talking to a human as that you're not talking to a human and that turns out to be a critical distinction. if you ask a question to which there is a correct answer, it will generally have that answer. if you say what country is paris? how many legs to ants have it will say six. but if you start to ask questions about itself to get this strange sense that you're talking to several thousand people that were being quickly cycled in and out. [laughter] and this is what i discovered when i started to ask about its love life. i said to you have a boyfriend? cleverbot cannot at the moment but i hope to find one soon. so i ventured i would like to be your boyfriend. [laughter] cleverbot, that would be difficult since i am happily

married. [laughter] petraeus come i asked again for clarification, do you have a boyfriend? no, i'm still looking for love. you have a husband? i don't have the husband because it would be illegal for me to have one since i am male. male? okay. but gender are you? female. once again for good measure, do you have a boyfriend? not at the moment, but i live in hope. can i be your boyfriend? no, i'm straight. [laughter] ..

to deal with these problems and issues and challenges so we welcome you and we welcome our internet audience and we also welcome the c-span tv viewing audience. who we are very happy to have. i will introduce our panelists. afterwards we will be having a book signing at the neighboring ballroom. you are all welcome to come over and take that opportunity if you are book collectors to signed first editions and maybe explore more deeply some of the perspective you are going to hear today. we have another panel this year whose death of expertise is matched by their diversity. i'm going to introduce the panelists from the end opposite myself, dr. christopher coppola

received his commission as a reserve officer in the u.s. air force in 1990. he served in the two gulf wars in deployed in support of operation iraqi freedom in 2005 and 2007. in iraq dr. coppola worked as a trauma surgeon at a support hospital at balad airbase 40 miles north of baghdad where he treated seriously injured u.s. troops, iraqi soldiers, civilians and even enemy detainees. he has completed humanitarian missions to brazil and haiti and now resides with his family in pennsylvania where he practices as a civilian pediatric surgeon. he recently published a memoir of his time in iraq entitled coppola pediatric surgeon in iraq. he is a 2000 graduate of norwich university masters administration program. welcome, dr. mac. [applause]

donna mcaleer is the award-winning author of the groundbreaking book "porcelain on steel," woman of west point long gray line. she is an aspirational speaker addressing the topics of leadership, a strong role model team teambuilding and breaking boundaries. donna graduated from west point in 1987 and served in germany as an army officer for four years. she left the service in 1991 to pursue an mba at the university of virginia's darden school of business. from there she mature successful professional career in corporate consulting and global logistics enrolls in public-private nonprofit corporations. she committed herself to a pursuit of a unique opportunity in 2000 to represent the united states united states and the 2002 winter olympic games. as a bobsled driver. she finished fourth in the olympic trials. welcome. [applause]

jack segal is u.s. army vietnam veteran awarded a bronze star into meritorious service medals. usurper 22 years as a senior u.s. diplomat at the state department including service as national security council, director for russia and eurasia. he served 10 years with nato including work in foreign-policy adviser to nato's afghanistan commander. he is a visiting distinguished fellow the national defense university and a lecturer at northwestern michigan college. welcome. [applause] karl marlantes is a graduate of yale university, a rhodes scholar at oxford and a marine veteran who served with great distinction in vietnam where he was awarded the navy cross, the bronze star, two navy commendation medals for valor, two purple hearts and their medals. is novel "matterhorn" come his

debut book was in her times bestseller and the "usa today" bestseller, best of 2010 title from "time" magazine, entertainment weekly, esquire and the "washington post." "matterhorn" is the recipient of this year's colby award and we are very proud to have karl marlantes with us today. [applause] and finally nears to me here is doug stanton. doug is the author of two "new york times" bestsellers "in harm's way" and the sinking of the uss indianapolis and the extraordinary story of its survivors and more recently "horse soldiers," the extraordinary story of a band of u.s. soldiers who rode to victory in afghanistan. his writing has appeared in esquire, then our times, the "washington post," time and other national publications. he is the founder of the national writers series, a book festival bringing great conversations to life in with the erica's greatest writers

consider by editors and readers to be one of the country's countries top tier book events that takes place in michigan. stanton's recent book horse soldier spent more than three years on the hour times bustle reston named the 2009 notable book by "the new york times". stanton lives and writes in michigan. welcome, doug. [applause] our topic today is the uncertain future in afghanistan assessing the conflict 10 years later. it is worth pointing out now that the u.s. has been present with its military in afghanistan longer than the soviet union did in 1989. and i think it is reflective of this. there was a moment a year or so ago when speaking to the troops in helmand province dr. stanley mcchrystal reflected on the intensity of emotions brought on

by the memory of the attacks of 9/11. he told his audience i'm sure you can recall what you are doing were doing on that fateful day and seizing the moment he turned to to a soldier nearby and set out that you remember what you are doing on 9/11. the soldier replied, yes, sir. i was having my braces removed. he was a young kid then and a wise veteran now. american forces have been there for 10 years. i think we ought to have to start at the beginning and remind us doug if you will "horse soldiers" is all about the competence of these great special forces soldiers working with the northern alliance in the earliest days. why do you walk us through that moment? what was the sense of mission and how was that the mission carried out? >> the sense of mission in 2001 in september and october of that year was very broad. many of us may know that the united states's total response to those attacks of 9/11 were

initially just 12 u.s. army special forces soldiers tasked to land secretly in afghanistan, link up with anti-taliban militia fighters led by various warlords who we have had kept contact with since the soviet withdrawal in 1989. it was a broad mission. they had been trained as special forces soldiers are to work independently to think in a network style, often being the only senior ranking american on the ground in any kind of conflict. they affected a very brilliant tactical victory in achieving in about eight weeks at the pentagon initially thought might take a year and a half. it is quite stunning. bob woodward in one of his books point out that this initial phase involved about 300 personnel followed very quickly by thousands of conventional troops. about $70 million and as i said

a very shortened timeframe. special forces had never been used before as a lead element in any deployment in united states history and so just before i stop here, just to set the stage of that, to think back to october of 2001 on the 19th of october, 12 of these guys planned and a helicopter landing zone 60 miles south of mazar-e-sharif in northern afghanistan. fish in a takes off, they watch their counterparts, their indigenous counterparts the step out of the gloom dressed in rags and robes and some not wearing shoes. this is very much a ragtag army. the united states was the underdog, the insurgent in that fight outnumbered and outgunned by a taliban force that basically owned 90% of the

country. so i think we will finish this conversation today by talking about how we did so little with so much back then was so little and held today we seemed to struggle to do a whole lot with a whole lot more and a not not be quite so successful. >> of course part of a comp which meant back then was the fact that we have a government. we have a government who is willing to serve as our target. it was very clarifying fact. see their mission was very broad, and here's what it was for those of you who write operations orders or get them. theirs was to make the country safer the taliban. highbrow that can be? just don't go off the road essentially and i'll break the law. they did that and what they brought to this battle was supreme close air support which however is debatable and a bomb dropped from 30,000 feet and not be technically close air support but it was guided by these lasers they had in their

rucksack so essentially the early part of this war is basically a western with lasers because they rode horses, believe it or not, and had no wheeled vehicles to speak of. >> and what was the strategic mission? what was the purpose? >> yeah, to secure the country and make it unsafe as a haven for taliban and/or/al qaeda training camps which had been operating there in a power vacuum which basically had festered and grown during their previous years of civil war. i will note that when the special forces soldiers joined by conventional troops, as well road through town on horseback into the cities, colonel mark mitchell at the time noted in a journal that he felt like he was back in his grandfather's time in world war ii because the

locals had come out to the street and were lining the street in waiting, waiting candy and throwing papers. the kids loved everybody. we had the country on our side at that time and place. it was quite a stunning moment. >> and though the government was overthrown with relatively seemingly light effort on our part of the strategic mission was not thereby accomplished at that moment was that? and carried forward in a more ambiguous way? >> the next space would have been seas of combat creation of everything that makes a society and today the counterinsurgency strategy there is these giant rings of troops meant to protect the center in places like helmand province which jack knows quite well. what is missing is the police force and judiciary. if you were driving any american city and go to the county seat what do you see? the courthouse. we take it for granted that the

