65, the next variant sends out over 100 different images. they carry this on one mq-9. an orbit with an mq-9 that has this kind of a system on it is very much different in terms of output than an mq-9 or other remotely powered aircraft that does not. that's the issue is we need to get more focused on output opposed to counting input measures or numbers of systems. now, this has a very tangible result because right now there's a department of defense investing in buying 15 more orbits worth of mq-9s at the

cost of $4.5 billion and more people requirements, but if you bought the systems that would increase the capacity or capability of what we already own, you could significantly reduce that bill and the number of people required to use them, not to mention reducing the footprint. does that answer your question? >> yeah, it does. [inaudible] [inaudible] >> i know where you are going. no, it doesn't cotray.com it. -- contradict it. what the house of secretary of defense decided to do is something different. >> quickly at a gloss to reenforce what david said. i don't know what the right answer is. i don't know, and in terms of what you need to make that forward platform as successful as can be. when somebody says we're going to double the number of orbits,

okay, and my answer was why? i mean, we really don't know whether, you know, an increase in orbits should lead to an increase to the number of folks working the information or a geometric increase or in fact if the informs collapses on itself that increased orbits lead to a lighter analytic workload. i mean, i think that's unlickly, but i think it could be possible in some circumstances, but we don't have the formula. we don't know because we never operated these scales before. >> okay. we have about five more minutes, and let me see how many questions are out there. one, two -- i'll ask both you and you to ask your questions consecutively, and then we'll have the panel response. is there a third one back

there? yeah, okay, one, two, three with the questions and then we'll have the panelists respond. >> just as a comeback on the best organizational approach towards this. i just throw out that perhaps what we see are the tightening of a decision cycle and all the tools enabling us to tighten a decision cycle and that is largely enabled by a lot of information technology, so jumping to yet another hat you've worn, general hayden, the question gets with are we associated with the ain't to do in air with the air vehicles, really some of this ability to tighten this decision cycle through information technology which then gets into how far sus cyber reach, and is that the key seal to all of this? >> another question over here. >> rama ramad from the

international red cross speaking in my own personal capacity. the discussion on uavs brings to light two broader trends in warfare and the law that governs it, and the most obvious is the trend towards remote war fighting, and one of the many issues that come out of that trend is well, what is the status of the pilot that is flying these uavs from nevada or some other place that is far from the theater of active hostilities, and we had this discussion a little bit earlier at the end of the earlier session, and for me it's very difficult to see how a uniformed member of the armed forces of a state that is piloting a uav and either directly launching attacks and providing tactical information to assist in a strike would not be directly participating hostilities and

could -- would be in any way protected against attacks, so in my mind that he would be a lawful target, and -- >> [inaudible] >> not only that, but in addition to that just like a soldier sort of asleep in the barrack is not only related to the time they are participating, there could be civilian collateral damage in a strike against that individual. now, the only way that i see that we could limit that is to say, well, nevada or wherever else the pilot is, well, that's not the battlefield, right? there's no active hostilities and the battlefield is afghanistan, iraq, wherever the active hostilities are taking place and that brings the second trend which is the notion of a limitless battlefield or a global battlefield, and these

two trends taken together sort of reenforce each other to have some personally serious consequences i think in two regards. one is with respect to civilian populations that are found simply by chance next to or in proximity to a lawful individual target and whatever state, whatever territory that attack takes place, and then a second consideration is that the relations between states and, you know, the notion of the global battlefield and implications for sovereignty, but my question is to what extent do you think there is sufficient attention being paid to the potential precedent that's being set with these two trends and the push towards a more global and open battlefield? >> thank you, and then one last question in the back.

>> two-parter here, hopefully fairly brief. general talked about the moving from the platform to enterprise. i'm cureout about what metric you may be able to use if not for orbits, whether it's kind of volume of photos or video feeds, just what might serve as another method rick for that capability -- metric for that capability, and then general hayden, you talked about the data avalanche and the reck sit sort of increase in personnel to handle some of the analysis. do we have a sense of how many personnel are involved for the distributed common grounds system and on the sort of data analytics and what's that projected to be going forward particularly given the budget tightening we have? >> okay. we have about a minute left, but -- [laughter] i do want the speakers to have an opportunity to respond to the three questions posed, so or

three sets of questions i should say. starting with general hayden and move down the line. >> i take the rici one and dave can continue with the rest. >> sure. >> great questions raised, one we are aware of and are addressed throughout the current war and we have not added the spice to the stew you created with an enemy who rejects the standard of geneva and makes it complex and makes decision we had to make during my time in government very difficult because that was unprecedented areas, and so i don't have a good answer, but these are legitimate questions that mature nations should discuss. i will tell you kind of a personal prejudice on my part, and come toed headquarters to talk about matters, and we had a

very adult dialogue. it is not useful for other nations to cut across their arms us americans because we cannot afford to admire the issues. we are involved in the conflict and have to make decisions as imperfect as they might be and rather than merely criticizing us for not adhering to some standard to recognize some things have changed and it rears us to re-- requires us to readdress what constitutes appropriate behavior among states. >> real quick because i found your articulation of those questions fascinating. i would just throw out there that limitless battle space and global conflict is nothing new. it's not been brought on by remotely powered aircraft. it's gone on in terms of information. it's had a direct effect. it goes on with respect to operations in cyberspace. it goes on with respect to economic actions, so there's

nothing new here, it's just perhaps another manifestation of globalization if you will. with respect to the answers on what are we looking at? yeah, we went through some extensive approaches to how do we characterize the output measures, and quite frankly, the answer is that's how you do it. what is it that is of interest that you're flying these aircraft for? is it for video, weapons deliver ri capacity? is it for collection of signals, and the output measures are what you want to tie to your measure of the effectiveness whatever it might be, and we have one. i'll talk to you about it offline, it's too complex for this. >> that's part of the problem. it's very complex when you look at the variety of different types of information that can be

collected, so how do you do that in a nice tight concise way as a decision maker? that's why the fault is to count orbits. we have to move beyond that. >> richard? >> well, i hope the output of this wonderful uav capability is not the delivery of chemical or bilogical weapons. uavs are the most efficient way of delivery such weapons, at least a factor of ten more lethal than other alternatives, so as with a space launch vehicles, the united states ought to provide services, share the benefits with other countries, but not provide the hardware. >> we -- i apologize for running over a little bit, but i would like to thank our three panelists for very thought-provoking and insightful ideas and proposals and