right pete it here because i think it's very important. i think the question he was asked had on do with the many international meetings that have been called in the coming months and it had to do with what is the specific agenda and objective of the various meetings. and he gave an answer about the fact that at some point there needs to be a mutually agreed upon internationally accepted set of understandings and facts about the events that occurred there. and since at japan they are still in a process -- we've talked about getting to the stabilizing point in responding to the events. this isn't the moment in time where we perhaps have that kind of international agreed to and a set of -- a chronology of events, a set of facts on the ground that we all know we're very confident of and there's no longer uncertainties associated with. and it will take time to get to that point. and i think it's important to

repeat here. again i thought it was an inciteful response to the question that the chairman received yesterday. so the international community will begin to organize itself to achieve that mutually agreed set of facts. and you mentioned in your presentation that you have begun to talk to international counterparts. is it too early to begin organizing how we will get to that more searching examination of a chronology or set of events given that again japan is very focus on the events on the ground there? how will we get to that set of facts? >> there is a meeting that's been called by the director general of iaea that will be held the week of june 20th that's in part as i understand the current planning a minu inns stairial meeting, but also some

technic technical sxerp technical experts. i believe what will be coming out of that meeting is more of an overall plan is for the overall community with the participation of iaea and the nuclear energy agency and then all of the member states of the iaea participating, an umbrella view of how we will address it internationally. i'm aware that the iaea has put together a team of international experts that will be going japan to begin that kind of multinational assessment of plant conditions and perhaps contribute to the con ol krochr that's being developed. and i'd expect coming out of the june 20th meeting there will be a number of other subsequent international meetings. one that's already been

identified is that the convention on nuclear safety, which is normally held every three years, had decided this last april to hold what they're calling an extraordinary meeting and that is -- i believe it's going to be in the august of next year, a special meeting member state by member state of all the people -- of all the countries that belong to the convention on what they've done individually and correctively in response to the events at fukushima. >> if i could ask, i'm really just sincerely unaware of this, but we talk about the set of actions that were taken in the yun united states that were ordered for nuclear power plants that were this response to measures that can look at catastrophic events and have some application of course then to natural disasters. and we've talked -- nrc has talked a lot about this in the days since fukushima.

are you aware, did any other country's nuclear safety authority look at the u.s. experience of 9/11 and put in place for their power plants anything akin to what we had done? i'm genuinely not aware if other countries took action based on our 9/11 events for their nuclear power plants in terms of catastrophic -- dealing with catastrophic events. >> i think i'd have to give you a complete answer after some specific review. but my recollection is that just about every country looked at the events of 9/11. they looked at what we did. i know we've actively shared with a swlekt number of countries specifically what we've done, the kinds of analyses that have occurred in the u.s. and many countries that have oc the u.s. and many countries have taken similar action. i don't believe anybody has done anything quite as comparable as we have done, but there are a number of countries that i'm

familiar with that have taken specific measures. >> and i have been aware of some countries certainly expressing an interest in how we approached our analysis and the evaluation after those events. i'll just reflect. we have snow shower carper who is the chairman of our oversight subcommittee in the senate, and he had said one of the great regrettable outcomes of these events would be if we fail to learn from them. i imagine after 9/11, i'm sure there will be an international spirit of coming together and really wanting to learn these lessons after these tragic events. if i were to turn now to a couple of specific questions that i had, charlie, you had mentioned that the task team's efforts are very separate from our office of looking at lessons learned in terms of the kind of response we mustered internally, operation center and, again, some of these may be kind of procedural things of how we conducted these things.

is there a time frame for review? is it going to be at all coincident with any of the lessons learned or recommendations that you bring forward, or is it entirely a separate effort? >> commissioner, it is running in parallel. it started while we were still in the operations center, and would i probably say it was last month that we concluded the information-gathering exercise from -- principally from people that stood the watches and were interacting with the team as -- as the event you be folded. i don't have a time -- specific time as to when we would finish that, but it's probably along the same lines or time lines that -- that charlie's team is working to that we would have that assessment completed. >> okay. and marty, i think you had referenced that we were starting to receive some insights from the results of the walk downs that were down in response i think to the temporary instruction, or walk downs were initiated by licensees and now we've built on that from our efforts. is there anything you can

discuss at the highest level, even in terms of areas, what areas are we getting insights from? >> well, we'll have the inspection results completed today, i believe, and we'll do it -- do a complete assessment, but i can give you a little bit of anecdotal information that i have from talking with regional administrators and nrr, and that tells that is none of the observations pose a significant safety issue, but there were observations that in some cases equipment that was relied on would not start, that it had not been maintained, that procedures -- and these are anecdotal. not at any one plant but if you look across the entire fleet, there were some places where the -- the capabilities to deal with the large fires and explosions, the station blackouts, design bases and external events like the flooding where -- where there were discrepancies in terms of the procedures, the equipment and the training. >> okay, and we're -- and,

again, as you've said anecdotal or at a high level, it sounds like the staff will be processing through in a most systemized fashion so i appreciate you sharing at a very high level. >> and that information will then be provided to charlie and the team. >> oh, objection very well. that's a good segue to the very last item that i wanted to cover. charlie, could you talk a little bit, because we talk about your team, and i think it's interesting. we talk about your scope which is expansive and you're looking at a lot of issues. you actually have a very small team, so could you help me understand a little bit more. my perception is you're really tapping into and you credit nrr for some responsiveness, but could you just broad brush explain how you're tapping into all the other areas and programs that are -- program support, because it just doesn't seem like something that a team so small could get done in the amount of time that you have, so could you help me understand how you utilize the rest of the agency? >> sure. one of the things that we have

got great support for is i feel i have all. agen agency's resources at my disposal. the office directors and regional administrators have been very cooperative. we need to talk to someone in a certain technical area. the team makes a request and we get a very timely response, and people come over and talk to us. add many hours of discussion with them, typical session can go g two, three hours, where we go back and forth we ask questions and they give presentations. it helps us to get a better understanding of what the state of affairs is now and what the individual members of the staff are looking at with their efforts, and it gives us a better understanding with regard to how our own plants in the united states and'd and as seen by our own nrc regulators who oversee them every day see how we are prepared and how our

plants are designed to withstand design bases and design basis even events. and the staff, beyond what they are doing every day, is assuring safety and the staff in what they are doing every day are looking at the vairious issues, independent of what the task force is looking at, so we wanted to get the insights of what's already going on within the agency and where we might make recommendations, if things should be enhanced in any way, but it's been an extremely invaluable and while we have a broad brush with people on the task bringing in with issues every day, can't be equalled. i mean, it's given us a tremendous amount of insight. >> thank you. that's helpful. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i would also like to thank the members. task force for the great job they are doing serving the commission and the nation. i will start with a question

that probably needs some clarification. if i wanted to play the devil's advoca advocate, i would say we are allowing the plants to operate because they meet our regulations, and yet the purpose of the task force is to see how the regulations might be changed, so why don't we shut them down until we know? >> well, i guess the way i would answer that question, commissioner, is, first of all, you're right. we're allowing our plants to operate because they do meet our regulations. we think our regulations are robust, but we also consider ourselves as a staff, especially a rerng organization, and we always look for ways where safety can be enhanced where it makes sense, but as i went through in my presentation, we want to make sure that our process is disciplined this time, and so if there are any areas that we would recommend where safety should be enhanced,

it's going to have -- it's going to have some real meaning and not just, you know, if -- if we look back to the time that -- that tmi happened, a lot of what was put in post-tmi enhanced the safety of nuclear plants in this country, but it didn't -- we didn't have the structure that we have today with regard to the discipline that we have to put into looking at what regulatory enhancements need to get made. >> it is then a preliminary conclusion of your team that we are talking about, enhancements to safety. >> right. >> but we are safe enough already. >> but some of these enhancements may not necessarily result in changes to our regulations. there may be some practical things. >> but it is enhancements we're talking about. >> currently from what we focused on we see it as enhancements, yes. >> thank you.

as you know, there are many decisions that are made regarding changes to the licensing basis of existing plans. and there are the safety calls, of course, and one of the metrics that we're using when we make such decisions for changes is the -- the early release, the probability in a year that we will have a large release early from the containment to the atmosphere, the so-called lerf. now for early reactors we are now looking at the lrf, large e

relief frequency, and i believe -- more than i believe, i know, that lerf is calculated for an individual unit, right? release and then it has to meet a certain goal. and like at fukushima though, shouldn't we revisit this and maybe stop talking about just early releases because fukushima shows that you can have a long-term release, late release, and also consider all the units at the site and how much they contribute to the release and to include spent fuel pools? in other words, what i'm saying is the large release frequency should be a characteristic of the site, not of individual units of the site, including the spent fuel pools. is that a crazy idea?

is it something that the task force may give us some options and think about it? >> well, i think to answer your questions as i mentioned earlier, one of the insights that we did get as a result of fukushima was you have to consider and take a step back and consider what would happen if you had a multiple unit, multiple units affected by some beyond the design basis of it. so with regard to our insists, think whice're trying to formul where we're going to go with that and i think it would be premature. i don't think your idea is a crazy idea. but i don't think i'm prepared to be able to give you a specific answer. >> don't think it's crazy, either? >> you need to think about it. you need to think were what it means. >> oh, sure. >> i'm asking you to give you an answer right now. >> i think the commission,

previous commissions, have addressed the issue. we now have the experience of fukushima. clearly i would see this as likely an issue that we're going to bring back to the commission, either as part of the short, the near term or the longer term review activities, but, i mean, it's an obvious question but a very broad policy implication. >> yes, it does. >> you structured a lot of your presentation around defense and depth. do you think that's appropriate? it's the cornerstone of our safety philosophy, so they talked about prevention, mitigation, emergency planning and so on. but it seems to me that under defense in depth, we can do a lot of things to integrate, for example, some of the -- some

things that you mentioned that right now are not integrated and to understand better the possible accident sequences, and maybe to go beyond the 8 or 16 hours that we go to now because of the station blackouts. in other words, to answer a lot of the questions by developing a so-called level three pra risk assessment. and there has been general reluctance to do that over the years, even thought the first one was done by the reactor safety study, 1975. so would your task force explore the benefits perhaps of having site specific level 3 pra and how that will help achieve some of the goals that you think

should be achieved? >> we've already had some discussions about that about -- about how risk assessments and tras can help better inform us, so i can tell you that we're looking at that, and where we'll come out with that, we'll report at a future mayor. it's a topic we've talked about, and what the merits of it are. what goes into doing that, the complications of doing something like that from not just an analytical perspective but from a time perspective, and then what insights do you get from that that would be useful to both the industry and the regulator and enhancing safety or letting us know where we stand with regard to safety, but i myself, i'm not a pra expert,

so i'll need to continue to go back and pulse the team about that and formulating our views. >> i don't want to let charlie off the hook for all the difficult questions, but this is another one where i would expect the near term task force to look at the issue and identify some of the key questions and not be able to resolve it and finally i think this is maybe something that's going to take a more thorough discussion and review than the limited time period we're giving this task force, but we would identify it as a topic that would go into the longer term review which we would have about my current thinking right now, specific task force, that might look at the use of pras, and a current regulatory scheme on how -- which ones are required for which plants, those kinds of questions? >> that's all i'm asking. you didn't mention the acronym

at all so i figured somebody had to. >> i'm surprised it was you, commissioner. >> i know you were. i know you were. >> i would not -- the staff really appreciate the level one pras, they are useful and are using them, and it seems to me that now fukushima is saying level three may be -- can have the same utilization, but i'll wait to see what words of wisdom you will come up with. one last question. i'm really bothered by this separation between design basis and beyond design basis events. i appreciate the need for it -- for a design basis, the licensees know what they have to do. we impose all sorts of

conditions, and this particular pump must deliver this flow rate under these conditions and then we're asking them to test it and tell what is they find, all this stuff, and then you have beyond design basis events. i went back and looked at the station blackout rules. that's paradise. tell us how you would do it and tell us how you would handle the station blackout and tell us what kind of frequency of loss of site power you assumed and tell us how much time do you think it will take to restore it, and tell us what you did about it. the licensee has tremendous freedom to do all these sorts of things, maybe supported by some statistical analysis and then they say we went to sears and bought a portable diesel and everybody says we're happy.

