senator from new jersey. mr. menendez: i ask unanimous consent that further calling of the roll be dispensed with. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. lautenberg: thank you, mr. president. as i stand here today, i am trying to figure out what it might -- what our activities here look like to the average american. they -- they know that we've got serious -- still serious economic problems that although we are on a good track -- and i think it's fair to say that we're feeling a little bit better, but we were cautioned by president obama the other day, those of us who had a chance to sit in a room with him, that

while things are looking up, there is still a long way to go before our people are back to work and before they can afford the basics that they need to take care of their families, and while this is going on -- and we've seen the most incredible courage, the most well-developed military plan imaginable and the courage of our people who went in there, and thank goodness nobody hurt, a job well done, and the execution of a man who helped kill almost 3,000 people at the world trade center, hundreds more and other -- in other attacks on american facilities, the embassy in tanzania, the embassy in kenya,

the ship, the u.s.s. cole, taking american lives, and that's what their determination was to do. and our president, president obama, after lots of years of previous administrations looking at things, trying to figure out what to do to stop this terrorist -- these terrorist attacks on america, president obama had the courage to say make a decision that would have rested so heavily on his ability to govern, to take the risk, knowing that our people were so well trained, so well committed that they -- the chances of their failure was very slim but very real. and so good things have happened in america. i think not only did we succeed in at least slowing down if not

eliminating some of the terrorist threat that we have in america, it also lifted the spirits of americans across the country. they all felt better about it because we fought back against this terror threat. and so when i -- i look at where we are and listen to the debate, look at what the house of representatives has done with their majority in terms of this point in time when we are still reeling in shock, having had perhaps the greatest recession since the great depression of the 1920's and 1930's, and instead of trying to figure out ways to solve the problems, they are -- our colleagues on the republican side are trying to figure out ways to punish the public, to say to them okay, so

you don't have enough jobs. well, we're going to try to reduce the possibility that you will -- that we will have enough, to reduce the possibility that a person who can learn but isn't well off can get an education. they want to take away those opportunities. they want to take away programs that have succeeded. when you look back, mr. president, at our history in the last 90 years and you ask how did we get here, how did we get where we are, 400,000 americans were killed in world war ii. they are planning during president roosevelt's days in the new deal. the planning that president johnson offered when we had programs earlier, we had social

security developed. and then came medicare and then came medicaid. programs that helped people. and on a personal basis for me, these years, -- those years i'm talking about were particularly significant. i was born to a poor family. my father found it very difficult to earn a living, as did millions of other americans. he worked in the factory, soap factory in the city of new jersey, paterson, new jersey. he worked there. he was a man very conscious of his health. but the problem was that the environment was such that he contracted cancer when he was 42. he died when he was 43 years old. and his brother, working in the

same type of facility, he died when he was 52. my grandfather who worked in the mills died when he was 56 years old, and that was life as i saw it. things were bleak. my mother was a 37-year-old widow, and she had to carry on through my father's sickness and bought a store to try and make ends meet. didn't do very well, but it kept her going for a while. but when all was over, my father died, i was already in the army -- already enlisted in the army, and my mother had no resources left. she owed doctors, owed pharmacists, owed hospitals, every penny she had was gone. and i looked at this experience and i thought there's something not fair here. but i was lucky. i was able to get my education under the g.i. bill, as did

eight million other people who wore the american uniform during those dark days. and what happened? i got an education. i went to columbia university. i was lucky. my tuition was paid for. i even got some money for books and some things that i might have needed along the way were provided. and it made a world of difference. it made a world of difference, mr. president. i was able with two friends to start a business. the company is fairly well known. it's called a.d.p. we started with nothing, three of us. their father also -- the two brothers with whom i was associated. their father also worked in the factories of paterson. they were immigrants, as were my grandparents, and -- but along

came this educational opportunity and with that came an opportunity to start a business, and today that company , a.d.p., is one of the four most creditworthy companies in the united states. they're listed as three-star companies. and a.d.p. has 45,000 employees. 45,000 employees. we work in 21 countries. most of the operation is in america, but lots of it outside. and here we employ over 40,000 -- 45,000 employees and help businesses by taking over a particular part of their record-keeping needs, so we helped making things better operating in the country, and

every month now, there is a labor statistic that is printed, that is put out, it's done by a.d.p., my old company. and our numbers are more reliable than those of the bureau of labor statistics because the data are fresher. every week, the -- some 35 million people get their paychecks through and we -- not we, they -- i left we when i came here 27 years ago or 29 years ago. and so -- so in america, they gave people like me a chance to do things and created what was called the greatest generation. the greatest generation in the history of america. and now, mr. president, i'm beginning to see what i consider

is a great generation developing. the number of people that are getting to work, the fewer claims for unemployment insurance. there is more spending, more consumer spending. retail sales are up. signs are good. and so, mr. president, when i look and i see what's going on in the house of representatives, the stubbornness of our colleagues, as i see it, to step in and say look, we have to keep the government strong, we have to make sure that we supply the kind of energy to the government, to the administration that can move america along, and their response is cut, cut, cut, cut, cut, when all the other social programs that i mentioned were expansion of government services. and, thusly, what's happened is we want to cut, we want to cut

-- the we want to cut. i'm not one of those who wants to cut. i'm one of those who wants to reduce the deficit. mr. president, when you look at a balance sheet, a financial statement, it carries two parts. one part is expenses, costs. and the other part is revenues. and you can cut expenses all you want, but if the revenues don't improve, you go bankrupt. pretty simple. and that's where we're being asked to put our future on the line. hold the debt ceiling at ransom, for what? it will destroy the confidence in america. it will destroy our ability to be the country we are, the country that leads the worl word still, despite competition. so, when i left home this

morning, mr. president, i passed an exxon station that's fairly near my home. there was a sign on the pump that said -- that gave the price of gas. almost $4.79 a gallon. $4.79 a gallon. and for people who have any distance to travel, this is painful. this is painful. this is part of the income that they can use for basic things that are needed. and what do we see? we see major gasoline companies, and we ask ourselves, who are our colleagues -- whose side are they on? it appears that they're on the side of the gasoline companies.

i think we ought to be more conscientious about this and make sure that the public understands that we are there for them for the majority of the people in this country, who are sick and tired of seeing the price gouging that we have seen from the gasoline companies. and we ask the question, and there was a finance committee hearing today, and i saw much of it through the -- through television, and i saw how the heads of these companies, of the five big companies, big oil, big gas, what are they worried about? wwell, they're worried about and it was even said in kind of a cause stick comment, that it might be un-american to away the subsidies that these people get, $4 billion a year dshedz 4

billion a yea -- and they're wod about these subsidies they get. when you look at what it is that's going on with these companies, you see astounding results. and make no mistake, greed is fueling their appetite, and the bigger it gets, the more they want. and during the years that we talked about -- in world war ii -- that i talked about, world war ii, there was a tax on excess profits, that said that companies shouldn't be feeding off of the opportunity that war presented and take advantage of the public. and, mr. president, we're at war, in case people forget about it. afghanistan is a real war.

we still have the remnants of difficulties in iraq. and we've got piracy on the seas. we've got all kinds of things that we have to keep fighting for. and so there ought to be some recompense for our country for the opportunity they have to make these kinds of -- this kind of money. here, these are during the first three months of 2011, which is still part of the recession time. exxon, over $10 billion, end-of-quarter profit, $10 billion. shell, almost $9 billion. b.p., $7.1 billion. that's after they -- after their foul mistake in the gulf of mexico. that cost o plenty of money. they still that i had ma kind of money. chevron, $6.2k billion. and then little conoco, they only made $3 billion in the

quarter. and look how much these c.e.o.'s are paid. and when you think about it, the irony is that how well b.p. has done, a company that's spewed 200 million gallons of oil into the ocean last year, and why is our government shoving billions of dollars into the pockets of their executives, their lawyers? why -- why shouldn't we -- why don't we use the money to invest in a stronger america, pay down our debt? i'd like to see us doing that. but big oil's greed is helping to inflate our deficit. and every day americans are fooght the bill -- are footing the bill. you'd think our colleagues on the other side of the aisle would want to put a stop to this madness, step up for the average

person. well, so far we're not doing what we had like -- what i speak for those who agree with me, what we'd like to see doing -- being done for the average citizen. big oil is doing everything in its power to protect its subsidies, and the republicans are doing everything in their power to help them. the republicans say eliminating these wasteful subsidies will raise gas prices. that's wrong. it's plain wrong. and we look at the compensation of the c.e.o.'s here -- now, they're not selling pretzels or making potato chips. they are dealing with a commodity that's essential to the functioning of our society, of mankind. the c.e.o. at exxon, he got $29 million. conocophillips, $18 million. self ron, $16 million.