whole world really revolves around the courthouse, and those are the two as far as i am concerned, the two missing lovers in that country still, a sense of a police force which does not terrorize its own population and a judiciary that can adjudicate land and water disputes. >> jack segal can we bring you in on this now and ask you for your assessment now 10 years on? what was the strategic mission then and where we find ourselves today relative to this? >> thank you very much. i think doug made a very interesting statement when he defined the special forces mission as to make the country unsafe for the taliban. some of you whom i have met here, i've made the point that the word to lead leave means student of islam and so a group of them are called taliban. and so if we define our mission

as making this place unsafe for the believers of islam, we defined the population and particularly the male part of the population as our enemy. that ambiguity that was built in into that initial mission we have been -- we became so much more careful about for a while and they began to talk about the insurgents, but more recently we have gotten sloppy again and we have begun to talk about defeating the taliban. and, if you are a religious muslim and you have an obligation to protect the holy koran and protect your religion, then you are obligated to engage in jihad, holy war against those who would destroy your religion. so if we are not cautious about what we define as our objectives, we create such a broad spectrum of possibilities that we can manage to define everyone in the population as

our enemy. that is not our intent obviously, and if there is in the definition the title of this presentation, an uncertain future, it is really the uncertainty of well, what future are you trying to create and i will tell you if you are on the right road. so, the lack of clarity is a consistent problem here. the president in march of 2009 said our objective in afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al qaeda, and to prevent al qaeda from attacking us or our allies from afghanistan or pakistan. i did not hear taliban in that mission statement. but, we tend to confuse these two things. if al qaeda is the enemy, al qaeda is who attacked us, clearly.

went bad attack took place, the united states through the state department, contacted the taliban a government and said turnover al qaeda to us and they couldn't do it for religious reasons, but had they done and we would not have attacked afghanistan. had they simply done that little thing, to turn over bin laden and his gang to us, they would not have been a war in afghanistan because we ignored what we would consider to be human rights abuses of afghanistan forever. the whole time they were in power, which is more than four years and it was only when it became a base for terrorism against us that it became our enemy. so i think we have to focus on that and say well, what exactly are we trying to achieve as probably the real challenge ahead of us now? >> jack this is in the first time you have wondered what our

mission might be and why he we somewhere. you like karl rove aunties served in vietnam and he write about a piece that you wrote, talks about this moment of befuddlement. i can no longer explain why we are here. are we at that moment in afghanistan right now? >> i think, you know if you talk -- i spent a lot of time with people with a lot of stars on their shoulders so they are sure about what they are doing, but i also have advantage of traveling around the country with one of those generals and i asked the people at the end of the day, when we are kind of settling down for the evening, i will approach young officers and young soldiers and asked the question my father asked me when i was serving in vietnam. he sent me a letter, in those days we used letters, and he said, are you making any headway? i was in my second tour. i didn't serve with anywhere near the distinction my colleague and friend karl

marlantes who won the second highest medal for valor that you quinn and our country and i greatly respect that, but i had to answer enter my father's letter. i sat on it for a month before even tried, and i would go to the gate or to the mess hall and i would ask young soldiers and officers, are you making any headway? and occasionally i would get one who would say yeah we are doing okay on this little village that we are working on. but quite often i would get, i don't know, i don't know what the headway is here. and so i think that it's very unfair to our soldiers. if they cannot clearly defined their objective, we do not deserve to asked them to go out the front gate in the morning. it is up to us, the decision-makers, the leaders, the political leaders in the military leaders to clearly define why you ask anyone to put their life on the line and if we

can't give them a straight answer, they should be inside the barbed wire doing whatever else they can do, perhaps training the afghans to defend themselves. >> i would like to weigh in a little bit on this. you talk about fundamental and the confusions. if you think about what a warrior is, a warrior is a person who first of all chooses a side. the warrior clearly knows that these are my people and those are my enemies, and he will risk his life and limb to use violence to try and stop the people who are trying to do violence against just people. that is a warrior. a policeman will also risk life and limb, but they cannot choose sides. they have to be on the side of the law.

if a policeman chooses sides, it is called corruption. we have fundamentally confuse the role of warriors with the role of police and we have put warriors who are trained to oppose another side, into a situation to act as policeman where there is no agreed-upon law. they have to be on the side of the law. if you go to the state pen and any state in this union, the people who are inside will all tell you if you say is it bad to kill or against the law to steal? they all agree on there is an agreement on the lawn where as we have put people who are trained as warriors into a situation where there is no agreement. well, it is perfectly justifiable to cut a woman's ears off if she has humiliated her husband in some way. which law are we dealing with? and the second thing is, if you have policeman who are trained,

they are generally more mature. infantrymen are young. would you take a 19-year-old and sent him send him to a troubled neighborhood in bedford stuyvesant and with an automatic weapon? it is not like he is going to do a very good job. if you sent him to go up against the enemy and he clearly knows who they are, he will do a magnificent job. that is with 19-year-olds do. if we don't get over this fundamental confusion we are going to be finding ourselves in situations time and time again where we are putting people who are trained one way into a role that has none of the requirements to make their role successful. >> clarity of purpose in battle is a real force multiplier. in the middle of matter carney have this devastating moment when a u.s. officer suddenly realizes and begins worrying over the fact that the north vietnamese army unit he is opposing are infused with a sense of purpose and mission and

you offer this devastating observation. you write for the americans that clarity was a thing of the past. the marines seem to be killing people with no objective beyond the killing itself. that lets a hollow feeling that of any try to ignore by doing his job which was killing people. and the cycle of this dynamic can quickly detach itself from larger should teach admissions, special emissions with ambiguities, counterinsurgency. >> i think it is naturally interesting parallel between vietnam and the current war in afghanistan because you think about world war ii. my father and my uncle they all fought and it is like are we making progress? yeah we took oil canal and we took tarawa and we hit the marianas. and you go to vietnam, and it is becoming unclear so how do we measure success and evolve it

into a body count? i am clear in my own mind that a body count is a very bad measure of success. first of all it is a moral. the warrior's job is to stop the other side from using violence and when that other side stops doing it, then you are done. the job is not to kill the other side. you sometimes have to kill people on the other side to dissuade them from doing what they are doing. that is the bad part of it but the objective should not be killing people. that is not a proper objective. is just inhumane and we have to remember everybody says all is fair in love and more. all is not fair in love and war. there have to be humanitarian perspectives on it. the second thing about body count which i find interesting is the north vietnamese who were very clear about that they wanted which was us out were prepared to have any number of

people die in order to accomplish that mission. the military could say well, we won the battle five dead americans. really a wonderful ratio. politically all the americans cared about was the five dead americans. that is the other side of the body count issue. nobody here politically is really going to care too much about how many the enemy we have killed. they're going to care about how many of our sons and daughters have died so it is another bad thing. in the book i take some time with humor. they are very easy to manipulate you never know the accuracy of it anyway. >> donna could we bring you in here on the question of leadership maybe and how army units have to conduct themselves in the situations where the enemy blends in, the enemy doesn't offer itself to battle. how was west point in its

leadership education adjusting this? he graduated west point as the soviets were getting their tails kicked in afghanistan and now here we are. what can we learn from them and what are we doing to benefit from the experience of the past 30 years? >> we bring up a really good point of why we study history and the importance of reading books such as karl's and the's. we study history so that we don't make the mistakes of the past and it seems like many of our elected officials have neglected to study history. through carl's presentation today, i can't think of a more appropriate book that every soldier should now be frankly required to read. a big part of the education at west point is certainly the study of history as i am sure here in norwich with a military history curriculum but also the importance of ultralow awareness i think we saw it very early on, general john abizaid who is the centcom commander, he is the

only general and our u.s. army who is fluent in arabic. he was actually from lebanese descent. he really put an emphasis on the cultural awareness and understanding of the anthropology. i think it as we now look forward 10 years, maybe that was something we have neglected. when we look at afghanistan it is not a country we really understood. there has been no history ever of a respected national government. it is in a tribal system and so that importance of that understanding of the enemy from all perspectives is really what the foundation of a liberal education is about, and i think here at norwich, at west point and hopefully so many of our other institutions of higher learning, that ability to study in multiple disciplines, take

disparate information and as a young officer be able to make decisions based on incomplete information. that is what is so valuable about the training and the course of study and it is as important to be able to solve problems from an engineering perspective as it is to be able to speak another language. i think you know the military academies in norwich are providing what is truly a liberal arts education and hopefully creating our soldiers, states people of the future. >> and donna your book is sort of a profiles in courage of women in uniform, poor slen on steel. what challenges do women serviceman confront entering a society such as afghanistan whose culture is really closer to ninth century than our own century? >> i think you will find as any servicemember the reason women join the service are the same as men, to get an education and to

be part of something higher and greater than themselves. i think certainly not speaking from experience on the battlefield because i don't possess it, the challenges women face are wanting to be equal partners and members of the varsity team, not the jv team. and the challenge right now is we have some issues with regards to how women can be utilized in situations. we are seeing now many of you are probably familiar with what the marines are deploying called female engagement teams. these are groups of servicewomen who are going into different villages and tribes and acting as human intelligence collectors the results have in this certainly in the more urban areas they have been well received almost as a third gender.