i'm oversimplifying. >> you're also not getting to a question. >> i'm getting there. and then we don't do anything after that as far as i understand. we don't inspect. in fact today, in energy daily, there was a statement they looked and maybe some of the equipment were not available as bill said earlier. can we keep doing this, can we keep saying oh, these are beyond design basis events. therefore, we don't get involved or we are happy that the industry responded. we look at it once, and that's it. in the future it's up to them, and i'm really bothered by that idea, though i do appreciate the value of having the distinction between design basis and beyond design basis events so any advice that the task force can give us i would at least

appreciate it as to how to handle that. make sure that what they told us -- not that they are bad people, certainly an industrial facility. things happen, you nknow. >> for us to get the warm feeling that, yes, indeed, all this stuff that they said is available, ten years down the line. >> it's a constant challenge that we have to deal with, there's a balance and what comes to mind, i was just listening to you are the principles of good regulation, the talk about having clear regulations and i think that's one of the founding principles of why we have a design basis, that there's a clear identification of what is required to protect public health ant safety. that's our mission and our objective and beyond that adds margin, but it's -- it's not the same kind of regulatory pedigree

as things that are within design basis, and i think it's an issue commissions have struggled with since the first day of the nrc. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> commissioner? >> thank you. before i ask my questions, i have a couple of personal observations i'd like to share. one that was not long after fukushima i was talking with a friend of mine who has nothing to do with nuclear business, knows nothing about it and doesn't particularly care for it, quite frankly, and -- and while we were talking about this, i was trying to reassure him about, you know, the safety of u.s. plants and the high levels of training of the personnel of the nuclear power plants. he challenged me with a comment that went something like, you know, if you're in the middle of a situation where, you know, people are dying all around you because of some large event and

things are blowing up and people are panicking, how do you know that these people in these control rooms don't just simply get into a car and get as far away from this thing as you possibly can? how do you know that these people stay and do their jobs? how do you really know? and i talk with him about it, and i talk about the training and everything, and i -- and i don't think i entirely convinced him but i tried to reassure that we train and the people know their jobs and have done it for a long time. i was -- something occurred to me recently. i visited several licensee facilities over the last couple of months, and a recent one sort of brought something to mind that i thought i'd share. something that people -- as i was talking and asking about -- asking about some. people that i met, the plants, the managers and the operators about something about their background, and i realized that a very, very large percentage of the people i talked to were

trained in the u.s. navy and that they were former sailors, submariners, you know, surface ships, people who had that -- that background shared with the commissioner, people who had, you know, put their lives on the line in the service of the country, and i -- i haven't gotten back to my friend yet to tell him about this. i don't know if it will impress him or not, but it impressed me and it give me sort of a personal level of comfort that when i tell people that these people will stay and do their jobs, that i think there's good evidence to support that. so another observation. charlie, appreciate you mentioning ki, because i was actually quite disturbed to see the stories in the media after fukushima of people in the united states running out and buying potassium iodine, and some of them apparently did take some of it. i'm very concerned about that. there were, you know, i think we -- i think the government did

what it could to get the word out on this, but there were other groups as well. i just wanted to highlight that. the health society also put some information out about ki which was good, the physicians website had a nice story, you know, about what ki should really be used for and why people should not run out and start taking, it so even -- even beyond the government, there are other organizations out there that did the right thing and made the right kinds of decisions, and i wanted to highlight that and krjtd them for that effort. just a few questions. you know, the -- we've had this conversation this morning about the post- 9/11 modifications we've made, what we call b-5b. what is your understanding, and maybe this is more for bill and marty than for the task force, but what's your understanding about what -- what -- what our

level of assurance is about the availability and operability of before we got to the fukushima, just as we've gone over the last few year, of this equipment? mean, what did we do when this equipment was installed to assure ourselves that it was the right equipment, that it could do what the licensees were saying it could do, because us a point out. this is a voluntary effort, but we have made a lot of references to it. what's -- >> not a voluntary. >> i'm sorry, the implementation, the specific implementation -- well. >> implementation, the industry had guidelines that were developed, and the nrc endorsed those guidelines for the implementation to meet our regulations, that's all. >> right, right. >> but to ensure that the regulations were in fact met, we conducted inspections that became part of our tri-annual fire protection inspections to go in and sample. that sample i think is the operative word here, so now with the ti we're going in and doing

a very more -- a more systematic look at the equipment, the procedures, the training, et cetera, et cetera, to make sure that everything is in place. we're also going out with the bulletin where the bulletin has in fact been issued and that bulletin will ask for information in 30 days and another set of more detailed information within 60 days to provide us the highest degree of assurance that that equipment is in fact operable and that the operators are capable of in fact implementing the strategies that they have laid out and for responding to large fires and explosions. >> i appreciate the task force asking for the bulletin, because i think in the ti i -- i had some questions, and as i mentioned, i visited several of these facilities and when i ask them about the inspection that actually took place in response to the ti, it -- it seemed that the actual work of showing inspectors that the equipment was available and would work as advertised, there were -- it was

implemented in somewhat different ways depending on which licensee you talked tomorrow some of them seemed to go through a lot of effort to lay things out and actually move hoses around to show that hoses would reach where they said and others did a lockdown. what's your understanding about what we -- what we got back from ti. what's the level of confidence that you got from that as you look for results? >> i think, well, let me start off by saying that at this point in time it's our understanding that whatever has been found has been corrected, and i haven't said that thus far, and i think that's an important statement, that if there were equipment inoperable, deficient procedures, that it's my understanding that those issues have in fact at this point been resolved. that said, we're still going out and asking for the corn firmation via the bulletin to ensure that that is in fact the case. all of our inspection activities are in fact samples. we don't go out and do everything, every piece. we direct the licensees to take those actions when we have those

doubts, so that's really what the bulletin does for us. it ensures that every piece is in fact locked down. the licensees have to respond to us, and they are held accountable to those responses. >> and when you say -- yeah, i want to sort of focus in the walk down part of this. when you say walk down, what do you expect the licensees to do in this part of the walk down, just to -- >> to make sure that if there's a hose coupling and a hose that they made up, and that's part of the problems that we have, to make sure all the procedures and strategies we have are actually implementable, that there's not some piece of equipment blocking access to a pump or a valve or something that needs to be operated as part of the strategy that they lay out. >> do you expect them to unfurl the whole hose and show that it can go from wherever it's supposed to go to a spent fuel? >> i think it depends. i don't know that i would go that far. the hose has to be there, have assurance of the integrity of the hose and that the couplings

would fit up and the length would be the rightling. >> may i add just one additional topic because it relates to the task force and the followup to fukushima is that you could comply with the current regulatory requirements, and it might not be what you really want to have as a plant can be as a result of flooding, so we're going to learn things from review of the fukushima event and then look at 50, 504, hh, the b-5b regulations now through a different lens, and that inform us to want to pursue a different regulatory approach or make a modification to the current regulatory requirements, and that's part of what will come out of the lessons learned. >> if i can augment that, commissioner. one of the things that really the task force has got an insight about it is that equipment, those procedures, were put in place for a specific type of event.

what we also recognize that they could have the benefit if they are capable of being utilized, for dealing with events, other than what they were intended for, but given that they were intended for a different type of event as bill said, there may need to be some fault with regard to how they might be augmented positions, things like that, to be better able to deal with the broad spectrum events. try to take the maximum benefits from our fukushima lessons learned to what's in place already, and is there any expansion of that needed to deal with the broader state of events without having to consider issues like multiple units and things like that. >> we've made -- i think you made the comment, charlie, early on that part of the guidance that you received for the task force was that the task force should be operating independent of any of the industry activities that are going on.

>> yes. >> and as we've observed, the industry activities are under way through nei and npo and are very beneficial and things we should be doing, but one thing that occurred to me as i talk to licensees is there's a lot of energy among the individual plants to -- to think about things they might maybe specific changes that they might pursue, and i -- i see that as a they are thinking about this. do you have any thoughts as this process goes forward how best to harness that, not so much the industrywide efforts but really the individual plant managers and operators that are giving good thought to how they might respond to these sorts of events? >> yeah, i guess from our perspective, first, we're very happy that you've given good thought to these types of events. it's good -- the primary -- the primary responsibility for safety does fall on the licensees, okay? so the fact that they are doing

that is a very good thing, but independent of that i believe, that you know, our task force with what we come up with with recommendations should be done independent of that, and if some of our recommendations have been taken care of but some. things that they are doing, that's not a bad thing, but then if the question becomes, you know, what, if any, regulatory footprint that we may want to put upon that, but i think that -- i think it's a good thing, and i'm -- i'm encouraged by the fact that they are not just sitting back waiting for what the nrc might do or not do. i think that the insights that they gain from fukushima are helping them inform their decisions. we're trying to stay back as regulator and say, hey, as a task force what do we think? and -- and then you can look at the two and see how they marry up, and if anything from our

perspective needs to be augmented. >> bill, do you have anything? >> one of the unique things about the u.s. nuclear industry is the way that they share operating experience and approaches to resolve problems. we don't try to get into the middle of that. we view that as a positive activity. we will deal with the industry in a generic manner as we come up with our inspection guidance or the criteria that we're going to use to verify compliance with the regulatory requirement, and we'll deal with them at that stage, but we don't try to fa l facilitate that information-sharing. there's other industry groups that play that role. we think they do that well, and we don't need to be in the middle of that. >> okay. thank you. thank you, chairman. >> commissioner. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to join my colleagues in adding my thanks to dr. miller's leadership efforts here. people sitting behind you and the team and also the very deep bench of the nrc staff who are

supportive of and very impressed. when i've talked externally to other colleagues, we've been very proud of the competency, professionalism and commitment of the nrc people working on this. thanks to you and others, charlie. i want to start out the questioning with this. you sat there march 21st when we had our commission meeting, and -- and talking about, you know, the way ahead and the chairman had drafted calm and we commented upon it, and the commissioner unanimously approved this plan to move forward with the task force and now that seven weeks or so have passed and eight weeks have passed since the task force kicked off, and i'm mindful of your comment march 21st that said, you know, after three mile island, went into too many different directions, the efforts, and too dispersed and somewhat diluted in some respects. given where you are today here, may 12th, do you feel like the

task force charter, task force direction from the commission, is it where it needs to be, or are there any other changes that need to occur here? are you comfortable to what the current scope is? >> yeah, i'm very comfortable with the activities of this task force. i think it's gone about its work in a very deliberate and thoughtful manner, and that was one of the concerns coming out of three mile island is that it's a little too reactionary and a little quick in some respects, so i think it is -- we have set up a process that will give serious consideration to a number of topics. the ones that warrant more work in the future are likely to be passesed to more detail issue specific task forces that, you know, i think will operate under the guidance of a steering committee. agencywide steering committee, but then we'll also have the ability to have a more thorough engagement of other stakeholders as we come up into individual