this is -- these are all in 2010 for the year just recently concluded. and so we want to assure -- make certain that people understand that people -- companies who pay their fair share in taxes isn't going to hurt the industry. in just means big oil executives may have to make -- do with a smaller swimming pool, maybe smaller yacht, but no real pain or punishment there. the fact of the matter is, the big off oil c.e.o.'s aren't feeling this recession. instead of making our government more fiscally responsible by ending big oil's big give way, the -- big oil's big giveaway,

they want to cut the deficit as we know t won't save us any money in the long-term. it will crates expenditures many are forced -- continent afford and are forced to rely on medicaid and other community programs for their health. seniors are struggling. big oil companies are, ainsdz wish that the other side would listen a little more closely to the wishes. -- to the wishes of the american people. almost three-quarters of the americans say stop giving billions in tax breaks to the big oil companies each year. the american people know that these subsidies are unnecessary, infect tirvetion and immoral-- --infect tirvetion and immoral. and it is not like the oil industry is taking its $4 billion annual -- annual $4 billion windfall and investing it in our country's future. no, in addition to going into the paychecks of the big oil executives, this money is being

used to line the pockets of the industry's lawyers and lobbyists who are seeing frequently and obviously around here. well, i've seen this time and time again during my career in the senate. i was the first senator on the scene at the exxon valdez had rammed into the alaskan shoreline in 1989. when instead of being forthcoming and doing what they should have done, exxon fought over every penny with the communities in alaska. the families and the fish #ermen whose descrieives it destroyed. -- whose lives it destroyed. instead of stepping up to pay the court-awarded damages of $5 million, exxon said, to health care with that verdict-- --to heck with that vempletd we'll fight it. we'll fight it all the way.

and they did. for years knocked down the amount from $5 million t billio0 million. they paid a health care of a price to the lawyers. they'd rather give it to them than to the american people. in the end, took more than 20 years for exxon to pay for what it had done. some victims died while waiting for the company to make things right. we should not be giving big oil $4 billion in tax breaks each year. their profits exceeded for the year last year $100 billion, these companies. larger than lots of countries. we should be investing in ways to break our dangerous addiction to oil. we should be investing in innovative approaches to moving people and goods, including increasing funds for transit, creating a world-class high-speed rail network, and

expand #-g the number of things like electric cars on our road. we should also boost our country's clean energy industry making sure we lead the world in the export of environmental products that are currently stamped "made in the u.s.a." labeled on them. don't be fooled. drilling will not in the final analysis get us out of our energy problems. we use almost a quarter of the world's oil, but we sit on less than 3% of the world's reserve. so drilling is going to just quickly bring the end of our ability to produce oil, and that will be the conclusion. according to the united states energy information administration, even if we open every offshore drilling area in the continental u.s., the averages price of gasoline would not drop by just 3 cents a

gallon by the year 2030. and here we see it. the increased benefit of more drilling will save us 3 cents a gallon in two decades. these not very promising for -- that's not very promising for people who have to rely on their automobile for all kinds of things in their lives. so continuing to subsidize oil companies only increases our dependence on dirty fuels, and even as our children pay a heavy price for asthma victims, other respiratory problems, it keeps us on a dead-end road to sky-high energy bills, more oil spills like the one we saw in the gulf, and dangerous pollution levels. investing in clean alternatives to oil, cars go further on a gallon of gas and smarter transportation like mass transit are the only realistic solutions to our energy challenges. and beyond clean energy,

investments, we should take the $4 billion we give away to big oil each year and use money to pay down our deficit. thea's it's pretty clear that we cannot restore fiscal sanity to our government unless we start paying more attention to the revenue column in our ledger. now, i was a c.e.o. for many years, and as i said earlier, you know -- i know that you can't run a company or a country without a strong revenue flow. ending the government's wasteful oil industry subsidies won't be enough to erase our deficit, but it is a good place to start. so, at this point in time, i call on my colleagues, be -- have a citizen heart, look at this thing as you would any other obligation that you have

in your life, make sure that our country is strong and that our middle class earners can look ahead at a life for themselves and educating their children and protecting their parents with proper health care. get big oil off of the welfare rolls. let's end the descries tax breaks and break our country's addiction to oil and other dirty fuels. let's invest in clean energy, smart transportation, cut the wind spoils to the oil industry lobbyists and lawyers. i want to make sure -- and i'm sure all of us now need to -- make sure our children and grandchildren inherit a country that's fiscally sound and morally responsible. mr. president, with that i yield the floor. call the roll. the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent on tuesday, may 17 at 10:00 a.m. -- that's 2011, the senate proceed to executive session to consider calendar number 31, two hours of debate equally divided in the usual form. upon the use or yielding back of time the senate proceed to vote without intervening action or

debate on calendar number 31, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid on the table with no intervening action or debate, that no further motions be in order to the nomination, any statements related to the nomination be printed in the record and the president be immediately notified of the senate's action and the senate resume legislative session. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i now ask, mr. president, consent the senate proceed to calendar number 41, s. 498. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: calendar number 41, s. 498, a bill to ensure objective independent review of task and delivery orders. the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent the committee-reported amendment be agreed to, the bill as amended be passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, there be no intervening action or debate, any statements relating to this matter appear in the record at the appropriate place as if given. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask consent the

intelligence committee be discharged from further consideration of s. res 96. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: senate resolution 86 recognizing the defense intelligence agency on its 50th anniversary. the presiding officer: without objection, the committee is discharged and the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent the resolution be agreed to, the preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, there be no intervening action or debate, any statements related to this matter appear at the appropriate place in the record as if given. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent that we now proceed to s. res 181, 182, 183 and we do that en bloc. the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed en bloc. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent that the resolution be agreed to, the preambles be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table

en bloc with no intervening action or debate, any statements related to this matter be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if given. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask consent that we now proceed to h. con. res. 16. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h. con. res. 16, concurrent resolution augting the use -- authorizing the use of the capitol grounds for the greater washington soapbox derby. the presiding officer: the senate will proceed -- without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, there be no intervening action or debate, any statements relating to this matter be placed in the record at the appropriate place as if read. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask consent now, mr. president, we proceed to h. con. res. 46. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h. con. res. 46, concurrent resolution authorizing the use of the capitol grounds for the national peace officers memorial service. the presiding officer: without

objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, there be no intervening action or debate, any statements relate to go this matter appear at the appropriate place in the record as if given. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i now ask we proceed to h. con. res. 50. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h. con. res. 50, a concurrent resolution providing for a conditional adjournment of the house of representatives. mr. reid: mr. president -- the presiding officer: without objection, the senate will proceed to the measure. mr. reid: i ask that matter that we received from the house which is at the desk, the concurrent resolution be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, there be no intervening action or debate. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i am told there are two bills at the desk due for their first reading. the presiding officer: the clerk will report. the clerk: h.r. 1229, an act to amend the outer continental shelf lands act and so forth and

for other purposes. s. res 990, a bill to provide for additional temporary extension of programs under the small business act and so forth and for other purposes. mr. reid: mr. president, i now ask for second reading en bloc, but i object to my own request en bloc. the presiding officer: objection is heard. mr. reid: i now -- the presiding officer: the bills will be read the second time the next legislative day. mr. reid: pardon my interruption, mr. president. i now ask consent that the appointment at the desk appear separately in the record as if made by the chair. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask consent that when the senate completes its business today it adjourn until 2:00 p.m. on monday, may 16, that following the prayer and pledge, the journal of proceedings -p approved to date the morning hour be deemed expired and the time be reserved for use later in the day. following leader remarks the senate proceed to a period of

morning business for debate only until 5:00 p.m. with senators permitted to speak for up to ten minutes each. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: the next roll call vote will be around noon on tuesday, may 17 on the confirmation of the nomination of susan carney of connecticut to be united states circuit court judge. senators are encouraged to come to the floor on monday to debate the carney nomination. mr. president, i believe there is no further business to come before the senate. if that is traourbgs and i believe it is -- if that is true, and i believe it is, i ask we adjourn under the previous order. the presiding officer: the senate stands adjourned until senate stands adjourned until

>> today a senate attended a meeting with president obama at the white house to talk about the negotiations. we've have more live senate coverage here on c-span2.

