the streets. much more people arrested and tortured. hezbollah telling everyone in the lebanon and the region, this is very important. because they are going to lose the popularity in the region if the double standard that our existence is much more important than the lives of the people. this is definitely not something they would like to convey, baa they have to. because they have no choice. another thing that is now becoming very obvious to people in lebanon, especially for the people who are critical of hezbollah, but more so the people who are in the middle. the shiite community and other communities, there are a lot of people who are hezbollah supporters, but tend to be critical of hezbollah. now they are realizing, i think this is the main thing for the people in lebanon and the region

in general, all of the violent and aggressive methods they have been used when they are obvious -- are on the opposition, all of the aggressive military violence has been that effect as the peaceful demonstrations and methods that are becoming more effective and toppling dictatorships and regimes. in tunisia and egypt, peaceful demonstrations were more efficient. even in syria, the word peaceful, the demonstrators, people are dying with the word peaceful, peaceful. this is the main slogan for the syrians. it's not just something that they created while demonstrating. this is parter their political strategy. i don't know if you agree. but it's peaceful demonstration

deficitly what they want to do. whoever is going to be coming, they will carry peaceful methods throughout. i don't they will open any front, or other people in the region, it's going to be peaceful. this is a steal. hezbollah is worried about that. peaceful method are more effective than their own aggressive and violent and military methods. basically it is the situation. also the indictment that is coming hopefully very soon. nobody knows when it is going to be published. but this will also add to the fears of hezbollah. because so far before the syrian uprising happens, hezbollah didn't care about the sdl indictments. even if they were going to be

accused, no one would be able to arrest any hezbollah member. no one would be able to do anything. hezbollah and syria agreed not to cooperate with the tribunal, because it's an israeli-american tool to defeat hezbollah. now it is different. people have been saying -- i've read analysis saying even if the regime doesn't fall, they will do anything to protect themselves. they will go and cooperative with the people who would be able and have the capacity to protect the regime, the international community, the u.n., the international organization. so they might actually cooperative when it comes to the tribunal. maybe they wouldn't when it comes to the existence as a regime. the alliance with hezbollah might be sacrificed for this. when it comes to the tribunal or other matters.

hezbollah knows they are important. when it comes to their existence as a regime, also they might be sacrificeed. i also want to add one more thing before i conclude. there's a real concern in the syrian people and in the region from lebanon to egypt to tunisia everywhere when there is kind of hypocrisy. why has the u.s. and west so far taken decisive stances as it did vis-a-vis, mubarak and others. it is kind of -- this is a serious issue. because i think the west and mainly the u.s. is created

enemies inside the syrian, within the syrian opposition figures. because they feel and they are totally convinced of that. i don't know if you agree. i've heard many people saying the u.s. is protecting the regime. because israel wants to maintain the regime. and the u.s. wants to have and protect israel. and this is definitely not a good thing. people do not -- the u.s. is definitely not credible now for the people and the street in that position. they don't understand. this is a prodemocracy movement. this is a peaceful movement. against a dictatorship that's an enemy to the u.s. what's going on? they need to be told immediately, something has to be done, something has to change immediately, and otherwise there will be a big problem afterwards when this is over and the u.s. will look like very hypocritical, not only the

syrians, everywhere in the region. this is nation. i think i will conclude now and definitely sure that you will be asking a lot of questions about that. so i will leave the floor to you. >> thank you very much, hanin. this is a good segue to the remarks of our next speaker. i would just observe that our principal baring some further explanation seems to be we side with our enemies and our hostile to friends or potential friends. this is very mysterious at the moment. but i think our next speaker maybe able to explain this. our next speaker is -- >> no, professor. >> -- is lee smith. lee is a fellow here at the hudson institute, but also an

editor with "the weekly standard" and has written for many publications. still does. he publishes practically weekly in "the weekly standard "and is the author of a fine book published last year "the strong horse power of politics and the clash of arab civilizations." >> thanks, steve. i don't know if i can explain i in the entirety, but i can venture a guess writing in the last few weeks, i think it's more than certainly on the surface this is what it looks like that we have been siding with our enemies and that we have been helping our -- or rather damaging our friends around the region, both within different regimes and different opposition movements. and i think certainly worth asking why it seems to be that preserving the asset regime is a vital u.s. interest.

why protecting the regime is a vital u.s. interest. if you look at the series of statements made by the administration, you see that they have been essentially protecting the asset regime. one the first statements that came out of the white house was the president when he -- this was his first statement, i believe, when he first -- in his first sentence, he warned the regime against blood shed. and his next sentence, he admonished the opposition to refrain from violence. it's outrageous. not least because the one opposition movement that the united states has thrown it's weight behind in the last four months happens to be the one group that went to weapons almost immediately, namely the libyan rebels, and the fact that the syrian opposition is entirely unarmed and peaceful and has remained so, the idea that the administration is warning them to avoid blood shed

is remarkable. there were a number of other statements that came out. there were a number of other statements that came out of the administration. some of them with attritions, some of them not. if you remember when the secretary of state said, she was quoting lawmakers from both sides of aisle who described westernized president assad as reform minded. making reforms. when she was called on this she rolled it back saying i didn't say this. i had quoted other people who were saying that. it is proprostous, it's still what the administration expects. it's what it keeps talking about. for assad to keep to the reforms that he's promised. as he's rolled out tanks, syrian cities, the administration is still talking about assad reforming. the notion that this president who is incapable of spiritual remedy is somehow going to

reform his political system now is preposterous. why is the white house protecting the regime? the reason is -- actually this goes back to be fair to the obama administration, the romance with damascus goes back it's lasted for entirety, not just bashar, but predecessor as well. if you look at the statements of of different officials and envoys and diplomats who have visited with damascus who have spoken with this regime since the '70s, they come back with the statements that assad is a great man -- not a great man, a man who keeps to his word. you can do business. what these different promises that the former syrian president supposedly kept to to take u.s. policymaking in the region easier is unclear. they came back and talked about what a tough bargain, what a

tough negotiator. there are even u.s. diplomats that boasted he wouldn't let them go to the bathroom for hours. it's astonishing what they believed about the regime. we saw a brief rest from this with the bush administration. this was only after people have to remember this was only after the syrians were believed responsible for the assassination of hariri. it was only at that point that the bush white house believed that this regime was incapable of remedy. they went through the ambassador and tried to isolate damascus, without much success, as i think even people in the administration will acknowledge. nonetheless, the solution was not to go 180 and reach out and try to engage that regime. the reason that they have tried to engage the regime is two main reasons. the peace process is essential to the obama's middle strategy.