specific task forces, so i think it will enhance the communication and the participation of other stakeholders by the time we get to the final regulatory analysis. one of the things i place the most value in having people of the quality that are on this task force was to have the ability to step outside of the normal jobs, because they are doing this full time, and really challenge ourself, is there something that we need to do right away to ensure the safety of the u.s. fleet? >> right. >> we made that judgment the day of the tsunami, and we make it every single day, but it's really valuable to me and i'm sure to the commission as well to have the kind of experts dedicated, focused on that question as part of the task force. i think we're getting great benefit out of that. >> thank you, bill. marty, on to your question here. somewhat again at a high level. one of charlie's slides have

made reference to pre-fukushima nrc regulatory efforts, gr-199, about the site and the use. we had a dam failure research efforts, and a lot of -- brian's insurance group has worked on that. there's decades of nrc research activities, regulatory rule-making activities, et cetera, et cetera, that all preceded fukushima, and i -- i'm mindful of the challenge that exists, even pre-fukushima, of trying to communicate to the public. this is what we as a regulator do. i think we can all recalling back to april 2010 with the gulf of mexico oil rig explosion where people trying to figure out what is mms, mineral management service and how is that part of the department of interior and what do they do vis-a-vis leasing and with respect to the coast guard? so i think we're all mindful of the challenge of communicating to the public what our

regulations are about and how we do business, even pre-fukushima and that effort is certainly magnified with respect to the fukushima event. do you have any comments or thoughts on how best to communicate externally to not just to the normal stakeholders but to the american -- average american citizen who may be before march 11th wasn't that focused on these kinds of issues? >> in -- in working through videsh use, and i think you cited a couple of them, like gsi or gi-191, where we're looking at seismic activity, what we're trying to do as we continue to move forward, because we're not stopping those events, or those issues. what we're trying to do is build into each issue a little communecations plan that explains how fukushima fits into that activity. if we continue to go out and i think our generic letter on gi-191 is a really good example where we've continued to press

on, but included within that an acknowledgement of the issues in fukushima and that we are in fact looking at them. i haven't thought about the issue -- the broader issue you raised. do we need an agency-wise communications plan? we're using the blog. we're using a number of different individual activities to try to communicate about fukushima. we're got -- we've established a share point site, a place where somebody can go to get all of the information that you have. if you're a member of the staff and you've been asked to make a presentation somewhere, we've provided a standard set of slides and communications tools, so i think there's a variety of things that we're doing today to make sure that we're communicating clearly, effectively, consistently about what the agency is doing with respect to our followup to this accident. >> okay. thank you. charlie, i turn to you here.

there's a little study before i came down here, and full disclosure prior to this, this week, i looked at the procedures that a licensee would have to handle some of these issues so my reactor system, my friend helped me go through the severe accident management containment procedures for one of our facilities and former operator plants, submarine plants, kind of has some feel for operating through the procedures, and i went through containment venting under extreme damage, an extreme mitigation design and i'm not going to mention what plant it was, but to see pictures in there this is where this valve is located and this is where you operate this particular switch, et cetera, that would help an operator in a situation go through this and then i went

through and locked at the conditions of the extreme damage at one of our plants, and i was very pleased to see the existence of detailed, robust procedures with pictures that are operator friendly, et cetera, and -- and now it's kind of pointing out to the point the commissioner was raising about, well, we may be saying operable under difficult stressful conditions. i know, i'm dating myself, in 1947 when i was fighting fires at the d.c. trainer in the philadelphia naval shipyard, i got the hair singed off my eyebrows and my hands were burned for fighting an actual wildfire, a whole bunch of other guys with hoses and that's a real wake-up call under stressful conditions and so i'm just curious and i know there's not a lot of time to discuss this, but i think it's important that the task force provides some assessment to the commission about the operator readiness to actually deal with

casualty procedures, mitigation guidelines, et cetera, under stressful conditions and for us to have, and this goes back to the commissioner's question on what is walk down of equipment? it's more than just seeing what the equipment is and can people actually utilize it when they have to? can you comment quickly on how the task force might look at this ability of operators to respond under challenging conditions? >> first of all, we're not looking at it on a plant-by-plant basis. >> understand. >> and we're trying to look tat holistically and spend a lot of time speaking about that. i can tell you we're looking at things that you've been talking about but let me augment that about how our thinking is going. those procedures may be very adequate in and of themselves, but as i talked about why we're trying to take a look at can we better integrate the eops, the

san-gs and eemgs into a framework that works together, we're looking at that aspect also. it's great to have the procedures in place. how much training is done on it and how much physical practice is done on it and how much can you realistically do? on some things you can go farther than others, you know. if you're not in an emergency situation, you're not going to vent the containment just for practice, but there's other things, you know, the commissioner talked about staging of equipment and hoses and -- and things like that. does training include more than just sitting around a table doing table tops because i think, as you know, from your experience, a certain amount of actually practicings certain things helps? it keeps it fresh in people's minds. it's important. so how much do you need to do that? that's what we're debating right now if formulating a recommendation. what's -- what's a reasonable

thing to do? how do you go about doing that? how can it benefit your readiness? >> that's a very important query. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i wanted to follow a bit on the comments made, in particular the distinction of design basis, beyond design basis. i think you talked about the integration perhaps of a severe accident, the extended mitigation guidelines, all of these procedures that deal with extensively some type of event, whether it's beyond design basis event or not. it seems that there's a natural kind of perhaps need to bring those things together, and i'm -- i'm wondering, again, to the extent that you're looking at these things, are you similarly looking about a way to bring together all events that perhaps gets beyond traditional definitions of design basis and

beyond design basis because i have to admit i -- i tend to struggle with what is in what category and, you know, i think if you look at the hydrogen combustion requirements, most of those fall as beyond design basis events, but they are requirements in our regs and, therefore, have the same kind of force as other requirements. is there any thought to kind of redefining this whole idea of design basis, beyond design basis, and does the distinction really mean anything anymore? >> i mean, i think it's fair to say that we have given this a lot of thought. one of the things that we did reflect on, as you mentioned, chairman, is did our -- we do have regulations that take us beyond design basis, and so what we're trying to take a step back at saying is are the regulations sufficient? are there things within our regulations that -- that could

be enhanced, and that's where i think i get to the integration of the procedures that maybe better do it. let me try a specific example and see if it helps because i always think better with specific examples. if you're the operator in the control room while that event is going on, your focus is on trying to achieve success. that's your primary focus. if this doesn't work, what do i need to do next to achieve success? well, if you look back in a case of fukushima, you -- you -- we don't know, but was anything being done to recognize that if you didn't achieve success what, should be your next step and that's where you really get into your mitigation thinking so where should that onus be? should it onnin the control room operator at the moment to do what they are doing and should other resources be brought to bear to say that if we don't achieve success, we ought to be

thinking about what we ought to be doing for mitigation next and whether that means you start staging equipment or start bringing resources to bear. i'm getting into role thinking and this is the kind of thinking that we're thinking through. >> and the operator is not sitting there say, well, this is a design basis event or a beyond the design basis. >> right. >> they are very highly trained? they are very highly trained. >> and obviously in that kind of a situation they are under a lot of pressure and have to neighboring a lot of decisions and so it's -- i think, you know, again, they are not thinking of it, but, for example, you know, this is where we got into our thinking with regard to where the command and control is and -- and where the command and control is with regard to the operators should others be thinking about it and if you look at the case of fukushima, you had what some would call delay and determination whether seawater should be brought in to start

flooding things. who -- whose thinking ahead about that when -- when you're in a crisis? what we're talking about here is having integrated crisis management so that you're trying to think ahead, and the more that you can do and the faster that you can do it can in many cases, while it's under mitigation, it can prevent the next step from happening, and so that's the kind of thing we're looking at with regard to that, and -- and, of course, we're not precluding whether or not we need to make any regulatory changes in there, but we simply haven't gelled our recommendations yet. >> well, i appreciate, that and it's almost as you talked about that i -- the thinking that i was doing here while the meeting was going on is from a design perspective, that there probably is a similar -- it's more of a graceful transition from design basis to beyond design basis events, that there are events. we treat events with varying degrees of regulatory

requirements. the systems are required to be able to deal with a large break local. other types of events, you know, the blackout was a one-time analysis and to have a coping strategy but not necessarily an ongoing review process, so just as we, you know, look at this, you know, again, some of these concepts may be outdated in a way, but there's more of a smooth scale as you go to these different types of events. >> and in the short term, i struggle though with the idea, maybe i'm just slow. >> i spoke too soon. >> but i think the concept of design basis adds a degree of regulatory stability that's very much needed, to -- to -- to have -- it serves as a starting point to begin the regulatory discussion. it doesn't undo the value of equipment that's there to respond to things beyond the

design basis. there are regulatory requirements that go beyond the design basis, and there's functional equipment that pras take advantage of that's not even a regulatory requirement that you can take credit for and the equipment is well maintained but having a clear defenced regulatory basis in this era when we're trying to come up with standardized compliance, of course works go in an opposite direction in my mind. you would never really be sure what the regulatory basis is at any one plant if -- if we didn't have a clear basis. we went through a long, very difficult program, i think starting in the mid-'80s, to reconstitute the design basis because we -- it was not being maintained in a -- in a regulatory space in the kind of way that supported effective regulation and even operation. >> i appreciate, that and i think -- i'm not suggesting that we get rid of design basis idea, but i'm not sure that it's --

it's a -- i'm not sure that that's the end of the conversation, you know, clearly as i said, you said we have those things which are regulatory requirements for beyond design basis events and i'm not necessarily sure what that means sometimes because it's -- what matters is it's a regulatory requirement versus something which is not a regulatory requirement which is a voluntary initiative. the extended mitigation, there's extended mitigation guidelines which deal with beyond basis events which is the non-regulatory requirements so i'm not sure that we're fit being a -- that we're putting and making the distinctions in the right way. what matters more is what the regulatory requirements are and what problems are they addressing and challenges are they solving? i think design basis efforts have been a useful tool, but clearly there are things beyond that, and perhaps a more

graceful segregation than it appears. that's probably more of a philosophical question anyway. one specific question that i wanted to address and touch on and see if the task force is looking at this at all. if you look at fukushima, and one of the consequences for sure, and in particular as you get into the phenomena of a larger extended release, assuming after two weeks, three weeks, two months, whatever the time frame is, you've taken the appropriate steps to evacuate, to relocate a population given whatever the dose levels may be. at that point you begin to deal more with consequences that are in a cost basis or a contamination basis. you know, if there continues to be a release for another six months let's say in fukushima, you know, there will be an impact on the mitigation and the cleanup, not necessarily a health and safety impact of the population because they have been relocated. how are we taking that into consideration, and to what extent does that factor into our

determinations and whether or not something should be considered, you know, in an enhancement to safety, a back fit test, and that sort of thing? is that considered in our reg analysis or not? like ultimately the cost of cleanup, a point in which you're no longer dealing with the potential for public health consequences? >> yeah. you know, i would say to some degree, but i'm not sure that it would go to the extent that you're thinking, i think our -- our goals and our thinking are always, you know, what do we need to do to have sufficient confidence that we won't get to that. prevention is the top level, and then if you need to mitigate what do you need to mitigate so that you don't get to that? what with the recognition that if you did get there, yeah, there would be consequences of