>> now senior military chiefs questioned by the house of commons defense committee in london on operations in afghanistan. the united kingdom has 10,000 troops deployed. they covered events in 2006 when british forces took responsibility of helmand provinces in the south, the most violence region in the country. they reflect on issues like u.s.-u.k. military relations on the ground and the impact of bin laden's death with the afghan conflict.

this haven't runs about an hour and a half. [inaudible conversations] >> gentlemen, we have a commission on this evidence session in afghanistan. the purpose is to do two things, first to look at what happened in 2006 and if the way of the structure in which we went into he'll -- helmand and what happened subsequently and second to look at the current situation in afghanistan. the issue of the current situation in afghanistan is something that i would like to

get on to at 20 past 11 in order to finish the committee meeting by 12 if that is acceptable to the committee and to the witnesses, but -- so that will explain why i try to rush things once we get to those times. cds, would you be kind enough to introduce your team and at some stage the positions you occupied in 2006 as well? thank you. >> well, thank you very much, and a pleasure to be here doing our constitutional duty, and we're very grateful for the committee's work on behalf of the defense general. it's good to be here. we agreed always to tell you the

truth so that you can do your work too. my team, i think you probably know, but for the record is general nick holden, the vice chief of defense staff, and general, the chief of the general staff. would it help if we said now what we did in 2006? >> i think it would. >> well, i think i was a nato officer in that period just to remind you. i was commander, and in november i think it was of 2004, the then prime minister tony blair said that the ark, hq ark would take the responsibility of the command and control and nato's agreed expansion into the south and the east so i went there in january 2005, and i was in that capacity all through the period of 2006-2007 that you'll be looking at. >> the year of 2006, i was in a

iraq as a senior military represent representative in iraq, and i did that job from early october 2005 through late march 2006. it's pertinent the price of that. i was the department of chief of the staff of the military defense and two star deputy to general pry who is giving evidence. i was the material part of the genesis in the commitment of 2006, but sort of the last three months of 2005 and 2006 i was in iraq, and came back from that mid-march 2006, span round, and by the end of march, literally the last couple days, i assumed the day of joint operations in northwood and chief joint operations for three years from 2006 to 2009 before taking on my current appointment, and from

that time clearly very involved with the very early days of the deployment into helmand. >> thank you. >> in february 2005, in the general job of the deputy of chief operations, responsible for the day-to-day running operations in iraq, afghanistan, and anywhere else we had to go, and i did that job for almost exactly two years until february 2007 which in the context of the questions i think you're going to ask us today means i was directly involved in all of the planning for the deployment to afghanistan after the key strategic decisions had been taken, and then responsible for the oversight from the north bend of operations in helmand through 2006. >> thank you. now, i think you may all have had the opportunity to see on

the subcommittee's website, the evidence given by former witnesses including general reed lower fry, and if there is anything you wish to correct from your perspective in that evidence, please take that opportunity of the morning to do so. >> in the first question, i'd like to ask is do you think it was wise to push for the deployment into helmand in 2006, and what was your own role in that deployment and that decision to go into helmand? >> well, remembering i was by then in my nato role, but briefly i think of what happened in this country, but just to

remind you the decision to go into helmand was a bigger decision for nato than the north and east. we were more sure of it at the time and the campaign needed jittering up, that someone had to decide which providence each of the whole league nations in the decision to go to the south would take the canadians, the british, the dutch, and to a degree with american support, and that process led to the u.k. going into helmand. somebody had to do helmand, but we were the most capable of the four nations. i personally thought there was a strong case for kandahar, but ended up in helmand for reasons

i suspect they no more than i do about. >> okay. >> three parts of the questions -- was it right to go to helmand and was it right to go then? in terms of was it right to go at all, i think in many respects, it was a level of decision making, a decision within the uscr and within nato -- a discussion at the political level in nato to galvanize the nature of both the international communities and nato on the international community's behalf to to bring about change in afghanistan in terms of it being as it were an unsafe place, a place that was

host to international terrorism and for which the delivery of good government was essential so i think in terms of going, the genesis of that from an international political level was right. to helmand, peter will have some views on this as well. i think that it was inevitable that the united kingdom as a leading player in nato has to play a leading part in what was assessed to be as it were the most challenging part of the country, and therefore it needed to be somewhere in the south, and within the context of the various decision making during 2005. it was quite clear that the canadians were very keen to take on kandahar. helmand was the next most appropriate place to go. i think helmand as it were the political deal as who attended who did what in the south,

helmand was the right place. was it the right time? that's the only thing on which i might hesitate because i think in terms of decision making, relating to committing after that time, some of it certainly from my knowledge in 2005 was based on a realistic, but subsequently optimistic view of what our level in iraq would be by that. the level of reduction in commitment in iraq that has been forecasted and hoped for in 2005 has not actually materialized in 2006, but i sense there was an ire irreversibility given the political and international level of the decision, and it was at no detriment to the most robust force package.

>> let me go into the business of what it right. i'm not sure what to judge here and certainly what i detected from february 2005, at which point the u.k. presence in afghanistan was in kabul. they were in pretty benign environments with a strong sense of a property peg in the south that needed to be nipped in the bud. they were strong in momentum of us coming out of london for us to get engaged in this in a very constructive way. there was no sense of commitment here. after all, the ark head jr. quarters had -- headquarters had been identified as the sort of level of commitment they needed to galvanize the results within the tolerance of the americans who proceed their operation during freedom process in the south and

the east to nato command. that level of competence implied the national commitment. down at the regional level with a light presence prior to our planning to this, it was put on us to try to work with the other nations that were going to be part of this effort in the south to start putting together the concept of operations and that was done in pj's cue. the canadians were very clear their ambitions was to play a dominant role in this and felt that kandahar because of its importance in the region and kabul, i think it would be putting words in their mouth to say they pitched their ambition to be a key player there, and helmand was the next place you looked at in this mosaic, and it

was, of course, consistent with the fact that the u.k. at this time had the ga lead in afghanistan and helmand was a significant element of that issue. a number of factors led to he'll mapped being -- helmand being our place. >> okay, thank you. >> when these decisions were being made about going into helmand, what was the perception on what you were expecting to find when you got there? who was giving you that view? >> this is something we thought an awful lot about over the middle of 2005 to try to understand what was going on there in light of the existing operation during freedom presence which was in the case of helmand a provengessal

reconstruction team investing large amounts of money into the quest of the population. on the back it led to the department of helmand in the 1950s as an agriculture area. as well as that, they had them some military operations there and groups in the south that used to make occasional parts into parts of helmand and kandahar, and we tried to ang tis pace what kind of force we would need to prom mull gait governments at the most pop

populated areas to deliver wide security, but this was a key question through our minds in 2005. >> go ahead. >> well, i just wanted to ask about this whole business of intelligence because in large part in the helmand part, the americans had about 100 people wandering around in that area, a huge, huge geographic area. how many -- i remember visiting 16 before they deployed and discussing with them what they thought they were about to encounter, and then a couple weeks later discussing with them in theater what they've actually experienced, and quite clearly, their intelligence exponentially increased because they came up against the tribes and so on. they didn't seem to have any graded intelligence of inequality about what they were

about to encounter. why was it that this in terms of this intelligence? >> i absolutely expect what we -- accept what we found on terms of forces on the ground were starkly different than what we anticipated and were hoping for. to be fair, we had discussed with the side of kandahar relations and the relations they had to fight their way on winning, so the idea they were going to kind of soldier in to set up camp and fill them with good deeds were not what we were anticipating. we were ready for an adverse reaction, but we did not, to be fair, expect it to be as vivid as it turned out to be. in terms of what had gone on in the proceeding months to try and

anticipate the intelligence situation, we did a number of things over the proceeding six months setting up a preliminary operations team under the then kernel messager which was a cross-government team to make a plan, actually called the helmand road map, and at the time planned to build many roads, but it was a plan to meld the security operations and building on the experiences of the cross-government in iraq which was not that finely tuned. here's an opportunity to take a hold of iraq. one of the other things that had not gone well in iraq if we're honest is our understanding of the situation, our ability to garner the intelligence picture down to tribal level. this was on the tip of our tongues throughout the whole

period. we with respect about to, you -- weren't about to, you know, emulate the inaccuracies of our effort as far as we were concerned. we wanted to get the picture as close as possible. we were understudy. the u.k. intelligence agencies were actively engaged with their american counterparts. there was wide consultation with academics. we even had a scholar in psq who fought there. we had a rig team in our intelligence cell with a general who has a little bit of history on shedding light on what might happen in these situations. i can't complain about the quality of people we had. we were working hard as well as everybody else to try to get the best assessment of what might be there when we hit the ground.