in fact, it is the obama administration's middle east strategy. the point is not just to -- where most administrations and policymakers understand the peace process as a way to get all of the other arab states on board and a way to bring on all of the other arab states, the obama administration rather understands this as a way to go over the heads of arab rulers and to win more of the affection of arab and muslim people. that this is what -- this is the purpose of the cairo speech. the purpose of the cairo speech was to avoid -- not to avoid, but to go around the way u.s. policymakers typically work. what is to do business with arab states. this is how diplomacy work. states do business with other states. what the obama cairo speech was about is going over the heads of arab regimes for better or worse, and for making the case

that the united states would win back or win the affection of the arab or muslim policies. not their regimes, but societies. and the way to do this was to -- it's not necessarily to win, adjust, and comprehendive peace, was at least to show the good faith of the white house. that is why the peace process is central to the administration. because it is about reaching out to arab and muslim masses. the subsidiary point to that was if the administration would manage to make room on the peace process, regarding the syrian track, what that would do is put distance between syria and iran. the administration of the not entirely insensitive to the fact that iran was washington's key strategic concern. but to talk about or -- but to

deal with iran, that was the instrument that this administration believed was most useful. the peace process. the peace process by losening the syrian's somewhat from the iranian accent by showing the syrians how much there was to gain from partnering with the united states and from jumping sides as egypt had done with the camp david accord had jumped from the soviet side to the u.s. side, this is what the u.s. meant to do with the syrians. now what we've seen over the last month and a half, since the middle of march, what we've known all along, is that this regime has very significant, strategic interest of its own, regarding the peace process and regarding it's alliance with the iranians. we saw this for -- we saw this during the entirety of the bush administration. people within the beltway,

people -- europeans, arab officials were warning the bush administration, you need to bring in the syrians. why are you isolating the syrians, engaging the syrians is a bad move. someone needs to show the syrians exactly what they can have. they need to be persuaded it is their best interest to jump sides. the fact that the bush administration is not doing that is a major flaw. well, that is what the obama administration came to office to do. so show the syrians it was in their interest to jump sides. what we've seen over the last month and a half again is that this regime will not reform. regimes who's snipers are picking off it's own children are not apt to make peace with their own populations, never mind the state of israel. it's preposterous that the administration is still looking at the regime as capable of

reform. the reason they are is because there is no other middle strategy. there is nothing else they have going on. there's nothing moving on the palestinian track, aside from hamas-fattah unity deal. which is also bad for the administration, very bad for the peace process. when that happened, you can see the syria track became -- will become even more important. i think it's going to be very difficult for this administration to find a way to cut the syrians lose. i don't think think are really protecting the syrians. because they are still an enfattuation. we can't do business anymore. i just want to say that the same thing happened in 2009, june 2009 after the iranian elections. excuse me.

when the green movement took to the streets and the administration was very slow to react. as someone explained in an article in this week's new yorker, the former administration official explained to the reporter ryan liza in this week's "new yorker" the reason the administration was so slow to react was because they still wanted to engage the iranians. that's exactly what it going on today with the administration's relationship with damascus. it is still looking for a way to engage the iranians. it's not about -- it's about the administration's middle east strategy. that's all they have right now. at that, i'll conclude and open it up for questions. >> thank you very. i'm going to make a couple of observations and questions. i think our panelist can feel free to poke each other. i'll start with the last point.

which was raised by hanin, how do understand american policy. and it is -- it is a great mystery. but i would hope that people in lebanon and syria and elsewhere might be persuaded that it is a mystery. that it requires an understanding which we don't exactly have. and there are two aspects to this. one is there has been the extraordinarily long indulgence over many administrations in the notion that syria was a) very important, and b) a good and useful and productive relationship with them and for the region as a whole was just around the corner.

and this predates any proposed views, israel questions this predates any serious expression on the side of the israelis for the whole of the deal with the israelis. it goes back to the '70s, '80s, '90s, the number of u.s. secretaries of state who have stood on the tarmac at damascus airport, in between visits to one or another of the assad's is extraordinary. probably said some kind of -- u.s. diplomatic effort. it looks as if the syrian regime managed to bewitch a whole generation or two generations of american policymakers and analyst. i use the term to which it is advisedly. it just looked like that. so it requires for some serious student of history an

explanation. but it should be -- that, i think, should be stress. this is not a new thing that somehow shows perhaps either our particular -- some very great skill on part of the syrians. i would say also but that it has been straightened under this administration for the reason that we said plus. the cairo speech is really a remarkable speech. because it was not about the middle east at all. expect incidentally. it was really about our relations with the muslim world as a whole. all 1.3 billion muslims. and somehow -- and that's clear ambitious of that speech is somehow to restore relationship or create a relationship between

us and all of the worlds muslims and somehow or another, everything else hangs on that, or derives from that. i think that's probably the greatest explanation for the preoccupation with the israeli palestinian things. it's the notion that somehow all of the worlds muslims really care about that terribly much. if you can solve that in america's relations with the worlds muslims that would improve. that may seem far too global for people living in downtown beirut. but i think there's a very powerful side to that. the other thing i wanted to say and this leads to the questions, the centrality of syria is the kind of dogma in almost every account of events in the middle east. it's repeatedly endlessly in the newspaper accounts of today's

events. the centrality of syria, the importance and stability of syria and so so forth. if you open you'll see it used continually. the question that i pose is really how central is syria? and if it is so central to the region, what is the region going to do with regard to syria? there are two large players in the region beside outside parties. namely the turks and iranians. i would be very -- i'm sure the audience would be interested in the reflections on how the present dynamic may draw them in, what the calculations are, so forth. let me start from one particular situation now. and that is the situation in daraa. over the past few -- that's where it began. and that's where the regime

seems to think it could end it. now daraa is -- it's not a village, but it's only 75,000 people. it's not that far from damascus, but it's not -- it's on the border. it's not in the heartland of syria. why is this taken on so much importance and why have they decided to bring in tanks to deal with -- i mean it's horrible enough that when they are shooting people with rifles and machines guns. but tanks? why -- how is -- what's their thinking and what is the thinking of neighbors? >> well, i think the question about daraa. it is really heartbreaking to watch the situation unfold in daraa, and watch the international community even

with the culmination of the developments. and a few years ago in a sort of small tv program, i was interviewed about syrian and the change. i said that one day they will be able to, you know, take the streets and fight peacefully for our freedom. and that the main goal will be for us on the outside and our role will be to shed light on the developments so that we prevent the terms of another hamas. and, you know, which -- the hamas is a city in 1982 that is destroyed by sad forces because they tried to crush the rebellion in the city. there are about 200 people. that is true. they ended up destroying half of the city and killing 30,000 people in order to get the 200 sort of which we agree are terrorists. you know? no one denied it at the time.