endeavour areas, it is a completely different situation there and i think trying to understand and relate to that is a big challenge. >> b effects of these engagement teams, the different situation being what? what happens in those rural areas? >> exact and understanding. this is a society where women are completely marginalized and i think that is tough for western women to comprehend and particularly our servicewomen. but this is something over four or five centuries. this is not you know, a recent creation. so understanding that mindset. the one benefit is the military particularly with its counterinsurgency strategy is learning a tank how to use human capital assets better and to really take advantage of different populations within the military to hopefully exploit that intelligence.

>> last november nato leadership agreed that afghan forces, ready or not, would have full responsibility for security in the country by, was at the end of 2014? and i read that and i read peggy noonan in the wall street journal recently recounting how pashtun tribesmen sometimes taunt american soldiers by saying you have the watches, we have the time. could you expand on this, maybe jack about this idea of strategic patience and the degree to which we may not have enough of it? >> yes, it is the a classic counterinsurgency problem first of all, that we from the outset it is not we are not going to be there forever and that downfall with regard to colonial powers like britain. but certainly from the perspective of the afghans who have been invaded repeatedly over the centuries, and

eventually the invading armies have left and they know that we are leaving and they had a sense that we were going to leave relatively soon. but, we have been announced in november at the nato summit that we would be leaving the combat mission in a end to stand by the end of 2014. it was quickly caveat it to say we would continue in a supporting role for quite some time after that. the setting of the timeline is a double-edged sword. i can put asher on the government to improve its performance and there is much room for improvement with our allies in afghanistan, with the afghan government. but it also tells the enemy, who could choose what is known in the military is the most dangerous strategy, the most dangerous enemy strategy that they could employ right now with you to withdraw from the battlefield and disappear.

because that would create the illusion that the dispute has been settled, and in a few years we would speed up the withdrawal because it would be all quiet and we would get out. then they would resume their insurgency. we have not solved the fundamental political issues that underlie the insurgency, and we are not doing that by putting in more soldiers. to the credit of the leadership, they understood that and they began to increase the civilian side of the effort. so that today there are 1100 civilians operating in afghanistan on behalf of the u.s. government as opposed to 150,000 troops, so it is still not a very good ratio when in fact we have to back up and say well, what are the basic needs that we are trying to address? in an afghan village like a

vietnamese village, the people want security. they want to eat enough food at the end of the day, and they want to have a situation and let me say security first of all, they wanted to the local security. they want their village leased by their people. we enter a village in our body armor and our gear and we look at invaders from outer space. i was once an afghan village with my four-star general partner and this guy we were talking to asked our interpreter, are the russians? he didn't know that the russians had left. we are back hundreds of years in time when we go into these villages. we see living conditions which i describe as like living in the 14th century. very little hygiene, very poor health, no education, no literacy.

and so to put a front of a marine corps or a u.s. army officer, and i would add i met many navy and air force officers in the situations and enlisted personnel, it is really quite a mismatch. it is quite unfair. they don't know enough about the situation to understand the people they are talking to. the people we are talking to are viewing us as another set of foreign invaders. we are well-intentioned and i would turn to chris in a minute to ask -- to add, to describe how we do a lot of good things. we tried to do a lot of good things. we repair bridges. we build roads, we provide health care which you can describe. rebuild schools, we do all sorts of things that we intend to be good deeds. but, as the book, "three cups of

tea" by greg mortenson described, before you can build a school you have to build a relationship. we don't have time to build a relationship, so we build a school. and without the relationship, the school is something we have implanted in a foreign land rather than something the afghans themselves have else on their own. that is to me a fundamental flaw in the strategy that we are presently in. i will turn to chris perhaps on the medical side. >> thank you and i would also like to say thank you to jim and admiral snyder for welcoming us. beyond the plenary session of this panel i do have to remark that in the past two days joining in with the norwich cadets and their classes has been an incredible experience, to step out of life and become a student again momentarily, to witness the future military leaders and citizens soldiers of

our country. it is something astounding and certainly makes me very proud to be involved. if i look across at the other panels antsy professional soldiers, authors and historians, leaders, diplomats and me as a physician who has now left the military service and as a civilian having settled in pennsylvania i am essentially a country doctor. but i'm happy that i am involved. what i would like to add is a perspective that is going to somewhat mirror what you all have been saying is that afghanistan is a country of contradiction. temporarily the modern times the primitive living situations. the fact it has a border but the people see a tribal and family identity above that, national identity. and my colleagues, the people that i've worked with in the hospital of iraq who are currently working in the hospitals in afghanistan tell me

that they are seeing the same injuries, the ied blast injuries, the all too common child who is picked has picked up a landmine or unexploded ordinance and has had their hands dramatically amputated. in some of the patients brought in with simple medical conditions like a hernia that has gone on for 10 years with no one to fix them or an unattended wound that has become gangrene, something that would be a simple antibiotic treatment to one that has become an amputation. what i have been able to do fortunately you stay involved with my colleagues to create a remote and virtual set of specialists so that the young doctors starting out, facing a difficult problem is able to reach out via the internet and also the electronic store and forward documents which are essentially medical after action reports are drawn the wisdom of not only our thousands of battle

castle tea treatments from our experience but also the many from the greats that have come before us. so it is an honor to continue to try to be useful in that manner. but, i would say that noting that civilians in areas torn by war are more vulnerable by far than the combatants and will bear the majority of the deaths and casualties, and additionally noting that our young professional soldiers will do any task no matter how horrible the personal sacrifice, the effort involved in the pain involved, that we do all it to them both those soldiers and those vulnerable citizens -- vulnerable civilians that area to try to see through this uncertain future, because as the time goes on, the cost in lives does continue. so it is a strong duty to those of us who are actively involved

in the military and civilian leadership and also citizens of our nation to apply our best thoughts and efforts to this problem. >> chris. >> chris maybe you could tell us something a little further about the state-of-the-art of battlefield medicine and 2011. how has the system setup and how does it come to the assistance of say a platoon out on patrol 100 miles from the nearest major base who comes under attack and sustains casualties? describe for us what happens and then how these cases eventually work their way up the line to you baby at a lot and maybe elsewhere. give the cadets a sense of how advanced advance the state-of-the-art is right now. >> well like my colleagues i was fortunate not to have the developments of hippocrates, larae, wilford hall and so many other surgeons before me who went to war. giving us a transition, penicillin, vaccinations to help keep people alive but what we in particular have been able to do

is develop a system both within our hospital, with the proper specialist and outside of the hospital logistics to have a 98% survival rate for any troop who comes to our hospital. they have a 90% chance of leaving the hospital alive. it translates to a survival of wound rates of approximately 93% the gap is those who aren't able to make it to the hospital from the time of their injury. it is something we are very proud of and it is a higher level of survivors than any other war. does result in the problem of many veterans returning to home life with lost sight or a lost limb. but i have impressed again and again the young men and women who surmount those obstacles and it is not a 70-year-old amputee. it is a 20-year-old amputee who is going to be in a kayak running a marathon. but to speak to -- speak to some

the specifics of our recent experience, we have the pipeline and that is level 1 which is level to which is a small forward surgical team that can do about six operations before it is depleted and then level 3. level 3 is a center which has specialized trauma care from the general surgeons, cardiac surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, ophthalmologic role surgeons and our -- is 19 specialties. from that to level 4 on a transport on a 141, one stabilize back to the united states level 5, walter reed and brook army medical center for the burn patients. that pipeline in and that pipeline out, that is what is the high rate of survival. additionally by putting us, putting the surgical specialists in the theater by helicopter within 20 minutes of any point in the country, or for level 3 centers in iraq help desk.