that nature, but i don't think -- i don't think we've looked at it from what i would call the out side in that way. i think we try to look at it from the inside out and making sure we've done everything that we're comfortable with doing, that we won't get there. and, i mean, there have been a lot of discussions over the years about that, how do you factor the cost of cleanup in? and i know that that's a big discussion with regard to sources and -- and financial aspects of it with regard to price anderson and things like that. >> well, it's certainly -- you know, again, as we look at these issues, i know our focus, i mean, we talk about public health and safety as our focus and we talked about these events in the context of addressing those concerns first and foremost, but there certainly is that additional piece that can have an impact, again, in particular, as we're looking at our analysis to see whether a

particular safety -- you know, we talk about safety enhancements, but there are things that could be done to reduce the likelihood of an accident that ultimately would have an impact on that economic consequence and -- and which -- which, certainly as i think we're seeing in japan, can be quite significant and may have an impact ultimately on the decision-making, but, again, it perhaps gets to the issues of -- of looking at level three pras and including in those analyses a look at the full breadth of consequences beyond just some of the health consequences. oh, good. i'm glad. that's why i said it, but -- so, again, i think it's just something as we go forward that i'll certainly be keeping a look at because, you know, we can have an event in which there's no public health consequences if the right mitigative actions are taken with emergency response,

but that can still be a very significant event from the standpoint of economic cleanup and those kinds of consequences, and, again, that may be not necessarily the traditional way that we've approached issues, but -- but they do have real impacts and real consequences and something that we'll look at. but with that i would offer any other questions or comments that my colleagues want to make? >> just one quick question. i hope the answer isn't too long. you've mentioned your interest in looking at command and control. >> mm-hmm. >> what's the current regulatory footprint in command and control? >> well, i think, that you know, our regulatory footprint has put a lot of onus and responsibilities on the control room operators, that they have the authorities to take the actions that they need to take while they are on shift, and they have a lot of authorities in that regard to make the what i was referring to is when

you get into a situation that would be proceeding if unattended to what happened in fukushima, who is thinking about the other control room operator who is focused on his unit if it is a multi unit setting, if all the units are affected because of some extraordinary event beyond the design basis for natural phenomena, where the priorities should be, where should we put priorities with regard to mitigation or calling for off site resources. that is the way we are approaching command and control. is not questioning command-and-control that we got in the united states today. we are comfortable that our control room operators have those authorities. >> looking beyond the control room as we look at emergency preparedness requirements and exercises, that is where you test command and control through the sequence.

>> what i am thinking about is in the case of beyond design basis, you are in to sandy territory. do we have any regulatory footprint in the way decisions are made when you get into that regime, when you are thinking about -- and the number of actions. >> that is what we are trying to determine through temporary instruction. >> regulatory really comes to an end at that juncture. >> for sam gs it is not part of our regulatory oversight. >> you are asking that, we have an emergency situation, the authority to order actions necessary to deal with the

crisis whether it is in the regulatory requirement or not? >> we do but the issue for me becomes if you wait for the nrc to make a decision it might be too late. you need someone making those calls. they assure me that the guy who will make that decision is the plant manager. the task force should give some thought to whether we need to become more involved in this. >> we are looking at -- >> any other questions? >> just one comment. one of the concepts are amish or prior commissions have struggled with, this idea of voluntary versus non voluntary, i can see the value of encouraging the industry to do things on a voluntary basis but at the same

time, i have this nagging feeling that we are not intervening too much. i don't know. a lot of the decisions seem to be based -- rather than what nature is going to do. i don't know about this voluntary thing. these are all voluntary until they are not. i don't know if you would call it a voluntary initiative. that is another concept. that is another concept i am struggling with. if you gentlemen can offer some advice may be in the long term, i would greatly appreciate it. >> i will close with that. we haven't really touched on the issue at all but a lot of this

-- voluntary versus non voluntary gets to the back and we haven't touched on the back of it. fundamentally, sometimes presents a hindrance to our ability to impose requirements. i certainly think that is something has the look at this, we have to take seriously. is that preventing the right kinds of activities from being implemented because some of these issues are very complicated to demonstrate a back fit. and do the analysis. as part of my question about looking at consequences in a different way from monetizing the economic cleanup of an accident versus those savings when you take into consideration an evacuation, you may be skewing those results to miss an

important saving or impact from the regulation and requirements. it is a good point and a very good discussion that we have all had. i look forward to an update in about 30 days with your continued progress and i would echo the confidence of my colleagues on the commission with the 18 assembled. the work you have done so far in a tremendously short period of time, a lot of thought has been given to very serious issues. i stress bill's point that doing this in a systematic way will be important that we have a good, clear understanding what needs to be addressed and why. with that, thank you.

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> coming up on c-span2, a couple of programs on libya. we get some perspective from libyan opposition leader and then deputy secretary of state james steinberg testifies before the senate foreign relations committee. later, a hearing about the implementation of the dodd-frank financial regulation law passed last year. >> republican newt gingrich announced he is running for president. the former speaker of the house will be in georgia later today at the georgia republican party convention. watch this road to the white house event live at 7:15 eastern on c-span. this weekend on booktv on

c-span2, last year's beatwater horizon oil rig explosion which killed 11 and released millions of barrels of oil into the gulf of mexico. in a reason to believe governor deval patrick recounts his life from chicago's south side to the massachusetts governor's office and afterwards william cohen shares his insight on money and power. how goldman sachs came to rule the world. look for the complete booktv schedule at booktv.org and get our schedules in your in box. sign up for booktv alert. the interim prime minister of the libyan opposition spoke about the conflict in libya. he says muammar gadhafi's frozen assets are needed by the opposition to express humanitarian needs. he spoke at the brookings institution yesterday after a meeting with members of congress on wednesday.

>> good morning. welcome to brookings. i am ken pollock, director of middle east policy at the brookings institution and i am delighted to see today. before we began our program let me ask everyone to make sure all of yourself loans for any of you who still keep beepers or any other electronic devices, are all silent. i am delighted to have you all here today because we are welcoming a very special speaker to our statesman's forum at the brookings institution. he doesn't need a very long introduction because he is the reason you are all here. nevertheless i am delighted to welcome dr. mahmoud gibril elwarfally, the interim prime minister of the transitional national council of libya to the brookings institution. for those of you who are not

familiar with him, the prime minister holds a master's degree in political science. and from the university of pittsburgh from 2007 to 2009 he served as chair of national development board in libya and led the national planning council. he has a bit of private sector experience including being a regional libya based consultancy. we begin with prepared remarks from the prime minister and then of alaskan the most basic questions and we will take some questions from the audience as well. with that bit of introduction, mr. prime minister, bookings podium is all yours. [applause] >> thank you very much. delighted to be here and honored. thank you for hosting me this morning. if you will allow me i would

like to start by giving some contexts to what is happening in libya and the middle east in general. what has taken place is a natural product of the globalization process. we have witnessed some results with financial and economic scene. what we are witnessing is a new cultural paradigm, some concrete results. what has happened in libya cannot be separated from what is happening in egypt and tunisia and yemen and syria and i would argue that this is an irreversible trend, a new global cultural paradigm based on global values, common values shared by many young people in the world. the middle east is no exception

calling for a human dignity, living with dignity, democracy, more involvement in the process, in daily life of any country of the middle east. i would say this trend will continue to -- in the years to come. just to establish from the very beginning that strategic interest for the united states, to pay closer, this is a new irreversible trend. hy would argue for framework of looking at foreign policy should be revisited.

that framework of foreign policy, it was revised after the collapse of the soviet union. now we are facing a new phenomenon where knowledge, it is well-known that this is duplicated in seven years. by 2025 it will be duplicated. this will reflect results in its systems, mass communication that took place, is going to affect our lives more and more in terms of behavior and organization to face this phenomenon. having said this, just to help me introduce the libyan picture.

it starts two days earlier, the actual start of the revolution. when it took place those young kids took to the streets peacefully looking for democratic structure, looking for a dignified life and a better future because they had been living for 42 years, them and their parents under the dictatorship of a tyrant regime which deprived them of every opportunity to have a dignified life. there is no better education or medical service, failure after failure of projects that had been introduced. enough to say that unemployment exceeds 50% in a country, 300,000 people with a vast

amount of wealth. there is a sense of deprivation and despair. if we couple this evolution taking place, on facebook and twitter and everything, they don't have the need to get into some sort of association that communications taking place naturally, they don't -- they can communicate any time and don't have any space for meetings. there was some sort of bigger picture that those people who took to the streets in tunisia and egypt and libya constitute one big party, the party of a future, all looking for the same future, calling for the same

thing because it is the same cognitive mind, the old system of values. their regime from the other side was looking at -- the same old story that using repressive measures, conflict of fear it is there so it comes to life. firing in the air would do the trick. to the surprise of the regime and ignorance of the regime also this new generation has no fear whatsoever because the socialization process which brought about the new value system is a different one from the socialization process exposed to old generations where fear as a value -- we all suffer from. therefore, the regime tried to benefit from the experience of

tunisian and egypt not to give any concessions, not to negotiate from the beginning. that is what the biggest mistake because the moment of firing live ammunition, the first group that took place -- it ignited more coming to the streets. and different strata of society were marching through the streets in protest against what was taking place. i would argue that the regime realized from the first week that they do not have enough personnel to put down the crisis and resorted to something which i called wicked that tried to go

for more killing because more killing would call for the international community to defeat and if the international community intervenes, gaddafi would set the story and against the international foreign policy. and hitting those -- goes for a petition of the country or recalls ground troops on the ground to call for liberation against those. for us, realizing this fact, we tried from the beginning to create some sort of structured just to shore the outside world that what gadhafi is saying about civil war, about the vacuum, illegal immigration from africa threatening the security of europe, the shortage of --

all those fears he is trying to project to the outside world to protect him from this popular revolution, compelled to intervene immediately on the establishment, the purpose of which is with one voice, libya is one. it was in the past. is now one country and will remain so in the future. one country, one history and one future with one capital which is tripoli. schering libyan people, from the keys are going to occupy you an keys are going to occupy you and do this or that. to clarify what is in different circumstances of the media, tnc is not a political organization.