no one despites that at the time. but killing 30,000 people to stop 200 terrorists is really, you know, not the situation that she wants. the reream is using from the begin, and the reason why he said they spoke about infull traitors and armed gangs rang all different sort of alarm bells. this is exactly what you are afraid of. by throwing the accusation you would end up having a situation like this where the government would move in full force against the pockets of resistance and justify it. so we were very clear from the very beginning to try to document the type of movements we have on the state to show that there are unarmed and to show that they come from different sort of backgrounds and to be very clear and about getting the information out that

could get possible. so the international community realize what they are dealing with here and the true nature of the movement and not fall into the regime rhetoric. of course we cannot make the willingly blind seats. you know, if there was some people in the world who are willingly blind who want to see assad as a reformer for whatever reason, i don't think we can make them see. you know, there is a situation that is behind us. but -- >> actually since -- they may not be willingly blind. they may just need an ophthalmologist. >> unfortunately the ophthalmologist himself seems to need an ophthalmologist. we are talking about a serious situation in daraa. the city has been under siege for several weeks now. and over the last week, in fact, the siege was complete. no electric, no water, no food

in and out, no medical supplies, and tanks invading, gunfire, bodies torn in the street according to eyewitness reports. for one simple reason, when there is no electricity, you cannot charge your camera or cell phones which were used to take any of the images that they are seeing. there are, you know, logistic problems along the lines. but we still get some images every now and then and still can communicate sometimes with some eyewitnesses on the ground up until recently. we get very horrifying tails. it's very difficult to be able to corroborate everything but on the bases of what has happened before, we can say the situation is definitely scary and the fact that you might be witnessing a massacre basically while we continue debating the final

points of, you know, what americans sort of ideological interests are is -- >> can you talk about this in a way that the proper reference point is here nearly 30 years ago in hamas. they are preparing another hamas for -- as a demonstration lesson. >> i think the idea is that they chose daraa because it can be isolated easily and they want to send them a message to the rest of the city and population that we are not going to put up with protests. it's interesting to see that the few details we got to see the protesters were throwing stones and rocks at the tanks. they are not exactly being coward. it's essential to realize even as the intervention has taken place in daraa and hundreds of arrests are also happening and many suburbs of damascus and

homes and, you know, the protest movement keeps field and numbers. there was still people protesting in other suburbs that the security presence was lightened because of over commitment elsewhere. and people were still willing to defy. and people still got out in numbers. when they realized they were regimed by the army, they said the army wants to come, we'll meet them with our bare chests. we are in a situation where people have to realize the majority of the population are really young. the movement is based on youth. young people when they break the barrier of fear, they, irrational about it. let's get it this way. there are going to be afraid of marxism. marxism is a very sort of emotional part of the culture. once it gets endorsed, everybody

had a certain attachment. fine. we die for freedom. why not? we are tired. we are tired of being lied to. when every time a syrian official come out and says look the infiltrators and the crisis of trust deepens, our situation hardens, our demand escalates, more people added to the blacklist. we don't want that situation anymore. :more people added to the blacklist. we cannot stand it. it will not be contained. it is quite did for a few weeks or days, it will be inflamed again -- quieted down for a few weeks or days, it will be inflamed again. this will end the way you wanted to end, with the regime toppled, with bashar al-assad

in prison or in london, in a flat, attending royal weddings. there is no other solution. bashar al-assad asked to go. -- has to go. that is it. >> thank you. this is great. i would like to go back to the first question. why is serious central -- syria central? there is something everyone should take into consideration and actively considered. you are talking about the peace process and why the u.s. wants or might be expecting syria to be part of the peace process. i do not think syria would be interested in peace for a very obvious reason for me. i do not know if you will agree with me. i think conflict is very

important in projecting the regime -- protecting and maintaining the regime. they survive on conflict. the emergency law allowed the regime to arrest people, to create a state of fear where everyone was not allowed to act freely -- is not allowed to act freely. the state emergency is based on complex. that is why they support costs -- hamas. that is why they support the iranians. i do not think the regime is interested in peace. this is someone that everyone should reconsider. think about whether syria is tea or not. it is keep it is, -- it is key to islam. it is definitely important as an ally. we either want to play a major role in the region, and they have -- they either want to play a major role in the region, and

they have, but they are not now, or they are just wanting to keep some bargaining chips for negotiation. that is it. i do not think they can actually use these chips anymore. that is my point of view. >> i think that is probably true. it is actually forgotten that there was a deal proposed between israel and syria, from which the assad's with true -- assad's withdrew. they never wanted to settle because of the advantages of having the conflict continue. >> i entirely agree with you, hanin. it is one of the problems that neither this administration or many before it, who have tried to drag syria into the process, understood.

bring syria to the table only strengthens their hand -- bringing syria to the table only strengthens their hand. it gives them prestige. we have been talking about this a lot. ammar and hillel, maybe someone in the audience bono -- my question over the last few weeks has been, why do we continue to talk about what happens after this? there are people in this city who should contemplate this. the syrian regime, the assad regime has painted itself as an adversary of the united states. it helps to facilitate the flow of islamist fighters into iraq, killing hundreds of thousands of u.s. troops -- killing hundreds, thousands of u.s. troops and killing allies.

this is clearly an enemy of the united states. why do we care what happens after? it is not clear to me when people say -- of course, i believe it is true that things can always be worse. no one has made a good case to me what can be worse than this particular regime. at least two more secret nuclear facilities with chemical warheads pointed at tel aviv, with its support for hezbollah, hamas, and other terrorist outfits, with its alliance with iran, what could possibly look worse? a regime that really gets to the nuclear bomb? that actually fires those warheads on israel? the only thing that has restrained the mask is has been outside pressure on damascus -- has restrained damascus is outside pressure on

damascus. >> this is one of the problems. for a long time, asked about the alternatives, people were paintings and areas that the situation would be worse and worse -- people were painting scenarios that the situation would be worse and worse. i have been working in syria for many years as an activist. among my colleagues, i am not going to necessarily be elected, but i am a voice. [unintelligible] you know, considering his background. it is really -- they seem to identify as a christian syrian -- me as a christian syrian.

it is really ridiculous to have to defend ourselves at this stage. what is more ridiculous is that about thee ask me, protests. civil society has been decimated. the only place we can breathe freely, relatively, it is the mosque. all imams are appointed by the state and they have to sort of total line of the state. those who do not our immediate a removed or go through the security hell that -- are immediately removed or go through a security hell. we -- it seems there is a kind of craziness going around that,

if you are religious in any way, shape, or form, you are an extremist, especially if you are islam. the majority of the people are religious, with their christian, muslim, sunni, shia -- thyey are christian, muslim, sunni, shia. a liberal like me would wish the situation otherwise. religiosity is still an important part of the fabric of arab societies. let us not conclude religiosity is extremist. this is something people have to really understand. if you're looking for alternatives to assad, the alternatives have been staring

in your face for years -- the dissidents, the opposition, the moderates, the liberals -- they have a very rational tone that is pro-peace, pro-west. many people say this is tactical and will change once someone comes to power. for 10 years, we have been consistent in our message. our own vested interest lies in developing our country and building universities, not to get into war with israel. we are not capable of waging that kind of a war at the risk of the future of our country and at the risk of more and more destruction to the next generation. we're not interested in that. there are diplomatic means for getting this done.

syrian diplomacy can work. at a last-minute, they balked. we won't balk. we want -- we are committed to the diplomatic process. we want to get this. we have support in the international community. we know a lot of israelis want to get us back. we are not worried about that. what we're worried about is developing our country. we're worried about getting rid of the only obstacle in our path towards a better future, which is this small slice of people that use a sectarianism, conflict -- uses sectarianism and conflict to keep themselves in power. the days of assad are numbered. people need to snap out of it.