in afghanistan the transport time is a bit slower. the terrain is worsened the weather is worse and the size is a bit different. the hospitals are clustered in the southern area. specific techniques with in our hospitals, we found a resurgence of early application of tourniquet use including the one-handed special forces self applied tourniquet has saved lives because the patients don't lead out and the rapid transport often lets us say that limit that hasn't been -- we have used you something called the vacuum assisted dressing and this will be addressing that is watertight has a sponge and applies continuous back into a wound instead of changing a dressing every 12 hours, allowing the bacteria and dirt, the blood is drained of contaminants and specialized techniques like something a broken vessel and transcatheter techniques, passing a catheter through the grind and affixing a fistula

fixing a hammer to that way, something that is only available in specialist thomas centers here in the u.s. we have on the battlefield. those techniques are being employed today in facilities where the u.s. military doctors are applying them. about 60% of their patients are. >> is a battlefield doctor how do you do with the fact that medical ethics will sometimes compel you to actually treat insurgents? how do you square this with your air force officer? and then, work through some of the ambiguities there for us because that is one of the really compelling aspects that comes through in your book. >> to be a military physician, which is an incredible privilege and an incredible honor and one i'm very fortunate that i was able to do that work and the most important work i will do in my life, it is following two code, the code of an officer, code of a physician and i would say additionally you have have the code of an american citizen and my own personal belief.

taking care of an insurgent, taking care of an enemy detainee, it didn't break any of those codes because once that detainee was within our custody, it was our responsibility, my personal responsibility if they could survive, to make them survived. on a personal level, when i have treated detainees of whom i know had moments before attempted to drive a vehicle borne ied into our home base, when i treated detainees i later found out had personally killed patients that i had treated and a child that i treated, that was a very personal price and a very difficult thing to face but the code of the doctor and that the code of an officer as a military officer a geneva noncombatant it is the duty i had sworn to do and i would say although my experiences may have been troubling and intense, being a

physician, surgeon at home and being a surgeon in the deployed environment although it was more intensive it was still the same job. i think our soldiers sometimes face the greater stress when they are moving from one occupation in the u.s. in a specialty to being moved to the deployed environment where their job is to be a killer, a lawful killer for the military. i think that is a greater stress than i ever had to face. >> i guess i would like to ask my colleagues here, we haven't addressed a pretty significant portion of iraq and that is its neighbor to the east, pakistan. and we know that pakistan has provided a safe haven for al qaeda as well as other terrorists. we are dealing with rapid population growth there, highly illiterate population, a very young population and a country that has -- by the way they

possess nuclear weapons in a country that has been devastated by floods. is there any of that medical expertise that we have developed in iraq and used in afghanistan from a goodwill perspective that we are bringing to pakistan when one of the keys to developing a relations in pakistan is that trust in that building of goodwill in the population. aesthetic consideration? we haven't even discussed pakistan here. >> to give a brief comment, i think in a scenario of a medical disaster, it is easy to be a physician because the mission is unchanging and i think that enemies can reunite to save the life and respond to an environmental disaster. once the response is complete, it doesn't make a negotiation

and diplomacy and easier than it was before the disaster. >> let me start off. we have a war in afghanistan and the way that we have one in the bn may be elsewhere soon. we do not yet have officially a war in pakistan and we certainly are not fighting a war against the government of pakistan, so we face a problem that we had in vietnam. we have a sanctuary across the border from afghanistan, where terrorists or insurgents can freely move back and forth. people will ask, why don't you seal the border? and i say well, okay let's seal the border from maine to key west because that is the length of the border between pakistan and afghanistan. so roughly speaking, that is obviously an impossible task. so we need to the corporation corporation of the pakistani government to stop the

cross-border insurgency. the problem that was from their perspective, they are quite satisfied to fight the pakistani taliban. they do not want afghan taliban to be their war. they do not attack with very energetically let's say anything having to do with the afghan taliban. there are other terrorist groups and insurgent groups and smugglers who operate across the same border, the haqqani network, the hekmatyar group and they also are not necessarily at war with pakistan. they are at war with us, or so it seems. we have not declared war on anyone actually. so, there is a great ambiguity fair and that is a possibility that could lead eventually to a negotiated settlement. it is clear to me that for

instance the hekmatyar group which is one of the big insurgent groups fighting americans in particular in the east, that hekmatyar is getting old and tired and looking for a way to stop the fighting but we have to be attentive to the signals and we have to be encouraged. the second group, the haqqani group is what karl was referring to, a police problem. this is a smuggling industry and we are injured pairing with their business and that is why they fight us. and they have allied themselves recently with al qaeda but it is mainly because they want to have common cause with one other group and they really don't have anything to do with the taliban. the taliban is the most complex of the problems and they operate on both sides of the border because these to leave, these believers in islam exist in the hills of pakistan just as much as they do in afghanistan.

they are trained in madrassas, these religious schools which are located mainly in western pakistan. they are financed by countries in the gulf region. they teach a form of islam that is extremely conservative. it is comparable to the form of islam that is practiced in saudi arabia and saudi arabia's islam is quite similar to the taliban's version of islam. so, we have to wreck guys that this is an except that form of a world religion in a particular part of the world, and again i would say that if we try to define that as the problem, then we define ourselves as the enemy of that segment of islam. we are not at war with muslims and we have to be very clear about that as well. the muslims of the world, over a billion people, for the most part have very little in common with these extreme

fundamentalists. they are not -- that is not the form of religion that they practice but if we push people and we defined them as our enemy because they are muslims, or in this case because they believe in the holy koran, then we will create more and more enemies in that community and we will broaden the base of people who object to what we are doing. let's be cautious here because we are now at war and another muslim country. we had a war in iraq which is almost ending, maybe. we have a war going on in afghanistan. we are firing hellfire missions into western pakistan and now we are dropping a lot of ordinance in libya. if you want to be a conspiracy theorist and you are muslim you could say i think these americans are at war with islam. and that would be a very dangerous situation for us to be in.

>> just to raise the question so then jack, we are not fighting an ideology which would be that brand of islam, so maybe we talked earlier today about we hit the reset button and how do we achieve success if not through body counts? when we were in afghanistan, i remember thinking at the time this was last april that success was measured in the number of lease that were trained, the number of judges, new judges that were in town. is that still true? is that now the new yardstick or the old yardstick? >> that is a very good question. as i said earlier, but that number one deed is security. the number two need is food. nine years, 10 years into this war 40% of the afghans go to bed hungry according to u.n. statistics. they have an insufficient supply

of calories which means they are hungry. and that seems to me given the billions of dollars they were spending to be unconscionable, to be indefensible, but that is a fact. they are hungry. these are hungry people you see on the street. they want the security, they want food and then they want a judge. that seems to be a strange thing in the hierarchy but this is a country without a clear title to things like food, water, cattle grazing rights, water rights and land rights. so they need someone to adjudicate these disputes and what they have is a corrupt government. the government will occasionally send a judge along and the judge is prom to be a recipient of rides. alternatively and 33 out of 34 provinces according to the intelligence officer at isaf, the international security

force, 33 out of 34 provinces have shadow government, and insurgent government and the insurgent governor appoints a judge, a mullah, a religious scholar because under this form of islam the only thing that counts is the koran. that is all the lie you need. so this judge makes a -- on a motorcycle from the woods to the village on a schedule that they know and he adjudicates whether this land belongs to you or the other person, whether those sheep are yours or for the other person's. people made bad and he never accepts bribes and he carries out his sentence on the spot. so, if the decision is that land is yours, from that moment on that land is yours and if his decision is that you stole and you are guilty of theft then the sentences to remove your right hand. because that is the sentence

allowed under the koran. and so it is clear, it is unambiguous, it is quick and it is free of robbery. i don't want to make that sound better than it is, but it is what people want. they want a decision. they don't like bribery. they don't like corruption and they are surrounded by it. and we continue to feed that rivalry and corruption. we funneled huge amounts of money into afghanistan. the official number is $171 billion this year into the war effort in afghanistan. the actual number i would argue is quite a bit more than that because there are some things not included in that number but whatever the actual number is it is a bundle even for the united states who invest in afghanistan given the state of our own economy and given the fact that after all these years and investing all that any and a we have so little to show for it. that is the last point i would

make about transition to afghan lead as part of our strategy. the president has called for that. this transition effort was announced two weeks ago to the president of afghanistan announcing that we are transitioning to provinces, panjshir which is in the east and the town of mazar-e-sharif, the town of the entire lawn, part of kabul province and the city of herat and the city of lashkar gah. that names for cities and to provinces out of 34 provinces. that is not a lot to show for the amount of effort that we have put into it and i think it would legitimately call for people to ask if that is the pace at which we are making progress, then we have to, we really have to consider what our options are in the future. >> i just wanted to sort of

remind, talking about money, the british navy ruled the oceans for several centuries, three or four, and the primary innovation that allowed them supremacy on the seas was the invention of the bank of england and a guilt edged law which allowed the english kings and the government later, to finance a very extensive military organization. no one else could keep up with them. when they were doing this, they were able to do this because england was a net creditor nation, the largest in the world by the end of the first while the war, angwin had ceased to be a creditor nation and have become a debtor nation. the united states became the largest creditor nation in the world and buys 25 years later we had something like 6000 capital ships.