>> if i may, while doing work, and i remember a number of meetings with lord reed, and it's not my job to defend politicians and their statements, but because we with respect, sir, and there was in some republics a failure despite the effort to try to get it right, he did give the task force helicopters and artillery because we had to be prepared for the unexpected. i think the root of the problem was we could not know enough about the northern part of helmand until we got there. there was one way to do it because it was basically enemy territory and alien, but there was a good picture building up that was positive. the crops were growing, and

arguably, it turned up in horribleness, but no one knew that until you did it so although that is always going to be lacks in intelligence or an alarming to think you would know everything you think you need to know about your enemy, and the processes were in place to deliver the best we could, but how we store is it is the case and really get on the ground and know who is what that your picture starts to rapidly develop, and that is historically the case in every conflict. i have to say despite all our high-tech, it will continue to be so. >> if i could just add, in my list of things was not trying to pretend this was a failure of intelligence once. reenforcing cbs's point, we had always anticipated, i think, taliban's intent, but what we underestimated was their capacity. >> i want to hear what the

chairman hads to say, because you took a particular position at this time and whether or not there was question of possibility delays and consequent knowledge is something to address as well. >> my point on that is if you were able to wind back the strategic clock on decision making would there have been an ability to deconflict more the results that resulted to separate operations. i wanted to come in -- >> deconflict two different operations? >> our commitment to iraq stayed at a higher level for longer than was anticipated in the original genesis of the planning. >> [inaudible] >> i think my point about a couple things i wanted to add on the business of what is a failure of intelligence and what cbs says intelligence is not perfect. some people think if you apply your intelligence to thee intelligence, the future is

defined with certainty. that's not at all the case, but i think there were and i might because i get around to the middle of this, but reflecting on it, there were a number of factors emerging in those early months which you can now reflect on to better explain why the hornets nest was. the intent factor of copy e radification at the time of the deployment and there was therefore in the minds of some local helmands and within the taliban the idea that these forces that are arriving are coming here to eradicate your puppy and take your living away. that worked against us in terms of tray stegic their tie. -- narrative. that was emphasized over the summer and spring campaign. what we found to that in

retrospect, this is the natural start of the fighting season if one is to be had. some 2,000 laborers my grat north -- migrate north from pakistan to helmand alone. they are happy to stay for hire if there is a local tribe or fight that they can earn money in. they have incentives to stay on, and in many ways you populate of eradication gave them a cause. as part of the preparation for our rival, the americans and cjtf76 were conducting a series of operations that culminated in mountain thrust which in many ways was part of the american's desire to create an easy entry for us, but i think it is very possible that this actual,

because it was a particularly connectic operation, there was much going on about which on a nation-to-nation basis we could moderate this and acted as whipping up the environment. the night before the last is that for reasons not administered, and i think this was sco led or whatever, decisions were made about what the nature of the government and governor in helmand should be, so characters known to many of you, sma, was removed as the governor, and the new governor called doud, which i just don't think was sort through, was to completely destabilize the tribal balance of the balance of power within normal helmand -- northern helmand, so i'm just making the point that yes, lots

of rigorous intelligence described was carried out leading to a fairly robust force package to deal with the hostile environment, but if you put narcotics, taliban, fighting season, the american connectic operations which were previewed in accompaniment of our deployment and the upsetting of the tribal balance, i think that is a more comprehensive explanation of quite why the situation on the ground was not that of what intelligence had forecasted. >> that's a fascinating answer which, although long, was not one that i have heard before, and i'm grateful to you for that. i'm sorry that we've got to move on quite rapidly now. >> [inaudible] >> [inaudible] >> how it affected things? >> he was not there at that

time. hugh was part of the changing scene too 12 months later. >> i'd like to talk about the admission change. you seen the evidence that we received from butler in which he says he didn't make the decisions alone. i wonder if you could just explain to us how a decision was made, who was involved, and why the decision was made then? why at that point? >> well, if i could start, i was not responsible at the time for the south. i took over on the 31st of july, but i was monitoring what was happening and discussed with general icheberry who had respondent for what was happening at that time within helmand and the rest of the

south. i don't think it's fair to describe it as a change of mission. i think it was a change of tactics and although i note on a number of books on the subject, i personally was opposed to what we now know as the house concept. i was very forgiving the brigade butler's need to respond to some very strong political pressure, largely from governor doud, and it was certainly to a degree instigated, but this is natural, by the way, by president karzai because he felt nato was on the brink of taking over responsibility and things were getsing away from him on the backs of taliban in a number of places, but included northern helmand, so the british, my perspective, is they were just

another nation that had responsibility or was going to have responsibility for and came under a lot of pressure to respond to that actual political requirement on karzai's part to be seen as doing more about what was happening north of helmand, but it ties to the general's point that on the back of the replacement by doud, there was a lot of political pressures in kabul stirred up by sma who would say i was running a good show, doud your replacement, you have to say progress, so brigade butler was put in a difficult decision. it was not the tactical planning we agreed, but it was the aid they had to bring forward, and as you all know, the troops chose to implement that, and it was not in place, and it became

a pretty brought year. >> this was not a decision that was made by brigade butler, the tactical commander alone. he did it with pj and we anticipated in the case and articulated as lord reed testified to you that this was tactical and desirable, but the thing in which political pressure was starting to build. it was something that those on the u.k. side and other departments who worked very hard to put doud in place had equities, and so it happened that i was on a program visit to lasakar and where the crisis started to unfold, the timing of it was driven because the

taliban had the districts of northern helmand under pressure, and the doud's perception, his lack of tribal influence to the reasons that nick has talked about. he was not able to pull this off with a behind the scenes politicking. there was undoubtedly pressure coming from the axis, and if the government flag had fallen in any of the district centers and the taliban flag had replaced it, and it was titanic stuff like that, battle of the flag poles and stuff like that, then the u.k. effort in terms of its recognition of afghan political motivation from the sort of provenn issue level or district level all the way up to the national level as was suggested was going to be in sort of political jeopardy, its

credibility in question just at the time when a u.k.-led headquarters was starting to take ownership in the operation. any suggestion this was a sort of whim by brigade butler on the day is repulsive. everybody else, as far as i know, was aware of this, closely involved. the military tactical risks were considered. it was accepted that this could be done at measured risk for a limited time frame, and we were then sort of having real stresses if it got extended beyond a short term period to shore up security of these district centers essentially to keep governor doud in power. >> there's a line of questioning that we ought to just throw into the mix here because most of the

questioning that i have on this, and, you know, the bbc are making a documentary about it at the moment, don't come at it from the position of what would have happened had we just stuck to plan a and taken no account of the changing situation, what is not normally recognized as a military approach. i believe that we would have had a political failure. we would have had a significant credibility problem in terms of the u.k. initiatives in the south and wider integrations of the two missions, and we still would have had a hell of a fight with the taliban, but it would have happened closer in the sense of the population rather than in the more remote districts, so it would have had greater resonance had we not done this even though the outcome was very unattractive. ..