i do not know how delusional they will continue to be after all these attempts to make them see the light. you have people being killed in cold blood in the streets. they are killing children, for crying out loud, openly. that has been recorded very clearly for everyone to see. no one is disputing the veracity of these individuals. everybody says this is true. we know it is happening. we are sorry. well, snap out of it. we wanted to go beyond sorry. we want you to embrace the alternative. >> what to the people in the administration speak to you? >> i have not had a single meeting with an administration official since obama came to office. there were some people who did. the language so far has been consistent with what you have seen with the statements out of the white house.

we are aware of the situation. we condemn violence. we hope assad will reform. it is annoying. >> we have a technical definition for american action, greeted largely through the libyan crisis, which is it -- created largely through the libyan crisis, which is a humanitarian crisis. it is killing children ordinarily an element of that -- i am wondering, is killing children ordinarily an element of that? >> i would interpret that as a green light to avoid using fixed-winged aircraft. if use around towns with tanks, then that is fine -- you surround towns with tanks, then that is fine. >> they used shoppers already in

the conflict in -- choppers already in the conflict in daraa. we have had reports of bombardments. i would not put it past them. they got into a situation where the international community, especially after the failure to issue a clear indictment, that they feel encouraged, they feel empowered to do anything they want. unless the international community adopts a language of sanctions and implements sanctions against by charles ko'd and his regime -- against bashar al-assad and his regime -- >> we hear that there will be another -- that there will be sanctions that will focus not

on assad. >> i would not agree. i also do not see the u.s. having much impact by itself at this stage. the eu is important. here is where the money is, -- europe is where the money is, the bank accounts, deutsche bank, whatever. we have been investigating that for a while. an asset freeze by europeans and sanctions by europeans would definitely have an impact on the situation. >> to you guys know exactly where the money is? -- and do you guys know exactly where the money is? >> we have a lot of information. >> have you published that information? >> no. >> would you? [laughter] >> i'm game.

>> show people what is going on. show them where the money is. >> i am ok with the idea. [laughter] >> let me return a little bit to the subject of lebanon. on the issue of what might succeed, as a person known to worry about the influence of the muslim brotherhood in various places, i must confess one place i do not is in syria. that is for relish -- a rather cruel reason. what happened 30 years ago was that the regime suppressed islam. far more effectively than anyone else has ever done, certainly more effectively than the egyptians. therefore, if one does not have to worry about that, one has

assad to thank. it is not a current issue. the issue on lebanon -- if i understood you, in a different context, you had suggested that lebanon is the bellwether for syria and that signs were promising for syria. is this because hezbollah is frightened? well-known scout leaders -- calculators oflat interest are withdrawing their support from syria. that is a promising sign. as far as lebanon itself is

concerned, should there be a regime change in syria, assad falls, let's say there is a regime which is broadly representative of the divisions within the country, whciich ammar described, important communities of various religions, what blessings or curses might that bring to lebanon, in your opinion? >> let me start with the bad news, then i will get to the good news. in my opinion, many people in lebanon are concerned about the reaction if this regime reaches the threshold or is about to fall, when it becomes a matter

of existence for the regime and for hezbollah. there are many concerns that something might happen in lebanon in order to divert attention or to link lebanon to syria, and some people also are afraid that the front between hezbollah and israel might be opened. i think it is too early for this to happen, because, so far, it is not necessary. has a lot does not want to initiate a war with israel now -- hezbollah does not want to initiate a war with israel now for the simple reason that they cannot -- they can maintain their support base as long as they are protecting their community. initiating award does not protect their community -- a war does not protect their community. their communities do not want another war. they might accept another war if israel started it.

it has a law initiates -- if hezbollah and she is, that is the end of all community support -- if hezbollah initiates it, that is the end of all community support. there are very aware of that. many people do not want another -- they are very aware of that. many people do not want another war. i do not think the conflict would actually divert attention. a clash between hezbollah and other factions -- there is no equal rights. this is far fetched. theirthey have to weigh existence, hezbollah, vis a vis their community support, they might actually do something dangerous. they would have to be pushed to

the extreme to do that. so far, i do not think that is the situation. also, something happened with hamas, a very similar scenario when they launched rockets and bombs to the -- and bombed the bus. this was also an attempt to divert attention from syria. it did not work. israel did not react the way they were probably expected to react. this is another reason i do not think it will happen in lebanon. the good -- we'll go now to the good news. i really believe that a chance within -- a change within the syrian regime, a weakened regime, or the fall of the regime, would weaken hezbollah, would weaken its allies, and

that would be a boost for others who have not interfered in other ways. they are getting a lot of accusations by the regime and by hezbollah of funding and sending arms to others. i think it is a good idea not to do anything right now. this is dangerous. you cannot make strong statements unless you are a journalist. and it is ok. [laughter] >> i'm not sure it is safe for journalists, either. >> it is not. but journalists are expressing opinions. as a politician, it is very critical. i think that it is good for some not to make strong statements. they are aware that any regime

change will definitely be a boost. the ideal scenario would be a liberal government with liberal intellectual activists. even if that is not the case. even if it is more sunni, not necessarily muslim brotherhood -- i do not believe that the muslim brotherhood will be the alternative. no matter what, it is better than this regime for anyone in lebanon. >> right here? by the way, please identify yourself. >> thank you to our panelists. this is very interesting. i am from the lebanon foundation. i want to bring you back to the administration and its policy. i want to say that i agree with a lot of what has been described here.

you do not need to take my word for it. you simply need to read the front page of "the new york times" and "the washington post." do any of you believe that -- last week, there was a different tipping point.an there is the announcement of possible designation by the administration, more willingness to see this go to the u.n. security council in geneva. have we reached the point where the administration is getting on board and head of the game, or at least catching up -- getting onboard ahead of the game or at hing up?tcin there are some who have been

relatively quiet on what is happening. has that changed since the start? >> that is a great question. have we gone through a tipping point? it is hard to say. one thing that we keep seeing coming out in comments from the administration -- and they say, we do not know how much leverage we have. we feel our leverage is limited. i think that is less representative of how much leverage the administration really has, than how much the administration has already limited itself. if you read this article in the "new yorker" about leading from behind, if the government perceives its role, its international role as leading from behind, it is, by

definition, going to perceive itself as limited in the amount of leverage it can exercise. i would like to think it is otherwise. i do not know exactly how it plays out. i am not sure how much the administration is responding to what is actually happening in syria from day to day or how much it is responding to domestic criticism, or how the the rest of the international community -- or how the rest of the international community is moving. these sanctions were supposed to come up before tomorrow, before friday, but, as far as i know, they have not been announced yet. >> if there was going to be a turning public that would lead to something very powerful -- turning point that would lead to something very powerful, the clearest sign would be for us to go to the europeans and say, we need you -- that would be

leading from behind, but it would be leading. the leverage that can be supplied by sanctions seems to be more concentrated in the hands of the europeans. >> i agree. what i want to see from his administration is a clear criticism of assad's own handling of the situation. do not keep him above the fray. he is the problem. he is the heart of the problem. i want to see a clear description of the regime as being family based, rather than tiptoeing around it. >> whether it is the regime itself, whether it is the syrian ambassador to washington -- everyone should get the idea that the united states is no longer going to goingthat -- going to lend that regime

prestige. canink the more clear thit be and the more clearly the regime gets the picture, this is where the united states is -- >> once that is formulated by the united states, that the problem is with assad and the way he is handling this, that this is no longer acceptable, that this kind of violence is not acceptable at all, and not be equitable -- equivocable about this -- we need to have that kind of clarity on this situation. frankly, i do not think assad gets how much trouble he is in . -- in. until you have clear sanctions, -- you can implement sanctions

that could really hurt the assad's, without having to go to the un. the u.n. might be a tough nut to crack because of the syrian centrality and whatever, which still plays in the minds of many politicians around the world. they will not taken issue on the position. it is really -- i think the united nations security council is aware of the situation. there will have irresolution at -- they will have a resolution at some point. the european union, in cooperation with the united states, could do a lot of damage to the assad's. >> i would like to answer.