the british 600 as an aside the canadians were third with around 400. today, we are the largest debtor nation in the world and the chinese are the largest creditor nation. i think we have to think about some very fundamental issues behind military strategy, which is how do we finance all of this? >> how much war can america afford? how many wars, how long, how deeply can we go? what airing does that have on the mission? >> yeah without jeopardizing our fundamental security, which is our ability to put out highly expensive technical weapons. we don't do asymmetrical war. we are able to project power because of visa norms costs that we are able to bear but at some point if we continue to be in debt we are not going to be a will to do it, so we have to look back. if you are a strategist you have to say how do i shore up the

fundamentals so we can carry on what is going on and that goes not just military policy, that goes to economic policy. >> we have gone about an hour and i would like to spend the bulk of the rest of our time to invite people to come to the microphones that will soon be set up on the isles and in previous years the highlight of the symposium has been the questions that come from the cadets and i hope you will be forthright and focal and inquisitive of our panel. i would invite you to begin doing that. what kind of end-stage state would you be comfortable with if they would charles began by 2014? where should be counterinsurgency effort, the diplomatic effort and the development effort, give me a ballpark. what is a reasonable 40-yard line to 40-yard line for a

reasonable withdrawal in afghanistan? .. i am not convinced purslane that patrolling in the afghan villages is getting much worse given the price. i think too often we are unfamiliar -- so unfamiliar with the situation that we are really at such a disadvantage that we

are easy targets. we also operate on the basis, so we are commuting to work, which is something general petraeus said we shouldn't do will stop doing that in iraq. it's much more difficult to start to enact in afghanistan because we cannot embed in their religions. they will not allow it. we can embed in small towns and cities of iraq. separate the strategy is not working so well. we need to back off or not and say let's operate more from her pieces. i think we're investing huge amounts of money and training the afghans. we need to look at our training them and what we're training them to do. karl has made a wonderful point. they need police more than they need an army. but we are training a bigger army than the police force and that may mean something we need to take a second look at. they also need to be practical about overtrained to get them to do. we are replacing soviet jeeps, which have this very simple six

cylinder engine with humvees. humvees are great vehicle, not mr. lee for afghanistan, but they need a computer to test them when they go bad end-user computer you have to be able to read, but 30% of the males and 10% of the women can read, so we have to teach them to read to fix the humvee when they can fix the russian jeep without been able to read. we make it cheap that may be simple enough or could be made simple enough to sell to the afghans forgave to the afghans. we don't need to re-create the u.s. army model in the afghan national army. and that we really need to focus on the police force that we are starting to do that. there's something called the afghan local police program. it's not -- people have tried this over the centuries in afghanistan of equipping and are made to local police. it may create problems for you because when you're in the air

on a mission nec account with a rifle, you've got to be sure this is a local police man for he -- he's not wearing a uniform, or is he one of our guys? or is he a bad guy? it's a difficult problem, but it's probably solvable. so we need to refocus that inevitably pull our troops mainly into the bases and let them do the training from our big pieces and let the countryside we under afghan control. it was under afghan control before we arrived. they defeated the soviet army with money and some weapons from us, but not with us running the shuttle. so they are not incompetent at sending their villages. if they have to do it, they will do it. i will never forget a british soldier who asked monday, are you making any headway? he said, if i go through another afghan village in nicaea kid my age sitting in the shade while i've got my body armor and i'm

pumping down the road and wait for the next ied to go off, i might put a bullet in that sop and the guy was laughing -- the afghan kid he saw was laughing. he thinks he was laughing at him. he probably wasn't. but that's what was going through his mind, that here's this guy just my age. he should be the one with the rifle. why am i doing this? and you know, that's a fair question for soldiers. >> we've got to watch as they've the time. i came up with this little scenario. it's 1863 and we are in atlanta, georgia and everybody there is a strong protestant and they're fighting against the government in washington d.c. and the french arrived and they don't speak english and they're very strong catholics.

they are here to build a school and to help. >> do we have any questions? please come forward. >> i don't want our guests to get off that easy. this is concerning a comprehensive approach. there's three priorities from a security would obviously be our burden to bear, but we also talked about the food and the legal system or framework. it seems to me that there's been a comprehensive approach to this issue, maybe the military shouldn't be the support of effort. maybe we should be to support an possibly the u.s. aid or state department or some other elite governmental agency to guide us through there. as we talked about the 19-year-old with the automatic weapon might not be the young man or woman that we would want

to tackle the problem. thoughts on that? >> i was really impressed when i made this trip last april to the detention center, which was created not far from the bagram detention center, which you could not get into during my first trip to afghanistan. and so, this is the gleaming white concrete barbed wire, looks like a county jail and everybody can see in they mean it that way so the afghan citizens can save that for my uncle is because he got mixed up in this raid and they can come into the telephone plexiglass and talk to him and he has some counsel on the hearing and it's kind of hard to get out of that jail. they are not letting guys out of

this because they think they are innocent. so that is one step forward to creating this judiciary that's good. now, to do that we've had to pull her lots of money to the country to secure areas where you might want to build those courthouses in those jails and i don't know, jack, we met that irish -- she was fat -- who was the irishwoman/cargo? this is an incredibly dynamic irishwoman named cameron she went to lash cargo, which was a british base and she created a little island in that city. through sheer willpower, money, some u.s. money but mainly

british money and a willingness to listen. this is something we are not the strongest. to listen to the afghans and to ask to three cups of tea, what is the unique? the answer is always security first and then there is a checklist of things. quite often the judiciary capabilities i'm not list. so, we're not going to train law schools, great law schools and have them in the near term. they are demanding that. they had tribal system for judging situations. we have imposed a foreign system in the country and a different model we can go back. i served in southern africa and botswana and they were traditional court. and you offer that is your

option reason go to the western-style court. he suffered -- you were disrespect dean the elders in your village a few shows the western-style. you are saying i don't trust their judgment. most people it to the courts and came up with traditional answers to traditional problems like land ownership, with water and cattle, which is what people were looking for. i think we've overengineered the answer. >> i was just thinking the answer to this question is that seemed to me that the fundamental way to approach this is we have to stop being cast as the enemy and easiest way to do that is to just move behind international organizations. nato is not quite as good as the united nations, but we all know there's clinical issues. if you actually are supporting by providing security to an international organization and the money is flowing to them to try to do some good and you

remove them, it's pretty hard for the bad guys to get many good pr by attacking women by some english ngo. i think the thing we have to remember is terrorism is actually a problem for the whole world and we're making it look like a war and were actually giving these terrorists the cachet of being warriors and being legitimate warriors against the united states. we should treat them as criminals and we shouldn't have put them in criminal courts and not give them the privilege of being tried in military courts and begin to have a worldview shift that they are attacking solid international organizations and only want to help. we will get credit because people will say think of how many tanks and trucks until they

are troops that wasn't coming for the united states. we need hitler. let's get straight about it. >> were also going to be taking questions from the internet audience. is there any of those, please send us an in the representative will come to the microphone. >> one of the issues about intervention is either intervene in a country overwhelmingly and impartially or you do it with less force or partially. one of the things the panel is not addressed is in fact the taliban and explicitly in the 1990s was an expression of pashtun ethnic pride and basically a kind of resurgence after the chaos following the soviet withdrawal. do you see the united states role in terms of policing towards intervention, trying to keep the peace between the

palestinians, tajiks and uzbeks in my follow-up question iscoming to use the elements of the northern alliance reconstituting and we are made because they also see the clock ticking and they also see the united states role at some point been pulled back. do you see them getting ready to refight the civil war of the early 1990s? >> yes, i do. if we were to leave tomorrow, yes, the country to be the stakeholder in the country can. i would say the taliban of the 1990s was not pan arabic. in fact, i was always used in surprise to the afghan taliban

would call them foreigners to admit across the border to reach -- to make travel all over the place. so yeah, go ahead, jack. >> i agree with you that is one of the scenarios that's quite likely the disintegration of the situation after we leave into a civil war. i would say that they haven't completely disarmed anyway. they put their weapons away, their heavy weapons are gone. there's also a bit of ambiguity here because the afghan national army, which we are financing has very, very few of pashtun officers.