it is administrative, managing this situation for the libyan people. the political question of who should rule libya and how he or she should rule it is for the libyan people to decide through political democratic process laid on constitutional grounds and in a civil society, based on equal rights, natural human rights for everybody. some other questions started to circulate. are we safe with tnc, with this group? we know some cracks and disagreements within this body. unlike to assure everybody that tnc preserve the hole libyan territory. two days ago the last meeting which was convened in abu dhabi with 27 representatives from the western part of the country and the southern part of the country just traveled this morning to

join the tnc to prove that this -- surpassing the libyan territory and regions. the second fanged, we started expanding the executive bodies of tnc to deliver every service and every commodity our people might need. we are facing some very acute financial problems because of the frozen assets we have in different european countries and the united states. i would like to seize this opportunity to call on the united states administration to help us, president obama particularly. has called for the end of

legitimacy of the regime, that this regime lost its legitimacy in tripoli. this was inspiring to many libyan people that they are not alone and they're fighting a dictatorship. i want to thank him for that call and all the free world who stood by us and decided to fight against tyranny. if we move a little bit further, i would like to clarify something. this revolution started as a peaceful revolution. it is not against some other arm. the struggle was forced on us because of genocide which was taking place, this killing machine fee but still killing people day and night by the thousands. over 11,000 people died in those

few weeks. we still have too many people fleeing their country going to to need and the egyptian border. the united nations before yesterday released its last report saying over 750,000 libyan people fled this country. this never happened in our history before. we, despite this painful human tragedy, are very enthusiastic about the future. they manage those machine guns against the machine to liberate their city. those towers in the western mountain, they are liberated now and open to break the siege toward tripoli. after uprising started to appear in the capital city of tripoli

in the last week and the week before, we are optimistic people started to gain confidence and taking things in their hands and gaining ground. this is against all allegations circulating -- is not the case at all. much better organized today because the gadhafi gave as enough time to mature and talk to each other with a common understanding and vision for the future, vision for development and a road map even after the fall of the regime. it can be done in ten steps. this is due to the fact the we have enough time to talk to each other and a better time to organize and regroup and divide our responsibility to carry it properly. i think there is a lot at stake

for the united states and the free world to cave to the savior of libya because libya is not only for other arab revolution such as egypt and tunisia, syria, yemen, but a model for africa. africa in particular because africa would be the most expanded continent in the next 65 years. africans would be marching for youth, three hundred fifty-five million africans by the year 200050. if we manage to create a real democratic model for developmental model for libya, this would be an oasis of peace and development that could be followed by the many african countries. libya could be the gate of development bridging africa with

europe which would be shaking. by 2015, seventy two billion people. so i think the solution for development and stability will be libya. serving as a model for other arab countries and development of problems in the african continent. thank you very much for listening and i will be ready to take your questions. [applause] >> thank you for that.

that was a great way to start us off. you made a nice foundation. there are a few questions i would like to ask that are foremost in americans's mind. we will open up to the audience. the first is effectively where you ended your remarks. you talk about the military situation, the fact that most americans have the perception the military situation in libya not withstanding today's important and hopeful events that there is a general sense that the military situation is bogged down into a stalemate. it would be helpful for americans to understand how you and the transitional national council are thinking about a strategy for bringing this war to a successful conclusion. >> first of all, it is on the ground. first of all if we look at it,

let me use the terminology out of a box, you are not able to sift this contract, always applied by saying the regime is not able to -- the regime is in power. heavy tanks, armored vehicles. airplanes. son civilians just have machine guns. the regime for 12 continuous weeks, they could not settle this. the freedom fighters are marching -- as i said in different occasions, when

there's a conflict between the right of power and the power of right, the power of right moves cities because those people have will and determination and nothing to lose. they elected to exercise their right to die for liberty. there is no defense against that. i am optimistic there is no stalemate. people are marching, gaining more confidence and experience, gaining more ground, more organization. a few coming weeks will witness more grounds guaranteed by the freedom fighters. regarding this issue, i would say gadhafi has two strife right now. the power to kill and the power

to strike. what relies in his power to kill is a must for any political solution to be reasonably have a chance of being a basis for negotiation. without having that, i would say any political solution will not be looked at by the regime. talking about cease-fire without being part of a continuous -- leads to the departure of gaddafi -- gadhafi and his regime. which we reject. the main purpose of establishing the tnc was to insist on libyan unity. people and geography, therefore i would say that our -- positive pressure, better protection of civilians, better obligation for

resolution, hitting command and control, and number 2, freedom fighters are gaining more ground, better confidence in themselves. the icc indictment arrest warrant, this is real political pressure. early indications of the real uprising taking place in tripoli, all those elements are pushing toward squeezing the regime. the internal crackdown will take place. original total collapse of the regime is not realized in the next few weeks. >> i would like to pick up the point you mentioned, talking about the cease-fire, political solution. is there a political solution to

the fighting itself? can you imagine a cease-fire you would trust given gadhafi's history and what would that look like? take us for what a successful political resolution of this conflict rather than a military resolution by the freedom fighters, what would a political solution will quite? what would you need to make that work? >> that will harbor some political initiatives on the table, the african union, which i would say is not a comprehensive political initiative. its main emphasis is the immediate cease-fire. with such initiative to be a viable need for negotiation. it should include some elements,

securing that initiative needs legitimate time for the american people which was clearly size thaw in the solution, there is also an initiative lately which is more comprehensive. and i would say it could serve as a frame for negotiation. too many things can be clarified during the negotiation process. that initiative clearly indicated the departure of gadhafi and his regime which is the strategic objective of this revolution. and establish our democratic role in the country. i would say the initiative is more comprehensive because

started lifting ten points and contains some points which are taking care of both phases of the cease-fire and what complications follow that and the face of establishing what is leading to gadhafi's departure. we on this council lately are good at developing our own political initiative which is capitalizing on all initiatives on the table, trying to take the resolution of the frame in which we can develop something compatible with the resolution and that the same time compatible with desperation -- >> we heard the news before we came out that you are going to be meeting with president obama. while i wish hour session was going to follow that meeting so i could ask what you did say it

to him i have to content myself by asking instead what will you say to the president? what are you going to tell him about the role the united states can play? what would you like to see the united states do? >> first of all, are would thank him for the role the united states had to play and urge him to play a more active role because there's a lot at stake for the united states. >> i guess i will content myself with that. let's shift over to the political side. the great question americans have for you is how would you plan to bring the war to a successful close, the regime is gone and the libyan people are

firmly in control of their country. what is the strategy for building a new libyan political system? a new libyan economy? a new libya? we have seen with our experience in iraq and afghanistan, reconstructionist hardest part of any fight. you don't get started with a strategy and a plan for doing that from the get go liberal ones you have won the victory it is often too late. >> you are right. for probably three weeks probably three multidisciplinary teams, one team is concerned with reconstruction of libya after the fall of the regime such as what is happening in kuwait. the second team concerned with the process, the south african

model and the capacity ofbuilding because it will initiate and establish a government structure on all hole of the regime, having the right institution and the right to qualify human-resources, delivering the necessary services and out comes the needed by the libyan people. therefore we came up with a road map. it is a transitional road map after the fall of the regime. immediately the tnc should call for the convening of the national congress. national congress, all cities and towns taken into consideration for each town and city. the function of the national congress is the select

committee, that constitution -- in the united nations. having that constitution approved, the election for the first libyan parliament, it is in place. two weeks after we finish the parliamentary election the, presidential elections should be there. there should be an interim government. that interim government is a mixture of members of tnc. in the old regime especially financial. knowing who is who and to the background of everything. there are two or three elements

from security and military officers and one judgment from the supreme court, and the civil society. the name of the game, two things, one conclusion, the interim government. and what happened -- hopefully this can be against the fall of the regime. >> listening the sketch that you are clearly ahead of where the united states was as we were engaging in worse in iraq and afghanistan. you have already best of us. why don't we open up to the government -- the audience? why don't we start right here?

>> on the eleventh of march, met with the treasury department and talk about the release of recognition. two months later there is no release of funds and no recognition. how long will be regime last? >> thank you for raising this question. this is the big hurdle we are facing right now. yesterday and today, meeting members of the congress to urge them to help us in this regard. we are facing a real crisis, running almost out of money.

we have different demands and expectations in the eastern part of the country and the cities which are surrounded by gaddafi. all of those people on the borders, that number exceeded 50,000 people. we have a real human tragedy in the making right now. unfortunately by those activities. but the real tragedy is underneath the real human tragedy. we try several proposals. 1973 resolution, imposing restrictions on those assets by being frozen from the libyan government. we are not recognized by the united states so cannot release

the money. we are not at replacement officially yet for the regime. the united states is declaring the regime lost its legitimacy. sodas not recognizing the other routine. with the tnc is trying to say is we need political recognition. recognizing this council as the sole legitimate representative of the libyan people. not talking about a new state that needs recognition. even this is not successful. this is political recognition. italy or france or some african countries like malawi and there are some other countries in a few days. we have a legal problem.

we tried another proposal by trying to convince them and there is something where senator kerry declared he is developing legislation and need some of that money around $180 million for something though as you well know, our frozen assets succeed $50 billion. are estimates of our immediate needs in the next six months exceed 3000000000.6 libyan the nile's which exceeds $3 billion. we are convincing them to keep those assets and use them against which we can have -- just to try to meet the demands of our people. even this so far is not working

but hopefully the appropriation committee is trying to develop another approach. four five weeks might be too late. that is why the finance ministers that we need this money. there is a sense of real urgency because of the human tragedy in the making right now. >> human and political development. welcome to our capital here and congratulations for the libyan council. my question is if we have all the nato countries, what is

establishing to get those recognized? >> my understanding, this is what i gathered from different political leaders and officials from different countries in need, there is an understanding of recognition as a legal requirement, trying to convince them of political recognition, some of them are not convincing enough. they recognize you as a state better than me. for the eastern part, if we declare a government we are a state but if we do that gadhafi

will say this is what are have been telling you. people in the east want to partition the country. that is why we call this executive view not a government because of that political concern. it puts us in a squeeze. they need the three elements to recognize. this is a tricky situation. if we need the recognition we need to go for a government and then we have separation. trying to help them use the tnc as interlock for the time representing the voice of the libyan people. if you are convinced of the legitimacy of this revolution, the legitimate demands of those people, then it is for the

taking. so far some governments came forward to recognize that some will do in the near future and they still see this is the legal structure they cannot overcome. >> the lady over there. >> my question is about the road map. >> speak into the microphone. >> can you hear me a? my question is about the elections for the free areas. my question is why cities, considered free areas. according to my understanding, in free areas right now. >> that is not true. we do not call for elections, we

call for elections after of the fall of the regime after the conclusion -- constitution is drafted and approved by the libyan people we call for a parliamentary election. we took part in that electoral process. >> back to the gentleman. >> are you satisfied and happy about them succeeding their mission bringing gadhafi regime down and also how much support from the people of libya? >> regarding nato operations in libya we are talking about

protection of libyan civilians. and clearly whatever measures needed should be taken to accomplish that objective. i think nato has more responsive -- i think talking to a nato -- in the early days there was some complaints about responsiveness to the atrocities and the genocide taking place against the libyan people. we discovered the decisionmaking process has a lot to do with the quickness of the response of

nato. i gather there are 28 members to the committee making a decision in a committee between eight members completely different to making the decision of the coalition led by one country. the time span is completely different but i would say nato is more accurate and the responsibilities of 1973 resolution. regarding the popularity, i would rather talk about the popularity of tnc, not myself. tnc represents for the time being the national consensus of the libyan people. this is an administrative body selected through confrontation. but when the political question of who should rule libyan, through the democratic process. >> let's keep moving back a

little bit. >> you have mentioned marching toward tripoli. do you have any timeline where you might take over that city? the other question is are you seeking some assistance from america? if you could explain to wes what arab countries are providing to you so far? >> we don't have a timeline or its timetable. those freedom fighters are not an army which has a plan to do something. we are trying to protect

themselves. when i said they are marching their joining hands with their brothers in the next town. and alliance to protect themselves against this tyrant regime which is applauding them day and night. it is a process of civil defense. i'll try to remind myself and others that this is a peaceful resolution, not an armed struggle and reminded distinguished members of the media, please don't forget this hole of rising started as a peaceful legitimate process of full libyan people looking for a better future. it was crushed in humanely and therefore to resort to whatever they can get to defend themselves. are rather not talk about that because this struggle, the

nature of this is a peaceful resolution. when gadhafi -- during the last week's, the whole thing stopped. this is an armed struggle. we wouldn't have the cease-fire. it was a national -- natural cease-fire taking place without any negotiations simply because gadhafi's bombardment, everything stopped. people are defending themselves. other questions please? >> are you going to -- what kind of help are you receiving? [talking over each other] >> we need the assistance of our arab brothers. the arab league.