could have undermined if the operations the outset. i think perhaps if i could add any more value, you know, to what degree of visibility was there all this indecision as operations to get the best possible understanding to decision-makers documented so we

can go one strategic convergence without political authority to do that. i dug out the best record of all this is probably the chief of staff minutes of may and june. i think it is clear from the record of the chief of staff and born after the minutes of the 24th of may depriest achieves about the proposed of concept. the 24th of may and the best concert 28 even though there'd been presence there in the build up. on the 24th of may in the battle procedure, a chief of staff committee meeting is immediately followed by ministerial briefing and briefed the proposed concept.

the next two and i'll be exhausted. the following meeting on the 31st of may i was able to report and that the concept was bearing down while and had a good local reaction to it. i think at that time raised the first chiefs have persuaded themselves as mutual. this is going to be sustained over time. it will put additional pressure on the sustainability and i was reinforced a week later i said yes, the helicopter damage to this. at the moment were only proposing to do it for one month in order that initial political concern that engineer governorship would be undermined

bush was referred to as the battle of the flat polls fighting over a number district would probably have been an admission as it were. very quickly, as the record development, if there is this conversation that the nature of the conflict is going to be resource of greater concern in the tactical command to me i think david actually who are having conversations with was going to come to a situation were to create percentage of the force was fixed in place rather then being open to maneuver. there is this narrative of dialogue that we need to maneuver for that performed various republics. but i say all that to go back to

the earlier in the chief of staff committee that there would be a requirement for early or significant to the north of rangoon to support the governments of the diet. so to dismiss any idea, this is sort of happening in some plot box of military decision-making and was not completely inadvertent to the chiefs of staff administers at the time. i would say quite right here at john bettman. but my memories of lord browne was that he was understanding. and he was only supportive about the judgments on the ground and the objects of political necessity to do this -- the reality is that research

intensity of this quickly becoming known as may turned into june. the theory match, everybody understanding what was going on, not some compartmentalized military. >> we understood what it was the transfer this from being a one-month long process to something more. >> at the moment, at the outset it was for one month to see whether or not the new disposition would work, for which we could draw back if necessary and the water running dialogue as to whether or not staying in dataset made sense in the guts of the thing at the time. you know, technically it was for carriers strategically, not fatally. he will remember as the year went on it was decided really at

the time the three commando brigade arrived that it was important to create the circumstances under which we could get out. it was too dangerous to hold. it was not a strategic benefit to us and a deal was arranged, a 14-point plan for memory, reasoning of local police under which isaf came out. the aftermath initial month was a constant decision. where should they come out of? where do we need to stay clinics is determined for the longer. so they would probably never be a specific date for the overall

decision that you incrementally move to a lay down which counterbalance the available resources, static security and ability to maneuver. if i had my own view on this, i think we would collectively read a sigh of relief when the commander braeburn n., brought additional equipment and was a far more balanced way down. we have successfully got through the initial deployment without it undermining the local governorship of afghanistan. >> i think the simple answer of course was dow didn't go away. he hadn't managed in the time in the early weeks to secure his

political influence and of course others were actively against a knife i carried on. >> i've got to move on for going to get onto the current operations. >> was that he briefing of lord browne of lord browne and his presentation to us says it was briefed, but briefed respectively. >> is that right? >> to be honest, there was no meetings or record that i can interrogate to try to dissemble the detail at the time. on the 24th of may was the ministerial meeting that followed. at that time, there had dirty been some investment of military presence in many of those, but

it might only have been temporary for a particular operation would come out. and the formal adoption of the concept was consequence of that briefing. 2627 was fully vested and i'm pretty certain that's not to say there had not been running battles with people going in and coming out prior to that time. the emergence of the idea of the platoon house confab in some people predated that briefing. >> thank you. and if the state hadn't been around, and the minister would have been. >> you know, the troop levels at the time and went assessment was

made by the nat and whether there was a sufficient requirement in july. we've had evidence before that actually there were strains leading up to this point anyway about suspicions resources to do with the tasks in how men. perhaps you can clarify whether it was sufficient in what was required. >> he was quite clear that if there was a requirement in the commanders could refine, he will do his best to deliver on it. one of the early list for more helicopters are not trained that it actually an uplift in the rational helicopter hours and that was by find them harder, sending out more. that was relative by the end of

june. three other big things i recall. one, and many of them but the most important resource can turn having reread the minutes as the force protection at kandahar airfield and the conservative philosophy strategic et aircraft. do not lead to deployment of a force protection in the royal air force that number. what could strategically unhinge this campaign if you were shot down? and second but the realization that 15% of the force came out six weeks then. primarily there was an engineer search in order to increase the pace. so those were the only resource. it wasn't a matter of 10 more.

they were also does higher-level concern about web resources needed. but perhaps the whole left side is there is a constant debate that matches the dynamics has commanded the resources. those are the only ones. >> at the time, the maneuver capability and support the initial optimistic assessment when the whole thing was that the u.s. would come and with all sorts of support for additional resources from elsewhere to carry the performance. the needs changed dramatically. so where was the ability to meet those needs to give you the supply and also maneuver capability? >> well, they were quite right

there were agreements with the americans to get disestablished. one thing you've got to remember is the full operating capability of the deploying task force wasn't due to the first of july. so we were deploying. >> the enemy may practice room. >> there's still only piece which you can get out that defined the rifle -- table know this. we changed it around to get more out there quicker because we were employed as we were deploying the force. they were preaching things from the americans that would run out a full operation capability when alert on helicopters or army had deployed. that was the end of the preaching. we did incremental uplifts the change out and they came with a

greater amount of protecting mobile equipment. primarily at the time. >> is there anything you would like to add? >> no, chairman. i endorse that it wasn't for us to find a net theater ready output. it couldn't have been easier to get it there either and therefore we were in terms of the neighbors which were the critical drivers told you this was going to be incremental, not quite avenges. it wasn't about more airframes. it was about more spares. more food and munitions supply.

>> that constraint last week of the apache forces still farming, what is your assessment of the implications of the theory restrict it means of increased needs because clearly we can take the general point of infinite demands from the theater, but what we're trying to get to is at this point in time, what this constraint actually means for the impact. >> i think we need to go back to the constraint that we were put on in terms of the original foresight. this is only ever going to be what we called a small-scale but they started theater platform bearing in mind the new venue if you play. so we tailored within a level of

$3150 endorsed insurance. and so, we didn't have more stuff standing by, whether it was enabling act to be working to defeat. the site was very much within that volume. i think the point they make is quite pertinent to the discussion we might have this afternoon, which is that were intending to designer aspirations for the future in fairly tight commit fairly minimalist state on themselves themselves to be resilient of offense in the situation that some things are unavoidable. >> i mean, looking as i do, it was very clear that the british

were getting into a difficult situation. having been involved with the computer at the time in trying to generate a new plan, it is that very understanding that led to the original plan which was that we go into/qatar and consolidate their and then start push out. you know you all understand war is a bummer. politics than the enemy and we the military had to respond to the reality on the ground. and you know, i'm slightly critical. i was full of admiration at the commander for the word they were very supportive that they could not have been more supportive to me the province but also

particularly one battle group affected us all, and 16th brigade really behaved magnificently in response to changing tactical and political situations. we can take time to recover. looking it over not six months, but over two years -- five years, things are much, much better. that's the way i'm afraid they tend to develop. >> this has been referred to and i think some of his analysis is his concentration versus dispersion is probably oversimplified. so we could be having a conversation about this pattern soldiers not stepped up to the plate and delivered in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different.

[inaudible] >> we haven't yet analyze what would've happened. >> the defense with what we adapt to for our complete support, that plan, but the soldiers stepped up to the plate and some very tough circumstances. we just need to record it. >> the strategic priorities of both the theater and motivation. we tend to focus in on the fourth of july. nothing that is happen on a military base is about a strategic threat. david spoke at length about his concern for what was on. that could strategically unhinged. and again, i've fallen in love

over the past 40 days. it's amazing to recognize how much afghanistan was second fiddle to what was going on in iraq. iraq was the mask roaming, easing of a government. civil war was on everybody's lips about where it might go as preparedness for operation. this is what trips at the time. not actually a deployment and that's about certainly to perkiness to lebanon. i'd forgotten the fact that we conducted an evacuation operation of lebanon. this is all a result. the idea of the intensity of concern probably wasn't -- didn't feel like it would come take some time. >> thank you.