>> doug, hold on to your question. >> quickly, about lebanese newspapers and media outlets -- a lot of lebanese media outlets are owned and funded by politicians. they are being very quiet. those who are affiliated with a party or politician. there are others, especially independent websites like ours, and regional papers and tv who are takin ga -- who are taking a stand. we are writing a lot about syria. >> why don't you talk about the now syria site? >> we have written editorials

and pieces. the main thing on the web site is a -- website is a live blog on syria, constant, minute-by- minute news in english. we translate everything. most of the youtube videos and twitter coming from syria. writing opinions is one thing. coverage is something else. you have different news. when it comes to news, tv is politically-affiliated -- the tv that is politically-affiliated is not doing the coverage. there are others providing more

coverage. there are some who are not providing as much as regional tv, like bbc arabic and al jazeera. these regional and international channels, sometimes newspapers, are doing the coverage. it is interesting to watch. 1- days -- only 10 days ago, al jazeera changed its views. people were very upset with al jazeera. it was all over facebook. they were calling for al jazeera to do the coverage, because they know they are aware, like everyone else in the region, when al jazeera decides to criticize the regime, the regime

will be toppled. whether we like it or agree with thit, it is true. it is very popular. it is the most popular media outlet in the region. when al jazeera picks up the uprising, it is a huge help. it is funny. at the beginning, for four weeks, almost impotent. something changed. they moved to the other side. i am sure you realize. it is interesting to watch out jazeera. >> what is the website again? >> nowlebanon.com. >> revealing how the regime actually works -- of jazeera has been accused of smuggling hallucinogens to the -- to

syria. there are major reports of crackdowns with of jazeera logos -- with bags and al jazeera logos on them. there was a cop attacked by protesters. he said bbc arabic was there and urged the protesters on. apparently bbc arabic has taken an active part in this. this is showing the kind of coverage that we get, the kind of propaganda that is being put out. >> so, despite -- i am a senior fellow here at the hudson institute. there were clear divisions within europe on attitudes

toward intervention. i would be interested in whatever like you could shed -- thet you could shed ion attitudes in europe right now toward syria. are any of the officials in europe inclined to take the a device that -- the advice that ammar abdulhamid offered about ways to pressure the syrian government? >> i am here in the united states. i am more engaged with the europeans than i am with the administration on this issue. there seems to be a lot of interest. we have had several phone chats and conversations with officials in the european countries who are interested in knowing what we advise and what we suggest. >> are there some countries --

some countries who are very sympathetic to intervention in libya. others are not. some are entirely opposed. >> the french and the chairman have been very critical -- german have been very critical, and clearly so. we have placed importance sanctions -- they should place important sanctions on the regime. we will see if they can get a consensus. there has been soft language coming out of the german, french, and dutch officials. i know that sanctions are being seriously considered. if we can add the wake of the united states, process -- the process will move more quickly

and the sanctions will be tougher. >> yes? >> thank you. joe with the lebanese formation center. i think, to what lee said about understanding that our interest is in the removal of the assad regime, the fact is that this administration [unintelligible] it is important to the president and administration to have multilateral action. the doctor out multilateral sanctions -- they talk about multilateral sanctions. multilateralism would involve the arab regime. where tdo the arab states, like qatar and turkey, stand?

>> hanin, do you want to -- >> sure. it is a great question. nobody knows, actually, where these countries stand now. qatar -- you can sense a change when you look at al jazeera. they're more proactive. turkey has just been advising the regime, bringing them books on reform. [laughter] what about our great ideas on how to run a country? that is it so far. saudi arabia is also quiet so far. i think they might take a different stance if they see the u.s. taking a different stance. they do not want to be alone on this.

if you are in saudi arabia, you do not want to lead on this. syria is more nearby than anyone else. you have iraq between syria and saudi arabia. they do not want to complicate things, but they might follow the lead. i am sure another regime would benefit saudi arabia. the rest of the gulf states are in the same position. lebanon is in a very vulnerable position. no one can say or do anything. >> if turkey took a vigorous role, it might actually be able to do something. >> i believe so. >> qatar's position is more like neutrality at this stage. you can feel, in the coverage, a

sense of aloofness. when you look at the egyptian situation, they were part of the revolution. here they are trying to be "objective." of talking about how th jazeera threw them out of syria -- -- talking about how al jazeera threw them out of at must have they come from the top. >> the situation with al jazeera is related to [unintelligible] as a result, assad demanded an

apology from the emir. it was insulting in the way he handled it, even though the government was willing to sell mi-apologize. he tells us what to do. i think the [unintelligible] yesterday, there was a statement by a qatar official saying, we are ok with the regime, but we are neutral. >> this should be a syrian solution. >> it is the neutron eddy. saudi arabia -- i do not think they want to see change. they prefer the status quo. the saudis are difficult to

theonbo -- to get onboard for any kind of change. if the u.s. was onboard, they might realize they should get onboard. turkey's role is important. this is the case for erdogan and his party to show their regional productivity. for a long time, there were trying to be moderator's -- they were trying to be moderators. now they are being tested. there was a conference held in istanbul a couple of days ago by turkish parties. there was a lot of opposition. there was kurdish and libearl

ral opposition. the event was given a lot of noise. for now, turkey is hedging its bets as assad emerging as some kind of reformer. they seem to be under the same delusion that the obama administration is under. i do not think they will stay under that delusion. what happens then? will they stand by? if the reports -- this could become a chaotic situation. turkey's position on this will be very important. to me, it seem slike er -- seems like erdogan has committed

himself to be so much on the side of reform and change, that for him to backpedal will be a defeat in turkish political terms. that might impact his own party in upcoming elections. he is on the spot right now as far as the syrian situation is concerned, unless he takes a clear line that is commensurate with the stations -- statements he is making. >> thank you very much. i think we're almost out of time. i want to thank you for this very interesting discussion of an extremely dangerous and sad situation. i invite everyone here to thank our guests for this discussion. [applause]

>> president obama announced a number of changes to his national security team with leon panetta replacing robert gates as defense secretary and general david petraeus to have the cia. track their careers online at the c-span video library. search, watch, clip, and share.