who calls for the protection of libyan civilians in the first place and who calls for the no-fly zone. we are seeking every type of assistance from our brothers. we played a very decisive role in assisting -- the arab league did the same thing. we had some financial assistance and other economic system of sharing their experiences to the kuwaiti invasion. and all types of support for the same thing. i cannot distinguish between what arab countries, all of them are recognizing the agony and human tragedy the libyan people are going to. i would like to see this opportunity -- >> one more quick question from the front. then i will ask everyone to

please remain seated after the event because diplomatic security needs -- >> thank you. our and kerri mitchell and the right of the mitchell report. i want to ask if you could put a little more flesh -- i'm interested to know if this group that is assembling in these groups-whether you have over and above that enormously important work you started with a picture in your head about what libyan in 2025 looks like. what is happening in libya?

and importantly because you said at the outset that this was a bunch of people who are leading this revolution. are they part of this process? are they part of this vision? >> this is a very strategic push. in 2007, and 2008, a group of libyan professors, other libyan universities took part in an exercise to develop a vision of 2025 for libya. it was based on the following factors. first, a reading of the global scene today. where things are moving

globally. where we see demography, capital and human resources population. those are the key factors that will shape the 20 first century. the interaction between those three factors. where libya can be positioned in the context, global context. we have depleted commodity. we have only oil. the oil reserve is whatever the duration is going to be. it is a commodity that is going to be pleased one day or the other so we have to think of the economy. it is not a haphazard selection. it is based on this position of libya.

which identity of an economy can help us compete regionally and internationally so we can get the currency and feed our people, find housing for them. we manage during that exercise to pin down that libya can go with the state of the economy based on knowledge, what human developments would be, education and a new paradigm of education in the regime. remove from management to knowledge and the regular class fleet the lead ministration, you know. that exceeds 2,100 pages because we went for all sectors of the economy and in each sector there is a road map that should take

us to that scene of democratic libya where the private sector play is an excellent road of inequality between different society members. and the agenda of necessity or religion, these are taken into consideration. independent judiciary authority. we are talking about transparency. reaching that stage, in libya is a must. we are facing four challenges.

it is very scary because libya among 28 countries is facing this population decrease. this is in time where the rest of africa is expanding exponentially. egypt by 2025 will be 1 seventeen million people. algeria and morocco combined by 2025, ninety-two million people. why libya in 2025 will be 8.1. the sudan, seventy billion people. pafford as a continent will be 1 billion to 1 fifty-eight million people. so it is a must that there will

be -- looking for a better life. that is where we tried to develop the developmental model not only serving libya but serving the continent making this transformation to serve the needs of the european economy and also at times of need, beautiful by 2025 meeting 1 ten million extra laborers to sustain productivity. the equation is there, we sustained the course, this is the first type of challenge. the second type is the depletion

of resources and the third type of challenge, libya and the eminence of the world in terms of the share of each individual resources. the fourth type of challenge is the diminishing -- in the minds of the people. the state of chaos taking place with constitution and lack of rule in the last 42 years. that is where corruption was spreading in the country. do whatever it can do. nobody will tell you it is applied in a selective manner if you are not cooperative enough for corrupt practices. other than that we have -- we

are all against war. it has taken place in the last ten years in the country. those four challenges if we do not attend to them immediately, libya would be in a serious position. .. position, you know, as it might be characterized as a failure state. with this uprising coming to existence, there could be a solution, because this is a new generation, where the libyans, the diaspora, some of the qualified libyans inside, we have the qualified libyan resources to do it. we have the financial resources. we don't need some assistance financial from anybody. all we need is the real political will to do it and the right vision to accomplish it. >> mr. prime minister, you've been incredibly generous with your time, and we can only wish that your vision of libya is one that is fulfilled and perhaps even before 2025. again, i need to ask everyone to

stay in their seats while we move the prime minister out, but please, from your seats, join me thanking the prime minister of the libyan opposition. [ applause ] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> now an update on the situation in libya. with debbie secretary of state james steinberg who testifies before the senate foreign

relations committee. he talks about sanctions place on the gadhafi regime, and the refugees trying to leave the country. this is 55 minutes. >> the hearing will come to order. thank you for coming this morning. we are under the gun on both sides of the aisle. senator lugar has to go down to the white house for a meeting of the republicans with the president, and i have to go down there for a separate meeting. so we're going to be a little bit compressed. senator shaheen as the hearing

continues beyond that the witching hour for both of us, then senator shaheen wheelchair. but it may well be that we can get where we need to go if we kind of move along here and compress everything. this is the fourth ring we have had on the question of libya since the popular uprising began in february. we are delighted to welcome secretary steinberg back. he appeared last year on march 31 when we kind of, we thought had congratulated him for becoming the dean of the maxwell school and sent him off to the sunset. but we need to proceed forward here with secretary burns nomination which were going to credited as fast as we can. we now have the papers, and the minute we can't we will get that hearing done, and i'm sure we will do it expeditiously.

the situation in libya, while it appears some significantly stalemated, i think is different from the way it appears, to be honest with you. yesterday we had the privilege of meeting with mahmoud jabril, producing met with him in cairo and invite him to come and meet with colleagues in the it a good meeting yesterday with a lot of colleagues in the senate. and i think everybody came away impressed by the serious this of purpose, the articulate presentation and agenda, and a commitment to democracy and to values and principles that i think our country can willingly and happily support. in the last hours, some progress has occurred on the ground which is encouraging. the taking of the airport

outside misratah, and liberating misratah and airport. some actions in tripoli itself. and i think prime minister elwarfally was quite encouraging about the fact of what hospitals are in the days ahead. we never know. obviously, there is tension in the stalemate in central libya. but i'm convinced that because of the actions taken by nato, by the gcc, by the arab league and the opposition themselves, i believe that the libyan people have been getting a fighting chance for a better future. and i think catastrophe was averted in been ghazi. unlike iraq or afghanistan, we've been able to achieve what's been achieved with a broad international support. in fact, with other nato members

really caring the brunt of the load. and i think there can be no denying that had the international community not taken action against gadhafi, i think the situation in libya would be far worse today, and also i think the message across the arab world, across north africa and into the middle east would have been significantly damaging to the aspirations of the arab spring, and two other interests that we have. i think the progress that the transitional national council has made has actually been quite remarkable. in a short three months they have organized themselves, articulated a roadmap forward, given a vision of a post-gadhafi libya that is democratic and inclusive. they've begun to develop institutions that can provide

basic services for the people. they are thinking about how to deal with humanitarian dislocation and challenges. and while some institutions are going to have to rebuild from scratch over a period of time, i think we are in a position to provide technical and financial assistance. and i applaud the initiative announced last week by secretary clinton and her efforts with contact group in rome where they decided it was important to provide the transitional national authority with access to financial sources. we are working here in the senate to construct and then pass the enabling legislation that will make it possible for gadhafi's money to support the efforts of the libyan people, which is what it should do in the first place. so, secretary steinberg, i'm

delighted to have your today. thank you for taking the time to come and. senator lugar. >> thank you, mr. commissioner, only this time he -- tammy and i join in welcoming back deputy secretary steinberg. the committee sought this witness from the defense department to join secretary steinberg at this hearing. the administration chose not to provide such a witness, in my judgment is inexplicable decision given the administration pledged to fully consult with congress, and the central of the united states military has played in the libyan operations. i'm hopeful the defense department witnesses will be provided at subsequent hearings on libya when requested. since our last libya hearing, more than a month ago, fighting between opposition forces and troops loyal to moammar gadhafi continued unabated. the united states is participating in the coalition of nations under the leadership

and is opposing the gadhafi regime with military force. among other steps the obama administrations initiated a process providing at least $25 million in nonlethal assistance to the libyan opposition. it has dedicated predator drones to libyan airspace. one can envision scenarios under which the fighting might come to an end. but a quick resolution of war is not likely. accordingly, under the war powers act, congress could render a judgment on whether to continue the united states participation in the war. at this stage, congressional leaders have not committed to a debate, and it is uncertain whether the majorities can be assembled for any particular resolution. the president should have come to congress seeking authority to wage war in libya. and i believe the congress and the american people would still

benefit from a debate on this matter. a respected as a debate, however, that congress and the american people should have answers to some very basic questions, the president has not addressed sufficiently. first, can other nato nations fulfill the primary combat mission in libya over an indefinite period, and how will the administration respond if allies request greater military involvement by the united states? second, what scenarios or emergencies would cause the united states to re- escalate its military involvement in libya? and with the administration seek a congressional authorization if it expands its military role? third, one of the administration's plans for aiding libyan opposition economically and militarily? and to have confidence in the people somewhere providing this

assistance? for the promoters of a military operations related to libya costing the united states backs and how much is the administration prepared to spend overtime? and fifth in the aftermath of the current civil war, what responsibility united states assume for reconstruction of libya? there are many other questions that require an answer, but this illustrates the degree to which the united states goals on resources and strategy related to libyan remain open and undefined. in addition, libyan operations have not been adequately placed in a broader strategic context. given all that is at stake in pakistan, afghanistan, iran, saudi arabia, egypt, syria, yemen, and elsewhere in the islamic world, a rational strategic assessment would never devote a sizable military,

diplomatic, economic and aligns resources to a civil war in libya. when measured against other regional problems, libya appears as a military conflict in which we have let events determine our involvement instead of our vital interest. it is an expensive diversion that leaves the united states and her european allies with two assets to respond to other contingencies in the region. i look forward to our discussion of these issues come of the situation in libya, and related administration policies and actions. i thank you, mr. commissioner,. >> thanks a lot, senator lugar. i appreciate it. you know the routine. if you want to summarize, your full testimony will be placed in the record. we look forward to hearing you. >> thank you, mr. commissioner, thank you, senator lugar. it is a pleasure to be back. i will summarize my remarks and hit on a few of the key points that i would like to raise with the committee. since my last appearance before

you we have i think made real progress assembly and remarkable international coalition of european and arab partners. on the military side following the adoption of u.n. security council resolution 1973, we've undertaken a clear but limited mission to protect the libyan people. the united states offered our unique military capabilities early on in turnover for command-and-control responsibility to a nato-led coalition. of the over 6000 sorties flown in libya, three quarters have been flown by non-us coalition partners. 20 ships are european or canadian come and the overwhelming majority of strike sorties are now being flown by european allies. but in ashington there is efforts are not simply military. we continue to work with our partners to pursue three tracks on the political and economic front. brushing and isolating gadhafi, supporting the libyan people, determine their own future, and delivering humanitarian aid. on the first we're working to

escalate the pressure, deep and gadhafi's isolation and convince those around him that latest future lies elsewhere. the international community is increasingly united around a shared assistance, that cannot be must go. in last week's contact meeting the conclusions pointedly noted that in the words of the contact group, gadhafi come his family and his regime have lost all legitimacy. they must go so that the libyan people can determine their own future. this coalition called on gadhafi to go to countries in turkey like in the past have had close ties to the regime. nations are joining us in expelling gadhafi's diplomats in refusing visits from gadhafi's envoys and listened are defecting are coming to discuss his departure. the clear message to gadhafi and those around them is that there's no going back to the way things were. through the u.n. security council they now face a no-fly zone, arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban to libya's national oil corporation and central bank are blacklisted. the united states and other

countries are taking further unilateral steps to tighten the squeeze on regime officials and regime affiliated banks, businesses and satellite networks. this week the icc prosecutor and as he intends to apply for arrest warrants for three senior officials in gadhafi's regime who in his words bear the greatest criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity. these measures are having an effect. we deprive the regime of fund assets that could be used to support attacks against the libyan people. libya used to export 1.3 million barrels of oil per day. that is now stopped energy was having difficulty accessing refined petroleum. there's some indication the regime can no longer afford to pay supporters to attend rallies and demonstrations. second come we are supported legitimate democratic aspirations of the libyan people. last time i testified before you, you all raise many questions about the makeup and intentions of the libyan opposition. our envoy in benghazi have been underground for several weeks. and meets regularly with a wide range of libyan opposition

members. secretary clinton herself has been three times with libyan opposition leaders and urged others to do the same, and as you noted, secretary, mahmoud gibril has been consulting with congress and will be meeting with us as well. we continue to stress the importance of the tse distancing itself from extremists who can hijack the piper move. we have been pleased by the clear view of the tnc leadership that you yourselves heard. reject the extremism and calling for tolerant democracy. we welcome the tnc's roadmap to draft a constitution for post-gadhafi libya and lebanon courage by efforts on the tse to strengthen their organization on the civilian and military side. as we got to know the living opposition come with stepped-up our support. we notify congress when provide at the $25 million for provision of nonlethal items to the tnc including medical supplies, food, tents, rationed and personal protection gear.