[inaudible] >> you've become so affectionately and such to would've been nice for us to do the same. i also think it's strange in searching for his evidence to find little or no record of millions of things that referred to in conversations, that there appears to be minutes of, which is rather strange. what can i ask you about the situation? you realize very quickly that things needed to be changed. if you look at that timeframe. then you have the deployment -- increased appointment in july. was it enough that you repair -- knowledgeable about deterioration in the situation realization that it was far worse and was going to be a long job rather than a short job? was that deployment 2006 -- could you cut in troops?

>> to verify it, i can't recall thinking about this time. i suspect there are practical limits to build up the force and built over the weekend and into the following year and within instigate because of this business has been fixed in set locations we then contributed from the u.k. and by research battle group for the south that suggests to me that we probably weren't. but i can't remember the precise details. >> what part do g3 have in setting the numbers they were going to be deployed in july? >> we put forward propositions. >> could you ask more? >> i can tell you i was asking

every nation will be for the 31st of july. i had very conversations with general wharton, where it is very patiently explained that because of the demand of iraq, it just wasn't possible. i could have had a more receptive order and the british get more. every nation have been -- i would've thought, caught by surprise by the developing events of 2006 and i've often pondered whether those people took decisions and deployed nato because in late 2004 if they knew what they were confronting in 2006. i suspect they would have had to but nevertheless everyone was doing suffering in the same. and this takes time to generate.

the groups as you know very well is rightly yours to make sure we put troops properly prepared today means it's just impossible because we have the duty of great care to them to make sure it's off as far as it can be. it was sent for the press. >> i'm afraid we've already way over run this bit on the 2006 aspect of what happened. i am grateful to all preview for this. and actually grateful to everybody who took part in this inquiry into the 2006 aspect because we are not trying to say it was your fault. what we are trained to do is work out how we as a nation try to improve the way we do things.

is that anything under two thirds and six aspect of moving it to government that any of you feel and this is particularly dressed that you do you feel there is a key point you would like to add that we haven't yet covered or should we move on to current operations? >> no, i think i am content that has been exposed today and we've kept track of from previous ways. >> thank you. >> then, moving on to current operations in afghanistan. >> i'm going to give you three questions together. but we're running out of time to deal with current operations. in general terms, what's your

feel about them? and more specifically, can you see something about the relationship retrieved the u.k. and specifically about progress in training the afghan forces, the afghan army and police force? >> well, thank you very much. first of all, just remind you this book in november is a new strategy was agreed and that is what we're now getting a too implemented. it was on the back of the u.s. search which we contributed a little bit here earlier. and that strategy is to intensify through the search of the taliban, the afghan national security forces and the new afghan police to develop to the government's capacity as well as local governments and currently

what is known as reconciliation reintegration corporation recognized at the higher level of for integration and means of people who are tired of the dissolution. and specifically to your three questions, i think were set at the military and set in the conditions for success in some of those other areas like military operations -- tech collaborations. we're making sure that the ansi grows in the timeframe and i remember from general bill caldwell to give you a feel for it was very usefully that the 31st of march target to

155,000 was on the 31st of march 159,000 so it's numbers are compact in the quality. the police target is 122,000 the hundred 25,000 that targets for the 31st of october 171,600 of 140 -- 134,000 respectively. he's told me there had of them. so i think is the core of our strategy is transition in all its aspects, in our case in particular friend icehouse operations to ans run operations, then that seems to be on track. i wouldn't say that it's without drama and pitfalls ahead that

you can institutionalize the necessary courses beyond 2014. i think the jury now will be -- it will be a difficult thing to be certain of intel about the end of next year. .. general corporation is a very good friend of ours, too. the lowest level with the u.s.

marines have been outstanding in the way they went into helmand and are now running. the news to the relationship between which we were a bit worried about at one stage because it also outstanding so i have absolutely no worries about our relationship and indeed it's important to preserve that relationship as a strategic requirement. the strength of the relationship is an essential and can i just say have we learned the lessons in 2006 we had $3,000 in 2006 and today just under 11,000. britain has the best ratio in afghanistan and indeed with the americans what it's worth reminding ourselves of the very difficult challenge increasingly

in the east of the country. i have no complaints, we can't get a complaint out. what i see what they've got, i am always embarrassed they've got too much, so them on military activity, at the time of our modern military that they didn't start quick enough and homeland today i have to say that it's excellent. they've done an outstanding job. budgie six couldn't be so we are learning the lessons to deliver the commodity control once in 2006i would be critical of it we have a national contingent commander who is charged with making sure that right off. we are much more fully

integrated than by the ups and military commander so i don't want to raise, we lost the challenge is the last three years but we handled ourselves >> a quick supplementary if i may on that. over that in helmand the national guard, but the question is how are we doing on recruiting some who are just at the heart of the relations and both to the army and the peace. >> all like to tell you is the proportions are right this is absolutely part of the strategy. they will not and joined until

they have the sense we're going to succeed and the taliban aren't going to get back to the alleged the fact that it's now about five to 8% is a good sign in itself and when i was there not long before you we went into this in some detail i would state to the trading error and it was introduced to emphasize there's was more and more in the joint but we are on the case and we know the importance of it and i think like a lot of other things to do with our strategy in afghanistan it is just too early to tell how successful we are going to be. i think that if you ought to a good time to review and we can tell you whether or not it is

indeed doing so. >> people who have gone through a training program what is the current strength as opposed to ones who might have been trained but disinfected? >> the current papers, 159,000 on any given day it is going to be less than that. but again it's not enough on the trajectory they are working and we couldn't believe such stupidities what happened. all of that means a very basic but vital to the martelle seem

to be sorted out and also things we might not associate with that properly housed treatment and levels of absence and the amount of desertions standing at one stage it's much lower than that. >> if >> i would have to come back to do with the accurate figure but the sort of figures that associate are around 5% and actually in terms of combat capability, those who are available on any of given day the figures stack up against our own armed forces for example. >> what is the breakout that has made in [inaudible] and the fact [inaudible]

about the ability to secure, and when they gave the statement of how many secure places there are to ask the government ability to detain? >> it's an interesting question. we've got and there's a lot of people peacekeeping. first of all, when the state

took place in germany in the second world war does that mean we brought the german armed forces it didn't. from a hugely rapacious breakout that we hold the afghan government as having cable they never had such a thing happen before. i would like to think from what their resources had that they learned the lessons and they would never have it happen again. but we've got to remember the enemy is thinking and has a vote in these things and it was a very audacious and successful break out. i do not think we should think every person is about to escape from a number of secure locations in afghanistan as it has before, and there's a lot of

soul-searching and there is a certain degree [inaudible] it is different than the way that we run ours. but they were never broken out before on that sort of scale but people do break out of our prisons. [inaudible] right off the british armed forces -- [laughter] >> any way we tend to back quite a lot but that is the concept it shouldn't have happened but had

they learned their lessons [inaudible] there was a short while afterwards a major assault in berlin for a sample which happened in kandahar. do you fear that the recent violence in kandahar would have taken place if the break out hadn't happened? >> it's a very good question. i think it would have done because such you know on the first spring offensive happened. there is no doubt that of those who were capable did join in that attack and probably made it more difficult for us but i

think actually it led to it it was part of them the sport after active -- sort of directive to persuade isaf they were on the front foot. what we do is the reports with the on the ground and the response to that was remarkably good and actually has given people confidence that indicate in the way we need to insure we transition by the end of 2014. they will continue to attack. it's how we respond to it and increasingly show the burdens and things are looking good. >> in the dynamics of the campaign quite often tactics are indicative of their relative strength and from the early

turkoman 2006, a 2007 when they were taking the convention that migrated into the ied. i don't want to guess that if the tactics transform to selective and high-profile against political targets it is indicative that in the dynamics of the ratio would it was capable of doing is a reduction in the overall capability to the specific targeted attacks. so it was more interesting. >> overoptimistic what we've always said is if you resource the operation properly then you have a chance of succeeding and set the conditions of the other active particularly on the political sphere and i personally have been banging on about the need of the political

engagement, but it may not be until september, october, november when the full year on the winter campaign will be able to see whether it would become good seems to be positive but i am the first to be cautious and overoptimism. >> [inaudible] >> to bring out the regular combat by the end of 2014. >> i think we are on course but we will continue to meet to deal

as undoubtedly challenge but the biggest problem is much bigger than the past and as we transition is to put sufficient extra capacity but the execution trading for britain has specifically asked for example we develop. we've got to do that because that means their future military and other leaders will be in the british tradition. we need to find a way with all to do that properly in the timeframe we are talking about so that is the biggest development. it's not really the tactical conduct operations.