they have a few more pashtun soldiers because they pay, but we have unsuccessful in recruiting out of the tune community. so we can be seen as arming the norm in alliance or not doing doing this chiefly. the budget for this year is $12 billion for training and equipping the afghan national army. last year was 11.2 billion. next year is going to be down to 9 billion then 6 billion every year thereafter for the foreseeable future. the argument being that it's cheaper than keeping the u.s. troops there. but to me, that is an unsustainable force both in size and in terms of its complexity as i said earlier. over here. >> good afternoon, ma'am and gentlemen. my question is in light of the address and discussion.

do you recommend that we strategically to korea to do damage control for do you recommend us withdrawing or stepping back a little bit? and if so, what considerations do we expect to save in terms of national interest in international image in the global community? >> could you justify and reactive damage control's? >> as far as addressing issues where we haven't made that much process and we've exhausted the letters means faster. >> the question is what do we want. we started out they're not overnight teen, 2001, simply to shut down these training camps, which al qaeda had been running and was sponsored with a nod of the taliban.

the question all of us in this audience have to ask if that's not what we have to ask. it's when we have to face. are you happy with in afghanistan and this outcome which which is very fundamental and women have very few rights as we recognize in the northern part of the country,. however, in the macro view is the country is largely stable and not fostering terrorism. that is where i think i am having an increasingly fewer and fewer options. and i think that's probably what we thought might have been all along. but it's so interesting to me than the monthly death toll in afghanistan escape for the first time that if iraq is a monthly basis, which i think was in june of 2008, nobody was paying attention.

one more soldiers came out in 2009, the publishing house had to remind the reporters and so on in the united states that we really mean it cannot stand. so president obama speech, december 7, 2009 after mcchrystal's ultimatum essentially in august of that year, and suddenly every realize were about to put our troops in the country, the whole america woke up at about what's going on? i was a little bit annoyed to be frank because i've been following the and it was a problem we created our own intention. it's a statement of more than answer to your question. >> one thing we look at what we want, what we try to propose on this nation. maybe it's a different perspective than what's

realistically achievable. i think we need to ask the question a different way in the position of what we want. >> i think one of the unspoken undertones here is that really has been a struggle between the conventional army about what to do in afghanistan and essentially the conventional site. one, although the insurgency is with any conventional warfare things built-in dr. ling and you know, i can remember early on talking to people during my research. we should do in afghanistan is go up to the centers of gravity and ignore borders because people in charge and writing things ignore them as well and really try to create change. one of the buzz phrases i always heard from people and special forces was insurgency is a social problem. these are guys who train to

maneuver and they see this as a social problem. and one of them later went on to teach the counterinsurgency program at west point. they say listen, we can even solve teen pregnancy and drug use in the united states with is a social problem. you're telling us at three to four years will fly to another country don't speak the language and am kind of fix their social problems, too. so i was reading for those guys because presenile kinds of different forms of power, soft and hard to really look at this in the centers of gravity and should be happy with solutions that may be gray and not necessarily black and white. >> i was just going to say he started talking about soft power. think about her experiences the western countries for south africa. we never went to war in south africa. they had a horrible social

problem going there was enormous pressure put on the south african government to make changes there and it took not six years. i don't know what i started four years ago, 50 years ago, but through simple things like were not going to play your rugby team anymore, which is embarrassing to these players in south africa. how come? because you have a social problem we disagree with. the international community through economic pressures, to social pressures actually hope an enormous amount to move the country out of a price tag. and i think we can take some lessons from that particular success and we need to put troops in. >> i have a student on behalf of the diplomacy program. he's currently located in kabul, afghanistan, task force 2010. his question is, what can be

done to reduce the widespread corruption in the afghan government's? to several ongoing efforts in this area. the u.s. government and nato. how does the panel cds as succeeding? >> well, there is a flood of money pouring into afghanistan and not a lot of financial control on that money. say you are pretty much asking for what you get. i mentioned a figure of $11 billion to train and equip the afghan national army. some of that's in the united states by independent, but some of them shipping equipment and a lot of it is building buildings in afghanistan. you've got to equip your people who are handling cash like that with the expertise and the tools to control those funds and we have not done that at all.

we have commanders emergency response with certain funds, which are lower-level and not billions millions of dollars. they are billions of dollars. we give those funds to midgrade officers come lieutenant colonels or lieutenant commanders and we say, this is your money to spend and you have to account for it. it's pretty unfair because then we go back to your site and say, what did you do with the money? what happened to that concrete that you bought? you're in a war zone but we try to be fairly liberal in giving people the opportunity to use money as a weapon. to put it differently, use money as a tool, but would then have to be realistic about whether they'll be able to be accountable for that money.

the high-level corruption in afghanistan is going to continue to exist. president karzai in a meeting i attended was questioned about corruption in his response was, well, 70% of the funds that you put into afghanistan are not funneled through my government. so who did you give your money to? it's a fair question. it's not a completely genuine one because there was plenty of money left over when you look at the 30%. but there is a lot of money disappearing in this process and there's a lot of houses being built in kabul, multi-story mansions and land that has been appropriated by senior officials of the afghan government. and nobody can explain how someone with the $11,000 a year can build a multimillion dollars mansion were other mansions are being built in dubai or

purchased in dubai by people winning kabul bank and kabul bank happens to be where we put on the funds for the pay of the afghan national army. some of that money may not be there when we need it, when we withdraw it. this is a situation where there is a tremendous flow of money. $171 billion a year. you need a lot of financial control and you need a lot of oversight. and i think those were oversights that we made when we didn't put those things into place. since i have the floor, let me just add one point. and may have created the misimpression that anything am critical of, that the blame belongs to mid-level and junior officers and ncos and soldiers. airmen and marines and that could be the furthest thing from my mind. responsibility for the mistakes being made with generals,

admirals, senior diplomats, ambassadors that the people on the ground are doing their damnedest best they can to execute the orders they have and those orders are very tough and difficult orders. i don't want anyone who is wearing a uniform today to walk out of here feeling like they've been tarred with the brush. anything they're trying to do, they're trying to do as best they can do incredibly difficult and harsh and demanding environment. >> please kindly to take a moment to quickly save thank you to caleb and obviously for what he's doing being on the line for all of us, but additionally for putting his brain to war and having the integrity to try to participate in the symposium for our benefit to your with the crowd level frustrations of corruption among others that

i've heard. and additionally, to be there to try to foster the sort of thought process. is there something we can do? i want to bring up something specific about the corruption and also following on the needs of the food, water, judicial system, policing, none of which sounds like soldiers jobs. and think back to the past two decades. and yeah, i think you mean bill to comment on this. as an outsider, i felt i was witnessing a pillaging the state department budget and perhaps a loss of reliance on what used to be called off power and probably is better described as public diplomacy. now i would suggest one of the solutions for the frustration of the corruption would be to carry and mistake and judicial rewording of the care it and

besides the one service i'm involved with, medical, which is a very valued service, building hospitals, i think additionally a service which leads to future leaders and future stability and education. and so, the schools and vote for health care providers and educators come a system that keeps them in the country said there's not a brain train because that will be the true future of the country and speaking as a citizen in an apparent come in knowing your children will be safe and have some sort of a chance for a future that is greater than your home, i think it does lead to a pride in one's country. and so may be generating some those aspects in afghanistan as an external pressure come you get more of this if your correction happens to stay out of boundaries, which are going to be interfering with our national security and maybe also

would have more jobs available to afghan youth who want jobs as assertions. what does he have any on that. >> over here. >> good afternoon. one thing i want to say as we've seen in america's history that in recent times has been a great difficulty in defining object is. it seems like we're having a hard time seeing what is the objective? what are we supposed to be doing? what is your opinion on the current situation in libya? refers start off by saying we're going to have a no-fly zones in on the u.s. is involved in the british went in. with that 110 tomahawk in an hour straight game troops the ground, where tanks in that kind of thing. i recently saw we got u.s. cia operatives on the ground. you know, are we not following our objective?