the treasury department has published new rules to remove sanctions on oil sales that will benefit the tnc. the libya contact group has great a new mechanism to provide transparent financial assistance to the opposition to which kuwait has already donated $180 million. as secretary clinton said in rome and as you mentioned, mr. chairman, we look forward to working with you to be getting targeted unfreezing of libyan government assets to meeting pressing humanitarian needs. third, we're providing more than $53 million of humanitarian assistance and continue to look for additional ways to support humanitarian operations. the international community has contributed, contributed $245 million. mr. chairman, i understand the desire for quick decisive results. we in the administration share that goal. however, i think it's important to recall how much has been accomplished in less than two much. it of any age managing catastrophe, in rallying the remarkable coalition, immobilizing pressure on the gadhafi regime, and working with

emerging democratic forces in libya. history teaches us that patience and persistence paid off. we've already seen the international pressure changed the calculation of some of gadhafi's advisers. it's impossible to predict which single step with the balance. we recognize the way forward is not easy, and so we're using as many tools and leverage as we can to bring about our ultimate objective, the end of gadhafi's will and the beginning of a new peaceful democratic libya. in all this we recognize and appreciate the critical role that congress place. even before the president directed u.s. forces to participate in coalition operations, he and his senior advisers reached out to the of congress including this committee. those consultations have continued both informally and in appearances before congress, including my own. by april 5 the united states successfully set the stage and transfer to our allies and partners the lead for enforcing the no-fly zone of protecting civilians on the ground pursue it to the u.n. security council

resolution. as this opera has move forward our role has involved to a supporting one as our ally partners have taken the lead. as we come closer to the end of the second month of operations, we are actively reviewing our role going forward. throughout the president has been mindful of the provisions of the war powers resolution and has acted in a manner consistent with them. he will continue to do so and we look forward to continuing to consult with congress on our role in the coming days. we welcome your support. let me add one final point. in closing, senator lugar, you raise many important questions but especially to touch on the last which are is our strategic stakes in this effort. in addition to the very compelling humanitarian crisis that we face them as i mentioned the last time we appeared, this operation, senator kerry has said as will come has applications not just libya, for the broader region. gadhafi's efforts to repress and attack his own people could have

enormous consequences for the transition to tunisia and egypt which are currently important to the united states and/or long-term interests. they send a signal to the rest of the world that we are able to work, especially when called upon by the arab countries in the region to take steps to try to protect the populations there and to make sure these kinds of efforts will not succeed. so i think as important as the stakes directly in libya are, even more broadly to do a profound consequences for the united states wishfully justifies the role that we've taken in this case. thank you all and i look forward to your question. >> thanks very much, mr. secretary. let me ask you, can you speak how it affected you think the sanctions and international diplomatic pressure right now is and what, whether there are signs, seizures or officials affection additionally within the gadhafi circle? >> i think it's always difficult any circumstances to know,

especially given the close nature of the gadhafi regime. but we do see real signs that in terms of the ability to conduct business as usual, particularly of life squad of the regime, oil sales and financial transactions, that we been very successful in mobilizing the international community. we see no signs of oil exports from the libyan regime itself but we are working with the tnc tuesday whether they can do this. they are access to the financial system has been badly damaged and so we do see signs that this is great real pressure. it all goes hand-in-hand trying to bring together the political, economic and military together to make the regime recognize that there are direct consequences and that we have sustainable and sustainable power here. >> what impact do you think the international criminal court or arrest warrants might have, if any, in calculations? >> i think as we said from the beginning, that it is essential

that both colonel gadhafi and all those around you understand that there are consequences for what they're doing and they will be held accountable. and that the individuals who are making decisions supporting gadhafi need to know that if they continue to undertake operations which violate humanitarian law, that they will have consequences. i think it dramatically increases the pressure on individuals and regime. and i think the important experience that we had in the context of kosovo as i mentioned in my last testament, i think is a relegation that not just for those who are indicted, but others around them that this can make them understand that they face clear choices and that the longer they hang on the greater risk to themselves. >> i think it's important as we go down this road to remember that after we intervened in the balkans, bond quite significant serbia, milosevic was there for another year, a whole year. and ultimately left not because

we drove them out but because people did at the ballot box fundamentally. there's going to be a valid boxer, but from what i understand from a number of sources and conversations i had recently abroad, the pressures are building on gadhafi. the calculations are beginning to shift among some of his folks who are aware that the opposition is getting more organized. the opposition is getting more support. the opposition is gaining on the ground. and so i think we're sort of that closer, not yet at the same point closer to where we were in the initial week or so when does swept the whole country. the indications i have are, is that broadly within the come -- even people within the areas of gadhafi control, they don't want him to stay.

and that there is a very broad base of people, opposition to his presence. can you spee-2 sort of what insights you and secretary and the others gathered in your conversations to our allies how you may be viewing the in game here the longer run? >> i think again we have to be careful and speculate. we see some signs that there may be some interest of people around gadhafi to find a way out. but these are the kinds of things until aptly -- after happened you don't want to bank on. i think the most significant feature is quite strong consensus in the international community to not look for half measures, not to look for ways to let him stay or to try to begin to cut back on our basic demands for what needs to happen. this most recent, third contact meeting was a real affirmation

of the fact that there is a complete consensus to the international committee that there is no future here that involves gadhafi in power or as part of the solution. and i think that's similar to what happened in the balkans, a recognition that this may not happen today or tomorrow but there's simply no long-term future for gadhafi. i think more than anything else that's what help shape the apartment and mexico to others who may want to be part of the future that they have to find an alternative. i think that's what we're driving home. as i mentioned, i think the efforts by countries like turkey which in the past have been more critical about this, closing the nation in tripoli, making stronger statement about this continues the drumbeat that has to be having an impact among the regime about the fact that there is no kind of halfway option that they might it would hold on you and kind of negotiate their way out of it. >> final question for me. we are nearing the 60 day mark with respect to the operations start. can you just speak to the type of operations were engaged in and whether or not, how the

administration views the authority for u.s. military for dissipation in operation unified protect it at this point? >> in terms of the specifics as you understand, mr. chairman, i prefer my cards on a mountainside to speak to that, but i think we can say as we said from the beginning that the very substantial majority of the operations are being conducted by the coalition partners, that we've reduced our our role to primary supporting in cases we have some unique assets that we made available. mindful of the passage of time, including the end of the two-month period. where at the process of redoing our role, and we will and the president will be making decisions in terms of what he sees as appropriate for us to do. as i said, and with his commitment to act consistently with the war powers resolution. ..

shall debate in our country from the authority of the president and war powers act for long time in the past. but leaving aside that, nor has there been a search for declaration precisely of what the authority of the president of the united states ought to be in this particular situation. in fairness the president's response on two occasion to questions i raised to hem said no boots on the ground.

clearly a humanitarian situation, saving lives of civilians. therefore, we will work with our nato allies and be behind them and push them forward. although the rhetoric as we heard to date very clearly that gadhafi must go or there is clearly a end game here evoke one doesn't know the time frame, i am disturbed by this anomaly because of libya but the precedent likely to set in modern times with regard to other specific countries. in the case of the balkans awhile back, we did attempt to help our european allies, too much for us given the history of yugoslavia and so forth. there was not a raft of situations of authoritarian

personnel in leadership who were shooting at their citizens. so it seems to me that this is clearly a time in which the proper authority ought to be stopped by the president's. there should be a proper debate in congress. before you get to that, we are in a situation in which we are taking authority to reach into libyan resources. the rationale is these are resources that were commandeered by colonel gadhafi in one form or another and should be seized and taken from him and used in a humanitarian way for the libyan people. this seems to me to be a very big reach. granted the administration is seeking potential legislation. he has worked with the

administration perhaps on enabling legislation so we may therefore have a congressional debate on that authority. but even then, granted the dislike we have for gadhafi or for various other people, reaching in and taking those resources and distributing them in an uncertain way unless physically the united states is going to monitor this situation we are finding that difficult to do in pakistan with much greater cooperation. it seems to me to be a stretch. i am grateful for the hearings because we are moving rapidly down the trail in a situation in which we haven't declared war. we have no particular authority for any of this aside from the president's assertion that we needed to save lives and we have

already put missiles into libya to some extent. the meter is still running on our expenditures and defense budget without much accounting for how much can be attributed to libya or how far we plan to go. more our responsibility for the writ of a station efforts. what is your own judgment as to what the administration is likely to do with regard to war powers or this reaching end to the coffers of gadhafi? what sort of authority do you believe are required? >> on the issue of getting access to libyan assets we want congressional authorization. we believe under these circumstances we are not shaping up to do this under existing authority but because this is a unique case and these assets were frozen pursuant to security

council resolution which complement our own domestic law which allowed us to free these assets it was important to craft -- to address the questions that you raise for the terms of the purpose which should be limited to the humanitarian purpose in terms of oversight and making sure those things serve that purpose and in our discussions with you mr. chairman and others, we want to craft that in a way that does address the issue. we think this is a narrow set of authority is we would like to deal with the circumstance but we think under these circumstances given the humanitarian needs it is appropriate that these are largely derived from their own resources and should be put in a controlled way to their benefit. we look forward to working with congress to establish that authority on terms -- with respect to the war powers, the president has been committed to act consistent with the war powers resolution. we provided a notification

consistent with the war powers resolution and the outset and as we continue to move forward the president is committed to do that as well. we will be looking at our own role and activities as we move through the next period of time and we will do this in consultation with you as we look at what we can or cannot do we will be engaged in close consultation with congress on this issue. >> that is the debate we may have. i raise the question not just in regard to libya but generally to our ability in a civil war situation beginning to allocate resources to one party or another in a situation where we have not declared war or declared our own intent. i think it is a very serious set of questions that lie before us. finally, certain of our allies are indicating that enough is enough. there are limits. their parliaments are blowing the whistle on how many months

they participate. perhaps for response will be a lot of nato nations. some still left in the process. what is the limit in terms of our nato allies given the defense budget they have been restricting foreign long time? much to our regret. where are we left finally as they depart the scene even though we keep shoving them forward indicating we are not the leader? >> what has been remarkable is the persistence and commitment of the nato allies and others participating. we have not seen any flagging of commitment. we are mindful we need to sustain this to make sure it humanitarian objectives are achieved but we don't want to set an artificial deadline to allow the regime to wear a out. but there's a clear determination there will be important meetings coming up in early june.