it's washington your way. >> and now a former member of the british parliament and former israeli peace process negotiator explain the global view of israel. this was part of the jewish committee's annual global forum meeting earlier this week. it's about an hour and 15 minutes. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this morning's session, the global forum on israel. please take your seats and welcome to the stage and allen

rich. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> ladies and gentlemen, i would like to welcome you, those of you not audience as well as those on our global web cast and those that will be viewing us on c-span to this session this morning. our session this morning is entitled delegit maization, the global assault on israel. i'm allan n reich. the more they say and the less i say, the more we'll get out of the program. joining us is gidi grinstein, the director of the youth institute in israel. rafael bardaji, the executive directer of the friends

initiative, and the leaders of the research center. before we begin our discussion, we have a brief intro video to help frame our discussion. >> an awkward word that's come to signify the ideological assault on israel's very right to exist. it's a campaign that predates the creation through a u.n. resolution of the jewish states. many of the tactics we see today, boycotts, denial of the jewish connection to the land of israel, the betrayal of zionism. >> the british mandate is rocked by full-scale war as a new

jewish state is born. >> as israel struggled to survive, it was called for elimination. following the arab-israeli war, the soviet union led the campaign against israel leading to the u.n. assembly resolution of 1975 later resended damning vilism as racism. today, it's a complex network of ngo's and activists leading the charge guest israel, but the message is the same. israel's existence is the original sin. in hubs across the world like seattle, london, madrid, and capetown and as well as the arab and muslim worlds, they push violent demonstrations and the ultimate lie that israel is the reincoronation of a karzai

africa. how can we turn the tide of the delegitimizers? >> the format this morning will be questions and answers and discussion with the panel. for the first half hour or so, i'll ask the questions, but then, it will be you, both people in the audience as well as on the webcast. let us begin. gidi, i want to ask you the first question which is the general question of what are the roots of this whole delegitimation campaign occurring in the world? >> thank you. first, it's a pleasure to be here this morning with this uniquely situated to play a role in this campaign on the assault of israel's legitimacy, and i'm very honored to be here with

you. you know, it was mentioned in the movie the basic arguments existed for a century, and the bias of overfocused on the land of israel, the holy land that existed for a century as well has to do with religious focus, you know, christians, muslims, jews, all view this as their holy land and the formally imperial friends, lorna from london, -- [laughter] tomorrow a royal wedding. all the ladies will be watching. >> [inaudible] >> i'm sorry? >> i got my film ready. [laughter] >> all the elements existed and the question you're asking is what made all these explode in the last few years. i want to point to the trend that converge and what allowed this assault on israel

legitimacy to take such volume and impact on israel. first and foremost, i would say that new technology is at play, social media allowing people to come together in new ways. we're seeing arab and muslim communities in europe much bigger, more assertive and aggressive and out there. we're seeing the radical left following the collapse of white south africa looking for a new cause. we're seeing a way of very strong anti-american feelings over the last decade especially around the second iraq war, and israel is sort of -- there's collateral damage towards israel. there's also the element of the weakness of these response. we have late to the game. we've been late in understanding this phenomena, organizing ourselves, and responding to it. there's also the crisis in some of the leading jewish

institutions. we see a decline in the institutions with the ability to collect a jewish response that has weakened. last but not least, there's a crisis in the level of israel education within our community. for too long we have taken the support of jews and jewish communities for granted and not invested in education with all members of the unit with regard to israel. when they go to colleges, it is facts based and the lines crumble, and they have a hard time offering a robust response and the support of israel is accordingly. we see all the trends converge over the last few years to what probably this room and others belonging to the community could

view as app assault that already has strategic implications for the state of israel which could be exist ten issue. earlier in the movie, this is the time to turn the tables and respond to a matter to move. >> thank you. lorna, rafael bardaji, you live in cities that are the hub of the delegit maization movement. what have you perceived? >> it's interesting. i'm not jewish. i come from a little village that is very unfriendly to any newcomer whatsoever, and i never knowingly knew a jewish person until i went to college, and so why am i a gentile atheist

zionist? i say atheist in various circles. [laughter] because when i was starting out on my political journey when i first went to college, i met a group of young jewish students and nonjewish students who understood the secular root of zionism and the history rooted in the european left, and it made it permissible to me for somebody who wasn't too sure of her relationship in organized religion although i'm a woman of faith to actually understand the jewish people are that, a people, a nationhood, and that if i believed in my right as a national group of people of self-determination, i should therefore confer on the jews

exactly the same right, and the problem is there's nothing that people understand that very, very simple, but crucial, political point, and therefore it's allowed for confusion and perception on behalf of israel's true enemies, and i think we should all be clear, israel's true enemies, the people who are antisemitic and zionist can lock together and are actually small in number, but there's a smoke of mirrors game that is conflated, res being conflated. there is a perception that the tide is moving away from israel, and therefore it makes people question their previous judgments, so when a situation happens, they become more prey to the narratives of our enemies.

the other issue is not an issue about israel, but about us in the west which is a crisis of confidence. for britain, it's post colonial guilt to do with post-iraq, moral authority, and so a lot of what is being projected in the arena of britain on to the debate of israel has actually god nothing to do with israel and everything to do with our crisis and our own identity, and we will be playing our enemy's game if ce conflate csh if we conflate all these people and issues into one big camp. there are delegitimizers, but we do them more service if we paint them bigger than they are. as gidi talked about the report on delegitmaization, then we

need to get better on understanding the soft vote and peeling them off because we have the arguments. we know they work, what works because in the 70s in britain, we were fighting motions of zionism equals racism, and we brought back the student movement to be friends of israel, so we have been here before to some degree, and therefore we have to have confidence and courage both in our own arguments and our ability to have goodceps of ordinary and other people that they will be receptive to an argument. >> i agree entirely with lorna. i think what we are facing is a war of a different nature, a different kind. it's not a war of the 58, 60s,

or the terrorism of the 80s. it's a world not against the idea, but a war against the idea of israel and its systems. as mentioned, the delegit maization of israel, we are delegitimizing what we are in the west because we share the same values and goals, same political system, opportunities, dignity, human rights, so when the israelists put on this book, western civilization is put in danger as well. you mentioned that there are increasing muslim communities in europe, and that's true, and unless we realize in europe and europeans particularly that israel is a part of the western civilization in the western world, we will be having a

difficult task to explain why it's impossible to trade up the security of israel. we must defend ourselves defending israel because they are in the front line of delegitimacy on this level. that's why it's important to stand up in europe and say israel has the right to exist under the secure borders. >> thank you. the challenge that you're talking about resinates with a great many of us. i want to go back to a point that you made, lorna, specifically that the actual core delegitmaization movement is small. are they coordinating this effort? is there any conscious coordination going on, and if so, who is it that is

coordinating it? >> i mean, i think the gidi's report outlines a lot of the activities. they are better organized over the last 20 years and they've learned dramatically and ironically they learned from the self-organization within british jury and elsewhere, and they revere how the community organizes. i was a member of parliament for eight years, represented their hometown which has a very significant south asian population from pakistan and bangladesh, and i still live in my home top, and they -- how many -- hometown, and the conversations actually happen and my jewish friends revere, and it's not as in the -- they say why can't we be organized? why are we so pathetic with our