>> it's the institutional was asian as you know very well you can have any number of book soldiers with an army that is worth its name has got its right and administration right, longer-term trading right, and so they do things we now increasingly and we need to make sure as we transition the government will -- a percentage is put and we have now got to make sure we deliver on that policy and the development strategy. >> obviously the death of osama bin laden raised the question of a u.s. strategy particular relation to afghanistan and the question about the more rabid withdraw is a consequence.

i'm not sort of asking you to these into the crystal ball but we have the elections in 2014 and the sustainability then on the afghan state to become self-reliant in the projections are there and includes 23, 25 before they are able to have the money to sustain the structures we have helped them build. so what is your assessment? have you got any plans or what is the effect of all of the potential in the america withdraw and what are your plans in relation to that? >> this is a hypothesis to really also picked up on the speculation about the the secretary of state and i were in washington ten days ago.

it was a very clear that those decisions were yet to be made actually so there's a lot of speculation. at my level we are very clear that the strategy is down and we must give it proper opportunity to come to fruition and no one can draw the proper deductions and so probably this year when we see it coming through the system. secateurs gates said the other day it's too early to tell and that is our consensus but there are indications that they did have a sort of psychological effect on some of them and they are a bit worried and they may

be affected and that is usually a problem to them. so i think it is a positive and as i said in an interview recently, but we don't really know yet how long it will come through. again, i think it would be a good side to come back. >> if i may on the drawdown, the u.s. have an enduring partnership with afghanistan. i think we and britain who are fully committed to this war must always remember that the americans have committed huge amounts of treasury and they have committed to making sure that this strategy which stems the credit will progressively be felt on the case of trading will be funded. i think it is a huge commitment on their part and we are

grateful and that is the plan which we are currently facing. it will be a boardwalk as americans very generously continue. >> so unless you see like i do the death of osama bin laden assessment militarily and strategically to afghanistan the al qaeda organization is of military significance or simply by activity from afghanistan and pakistan to the mcginn case of the military significance of al qaeda yours is as good as mine that it is well beyond osama bin laden and we now know he was in pakistan in somalia and other

places in the middle east and what was going on which is a bit more than we might have thought in his compound but where will it lead in terms of the bases in afghanistan? all of these things go through the mill. what we are hearing is that pakistan is a vital ally in to the war of terror and we must remain close to pakistan while ensuring they learn whatever lessons they will undoubtedly learn. >> the impact in the past --

pashtun d.c. any impact in the fact of pakistan is the impact on the ground of how the potential outcome is received? >> the could be the cut pictures continue to be built up the there is no evidence today that the pashtun who don't forget the taliban and the latest poll a few months ago continues they do not want to be ruled by the relevant so in particular with some figure among the majority of the pashtuns.

it had an effect on the taliban is an issue and as i said a minute ago we don't really know. it would appear that must themselves are pleased because they don't want the taliban back greater than we knew and the would be a positive so we haven't seen the supports that concern although we are monitoring the possibility. >> in 2006 we also heard evidence about the hearts and minds and for communicating the mission are you confident that now you have sufficient resources to communicate the purpose to the tactics to the local populations?

>> i would say one of the lessons we haven't fully incorporated or the trading resources of the information operations. i think it's much better in the inability to turn that should have been a great propaganda the way the taliban killed 90% of the casualties and still today is on innocent civilians but could we get that into the idea of who we are trying to protect? not very readily. i think we are much better but i have a particular aid which is to develop our ability to conduct information and influence much more efficiently

but we haven't yet organized nor is it understood to be a vital part as a always was much more complex as much as findings so to keep pressing us on it because it's a big help to me >> the matter is of the communications i absolutely endorse finding it quite difficult for the definitive improvement to recognize it in a democracy is quite balanced of what we can say and have to say but in this specific situation i'm struck when i go there by how much time the government

spends and a lot of it this about so we really need to adopt their split and of course the messaging of the security and its relation goes across the south and beyond is an afghan lead and their military and their police are on to that because quite a lot of the operations that are going on today are afghan planned and led but the ability for the soldiers to engage in afghanistan has increased exponentially as we run the initiative for having the right issues and the reinforcement in to the same area that we are and so this is

a positive trend and i think if you were to go ask people in the streets and helmand and to look at the media which is quite specific i think it is quite reassuring. >> from the statistics on the attrition in april 1.85% and the target is 1.4%. so, it's pretty good. >> thank you for a much. i learned a great deal to enforce this morning. we are all grateful and i'm sorry to be so rushed.

[inaudible conversations] president obama and vice president biden honored police officers today at a rose garden event. the national association of police gave its tops cops award.

this is a little over ten minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> ladies and gentlemen, the president and vice president of the united states secretary janet napolitano and mr. tom mead. [applause] >> good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to the rose garden. it's a lot safer place than -- it's always a safe, but it's particularly see today. ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by saying congratulations. it's a genuine honor to be in the presence of the best of the best. you each are -- the folks behind us -- and inspiration to not only fellow law enforcement officers but to the whole

country. and the president and i recognize and have for a long time recognized the bravery you display simply by putting on that shield every morning, strapping on a sidearm, kissing your husband or wife goodbye and walking out, knowing that you don't know with any degree of certainty what's going to greet you. the officers honored here today have been singled out for going above and beyond the call of duty. and we commend each and every one of them. but we also know that there are thousands and thousands more law enforcement officers out there today on the job, and every day, who are taking risks that are hard for ordinary people to imagine -- risks just to protect their community, to protect people they don't know, protect people they've never met, and in some cases, maybe protect people they don't even particularly like. but the wall. they do it. and today is a day for them as

well; a day for every man and woman in uniform to feel proud and to feel proud of themselves. and today is the day the entire community of police officers should understand that america appreciates what you're doing, and this president and i and secretary, we appreciate what you're doing. the president's commitment to law enforcement can be seen by the unprecedented -- the unprecedented investment we've been putting in cops on the street and this administration's plan to give you all access to what we promised a long time ago -- a wireless public safety networks and you can actually -- actually communicate with all first responders. and we're also doing everything in our power to protect the rights of workers -- including you, including law enforcement officers. you're too important to us. >> and folks, let me say -- and i will conclude with this --

what i said to the honorees in the roosevelt room before the president came in. we owe the families. we all the families -- because you, other than those who have men and women deployed or work in the fire service, every single day, you kiss your husband or wife goodbye, your son or daughter, you know there's that little nagging feeling inside you, that nagging feeling inside that i wonder what's going to be there for them today. and that is a sacrifice. it's a sacrifice that warrants recognition. ladies and gentlemen, it is my great honor and privilege to present to a president whose commitment to law enforcement is in his bones and in his every action he is taken as president. ladies and gentlemen, the president of the united states, barack obama. [applause]