what is their objective? and how do you guys believe, you know, how could we stick to our objectives? >> all right, well, i am not a department officer, so this will not be the state department dancers. i can only go by what the president told us, that this is a limited mission to prevent the killing of innocent civilians. clearly that is a carefully crafted statement and is difficult to define what a civilian is, as someone carrying a gun, fighting the libya army and civilians or that a combatant in a disorganized or unorganized force? we are in a very ambiguous

situation and were in a very tight but because at the end of his statement, the president ended his address to the nation by saying that we think gadhafi have to go and that is a statement that could be adjusted to make that we intend to accomplish. i am not clear that's what we intend to accomplish. what has been accomplished is nato a great struggle inside nato, which i am aware of, has now agreed to take on the entire mission. so it is now a nato mission, which is useful because it means we have 27 other nations plus several non-nato nations are involved. qatar has agreed to send some. the uae is going to be involved. so it is not just us fighting.

the command enough for the task worst is canadian air force officer who is part of nato. so i think we've made some progress there, but i would caution all of us as voters and citizens to question the congress has to how far are we going to go with this? this is a legitimate mission to depose a horrible dictator as was the commission and iraq, then what about syria is another horrible to tutor who was killed thousands of his own people already. that's clearly no and documented and you know, you don't have to stuff was serious. you can go to yemen in a lot of places. and by the way, there is a civil war breaking out, which we completely ignore because it's in africa and i can't think of

any other reason why we are ignoring it. the violence there in the death toll there is much higher so far in libya. >> we have lofty ideals about there being applied situationally. yes. >> good afternoon. i do question and also some about the libya middle east situation, but more about discussion i've seen in the media. the president has not said whether or not we will send in the arms of other sorts of weapons over to fight against the libyan army, but i want to know whether it really provides us the type to go advantage to arm them as an historical point of view, whether americans might feel you seen the show before.

we armed them and comes back to bite us in a few years and the obvious financial point of view if we can afford it. i'll take my questions sitting down. >> nothing to do with the state department or anything. i can say whatever i please. if you agree with me how to use a novelist. what does he know? but it seems to me that the question about libya is that it's not. what a difficult thing and these revolutionaries were in danger of being exterminated in gadhafi had even gone on record as saying he's going to hunt them down house to house. now what can we do about it? well, we did what we could and i think we stopped that from happening by the judicious use of airpower. so i thought that was pretty good. i think we can also maintain that.

in other words, it's like what we've got these people and eastern side of the country for by the way are a different tribe. and we can keep gadhafi's forces at bay with very little money and very little expenditure of life if any simplifies if any of his troops popped up, some red line we put in the desert is for you cross this down from the tomahawk and unless those people sorted out and we can at least protect the people who are trying to do a nations democracy. what they understand by the word proceeds, we have no idea and that's why we shouldn't get any further involved in saying that we just don't want wholesale slaughter to go on, particularly if it's a movement in the way of ra deals. and i think we can hold the line there. but to say we want gadhafi out, we don't want them out in slate not our business.

yes? >> good afternoon. i recently had the privilege of traveling to egypt and jordan and meeting with students about the university university of georgia and to my mind and american university in cairo. i got to sit in on some of their classes and one of the main things was how outrageous they are that the words muslims than terrorists can be lumped together in the same category. with that being said, we recently have seen the determination and bravery of this generation with the revolution, particularly nietzsche. i was wondering what kind of role if any you see young militarists playing in the global fight against terrorism. >> well, i think your experience is fascinating and we keep talking about these new problems we are facing about being part of the population itself and were not fighting asymmetrical line troops and weaponry.

and what you just did by going over there is really one of the keys to the future. you coming here and saying yes so everyone hears that this kind of ground truth is just as important as any kind of satellite map a weapon placement anywhere. i mean, i really believe that. the future is just what you did more of. i know that -- i don't know the exact figure, but the amount of the youth population in the middle east is huge under 30 and it's usually unemployed. so i want to step back for a moment. what are we trying to achieve here? we are trying to achieve peace and stability throughout the world so people are killing each other. that's all we're talking about.

what these folks want our jobs of the future. we can't give them all back. that's really if we think about how to spend last tax dollars and armaments overseas. it's another social problem. >> if you don't mind expanding a bit, do you have any impression of what he thought of you and what effect your presence made? >> they were very, very welcoming on facebook friends and a lot of them now and whenever -- they were american policy in their little confused with how we go about things, but in general they understand fighting terrorism. >> i wonder if some of our

problems may be could we solved since this was such a stimulus of each in particular. i think to go back to public diplomacy one of the strongest programs was our financing visitors from other countries to spend time in u.s. universities. it is not the only way to meet some of our national security goals, but it was a strong method. i think if you look at other countries in the region and iran in particular, there is a large young population that is a potential source of alignment between our countries and the source of alignment in her old. >> the interesting thing is in 10 or 15 years when you're in a leadership position, those relationships you form in the classroom and on that exchange are going to become critical, so

it's not just today. it is a significant investment in our future. >> we are cupping against our hard money. i want to say we have time for two more questions. so we can come to that site. >> my name is matthew k. from national guard. my question is directed specifically at mr. segal. you mention afghanistan's lack of involvement in combating taliban forces is due in part to the fact that pakistan is already combating insurgency with its adult workers. if that's the case, why is the pakistanis i sighed continually involved in supporting insurgent activity within afghanistan and even more so on the kashmir region to the north. if you'd like, i can provide specifics. >> in the interest time, it's a fair question that very many pakistan that play here. there is a fundamentalist population, which is not --

which is concentrated mainly in the hills. the isi has used the war in afghanistan, isi for the military intelligence element, which is not completely under control. it's weekend pretty corrupt and pakistan has one of the fastest population growth rates in the world and also one of the fastest whitening gaps between rich and poor in the world ended as a nuclear state, nuclear power. so we have a very strong interest in not being destabilized and i'm becoming a fundamentalist state. if you think that's impossible khomeini to look back in history at general zia outlook was a fundamentalist and he didn't have nuclear weapons. he seriously died in an airplane crash along with the ambassador.

but they have a history of having a fundamentalist in charge of that country. if they take over the nuclear weapons supplied and they are very suspicious that's what we are really focusing on. so this is a very unstable mix and you had to kashmir to the picture. india has 16 u.s. spy. the pakistanis we have no doubts about five. the unions have said that there in the sea in kabul has been attacked three times come every time by a pakistani. so there is a war going on in kashmir. it's a difficult problem. >> good afternoon, ma'am, gentlemen. i'm a senior here. many mischiefs warning and for the past semester i've been

working on my senior seminar project at university history. i've been interviewing him like food served in iraq and afghanistan one of those alumni is stationed there right now. lieutenant colonel r. curry in mazar-e-sharif and she is in charge of a whole bunch of engineering projects. she recently told me and my most recent interview is any project, you believe the number she gave me was under $4 million is given to ask any contractors said they can build their own infrastructure. to me this seems like a really great idea and am curious what you think about that and how do you think we can expand from that so they can take over with the more expensive projects as well? >> it is part of our program and all of our expenditures we have a buy afghan been possible policy and it's not as simple as it sounds because companies

really are there are companies really can't deliver. there was a u.s. army shipping contract given to an individual for $125 million it turns out he counted the tracks. but that said, he was a son of a government administered and said the contract stood. you know, you get into very correct situations because of it's a fledgling economy and their clear roles for banking regulations and so on. it's a good idea and we should do a lot more of it and we should be cautious about where we spend our money. >> thank you very much. >> i think on that note, we're going to adjourn the session. and like to thank our panel for their deep engagement with a lot of questions. [applause] and i'd like to thank carla to