that is an opportunity to look at the resources. >> thank you very much. senator cardin. >> thank you very much. always nice to have the before our committee. thank you for your service. the situation in libya is fluid. it changes. one of the areas of great concern deals with the issues concerning migrants. one of the principal reasons for international intervention in libya is to provide safety for the people in the country. the numbers i have is the number of migrants excellent libya beginning this month was in excess of 700,000 and over one 1/3 were foreign nationals. i bring that up because reports from those fleeing libya, entering little italy, of there

were hundreds lost at sea, leaving tripoli. my question to you is twofold as it relates to the migrants. if this conflict becomes protracted, the number of migrants will increase and will cause increasing problems in the surrounding countries. we know that they have migrated to tunisian of the digital -- chad and sudan. is there a strategy in the international coalition to deal with the safety of those fleeing libya and secondly, having a game plan depending in part by the left of this conflict as far as time as to what we are going to do with the migrants. we don't want to create another circumstance similar to what happened in iraq where we had permanent issues that are difficult to deal with because

of the number of displaced individual migrants. do we have a game plan as relates to the migrant population? >> this is an important issue and clearly i was one of the main reasons for our initial engagement. the deal was the humanitarian situation in libya and destabilizing the neighboring country. i had a chance to review these issues with the experts in the department yesterday on this and i am going to give you some ballpark members but if you will allow me i can make sure -- the response of the united states and the international community to the problem of migrants, displaced libyans and third country nationals has been remarkable. if you look at the situation in tunisia and egypt compared to where it was several weeks ago the numbers are down. they are relatively small numbers in camps. through the generosity of people in tunisia a number of people

are living with families in to nietzsche supporting that effort so we don't have the hundreds of thousands in desperate circumstances that we saw in the early days. there has been especially a very effective international effort to move the third country nationalss back to their homes. that is one aspect of the problem that is not over. people completely -- for in terms of the game plan and strategy to reduce the pressure on tunisia and egypt. the second is clearly to the effect that we are successful infer protecting ben ghazi and we create a more stable situation here and elsewhere at reducing pressure on people to leave and impending fear of disaster. the humanitarian intervention

here has a significant prospect. as you mentioned is the case in iraq the larger success depends on political change in libya creating an environment for those who have been fearful and have left to come back. among the many regions that is why we are so committed to this political change and why we don't believe some kind of compromise or have measure with gadhafi there will be a solution to this problem in terms of sustainable democracy in libya or bringing an end to the humanitarian migration problem. it is something we have devoted a lot of resources to and we have a game but at heart that game plan is part of a broader strategy for bringing political change. >> you are absolutely right. my main point on this is we all want to see a regime change and stability in the country as quickly as possible. it seems to me the international

community needs to have a game plan as it relates to the migrants. if this matter is resolved quickly with a matter of weeks it is one set of circumstances as relates to displaced individuals but if this becomes a conflict that goes on for longer period of time there needs to be a different strategy as it relates to the migrant population. i am pleased to see foreign nationals have gone back to their countries and more convenient accommodations for those who left out of fear who hope one day to return to libya. i would ask that you investigate the reports about those fleeing tripoli by small boats and their safety as to whether there is a need for international attention to their safety. there have been reports that there were those lost at sea if you could look after that.

>> one last point if i might. deals with the war crimes issue. there have been some reports that the international criminal court is active in this area looking at war crimes committed by officials in libya. can you either update us as to what is happening as it relates to potential war crimes, and what the united states is doing to pursue those types of accountabilities for those responsible for mass murders and other actions? >> this past week the icc prosecutor announced he plans to apply to three senior officials in gadhafi's regime. this process is going forward and we are supporting these efforts in collecting information. this is an important part of the pressure and accountability that can have an impact not just on gadhafi himself but forcing the choices we would like to see

made later. >> we believe colonel gadhafi should be a target of this investigation. but i would very much urge the united states to be actively engaged in pursuing these issues. it is important to the international community. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for your service. i respect the work you do and appreciate your coming out here. you use the word consultation but there really isn't any consultation. we have written a letter asking about the assets we have engage militarily and gotten a stiff arm for several weeks. we ask for somebody from the military to be here and you declined and someone asked earlier what assets we did have engaged and you said you would be for to the military.

i would like to ask why in the name of consultation the administration has been so remiss in letting us know what we're doing as it relates to our military assets and engagement to libya. >> there are a number of forms to explore these issues as we can get this information to you -- >> you had written a letter several weeks ago and i got a stiff arm from the administration. name before and i will be there. i am not busy after 1:00 today. i will arrive on monday. could you arrange to set that up and let us know exactly what is happening? >> i will get back to you. >> that has been -- i don't understand. i really don't. people just want -- they are concerned about mission, i don't

understand. is not as if there's a huge rift happening here. i hope you will get back. the secretary of defense will get back very quickly and let us know. this use of the word consultation is bogus. people like myself who cooperate in many ways, candidly are getting a little impatient with the fact that basically you are waiting until this conflict is mostly over possibly to even let us know what is happening. i don't consider that consultation. that is not something there creates goodwill or something that is going to cause us to work well together in the future. i hope you will get back very quickly. you know how to reach me. what have we told the rebels move by the way their leader--one of their leaders was in yesterday. for what it is worth yesterday, a very impressive guy.

i was impressed with what he said and the things he talked about were happening on the ground. as a matter of fact, he mentioned the fact that we haven't come in in a more forceful way has allowed them over time to be in a state of unification meaning in the beginning they weren't. because they had to do this themselves they have become far more unified than they would have been otherwise. speak to that for a moment. >> we are pleased that mr. schapiro had a chance to meet with you and engage. it was clear from last time i was up here, the importance you attach to understanding what this movement is and who these people are. it is a challenge being put together in different circumstances and effective set of operating procedures and institutions to meet civilian and military requirements they are facing is a challenge.

it is a disparate group of people motivated by a common set of objectives and we have seen strengthening of their cooperation. we learned in the last day or so that they expect to announce a new defense minister to organize their military activities. we have seen on the civilian side a strengthening of financial structures and the way they are coordinating their efforts. there is a more substantial international presence in ben ghazi sharing expertise to help them strengthen that capacity. they started from a difficult set of challengess but in the course of

libya. two inclusive process, not as the self-appointed group. given the difficulties they face we should be appreciative of what they have done and they value the advice they're getting from you and others. >> the next question is what are we telling them, what are you telling them we are going to do in regard to support should they be successful? the time horizon for when they think gadhafi is out of there is shorter than it really is? who knows if they are right or not? what are you telling them we as the country will do to support their efforts? >> one especially hopeful point in the future here is this is the country of great natural resources and great access not only to the existing resources that have been blocked by us and so many other about an ongoing set of resources. one would hope going forward that significant aspect of what will be a financial challenge

can be generated by the libyan people themselves. the place where we can be most helpful generally is providing advice and guidance and counsel in terms of how to build democratic structures. we have experience with that and we worked with others in recent weeks with leaders from central and eastern europe sharing their experiences in the post-communist period for leadership of the tnc. people from civil society, i think that is the place where the outside world will have the greatest to are for working with our government and partners to help build structures -- >> you do not see as engage in the kind of nation building or a state building that is occurring in afghanistan? you don't see is doing that? they have their own resources and they will take it and run. >> i don't want to say there are not targeted places in which

reasonably modest amount of assistance would support their technical advice but the approach is there is a capacity within libya to take this on and we want to support that. >> i know my time is up. we have a hearing on afghanistan next week. secretary clinton has declined to come. there are no administration witnesses. most of the folks on this panel realize partisanship stops at our shoreline. we work together to do a lot of good things together. you are not exhibiting the kind of relationship we have had in the past and to me you are ceding the germination if you will of some really bad will by the way you're handling this conflict. and your lack of transparency that this administration has been built upon i hope will change very quickly.

>> i know the secretary is committed to this issue. she takes especially seriously hurt relations with congress given her own background and she works very hard both in formal and informal settings to be in touch with you and have individual conversations and the committee as a whole but i will take your concerns. she has the traveling and working very hard on these issues but i know she takes it seriously and i will take back your concerns. >> thank you, senator in corker. senator menendez. >> once a new government is formed, they would be willing to cooperate with the united states on a new investigation into the pan am 103 bombing. given the additional information that would be available from are compliant libyan partner, is the administration open to a new investigation into the pan am bombing and commence legal action on u.s. soil against all

persons responsible that would be derived from that information from persons planning or authorizing that attack? >> like you we have been struck by this attitude that the tnc leadership had and recognition going forward as part of a long-term relationship with the united states and international community with increase transparency, living up to those international principles. on specific question this is an issue for the justice department in terms of how they will proceed. >> but the context of what our future relationship is going to be with a future libyan government and recommendations you would make. >> we certainly welcome the offer that you made. it will be important in terms of long-term relations between the united states and libya that

they be supportive. and whether we open -- >> the state department raised this question. has the state department raised this question with the tnc? >> in general terms yes and i will meet with him myself. >> i hope you will get him to verify what you said to me. secondly to your knowledge, have members of the tnc been interviewed by the department of justice, the fbi or the state department about their knowledge and planning authorization of the pan am 103 bombing? >> last time we talked about this we made clear to the british authorities we believe it is important to have appropriate access because this is an ongoing criminal investigation. >> has the state department raised, outside of the justice

department, questions of that nature? they you have access to mr.m a mr.misakusa? >> i don't believe so. >> would the state department as a condition of recognition of a future libyan government that for argument's sake derived from the tnc, make as a condition of that recognition and effort both a commitment to a new investigation, cooperation of pan am 103? >> it is something i think we should raise with the tnc in terms of what they are prepared to do. >> i hear you but i have a diplomatic speak that doesn't let me understand whether or not

you are going to create -- the state department will recommend to the president of the united states what position we take with the tnc and under what conditions we take it. it seems to me this is reasonable to expect that americans who had their families killed at the hands of the orders of mr. gadhafi should be able to derive from a new libyan government committed to what i hope will be democracy, human-rights and the rule of law, as a condition precedent extract that as a commitment to. >> i would say i think we share the importance he attached to it. what has been important and what you heard is in the first best case is for them to offer to do this without making a condition without saying somehow this is being imposed on them. for women to willingly assume

that. i hope that is what they do rather than because we in pose a commitment because they understood in terms of their own democratic development -- >> i appreciate their willingness to suggested would be helpful and cooperative. it seems to me that in any relationship, with at mr. gadhafi we created conditions. he had to renounce terrorism and get rid of his weapons. i see no reason the united states government cannot insist in the process of pursuing relationship with the tnc that they be committed to what in essence is the fulfillment of the rule of law and justice. i want you to know that how i vote on what the state department is going to recommend in this respect i am sure my colleagues who have all shown interest in this will be very