>> thank you so much. thank you, everybody. thank you. please, everybody, have a seat. thank you, joe, not just for being a great vice president, but being one of small enforcement's best friends in the strongest advocates over the years. i think they've gotten even more lot from you within the railroads -- [laughter] and that's hard to -- that's hard to do. i look forward to this event every single year. i can't tell you how much i appreciate the efforts of bill law enforcement officials nationwide -- not just because i've got several around me 24 hours a day. i have had the special honor of meeting police officers and law enforcement officials in all 50 states. last week i had a special honor of visiting with the men and

women of new york city's first precinct, which was the first to respond on 9/11 and serves the area encompassing ground zero. and what i told them is the same thing i will tell all law enforcement professionals here today, thank you. we appreciate your service. you have our support. we are grateful for the sacrifices you and your families make, and my administration is committed to making sure the you get what you need. some of the public servants helping us do that today are here. our excellent secretary of homeland security, janet napolitano. [applause] our director of the office of national drug control policy, gil kerlikowske is here. [applause] -- a long time police officer who also served as police chief in four different cities. i also like to say that today i

am seeking a two-year extension for fbi director bob mueller. [applause] his ten years of the fbi bald said the gold standard for leading the bureau. he's improved the working relationship with local law enforcement across the country, and i hope that democrats, led by judiciary chairman pat leahy, who is here, as well as republicans in congress will join together in extending the leadership for the sake of our nation's safety and security. we've also got several elite the officials here today, and i am grateful for their service and support of law enforcement. and obviously i want to welcome the leaders of the national association of police organizations, including your president, tom nee, and if your executive director, william johnson. [applause] and most importantly, congratulations to the 30

officers, sheriffs, detectives, investigators come agents who are behind me -- ellen nations tops cops -- right here. [applause] we've got the montana crew hollering. that was missoula, right? [applause] there you go. i know the families are just bursting with pride for your loved ones accomplishments, but your love and support has had a lot to do with those accomplishments. so again, we are grateful to you. this is the third year i've had the honor of welcoming americas tops cops to the white house. kind of like a heisman trophy presentation for law enforcement. but i just spend a little time with these men and women in

slide, and i can tell you with certainty, they carry themselves with such humility. they don't say to themselves this is it. this year and a top cop. i'm going to train, put in long hours and go to washington and stand with the president. that's not why they do what they do every single day. none of them put together a p.r. package for our consideration some of them are still recovering from gunshot wounds suffered in the line of duty, some have heavy hearts for partners who have been lost and they commit themselves to their memory. and all was but for others in the units they would say are just as great for just as dedicated or just as capable or just as deserving of this recognition. but you know, a moment came when their actions earned recognition.

it wasn't tough, it was what they did. they didn't know that morning when they pinned on their badge or strap on or haul start a weapon, but that day something would happen that would make them worthy of this honor. whether it was a random act of bravery or successful outcome the was the result of the months and years the honor with courage under the withering fire to defend the enemy. the women and the children from the armed gang members and saved the lives of the shooting victim when there wasn't time for paramedics to arrive. they carried out a dangerous and deadly sting operation to get drugs off the streets. they burst into a white hot building to save paralyzed senior citizens whose bids were engulfed in flames.

the doggedly pursued an 18 year old cold case until justice was done. the attempted times where bombing successfully extracting a full confession and wealth of actionable intelligence leading to arrests that have made this country safe. think about the strong stuff that takes, the character it takes to close the books on the case forgotten by all the victims' families. the coolness to talk down the hostile criminals. the courage it takes to run into flames and press forward through a hail of bullets when every natural instinct would say stop, think about yourself, sir survive. they would be the first to say they've been trained to do it. some of them argue they are not heroes and they will tell you a badge doesn't this go courage or special training or physical

strength doesn't make you prefer. but heroism isn't something that is evident only after the chaos of the fire fight. when you talk to most of these guys they will say heroism lies in the action of their fellow officers and parts of their fellow citizens they've sworn to protect and heroism is inside all of us just waiting to be summoned by tell you what, when the gunshots ring out and fighters burned hot, when the justice goes unanswered and innocent people cry out for help it's one thing to talk about courage. it's another thing to respond swiftly, decisively, heroically with little regard for your dd card yourself and your fellow man and these are the men and women who actually respond. these are america's top cops who protect and serve, who walk the beat an answer the call and to the dangerous and difficult work of forging a safer, stronger

america block by block and neighborhood by neighborhood. each of you deserve this moment in the sun and it is sunni because tomorrow we know that you and your fellow first responders will be back on your diligent to be looking out for us, looking out for one another, looking back at times when falling partners determined to make sure that their extraordinary sacrifices were not in vain. and we will be standing behind you as one nation and one people, proud of your actions, your courage and grateful for your service on our behalf. so to all of you and to all of you who wear the badge, thank you for keeping us safe. god bless you. god bless the united states of america. [applause] we're going to dhaka on this podium and let's take a picture with america's tops cops. [applause]

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♪ to discuss unemployment. afterwards the caucus chairman emanuel cleaver spoke with reporters in the white house driveway. this is about ten minutes. >> we just had an hour-long meeting with president obama, but we conveyed to him the number one current concern in the district we represent the will be of no surprise to you that we spoke to him mostly about jobs and the need for some coordinated effort between the white house, the cbc and other

sections of the house and the senate to get a jobs program in place and to create jobs through economic recovery. we've put on our web site that we were going to meet with the president, and we asked for questions from individuals who visited the site as to what should be asked of the president, what we should discuss with the president, and almost 100% of them were jobs, and we believe that the president is also focused on jobs. he understands clearly what we spoke to him about, and that is the pain that is taking place in the urban core and many of the district's we represent. so we gave the president our proposal that we think would be of importance to address unemployment with the volatile population, and while we are a

congressional black caucus, the issues are that we need to deal with of affordable populations of which we are a major part but there are people who are otherwise middle class who through no fault of their own found themselves without jobs. there were fire fighters, factory workers, police officers, state workers, and they are begging for help and i think the congressional black caucus and the president or was interested in trying to come up with some means of addressing that and doing it rather quickly. we talked about some other issues but i think primarily we focused on jobs. >> what is going to move this president after two years talking about the universal approach and you're talking about this pain in the urban poor and you have the

unemployment in the black community, 34 per cent unemployment of black teens and summer is coming >> we did raise the issue about summer jobs for the president and he understands the urgency of doing that and the president is now exploring some creative ways of trying to not only address the unemployment in the urban core with teams in the summer, but some creative ways of dealing with that same issue in the areas that have been devastated by tornadoes and floods, so it goes back to the whole issue of the vulnerable population. now, on the issues that we've talked about earlier and for which you just alluded, yes, the issues are difficult to manage, difficult to solve. if they were not we would have already done it, but we said with the experience we have here

in the congressional black caucus there are members to present the president with some alternatives that we believe will give him and his staff a new direction to look at and work on that might be productive in the short term in order to create jobs but the president is also focused on trying to ignite an economic recovery that would generate jobs for the entire nation. we are concerned about that as well. but as i said, the pain in the urban core is at an extremely high level and so we are pushing, and unapologetically pushing and i think the president realizes that and understands it. >> [inaudible]

>> what we shared with the president and he was pleased we did it because she and i thought about it and that is when you're going in declaring federal emergency is in this area we are saying if there are some creative ways that that emergency declaration can lead to jobs particularly for young people then we would like for that to happen. the president did not say we are going to do it. he wants to make sure that it's something that can be done so he is examining all of the ways in which he can respond to the suggestions and requests. islamic what suggestions did you give, what kind of proposals to alter? >> we talked to the president about doing some programs would be designed to impact people in the census tracks where unemployment where poverty are persistent and they've been there for decades, and it's the

whole thing about the wounded figure. if i have a wounded from i'm going to protect it and surround it with the others, so we are saying we want you to figure out how to protect and one way of doing it is through the census tract and they go far, far beyond the members of the cbc and in fact 87, different districts that would be impacted and the district with the highest level of need is not represented by the cbc. it's an area in tennessee. so we believe this is someone who could hold the entire nation dealing with the vulnerable population. >> did the president offered his own ideas and solutions for some of these problems? >> yes, the president did speak to us about things the

administration is already doing and he said to us twice he is working on trying to heal the economy and that if he heals the economy it will also take care of the issues that we've raised. >> well will you do now to push ahead with this? >> you answered it. we came over to push and when we believe we're going to still pushing and tomorrow morning we are going to push. >> does that mean more pressure on the white house? >> that is why the president's response when they continue to say it's focused on the vulnerable populations are you easily not satisfied with the response from your constituency? >> we are not satisfied the the poor and the vulnerable are hurting. we are satisfied the attention

of the president is on that. >> was there any discussion on immigration reform? >> no, we only had one hour and we didn't -- we did not talk about this. we had an hour. >> we had a good meeting with him yesterday. >> what can out of that? >> i think the study will be released to the press shortly. it's complete, it's finished. the issue is what happens now the implementation and the secretary has made a commitment to push on the implementation and frankly we think one of the suggestions we are making that is going to be something that