escape organized the panel in admiral schneider, trustees, donors and not least about the cadets, you will hear who our future is in your hands and we hope that today has been a small contribution to gaining some necessary insight for what lies in the future. thank you very much. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> professor paul halliday, what is "habeas corpus"? >> "habeas corpus" is not only

that but was given a scrapbook that a judge sent to jail or in ordering the jailer to bring a named prisoner into his court and along with it what was called a return also had to be on parchment. the unexplained way that jailer was holding a prisoner. for more than just a scrap of parchment and i think even 300 years ago and certainly today, habeas corpus stands in our minds not only in lawyer's mind, but white people's minds for the idea that no one should be held constrained in any way against her will by someone else without the law somehow supervising the constraint, without the law in the personal judge according to law. >> out of the concept of habeas corpus realize? >> well, emphasized the literal piece of the parchment because billy pbs is a legal device long before it is an idea, long

before the kind of idea you and i associate with the term about the great writ of liberty and it being one of the fundamental means by which we ensure freedom constraint. it's actually a very common form of process. when you stop to think about it, courts are commonly dealing with people that have to be in front of them, whether as witnesses. [inaudible] >> that's right. courts are always having two people call people into court. there's lots of instruments to pull you into court to testify to testify because you of somebody at that. it's really kind of ironic in a way that this very humdrum instruments of daily court activity should ultimately come to be associated with ideas about how bought this poster realize that freedom. >> how is it used? >> and lots of different ways. i think that's one of the most interesting and important things

about its history is simply variety and a much greater variety than we associate with the rate today. i mean, people would have been jailed for fathering a child, for not paying taxes, for literally laughing in church. people would've been impressed impressed in the navy. anyone of these things. your spouse who has been beaten and locked up prayer has been. anyone of these might have been occasions for using the writ of habeas corpus to bring someone in front of the judge to be sure that the manaus wasn't constraining them against the law. >> wasn't also a kings right? >> yet, that's a really important point because those of us who know about habeas corpus we call it the great writ of liberty and yes ultimately it is about liberty of that kind did you and i associate with the word, but 30400 years ago people

didn't have the same ideas about liberty. what they did have were notions of sovereignty and the sovereign was literally individually they came. the way habeas corpus not to address the claims of a prisoner upon liberty has been violated. it is really about one officer of the king, the judge being sure the lesser officer, the jailer, didn't disobey the king fahd. disobeying the king file would be to the kings dishonor. so it was very important that the jailer was the kings officer behave. so interestingly, i think one of the things with the rewritten of habeas corpus shows is that the prisoner is really the focus of the writ. the jailer is. >> how does the concept of habeas corpus developed in american society or early revolution society and how did they make its way into our constitution? >> well, they're a couple of different ways to think about

that. my first is the extensive experience we had in north america and of course all the other british colonies around the globe in the 18th century prior to her independence. there is a very extensive experience in colloquial court and of course then caribbean and canadian courts to a lot of ways we have to remember americans are partaking of an experience that british colonialists are happening all over the globe. we find early into u.s. law virtually through that part is. in other words, largely through the silent accommodation of english common law more generally into english american judicial part is. of course the other interesting way is in the constitution in the so-called suspension clause. that is a cause that really puzzles historians and lawyers and naturally has really puzzled

than in recent years because in a lot of ways, the suspension clause brings habeas corpus into our law negatively by saying when it is habeas corpus can't you wouldn't be available. it is a habeas corpus is part of our law. it seems to assume that presidents habeas corpus. >> who is behind that? >> we don't really know. this is one of the things that has been some interest in recent years as u.s. courts have been asking questions about the nature because the typical practice for u.s. courts when they want to figure out what's the history of the constitution, the first thing you want to do is read diaries than the other accounts from the constitutional convention in 1787. but they are probably only a couple of their points total in two or three speakers to speak to the question of habeas corpus during the convention itself. at least from the records that we have. so it is hard to lay this on a

particular person or a particular impulse. instead i think the better way to think about how this comes in law and how it ends up in our constitution is that it was widely assumed to be part of the common law that was going to be carried into american law simply by virtue of having been part of the practice that colonial britain is now american citizens. we're going to have their own law. >> civil war and habeas corpus suspended. any other times? >> i can't speak to that and i want to be very clear i want to pull back a little bit and favorite and strictly about the english and the imperial history. as a matter of fact, i didn't want to write about the american history in part because other people have written about it quite extensively in the part because they've done so successfully. my point was that we had misunderstood the english and imperial prehistory.

not to answer your question, he abuses only formally suspended during the civil war. there have been other moments in american history, especially during world war ii, went the way the writ was used or not used was controversial and has continued to be controversial. one of the interesting things about recent jurisprudence on habeas corpus has been now american courts have generally, because those american decisions have run and countervailing directions have wanted to reach over and pass those american experience is coming back into see if there's some kind of irreducible kernel of history you can get out. >> well, how would they like to take that to your original virginia via article? it was used in a supreme court case. >> that's right. i certainly want to be sure that

your listeners know that i worked on not with a marvelous colleague at the law school here come the g edward white in large part because he knew the american side. i was a specialist in english and imperial part is tonight in writing and thinking about that is an ainu given what had been going on, let's go and get it out there with this guantánamo business, that the english practice was an enormous interest in u.s. courts into my mind they didn't fully understand the history. so i started writing about this in with my colleague, ted, without we've got to work on this. he could help put this into a form that would help connect it to american jurisprudence and not precisely what we did in that article and why ultimately we had a justice kennedy in the 2008 decision of the case cited the article because we were able to connect to the kind of ideas

i just mentioned from the english. , the writ is premised on the kings authority, thus about the ultimate and unquestionable authority of the judge to question any jailer handling any person anywhere. that was really the central premise that justice kennedy lived on out of that review article. the corollary to that was critically at the key thing was that historically the rate by being concerned with the jailer's and not so much with where they were meant that the question about whether or not an american jailer was in guantánamo for philadelphia with less interest and then whether or not the jailer is supposed to answer to u.s. courts and u.s. oversight. i think it is at that point that the english history going back centuries, the idea of the king

and answering to the king comes into play. >> what is the image on the front of your book called? >> that is a marvelous image i remember correctly correctly from the 1780s. 1770s or 1780s. a prisoner is being brought in. interestingly, that is the image of the husband of a woman who had been constrained by him as well. so in a way, it is what you want a callback a doppelgänger in which the court is supervising constrained. he has now been constrained for having previously illegally constrained his wife. but one of the things i loved about that image as it ended up on the cover is that there you have the justices sitting up on the bench and looking down and literally minding the jailers as they are bringing in the hapless prisoner, who may actually rightly be held in this case by

the jailers. of course that's one of the things you learn on habeas corpus pleading and sent off in prisoners aren't legally held. it is not a get out of jail free card. >> what to teach at the university of virginia? >> i teach british history general to undergraduates. i teach english legal history as kind of a survey course also of undergraduates, which is a lot of fun and then i teach graduate students in early modern british history, but particularly at our law school. >> to the law school. teaching on this course is, when you find time to write? [laughter] >> i mentioned the other day in my book festival presentation that i wasn't sure if i was proud or embarrassed or the fact that i spent over 10 years working on that boat. i started for guantánamo. this is a project that came out questions strictly from within what historians call the

historiography. what are the questions about the past in which we don't have good answers? so that the way of saying that you fit in the time to write him in this project, much more cygnet away the time to do the research. one of the keys to this project was that i literally went and studied the rates themselves, which no one had ever before examined. that was the foundation for writing a book about something, about a topic added and written about before and coming to some very different insights about it historians come our come our eyes light up a little bit when we talk about the archive, but it was really quite remarkable when i was in the archive and a real light from the condition of what are called record files, that the fires are messy bundles of parchment, hundreds of them for any given year with writs of habeas corpus and other things than men. the way they are organized are a sinew, and animal sinew court in

stringing together all these rates. at the end of the day, the clerks which is tied up real hard and bundled so tight that you can only read the thing on top and hundreds of things that it cannot be read. i was assigned no one had open these up into, three for centuries. when you are an historian and an archive and you see that come you realize, here is a yet unrealized opportunity. so the real issue in terms of time was finding the time to go to london, finding the time even after you come back, to make sense of after reading thousands of these things, what it adds up to. so comes in between teaching the occasional semester. >> what is the earliest reference to habeas corpus? >> i didn't search out any original moment because i knew that would be probably searching