case? it doesn't feel like it from our side, but they think that they couldn't -- we have a phrase in the north of england and it's very difficult to plant fog, and they don't think they are effective, but the truth is they have been very, very good just like the nonstate actors at applying and adapting. they are opportunists. they smell a changing wind and capitalize on it. our problem that we have is our architecture both in america and in europe is established. it's like supertankers like governments and that's why israel finds it hard to adapt with state and nonstate actors, and it's very similar to the organized jewish community versus basically beyond organizations that are capitalizing on events and so when in britain, for example,

there was a huge stop to the war in europe and spain and movement around the iraq war, they realized there was the ability to recruit from that space for their reasons and their causes, so like as always with these organizations, they are brilliant infill traitors -- infiltrators and masters at making friends. the problem is that we're not actually as good as we think we are at making friends because we say how high is that bar? am i truly a state of israel? can i really be trusted? taken me 20 years to get to the stage of being truly absolutely trusted, and i have to lose my parliamentary seat to do it on the issue of supporting israel, and my jewish friends said to me, we know you're a friend, do what you need to do. in terms of where it comes from,

it is -- it is a long time of actual studying what we do, applying and adapting, and using world events and our uncertainty of our position within britain and europe and actually preying on that uncertainty. >> you lead to my next question, but before i do so, i'd like to remind the audience that we've distributed cards and if you have questions to ask, please fill in the cards at this point in time, and they will be collected, and likewise audience, hit the submit button if you want to submit a question. my follow-up question is each of you is a director of an organization that directly -- that speaks to this issue, that an intellect and tries to address the issue own counter

the delegitimacy efforts. i appreciate if you can sprend briefly a few minutes each describing your organization and what you are doing. maybe, gidi, i can start with you. >> it's a government of nonparties strategy and impact group based in tel-aviv, and our role in this system, in the system of the state of israel is to identify areas where israel faces a stray -- strategic gap, understand the reason for the gap, have a path for progress, and create basic momentum to seek transformative change. in the issue of delegit delegitmaization, our story started following the war of the summer of 2006, and i'm sure many of you remember that and the issues with he hezbollah. when you lin to the israeli

government, you could have concluded the frustrations of the summer of 2006 were the outcome of a conference of technical problems, command and control, logistics, intelligence, the training of officers and so on. we looked at it from the -- with our tools, and we concluded that actually the war exposed that the national security, that the security of foreign policy approach of israel has been exposed as irrelevance meaning the other side, hezbollah, iran developed an approach that allows them to frustrates superiorities through a use of military tactics and the media and diplomatic approach, and the outcome of the war was sort of, you know, undecided. so from that moment, we understood that there is a problem here that is much bigger

than anything we've known before. israel came with the mentality of pr and hezbollah, and they had this whole campaign of delegitimacy. we had to have guides and principles for their response, and after we have done that, and by the way, a lot of the work was done in london because very quickly we understood it is the hub of the hub of the campaigns, and we met dozens and dozens of people to understand what was going on, and it was around january of 2010, we have been working to create the coalition to transform of the response with many other great organizations and groups, and one is ajc who is coming from access 2020. our role to do the analysis and give direction and be the capitalist for the response. >> rafael bardaji, friends of

israel initiative. tell us about it. >> it was launched less than a year ago. it's a small group of people chaired that include lord -- and the former president with czech republic among many others and not only from policies, but the catholic leader here in washington. the goal is basically to defend the right to exist in israel. it's not anyone from israel or a specific party, and not a single politician. it's our role to protect and defend in a positive way as a

kind of -- some democracy in the region of nondemocratic regime. it's a wonderful opportunity, and we have tried to spread our message in a very small image, let's say in the market we are not a grass roots movement or a think tank. what we try to do is to help current leaders from making mistaken decisions. to give you an example, when the former president started last december to propose a common block to recognize the palestinian state, we took a delegation on the initiative and toured all the countries in latin america from argentina to mexico to explain why we consider that a mistake. we tried to help those making

decisions today to avoid making mistakes is the way of doing our business. >> it's an organization supported by 300 wonderful individuals. we are seeking to be, and hope we are an tort source with a mission to help to create more supportive environment for israel and britain. we focus on the policy, the opinion formists, people who form opinions in the media and media who forms opinions. we do public and private events. we do research. for example, the data on what britain thinks on israel and others, and if you tempt me, i might tell you because it may surprise you. as an ex-politician, those

people who think the public aren't smart should leave politics because absolutely the public might not know much, but they are not stupid, and we try to make this benefit the community, so we're doing something quite unique on the 15th of may which is we brought together the most extrord their group of communal and noncommunal organizations to run the biggest conference that's ever happened in british history in israel with the ambition of getting a thousand people, both jews, christians, nonaligned, to a conference on israel to show the depth of support. there's cabinet ministers, international seekers, local politicians, ect. are coming. now, i tell you this because

britain has got the home of the english speaking media. i know america is the front of real power, but worrying facts. two years ago the bbc's research showed that there was a 26-year low in american-owned medias on foreign affairs. there was a corresponding 58% growth in elite households from alaska to tennessee choosing british online media sources. the biggest market for the bbc,ed guardian, the financial times, the economist, and now online, the daily mail and followed by the telegraph is your market, america. the biggest news gathering monopoly in the world is the bbc

and the way the media market is growing, that is only going to continue. now, i am the biggest, and for all intensive purposes, the only organization dealing with the media in london. guess what my budget is? $-- 1.6 million pounds, and i get asked consistently from friends across the pond, what are you doing? everybody is very bothered about what is happening in london, by minority support sport is funding pro-israel work in britain, so there's lots of organizations that are bothered about what's happening in britain and spain, but indigenous local organizations that are in reports key to the long term sustainable fight that can change the balance of power are not seeing a penny of the money raised on the backs of the

concerns so we are doing what we can, but we need a lot more juice in the engine to actually change the balance of power. >> very interesting. [applause] if i can just add one thought about this. you were asking about the global nature of the network that is engaged in the campaign to delegitimize israel, so what we have learned in the work is it's concentrated in a number of hubs of majorities, and a single digit number of organizations are truly dedicated to this cause. everybody else sort of tag along in one way or another, and the response is local, exactly as lorna said. there's an issue in seattle. the people that would be best equipped to respond to the situation in seattle is the local leadership, and this is

one of the most difficult elements here. no one from jerusalem or tel-aviv or even washington, we may be able to give advice, but at the end of the day, the local players determine the outcome of the situation, and that's why it's so important to bring the networks together. >> that's what we discovered at agc that we are most successful in our offices. >> not surprising. >> as you can imagine the audience here locally and in washington have a great many questions. the first comes from an audience member as follows, and i'm going to focus this question on you, gidi. why is the focus always on what israel should do? shouldn't we demand that europe and the u.s. do what they can to make the flotilla from departing? >> sure. the way we should understand the

first flotilla is a strategic strike against the political position of the state of israel. it was orchestrated, some of you may not be aware of this, for 14 months in the open, in the internet, in places friendly to the state of israel at the time turkey, but also london, the bay area, and so on, it was organized by a hamas activist. the majority of the people were not necessarily delegitimizers, but people concerned about the policy and it may or may not did legitimate in the eyes of the people of the group, but a small group orchestrated the flotilla. now, the people in israel, if you look at the way israelis have been frustrated about and talking about our response, and it's as if we discovered the flotilla after it fled from turkey, so it's all tactical. it's whether the naval

intelligence spoke to the military intelligence and how the seals are equipped. there's another way to think about it. we have to go after the network that produces the flotillas and the same network that produces the campaign, the same network that produces the durbin conferences which is the same network that does a lot of the demonstrations behind and iran defense. this is what we need to be doing, and our approach needs to be very simple. with regard to these delegitimizers, as you said, few and far apart, outing, naming, shaming. most of the positions they present to the public are false, and we can call them on this. with regard to their sort of clob ray tores willingness with liberal and progressive circles, substantive engagement. we have to engage in substance, but most importantly, we have to be able to build relationships.

every success story of couldn'ting an attempt -- countering attempt, a perm relationship was deployed. what i mean is someone called another person on the other side, had coffee with them, a meeting with them, a conversation with them, and talked them away from the delegitimizers. the ability to deemployee relationships, and i'm talking to the audience, very few organizations are as well positioned to be able to develop the relationships and deemployee them. you're talking right. we undermind the policies of government of israel in israel by making sure there's no humanitarian crisis in gaza, not that there was, but making sure about it, and also creating a campaign to undermind the logic of the flotillas. >> at the grass roots level, we have to talk about that? >> maintain and make

relationships and take speedometer when we -- responsibility when we make a mistake. [applause] >> what are the friends of israel initiative doing in terms of reaching out to heads of state in this regard? >> well, as you know, the first first -- i think we need to make clear to anyone who is giving any particular members to rely on any support that they have to be -- what we can do is through the system making in nato to help those friends of israel like the czech republic, the u.k. government, france, to pass the message to the rest of the allies that something is brewing up in the country, like the half of the new flotilla

organizations. if you get them starting from the allies that this is the wrong thing to do, you create an environment which is less conducive for them to agent freely. the thing we are trying to obtain. >> very good. thank you. we perceived a good many questions almost naturally about a concern about what does the panel make of the fact there's so many jews who appear to be in the forefront of the delegit mages movement? >> i do a lot of work outside my day job inside the jewish community, and the most angst ridden conversation about why are the jews part of organizations like jews for justice of palestine now on the -- basically the title isn't bad, but the activities of the organization are very pa

seniortive in believing the people who support the state of israel do not support the justice for palestinians, and so there is a lot of hurt, but the truth is we play our enemies game if we focus on those individuals that only exist if we shine a light on them. i don't want to be too disparaging because they are important. we pay to legitimacy them. that's how you win elections. that's how you change politician's minds and make sure apart from the key of relationships which there is no shortcut to, you have to have the personal relationships. what made tony blare in the end use the last political power he

had in supporting the state of israel during the lebanon war? it was the relationship that he had developed that meant in the end he made the decisions to use his political capital on some things that eventually cost him his job, and you have to develop relationships, and we constantly pamper to those who shout louder. now, i come from a political party who spent 18 years in the wilderness because we didn't learn the lesson. it's not about those who shout louder because they want your attention. it's about the quiet people that you presume are against you actually heralds. the truth is why did i become a gentile designonnist? because someone smiled at me and allowed me to ask silly questions and didn't presume i was ignorant. okay, now the truth is it'shearted to trust. i understand the issue of trust for the jewish people, but the truth is you can want do it with

the -- cannot do it without the north jews. we use intense language in northern language when on television sometimes, so forgive me. >> that's okay. i'm from chicago. [laughter] >> i'm being slightly and some are very serious, but the truth is we are going to change the balance of power on people you're not talking to rather than those people. [applause] >> any further comments? >> well, i don't care. i think the beauty of democracy that there is no single voice. i love the discrepancy, and you have to live with that. instead of focusing on those elements, you have to focus on the different people on trying -- maybe i'm wrong, but

we have failed miserablely and we need to be on the defensive, but we have to have a positive message and change the narrative. we are presenting israel always in a positive manner. we don't engage fighting other people who are criticizing israel because i think for us -- for other organizations, maybe the right to pursue, but not for us, so we try to change the mind of those people who are always proving to be tremendous for our cost. >> we just launched in the house of commons of britain a campaign about the progressive case of israel launch of the by labor members of parliament, some of the biggest trade unions in britain, and nobody would expect then to have the climate in

britain, and they were proud to, and they were absolutely proud to state the progressive and self-evident case for israel. if we're not doing it, who is? >> this is a critical point because in many ways, we're talking about driving a wedge between the delegitimizers and liberal and progressive groups. what happened then is they are driving outside of israel, a us real that were unified are now decisive. we can leverage these fashions and engage with israel telling the story not in the old way which was sort of simplistic and based on myth and ended with expectation for unwaiverring

political financial support, but in a new way, a way that is more nuanced and sensitive to the complexities and idiosyncrasies of israel. it's the right of the reorganization of the right of the jewish people in self-determine in addition in a very complex environment where there's identity and security and quest for prosperity. this is a challenge where every voice in the jewish world is represented in israel, and has -- tries to shape its future. there is a big opportunity here. second opportunity is for us to work across the fault lines within the community, left and right, the delegitimacy of israel is the right of every jewish person to self-determination, and the last thing is we need to be able to talk within our community about

two big questions. who is the delegitimizer, and what is pro-israel? because if we expand the definition of a delegitimizer and throw in those who are critical of policies and so on and narrow the camp of who is pro-israel, that if you don't support them, we are fighting them against a narrow-based community, and then we're not going to win. [applause] the flip side of it is we expand the definition who is pro-israel and we narrow the definition of delegitimizer and foe -- focus on the bad guys, then we would win the fight for sure because they are few and far apart, but this requires less than right to understand. the right must understand the most credible voices standing up against delegitimation is the

left. there has to be red lines. not everything goes. these are difficult conversations to have within the communities and also is a big opportunity. >> thank you. [applause] >> i -- [applause] >> lorna? >> i think this is critical, absolutely critical. i woke up on january 1, 2011, and found the middle ground nonexist end. all the left did was prove they were right and right was wrong and the right wanted to prove they were right and the left was wrong, and the rest of us could go with that. [laughter] this is a juggle act. there's the conference with the zionist federation, all the pillars of left and right and everything, and it's like herding cats i have to tell you. [laughter] but we are merely at our destination, and all i say as

was said, if you want us to believe in the argument, which we do politically and spent all our life supporting, which is we are you and you are all in terms of israel, okay, then it's very, very important in terms of winning that argument to therefore do exactly as gidi says. if you can't have it both ways, you can't have support and say that actually we are inseparateble because it's about democracy and values in the future. i took this job, okay, because i was a new middle-aged mother who suddenly realize that the best insurance policy for my precious child was to make sure that the one capped l that was in the